The Thirty Years' War

Edited by
Geoffrey Parker

Second edition



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THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

The first edition of *The Thirty Years' War* offered an unrivalled survey of a central period in European history. Drawing on a huge body of source material from different languages and countries throughout Europe, it provided a clear and comprehensive narrative and analytical account of the subject. It has established itself as the classic text with reviewers, students and the general reader.

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THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

Second edition

Edited by *Geoffrey Parker*
with contributions by
Simon Adams, Gerhard Benecke, Richard J.Bonney, John H.Elliot, R.J.W.Evans, Christopher R.Friedrichs, Bodo Nischan, E.Ladewig Petersen and Michael Roberts

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‘Well, since you aren’t thinking about anything you can tell me the date of the signing of the Peace of Westphalia.’

Antoine neither moved nor answered. His father remonstrated in a shrill voice… ‘You hear that, everyone? He doesn’t know the date of the Peace of Westphalia. He ought to be ashamed of himself.’…

The carriage was filled with a shocked silence. For her brother’s benefit Lucienne mentally recited a prayer recommended by the Desmoiselles Hermeline as an aid to recalling the Great Dates of History. Frédéric drew the figures in the air with his finger, and Mme Haudouin tried to catch her son’s eye in order to comfort him with an affectionate smile. But Antoine, staring down at his boots, refused to see anything…

Finally, Antoine’s breast heaved with a sob…
He gulped, and muttered in a stifled voice: ‘1648’.

Marcel Aymé, *The Green Mare* (New York, 1963), 100–1:
set in the year 1885

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(Note: Maps 1 and 3 were prepared with the aid of some material supplied by Professor C.R.Friedrichs and Professor R.J.Bonney respectively.)

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Preface

It is often claimed that Samuel Pufendorf, the eminent seventeenth-century jurist and historian, was the first to coin the term 'The Thirty Years' War' to describe the series of conflicts which ravaged Europe between 1618 and 1648. That phrase certainly appears in his book, *The Present State of Germany,* first published in 1667; but by then it was hardly new. In May 1648, even before the fighting stopped, one of the delegates at the Westphalian Peace Congress spoke of 'the Thirty Years' War' that had ravaged his country; and in 1649 the English weekly newspaper *The Moderate Intelligencer* began to publish a series of articles entitled 'An epitome of the late Thirty Years' War in Germany'. Issue 203, dated 8 February 1649, summarized the 'Bohemian war', 1618–23; issue 204 followed with the Dutch phase of the war; issue 205 covered the Danish phase; and so on. Within three months of the signature of the peace of Westphalia, which brought the war to an end in October 1648, English readers were thus provided with a framework for interpreting the war which was recognizably modern. At the same time, a similar service was provided for German readers in a pamphlet in that language entitled 'A short chronicle of the Thirty Years' War', which not only gave the dates and places of the major military actions but also offered a rough calculation of the losses of life and property caused by the conflict.[1]

But, in the seventeenth century, historians were rarely as free from bias as their modern-day descendants claim to be. All of the publications discussed above were composed by Protestants who had an interest in emphasizing that the various wars fought in Europe during the decades following 1618 were linked together in a single struggle in defence of religious and constitutional liberty. They sought to justify retrospectively the rebellion of Bohemia in 1618–21 against Emperor Ferdinand II by reference to his subsequent behaviour. At the time, the Bohemians' cause seemed far from just to many observers—which is why so many Protestants princes refused to support it. Only afterwards, as Imperial strength increased and constitutional proprieties were forgotten, did they repent of their neutrality and oppose the Habsburgs themselves. Thus rewriting the history of the war helped to salve their consciences. When Gustavus Adolphus, king of Sweden, claimed in 1628 that 'All the wars that are on foot in Europe have been fused together and have become a single war', he was in part expressing a wish that it should be so, since it helped to justify the transfer of his armies from Poland and Livonia to Germany.[2]

Catholic Europe, however, saw matters otherwise. One of the Habsburgs' official historians, Eberhard Wassenberg, published an interim account of the war in 1639 which handled each campaign as yet another unjustified attack on the emperor: its title ran 'Commentary upon the wars between Ferdinand II and III and their enemies'. Wassenberg's account of 'the Danish War' of 1625–9 was accompanied by descriptions of 'the other Austrian War' (i.e. the 1626 Peasants' Revolt), 'the third Transylvanian War', 'the Dutch War', 'the Mantuan War' and so on. This was, perhaps, an extreme view; but even Catholics who lacked Wassenberg's neat, compartmentalized vision still

perceived a grave difference between the campaigns up to 1629, in which the emperor was opposed principally by his own subjects with some foreign aid, and the struggle after 1630, in which he fought mainly against foreign powers whose German supporters were, at most times, few in number and limited in resources. Bishop Gepeckh of Freising (1618–51), in the heart of Bavaria, always distinguished in his correspondence between 'the Bohemian troubles' of the 1620s (little different in nature from the series of alarms and petty wars which had disturbed the peace of the Empire since the Augsburg Settlement of 1555), and 'this war' (which began with the Swedish invasion in 1630 and forced him to flee from his capital eight times before the peace was signed in 1648). For the bishop, the war lasted not thirty years but eighteen.[3]

These, of course, are the opinions of but half a dozen individuals. Now that all public archives for the period are open to historians, tens of thousands of opinions are available. In the Czech and Slovak Republics alone, twenty-seven repositories today possess important collections left by participants in the war; twenty folio volumes concerning just the Edict of Restitution, issued in 1629, are available in the Saxon archives alone; and so on. Admittedly, heroic efforts have been made to print some of the more important sources. No less than forty-five volumes are envisaged to publish in full the correspondence and negotiations generated by the peace of Westphalia; thirteen volumes will be needed to publish the edited correspondence of Maximilian I of Bavaria and his allies between 1618 and 1635; scores of volumes would be needed to calendar the relevant State Papers Foreign in the Public Record Office, London. And this still represents only a fragment of the available unpublished material. Everywhere, the war increased paperwork. In Protestant Bremen, the secretariat of the ruling archbishop-administrator had to be doubled in 1632 in order to cope with the exigencies of the armies in the area; and when, in the 1650s, the archives of the Catholic diocese of Würzburg were reclassified, two series were required—one 'pre-war', which stretched back into the mists of time; the other 'since the war began', which was of almost equal bulk.[4]

We live, as Lord Acton once predicted, in the 'documentary age… which will tend to make history independent of historians, to develop learning at the expense of writing'. Certainly, the miles of documents produced by a continent at war present a daunting challenge to stamina.[5] Yet even superhuman dedication to archival research will not be enough, for the documentary records of the Thirty Years' War are written in too many different languages. The Habsburg Monarchy included a German, Czech and Hungarian chancery; the court of Spain maintained secretaries for correspondence in French, Dutch, German, Latin, Italian, Aragonese, Portuguese and Castilian; and there are documents in each tongue which refer to the war. It is true that, on the Protestant side, the *lingua franca* tended to be an inexorably verbose High German liberally peppered with Latinisms; but correspondence and state papers couched in Latin, Danish, Swedish, English and Dutch are also to be found in abundance. At the distant court of Bethlen Gabor, prince of Transylvania, documents concerning the war were composed in German, Hungarian, Romanian, Latin and (when the Ottoman Porte was concerned) Court Persian.

There have been a number of homeric attempts, despite the obvious problems, to provide an acceptable synthesis of this material. In the West, two of the most celebrated were produced on the eve of the Second World War: C.V.Wedgwood (in 1938) saw the struggle as essentially a German conflict influenced from time to time by the northern and western powers, while G.Pages (in 1939) seemed obsessed by the importance of

France as the arbiter of Europe's destinies throughout the war, to the exclusion of almost all other considerations. In the East, similarly circumscribed views have been advanced by the Czech historian J.V. Polišenský (1971), who argued that events in his native Bohemia were at all times central; while the Russian B.F.Porshnev (1976) claimed that the climax of the war in 1630–41, when the Swedish armies dominated the Empire, could only be explained in terms of Russia's policy towards Poland.[6] German historians have tended to be even more parochial: writers from Bavaria and Brandenburg, in particular, have tended to study the war in almost exclusively regional terms. There is nothing to rival the three-volume German synthesis of Moriz Ritter, *A History of Germany During the Age of Counter-Reformation and the Thirty Years' War 1555–1648,* first published in 1889 and never translated. Since then, although there have been hundreds of studies of the conflict—almost all of them entitled (like this one) *The Thirty Years' War*—the persevering student of the subject looks almost in vain for a modern survey that pays attention not only to Germany, Scandinavia, England and France, but to Spain, Italy, Transylvania, Poland and the Netherlands as well.

The sole exception was published by an East German historian. Herbert Langer's *The Thirty Years' War* (Poole, 1981) offers a cultural history of Germany during the war based on little-known data drawn from all over continental Europe, with text and illustrations pleasingly integrated. But it is not a history of the war. Langer's book makes it possible for this volume to pass over most of the cultural impact of the war; but his study should be seen as a complement, not an alternative, to the present work, which seeks to provide a structured analysis of the conflict itself.

Not all periods are covered here in the same detail, because some periods—particularly the 1620s—are more complex than others.[7] Moreover the text covers more than just Germany and more than just the thirty years: the war of Mantua and the Swedish campaigns in Poland are included because they were crucially important for developments in the Empire; and the narrative goes back to the 'Donauwörth incident' of 1607, which accelerated the polarization of Germany into hostile confessional camps, and stretches onwards to the final agreement in 1650, at Nuremberg, concerning the demobilization of the armies that still occupied Germany. Donauwörth to Nuremberg: on the ground barely 150 kilometres separate them, yet in history more than forty years of war and rumours of war lie between. Sometimes the conflict seemed to become so intense, and to involve so many states, that it has justly been termed 'the European Civil War'.[8] To do justice to such turmoil within the framework of a single volume, without over-simplification or distortion, is not easy.

Acknowledgements

This book is the work of a team of ten historians. In 1977, not long after I was invited by Andrew Wheatcroft of Routledge & Kegan Paul to write a new account of the Thirty Years' War, it became clear that the volume of relevant published work, let alone the quantity and variety of the surviving documents, was greater than any individual scholar could ever cope with alone. Various experts were therefore invited to cover those aspects of the war where the tangle of unsynthesized, unfamiliar material was thickest—the Scandinavian lands, Brandenburg and Saxony, the aftermath of the war, and so on—and their contributions form an integral part of the text, narrating, analysing and explaining in their proper place the events and developments that together made up the conflict. But herein lay a serious practical difficulty. Since all the contributors wrote their sections at the same time, a substantial amount of revising and rewriting was required to ensure that their chapters fitted in with, yet did not overlap, the others. My first, and greatest, debt of gratitude must therefore be to my fellow authors, who graciously accepted more editorial interference than any scholar should be asked to suffer and provided invaluable assistance in ways too numerous to mention.

Another important debt, which it is a pleasure to record, arises from the munificence of the British Academy and the Newberry Library. In 1981 they provided me with a three-month fellowship to work in Chicago and it was there, in America's 'Second City', backed by the resources of several magnificent libraries and surrounded by many distinguished scholars, that I drafted almost all of my sections of this book. Next, Andrew Wheatcroft has offered sympathetic support and helpful advice at all times, for which I am most grateful. Suggestions, references to obscure (and not-so-obscure) works, and assistance also came from Professor Robert Bireley, SJ, Professor Bruce Lenman, Professor Konrad Repgen, Dr Hamish Scott, Dr Lesley M.Smith, Professor Hugh Trevor-Roper, the late Dame Frances Yates (who was to have been a contributor) and, above all, Dr Simon Adams. Finally, the editor and all the authors are grateful to Nancy Wood, who expertly typed and retyped our text on a word-processor.

Note on the second edition

In preparing this revised edition for the press, I and most of the contributors have corrected a number of errors that crept into the text and notes. We are most grateful to Professor Dieter Albrecht, Dr Derek Croxton, Professor Konrad Repgen, and Dr Kurt Treptow for drawing them to our attention. We have also thoroughly revised, with the aid of Derek Croxton and John Theibault, the *Bibliographical essay* in order to reflect the latest scholarship on the subject.

Sadly, Gerhard Benecke could not revise his material, for he died in August 1985. His loss is still felt by scholars everywhere, not only in St Andrews, where he was a student and research student, and at Canterbury and Vancouver, where he taught, but by early modern historians in general. And he is especially missed by his fellow contributors.

Conventions

Currency As far as possible all sums of money are given in Imperial thalers *(Reichsthaler)*. Conversions from other currencies have been made according to the following scheme:

4.8 thalers 4.5 *escudos* 12 *livres tournois* 10 Dutch florins 6 Rhine florins	equal £1 sterling

Dates All 'new style' unless otherwise stated.

Place and personal names Where a recognized English version exists, we have used it (thus Vienna, The Hague and Rome; Wallenstein, Bethlen Gabor and Gustavus Adolphus); otherwise we have used the form generally preferred by the particular place or person (thus Regensburg rather than Ratisbon, Bratislava rather than Pressburg or Posnonia, and Maurice of Nassau rather than Maurits).

A short résumé for each major figure is included in his or her entry in the index.

Chronology

† = death
⚔ = victory for Habsburgs or allies
✕ = defeat for Habsburgs or allies

All dates are New Style
Important events are CAPITALIZED

Date	*Germany*	*The Habsburg Lands*	*Spain and the Netherlands*
1606		*June.* Peace of Vienna ends Hungarian revolt *Nov.* Peace of Zsitva Torok ends 'Long' Turkish war	
1607			*Mar.* Cease-fire in Dutch wars (to 1609) *Nov.* Spanish bankruptcy
	17 Dec. 'DONAUWÖRTH INCIDENT'		
1608	*Jan.* Imperial Diet at Regensburg (to 3 May)		
		Feb. Treaty of Bratislava	
	11 May. PROTESTANT UNION FORMED		
		June. Matthias becomes reigning archduke and king of Hungary	
1609	*Mar.* First Cleves-Jülich crisis (to Oct. 1610)	*Mar.* Matthias's concessions to Protestants	
			Apr. TWELVE YEARS' TRUCE (to 1621)
	10 July. CATHOLIC LEAGUE FORMED	*9 July.* Letter of Majesty: 'defensors' appointed	
1610			
	Oct. † Frederick IV of the Palatinate; Frederick V succeeds		
1611		*Mar.* Passau troops attack Prague	*Mar.* Franco-Spanish marriage treaty
		May. Matthias crowned king of Bohemia	

July. John George I Elector of Saxony (to 1656)

1612 *20 Jan.* † Rudolf II; Matthias elected Emperor (to 1619)

France, Britain and Italy	*Scandinavia, Poland and Russia*	*Transylvania and the Turks*
		June. Peace of Vienna
		Nov. Peace of Zsitva Torok
	Sept. Poland invades Russia (to 1618)	
14 May. † Henry IV of France; minority of Louis XIII (to 1617)		
Mar. Franco-Spanish marriage treaty		
	Apr. Denmark invades Sweden (war to 1613)	
	Oct. Gustavus Adolphus king of Sweden (to 1632)	

Date	*Germany*	*The Habsburg Lands*	*Spain and the Netherlands*
1612			
1613			
	Feb. Marriage of Frederick V and Elizabeth Stuart		
	Apr. Elector of Brandenburg becomes a Calvinist		
	May. Dutch-Union treaty		
	July. Wolfgang William of Neuburg becomes a Catholic		
	Aug. Imperial Diet at Regensburg (to Oct.)		
1614			
	May. Second Cleves-Jülich crisis (to Sept.)		
	Aug. Aachen recatholicized; Fettmilch revolt at Frankfurt	*Aug.* General Diet at Linz	
	Nov. Treaty of Xanten		*Nov.* Treaty of Xanten
1615	Lutheran rioting in Brandenburg		Dutch fleet attacks Pacific coast of Spanish America
		Dec. Uzkok war (to Feb. 1618)	
1616			
1617	Lutheran Jubilee year; ‘Military Academy’ opened at Siegen		

		20 Mar. OÑATE TREATY	*20 Mar.* OÑATE TREATY
France, Britain and Italy		*Scandinavia, Poland and Russia*	*Transylvania and the Turks*
Apr. Anglo-Union Treaty of Wesel			
Dec, Francis, duke of Mantua			
		Jan. Peace of Knäred (Denmark and Sweden)	
		Mar. Michael Romanov elected Tsar (to 1645)	Bethlen Gabor prince of Transylvania (to 1629)
Apr. First war over Mantuan succession (to June 1615)			
Jan. French civil war (to May)			
Oct. French States-General			
June. Treaty of Asti ends first Mantuan war			
Aug. French civil war (to May 1616)			
Dec. Uzkok war (to 1618)			
Sept. Second war over Mantuan succession (to 1617)			
Feb. French civil war (to Apr.)		*Mar.* Peace of Stolbova (Sweden and Russia)	
Date	*Germany*	*The Habsburg Lands*	*Spain and the Netherlands*
1617	*Apr.* Evangelical Union renewed (to 1621); Catholic League dissolved		
		July-Dec. Ferdinand of Styria recognized as king-designate of Bohemia andHungary	
			Aug. Oldenbarnevelt raises waardgelder troops
1618	Brandenburg annexes Prussia	*Feb.* Peace of Wiener-Neustadt (Archduke and Venice)	
			Mar. Don Balthasar de Zúñiga becomes Spanish chief minister (to 1622)
		23 May. DEFENESTRATION OF PRAGUE	
		June. Savoy subsidies to Bohemia (to Apr. 1619)	
			Aug. Fall of Oldenbarnevelt
		Sept. Mansfield captures Pilsen	

1619	*Jan.* Catholic League re-formed		
	20 Mar. † Matthias	*20 Mar.* † Matthias; Ferdinand of Styria succeeds	
		May. First siege of Vienna	*May.* Archdukes send aid to Ferdinand; execution of Oldenbarnevelt
		10 June. ✕Zéblatí. Moravia joins confederation	
	28 Aug. Ferdinand elected Holy Roman Emperor	*22–6 Aug.* DEPOSITION OF FERDINAND; ELECTION OF FREDERICK	
	8 Oct. Treaty of Munich (Spain-Bavaria-emperor)		

France, Britain and Italy	*Scandinavia, Poland and Russia*	*Transylvania and the Turks*
24 Apr. Personal rule of Louis XIII begins (to 1643)		
	June. Sweden invades Livonia	
9 Oct. Peace of Pavia ends second Mantuan war		
Feb. Peace of Wiener-Neustadt	Swedish truce with Poland (to 1621)	
	Jan. Peace of Deulino (Poland and Russia)	
Feb. French civil war (to Apr.)		
		Aug. Bethlen conquers Hungary (to Oct.)
	Oct. Poland attacks Turks	

Date	*Germany*	*The Habsburg Lands*	*Spain and the Netherlands*
1619		*Nov.* Second siege of Vienna	
1620			
	20 Mar. MÜHLHAUSEN GUARANTEE		
	3 July. TREATY OF ULM	*July.* Bavarians occupy Upper Austria (to 1628)	
	Aug. Spínola invades Palatinate		*Aug.* Spínola invades Palatinate
		Oct. Confiscations Court created (to 1623)	
		3 NOV. ✕WHITE MOUNTAIN	
1621	*21Jan.* Frederick outlawed	*Jan.* Mint Consortium formed: 'Kipper- und Wipper' period (to 1623)	
	Feb. Segeberg conference		

			31 Mar. † Philip III; Philip IV king of Spain (to 1665)
	Apr. Cease-fire in Palatinate (to July) *27 Apr.* Frederick allies with Dutch Republic *14 May.* Union dissolved		*Apr.* WAR IN NETHERLANDS (to 1648); Frederick V arrives in Dutch Republic
			15 July. † Archduke Albert
	Oct. Bavarians occupy Upper Palatinate; Kipper- und Wipperzeit (to 1623)		
1622		*Jan.* First peace of Nikolsburg	
			Feb. Spínola captures Jülich

France, Britain and Italy	*Scandinavia, Poland and Russia*	*Transylvania and the Turks*
		Nov. Poland invades Transylvania *20 Jan.* Bethlen concludes nine-month truce with Habsburgs
Apr. Rebellion of Marie de Medici (to Aug.) *July.* Valtelline massacre		
Aug. End of French civil wars; Louis XIII invades Béarn; Habsburgs occupy Valtelline		*Aug.* Bethlen invades Hungary again
	20 Sept. ✕ Cecora (Poles versus Turks)	*20 Sept.* ✕ Cecora (Poles versus Turks)
Feb. French Huguenot war (to Oct. 1622)	*Feb.* Segeberg conference	
Sept. Habsburgs occupy Grey Leagues' lands	*Sept.* Sweden captures Riga	
	Oct. Polish-Turkish truce	*Oct.* Polish-Turkish truce
Jan. Pope founds Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith		*Jan.* First peace of Nikolsburg (emperor and Transylvania)

Date	*Germany*	*The Habsburg Lands*	*Spain and the Netherlands*
1622	*Mar. Spanish Chancery* published		
	Apr. ✕ Wiesloch		
	6 May. ✕ WIMPFEN (George of Baden Defeated		
	June. Brussels conference (to Nov.)		*June.* Brussels conference (to Nov.)
	20 June. ✕ HÖCHST (Christian of Brunswick defeated)		

	13 July. Frederick dismisses Mansfeld and Brunswick		
	26 Aug. ✕ Fleurus		
			4 Oct. Spínola abandons siege of Bergen
			Oct. Zúñiga; OLIVARES CHIEF MINISTER (to 1643)
1623	*25 Feb.* Palatine Electorate transferred to Maximilian		
	Mar. Surrender of Frankenthal		
	6 Aug. ✕ STADTLOHN		
1624	*Jan.* Mansfeld disbands army		
			June. Treaty of Compiègne (France and Dutch Republic)
			July. Spanish siege of Breda (to June 1625)
			Oct. Almirantazgo del Norte formed
			Dec. Mansfeld's army sails for Holland

France, Britain and Italy	*Scandinavia, Poland and Russia*	*Transylvania and the Turks*
Feb. League of Lyons formed; Spain agrees to evacuate Valtelline		Bethen invades Hungary; Turkish war against Persia (to 1639)
Apr. Buckingham and Prince Charles go to Madrid for Spanish Match		
Aug. Urban VIII elected pope (to 1644)		
Apr. Richelieu enters Council of Louis XIII		
		May. Second peace of Nikolsburg; Persians take Baghdad
June. Treaty of Compiègne (France and Dutch Republic)		
Aug. RICHELIEU CHIEF MINISTER OF FRANCE (to 1642); French occupy Valtelline		

Date	*Germany*	*The Habsburg Lands*	*Spain and the Netherlands*
1625			
	Apr. Christian IV elected Kreisoberst of Lower Saxony		*Mar.* Spain at war with England (to 1630)
			Apr. † Maurice of Nassau; Frederick Henry becomes Captain-General of Dutch Republic (to 1647)
			June. Spanish capture Breda

			(to 1637); Spanish river blockade in Westphalia (to 1629)
	July. Wallenstein raises new Imperial army; Spanish river blockade in Westphalia (to 1629)		
		Oct. Reformations-kommission in Upper Austria	
			Nov. Anglo-Dutch attack on Cadiz
	9 Dec. HAGUE ALLIANCE		*9 DeC.* HAGUE ALLIANCE
1626			*5 Mar.* Treaty of Monzón (ratified in May)
	Apr. ⚔Dessau Bridge		
		May. Upper Austrian revolt (to Sept.)	
			July. Union of Arms scheme published
	26 Aug. ⚔LUTTER. Imperialists advance northwards		
1627	*Feb.* Mecklenburg given to Wallenstein as pledge; Imperialists conquer Mecklenburg, Pomerania, Holstein *Mar.* Hesse partition favours Darmstadt; Maurice of Hesse-Kassel abdicates *May.* Treaty of Königsberg (emperor-Brandenburg)		*Feb.* Spanish decree of bankruptcy

France, Britain and Italy	*Scandinavia, Poland and Russia*	*Transylvania and the Turks*
Jan. New Huguenot revolt in France (to 1629) *Mar.* War with Spain (to 1630); Savoy invades Genoa		
Apr. † James VI and I; Charles I king of England (to 1649)	*Apr.* Christian IV elected Kreisoberst of Lower Saxony	
	June. Swedes invade Prussia	
Nov. Anglo-Dutch attack on Cadiz		
9Dec. HAGUE ALLIANCE	*9Dec.* HAGUE ALLIANCE	
	Jan. ⚔Wallhof (Swedes defeat Poles	Bethlen invades Moravia; Turks fail to retake Baghdad
5Mar. Treaty of Monzón (ratified in May)		

May. Gustavus campaigns in Prussia (to 1629)

26Aug. ⚔LUTTER

Dec. Peace of Bratislava

Mar. Franco-Spanish alliance against Britain

June. War between France and Britain (to 1629)

Date	*Germany*	*The Habsburg Lands*	*Spain and the Netherlands*
1627		*Sept.* New constitution for Bohemia and Moravia	
	Oct. Mühlhausen Electoral meeting (to Nov.) *10 Nov.* Capitulation of Fransburg (Pomerania)		
1628	*Jan.* Wallenstein becomes duke of Mecklenburg; Imperialists overrun Jutland		
	May. Bavaria annexes Upper Palatinate *May.* UNSUCCESSFUL SIEGE OF STRALSUND (to july)	*May.* Upper Austria returned to Habsburg rule	
	Sept. ⚔ Wolgast (Wallenstein defeats Danes)		*Sept*. Dutch capture Spanish silver fleet
1629	*6/28 Mar*. EDICT OF RESTITUTION		
			Apr. Dutch besiege ‘s Hertogenbosch (to Sept.)
	7 July. PEACE OF LÜBECK; Imperialists send aid to Poland		
			Aug. Spaniards take Amersfoort; Dutch take Wesel 14 Sept. Dutch take ‘s Hertogenbosch
1630			
			Feb. Dutch occupy Pernambuco (Brazil) to 1654

France, Britain and Italy	*Scandinavia, Poland and Russia*	*Transylvania and the Turks*
Dec. Third Mantuan war (to June 1631)		
	June. Sweden relieves Stralsund *Sept.* ⚔Wolgast (Wallenstein defeats Danes)	

28 Oct. SURRENDER OF LA ROCHELLE

Mar. French under Louis XIII invade Italy

Apr. Peace of Susa between France and Britain

May. Imperialist army invades Italy

28 June. 'Grace of Alais' ends Huguenot revolt

14 Mar. Ulfsbäck meeting (Christian and Gustavus)

17 June. X Honigfelde (Stuhm)

7 July. Peace of Lübeck

26 Sept. Polish-Swedish truce of Altmark (to 1635)

Nov. † Bethlen Gabor; George Rákóczi succeeds (to 1648)

French occupy Savoy; plague ravages Italy (to 1631)

Date	*Germany*	*The Habsburg Lands*	*Spain and the Netherlands*
1630	*Apr.* Annaburg meeting (Saxony and Brandenburg)		
			17 June. Franco-Dutch subsidy treaty
	6 July. Gustavus invades Germany *July.* REGENSBURG ELECTORAL MEETING (to Nov.) *Aug.* Magdeburg defies emperor (to May 1631) *13 Aug.* Wallenstein dismissed *Sept.* Zabeltitz conference (Saxony and Brandenburg) *13 Oct.* PEACE OF REGENSBURG		
			15 Nov. Peace of Madrid (Britain and Spain)
1631			
	Feb. Leipzig Assembly (to Apr.) *12 Apr.* Leipzig Manifesto *20 May.* Sack of Magdeburg		
	22 June. Brandenburg-Swedish alliance *4 Aug.* Frankfurt convention (to Oct.) *Sept.* Saxony, Bremen and Hesse-Kassel ally with Sweden *17 Sept.* BREITENFELD		*Sept.* Revolt in Basque lands (to (1634)
	Nov. Swedes take Mainz (to 1636) *Dec.* Wallenstein recalled	*15 Nov.* Saxons take Prague (to 1632)	
1632	*Apr.* RAIN; Swedes occupy Bavaria *13 Apr.* Göllersdorf agreement: Wallenstein restored to chief command		

France, Britain and Italy	*Scandinavia, Poland and Russia*	*Transylvania and the Turks*
17 June. Franco-Dutch subsidy treaty		
July. Imperialists take Mantua	*July.* Gustavus invades Germany	
13 Oct. PEACE OF REGENSBURG		
11 Nov. Day of Dupes (Paris)		
15 Nov. Peace of Madrid (Britain and Spain)		
23 Jan. Treaty of Bärwalde	*23 Jan.* Treaty of Bärwalde	
	13 Apr. Swedes take Frankfurt-on-Oder	
8 May. Treaty of Fontainebleau (France and Bavaria)		
19 June. Peace of Cherasco	*June.* Swedish-Brandenburg alliance	
	Sept. Swedish-Saxon alliance	
	17 Sept. ✕ BREITENFELD	
	Apr. † Sigismund III; Władisław IV succeeds (to 1648)	

Date	*Germany*	*The Habsburg Lands*	*Spain and the Netherlands*
1632			*June.* Dutch capture Venlo, Roermond; South Netherlands revolt averted
	July. Siege of the Alte Veste (to 18 Sept.)		
			23 Aug. Dutch take Maastricht
	1 Nov. Wallenstein captures Leipzig		
	16 Nov. ✕ LÜTZEN		
1633			
	23 Apr. Heilbronn League (to 1635)		
		June-July. Truce in Silesia	
	July. ✕ Hessisch-Oldendorf; Swedish army mutinies		
		Aug.-Oct. Truce in Silesia	
		Oct. ✕ Steinau; Wallenstein reconquers Silesia	
1634	*25 Feb.* † Wallenstein		
	22 Apr. Brandenburg demands Swedish evacuation of Pomerania		
		July. Saxons invade Bohemia (to Sept.)	

6 Sept. ⚔NÖRDLINGEN		*Oct.* Cardinal-Infante governs South Netherlands (to 1641)
1 Nov. French alliance with Heilbronn League *24Nov.* Preliminaries of Pirna		

France, Britain and Italy	*Scandinavia, Poland and Russia*	*Transylvania and the Turks*
	16 Nov. ⚔LÜTZEN; †Gustavus; Christina succeeds (to 1654) *Dec.* War of Smolensk (to June 1634)	
19 Apr. Franco-Swedish treaty renewed	*19 Apr.* Franco-Swedish treaty renewed	
	23Apr. Heilbronn League; Swedish army mutinies	Turks attack Poland
June. France invades Lorraine *Apr.* France increases Dutch subsity		
	June. Peace between Russia and Poland	Turks attack Persia
Nov. France occupies Swedish strongholds in Alsace; Heilbronn League allies with France		

Date	*Germany*	*The Habsburg Lands*	*Spain and the Netherlands*
1635			
			8 Feb. Franco-Dutch treaty renewed
	Mar. Spain occupies Trier; Elector arrested (to 1645)		*26 Mar.* Spain occupies Trier
	30 May. PEACE OF PRAGUE: emperor and Saxony *Aug.* Swedish army mutinies		*19 May.* FRANCE DECLARES WAR ON SPAIN
	6Sept. Brandenburg accepts peace of Prague	Peasant revolt in Styria	
1636	*Jan.* Sweden surrenders Mainz *Mar.* Emperor declares war on France		
			July. Army of Flanders invades France *15 Aug.* Army of Flanders at Corbie
	4 Sept. Regensburg Electoral meeting (to Jan. 1637) *Oct.* Congress of Cologne convened *4Oct.*⚔ WITTSTOCK *22Dec.* Ferdinand III elected king of Romans		

1637	*Jan.* Swedish army withdraws to Torgau		John Maurice governs Dutch Brazil (to 1644)
	15 Feb. FERDINAND ii; FERDINAND III succeeds *Mar.* † Bogislav XIV of Pomerania *June.* Swedish army withdraws to Pomerania (until Oct. 1638)	*15 Feb.* † FERDINAND II; FERDINAND III succeeds	

France, Britain and Italy	*Scandinavia, Poland and Russia*	*Transylvania and the Turks*
8 Feb. Franco-Dutch treaty renewed *Mar.* France occupies Valtelline (to 1637)		
28 Apr. Treaty of Compiègne (France and Sweden) *19 May.* FRANCE DECLARES WAR ON SPAIN	*28 Apr.* Treaty of Compiègne	
	Aug. Swedish army mutinies *Sept.* Swedish-Polish peace of Stuhmsdorf (to 1655)	
27 Oct. France engages Bernard of Saxe-Weimar		
Mar. Emperor declares war on France		
30 Mar. Treaty of Wismar (Sweden and France)	*30 Mar.* Treaty of Wismar (France and Sweden) *June.* Oxenstierna returns to Sweden	
July. Army of Flanders invades France *15 Aug.* Army of Flanders at Corbie *Sept.* Imperialists invade Burgundy; Croquant revolt in France		
Mar. Revolt of Valtelline; Spanish reoccupation		

Date	*Germany*	*The Habsburg Lands*	*Spain and the Netherlands*
1637			*Aug.* Troubles at Evora *Sept.* French take Leucate (Catalonia) *Oct.* Dutch take Breda
1638	*Mar.* ✕ Rheinfelden		
	Dec. Bernard of Saxe-Weimar takes Breisach		*Dec.* Bernard takes Breisach
1639	*Apr.* ✕ Chemnitz		
		May. Swedes invade Bohemia (to 1640)	
	July. † Bernard of Saxe-Weimar; France inherits all his conquests		*July.* French capture Salces

		21 Oct. ✕ The Downs: Dutch navy destroys Spanish fleet
1640	*Jan.* Bavarian-French talks at Einsiedeln *Feb.* Nuremberg Electoral Meeting	
		May. Revolt of Catalonia (to 1652)
	Sept. REGENSBURG DIET (to Oct. 1641)	
	Dec. † George William; Frederick William succeeds	*Dec.* Revolt of Portugal (to 1668)
1641		*Jan.* Catalonia accepts French protection
	May. † Baner; Swedish army mutinies	
		June. Dutch-Portuguese alliance
	24 July. Brandenburg-Swedish peace	
		Aug. Dutch take Angola (to 1648)
1642	*Nov.* Torstensson arrives in Swedish army *Jan.* Peace of Goslar (emperor and Brunswick)	

France, Britain and Italy	*Scandinavia, Poland and Russia*	*Transylvania and the Turks*
	June. Swedish army withdraws to Pomerania	
Sept. French take Leucate (Catalonia)		
15 Mar. Treaty of Hamburg (France and Sweden)	*15 Mar.* Treaty of Hamburg (France and Sweden)	
Apr. Anglo-Danish treaty of Hamburg	*Apr.* Anglo-Danish treaty of Hamburg	
July. French capture Salces; Nu-pieds revolt in Normandy (to Nov.)		
Jan. Franco-Bavarian talks at Einsiedeln		
30 June. Treaty of Hamburg (Franco-Swedish alliance until war's end)	*30 June.* Treaty of Hamburg (Franco-Swedish alliance until war's end)	
July. Soissons conspiracy		

Date	*Germany*	*The Habsburg Lands*	*Spain and the Netherlands*
1642	Swedes occupy Saxony and invade Moravia *2 Nov.* ✕Breitenfeld II		
1643			*17 Jan.* Fall of Olivares
	Feb. Frankfurt 'Deputationstag' (to 1645) *May.* Sweden invades Denmark (to 1645)		
			19 May. ✕ROCROI
	*Aug.*NEGOTIATIONS AT WESTPHALIA BEGIN (to 1648) *Nov.* ✕Tuttlingen		
1644			
	Aug. ✕Freiburg; French occupy all Alsace		
1645	*6 Mar.* ✕JANKOV *May.* ✕Mergentheim		French capture ten towns in Netherlands
	3 Aug. ✕ALLERHEIM; first full meeting of Westphalian peace conference *6 Sept.* Truce of Kötzschenbroda (Saxony and Sweden)		
		Swedish siege of Vienna	
	Nov. Trauttmannsdorf arrives at Westphalia (to June 1647)		
1646			*Jan.* Dutch Republic's negotiators arrive in Münster

France, Britain and Italy	*Scandinavia, Poland and Russia*	*Transylvania and the Turks*
Aug. English Civil War (to 1649); Cinq-Mars conspiracy *4 Dec.* † RICHELIEU; MAZARIN BECOMES FRENCH CHIEF MINISTER (to 1661)		
14 May. † Louis XIII; LOUIS xiv king of France (to 1715) *19 May.* ✕ROCROI	*May.* Danish-Swedish war (to 1645)	
Nov. ✕Tuttlingen		*Nov.* Swedish-Transylvanian alliance (to 1645) *Feb.* Rákóczi invades Hungary (to Aug. 1645)
July. ✕Marston Moor; INNOCENT x succeeds URBAN VIII as pope		
	Nov. Cease-fire agreed in Danish-Swedish war	
June. ✕Naseby		*June.* Turks besiege Crete (to 1668)

July. † Michael Romanov *Aug.* Peace of Brömsebro		*Aug.* Rákóczi recalled *16 Dec.* Treaty of Linz

Date	*Germany*	*The Habsburg Lands*	*Spain and the Netherlands*
1646	*Apr.* Peace of Eilenburg (Sweden and Saxony) *Sept.* Franco-Imperial preliminary peace		
			Oct. French take Dunkirk
1647			
			Jan. Spanish-Dutch truce (to 1648)
	14 Mar. Bavarian-French truce (to Sept.)		
			May. † Frederick Henry; revolt of Sicily *July.* Revolt of Naples *Oct.* Spanish bankruptcy
1648			
			30 Jan. PEACE OF MÜNSTER
	17May. ✕ Zusmarshausen		
	6 Aug. Sweden-Imperial preliminary peace		*20 Aug.* ✕ Lens
		Oct. Swedish siege of Prague	
	24 Oct. PEACE OF WESTPHALIA	*24 Oct.* PEACE OF WESTPHALIA	
1649	*Jan.* Bavaria evacuated *Apr.* Imperial Cities admit religious parity		
1650	*26 June.* NUREMBERG AGREEMENT ON DEMOBILIZATION		

France, Britain and Italy	*Scandinavia, Poland and Russia*	*Transylvania and the Turks*
Sept. Franco-Imperial preliminary peace *Oct.* French take Dunkirk		
14 Mar. Franco-Bavarian truce		
May. Revolt of Sicily		
July. Masaniello's revolt in Naples (to 1648)		
	Feb. † Christian IV	
May. Fronde begins (to 1654) *20 Aug.* Lens		
24 *Oct.* PEACE OF WESTPHALIA	24 *Oct.* PEACE OF WESTPHALIA	
	Chmielnicki's revolt in Ukraine (to 1654)	
	26 *June.* NUREMBERG AGREEMENT	
	Oct. Queen Christina's coronation	

I
Europe between war and peace, 1555–1618

The *History of the Voyages of Scarmentado,* set in the years 1615–20, is not one of Voltaire's best works. The author's vision of the seventeenth century as an unusually violent and unsettled period of history is better developed and better documented in his *Essay on Manners;* and much of his heavy irony, so telling elsewhere, here misses its mark. Yet the short story merits some attention from historians. Its hero and narrator, born in Crete and sent as a teenager to Rome by his parents, sets out on a 'Grand Tour' of Europe in search of truth, but instead finds only violence caused by religious and political disagreement. In Paris he is invited to dine on a morsel of flesh hacked from the fallen f avourite of Louis XIII; in London he notes that 'saintly Catholics, for the good of the church' had recently tried to blow up the king, the royal family and the entire Parliament (the Gunpowder Plot). Next, Scarmentado visits The Hague, where he sees a venerable old man being led out for public execution. It is Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, chief minister of the Dutch Republic for forty years. Puzzled, the narrator enquires of a bystander if the old man is guilty of treason. 'Much worse than that,' comes the reply. 'He is a man who believes that we can achieve salvation by good works as well as by faith. You must realize that if such views become accepted, a state cannot endure, and severe laws are required to suppress such disgraceful horrors,' Disgusted, our hero moves on to Seville, where he is imprisoned and fined by the Inquisition for a careless word overheard while forty sinners are burnt at the stake for heresy. He counts himself lucky to escape to the relative peace and harmony of the Ottoman empire.

It is curious that Scarmentado never visited Germany. Some critics have suggested that Voltaire excised the passage which dealt (no doubt equally offensively) with that land, in order to spare the feelings of his ex-patron, Frederick of Prussia; but it may also be that the situation of Germany in the years 1615–20 was simply too complex to be portrayed in a short story![1] Whatever the reason, there is a lot to be said for Voltaire's decision to concentrate on the periphery of Europe, for the religious and political passions which were to produce the Thirty Years' War did not in fact originate in Germany, but in the lands that surrounded it, and above all in the states governed by Europe's foremost dynasty, the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs.

i The Habsburgs and Europe

Philip III, who succeeded his father as king of Spain in 1598, ruled an empire upon which the sun never set. He commanded subjects in fortresses and seaports around the coasts of Africa and southern Asia, in the Philippines, Mexico and Peru, in Spain and Portugal (united since 1580), in Lombardy, Naples and Sicily. But not in the Netherlands, although that country had formed an important part of the empire ruled by his father,

Philip II. When he died, the South Netherlands passed to Philip III's sister, Isabella, and her husband Albert, universally known as 'the Archdukes' (see Table 1). In their satellite state, the Archdukes were sovereign in domestic matters; but in foreign and defence policy they were subject to Spain. The distinction was important, because Philip III seemed determined to continue his father's war against the Archdukes' northern neighbour, the Dutch Republic.

Born in the rebellion of the North Netherlands against Spanish rule during the 1570s, the young Republic had only survived the onslaught of Europe's greatest empire thanks to a combination of dogged defence at home and tireless diplomacy abroad. Treaties of friendship with England (1585), France (1589), the Palatinate (1604) and Brandenburg (1605) increased the supply of both men and money to the rebels until the Spanish government was forced to accept that victory in the Low Countries' Wars was no longer attainable. Early in 1607, despite some military successes the previous year, peace talks were begun. But after two years of discussion, the Archdukes, Spain and the Republic still could not agree on terms. Instead, a truce of twelve years was concluded, starting in April 1609; but even that applied only to the Netherlands. There was to be no withdrawal of Dutch warships or merchantmen from Spanish America or Portuguese Asia; and the Republic continued to seek alliances with anti-Habsburg forces elsewhere—treaties were concluded with the Ottoman Turks (1611), Algiers (1612), the German Protestants (1613), the Hanseatic towns and Sweden (1614), Savoy (1616) and Venice (1619).

The Dutch Republic had thus not only created an impressive patchwork of alliances; it had also secured the diplomatic isolation of its arch-enemy. Spain was not even given assistance by the other branch of the family, the Austrian Habsburgs. Despite numerous marriage ties -Philip II had been simultaneously the cousin, uncle and brother-in-law of Emperor Rudolf II, and Philip III married another Habsburg cousin—with scarcely an exception, Austria offered no help to Spain in her struggle against the Dutch.[1] This was most fortunate for the Republic, because of the huge resources over which the Austrian Habsburgs ruled. Their territories were (in the words of a seventeenth-century traveller) 'much larger than commonly apprehended'.[2] In the west lay 'Further Austria', governed from Innsbruck and comprising the Tyrol, some isolated lands along the middle Rhine, and parts of Alsace; in the southeast was 'Inner Austria', as the duchies of Styria, Carinthia and Carniola were termed, with a capital at Graz and some two million subjects. Then there were the original Austrian duchies, the 'Upper' ruled from Linz, and the 'Lower' from Vienna, which were less populous than Inner Austria (perhaps only 600,000 people together) but far more prosperous, with many towns and a powerful aristocracy whose feudal powers over their vassals were the envy of their fellows elsewhere. These formed the so-called *Erbländer,* the patrimonial provinces of the House of Habsburg. To them had been added, since 1526, the elective kingdoms of Bohemia (which included, besides Bohemia, the territories of Moravia, Silesia and Lusatia, and contained some four million subjects), and Hungary (or, rather, the north-western perimeter of the medieval kingdom, for the rest was under the sway of either the Turkish sultan or his Christian vassal, the prince of Transylvania) with perhaps one million inhabitants (see Map 1).

TABLE 1 The Habsburg connexion



The turning-point in the development of this extensive Habsburg inheritance was the death of Ferdinand I in 1564. Ferdinand had been elected king of Bohemia and Hungary in 1526 largely because the subjects of those states, whose ruler had just been killed in the great Turkish victory over the Christians at Mohács, hoped to secure, through him, German and Austrian protection against the seemingly irresistible Turkish advance up the Danube. Throughout his reign, Ferdinand was able to exploit this need f or def ence in order to enhance his authority both in these new kingdoms and in the Erbländer (where he was regent for his brother, the Emperor Charles V, after 1521). He successfully played off towns against nobles, acceptable non-Catholics (Hussites and, eventually, Lutherans) against unacceptable ones (Anabaptists, Bohemian Brethren and, eventually, Calvinists), and one state against another (the leaders of the Bohemian rebellion of 1547 were tried by judges from Moravia and Silesia). But this advantageous situation was transformed after 1564. In the first place, Ferdinand divided his lands at his death: Inner Austria went to his youngest son, Charles; Further Austria went to his second son, Ferdinand; only Upper and Lower Austria, with Bohemia and Hungary, were left for the eldest, Emperor Maximilian II. It was no longer possible to continue Ferdinand's practice of 'divide and rule'.[3]

Two other developments would probably have undermined that policy in any case: the creation of representative assemblies in all the Austrian duchies, each largely dominated by the aristocracy, after 1564; and the growth of a Protestant presence, especially among the nobles and the knights. By 1580, some 90 per cent of the nobles of Lower Austria were Protestant (almost all of them Lutherans), and the situation was similar in Upper Austria (except that several nobles became Calvinists). The Roman Catholic Church in both duchies was moribund: parishes remained almost permanently vacant, congregations were abandoned, and the surviving establishments languished in an unedifying condition. Lower Austria in 1563 could boast 122 monasteries, with a total of only 463 monks and 160 nuns, but 199 concubines, 55 wives and 443 children.[4] They proved powerless to stem the Protestant tide. In 1568 and 1571, in return for substantial taxes to pay for defence against the Turks, Maximilian II granted freedom of Protestant worship in Lower

Austria to all nobles and their vassals (although not to the towns). In 1578, the Protestant-led Estates of Upper Austria raised an army of 1,500 men in order to secure similar concessions from their new ruler, Maximilian's son Rudolf II. In the same year, the Estates of Inner Austria managed to extort extensive religious guarantees from their own sovereign, Archduke Charles, in return for voting taxes to support a permanent defence establishment along the Hungarian frontier. It was now the vassals, not the rulers, who exploited the Ottoman presence abroad in order to win important concessions at home. As the court preacher to Archduke Charles grimly observed: 'The Turkish threat is a blessing to the Protestants: if it were not for that, we would be able to deal with them in a very different way.'[5] The victorious Estates went ahead to make the most of their advantage, creating Protestant schools in the major cities, and a central standing committee to oversee religious affairs. The Austrians seemed bent on creating a territorial church on the lines of north German states such as Mecklenburg or Saxony.

But there was a crucial difference between the north German states and Austria: in the latter, the prince was not a Protestant. The entire process of securing guarantees and building up a *Landeskirche* was hollow and artificial. It flew in the face of a fundamental principle of early modern statecraft, that each sovereign secular ruler determined absolutely the faith of his subjects; it could therefore lead, ultimately, only to conflict. In 1579 the archdukes of Tyrol and Styria held a secret meeting at Munich with the duke of Bavaria at which it was decided to make no more concessions to the Reformed creeds, but to restore a Catholic monopoly, 'not with sound and fury, but surreptitiously and slowly;…not with words but with deeds'.[6] The process was easier in the outlying Habsburg duchies, for the Reformation had penetrated less deeply and the nobility was by no means solidly Protestant.[7] The progress of this first wave of the Counter-Reformation was halted by the death of Archduke Charles of Styria in 1590, and of the archduke of Tyrol shortly afterwards, but everyone realized that it was merely a truce. When Charles's son, the seventeen-year-old Ferdinand II, returned to Styria in 1595, after five years of Jesuit education at the university of Ingolstadt in Bavaria, he was given a paper drawn up by his advisers entitled 'A consideration of the way in which Catholicism may be restored'. In 1598, incognito, he paid a visit to Italy and was received in audience by the pope, to whom he no doubt explained his plan of campaign, for, as soon as he returned to Styria, he ordered all Protestant clergy and schoolteachers to leave. In 1599 a special 'Reformation Commission' set about closing down Luthera'n establishments in the duchy (almost seventy were terminated within twelve months) and destroying all prohibited books (10,000 were burnt at Graz alone in a vast bonfire). In 1600, prominent Protestants and their families, including the Graz mathematician and schoolmaster Johannes Kepler, were obliged to leave. Perhaps 2,500 persons went into exile. After this success, the archduke and his Reformation Commission turned their attention to Carinthia and Carniola. Although one fearful bishop predicted the outbreak of rebellion 'on a Netherlandish scale', the archduke knew that fear of letting in the Turks (who had just captured Canissa, only 250 kilometres from Graz), and the Lutherans' reluctance to oppose a lawful prince, offered him a decisive advantage. Ferdinand II had managed to revive his grandfather's policy of divide and rule with startling success.[8]

There were some parallel moves in Lower Austria. In 1578 Rudolf II, then living in Vienna, ordered the closure of all Protestant institutions in the capital, including a notable grammar school run by the Estates themselves. There were complaints from the

Protestant nobles as the churches and schools moved from Vienna to the nearby town of Horn; but there the matter rested. There was likewise no resistance from the nobles when the government, at the behest of Bishop Khlesl of Passau (and later of Vienna), began to force Catholic magistrates upon the towns of the duchy during the 1590s. In part, this compliance stemmed from the peasant revolt which paralysed much of Lower Austria in 1595 and 1596, and abated only thanks to Imperial intervention: the anti-aristocratic revolt had shown the landowners how dependent they were on government support. The powerlessness of the Lutheran pastors to stop the unrest had also shown that Protestantism was a poor guarantee of public order and, following the rebellion, several major landowners—Karl von Liechtenstein, head of one of the oldest families in the duchy, among them—converted to Catholicism.

It was much the same story elsewhere: from the 1590s onwards, scions of the major families of all Habsburg territories began to abandon the Reformed churches in favour of Catholicism—Wallenstein and Slavata in Bohemia, Eggenberg and Trauttmannsdorf in Styria, and many other figures later prominent in the Thirty Years' War among them. The spearhead of the Catholic offensive was formed by the colleges run by the Jesuit Order, of which there were four in the Habsburg lands by 1561, and some fifty by 1650, served by 870 full members of the Society. William Lamormaini, SJ, confessor to Emperor Ferdinand II, was not being over-patriotic when he later claimed that 'if there had been no schools of the Society founded by the prudent design of the emperors and archdukes in Vienna, Prague, Graz, Olomouc and elsewhere in Germany, there would have remained scarcely a vestige of the Catholic religion': the face of Catholicism in the Habsburg lands after about 1580 was moulded to an unusual degree by the stern, uncompromising, legalistic f aith of the Jesuit Fathers.[9] As the more tolerant older generation was gradually removed by death, the temper of religious opinion became steadily more aggressive. The mannerist-humanist synthesis, with its defence of the old unity of Christendom, may still have attracted supporters, but too many of them were men of little substance, fugitives from fanaticism elsewhere. The Habsburg lands in central Europe had seemed their only refuge; now, there too they were threatened.[10]

These developments, which were apparent to all, should have alarmed the Habsburgs' Protestant subjects. But they did not. Those living in Bohemia and Hungary were particularly complacent, for both kingdoms possessed sound constitutional guarantees against princely absolutism—the Golden Bull of Hungary (1222) conferred particularly extensive rights on subjects—and both kingdoms had a long tradition of successful resistance to monarchical abuse (the Hussite rebellion of 1418–36 had defeated all efforts at repression by both Empire and Papacy). Moreover, both kingdoms elected their rulers, and regularly bargained with prospective candidates over concessions before coronation. But the coming of the Reformation to central Europe loosened the armour of these well-protected vassals. Admittedly the three major non-Catholic churches of Bohemia—Lutheran, Hussite and Bohemian Brethren (the radical wing of the Hussite movement)—agreed on a common creed in 1575, the *Confessio Bohemica,* and compelled Rudolf II to grant them official toleration in return for election as king; but his promise was only verbal and half-hearted. Almost at once, Rudolf reneged on the agreement by ordering the expulsion of the Bohemian Brethren (although it could not be carried out until 1602 for lack of resources). In Hungary, the situation was more uncertain still, since the major

creeds there—Calvinist, Lutheran, Socinian—were unable to agree on a common declaration of faith.

The precarious position of Protestantism in both kingdoms under Habsburg rule was demonstrated during the 'Long Turkish War' (1593–1606) between Rudolf II and the sultan. Although the Turks had enjoyed success in the first years of the war, the sultan's Christian vassals in the Balkans—the princes of Wallachia and Moldavia—rebelled against him in 1594 and in 1598 made common cause with the emperor. The Balkans might have been liberated had not Rudolf decided to use the opportunity to engineer a revolt in Transylvania, and to exploit the presence of his armies both there and in Hungary to restore the Roman Catholic Church to a position of supremacy. From 1602, special courts supplemented the actions of the troops, confiscating the lands of Protestant nobles (and indicting several for treason), expelling Protestant vassals, and restoring Protestant churches to Catholic use. In 1604 the Habsburg government declared that the local Estates were henceforth forbidden to discuss religious matters, and ordered that rigorous measures against heresy were to be strictly enforced.

This was pure folly: unlike Styria, there were scarcely any Catholics left in Hungary and Transylvania. Even papal agents could only find 300 Roman clergy in Hungary in 1606, most of them in the southern province of Croatia, flanking Inner Austria; in Transylvania there were less than thirty; and not a single Hungarian prelate had visited Rome since 1553.[11] There were no Catholic-controlled towns and virtually no Catholic nobles. So when, in 1605, the Imperial army was forced to march southwards to meet a major Turkish attack, there was no one left to prevent the rebellion of the Protestants of Hungary and Transylvania, led by the Calvinists Stephen Bocskay and Bethlen Gabor. When the Hungarian Estates had endorsed their revolt, Bocskay's forces invaded Moravia.

It began to seem as if the House of Habsburg was about to lose its grasp on the kingdoms acquired in 1526; yet the head of the family, Rudolf, whose ill-considered policies had unleashed the storm, seemed impervious to the risk and became more of a recluse than ever. He seldom emerged from the Hradschin, the massive palace complex above the 'New Town' of Prague which had been his home since 1581. Rudolf's closest relatives, fearing that he could no longer cope with the dangers facing the Empire and the dynasty, held a secret meeting at Linz in April 1605 to discuss what to do. They deputed the emperor's eldest sibling, Archduke Matthias, to take charge of affairs and urged him to make peace both with Bocskay and with the Turks; in return they promised to support his claim to succeed Rudolf as king of Bohemia and Hungary.[12] At first all went well: a hastily collected loyalist army, which included such important actors in future events as Count Thurn and the young Wallenstein, drove back Bocskay and enabled Matthias to conclude a cease-fire in January 1606. The following June, by the peace of Vienna, the archduke recognized Bocskay as prince of Transylvania, ceded him eight counties of royal Hungary, and promised full religious liberty to all the Protestants of the kingdom (although the Roman church was also offered protection). In November, thanks in part to Bocskay's good offices, Matthias also concluded a reasonably favourable treaty with the Turks at Zsitva Torok, which brought peace to the Turkish frontier—thanks to frequent renewals—for many decades.[13]

Rudolf, however, was not happy with these arrangements. Indecisive and uncertain, the emperor came to believe the suggestions of certain Catholics that the plague which

was devastating Bohemia, even driving him from his beloved Hradschin, was God's punishment for the toleration granted to the Protestants. Although he signed the peace of Vienna, he protested that his assent had only been extorted under duress, and he strove to prevent the concessions from being implemented. In 1607 he issued a 'List of charges', criticizing his brother's administration in Austria and Hungary, his direction of the war, and his concessions to the Turks and rebels.[14]

The Hungarian Estates and the archduke were thus almost forced, in order to defend themselves, to conclude an uneasy alliance: the former could offer to recognize Matthias as their king in return for firm guarantees that the peace of Vienna would be maintained; the latter could exploit the Hungarians' desire for constitutional security in order to achieve recognition of his succession claims. The bargain was sealed at a meeting of the Hungarian Diet at Bratislava early in 1608, and Matthias now set about securing similar recognition from the other Habsburg lands. His own provinces of Upper and Lower Austria presented no difficulty, for a delegation of their Estates was already at Bratislava, led by George Erasmus Tschernembl, a Calvinist nobleman partly educated in the West (whose library of almost 1,900 volumes included many Protestant works and a manuscript treatise of his own, concerning a subject's right to resist his sovereign).[15] In February the Austrian leaders, the Hungarian Estates and the archduke signed an alliance to secure the enforcement of the treaty of Vienna. Moravia soon joined this union, and in May Matthias led a small army raised by the confederates towards Prague; but Rudolf still refused to recognize his brother's new titles. Only in June 1608, with Matthias and his army only five miles from Prague, did the emperor capitulate.

Now, however, the Estates had tasted the sweet fruits of blackmail, and they cynically increased their demands. The Estates of Upper Austria, led by Tschernembl, suddenly required from Matthias full religious liberty for the towns as well as for the nobles, and full parity of treatment with the Catholics, in return for coronation. When the archduke refused, the Protestant members of the Estates signed an alliance with their co-religionists from the Lower duchy pledging themselves to mobilize troops in order to secure these new concessions. In March 1609, since Rudolf remained intransigent, Matthias was constrained to accept the conditions and confirm the religious privileges of the Austrians in order to be recognized as reigning archduke.

Only Bohemia, Silesia and Lusatia were now left under the direct control of Rudolf. The events of 1597–1604 had shown that some form of confirmation of their religious privileges was advisable, and in January 1609 the Estates of the kingdom met in Prague to secure this. But Rudolf refused. In May, the Estates created an executive of thirty 'Directors' and authorized the levy of 4,500 troops, obliging the emperor to sign, on 9 July 1609, the famous *Letter of Majesty* which made official and legal the right of all Bohemians to choose either the Catholic faith or one of those comprised in the Confession of 1575. Protestant schools and churches could now be built by the nobles and towns; and even in the royal domain Protestants might open a church or cemetery, if these were not already in existence. One ambiguity remained, probably unperceived by contemporaries: there was no mention of the legal rights of Protestants living on ecclesiastical lands. Probably the Estates assumed them to be included in the provisions for the royal domain, although the government was later to deny this. But it was only a minor matter when set beside the enormous tangible gains. Rudolf had even agreed that a standing committee of the Estates, to be known as the 'Defensors', should become

responsible for seeing that his concessions took effect. In 1611 these men were able to flex their muscles, when Rudolf inexplicably permitted his cousin Leopold (brother of Ferdinand of Styria) to invade Bohemia with some 7,000 troops. If he had hoped to overawe the Estates he was mistaken, for a considerable Bohemian force drove Leopold's men back from the suburbs of Prague, and the Defensors called upon Matthias to take over the government of their kingdom. Rudolf, cowering in his palace, alone and probably insane, was declared deposed; and in May 1611 Matthias, after confirming the Letter of Majesty, was crowned king of Bohemia. The power of the Estates in the Habsburg lands had rarely seemed so great. And yet it was bound to be impermanent: the Defensors only awaited an opportunity to secure more, while Matthias (according to his own admission) was equally anxious to revoke what he had conceded.

It is hard now to see these tumultuous events in true perspective. In the aftermath of the Bohemian rebellion of 1618 the gains of the Estates appear doomed from the start; but so did most of the other great political concessions of European history, when viewed only a few years later. Even England's Magna Carta, which by the seventeenth century was generally accepted as the corner-stone of the constitution, had been subjected to violations and attempted revocations during the century after the barons wrested it from King John at Runnymede in 1215. To make Bohemia's *Letter of Majesty* similarly immutable and respectable required only time. But time, as everyone recognized, was fast running out.

ii Germany before the war

> I am very much afraid that the states of the Empire, quarrelling fiercely among themselves, may start a fatal conflagration embracing not only themselves…but also all those countries that are in one way or another connected with Germany. All this will undoubtedly produce the most dangerous consequences, bringing about the total collapse and unavoidable alteration in the present state of Germany. And it may also perhaps affect some other states.[1]

The pessimistic assessment which Maurice, landgrave of Hesse-Kassel, communicated to the French government in 1615, would not have seemed extravagant to most of his contemporaries. There was a widespread conviction, both inside the territories of the Holy Roman Empire and beyond, that another major war in Europe was imminent. All over Germany, governments had begun to spend heavily on defence. Travellers coming from the Dutch Republic during the second decade of the century noted the contrast between the Netherlands, where troops were seldom seen, and the Empire, where every potentate seemed to boast a private army, ostentatious in dress and obtrusive in presence. Even Landgrave Maurice, patron of intellectuals (many of them formerly attached to Rudolf II's court in Prague), musicians (including the young Heinrich Schütz) and the theatre, created in 1600 a new militia of some 9,000 men. The following year he drew up in his own hand a 288-page directive on how it should be employed in an emergency, and

promptly used it to invade and annexe Hesse-Marburg (page 19 below). In 1618 he created a special 'military academy' to train officers for his regiments.[2]

Some rulers concentrated upon improving territorial defences in other ways. Thus, although the government of ducal Prussia could not persuade the local Estates to pay for a militia, taxes were voted in 1601 for new fortifications at the ports of Pillau and Memel, and for two warships to patrol the Baltic approaches. The Electors of Saxony created an Arsenal at Dresden which, besides being an architectural marvel, contained enough military hardware to equip an army of (it was claimed) 10,000.[3] After 1600, the pace of defence-spending accelerated. The Elector Palatine ordered expensive new walls, with bastions and moats, to be built around Frankenthal and Heidelberg, and in 1606 he created at Mannheim an entire fortress-city which, with its citadel and vast star-shaped chain of walls, was intended to be impregnable.[4] Between 1603 and 1618, the city of Hanau, allied to the Palatinate and ruled by a Calvinist count, was also given a completely new defensive network. The Catholic powers of the Rhineland, feeling threatened, soon undertook counter-preparations of their own. The Elector of Trier fortified Ehrenbreitstein, overlooking Coblenz at the junction of the Rhine and Moselle; Philip Christopher von Sötern, bishop of Speyer, built the great fortress of Philippsburg at Udenheim, on the Rhine south of the Palatinate (1615–23). The lords of Alsace built new walls at Benfeld, Breisach and Hagenau, while the duke of Bavaria added new fortifications around Munich, Ingolstadt, Rain and some frontier towns, at a total cost of almost 1 million thalers, between 1598 and 1618.[5] The scale of each of these enterprises must not be underestimated: millions of bricks were required to construct walls that might be as much as 40 feet wide, 30 feet high and several miles long. When John Taylor, the English poet, humorist and traveller, visited Hamburg in 1617, he was astonished by the size of the army of artisans at work on the walls.

> And when I perceived these fortifications I was amazed, for it is almost incredible for the number of men and horses that are daily set on work about it; besides, the work itself is so great that it is past the credit of report.[6]

By the summer of 1617, war certainly seemed to be in the air.

At the same time, it is possible to exaggerate the sense of gloom and impending destruction. The year 1617 itself saw an end to hostilities in France, Russia and Italy. The English ambassador in Turin, Dr Isaac Wake, was prompted to exult that 'the gates of Janus' had been shut, promising 'calm and Halcyonian days not only unto the inhabitants of this province of Italye, but to the greatest part of Christendome'.[7] Although the fortification and militarization of Germany caused the war there to last longer once it had begun, they did not of themselves make its outbreak inevitable. When Thomas Coryat, another itinerant English humorist, travelled to Venice and back in 1608, he walked alone most of the way from Basel to Mainz and yet only once met with any troops; nor did he have any unpleasant encounters with footpads or brigands. On the contrary, he frequently praised the orderliness, prosperity and peace of the Upper Rhine valley, where bread and vegetables were so cheap that one could have a nourishing meal for a farthing and buy a year's supply of grain for £2. However, Coryat found it prudent to sail down the Rhine below Mainz on a passenger barge because the roads in that part were reputed to be

infested with outlaws. He was wise: another English traveller of this period, Fynes Morison, was obliged to journey through Westphalia in disguise (on one occasion hidden under a wagon-load of goods) in order to escape robbers.[8] Germany was the largest country in Europe, and it was far from homogeneous.

> The dear old Holy Roman Empire,
> How does it stay together?

asked the tavern drinkers in Goethe's *Faust*—and the answer is no easier to find today than it was in the late eighteenth, or earlier seventeenth, century. The truth was that Germany, or 'The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation' to give its proper title, was a land of many states and many economies. The prosperous south—the Palatinate, Alsace, Bavaria and so on—had always presented a contrast with the barren heaths and wastelands of the north-west, a prey to the armies operating in the war-torn Netherlands, and their irregular supporters. In 1599 the entire Spanish field army invaded neighbouring Westphalia in search of winter quarters. The local princes attempted to raise a force of their own to drive the Spaniards out, but it proved totally unsuccessful—and, to add insult to injury, the luckless troops then mutinied for their pay. The cost of failure was over 400,000 thalers. It was this debacle, more than anything else, that initiated the headlong creation of separate territorial armies in the early years of the seventeenth century, for by that time the supraterritorial institutions of the Empire had become all but ineffectual.[9]

The 'Circles' *(Kreise),* responsible since the early sixteenth century for local defence, were no longer capable of mobilizing sufficient forces to guarantee the security of their members—the mutinous troops of 1599 were raised by the Rhenish and Westphalian Circle. Attempts at inter-Circle cooperation were few: the weaving regulations, common currencies, and grain controls agreed in 1564–72 between the Bavarian, Swabian and Franconian Circles were exceptional and impermanent. The main obstacle to cooperation was the extreme religious and political fragmentation of southern and western Germany. Swabia, more or less equal in area to modern Switzerland, included sixty-eight secular and forty spiritual lords, and also thirty-two Imperial Free Cities. All were represented in the Circle Assembly *(Kreistag),* which met regularly (sixty-four times between 1555 and 1599); and each was a direct vassal of the emperor. But they ranged in importance from the compact duchy of Württemberg, covering 9,200 square kilometres, down to the lands of the numerous 'Imperial Knights', who might each own only part of one village. Over half of the members of the Circle, and almost exactly half of its population, were Catholic; the rest were either Lutheran or Calvinist. It was the perfect formula for paralysis, and most of the Circles of south and west Germany were similarly divided by their confessional and political differences. In the Empire as a whole, with a population in 1600 of perhaps 20 million, there were some 1,000 separate, semi-autonomous political units, many of them very small. Yet even the tiniest polities were tenacious of their rights. The 400 or so Imperial Knights were organized into fourteen 'cantons' of their own, each with a Director, Treasury and Chancery, holding assemblies four or five times per year, and from 1590 their autonomy was guaranteed by a special Imperial ordinance. At a slightly higher level, the fifty or more 'Imperial Counts' also had their own

organizations: perhaps the most important, in the Wetterau region north of Frankfurt, was led after 1565 by the Calvinist counts of Nassau (which helps to explain their importance in the politics of the Empire). The Imperial Counts even had two guaranteed seats in the Imperial Diet.[10]

But these minor potentates, although they insisted on exercising to the full their religious, economic and feudal powers, were of little weight when set beside the eight major states of the Empire. In the lead were Electoral Saxony, Brandenburg, and Bavaria, with over 1 million subjects each; the Palatinate with perhaps 600,000; and Hesse, Trier and Württemberg with 400,000 each. However, these large states, some equal in size and population to the kingdoms of Scotland or Sweden, were prevented by two serious disadvantages from achieving outright dominance in the Empire. First, they did not all accept the principle of primogeniture: Hesse, for example, was divided in 1567 between the four sons of Landgrave Philip the Magnanimous, Luther's patron, with a consequent loss of influence in the affairs of the Empire. Second, many of them were geographically fragmented. The Palatinate, most notably, was divided into two major units: the Lutheran upper county, which had once been part of Bavaria, adjoined the borders of Bohemia and contributed some 40 per cent of the Elector's revenues, while the Calvinist lower county, around Heidelberg, straddled the Rhine. Further, minor parts of the Palatinate were ruled by separate branches of the dynasty, such as Zweibrücken and Neuburg. Since the smaller principalities of the Empire were, if anything, more fragmented and fissiparous, it was sometimes very difficult for a traveller in Germany to know where he was. Only the borders of a few territories (such as the confines of Lorraine, the Palatinate, Hanau and Zweibrücken) were marked by a series of special boundary columns. More frequently, frontiers were represented by customs posts, both on land and on water. For example, there were thirty toll stations on the Elbe between Hamburg and Prague, and eleven on the Rhine between Mainz and Cologne, each equipped with a small cannon to sink ships attempting to run through without paying dues.[11]

For all these reasons, no individual territory in Germany could match the power of the Austrian Habsburgs, who had monopolized the Imperial title since 1438. Yet their extensive territorial and demographic base was insufficient to permit absolute control of the destinies of Germany. After 1601, many important territorial rulers ceased to accept the decisions of the Imperial Supreme Court (the *Reichskammergericht*), and by 1620 the vassals of Saxony, Brandenburg and Bavaria were forbidden to appeal to this tribunal without the consent of their prince. More serious still was the refusal, after 1608, of an important group of princes to attend the Imperial Diet. This assembly of all the territorial rulers of Germany, or their representatives, had only met six times between 1555 and 1603. Its members, divided into three 'colleges'—Electors, princes and towns—deliberated separately on the propositions submitted by the emperor, then conferred together and, in due course, submitted a response. In a prolonged Diet, there might be over one hundred sessions and over twenty joint conferences. Considerable delays were caused by the large number of semi-autonomous participants: although there were only seven Electors (including the emperor himself as king of Bohemia), there were some 150 territories represented in the princes' college, and fifty-two members in the towns' college. All decisions depended ultimately on consensus, and therefore on compromise; and it was because compromises could no longer be reached on certain key issues, above all on religious equality for Protestants and Catholics within the Imperial institutions, that

in 1608 the Diet ceased to function. Only one further meeting was held between then and 1640—in August 1613 at Regensburg—and many Protestants boycotted even that.[12]

The paralysis of the major Imperial institutions—Circles, Supreme Court and Diet—at this time was particularly unfortunate because the Empire was faced by a number of serious problems. Most important, perhaps, was Rudolf II's war with the Turks between 1593 and 1606: without a Diet, he was unable to secure taxes from the Empire to pay his forces in Hungary. The extent of Rudolf's dependence upon German contributions emerges by contrasting his demands for *Römermonate* (the basic tax voted by the Diet) with those of his great-uncle, Charles V (emperor 1519–58): whereas Charles had only asked for 73½ Römermonate, Rudolf asked for 409 against the Turks alone. The money could not be found: even as late as 1619, unpaid arrears of these wartime taxes still stood at almost 4 million thalers.[13]

But there was more to non-payment of taxes than a constitutional wrangle: many parts of Germany were suffering the effects of a serious economic recession. The rapid and prolonged growth of the population which Germany experienced (in common with the rest of Europe) during the sixteenth century created many difficulties. On the one hand, all available land had been cleared for arable farming, leaving less for pastoral use or industrial crops; on the other, the run of exceptionally high food prices during the 1590s caused a collapse in the market for manufactured goods—many consumers no longer had money to buy anything except bread. After this crisis, recovery was slow. Many towns, particularly in the south-west, experienced a fall in industrial output (as entrepreneurs turned increasingly to cheaper rural labour). Many more ran up heavy debts, either because economic recession reduced income or because the construction of new defences or new civic amenities increased expenditure. And almost all towns—whether Imperial or territorial—suffered increasing interference in their social, political and religious affairs from their princely neighbours.[14] What the territorial states desired from the towns, above all else, was money. At the turn of the century the rulers of Germany were rarely solvent. Emperor Matthias owed almost 30 million thalers at his accession in 1612, while the Elector of Brandenburg owed 18 million, the Elector of Saxony over 3 million, and the Elector Palatine almost 2 million. It was no coincidence that this period saw a spate of 'household economy' books, advising princes on how best to cut their coats according to their cloth.[15]

Financial embarrassment brought many rulers into conflict with their Estates, whose consent (in almost all territories) was required before taxes could be levied. The composition of these representative assemblies differed from one territory to another. Some, particularly in south Germany, included nobles, clergy, towns and peasants; others had only towns and peasants; and the Estates of some smaller units had only peasants. All might claim to deal with legislation, taxation and declarations of war. But in the larger territories, where most people lived, there was no such 'democracy'. In a letter of 1598 to his father, who had just abdicated in his favour, Duke Maximilian of Bavaria wrote: 'I myself believe that we princes are only esteemed, by both spiritual and secular powers, according to "reason of state"; and I believe that respect goes only to those who have a lot of land or a lot of money.[16] Throughout his long reign, Maximilian acted accordingly, aided to a surprising extent by his Estates. The *Landschaft* of Bavaria met thirty-three times between 1514 and 1579, six more times before 1612, and never again until 1669. At the 1612 assembly Maximilian, who had just issued a complex legal code without

consulting his Estates, persuaded the 'representatives of the people' to vote him a handsome annual subsidy for seven years (equal by itself to double the revenues of the Elector of Saxony); to invest him with the power to make war and peace as he chose, and to raise all necessary taxes (in case of war) at his own discretion. Here was a relationship between prince and Estates that was quite unlike that prevailing in England, France or the Habsburg lands.[17]

Undoubtedly the principal reason for this cooperation was Maximilian's proven financial expertise. By 1612 he had halved the debts inherited from his father, and after that he carefully built up a surplus, so that even in wartime he could finance his army without recourse to his Estates. He also created a special fund (the *aerarium*) for the active defence of Catholicism in the Empire, whenever the need arose. These measures were only possible because Maximilian and his immediate predecessors had largely purged their domains of Protestantism. In the 1550s, the Bavarian Protestants had attempted to extort promises of toleration from the government against threats that, without such guarantees, they would vote no taxes. There was a confrontation on the issue in 1563, after which the dukes strained every nerve to expel all Protestants from their domains; and as they succeeded, so the Estates became more compliant.

The same development was taking place in other Catholic territories, under the terms of the 'Religious Peace of Augsburg' (1555), which put a temporary end to open confessional warfare in Germany. The Augsburg settlement created a layered structure of legal securities for the people of the Empire. At the top was the right of each secular territorial ruler, from the Electors down to the Imperial Knights, to dictate whether their subjects' religion was to be Catholic or Lutheran (the only officially permitted creeds: Calvinism and all other faiths were forbidden). This principle was later known as *cuius regio, eius religio:* that the religion of the governed should be the same as that of their territorial ruler, and that subjects who so desired were to be allowed to emigrate. The only exceptions to this rule were the Imperial Free Cities and the Catholic ecclesiastical states. In the former, the Peace guaranteed that where both Lutheran and Catholic groups existed, both were to enjoy freedom of worship (in effect, this only applied to eight of the sixty or so Free Cities, because almost all the rest were either wholly Lutheran or wholly Catholic). The second exception was far more important, since it concerned the extensive ecclesiastical principalities. On the one hand, it decreed that 'territorial church lands' (i.e. those under the political authority of a territorial prince or city) in Protestant hands by the year 1552 were so to remain, but there were to be no more secularizations. Quite different was the fate of the 'Imperial church lands' (i.e. those under an ecclesiastical ruler—a prince-bishop or prince-abbot—subordinate politically only to the emperor), for if the *cuius regio* principle were to be applied there, the election of a Protestant bishop or abbot would produce the Protestantization of the entire principality. It was therefore agreed that if a prince-bishop or a prince-abbot embraced the Reformation, he was to resign so that a Catholic prelate could replace him. Not surprisingly, Protestant partisans at Augsburg did not accept this measure, known as the *reservatum ecclesiasticum,* and it was included in the Peace only by virtue of Imperial authority, not by vote of the Diet.[18] It could therefore be disputed, as happened after 1583 when the ArchbishopElector of Cologne turned Protestant: a war lasting five years was fought between his supporters (who included the young Dutch Republic and the Palatinate) and his Catholic replacement, Ernest of Bavaria (aided by Philip II of Spain and by Ernest's brother, Duke William, who ran up

debts of over 500,000 thalers in his successful attempt to uphold the *reservatum ecclesiasticum*).[19] But there were surprisingly few blatant attempts of this kind to challenge the terms of the Augsburg settlement.[20] More numerous were conflicts between rulers and ruled within the Imperial church lands because, during the heated discussions that preceded the Augsburg settlement, the Habsburg negotiators had made an undertaking (the *Declaratio Ferdinandei*) that if the cities or knights of an ecclesiastical prince had already practised Lutheranism for some time, they were to be allowed to continue. But this concession was not promulgated as part of the Peace, remaining secret for almost two decades. Not surprisingly, when it was eventually made public, many prelates treated it as spurious and thus provoked severe conflicts with their Estates.

At first, however, the Catholic rulers seemed unable or unwilling either to enforce religious uniformity in their domains or to prevent the rapid spread of Calvinism in the Empire (discussed below). Only after 1580, with support from Austria and Bavaria, did the ecclesiastical princes—most notably the abbot of Fulda and the adjacent bishops of Würzburg, Bamberg and Eichstätt—make serious efforts to end Protestant worship in their lands, in spite of the *Declaratio Ferdinandei*. Progress was particularly rapid after the War of Cologne (1583–8), which may be seen as the turning-point in the struggle between Protestantism and Catholicism in Germany. The war marked the first successful attempt to halt the Protestantization of an ecclesiastical territory; and it provoked an important treatise arguing that the Catholic cause was being lost in Germany by default and must be saved before it was too late—the anonymous *De Autonomia,* written in 1580 and published (at the duke of Bavaria's expense) in 1586.[21] The exodus of Lutherans from the *Pfaffengasse* (the Priests' Alley, as the ecclesiastical territories along the Rhine and Main were known) now became a flood. Most refugees sought a sanctuary as close to their former homes as possible, where they formed a militant and restless community of exiles: they left reluctantly, and they dreamed constantly of vengeance against those who had expelled them. There were many who, like the Lutheran exiles from Würzburg, driven into exile at nearby Ansbach in 1588, sang the psalm of bitterness 'By the waters of Babylon we sat down and wept' as they travelled in a body from their old home to the new and longed to return to their fatherland. But of this there was little chance, f or Julius Echter von Mespelbrunn, bishop of Würzburg from 1573 to 1617, turned his territory into a showpiece of Counter-Reformation achievement. His capital was both beautified and enriched with a new university, a lavishly restored palace and many refurbished churches. Priests with concubines were exhorted to abandon them; and a special fund was created for renovating Catholic churches recovered from the Protestants (over 300 churches in the diocese were rebuilt in the 'Julius style'), for improving clerical standards, and for increasing clerical salaries.[22]

The impetus of the Counter-Reformation seemed irresistible, drawing strength from the creation of the *Congregatio Germanica* (Council for German Affairs) in Rome, in 1568, and of the diocesan seminaries, synods and schools all over Catholic Europe. Likewise, thanks to the presence of vigilant nuncios at the Imperial Court and at Cologne, and to the work of the religious Orders, Tridentine orthodoxy was defined with enhanced clarity and enforced with increased rigour. Many of the more active Catholic clergy were actually trained in Rome at the *Collegium Germanicum,* founded in 1552.[23]

Most of the Catholics' gains were made from the Lutheran Church, which for some time had been in theological disarray thanks to the acrimonious internal debates between

those who wished to maintain Luther's teaching unchanged in all respects (the 'Gnesio-Lutherans') and those (known as 'Melanchthonians' after their leader, Philip Melanchthon) who looked for certain changes. Between 1537 and 1577 there were ten major clashes on doctrinal issues between the two factions, and a continuing dispute over pedagogic and political attitudes; but eventually the Gnesio-Lutherans managed to have their views included in the so-called Formula of Concord, compiled between 1577 and 1580 by a committee of Lutheran court chaplains acting on their masters' instructions. This reunited about two-thirds of the Lutheran world on doctrinal matters, but left the Melanchthonians with little option but to merge into the Calvinist Church. Defections from Lutheranism therefore became frequent and substantial, and they included several secular rulers. Among those who turned to Calvinism were Elector Frederick III of the Palatinate in 1559–60, Count John of Nassau in 1578, and Landgrave Maurice of Hesse-Kassel in 1605. The last conversion gave rise to a war, for the extinction of the Hesse-Marburg branch of the family the previous year was exploited by the newly Calvinist landgrave: he occupied the vacant inheritance, and in particular the famous university of Marburg, which had become an important seminary for training Lutheran pastors. The students rebelled, but Maurice's troops prevailed. The Lutherans were forced to migrate to the academy of Giessen (in Lutheran Hesse-Darmstadt, made into a university in 1607), whence they conducted a violent and acrimonious debate with their Calvinist expropriators at Marburg.[24] Perhaps the Calvinist's greatest coup, however, was the conversion of two other Protestant Electors. Christian I of Saxony (1586–91) maintained close relations with the Palatinate and began to appoint Calvinists to senior positions in his schools and universities and at Court. In 1590 he offered to send military aid to assist Henry IV, the Calvinist king of France, against his Catholic enemies, and in 1591 he signed a military alliance with the Calvinist ruler of the Palatinate. In the same year, he introduced changes to the Saxon church order which brought it closer to Calvinism. Only Christian's sudden death, at the age of thirty-one, saved the Lutheran cause in Saxony. In 1613, much the same process threatened Brandenburg with major religious change: the new Elector, John Sigismund, openly embraced Calvinism, and tried to change the official creed of his territories according to the *cuius regio* principle. But there was rioting in the streets of Berlin and brawling in the Estates until a compromise, which tolerated both forms of Protestant worship, was agreed. A flood of pamphlets appeared—200 are known for 1614–17 alone—discussing the change of religion in Brandenburg.[25]

Small wonder, then, that the Lutheran clergy cordially detested the Calvinists even more than they loathed the Catholics. The leading voice in the anti-Calvinist campaign was Matthias Hoë von Hoënegg, of Austrian descent, who became court chaplain to the Elector of Saxony in 1602, and chaplain-in-chief in 1613. Hoë was pugnacious. In the prologue to his *Prodromus* (1621) he wrote: 'I remain determined to make war for the Lord, and I thank my God that He has taught my hands to fight.' Even the titles of his numerous books bristle with aggression, from *A solid, just and orthodox detestation of Papists and Calvinists* (1601), to *A weighty (and in these dangerous times very necessary) discussion of whether and why it is better to have conformity with the Catholics…than with the Calvinists* (1620). Other works contrasted the Reformed religion unfavourably with Islam.[26]

But not all Lutherans were obsessed by Calvinism to the exclusion of their more ancient adversary. Most of the forty-six published sermons celebrating the Lutheran

Jubilee of 1617 called for an immediate crusade against Rome, centre of idolatry, sodomy and other vices, and seat of 'the Beast of the Apocalypse'. Tensions between Lutherans and Catholics were most notable in the city-states of Germany, where social grievances were often added to religious division. There was rioting or rebellion in some twenty cities of the Empire between 1595 and 1618 (see Map 1), of which the most serious was that at Donauwörth in 1606–7.[27] Although Donauwörth was one of the eight Imperial Free Cities where both Lutherans and Catholics were officially tolerated, until 1605 the Catholic clergy had scarcely dared to hold open processions, carrying no insignia when they peregrinated on Holy Days and keeping to the backstreets. And with reason: for when, on St Mark's Day 1606, the clergy attempted to hold a proper procession, they were beaten up and their relics and banners were ridiculed and confiscated. Two months later, Father Laurence of Brindisi, a leading Capuchin (later canonized), arrived in the city en route to the Imperial Court and was himself mobbed by a Lutheran crowd chanting 'Capuchin, Capuchin, scum,scum.' He heard from the local clergy of their plight and promised to ask the emperor to provide redress.

He found Prague in the grip of plague, so that in September even Rudolf II had to abandon his capital in order to escape the contagion. Laurence promptly preached a sermon blaming the plague on the concessions to the Protestants in Donauwörth and elsewhere. His tone gave grave offence, and he was only saved from unpleasantness by an urgent summons from Maximilian of Bavaria, who desired Laurence to exorcize his apparently deranged duchess. The successful treatment, which required several sessions, afforded the Capuchin a chance to engage Maximilian's sympathy for the cause of the Donauwörth Catholics, so that when he returned to Prague the following February, Laurence could assure the emperor that Bavaria was ready to enforce the Augsburg settlement on the city. Accordingly, Rudolf agreed to send an Imperial Commissioner to ensure that the Catholics had their full St Mark's Day procession in April 1607, and Maximilian sent a couple of agents, too. But to no avail: priests, commissioner and agents were virtually besieged by a Lutheran mob and could not leave the monastery where they had assembled. The magistrates, Protestants to a man, did nothing to prevent the disorders.

The emperor's authority had now been openly slighted and in August Rudolf ordered Donauwörth to allow the Catholics freedom of worship or be declared contumacious; Maximilian was empowered to use force if necessary to restore obedience. When requests failed, the duke raised an army and, despite counter-mobilization by some Protestant neighbours, his forces marched into the city on 17 December 1607 and restored Catholic worship. This act was manifestly illegal, for Donauwörth was in the Swabian, not the Bavarian Circle, and the Imperial Ban should have been enforced by the Swabian Director (the Lutheran duke of Württemberg). Further illegalities followed. In June 1609, in a move that was to be repeated in 1620 on a grander scale, the emperor granted Maximilian the city as a pledge for the expenses he had incurred in executing the Ban. At once the duke forbade Protestant worship there, according to the *cuius regio* principle, and expelled those who would not conform. Another pamphlet war began, this time between the Lutheran refugees (mostly in Württemberg) and Maximilian's apologists.[28]

On hearing of the occupation of Donauwörth, the prescient Duke Philip Ludwig of Neuburg lamented, 'Maximilian, Maximilian, you do not realize the consequences of

what you are doing.[29] He, like others, saw at once that the coup torpedoed all chance of cooperation between Protestants and Catholics at the Imperial Diet summoned to assemble at Regensburg in January 1608. Circumstances already favoured a confrontation there between the emperor, whose chief desire was for money to liquidate the debts incurred during the Turkish war, and the militant Protestants, led by the Elector Palatine, who demanded religious changes beneficial for Protestantism in general and for Calvinism in particular. The occupation of Donauwörth, scarcely 100 kilometres from Regensburg, drove normally moderate Lutheran rulers, such as the duke of Neuburg and the Elector of Saxony, into the Palatine camp. They demanded at least an increase in Protestant representation on the Imperial Supreme Court. But the emperor's representative, Archduke Ferdinand, remained adamant: the Catholics still possessed a majority in two of the three colleges of the Diet (four to three among the Electors, and thirty-three to fifteen among the princes; only the towns, who lacked a binding vote anyway, were predominantly Protestant). It was even rumoured that the archduke was plotting with Maximilian of Bavaria to launch an armed coup against the Diet if he failed to get his way. Although this did not materialize, in February 1608 the Catholics in the Princes' College introduced a motion calling for the restitution of all ecclesiastical lands secularized since 1552. This was intended to force the Protestants to offer concessions on other issues in order to have the measure withdrawn, but it in fact made their position untenable. In April the Palatine delegation, after submitting a formal protest to Ferdinand, walked out of the Diet. They were followed by the representatives of Brandenburg, Ansbach, Kulmbach, Baden-Durlach, Hesse-Kassel and Württemberg. Although the Saxon contingent, together with some others, remained, on 3 May Archduke Ferdinand reluctantly dissolved the Diet.

Eleven days later, in the chapterhouse of the secularized monastery of Auhausen (near Nördlingen), six leading Protestant princes (the Elector Palatine, Neuburg, Württemberg, Ansbach, Kulmbach and Baden-Durlach) signed an alliance, known as the Protestant Union, to last ten years, pledging mutual support in case of attack. To a large extent, the battle-lines which divided Germany during the 1620s were thus drawn. Most of those who defied Ferdinand in 1608 were to do so again; those who hesitated at Regensburg were also to hesitate later; the archduke's supporters were already counted. It is a source of wonderment, to historians as to contemporaries, that a general conflict did not break out between the already embattled parties in Germany for a whole decade after the 'Donauwörth Incident', despite several serious clashes. The explanation is to be found in the policies of certain states outside the Empire.

iii The Union, the League and the politics of Europe

The foundation of the Protestant Union initiated a new phase in the politics of the Empire: despite the continued efforts of many princes to make the older Imperial institutions function, confessional alliances now dominated the stage. As the alliances turned for support to their co-religionists abroad, so the traditional opposition to the involvement of foreign powers in the Empire came under increasing pressure, and Imperial politics and the international balance of power became closely intermeshed. Yet the revolution was never a complete one: while some princes considered a full-scale war

of religion to be inevitable, and others were frightened into confessional alliances by the apparent course of events, a few key figures (both within the Empire and without) still tried to prevent such a disaster. In consequence, the decade between the Donauwörth Incident and the outbreak of the Bohemian Revolution was characterized by a complicated and confused mixture of open brinkmanship and cautious defensiveness.

The need for confessional politics was most unreservedly accepted in the Rhine Palatinate. The conversion to Calvinism of the Elector Frederick III (1559–76), and the continuation of his policies by his younger son, Johann Casimir (regent, 1583–92), had made Heidelberg one of the major centres of the Reformed religion. To the Palatine court a remarkable group of Calvinist freelances and former Melanchthonian Lutherans had been attracted, of whom the most ambitious, and ultimately the most notorious, was Prince Christian of Anhalt-Bernburg. Anhalt was appointed governor of the Upper Palatinate in 1595, and the alcoholism and infirmity of the Elector Frederick IV (1592–1610) soon gave him more or less unchecked control over the conduct of Palatine foreign relations. His immigrant protégés—such as Ludwig Camerarius, the brothers Christoph and Achatius von Dohna, Vollrad von Plessen and Hippolytus von Colli—became increasingly prominent as agents of Palatine diplomacy, and the distinction between Palatine policy and Anhalt's own steadily diminished.

These Palatine activists shared a starkly ideological approach to European politics. Since the late 1560s, Heidelberg had been convinced of the existence of an international Catholic alliance led by the Habsburgs and the papacy which, once it had established a position of strength, would embark on a campaign to extirpate heresy throughout Europe. To the Palatine leaders, a major religious war seemed inevitable: to defend the Protestant cause the Catholic revival would have to be combated at every stage, not only within the Empire but also through the creation of an international Protestant alliance.[1] During the later decades of the sixteenth century the Palatines had repeatedly sought alliances with England, the Dutch rebels and the Huguenots of France; but by the end of the century their diplomatic effort had failed to achieve its end.

Their relations were closest with the Dutch Republic. Here the confessional bond was further cemented by personal and dynastic connexions on a number of levels and by a shared strategic interest in the Rhineland. In 1593 Frederick IV had married Louisa-Juliana, half-sister of Maurice of Nassau, the leader of the Dutch Republic. Her uncle, Count John VI of Nasau-Dillenburg, was a leading member of the Palatine Council until his death in 1606. John's brother-in-law, John Albert, count of Solms-Brauenfels, became Palatine court chamberlain in 1602. The dynastic link with the house of Nassau, which brought the Palatinate into the central nexus of European princely Calvinism, was supplemented by the service of a number of Palatine officers in the Dutch army.[2] The shared interest in the Rhineland had first emerged during the course of the war for Cologne and the Spanish invasion of Westphalia (page 13 above); by the beginning of the seventeenth century it had found a new focus in the disputed succession to the Catholic and childless John William, duke of Cleves-Jülich and Berg, count of Ravensburg and Mark.

The territories were divided in religion (Jülich was strongly Catholic, while Calvinists and Lutherans were plentiful in Cleves, Ravensburg and Mark); but both the leading claimants, Elector John Sigismund of Brandenburg and Philip Ludwig, duke of Pfalz-Neuburg, were Lutherans. The duchess, Antoinette of Lorraine, and the Jülich Estates

were determined to prevent a Protestant succession, and they had been given assurances of support by the Elector of Cologne and (in the 1580s) by Philip II of Spain.[3] The Dutch and the Palatines were equally anxious to prevent a Spanish occupation of the duchies. Owing to strained relations between Neuburg and the Palatinate, the candidate favoured by both the latter and the Dutch was Brandenburg: but the Elector was prevented from making a formal alliance by a long-standing compact with the ruling families of Saxony and Hesse (the *Erbverein*), which did not permit outside treaties.[4] The best that could be arranged was a private agreement between the three in April 1605, in which the Dutch, in return for loans of 100,000 thalers from Brandenburg and the Palatinate, promised to occupy Cleves-Jülich on John Sigismund's behalf when the duke died.

Anhalt's diplomatic endeavours were by no means confined to Germany, although Palatine relations with England and France were less encouraging. An invitation to James I on his accession in 1603 to become the head of an international Protestant alliance had been politely refused, and he displayed little interest in German affairs.[5] Relations with Henry IV had been complicated by his conversion to Catholicism (in 1593) and by the tension between the French crown and the Huguenots. In 1591, Anhalt himself had led a military expedition to Henry's assistance—and was still owed 1.3 million thalers for his expenses—but the king now regarded international Protestant connexions with suspicion.[6] The main aim of his foreign policy was the prevention of a new religious war in Europe that would jeopardize the hard-won and still fragile civil peace in France. While he was prepared to support the German princes against the emperor, he was less happy about the confessional trend in Palatine policy. His suspicions were confirmed by the Palatine protection of the Huguenot duke of Bouillon, an old friend of Anhalt's and the husband of another Nassau princess, who had fled to Heidelberg in 1602, following his implication in a conspiracy against the crown. When he returned to his seat at Sedan in 1606, Bouillon was accompanied by the future Frederick V, who completed his education there. In retaliation for this flagrant support of a rebel, Henry refused Anhalt's invitation to participate in the 1605 agreement over Cleves-Jülich.

With his ambitious diplomacy thwarted, Anhalt turned his attention to the creation of a purely German alliance. In 1607 he concluded a treaty between the Palatinate, his nephews the margraves of Ansbach and Kulmbach, and the city of Nuremberg—ostensibly for the protection of the Upper Palatinate against an attack from Bavaria. The occupation of Donauwörth six months later provided him with an opportunity to expand this alliance into something more significant. The Lutheran princes had previously been as much alarmed by Palatine activism as they were by the Counter-Reformation; but Elector Christian II of Saxony (1591–1611) had refused to sponsor a Lutheran confessional alliance. In the absence of the Saxon leadership, the most active Lutheran prince was Pfalz-Neuburg, whose uncomfortable proximity to Bavaria, claim to the Cleves-Jülich succession, and enmity to the Palatinate made him all the more anxious to see a firm stand taken. To counter the Palatinate-Netherlands-Brandenburg agreement of 1605, he had created his own alliance with the duke of Württemberg and the margrave of Baden-Durlach, both for mutual def ence and f or the protection of his interests in Cleves-Jülich. This alliance was aimed as much against Heidelberg as against Munich: but the occupation of Donauwörth persuaded Philip Ludwig that Maximilian was the greater threat. After the collapse of the Regensburg Diet in April 1608 he agreed to Ansbach's proposal that he merge his alliance into a wider Union. Neuburg's 1605 treaty provided

the basis for the constitution of the Auhausen alliance (page 22 above)—the main differences being the exclusion of any commitment to support the claimants to the Cleves-Jülich succession and the addition of clauses on the one hand discouraging theological controversy between Lutherans and Calvinists and on the other limiting the duration of the alliance to ten years.

Yet the future of the Protestant Union was by no means clear. Apart from an implicit commitment to mutual defence against Bavaria, the alliance did not embody a common political programme. Of the eight founder-members, only Ansbach and (more hesitantly) Württemberg and Baden shared the Palatine conviction that a major religious conflict was inevitable. A general invitation to all the Protestant states of the Empire had been issued from Auhausen; but by the spring of 1609 only the counts of Oettingen and the cities of Strasbourg, Ulm and Nuremberg had applied to join. Nor did Anhalt's simultaneous attempt to expand the Union into an international alliance get very far. The Union Assembly at Rothenburg in August 1608 rejected his proposal to include Henry IV, while further invitations to James I, the Dutch Republic and Christian IV of Denmark were deferred.[7] Thereupon, Anhalt—initiating what was to become a constant and ultimately disastrous trend in Union politics—decided to proceed independently. In the autumn of 1608 the Palatine Council voted to seek a marriage between Prince Frederick and James I's daughter Elizabeth, while Anhalt himself encouraged his friend Tschernembl, leader of the Austrian Protestant Estates, to look to the Union for support against his Habsburg overlord, if required.

The long-awaited demise of John William of Cleves-Jülich on 25 March 1609, fifteen days before the Twelve Years' Truce brought the war between Spain and the Dutch Republic to a temporary end, presented the alliance with its first test. Neuburg and Brandenburg immediately sent representatives to the duke's seat at Düsseldorf to claim possession of the duchies. They were resisted by the widowed duchess (supported by the Jülich Estates), and on 2 April Rudolf II ordered that she was to remain as regent until he had resolved the succession dispute. The confidence of Neuburg and Brandenburg (now known as the 'princes pretendant') in the emperor's impartiality had been destroyed by the Donauwörth affair, however, and in June they agreed to seek independent arbitration and to govern jointly in the meantime. Rudolf declared this agreement invalid and commissioned his cousin Archduke Leopold, bishop of Strasbourg and Passau, to assist the duchess, empowering him to call, if necessary, on military assistance from the Spanish Netherlands. Leopold took command of the Catholic garrison of the fortress of Jülich on 23 July but then found himself blockaded by troops raised by the claimants.

Neither side wished to initiate hostilities: but Leopold's mobilization of reinforcements in the diocese of Passau, his visit to Brussels in October, and the foundation of the Catholic League (see below), all convinced the princes of the Union that their fears of a second Donauwörth affair were justified. In May 1609 the Union had agreed that while the alliance was not committed to support the claimants, members should provide assistance individually if requested; in November a meeting of the leading princes agreed to recommend to the next full Assembly that the Union as a body should reinforce the princes pretendant with 5,000 men. The justifications for intervention were outlined by the Palatine councillor Michael Loefenius:

> Even if the Jülich affair does not in itself involve the Union, the members should still do something immediately to ensure that those lands be preserved for the Protestant princes. If the lands were held by those princes, a good part of the Rhineland would be joined to the Union, while great dangers would result if they fell into the hands of the Spaniards. If the princes were left helpless, great damage would be done to the Union's reputation. When Protestant estates, like Donauwörth, whom the Union is not pledged to assist, are threatened by dangerous practices, it is the case that all the Protestant estates are limbs of one holy body and that the illness of one will affect the others. Help for Jülich will, therefore, benefit the inhabitants of Donauwörth and others in similar situations.[8]

Earlier in the autumn Brandenburg and Hesse-Kassel had tried to persuade Christian II of Saxony to support the claimants. When he refused, they declared the *Erbverein* terminated and applied to join the Union. In December Anhalt himself went to Paris to discuss French intervention with Henry IV; simultaneously, other approaches were made to James I and the States-General.

The Union's intervention was confirmed by the Assembly held at Schwäbisch Hall in January and February 1610—but not without some significant debate. Ansbach welcomed intervention with the confident assertion that 'with Donauwörth, the whole burden lay on us; but with Jülich, we will bring in France, the States-General, England and others'. But only he and Baden supported Anhalt's proposal that the Union commit itself publicly to the cause of the princes.[9] Hesse-Kassel, Württemberg and Neuburg, worried that a major conflict might result, wanted only an informal agreement to provide military assistance. On 4 February, Anhalt revealed Henry IV's offer to send troops to the siege of Jülich and to mount major diversionary campaigns in the Netherlands and northern Italy to prevent Spanish intervention. As he had hoped, this offer temporarily pacified those members who feared an open confrontation with Spain, and the Assembly in the end agreed to adopt the proposal to raise 5,000 men. The expenses incurred in the levy were to be considered a loan to Brandenburg and Neuburg.

The intervention of Henry IV transformed the Cleves-Jülich affair from an Imperial to an international crisis. At the time, the English diplomat Sir Ralph Winwood considered the king's decision to be 'a deeper mystery than every man's capacity can conceive and a project more strange than any man (I think) will easily believe'.[10] Henry's motives have remained the subject of considerable debate, but the theories most often advanced—the implementation of a Grand Design, or the flight of Charlotte de Montmorency to Brussels in November 1609—provide less convincing an explanation of his decision than do the continuing dilemmas of French foreign policy. The crisis over Cleves-Jülich threatened to provoke the European religious war Henry feared so much; by intervening in force, he could regain control of the Union before the situation got out of hand. In this respect, the conditions attached to his offer of military support, which included a demand that the Union sever its contacts with the Huguenots, are revealing. In the event, the wider war did not take place. Spain decided not to endanger the Twelve Years' Truce by intervening in Germany, while the assassination of Henry IV on 14 May 1610 brought the more ambitious French manoeuvres to a halt. Military operations were limited to a short siege of Jülich by a composite army of French, Dutch, English and Union troops; Archduke

Leopold surrendered on 1 September. Nevertheless, the impact of the crisis, both upon the Union and upon the Empire as a whole, was considerable.

The willingness of the Union to resort to force in 1609–10 finally persuaded the leading ecclesiastical princes (who had resisted earlier appeals for a Catholic alliance from the bishop of Würzburg and the papal agent in Germany, the Palatine *émigré* Caspar Scioppius) to take measures for their own defence. During the sixteenth century the dukes of Bavaria had sponsored several confessional associations, but the last of these, the League of Landsberg, had been dissolved in 1599 as a consequence of the near-bankruptcy of Bavaria after the War of Cologne. Maximilian, made cautious by his father's experience, would only agree to a new alliance if he were provided with guarantees that the financial burden would be more equally shared. In the treaty of Munich, signed on 10 July 1609, the members of the new Catholic League gave Maximilian control over a centralized war-chest and command over any troops raised. The original members—Archduke Leopold, the bishops of Würzburg, Augsburg, Regensburg and Constance, the abbot of Kempten and the prior of Ellwangen—were all near-neighbours to Bavaria; but in the autumn, fear of war in the Rhineland brought in the bishops of Speyer, Worms and Bamberg and, most significantly, the three ecclesiastical Electors. At this point, both the Electors of Cologne and Mainz exchanged French for Spanish pensions.[11]

But the League hesitated over intervention in the Cleves-Jülich crisis. Despite Archduke Leopold's appeals for assistance and Maximilian's willingness to support him, the majority of the prince-bishops regarded the alliance as defensive in purpose and were unwilling to go to war unless directly threatened. Nor did the subsidies Maximilian had requested from Philip III and the papacy arrive until August 1610. In September, fear that the war might spread after the fall of Jülich caused the League to mobilize an army of 19,000; but on 24 October, when it became clear that the Union had no further military ambitions, Maximilian agreed to a truce. On the other hand, the foundation of the League inspired a dramatic expansion of the Union's membership. The January 1610 Assembly saw the addition of Brandenburg, Hesse-Kassel, the brothers of Christian of Anhalt, the duke of Pfalz-Zweibrücken and thirteen Free Cities from the south and south-west. The now numerically superior urban contingent provided a substantial reinforcement to the more cautious princes, for the cities were predominantly Lutheran and had joined primarily out of fear of Bavaria and the League; they were uneasy about Anhalt's adventurous politics and highly conscious of their vulnerability to retaliation. The constitution adopted at the Assembly to deal with the new composition of the Union—which gave them only eight votes to the princes' twelve—did little to assuage their fears.[12]

These fears were not unjustified, for Anhalt was led by his apparent success in the Cleves-Jülich affair to make some major miscalculations. Unlike the approaches to Henry IV, those made by the Union to James I and the Dutch Republic had met with a cautious response. The Dutch (like Spain) were unwilling to jeopardize the Twelve Years' Truce by a costly unilateral intervention, despite the 1605 agreement, and did not commit troops until after Henry IV had mobilized.[13] James I had initially intended to offer his services as a mediator; only after he learnt of the French decision did he offer to send some English troops in the Dutch army. Anhalt, however, had been listening to Winwood and

other English diplomats who viewed the crisis in the same terms that he did. On 17 October 1609 Winwood had written to the earl of Salisbury that:

> The issue of this whole business, if slightly considered, may seem trivial and ordinary, but duly examined with all the consequences necessarily ensuing (if freely I may deliver my poor judgement) doth, as it shall be carried, uphold or cast down the greatness of the house of Austria and the church of Rome in these quarters.[14]

Fortified by the belief that an international Protestant alliance was there for the making, the Union princes had rejected Henry IV's terms in February 1610 and had decided instead to offer the presidency of the Union, together with a Palatine marriage alliance, to James I.[15]

An initial embassy to England in the spring of 1610 met with a cold response; a personal mission by Anhalt himself in October was no more successful. What caused James to change his mind and revise his opinions about the utility of a Palatine alliance was the course of events in France following the death of Henry IV, particularly the Franco-Spanish marriage treaty of March 1611. For a brief period in 1611–12 he took seriously the possibility that an international Catholic conspiracy had been created, and resolved to counteract it. The Anglo-Palatine marriage was arranged by the duke of Bouillon in the spring of 1611, and in the autumn James agreed to make a six-year defensive alliance with the Union. Although he declined to become its president, he encouraged the Union to make similar alliances with the United Provinces and Christian IV of Denmark. The Anglo-Union treaty was signed at Wesel in April 1612, the Netherlands-Union treaty at The Hague in May 1613.[16]

These international alliances became the corner-stone of Anhalt's future diplomacy, but they were only achieved at the expense of increased tension within the Union. The brinkmanship of 1610 had frightened the cities, and the Dutch treaty (which they feared would involve them in a renewed Dutch-Spanish war) was ratified by the princes in 1614 in spite of their objections. They were also unhappy about the tendency of Anhalt and his allies to conduct the Union's diplomacy secretly and informally.[17] Their fears were shared by the smaller Lutheran princes, particularly Oettingen, Kulmbach and Neuburg: by 1613 the latter were seriously considering resignation. Neuburg's disenchantment was reinforced by the open rejection of his claims to direct the regency of the Palatinate following the death of Frederick IV on 8 September 1610. Suspicious of the Brandenburg-Palatine association, he looked increasingly to Saxony, Bavaria and the emperor to protect his claims to Cleves-Jülich. In 1613 he finally broke with the Union by remaining at the abortive Diet of Regensburg after the departure of the other Union representatives. His son Wolfgang William went further and converted to Catholicism on 19 July 1613—later in the year he married Maximilian's sister (see Plate 3). According to one contemporary report, Philip Ludwig 'strongly regretted and detested the apostasy of his son, but, considering that he had thrown himself into the arms of the papists to obtain his rights and claims, he avowed all, as if he had done well'.[18] The Cleves-Jülich crisis had also converted Christian II of Saxony (who had been appointed Imperial arbitrator in July 1610) and his son John George into open enemies of the Union. The Electors' hostility now prevented the Union from recruiting any of Saxony's client states in the

north and north-east. Only Brandenburg drew closer; the conversion of John Sigismund to Calvinism in 1613 was followed three years later by the marriage of his son George William to Frederick V's sister Elizabeth (see Table 2).

Despite the growing dissensions in its ranks, Anhalt still hoped to use the Union to exploit the weaknesses of Imperial authority. He had seen the long struggle between Rudolf II and his brother Matthias for control of the Habsburg lands as the opportunity both to prevent the election of Rudolf's other brother, Archduke Albert, ruler of the Spanish Netherlands, as his successor—Albert was a particular *bête noire* of Anhalt's—and to create an Imperial interregnum, in which the Elector Palatine, as the senior prince of the Empire, would play a leading role in Imperial affairs.[19] But Anhalt was unsure whether it would be more advantageous to offer the support of the Union to the weakened Rudolf or to the ostensibly more accommodating Matthias. He vacillated between the two, and the sudden death of Rudolf on 20 January 1612 and the uncontested succession of Matthias took him by surprise.

The election of Matthias provided an opportunity for his new chancellor, Melchior Khlesl, bishop of Vienna, to attempt to halt the drift toward confessional confrontation by reviving the traditional Imperial alliance with Mainz and Saxony. Khlesl wished to see both religious alliances dissolved and the League then converted into a wider non-confessional body under Imperial presidency which would include the Lutherans and, hopefully, isolate the Palatinate. He tried to win over such discontented Union members as Neuburg and Kulmbach and even offered Ansbach the command of the Imperial army in Hungary. The Union, however, stood firm. The Assembly at Rothenburg in March 1613 voted not to disband while the League was still in existence, and to ensure that a number of long-standing grievances were rectified. These now included the abolition of the *reservatum ecclesiasticum* (page 17 above), the restoration of independence to Donauwörth, and the recognition of the religious liberty of Aachen—where in 1612, after several years of agitation supported by the Union, a Catholic magistracy installed by Spanish troops in 1598 had been overthrown.[20] The Union representatives walked out of the Diet at Regensburg in August 1613, immediately after it opened, when it became clear that, while some judicial reforms might be made, their main demands would not be met.

Khlesl's proposals had a more immediate impact on the League. The League's membership had further expanded following the election of pro-Bavarian prelates in Salzburg and Eichstätt in 1612, but at the same time Maximilian's presidency was being increasingly challenged. The ecclesiastical Electors were highly conscious of their constitutional position, particularly Johann Schweikart von Kronberg of Mainz, the Imperial arch-chancellor, and, under his influence, the other Electors demanded the decentralization of the League into an Upper German directorate led by Bavaria and a Rhenish directorate under Mainz. Maximilian regarded decentralization with mixed feelings; but he was decidedly more unhappy about Mainz's further demand for Habsburg participation, which Philip III of Spain had also made a condition for his subsidy. Habsburg involvement, Maximilian considered, would turn the League into an instrument of Imperial policy and commit it to the subsidizing of wider Habsburg interests.[21] At the League Assembly held simultaneously with the Diet of Regensburg in 1613, Khlesl and Mainz managed to persuade a majority of the members to accept both decentralization and Imperial participation: Archduke Maximilian, the emperor's brother,

was admitted, and a third directorate, the Austrian, created for him. Maximilian of Bavaria had strongly opposed this step, for he now regarded Habsburg participation as a means for Khlesl to achieve his ambition of opening the membership to Lutherans.[22] To protect his own position, in March 1614 he formed a private alliance with his particular followers: the wealthy and geographically compact ecclesiastical principalities of Würzburg, Bamberg, Eichstätt and Ellwangen.

Decentralization made the League an ineffective instrument. During the second Cleves-Jülich crisis of 1614, its response was disorganized and hesitant. Moreover, there were also serious disputes between the two Maximilians over the membership of the new Austrian directorate, particularly regarding the wealthy Swabian bishoprics, which Maximilian of Bavaria wished to retain in his own directorate. As a consequence of these and other discontents, he resigned from the League at the beginning of 1616. His departure removed the League's guiding genius, and when Matthias issued a formal demand for the dissolution of both alliances, in April 1617, Mainz and Archduke Maximilian disbanded it with the agreement of the membership. In the following month, Maximilian of Bavaria, at the request of his allies of 1614, created a purely local and private defence pact for mutual protection against the Union.[23]

Yet by then, the Union's weaknesses had also been fully exposed by the revival of tensions over the Cleves-Jülich settlement. In May 1614, deteriorating relations between Brandenburg and Neuburg caused the Dutch commander of the joint Neuburg-Brandenburg garrison of Jülich, Colonel Pithan, to summon Dutch reinforcements. Wolfgang William, suspecting a Dutch-Brandenburg conspiracy, then seized control of Düsseldorf and Pithan dismissed the Neuburgers from Jülich. The States-General attempted to mediate, but in August, at Wolfgang William's request, 15,000 troops from the Spanish Netherlands entered the duchies to secure Neuburg's control over the other towns.[24] As in 1609, the Dutch were unwilling to intervene on their own, but this time neither England nor France was prepared to take military action. Both James I (increasingly under the influence of the new Spanish ambassador in London, Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, the future count of Gondomar) and Marie de Medici (unwilling to jeopardize the Franco-Spanish marriage treaty) sought instead to mediate in the dispute. Only after the Spaniards captured the important Rhine crossing at Wesel did the Dutch mobilize. Neither side wished for a war, however, and a truce was made quickly at Xanten; after English and French envoys had intervened, the truce became a full treaty in November. The government of the duchies, pending a final settlement, was now divided: Brandenburg received Cleves and Mark; Neuburg secured Jülich and Berg. Less easy to arrange was the mutual evacuation of the Spanish and Dutch armies and, despite repeated efforts by James I in 1615 and 1616, the Dutch remained in Jülich and the Spaniards in Wesel.

The second Cleves-Jülich crisis had a number of ramifications. For James I, it was a comparatively successful settlement of a potentially dangerous dispute, in concert with France and Spain, and he was encouraged to see himself as the mediator of future crises rather than as the leader of a confessional bloc. For others in England, the United Provinces and Germany, the price of mediation appeared to be the surrender of Protestant interests. Frederick V reminded James that Spanish occupation of the duchies created an effective barrier to the military cooperation between the United Provinces and the Palatinate upon which the Union's security ultimately rested.[25]

Within the alliance, the crisis brought the tension between the cities and the princes to a head. In 1615 the cities flatly refused to support a war over Brandenburg's claims in Cleves-Jülich and the Elector was advised to seek future military assistance from the Dutch. The full effects, however, were felt two years later. In April 1617 the Union held a major Assembly at Heilbronn to formulate the terms for the renewal of the original treaty which was due to expire the following year. Since 1610 the composition of the alliance had stabilized: only two further small cities had joined; Neuburg and one city had resigned; and a limited treaty had been made with the princes of the Lower Saxon Circle—who were growing increasingly worried about the security of their secularized ecclesiastical estates. More significantly, many of the princes, especially Brandenburg, Ansbach, Württemberg and Baden, were heavily in arrears with their contributions and the alliance was now financially dependent on those of the cities. Led by Nuremberg, Ulm and Strasbourg, the urban representatives did not hesitate to use their financial power to dictate the terms of the new treaty. The cities were given a veto over future military action by the alliance; the Union was prohibited from providing support for claims to other than the existing territories of its members; and, expressly to prevent any involvement in a renewal of the Dutch-Spanish war, the alliance was to last only until 14 May 1621, rather than 1625 as the princes had desired.[26] Brandenburg's interests in Cleves-Jülich were thus clearly excluded, and the Elector resigned soon afterwards.

The loss of one of the two leading princes and the increased power of the cities made the Union a much less impressive alliance than it had previously been; but, to Anhalt, its weakness was counterbalanced by the demise of the League. In any case his attention was drawn once more to the Habsburg menace. During the invasion of Jülich the Spanish commander, Ambrosio Spínola, had been granted an Imperial commission to restore the Catholic magistracy to Aachen—an action that confirmed the Palatines in their suspicion that no Habsburg emperor would hesitate to use Spanish troops within the Empire, and convinced them that a non-Habsburg successor to Matthias would have to be found.[27] Their conviction was reinforced in 1617 by the discovery of the Habsburg family compact to support the candidacy of Archduke Ferdinand of Styria (page 37 below): Anhalt later commented that he would rather see a Turk or the Devil elected.[28] He may at one stage have hoped to see Frederick V crowned: James I later claimed that a scheme for the election of Frederick had been proposed to him in October 1610.[29] But there was no possibility of obtaining a majority for Frederick in the Electoral College and, in the hope of dividing the Catholic Electors, the Palatines turned instead to sponsoring the candidacy of Maximilian of Bavaria. Between 1616 and 1618 a long series of discussions was held between Heidelberg and Munich. Maximilian, however, could not be persuaded to act as a front for the Protestants, while both James I and Louis XIII made it clear that they would not support interference with the election of a Habsburg.[30]

When the negotiations with Bavaria reached a stalemate, Anhalt returned to his earlier strategy of striking at the root of Imperial power by encouraging the Protestant Estates of Austria and Bohemia. During the winter of 1616–17 both Camerarius and Christoph von Dohna were sent to Prague to strengthen the contacts between Heidelberg and the Bohemian Protestants.[31] At the same time Anhalt had grown increasingly interested in forming an anti-Habsburg front in northern Italy with Venice and Savoy. His agents had been active in Venice since her great quarrel with the papacy in 1605–8; and, although Charles Emmanuel of Savoy had been distrusted in Calvinist circles since the 'Escalade'

(his attempted assault on Geneva in 1602), the wars between Savoy and Spain over Montferrat between 1613 and 1617 suggested that he might be willing to join an anti-Habsburg alliance. Moreover, James I had been encouraging the Palatines to cultivate Savoy, while the attraction of closing the Alpine passes to Spain was difficult to resist.[32] In 1617, a former associate of Ansbach's, Ernest, count of Mansfeld, was permitted, as a gesture of good-will, to recruit a regiment for Charles Emmanuel in the territories of the Union.

By 1618, therefore, Anhalt was returning to the brinkmanship of 1609–10, though this time he was not dealing with two small, if strategically important, duchies but with the future of the Empire. From his perspective, however, the challenge to the Habsburgs was not necessarily a desperate gamble. If recent events had exposed the weaknesses of the Union, he could take satisfaction from the collapse of the League amid internal discord. And if his foreign allies, particularly England and France, had proved to be less reliable than he had hoped, the dangers of acting in isolation could be set against the fact that a major war was due to recommence in the Low Countries on the expiration of the Twelve Years' Truce in 1621. England, if not France as well, would be forced to take the anti-Habsburg side. What he did not foresee was that the timing of his plans would be upset by the arrival, in May 1618, of unexpected and dramatic news from Prague.

iv The gathering storm

Rudolf II was broken in mind and body by his deposition in May 1611: in January 1612, barely sixty years old, he died. Later that year his brother and heir, Matthias, was elected Holy Roman Emperor and thus reunited under one sceptre all the lands and titles that Rudolf had once held. But his credentials for high office were not good. In 1577, despite the express prohibition of his family, he had journeyed secretly from Vienna to Brussels to become titular head of the Netherlands rebels against Philip II. But he found his position, in the words of a close adviser, 'a labyrinth, from which he expects his deeds to earn little thanks'. He was right: in 1581 he was forced by his own subjects to resign. Next, Matthias went to Linz to serve as governor of Upper Austria for his brother. He was advised, to Rudolf s dismay, by several Calvinists, and in 1586–7 he went on a tour of northern Europe including Protestant Denmark. In 1590 he moved his residence from Linz to Vienna, where his Reformed sympathies gradually declined as he came under the influence of Melchior Khlesl, bishop of Vienna; but he still lacked appeal in the eyes of hardline Catholics. His conduct in 1608, playing off emperor against local Estates in order to win support for his cause, appalled Archduke Ferdinand of Styria: 'All Catholics very much lament it,' he wrote, 'but the Protestants are delighted.'[1]

Ferdinand, of course, had a vested interest in maintaining Imperial prestige: he regarded himself as next in line of succession, after the childless Matthias, both for the Imperial crown and for Austria, Bohemia and Hungary. But not everyone agreed, not even all members of the House of Habsburg. His relatives, and their advisers, found him too dependent on the Jesuits. The rector at Ingolstadt University, where Ferdinand's Bavarian mother had sent him, smugly observed of the young prince that 'nothing sown in this fertile soil seems to perish'; and in 1616 an exasperated Khlesl, trying to negotiate with Ferdinand over the succession, complained to Matthias that The court of Graz is

ruled as much by the counsel of the Jesuits as by that of his advisers; they are with, around, and about the archduke day and night.[2] And if this exemplary piety irritated his Habsburg cousins, it terrified the Protestants. Many of those expelled from Inner Austria in 1599–1600 had taken refuge in Bohemia and issued warnings of what Ferdinand's rule could mean; and before long the Court of Graz was in touch with beleaguered Catholics in other Habsburg provinces, encouraging firmness and welcoming converts. In Lower Austria, for example, the number of Catholic nobles rose from one-tenth to almost one-quarter of the total between 1580 and 1610, and in the latter year (much to Ferdinand's delight) sixty of them signed a league of association 'for the defence of God Almighty's faith and church'.[3] In the bishopric of Olomouc, covering much of Moravia, Cardinal Franz von Dietrichstein improved clerical standards, reformed monasteries and founded a seminary in order to strengthen the Roman Church; he also strove ceaselessly to inconvenience the local Protestants. In all aspects of his Counter-Reformation he had the full support of the Court of Graz.[4] But after 1612 Ferdinand's religious zeal was tempered by three related political difficulties: the succession; the hostilities in northern Italy; and the threat of renewed war in the Netherlands.

At the centre of each problem was Spain. No sooner was Matthias crowned emperor than Philip III began discussions on the succession with his Austrian relatives. In October 1612, the king put forward his claim, as the only male grandchild of Maximilian II, to succeed to the Imperial title. He declared himself ready to waive these rights in favour of Ferdinand, but only in return for the cession of Alsace, Tyrol and certain Imperial territories in Italy. The price seemed too high to the archduke, and no agreement was reached; but when talks about the succession were resumed five years later, Ferdinand's bargaining position vis-à-vis Spain was far weaker. In 1615 a Venetian army with substantial Dutch and English reinforcements had begun the 'uzkok war' by laying siege to the archduke's city of Gradisca, and Ferdinand stood in desperate need of Spanish assistance.

The uzkok war was one of the more bizarre episodes of the earlier seventeenth century, yet it offered an alarming example of how a minor political conflict in a remote corner of Europe could threaten to engulf the whole continent with war. The defence of the Austrian frontier with the Turks was partially in the hands of refugees from the Balkans who had fled to the Habsburg lands: they were called 'uzkoks' (the Serbian word for 'refugees'). Some of them settled in the small ports of the eastern Adriatic, especially Zengg (Segna, captured in 1537), and kept the area free of Turkish shipping. Unf ortunately f or Ferdinand, his vassals kept the area free of Christian shipping, too: no one was safe from their piratical attacks, and Venetian merchantmen were a particularly frequent target. At first the Republic spent heavily on escorts for its fleets, on watch-towers, and on armament, appointing a special *capitano contra gli uscocchi* from 1575; but the cost soon became prohibitive (120,000 thalers annually in the 1590s, 200,000 in the 1600s, 360,000 by 1615). In addition, the uzkoks were now joined by others, including Spanish corsairs operating from the kingdom of Naples, so that, to a contemporary chronicler, it 'seemed as though all who sailed the sea had joined together in a plot to plunder Venetian shipping'.[5]

The Republic, somewhat unexpectedly, decided that the best form of defence was attack, and in December 1615 their forces crossed the Isonzo to besiege Gradisca. At the same time Venetian envoys abroad orchestrated a major diplomatic campaign for allies in

the struggle against Ferdinand. In September 1616 Count John Ernest of Nassau-Siegen agreed to raise 3,000 men in the Dutch Republic for Venetian service against the archduke, and they arrived in May of the following year; six months later, some 2,000 more came, together with a contingent of English volunteers. Meanwhile a flotilla of ten English and twelve Dutch warships sailed into the Adriatic to prevent any aid from Spanish Naples reaching Ferdinand. No assistance could come to the archduke from Spanish Milan either, because of the outbreak of the 'war of Mantua'.

Mantua was an Imperial fief which could only be inherited by males so, when Duke Francis died in 1612 leaving a daughter but no sons, the state passed to his brother Ferdinand (see Table 1). But Montferrat, ruled by the Gonzaga dukes of Mantua for generations, apparently had no such restriction: succession through the female line was permitted. The state was therefore claimed by Francis's daughter, who solicited aid from the duke of Savoy (her grandfather).[6] Duke Ferdinand turned for support to the Habsburgs, but despite their assistance he was unable to secure all of Montferrat by the summer of 1615, when French diplomats negotiated a truce. But the following year, the French government (temporarily led by the bishop of Luçon, the future Cardinal Richelieu) and the Venetians of fered to support Savoy if he should invade Montferrat again, thus tying down Spanish forces. The duke recruited widely, and his army eventually included 4,000 German Protestants, raised with the consent of the Union leaders by Count Ernest of Mansfeld, and perhaps 10,000 French volunteers. Although the governor of Spanish Lombardy managed to hold his own against this motley assortment until papal mediation secured a peace in October 1617, he was unable to assist Archduke Ferdinand against Venice.

So the archduke seemed set for a resounding defeat. With only 4,000 men in arms, beleaguered Gradisca seemed doomed unless he could find the money to raise more. In fact, only Spain could produce the subsidies that would avoid surrender, and the cession of Alsace and two Imperial enclaves in Italy (Finale Liguria and Piombino) now seemed a cheap price to pay in return for Spanish recognition of himself as heir to Matthias and a cash provision of almost 1 million thalers.[7] Accordingly, in March 1617, Ferdinand and the Spanish ambassador to the Imperial court, Count Oñate, concluded an agreement that formalized these terms. Next, with Spanish support in his pocket, Ferdinand joined the Emperor Matthias in Vienna, and together they travelled to Dresden to see John George of Saxony, 'to discuss something important concerning the welfare of the Empire'—namely the succession.[8] The Elector was obliging, and the Habsburg cavalcade proceeded first to Prague, and then to Bratislava, where Ferdinand was accepted in turn by the Estates of Bohemia and Hungary as 'king designate'. Things seemed to be going the archduke's way. Faced with Spain's military and diplomatic pressure, the Venetians reached an agreement with Ferdinand in the course of 1618, by which many of the uzkok pirates were executed or exiled, and a permanent Austrian garrison was installed in Zengg. Inner Austria was safe at last.

The uzkok war, although apparently minor, was important because it brought a general European conflict perceptibly nearer. On the diplomatic plane, it either cemented or occasioned alliances that favoured aggression: the easy cooperation of the Protestant Union with Savoy and Venice, and the apparent readiness of England and the Dutch Republic to send military assistance to distant allies, raised the spirits of militant Protestants everywhere; while the impressive and prompt support provided to Ferdinand

by the king of Spain ended the decades of mistrust and misunderstanding that had divided the two main branches of the House of Habsburg. Even though Alsace never actually came into Spanish hands, the Oñate treaty created a framework within which Vienna and Madrid could work together to secure their joint interests both north and south of the Alps. Therein, however, lay a logistical problem: how could intention be turned into action? How could troops from Austria reach Lombardy, and vice versa? The western passes through the mountains were controlled by the hostile duke of Savoy; the central ones by the powerful but neutral Swiss cantons. Only the Alpine crossings controlled by the Protestant Grey Leagues (Graubünden), not yet a part of the Swiss confederation, seemed to offer a possible link between Spanish Lombardy and Habsburg Tyrol, thus affording access (if needed) to Alsace, Lorraine and eventually the Low Countries (see Map 2). There was, moreover, a major weakness in the Grey Leagues' position: the Catholic corridor of the Valtelline, which ran directly between Lake Como and the Inn. Already in 1572 and 1607 there had been revolts by the Catholics of the Valtelline against their Protestant masters, while in 1603 the Spanish government had constructed a major redoubt at the entrance to the valley: the 'Fuentes fort' (called after its founder, the count of Fuentes, who ruled Spanish Lombardy with a rod of iron from 1600 to 1610).[9] In 1618 there were further demonstrations by the Valtelliners against their Protestant masters which were so savagely repressed that many of the Catholic leaders were forced to flee to Innsbruck and Milan. There they set about convincing the representatives of both branches of the Habsburg family that a Catholic restoration was in their interest. They succeeded: in July 1620, while Habsburg troops sealed off both ends of the Valtelline, the Protestants of the area were massacred in a new rising and the Spaniards then marched in, creating a safe military corridor from Lombardy to Austria and northern Europe.

The new itinerary was urgently needed. The Twelve Years' Truce signed by Philip III in 1609 had not proved popular in Spain. Although the fighting ended in the Netherlands, enabling the Army of Flanders to be cut to a peace-time strength of 15,000, and although Dutch piracy in the North Sea virtually ceased, there was no reduction in the Republic's attacks on the Iberian overseas empires. Forts were established on the coast of Guyana in South America, on the Hudson River in North America, on the Gold Coast in Africa, and in many parts of southern Asia under the overall direction of the Dutch East India Company. In 1615–16 a fleet of six large warships sailed westabout to the Moluccas, raiding several Spanish colonies in America and destroying whatever Spanish and Portuguese vessels crossed its path. With the aid of such brutal tactics, the Dutch were soon able to export twice as much Asiatic pepper—the most valuable commodity in the spice trade—as the Portuguese. If these developments caused anger in Madrid, Dutch support for Spain's opponents in Europe produced outrage. As early as December 1616, the council of state had resolved that if Dutch troops were sent to aid the duke of Savoy, Spain would resume the war in the Netherlands.[10] Although this threat did not materialize, in March 1618 Philip III's ministers initiated an internal debate on whether to renew the Twelve Years' Truce when it expired, three years later. It was noted from the outset that the Dutch had prospered astoundingly, and there was a general feeling that there should be no renewal unless the terms of the truce, especially regarding overseas trade, could be changed in Spain's favour. In the oft-quoted (because cogent) formulation of Don Carlos Coloma, a commander of the Army of Flanders: 'lf in twelve years of

peace the Dutch have undertaken and achieved all this, we can easily see what they will do if we give them more time… If the truce is continued, we shall condemn ourselves to suffer at once all the evils of peace and all the dangers of war.'[11] It was thus becoming clear that a major war would start in Europe in the spring of 1621, and most political observers knew it. The events of 1618 in Bohemia merely anticipated that general conflict, bringing together the incipient but separate crises which had already polarized opinion in the Empire and in the Habsburg heartland.

In the winter of 1617–18, with Ferdinand safely—and unconditionally—elected king-designate by the Bohemian and Hungarian Estates, the Imperial Court withdrew southwards to Vienna and left a committee of ten regents (seven of them staunch Catholics) to govern in Prague. Acting on orders from Ferdinand, the regents introduced a number of provocative measures: they established a censor's office in the capital to control printed literature; they prohibited the use of Catholic endowments to pay Protestant ministers; and they refused to admit non-Catholics to civil office. More inflammatory still, they ordered Protestant worship to stop in two towns—Broumov (Braunau) and Hroby (Klostergrab)—belonging to Catholic prelates (church lands were not specifically covered by the Letter of Majesty). Each of these measures increased the risk of a confrontation. Polyxena Lobkovic, wife of the chancellor of Bohemia, expressed the fears of many when she observed that 'Things were now swiftly coming to the pass where either the Papists would settle their score with the Protestants, or the Protestants with the Papists.[12]

The leading roles in the gathering crisis were played almost entirely by members of Bohemia's landholding elite: some 200 nobles and about 1,000 knights. But this elite was neither united nor stable. It has been calculated that of sixty-nine families of peers holding lands in 1557, thirty-seven had entirely died out by 1615, making way for new men, such as Chancellor Lobkovic, Cardinal Dietrichstein, or the leader of the 1617–18 council of regency, Vilém Slavata. Much has been made of this 'biological failure' of the Bohemian aristocracy; but more important by far was the fact that the surviving families, and their new colleagues, acquired an increasing share of the lands of the kingdom. The peers had held less than half the total seigneurial lands in 1529; by 1619 they owned almost three-quarters.

It was amongst these great landowners that the Catholic Church found most of its converts in the years before the revolt, and amongst them, too, that the Habsburgs' greatest supporters were numbered.[13] Those who stood up in 1618 for the Protestant religion and constitutional liberty tended to come from the ranks of the lesser nobles and the gentry, and they were acutely aware of their declining economic and political strength. Not least, they realized that their status under the Letter of Majesty was provisional. As Tschernembl, the leader of the Upper Austrian Estates, observed: 'what the prince can do, he can also undo.' It was to offset this inferiority that the Bohemian leaders began to search for allies abroad who would lend them moral—and, if necessary, political and even military—support. The list of contributors to the cost of building a new Protestant church in the Old Town of Prague in 1610—one of the three to be erected in the city after the Letter of Majesty—gives a good idea of where the Estates were looking for support. James I of England headed the list, with a donation of over 3,000 thalers; then came the Electors of Saxony, Brandenburg and the Palatinate, the rulers of Brunswick, Hesse and Württemberg, and so on. The list reads like a roll-call of important

Protestant princes, both Lutheran and Calvinist.[14] Nor was it merely religion that brought the Habsburgs' Protestant subjects into contact with foreign sympathizers: there was also the pursuit of education and learning. In 1622, Ferdinand blamed 'the subversive Calvinist schools' for the revolt of Bohemia, because the nobles of the kingdom had there, 'in their youth, imbibed the spirit of rebellion and opposition to lawful authority'.[15] In fact, well over 200 students from Bohemia and Moravia attended the universities of Heidelberg, Geneva and Basel between 1574 and 1620, 'imbibing' (among other works) Duplessis Mornay's *A Defence of Liberty against Tyrants* and Beza's *Rights of Rulers over Their Subjects*. It was a Moravian nobleman who in 1605 purchased Beza's entire library and took it home with him. Even more Bohemian students—over 300 in all—enrolled during the same period at the radical Lutheran universities of Jena (in Saxe-Weimar) and Altdorf (just outside Nuremberg): a dozen of them later became members of the rebel government. The professors of both institutions declared their support for the rebels' cause in 1619–20, and some even went so far as to criticize in public the pro-Habsburg stance of the universities of Leipzig and Wittenberg in Electoral Saxony. A degree from Jena or Altdorf must indeed have seemed to Ferdinand like a diploma in revolutionary studies![16]

The radical professors, however, were merely reflecting the prejudices of their powerful patrons. Jena constantly criticized Wittenberg because the dukes of Saxe-Weimar were implacable opponents of both the Habsburgs and Electoral Saxony.[17] Altdorf supported the cause of Bohemia because most of its students came from the nearby Upper Palatinate, governed from Amberg by Christian of Anhalt, the most active supporter of the anti-Habsburg cause, who propagated his policies by cultural as well as by political means. In 1617, at his suggestion, two literary societies with a distinctly Protestant bias were founded: the *Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft* (for the defence of the German tongue) at Weimar, and the *Ordre de la Palme d'Or* (for Calvinist nobles) at Amberg. Both soon came to include most of the supporters of Frederick V's bid for the Bohemian crown, many of them from outside the Empire.[18]

Naturally, the Bohemian leaders were much impressed by Anhalt and his network of powerful and cultured friends. When, in 1618, they rashly decided to resist the emperor, without doubt they expected the mobilization of massive foreign support for their cause, much as had been done in 1616 and 1617 for Venice. But there was a fatal flaw in their calculations. Although viewed from Amberg, or Prague, a correspondent with similar tastes and beliefs might appear a political ally in peacetime, events were to show that there was a wide gap between intent and action when it came to war; and likewise it became clear that, whereas support for an independent state was permissible among the nations of Europe, support for rebels was not.

II
The indecisive war, 1618–1629

The events of the 1620s present historians of the Thirty Years' War with their greatest problem. On the one hand, the unprecedented success of the Catholic powers must be explained; on the other, the tortuous course of the Protestants' road to defeat must also be analysed. The latter task is the more difficult, because of the fragmentation of the Protestants' efforts. Until 1621, to be sure, there was a single focus to the struggle—the question of Bohemia; but, in that year, the war between Spain and the Dutch Republic resumed and Protestant Sweden attacked Catholic Poland. Although the progress of both these new conflicts was intimately connected with the evolution of the war in Germany, on the whole, until the end of the decade, they were conducted separately. Furthermore, in 1624, France intervened for the first time: she became involved in two of the existing wars, and she started an entirely new one of her own, in northern Italy and the Alpine valleys. But her participation was always intermittent and unpredictable. First there were the internal disorders caused by dissident nobles and militant Protestants; then there were the struggles of various power-groups for control of affairs. Both made a consistent foreign policy almost impossible to implement.

But France by no means stood alone in inconsistency. Most of the states which intervened in the war at this time also felt doubt about their grounds for doing so. Some political leaders perceived an international conspiracy ranged against them, drawn up along confessional lines and aimed at extirpating not only their liberty but also the entire religion to which they belonged. Others, however, claimed that the war was fought only f or the sake of Frederick of the Palatinate—either to win him the title 'king of Bohemia' or, later, to win back his Electoral status. Factions which espoused these rival views could be found at almost every court of Europe. In France, the Catholic extremists (known as the *dévots*) called for intervention in favour of the emperor in order to stem the Protestant tide, while in England, the Puritan leaders in Parliament urged their reluctant king to fight manfully for 'the Protestant cause'.[1] It was the same elsewhere: in Spain, in the Netherlands, in Sweden, in the princely courts of Germany (even in those of the principal antagonists, Frederick and Ferdinand) the interventionists and the isolationists wrestled. And since both interpretations were justifiable, and indeed seemed from time to time to be justified by events, no individual faction was able to monopolize the foreign policy of its government for long. That is why the course of European diplomacy in the 1620s (and to a lesser extent in the 1630s) is littered with repudiated negotiations and unratified treaties. That is also why the history of the first decade of the Thirty Years' War, which will be surveyed in this chapter mainly from the Protestants' standpoint, is so complicated.

i The war for Bohemia

The Defensors appointed in 1609 to maintain the precarious religious balance in Bohemia summoned a meeting of the Estates of the realm for 5 March 1618 to discuss the regents' anti-Protestant policies. There was particular concern about the grant of crown lands (protected by the Letter of Majesty) to Catholic prelates (who were apparently not bound by the Letter). Since 132 'royal' parishes had been transferred to the archbishop of Prague alone since 1611, the status of such lands under the Letter of Majesty was a question of some significance. The Prague assembly accordingly sent an urgent petition to the emperor asking for a change of policy. Matthias refused, and instead called on the delegates to disperse. Although they did so, it was agreed that a further meeting should be held in two months to consider developments. On 23 May, after only two days of debate, the assembly was again ordered to disperse at once. Since the command, which appeared to be unconstitutional (such meetings were certainly permitted by the royal concessions of 1609 and 1611), emanated from the council of regents which sat in the Hradschin, the incensed delegates marched to the palace, entered the council chamber, and (in conscious imitation of the events that began the Hussite revolution in 1418) hurled two of the most outspoken Catholic regents, and their secretary, out of the window. Next, the delegates appointed a provisional government of thirty-six Directors and authorized the levy of a small army, as had been done in 1611. For the third time in ten years, the Bohemians were in revolt.

News of the 'defenestration of Prague' struck most European courts like a bolt from the blue. All the diplomats attached to the Imperial court had followed Matthias from Prague to Vienna at the end of 1617, and so their dispatches over the winter contained scarcely a hint of the worsening crisis in Bohemia. When they heard the news, they tended to overreact. The Spanish ambassador, Count Oñate (who had only been in that post for one year), believed at first that 'The gravity of the offence, and the ease with which they have attained their object, will make them resolve to finish off what they have begun.' And his letters to Madrid—where news of the defenestration only arrived on 6 July—continued to exude an atmosphere of panic. By January 1619 Oñate had decided that only the arrival of a substantial Spanish army could save Bohemia: 'It seems to be necessary for Your Majesty to consider which will be of greater service to you,' he chided, 'the loss of these provinces or the dispatch of an army of fifteen to twenty thousand men to settle the matter.[1]

It is unlikely that even these desperate pleas would have produced a favourable response in Madrid, had the king's council not come under the domination, at just this time, of the formidable Don Balthasar de Zúñiga. After distinguished service in the army (including the Armada campaign) and a long spell as ambassador in Brussels, Paris, Rome and (latterly) Vienna, Zúñiga had returned to Madrid in 1617, where he began to speak with unimpeachable authority concerning the affairs of northern Europe. Although his brief period of power appears, in the history books, as no more than an interlude between the more colourful supremacies of Lerma and Olivares, from early in 1618 until his death late in 1622 Zúñiga's first-hand knowledge of the terrain and the personalities involved were used to justify his own innovative foreign policy and to defeat that of his

rivals, led by the duke of Lerma. For twenty years the duke had managed both Philip III and his government, but now his grip was failing. First he had yielded the role of royal favourite to his own son; now his decisions on Spain's overseas policies were being questioned. The man who had amassed a personal fortune of 44 million thalers (equivalent to Philip III's entire income for five years), and had built two palaces and founded eleven monasteries, three university chairs and two collegiate churches, was now publicly attacked for corruption. One of his principal advisers was arrested for murder and malversation of public funds. As protection against similar misfortunes, Lerma in the spring of 1618 decided to enter the Church (securing a cardinalate), and he became anxious to retire from secular office. But before he went, he tried to salvage a project dear to his heart: the dispatch of a major naval expedition to Algiers.

The pirate kingdom of Algiers had been a thorn in Spain's side for almost a century, but in the early seventeenth century piratical attacks on shipping and raids on coastal settlements attained an unprecedented ferocity. The Madrid government therefore agreed that a major North African campaign would be undertaken in 1618; but now Zúñiga called for aid to Vienna instead. Clearly Spain could not afford both campaigns, especially not with the costly wars over Mantua and the uzkoks: a major decision on priorities became unavoidable. In July 1618, Lerma and his allies tried to prevent the dispatch of 200,000 thalers to the emperor, on the (entirely plausible) grounds that it would encourage him to take a firmer stand which might result in a prolonged war. Lerma lost. He lost again in September when, despite strong opposition, another 500,000 thalers were dispatched to Vienna; and he lost finally in January 1619 when the king reluctantly decided that the Algiers campaign would have to be abandoned in favour of aid to Vienna:

> Because it would be impossible to commit ourselves to both enterprises, and because of the risks involved,…if the aid to Bohemia is delayed,…it seems unavoidable that we must see to the latter.[2]

In May 1619 a force of 7,000 veterans from the Spanish Army of Flanders therefore marched across the Empire to Vienna, and by the end of Philip's reign (in March 1621) some 40,000 of his troops were assisting the Austrian Habsburgs. There was also a steady supply of money: 3.4 million thalers by July 1619; 6 million by the end of 1624.[3]

Spain's decisive stance, which was fully endorsed by the Archdukes in Brussels, encouraged the German Catholics to sink their differences and reactivate their League under the sole direction of Maximilian of Bavaria. Some Catholic princes declared their sympathies at once. The archbishop of Salzburg, for example, entertained Archduke Ferdinand in July 1619, on his way to the Electoral meeting at Frankfurt, with a military display, a waterfolly, a performance of Peri's *Orfeo* and—most important of all—a loan of 40,000 thalers.[4] But most other Catholics still hesitated to declare their support for Ferdinand in his struggle against the Bohemian rebels: most hoped to remain neutral, and only renewed fears that a Protestant international existed forced their hand.

The wars over the uzkoks and Mantua, which were drawing to a close at the time of the defenestration of Prague, had already created important links between various anti-Habsburg powers. The news from Bohemia kept them in being. The duke of Savoy wrote, as soon as he heard the news, to the Elector Palatine to offer the services of the

regiment Mansfeld had raised for him, through the good offices of the Protestant Union, the previous year. In August 1618 Frederick gratefully accepted and the Savoyard troops moved to Germany to await developments.[5] For a considerable period, they waited alone. The Protestant leaders—Frederick, Anhalt, Ansbach—were as surprised by the events in Bohemia as everyone else. Although they had considered the possibility of the Elector Palatine becoming king of Bohemia after Matthias, the preelection of Ferdinand by the Estates seemed to settle the question of who ruled in Prague for at least another generation. Now, in mid-June, the Bohemian Estates wrote to the Protestant Union, asking to be admitted as full members and requesting military assistance. They hinted that the reward for timely aid would be the election of the Union's leader—Frederick—as their king, in place of Ferdinand. Unfortunately, this same hint was dropped to more than one aspirant—the hopes of the duke of Savoy, Bethlen Gabor of Transylvania, the Elector of Saxony and Frederick of the Palatinate were all raised—and the Bohemians' duplicity was gleefully made public by the Habsburgs, who seem to have intercepted and deciphered almost every letter leaving Prague for a foreign destination. But, for a time, indiscretion was immaterial: the rebellion prospered. In the summer of 1618, Lusatia, Silesia and Upper Austria joined Bohemia; and, in the summer of 1619, so did Moravia and Lower Austria. Only Hungary stood aloof, but the forces of Bethlen Gabor could be relied on to overcome loyalist elements there. In September 1618 Mansfeld and the duke of Savoy's regiment captured the stronghold of Pilsen. In May 1619 the army of the confederates, under Heinrich Matthias, Count Thurn (who had played a leading role in the defenestration) marched on Vienna and laid siege to it. At the same time, Christian of Anhalt visited Turin and persuaded the duke of Savoy to increase his financial support for the cause, while the Dutch and Venetian Republic talked about a mutual defence pact against Spain. But these successes alarmed the Catholics, and by June 1619 Ferdinand had secured enough support to permit an invasion of Bohemia.

The end of the uzkok war had freed the troops of the archduke for service further north, and throughout 1618 units were marched up to garrison the few towns that remained loyal. But there were still only 13,000 men, one-third of them in Spanish pay, and Ferdinand's principal commander, Count Bucquoy, urged his master to raise troops abroad—in the Spanish Netherlands (where Bucquoy had served his apprenticeship), in Lorraine, in Italy, in Croatia. Now, in the summer of 1619, with the aid of the subsidies from Spain and the papacy, the Imperial army numbered some 30,000 men, with reinforcements promised from Tuscany, Spanish Lombardy and the Spanish Netherlands. On 10 June, Bucquoy routed Mansfeld and his regiment at Zéblatí in southern Bohemia, and cut off communications between Prague and Thurn's army around Vienna. The siege was lifted almost at once. Almost as serious for the rebel cause as these strategic reverses was the loss of their principal foreign supporter. Mansfeld's field chancery was captured by the Imperialists, revealing in detail the duke of Savoy's dealings with the Bohemians, the Dutch, the Venetians and the English. The embarrassed duke—already aware that he would not be elected king of Bohemia—hastily ended his subsidies (which had already cost him almost 40,000 thalers). But the rebellion continued without him. On 31 July 1619 the Estates of the crown of Bohemia signed a mutual pact of 100 articles, which created a federal union; shortly afterwards they signed a special treaty of alliance with the Estates of Upper and Lower Austria. On 22 August, the confederates solemnly deposed Ferdinand as their king and, despite support in some quarters for the rulers of

Transylvania and Saxony, on the 26th they decided by an overwhelming majority to offer the crown to Frederick of the Palatinate.

It was in many ways an odd choice. Although part of Frederick's inheritance—the Upper Palatinate—bordered on Bohemia, it was a part he had rarely visited. Moreover Frederick was neither wealthy nor experienced. In 1622 a hostile observer, beleaguered for the Protestant cause in Frankenthal, questioned the wisdom of electing 'a man who had never seen either a battle or a corpse,…a prince who knew more about gardening than fighting'.[6] But three years previously this had seemed irrelevant: Frederick was one of the best-connected princes in Protestant Europe (see Table 2). If any ruler could mobilize confessional support, it was he.

Nonetheless, in August and September 1619, the young Elector was in a quandary, and his counsellors prepared conflicting papers of advice concerning the Bohemians' offer. The native Palatine advisers on the whole concluded that, although there were several reasons for acceptance, there were even more reasons against—including the probability that 'acceptance would begin a general religious war'. But the others, led by Anhalt and Camerarius, argued that war would come in any case: a general war seemed inevitable on the termination of the Twelve Years' Truce in the Netherlands, while everywhere there was evidence of a militant Catholic alliance, aimed at the destruction of Protestantism throughout central Europe. If the Bohemian revolt were suppressed, Camerarius and his friends argued, the kingdom's religious liberty would be ended; how long after that could the Protestants of Germany feel safe? It was a weighty consideration which was shared by many responsible foreign observers. Dudley Carleton, England's ambassador in The Hague, observed in September 1619 that 'this business of Bohemia is like to put all Christendom in combustion', and noted the Dutch leaders' deduction that 'since the revolution of the world is like to carry us out of this peaceable time, it is better to begin the change with advantage than with disadvantage'. For, if Bohemia were to be 'neglected and by consequence suppressed, the princes of the religion adjoining are like to bear the burden of a victorious army…Where it will stay', he added gloomily, 'God knows, being pushed on by the Jesuits and commanded by the new emperor, who flatters himself with prophecies of extirpating the reformed religion and restoring the Roman Church to the ancient greatness.'[7]

But by then the cause of Bohemia was again making good headway. Late in August, overcoming his chagrin at not being elected, Bethlen Gabor began the conquest of Habsburg Hungary. On 5 September he captured Košice, the capital of the eastern division of the kingdom, and was chosen 'protector of Hungary' by the Diet. News of this success seems to have tipped the scales for Frederick. Although he was, as he confessed to his wife at this time, 'in agony about what to do', on 28 September he accepted the Bohemian crown. The opportunity, he proclaimed, 'is a divine calling which I must not disobey. My only end is to serve God and His church.' And, for a time, it seemed as if the Lord had heard His servant. On 13 October, Bethlen defeated the last Habsburg army in Hungary, commanded by Ferdinand's brother Leopold, and soon afterwards entered the capital, Bratislava. From there, in November, the Transylvanians moved up the Danube, joining forces with Thurn's army in November to lay siege to Vienna a second time. Offers of further support arrived from several quarters. In December an envoy arrived in Bratislava from the new Turkish sultan, Osman II, offering military aid against the Habsburgs; and, after long arguments about the freedom of trade in the Adriatic, the

Venetian and Dutch Republics signed a fifteen-year alliance during which each side promised to pay the other 30,000 thalers a month in case of attack.[8]

TABLE 2.1 *Frederick V of the Palatinate and his relatives I*



TABLE 2.2 *Frederick V of the Palatinate and his relatives II*



The political situation was now clearly out of hand, and many statesmen feared for the future. On 28 August 1619, at Frankfurt, the seven Imperial Electors decided to play safe and unanimously chose Archduke Ferdinand as the next Holy Roman Emperor. It was the most significant election since that of Charles V, exactly a century earlier, and the first since then to be seriously disputed. John George of Saxony, whose borders adjoined Bohemia and the Upper Palatinate, only agreed to vote for Ferdinand when, a week before the election, he was given a guarantee by the Brussels government that 'in case the Elector should be molested by the Bohemians, he will be aided and assisted by the troops that His Majesty [Philip III of Spain] has in Germany and, if it should be necessary, by some of the troops in this army also'.[9]

Some experienced observers hoped that the events at Frankfurt would bring about an end to the crisis in the Empire—and, indeed, in September the Army of Flanders stood down the troops which had been mobilized along the German frontier during the election. But Frederick's simultaneous acceptance of the Bohemian crown re-established the tension. So, from Frankfurt, Emperor Ferdinand went down to Munich, accompanied by the Spanish ambassador, Count Oñate, and a senior official of the Elector of Cologne, to discuss with Maximilian of Bavaria what assistance the newly reconstituted Catholic League could give to the Habsburg cause. Since the German Catholics were not prepared to intervene except with Spanish aid, the initiative rested almost entirely with Oñate; and he acted decisively. Without waiting to receive instructions from Madrid or Brussels, the ambassador promised the immediate dispatch of 1,000 cavalry troopers from the Netherlands to join the League, the transfer of substantial reinforcements from Spanish Italy to Austria, and the intervention in the Rhineland of a major army from the Low Countries. But Maximilian demanded still more, in return for a promise to commit the army of the League fully against Bohemia. So the ingenious Oñate persuaded Ferdinand to offer the duke not only a cash indemnity and a guarantee that the Habsburgs would play no part in League affairs, but also possession of any part of the Palatinate conquered by the League, and a promise that the Electoral dignity would be transferred from Frederick of the Palatine to Bavaria. Since both men belonged to the Wittelsbach family, Oñate argued, and since Bavaria had some claim in law to both the land and the title, the transfer could be effected relatively easily. More practically, he added, Maximilian's armies would probably not make enough headway against the Protestant alliance to be able to claim these further rewards. So the treaty of Munich was signed on 8 October 1619, and on 5 December the leaders of the Catholic League authorized the levy of 25,000 troops, to be used as Maximilian thought fit.

Much had been promised by Oñate in the name of Spain, at a time when the governments in Madrid and Brussels were increasingly concerned with preparations for a new war with the Dutch. Zúñiga, at least, candidly admitted that he no longer knew whether the Twelve Years' Truce should be renewed. To convince ourselves that we can conquer the Dutch is to seek the impossible, to delude ourselves,' he lamented in April 1619, as he struggled to make the right decision.

> To those who put all blame for our troubles on to the Truce, and foresee great benefits from breaking it, we can say for certain that whether we end it or not we shall always be at a disadvantage. Affairs can get to a certain stage where every decision taken is for the worst, not through lack of good advice but because the situation is so desperate that no remedy can conceivably be found.

Spain's chief minister was scarcely more optimistic when he looked at the position in Germany:

> The situation demands [he claimed] that we should make all those supreme efforts that are normally made when one is confronted by total disaster, attempting to raise all possible resources to provide the archduke

> with what he is asking for, and attending to all the other matters in so far as it is humanly possible.

These and many other expressions of profound and complete disillusion in the last years of Philip III's reign read like quotations from a Calderonian tragedy.[10] For Zúñiga saw his dilemma all too clearly: unless Spain intervened massively in support for Ferdinand, the rebels would win, giving the Protestants control of the Empire and undermining Spain's position in Italy and the Netherlands; and yet, if massive aid were forthcoming, it might well provoke another conflict that would last as long as the Low Countries' War, if not (as some argued) for ever.[11]

But it was now too late for Spain to withdraw from Germany. An agitated dispatch from Oñate, besieged in Vienna for a second time by the Transylvanian and confederate armies, arrived in Madrid early in 1620. The letter insisted yet again that, if the Austrian Habsburgs were to be saved, aid for Ferdinand was required on an unprecedented scale. Once more the ambassador's urgent voice could not be ignored, and it seemed to Philip III's council that the most effective way to take the pressure off Vienna was to mount a diversionary attack on the Rhine Palatinate. This would, in addition, make it more likely that the terms of the 'Oñate treaty' with Ferdinand would be implemented, delivering Alsace to Spain; and it would free the army of the League to campaign in Bohemia without fear of an attack from the rear. Accordingly, after some debate on size and timing, it was decided that, in the spring of 1620, an army of 20,000 veterans would march under the personal command of Ambrosio Spínola, from the Low Countries into the Palatinate. A crucial step in turning 'the revolt of Bohemia' into 'the Thirty Years' War' had been taken.

It was ironic that, because of the postal delays between Austria and Spain, Philip III's fateful decision was taken some time after the threat to Vienna had been lifted. On 27 November 1619, Bethlen Gabor received news that a large army from Poland had entered Upper Hungary and had cut his communications with Transylvania. In fact the report was greatly exaggerated, but it was enough to ruin the siege of Vienna: Bethlen hurried back to Hungary, so Thurn had to return to Bohemia. Although the Hungarian Diet at Bratislava elected the Transylvanian their 'prince' on 15 January 1620, his situation remained unfavourable. Bethlen had supported a large army for five months, although his principality was poor (it exported only cattle, salt and quicksilver, and a substantial portion of its wealth was surrendered every year in tribute to the sultan). To some, the prince's campaign had always seemed 'a torrent without a source'; and without urgent financial assistance from the rebel government in Prague, it was doomed to dry up.[12] But the confederates' resources were as depleted as Bethlen's own: they could not pay the 400,000 thalers that he demanded. Moreover the prince's chief asset had always been his vaunted role as mediator of Turkish aid to Ferdinand's enemies. Now Habsburg diplomats had persuaded the sultan to withdraw his support from the confederate cause, while the outbreak of hostilities between the Turks and Poland in 1619–21 prevented any Ottoman campaign up the Danube. So when an Imperial delegation offered a nine months' truce, which left Bethlen in temporary possession of his Hungarian conquests, the prince was pleased to accept (20 January 1620).

The neutralization of Transylvania was just one part of a careful campaign to isolate the rebels. Not only had Spain been persuaded to contribute men and money on a grand

scale to the emperor (and, after April 1620, to the League, too); aid was also received from several Italian princes. The pope arranged a monthly subsidy of 8,000 thalers to Vienna from July 1618 and, by the end of the year 1620, 304,000 thalers had been dispatched; over the same period a further 204,000 were sent to the army of the League. Genoa also sent financial contributions and Tuscany sent troops. To be sure, Savoy and Venice were hostile but, alone, these two powers could do little. The only cause for alarm, in Habsburg eyes, was the promise of Dutch aid to Bohemia.

On several occasions in 1618 the States-General, the ruling body of the Dutch Republic, debated whether to accede to the confederates' request for assistance; but each time they declined. Their caution was well founded: throughout the year, the Republic was paralysed by the struggle between the Estates of Holland, led by their Advocate, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, and the Estates of the other provinces, led by Maurice of Nassau, the captain-general. Early in 1619 with Oldenbarnevelt arrested and his supporters scattered, the purged States-General resolved to provide a monthly subsidy of 25,000 thalers—but only for three months, and only as long as the Bohemians kept on fighting and the Dutch Republic remained at peace. In the event, the subsidy was continued (with great reluctance, and in the teeth of opposition from one or more of the inland provinces) until December 1620; but the States-General refused until it was too late to send troops into Germany either to aid Frederick of the Palatinate or to protect the Union. Worse still, although the States agreed that 'they will take such course by way of diversion that the Spanish troops in those provinces under the Archduke shall not be spared or have commodity to be employed into Germany', in fact they did nothing of the sort. Until almost the last moment they were fooled by Spínola into believing that his army's destination was Prague and not the Palatinate; and, when they realized the truth, the lack of support from England and the Protestant Union prevented any effective counteraction.[13]

After some hesitation, James I made public his distaste for the Bohemian venture of his son-in-law in the autumn of 1619. He refused to support attempts to collect money for Frederick's cause; he attempted to set himself up as a mediator between the two sides; and he urged the Union to remain aloof. But the Union was already in disarray. At a meeting in June 1619, the members resolved to raise an army of 11,000 men, but simply for defence against the League—'to protect liberty and law' and 'to maintain our religion like true patriots'. But they would go no further, because 'one should not oppose the House of Austria lightly', especially not 'without either troops or money from England'.[14] At a further meeting of the Union in November, only the margraves of Ansbach and Baden supported Frederick's decision to accept the Bohemian crown (although others expressed readiness to defend themselves against the League). Other Protestant princes were equally cautious. Apart from the dukes of Saxe-Weimar, only the Calvinist Elector of Brandenburg offered encouragement, and he died at Christmas 1619. His young successor, George William, even though married to Frederick's sister, was unable to persuade the Lutheran Estates to continue his father's defiant policy. Since Brandenburg's public debt was one of the largest in Germany, without new taxes prudence was the only policy. The finances of John George of Saxony were scarcely better, a fact which the Catholic princes exploited to the full. At an Electoral meeting at Mühlhausen, called early in 1620 to prevent the 'Bohemian fire' from spreading into Germany, the Catholic Electors (including Ferdinand) promised that there would be no

attempt to regain by force the secularized church lands in the Upper or Lower Saxon Circles until the princes in possession had received a legal hearing—always provided that those princes loyally supported the emperor. John George seemed reassured by the 'Mühlhausen guarantee' (20 March 1620), and so the emperor followed it with the offer of Lusatia as a pledge if the Elector would raise an army and capture it from the rebels. John George immediately agreed.

The final blow to the Protestant cause was dealt by France. Louis XIII had suffered rebellion and difficulties himself at the hands of his Protestant subjects, and he was therefore at first full of sympathy for Ferdinand's plight. At one point he impetuously offered to lead an army to aid his cousin. Although this resolve did not last, a high-powered diplomatic mission, led by the duke of Angoulême, was dispatched to Germany instead. Angoulême made first for Ulm, where the army of the League, under Maximilian of Bavaria's personal command, jockeyed for position with the troops of the Union under the margrave of Ansbach. Angoulême persuaded the two commanders to sign an undertaking to desist from mutual hostilities at once, and to withdraw their forces (the treaty of Ulm, 3 July 1620). He expected to negotiate a similar agreement between the emperor and Frederick, and moved on to Vienna; but here he was unsuccessful. The cease-fire agreed at Ulm had given the emperor a decisive advantage, and he intended to use it: the Union army was compelled to meet Spínola's approaching host from the Netherlands; but the forces of the League, by contrast, were free to assist Ferdinand in the east. Accordingly, on 17 July, just a fortnight after the treaty of Ulm, an army of 30,000 League troops (which included many notable volunteers, the philosopher Descartes among them) was led by Count Tilly into Upper Austria. Within two weeks, the duchy had fallen and Tilly joined forces with the Imperialists under Bucquoy, now masters of Lower Austria. In the north, the Saxons occupied Lusatia with scarcely a blow (only Bautzen resisted—see Plate 4); while, in the west, Spínola made a leisurely progress through the Palatinate. The Union forces were heavily outnumbered and only small contingents reached them from England and the Netherlands. Small wonder that the duke of Angoulême's efforts to interest Ferdinand in peace talks fell flat: there was 'nothing more to be gained from treaties', the duke was informed, since the emperor was 'resolved to secure complete obedience from his subjects, and this could only be assured by the sword'.[15] Accordingly the troops under Tilly and Bucquoy, with the duke of Bavaria in attendance, advanced inexorably into Bohemia, seeking a decisive engagement with the enemy's main army (jointly commanded by Anhalt, Mansfeld and Thurn). On 8 November 1620 the rebels made a desperate stand on the White Mountain, just beyond the walls of Prague. It took only an hour for the Catholics to secure a total victory. The revolt of Bohemia was over.

ii Europe and the Palatine war

> The loss of soldiers was not much unequal, but the loss of cannon, the baggage, reputation, is the Imperialists' victory who, as it seems, hold Bohemia now by conquest, and all immunities [and] privileges [are now] void. And if a new establishment by petition shall be obtained, it will be

> only the Law of the Conqueror, who doth already finely call those of the [Protestant] Religion to account for what they have, and put it into safe keeping; so that they taste already their condition to come.[1]

Sir Edward Conway's prophecy concerning the consequences of the Bohemians' defeat at the White Mountain was to prove entirely accurate: the Law of the Conqueror was indeed ruthlessly imposed on Bohemia (see Chapter III). But the 1620 campaign delivered more than just Bohemia into the victors' hands. Lusatia, Silesia, Moravia and Austria were all overrun, so was half of the Rhine Palatinate, while the Upper Palatinate lay defenceless. Yet these successes did not conclude the war: on the contrary they expanded it. Had the campaign resulted in a military stalemate, a compromise settlement might have been achieved. But, given the magnitude of his defeat and the implacable nature of Habsburg hostility, Frederick of the Palatinate had nothing to lose by continued resistance.

The emperor was therefore faced with the problem of eradicating all support for Frederick from the Empire, without provoking a general European war in the process. In 1619 and 1620, his military success had been assured by a careful diplomatic campaign which shattered the pattern of alliances built up by the Palatine party and isolated Frederick from his more powerful potential supporters; but whether this diplomatic feat could be continued in the future was another question. Skilful propaganda could easily arouse fears of boundless Habsburg ambition. It had been done before—within five years of Charles V's great victory over the German Protestants at Mühlberg in 1547, all Imperial gains had been lost—and a similar change of fortune was not considered impossible after the White Mountain.[2]

The chances of this, however, at first seemed slim. Frederick's active German supporters had never been numerous, and now some of these abandoned his cause—Anhalt and Ansbach led the way, making their peace with the emperor in 1621.[3] Only a handful of princes, of whom the most important were the dukes of Saxe-Weimar and Christian of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, administrator of the secularized bishopric of Halberstadt, still espoused the Palatine cause without reservation. Margrave George of Baden remained neutral in 1621 through fear that open defiance of the emperor would lead to his deposition in favour of the rival, Catholic, branch of the family (and he only went to war in 1622 because he became convinced that, whatever course he took, his deposition would follow Frederick's defeat). Similar considerations deterred the Calvinist rulers of Hesse-Kassel and Brandenburg from mobilizing in support of the Palatine cause: the former feared deposition in favour of the strongly Imperialist (and Lutheran) ruler of Hesse-Darmstadt; the latter was inhibited by his strongly Lutheran and neutralist Estates. John George of Saxony, with Lusatia and the Mühlhausen guarantee in his pocket, did his utmost to prevent all other Lutheran rulers from assisting Frederick's cause in any way.

This persistent failure to win over a significant body of German Protestant opinion made Frederick all the more dependent upon the same foreign allies who had failed him in 1619–20. His uncle, Maurice of Nassau, arranged a splendid welcome for the Elector when he visited The Hague in April 1621, and allowed him to establish his court-in-exile there. But at precisely this moment the Twelve Years' Truce ran out, and various half-

hearted attempts to renew it proved unsuccessful. The States-General, therefore, only agreed to continue their monthly subsidy to Frederick on the understanding that he would also secure aid from England. With Spínola and his veterans returning victorious from the Palatinate, the States-General would take no chances: they might lend army officers, and advance credit for the purchase of arms, but they could not afford to become the paymaster of the Protestant cause.[4]

Christian of Denmark also maintained a prudent stance. Admittedly in 1618–19 he had allowed a number of his officers to serve the Bohemian Estates, while others later served with Mansfeld; and in 1620 he had loaned money to Frederick and his allies. But he faced substantial opposition from his council to any further action (see pages 64–5 below), and he had considerable misgivings about his nephew's rash attempt to 'overthrow kings and seize kingdoms'. At the assembly of the Lower Saxon Circle held at Segeberg in February 1621, he declared that he would only intervene if supported by England.[5]

So England served as the focus for Palatine—and, indeed, for all Protestant—diplomacy. There were many both at court and in Parliament who accepted the Palatine argument that on the success of Frederick's cause hung the fate of Protestantism. In June 1621 the House of Commons published a declaration supporting whatever military action would be necessary to defend 'the true professors of the same Christian religion professed by the Church of England in foreign parts…being touched with a true sense and fellow feeling of their distresses as members of the same body'.[6] The House looked for the creation of a coalition, based on an alliance between England and the Dutch Republic, to save the cause. James I, however, had no wish to see the Palatine issue turn into a general war of religion, and he had become convinced that the best way to preserve the peace was by a close alliance between himself and Spain, founded on the marriage of his son and heir, Prince Charles, to Philip IV's sister María. Although James had indeed committed himself to the restoration of Frederick to the Palatinate, following the Spanish invasion in the autumn of 1620, he hoped to accomplish this as part of a wider diplomatic settlement. Paradoxically, therefore, England insisted on regarding the Palatine question as a purely German affair, yet at the same time sought to link it to all sorts of other issues with which it really had no connexion.

At the beginning of 1621 James I attempted to negotiate a general suspension of arms in the Empire as a first step towards the desired full settlement, in which he hoped to obtain Frederick's restoration to the Palatinate in return for the surrender of his Bohemian claims. In April, a brief cease-fire was duly arranged at Mainz between the armies operating in the Palatinate, which lasted until July; but Frederick, encouraged it would seem by Maurice of Nassau, could not be persuaded to renounce his Bohemian pretensions unconditionally. The Habsburgs also proved obdurate. The death of Philip III on 31 March and of Archduke Albert on 15 July 1621 created something of a policy vacuum which left the initiative briefly with the Archduchess Isabella, Albert's widow, and her faithful general, Ambrosio Spínola. Both wished to complete the conquest of the Palatinate as soon as possible, and in this they received whole-hearted support from the emperor and the duke of Bavaria. The war was certainly going their way: as part of the Mainz armistice agreement, the Union had consented to disband its forces in return for an undertaking that their territories would not be attacked; and in May, the Union dissolved itself. This allowed Spínola to withdraw a large part of his army to the Netherlands, to meet any Dutch attack, yet still to leave some 11,000 men under Don Gonzalo Fernández

de Córdoba to continue the conquest of the Palatinate. As soon as the Mainz armistice expired, they laid siege to Frankenthal, one of the three major fortresses (the others being Mannheim and Heidelberg) on which the retention of the Palatinate depended.

There were, at this time, still some forces loyal to the Elector in the east, but they did not survive for long. In the late summer of 1621, Tilly led the League army into the Upper Palatinate and occupied it with scarcely a struggle. Some of Frederick's troops decided to move eastwards and throw in their lot with Bethlen Gabor of Transylvania; but in January 1622 the prince made peace with the emperor at Nikolsburg. The rest of Frederick's soldiers, under Count Mansfeld, had marched to the relief of Frankenthal and in this they were successful. But Tilly was hard on their heels, and by the spring of 1622 the Catholics possessed overwhelming superiority in the Rhineland. Their advantage was consolidated when Spínola compelled the Dutch garrison of Jülich to surrender, thus blocking the route by which the Dutch Republic or England might send assistance to the Palatinate. But no such aid was in fact forthcoming. James I rejected his Parliament's demand for war against Spain in December 1621 and instead conducted a complex diplomatic quadrille designed to assemble all parties to the dispute at a general peace conference. At first, however, Frederick refused James's demands that he should cease fighting or else forfeit all English support.[7] Instead he allowed Mansfeld, in Alsace, to build up an army of 43,000 men by widespread recruiting among the Swiss Protestants and the French Huguenots. In April, they were joined by a further 11,000 men raised by George of Baden-Durlach. But the two armies failed to operate together and on 6 May, at Wimpfen on the Neckar, Córdoba and Tilly together inflicted heavy losses on Baden's army. The tables might have been turned, for Frederick could call upon a third army, raised by Christian of Brunswick in north Germany; but on 20 June the redoubtable Tilly intercepted this new force at Höchst on the Main and again caused heavy losses.

At last, Frederick was ready to negotiate. He dismissed Brunswick and Mansfeld on 13 July and retired to await the outcome of the general conference so desired by England, which had convened at Brussels.[8] The victorious Catholics, however, had now lost interest in negotiation. Tilly, under instruction from Maximilian, followed up his advantage: Heidelberg was stormed on 19 September; Mannheim surrendered on 2 November. The Brussels conference broke up. Frankenthal was saved by the lateness of the season but, in March 1623, James I ordered its predominantly English garrison to hand the city over to officers of the Archduchess Isabella, who were to retain it until the peace conference reassembled.

James failed to realize that the Spaniards had no intention of surrendering their footholds in the Rhineland, for they offered an invaluable link between the Netherlands and the Alps. As long as the war with the Dutch lasted, the logistical problems of supplying the Army of Flanders with men, money and munitions made it imperative to preserve all reliable and secure military corridors between Lombardy, Spain and the Low Countries (see Map 2). Exactly the same consideration made the Madrid government also reluctant to surrender control of the Valtelline, which had been occupied by force in 1620 (pages 37–8 above). But diplomatic pressure, this time from France, was building up for its restitution. From the first, Louis XIII had been begged to intervene by the Swiss Protestant cantons, Venice, and the Grey Leagues (the overlords of the Valtelline, to whose protection France had been committed by treaty since 1602). But the king was unable to help. He was compelled to concentrate on the revolt of some extreme Catholics,

led by the Queen Mother (April–August 1620); afterwards, partly to placate these dissidents, he embarked on the forcible catholicization of the principality of Béarn in the Pyrenees (August 1620–October 1622). By the time news of the Habsburg invasion of the Valtelline arrived, Louis had no resources to spare. At the end of 1621, the Grey Leagues therefore decided to act on their own, with some support from Bern, Zürich and Venice. They were totally defeated, and the victors occupied some of the Grey Leagues' lands as well. But French prestige was now at risk, and the 'Valtelline question' assumed much the same significance in Paris as the restoration of the Palatinate had acquired in London. In the autumn of 1622, following an agreement with the Huguenots, Louis XIII held a series of widely publicized meetings with the duke of Savoy and a Venetian embassy, from which emerged a triple alliance, known as the League of Lyons, pledged both to drive the Habsburgs out of the Grey Leagues' lands and to enforce Savoy's claims over Genoa and Montferrat (7 February 1623). Almost before the ink on the treaty had dried, Spain backed down. Her grip on the valleys had already been shaken by a new revolt during the summer of 1622, and in October the experienced Don Balthasar de Zúñiga died. His nephew and successor as chief minister, the count of Olivares, was not prepared to go to war with France for the sake of a remote Alpine valley. Accordingly, on 14 February 1623, he agreed that papal troops should take over the Valtelline for a transitional period of four months to allow Spanish forces to withdraw.[9]

By then, the attention of Europe had moved back from the Alps to the Palatinate. In the dark days of October 1619, with the prospect of defeat staring him in the face, the emperor had promised great rewards to Maximilian of Bavaria—above all, the transfer of both the Upper Palatinate and the Electoral title, in return for his military assistance against Frederick. The offer had been rashly made, on the assumption that Maximilian would never be able to mobilize an army strong enough to overcome the rebellion single-handed; but after the White Mountain, sooner or later the debt would have to be paid. By August 1621, Maximilian was already importunate and, as an English envoy in Germany noted, with Mansfeld still fighting in the west and Bethlen at large in the east, 'it may well be judged that this is not a fit season for the emperor to give the duke of Bavaria a pure negative'.[10] So Ferdinand promised to effect the Electoral transfer at the next Imperial Diet, pending the approval of Saxony and Spain. But one of the couriers carrying news of this decision was captured by Mansfeld. The letters soon came into the hands of Frederick's principal counsellor, Ludwig Camerarius, who scored one of the publishing coups of the century by printing them in March 1622, with a damning commentary, in a book usually known under its Latin title, *Cancelleria Hispanica*.[11]

The popular outcry which followed this unsought publication of his plans persuaded Ferdinand that the transfer would have to be delayed, and in the meantime a remarkable task-force of diplomatic salesmen, all of them Capuchins, was provided by the papacy to convince the Catholic world, at least, that the transfer was in their best interests. Valeriano Magno was sent to Paris, Alexander of Hales went to Brussels, while Hyacinth of Casale engaged in ceaseless shuttle diplomacy between Munich, Vienna, Madrid and the Rhineland, covering almost 16,000 kilometres in the course of 1622. The importance which was attached to Hyacinth's work is revealed by the steady stream of letters the Capuchin received from the Bavarian chancery: nine between 25 November and 22 December alone, or more than two a week. And in the end, his efforts proved successful. Father Hyacinth found the Spanish government opposed to the transfer (despite the fact

that the idea had originally been suggested by its ambassador, Count Oñate); but the death of Don Balthasar de Zúñiga meant—as a Bavarian correspondent in Madrid was swift to note—that 'no one here has any understanding of German affairs'.[12] So the emperor felt able to overlook Spanish opposition to Maximilian's elevation to the Palatine Electorate, and in January 1623 a thinly attended assembly of princes (a *Deputationstag*) met at Regensburg to sanction the transfer. In view of the continuing opposition of Saxony and Brandenburg, however, after six weeks of heated debate the most that Ferdinand felt able to do publicly was grant Maximilian the dignity for his own life only leaving the long-term future of the Palatinate unresolved.[13]

Yet even this was more than most European powers were prepared to stomach. Frederick deposed now found more supporters than he had ever done before. And he could make use of an army, still commanded by Mansfeld and Brunswick. After they had been summarily discharged from Palatine service in July 1622, the two commanders had entered Dutch employ and immediately performed useful deeds, first by defeating Córdoba's pursuing Spaniards at the battle of Fleurus (26 August) and subsequently by forcing Spínola and the Army of Flanders to raise their siege of Bergen-op-Zoom (4 October). These successes persuaded the States-General to keep the allied army in being: Mansfeld's troops were sent to winter quarters just across the Dutch border in East Friesland, whose ruler had been flirting with the Habsburgs. Mansfeld's unwelcome presence deprived Spínola of a potential base in the north-east from which to invade the Republic. Meanwhile, Frederick planned a new assault on the emperor in order to recover his lands and titles. It was agreed that Brunswick, with support from Mansfeld and the Dutch, would approach Bohemia from the north while Bethlen Gabor, assisted by a group of exiles under Count Thurn, would attack from the east. The new campaign, however, scarcely got off the ground. In May 1623, with the entire Palatinate finally under Habsburg control, Tilly led his army northwards to the borders of Lower Saxony, in order to block Brunswick's route to Bohemia. The 'mad Halberstadter' (as the Catholics called him) therefore decided to lead his 21,000 men, most of them newly raised and badly armed, to the Dutch Republic—as he had done, successfully, the previous year. This time, however, he was brought to battle at Stadtlohn on 6 August and all but 6,000 of his troops were wiped out. Tilly wanted to complete his victory by an attack on Mansfeld, but the weather (together with the strength of Mansfeld's defences) frustrated him. Less impregnable, however, were Mansfeld's finances. For most of 1623, he had existed on small pensions paid him by the members of the League of Lyons as a retainer, in case his troops should be required for a campaign in the Valtelline. But when these ran out, at the beginning of 1624, he had no alternative but to disband his army. Like Brunswick's troops the previous year, most of his men immediately entered Dutch service.

Stadtlohn was the most decisive of all the Catholic victories. Bethlen Gabor, abandoned by his allies, was obliged to make peace again with the emperor; Frederick, on receiving the news of his army's defeat, gave up all further military ambitions and surrendered his cause without reservation to the mediation of James I. But 'the English Solomon' was no longer prepared to mediate. He had sought a 'Spanish Match' for his son Charles for nearly six years, and had founded his hopes for a settlement of the Palatine dispute upon this alliance with Spain. But in 1623 James received a rude awakening. It came about through the romantic secret journey to Madrid made in the spring by the young prince, tired of the interminable diplomatic prelude to his marriage.

Accompanied by the duke of Buckingham (his father's chief minister), Charles arrived at the Spanish court unannounced and demanded a speedy conclusion of both the marriage treaty and the restoration of the Palatinate. The Spanish government was now forced to state its demands openly: the conversion to Catholicism of both Prince Charles and Frederick's heir. The English envoys were thunderstruck: such conditions had never been acceptable. In 1624 James therefore bowed to the demands of Parliament (and his son) that all negotiations with Spain should be broken off, and instead opened talks with the French government for a joint expeditionary force, to be led by Count Mansfeld, to regain the Rhine Palatinate for the deposed Elector.[14]

Frederick and his councillors, however, did not believe that this would be enough. Instead, Ludwig Camerarius was sent on a secret mission to Stockholm to discover whether the Swedish government was prepared to fight for the Palatine cause in Germany. King Gustavus was already known to be favourable: as early as 1618 he had begun to employ the Swedish clergy, through a regular series of days of intercession, to warn the population of the growing danger to the Protestant cause in continental Europe. Moreover the Palatine point of view was forcefully represented at Gustavus's court by Johan Casimir, duke of Pfalz-Zweibrücken, brother of the former administrator of the Palatinate and husband of the king's sister. But the desire for intervention was not shared by the rest of the Swedish council, led by Axel Oxenstierna: for them, the chief danger to Sweden came not from Germany but from Poland.[15]

Sigismund III of Poland, the emperor's brother-in-law, had become king of Sweden in 1592. After only a few years, he was deposed by a conspiracy led by his uncle, Duke Charles, who subsequently took the title of king and passed it on to his son Gustavus Adolphus. But Sigismund, representing the elder and legitimate Vasa line, never dropped his claim to the Swedish crown and aroused in the breasts of his younger cousins the sort of unease that, a century later, the Jacobite Pretenders to the British throne were to cause their Hanoverian relatives. However, whereas George I and his son waited to be attacked, Gustavus Adolphus took the war into the Pretender's camp. No sooner had Sweden made peace with Russia in 1617 than her army was directed into Polish Livonia. In autumn 1618 a truce was concluded, but only for two years; so a new Swedish assault in the spring of 1621 came as no surprise. The sophistication of the campaign, however, attracted international attention. The king crossed the Baltic to direct the siege of Riga in person, and he tried out several new military techniques—creeping barrage, total exclusion zones, all the latest techniques of siegecraft. The town fell. Gustavus seems to have hoped that he could barter Riga against Sigismund's claim to his throne and, to facilitate negotiations, a year's truce was agreed in July 1622, which was prolonged into 1624.[16]

It was during this hiatus that Camerarius arrived at Stockholm (November 1623) and was at once impressed by the personality of the young Gustavus—'Gideon' he called him. 'I cannot praise adequately the heroic virtues of that king, he wrote: 'piety, prudence, and resolution. He has no equal in Europe.[17] Before Camerarius left the king's intoxicating presence, he believed the foundations of a general Protestant alliance under Swedish leadership had been laid, which would restore Frederick to Bohemia and install Gustavus Adolphus as the new Holy Roman Emperor.[18] But Sweden could not succeed alone, so the next targets for Frederick's diplomats were the Dutch Republic and France. Little could be expected from the former, for in the summer of 1624 the Army of

Flanders began the siege of Breda in north Brabant and, for a whole year, the Republic's every effort was bent towards its relief. The Palatine court in exile therefore pinned its hopes increasingly on France, where in February 1624 the anti-Habsburg marquis of La Vieuville was appointed minister of foreign affairs. Almost at once, negotiations began between France and England not only for an alliance to restore Frederick but also for a marriage between Prince Charles and Louis XIII's sister, Henrietta Maria. Shortly afterwards, envoys were sent from Paris to the princes of Germany with offers of subsidies and promises of aid in case of need.[19] In June, the Franco-Dutch alliance, dormant since the execution of Oldenbarnevelt in 1619, was revived: by the treaty of Compiègne, in return for an immediate loan of 480,000 thalers, and the promise of further instalments, the Dutch agreed to continue their war against Spain for another three years.[20] Finally, the League of Lyons with Venice and Savoy was revived.

It did not escape the notice of Catholic extremists at the court of Louis XIII that the majority of these pacts were made with Protestants, and this was one reason why, in August 1624, La Vieuville was replaced by Cardinal Richelieu. But it needed more than a change of ministers to overcome the dilemmas of French foreign policy. While the Most Christian King might exploit the problems caused for the Habsburgs by the Protestant alliance being formed by Camerarius and his friends, he could not become a member. As Richelieu commented crossly to a confidant: 'We can neither contribute to [the restoration of Frederick of the Palatinate], because of our Catholic faith, nor deny it without being reproached by our allies'.[21] Likewise, Louis was obliged to reject the attempts of Maximilian of Bavaria (supported by the papacy) to place himself under French protection and thus become independent of the Habsburgs, because France could not yet bring herself to recognize Maximilian's new Electoral title. It was partly to escape these agonizing choices that Richelieu decided to concentrate on Italy rather than on Germany. In the autumn of 1624, using the pretext that papal forces had not been withdrawn from the Valtelline as agreed (page 59 above), French and Swiss troops invaded the lands of the Grey Leagues. They were surprisingly successful; so in the spring of 1625, with the Alps firmly under friendly control, Richelieu promised to send an army to join the duke of Savoy's siege of Genoa. Unfortunately, none of this was of much direct help to the opponents of Habsburg supremacy in Germany, and the Palatine politicians began to despair. However, at this critical juncture, a new power intervened to save them: the ambitious and wealthy Christian IV of Denmark.

iii The Danish intermezzo

Ever since the Augsburg settlement of 1555 the principal concern of Danish foreign policy had shifted from Germany to Sweden. Two major wars, in 1563–70 and 1611–13, had been fought to preserve Danish hegemony in Scandinavia and the *Dominium maris Baltici,* but by the second decade of the seventeenth century Sweden's expansion seemed to threaten both. After the 1590s the rulers of both countries abandoned attempts to settle their disputes by negotiation or mediation, and even in peacetime the Danish government spent heavily on defence and the fleet. During the first twenty-five years of the personal rule of Christian IV (from 1596), about 1 million thalers were spent on the fortifications

of Copenhagen, Malmø and the fortresses along the Swedish frontier. Open conflict remained a permanent and immediate possibility.

Constitutionally, however, the king shared power with the council of state *(rigsraad),* representing in theory all Estates, but in fact exclusively recruited from the aristocratic elite. Basically, the balance of power and the chances of restricting monarchical emancipation lay with the council's right to vote or refuse extraordinary taxation, and its absolute veto concerning war. The core of the council's political programme, which in part reflected the interests of large-scale landowners, was the maintenance of peace with Sweden and the avoidance of any involvement in European alignments.

Of course, the council was equally worried by Sweden's Baltic expansion and by the Catholic victories in Germany after 1619, but it was reluctant to go to war over them. Although the council voted new taxes in 1624 to strengthen the garrisons along the Swedish frontier, it also prudently forced Christian to disband the small mercenary army raised to safeguard Danish neutrality against possible German infringements; under the circumstances it might have become a dangerous instrument in the monarch's hands. But aristocratic control over foreign policy had by then become an illusion. After the death of Frederick II in 1588 the regency government had succeeded in balancing the ordinary budget once more, and the favourable financial conditions laid the foundations for remarkable capital-formation in the royal Chamber over the following decades. By 1608 the ordinary budget surplus of Christian IV amounted to about 250,000 thalers annually (after all requirements had been met); more came from the tolls levied at Elsinore on international commercial shipping (200,000 thalers annually around 1620); but the largest single item was the war indemnity of 1 million thalers imposed on Sweden in 1613, and paid in instalments to the king in person until 1618.[1]

By 1618 Christian himself valued his assets at 1 million thalers, and he invested his profits prudently. In particular, between 1618 and 1624, a period of international economic crisis, the king lent over 400,000 thalers to noble landowners, thus binding the aristocratic council more closely to him politically. The formidable means at the king's disposal shattered the council's prospects of controlling royal foreign and military activities, for unless Christian remained dependent on their taxes, their power was at an end. By 1625 his total assets, including continental investments, approached 1.5 million thalers—enough to start a major war. With the exception of the queen-dowager Sophia's inexhaustible treasure chests (also accessible to her son), his only peer in Europe was, ironically, Maximilian of Bavaria, who could muster in 1618 around 4 million in cash. It was equally ironic that the Swedish war reparations contributed significantly to the formation of this royal fortune (see Plate 2).

Christian was drawn into the Thirty Years' War by two separate developments. First, his strong domestic position made him a valuable and important international figure. Initially, this counted against him: Sweden, fearful of further Danish aggression, signed in 1614 a defensive alliance with the Dutch Republic, whose ships made up over 60 per cent of the total traffic passing through the Sound. Dutch mercantile interests, ably championed by Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, therefore wished to weaken the Danish stranglehold on Baltic trade (amply demonstrated during the war of 1611–13) by increasing the power of Sweden. But in 1618, Oldenbarnevelt fell from power and the struggle in the Empire began; in 1621, the truce between the Dutch and Spain expired. The Republic now placed politics above trade, and chose to make a determined effort to

enmesh Christian in the Protestant cause, lending tacit support to his dynastic ambitions in Germany. The king needed little encouragement; he was already deeply ensnared by a second development.

In his capacity as duke of Holstein, Christian exerted a considerable influence within the Lower Saxon Circle and he was anxious to extend it. In particular, he cast avaricious eyes on the secularized bishoprics of Bremen, Verden and Osnabrück (south-west of Holstein), not only because they would provide a handy appanage for his younger sons, but also as a means of establishing political and fiscal control over the estuaries of the Weser and the Elbe; furthermore, they would serve to counterbalance Sweden's expansion in the eastern Baltic, intensified since the peace of Stolbova (1617). In 1616, Christian scored an early success by constructing the fortress-port of Glückstadt above Hamburg; five years later, Hamburg was forced to recognize the suzerainty of the Danish crown. Next, the king spent at least 135,000 thalers from his private fortune 'to see that my son Frederick should come to the see of Verden'. This was achieved in 1623. The prince was already coadjutor of the archbishopric of Bremen.[2]

It would seem, therefore, that Danish foreign policy had achieved all its immediate aims by 1624. The Dutch-Swedish alliance had been broken; the king's position in north Germany was strong; and Denmark had, apparently at least, avoided engagement in the European maelstrom. Yet by the beginning of 1625, Denmark found herself at war with the emperor and his allies, in spite of the council's flat refusal to countenance armament and hostilities. Why?

The explanation should be sought principally in the policies of the ally-hungry supporters of Frederick of the Palatinate, who managed to exploit Scandinavian rivalries, and Christian's German ambitions, to the point where the king had to throw in his lot with them in order to safeguard the very structure of his political system in Scandinavia and north Germany. At first, Christian refused, at a conference convened at Segeberg (February 1621), to intervene alone against the emperor. He himself was willing, but he failed to enlist sufficient powerful allies abroad. So he merely loaned money: 300,000 thalers at James's request for the support of Frederick in 1621–2; a further 1 million thalers to other leading German Protestants (such as the Elector of Brandenburg and his nephews the dukes of Brunswick).[3] But most of these transactions were kept secret: the full range of the king's financial and political commitments, which so endangered the policy of non-intervention desired by the council, only became manifest in 1623–4. At first the council steadfastly persisted in its position, drawing a clear-cut line of demarcation between the 'engagements of the realm' and those of the king personally; but the situation changed totally in 1624, when the Dutch, English, Brandenburg and Palatine leaders resolved to invite Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden to lead a coalition army into Germany.

In November 1623, Gustavus had agreed with Ludwig Camerarius (page 62 above) that Sweden, backed by a general Protestant alliance, should descend the Vistula in order to invade Bohemia, restore Frederick and depose Ferdinand. However, the Elector of Brandenburg (Gustavus's brother-in-law) pointed out that a direct challenge to the emperor might alienate more support than it gained. Instead he proposed that Sweden intervene in the west and regain the Palatinate. Gustavus was prepared to accede to this change of strategy, provided that he was supplied with an army of 40,000 men (to which England, Sweden and the German princes would each contribute a third) and bases in the

Lower Saxon Circle. But the king refused to allow France to become a full member of his proposed Protestant coalition, despite the fact that James I had already agreed to send a joint Anglo-French expeditionary force, led by Count Mansfeld, to the Palatinate; and he also refused to take part in any campaign in which he was not given full command of the armies.

These developments thoroughly alarmed Christian, for Denmark's relations with Sweden were strained at this time because of alleged or real Swedish violations of the treaty of 1613, and he feared that if his rival were entrusted with a large army, perhaps supported by the Dutch fleet, the Baltic would be turned into a Swedish lake. Accordingly, in January 1625, Christian offered to intervene himself, provided England would send 7,000 men to Denmark as part of an invasion force, and dispatch a diversionary campaign in the Low Countries (if necessary, led by the 'odious and suspect' Mansfeld). Still James hoped to secure the participation of both Sweden and Denmark, and it was to resolve their differences—as well as to make sure of continued French support—that he asked for a major conference of the allies to be held at The Hague in April 1625. But the death of both Maurice of Nassau and James in that month intervened and the conference was postponed until November.[4] None of this deterred Christian: he pressed ahead on his own, rashly assuming the role of Defender of the Protestant Faith. Early in 1625 he entered the war, in his capacity as duke of Holstein, without having secured binding promises of political and financial support from anyone.

Danish historians have traditionally labelled the intervention the product of the king's 'foolhardy' or 'childish' schemes. But neither this explanation nor recent attempts to argue that the royal enterprise was basically sound, failing only because of the council's systematic—and economically selfish—sabotage, can be maintained without serious reservations. It was more that the king's extraordinary freedom of financial operation left the way open for extensive activity beyond the range of constitutional control; and the fusion of Scandinavian rivalry for Baltic hegemony with the tortuous yet disruptive diplomacy of England, the Elector Palatine and the Dutch, played upon Christian's confessional conviction and personal ambition in a way that was hard to resist.

In defence of his decision to invade Germany, it must be said that the military situation in the spring of 1625 seemed disarmingly simple. The forces of the Catholic League and the emperor were on the borders of the Lower Saxon Circle; only the French (in the Valtelline), Mansfeld (in the Netherlands), Bethlen Gabor of Transylvania, and Charles Emmanuel of Savoy seemed prepared to take the field. Christian convinced himself that he must act before it was too late. In spite of the opposition of his council, he secured election as *Kreisoberst* of Lower Saxony in April 1625, pledged to defend the Circle against Imperial or League aggression. In June he led some 20,000 mercenaries, paid for the time being mainly by the king's personal fortune, across the Elbe and marched south to Hameln.

However, by a bizarre coincidence which is often overlooked, Christian had in fact chosen the worst possible moment to invade. So far, the Protestants' main enemy had been Tilly's army, financed largely by the Catholic League and billeted in Westphalia and Hesse. But in the spring of 1625, at the suggestion of the League's leaders, the emperor decided to raise a major campaign army of his own, entrusting the supreme command to a Czech nobleman who had made enormous profits from the sale of confiscated estates in Bohemia: Wallenstein. With the aid of the resources from his new

domains, of loans arranged by the Antwerp banker Hans de Witte, and of contributions extorted by his own troops, Wallenstein had by the summer raised some 30,000 men. This force, about which the Danes knew nothing, moved northwards into the territories of Magdeburg and Halberstadt. So now Christian, far from his home-base, had to face two armies, not one. Inevitably he was forced to fall back, only avoiding disaster because Tilly and Wallenstein quarrelled about the limits of their authority.

Christian now stood in desperate need of help, but his allies melted away. First came the collapse of the Anglo-French alliance. By the end of 1624, even before Christian intervened, Richelieu had withdrawn his support from the Mansfeld expedition. When the count landed in the Netherlands with 12,000 English levies in January 1625, he brought with him no plan of campaign other than the strict orders of James I that he was to engage in no military action outside the Palatinate. The dispute over Mansfeld coincided with the revolt of the Huguenot duke of Soubise in western France. Richelieu demanded naval assistance from England and the United Provinces as the price of his continued support for the anti-Habsburg cause, but cooperation in the repression of Protestants provoked a major public reaction in both countries. Trapped by the dilemmas of confessional politics, Richelieu changed course and abandoned the war: he refused to honour his commitment to the duke of Savoy, who had rashly invaded Genoa (Spain's ally and a crucial link in her Imperial communications), and he agreed to abandon the Valtelline to Spain, retaining only nebulous rights of transit for French troops (peace of Monzón, 5 May 1626). A few months later, the French government formally refused to join the anti-Habsburg alliance and, worse still, in March 1627 concluded an alliance with Spain to make war on England (pages 94–5 below). In retaliation, England offered support to Soubise, the Huguenot leader, and in July sent an expedition under the duke of Buckingham to foment rebellion in La Rochelle. For over a year, the siege of the port-city was a focus of European attention: England supported the Huguenots; Spain (briefly) and the Dutch (even more briefly) lent their aid to Louis XIII and Richelieu, who directed operations in person. Until La Rochelle surrendered, on 28 October 1628, France was powerless to intervene in affairs elsewhere.

In the summer of 1625, Gustavus Adolphus also deserted the coalition and embarked on an independent campaign against the king of Poland, first overrunning the rest of Livonia and then attacking Polish Prussia. In view of Gustavus's decision, Brandenburg returned to neutrality. More serious still, the new king of England, Charles I, also offered less to his allies. Although in April, just after his accession, he agreed to provide Christian IV with a monthly subsidy in lieu of an English contingent for his army, the dissolution of Parliament in 1625 gravely weakened his financial position. In the event, most of the available funds were used to equip the fleet sent to raid Cadiz in November, and even that was a miserable failure. Ninety Dutch and English ships, carrying some 9,000 men, failed to capture the treasure fleet from America, failed to destroy any Spanish shipping of note, and failed to take any enemy town. The return of the battered expedition to England in November, having lost thirty ships and many men, did nothing to raise the level of enthusiasm in the country for another foreign venture.

So, in the autumn of 1625, it was only a rump of the grand alliance—England, Denmark and the United Provinces—which actually sent delegates to The Hague to discuss the next campaign against the Habsburgs. At first the English delegation, led by the duke of Buckingham, concentrated on trying to shift some of the financial burden on

to their allies.[5] But in October Jacob Ulfeld, the chief negotiator for Denmark, made it plain that the appearance of Wallenstein's army had completely changed the nature of the problem, for if the theatre of war should move into northern Germany, the Danes might well have to arrange a separate peace with the emperor. A compromise was reached on 9 December 1625: the Hague Convention. England and the Dutch Republic each promised to pay 144,000 thalers to Denmark every month, and Mansfeld's army was to become a part of Christian's forces.[6] It was hoped that Bethlen Gabor so far not in contact with Christian IV—would attack the emperor again, and France promised to pay the prince a subsidy should he do so.

Although coordinating and supplying trans-continental operations in the seventeenth century was not easy, the allies decided on an ambitious campaign for 1626. Mansfeld would advance down the Elbe into Silesia, ravage the Habsburg lands and join up with Bethlen Gabor; their united forces would draw Wallenstein after them, and defeat him. The Imperial victory at the Dessau Bridge in April 1626 delayed Mansfeld's departure, but in June he resumed his campaign and, according to the information relayed back to Christian's headquarters, succeeded in drawing Wallenstein after him. In July the king was greatly encouraged to learn of the widespread peasant revolt in Upper Austria (page 84 below), which required the intervention of regular units of the Imperial and Bavarian armies before it could be contained. So in August, confident that only Tilly's army—equal to his own in quality and strength—lay between him and Vienna, Christian set out from Wolfenbüttel. His forces were to form one arm of a giant pincer movement towards the Habsburg heartland; Mansfeld and Bethlen were to be the other. But Christian was outnumbered and outgeneralled: Wallenstein had in fact left considerable forces behind in Lower Saxony, and Tilly had all the advantages of recent military experience. When, on 26 August 1626, after several days of heavy skirmishing in the rain, Christian brought Tilly to battle at Lutter-am-Barenberg, the laconic entry in the king's diary for that day reads: 'Fought with the enemy and lost. The same day I went to Wolfenbüttel.' To his army, retreating chaotically under constant enemy pressure and abandoned by their commander, his comment must have seemed something of an understatement.[7]

What exactly happened at Lutter is obscured by the plethora of pamphlets produced immediately after the battle by Tilly's field chancery—all of them stressing the inevitability of defeat for heretics who opposed the rightful emperor and his loyal host. By contrast, Protestant propaganda seems to have blamed—for internal political reasons—the defection of the cavalry at a crucial moment, and the ambushes laid behind Christian's lines. As far as one can see, Tilly's victory was due not so much to the superior quality of his troops as to tactical blunders on the side of the king. What is not in doubt, however, is the significance of Lutter: the fragile unity of the Lower Saxon Circle collapsed, and there was now nothing to stop the Catholic forces from invading Denmark. If the decisive campaign was delayed until 1627, that was merely to allow Wallenstein and the new Imperial army to get a share of the spoils.

Mansfeld had been no more successful than Christian. When he heard on 3 September 1626 of his colleague's defeat, he was in Silesia, with Wallenstein in hot pursuit. Deprived of his avenue of escape northwards, he resolved to join forces immediately with Bethlen Gabor. This he achieved within a week. Shortly afterwards, some contingents supplied by the Ottoman government arrived, and on 30 September the unlikely allies turned to face the Imperialists. But there was no battle, because Wallenstein (whose

troops had suffered severe privations on their rapid march to Hungary) had not enough men and Bethlen Gabor (who had taken the field late) had not enough guns. It was the Transylvanian's last chance of a great victory: a few weeks later, news reached him that the Turks had suffered a massive defeat in the Near East—despite a siege lasting almost a year, the Ottoman army failed to recapture Baghdad, taken by the Persians in 1624. Bethlen realized at once how significant this reverse was for his own plans. 'I see that I must make peace' was his immediate comment: deprived by Lutter of aid from the west, and now deprived by Baghdad of support from the east, he could not afford to face the Habsburgs alone. The peace of Bratislava was signed early in 1627 and Wallenstein moved north-westwards into Mecklenburg, Pomerania and ultimately Jutland.

The emperor now demanded an awesome price for peace. The dukes of Mecklenburg, who had supported Christian, were summarily deprived of their titles, and Wallenstein was given the escheated duchy. Christian was required to cede all Jutland, to make extortionate reparations, and to renounce forever his territories in the Empire. Such extreme demands went too far. Christian was unwilling to accept them, and his allies could not afford to let him. England and the Dutch, who regarded a separate peace between Denmark and the emperor as a prelude to the collapse of their cause, sent fresh (though limited) supplies of men and money. Gustavus Adolphus signed a defensive alliance with his former rival, and even held an awkward personal meeting with him on their common frontier in February 1629, apparently with a view to frightening the enemy. But by then it was clear that the Imperial position, so impressive at the end of 1627, had begun to crack. Wallenstein's efforts to create an Imperial fleet in the Baltic, with Spanish aid, foundered when neither Poland nor the Hanseatic ports would cooperate. His attempt to dig a canal between the Baltic and the North Sea, which would allow shipping to avoid the Sound tolls, remained a pipe-dream. More important, the Imperial army failed to take the Danish islands—the necessary precondition of complete surrender; and it proved unable to capture the port of Stralsund, which contained a ready-made fleet, despite a prolonged siege (see page 89 below).

While Wallenstein strove unsuccessfully for his objectives, the cost of his army became intolerable to the German states. It was clear that the Empire needed peace as much as did Denmark, and negotiations therefore began in earnest at Lübeck. Now there was no question of war reparations or the cession of territory. At the peace, in May 1629, Christian regained all the territories he had lost and was confirmed in his right to levy tolls on the River Elbe. In return, the king promised never again to interfere in the internal affairs of the Empire, a purely personal bond that did not affect the political parameters within which he could—and did—operate on behalf of his successors.

So ended the Danish intermezzo. Exactly how much it cost is hard to estimate. Christian IV, who did not even attempt to make his forces live off the land like the armies of Wallenstein or Tilly, spent correspondingly more of his own money and that of the realm: 2.6 million thalers passed through his treasury during the two years of continental war alone. Most of it was raised in Denmark: the foreign subsidies only began to arrive in spring 1625, and were only paid reluctantly and in part (only 547,000 thalers of the English subsidy were ever paid). This figure does not include the subsidies paid either by Christian himself, or by the Western powers, to allies such as Mansfeld. In 1628 the council re-established its financial tutelage over the king: taxes for war purposes were voted only on condition that they should be administered by special commissioners

elected by the council. This applied to the 700,000 thalers (or so) raised to pay the arrears of, or to disband, units in Denmark. When all the bills were paid, the government was faced with considerable debts both at home and abroad, so that Christian's German adventure might have cost his kingdoms between 6 and 8 million thalers in all.[8]

This was a serious blow, but its long-term consequences must not be exaggerated. True, Jutland (in particular its forests) had been devastated, and its population had been required to pay 2 million thalers, over only four months, to the Imperial army of occupation. The war therefore left much poverty and a legacy of social tension, not least directed against the nobles who had 'safeguarded' themselves by flight to the islands. Poor harvests, epidemic diseases and heavy taxation made a bad situation worse. But the post-war crisis did not last long. The continuing war in Germany created a market for Danish agricultural produce that enriched both merchants and large-scale cultivators, until Christian's anti-Swedish diplomacy provoked Lennart Torstensson's lightning attack upon Denmark in 1643 (see page 156 below).

If the war thus did little permanent damage to Denmark, what were its effects on her king? Again, the assessment must be negative. In international terms, Christian's defeats discredited him, while Sweden's victorious intervention after 1630 (with French, Russian and Dutch support) secured her the *Dominium maris Baltici* and allowed her to encircle Denmark—precisely the development that Christian had fought to avoid. The war had proved the vulnerability of Denmark's southern frontier for the first time; before long, others would exploit its weakness. On the domestic front, king and council recognized that there would now have to be more spending on defence, 'since…the impending danger is coming ever closer to our borders'; but they could not agree on who was to direct their foreign policy and control taxation.[9] In 1629, Christian blackmailed the council into approving taxes worth 1 million thalers, 'to repay his expenses on behalf of the realm during the war', by threatening that otherwise he would not ratify the peace of Lübeck. Apparently, the king had intended to restore by this manoeuvre his pre-war financial independence; he failed due to the council's systematic obstruction. By 1637 his 'ten barrels of gold'—as it was called by contemporaries—had vanished, and the need to establish a standing army for the first time enabled the Estates, resisting the explosive growth of taxation, successfully to insist that they should supervise the collection of tax revenues for military purposes through elected noble commissioners.[10] In 1645, after a second and far more fatal war, the commissioners also gained control of military expenditure. These developments—aided by economic depression from the 1640s—rather than the immediate consequences of the Danish intermezzo, started the country's period of decline.

What, then, had the Danish intermezzo achieved? Christian was discredited and defeated; Charles I, whose starving troops surrendered in April 1628, effectively withdrew from the war; Mansfeld and Bethlen Gabor, although technically undefeated, had been forced to withdraw from the war and both were dead by 1629. By then the Protestant cause was in ruins, but at least it had survived. It had also been transformed. Those who had argued that the Palatine cause was the same as the Protestant cause were vindicated; the leaders of Europe, whether Protestant or Catholic, were now convinced that the troubles of the 1620s were caused by more than the ambition and obstinacy of Frederick V. This changed vision was not, however, entirely due to the propaganda of the Palatine exiles or their allies. It owed far more to the actions and statements of the

victorious Habsburgs, and their supporters, who left Europe in no doubt that they intended to exploit their successes to the full. After a century of standing on the defensive, the Catholics of Germany had many scores to settle.

III
The Habsburgs victorious

Never since the Reformation had all the major Catholic states of Europe combined effectively to extirpate heresy. Charles V had been consistently opposed by France and occasionally by the papacy; Philip II had been almost as much at loggerheads with his fellow-Catholics as with the Protestants. After 1619, by contrast, Ferdinand could count for a time on the active support of Spain, France, Poland, the German Catholics and the leading states of Italy in his wars against rebels and heretics alike. Gradually, it is true, these allies peeled away—Poland and France in 1621; the papacy and most of the Italian states in 1623—but the Vienna -Brussels-Madrid axis, aided only by the German Catholic League, nevertheless continued to defeat their Protestant enemies. Eventually they were even able to mount impressive joint operations in both the Netherlands and Italy—although many of Ferdinand's councillors entertained profound doubts about the wisdom of such open aid to Spain.

Although it has become the convention, in histories of the Thirty Years' War, to examine the events of the 1620s mainly through the eyes of the defeated Protestants, such a view is both distorted and deceptive. It fails to take into account the patient labours of the victors to turn their temporary triumph into a permanent achievement, first in the reconquered lands of the rebels, and later in the Empire at large. It therefore also fails to explain how these activities, pursued for a full decade, eventually caused the isolation of the Habsburgs so that they could be decisively defeated. Re-examining the first decade of the war from the Catholic point of view is therefore essential, even though it means looking again at certain events, such as the crucial sieges of La Rochelle and Stralsund in 1628; for the same occurrence might take on an entirely different significance when seen through Catholic rather than Protestant eyes.

i The Imperial vision

The year 1620 represents a turning-point in Central European history. Yet it was not the brief and confused encounter on the field of the White Mountain which made that so, nor even the breathless and craven withdrawal of Frederick of the Palatinate. Rather, Emperor Ferdinand II took a series of personal decisions in the wake of his victory, which markedly altered the nature of Habsburg sovereignty in his own territories, as well as rendering a prolonged war in Germany much more likely.

In Bohemia his lieutenants instituted a programme which blended persecution with reorganization. However chaotically implemented at times, the plan bore the mark of an underlying consistency. First, the active participants in the rebellion were brought low, then the most dangerous ideological opponents, the Calvinist ministers, were expelled, followed closely by the Lutherans. Next came an assault on the Protestant towns, and

finally, by 1627–8, the whole nobility faced a choice between conversion and exile. Meanwhile, trusted Imperial advisers hammered out a revised constitution for Bohemia and Moravia to enshrine and perpetuate the new royal powers: hereditary Habsburg rule, with enhanced legislative and judicial rights; the abolition of religious tolerance; officials made responsible to the sovereign rather than to the Estates; an exclusive royal prerogative to ennoble, and hence to bring foreigners into the administration; equality of the German language, which predominated at court, with Czech, which predominated among the people. And though Bohemia, as the main focus of contumacy, received the severest treatment, moves were afoot throughout the Habsburg lands to proscribe Protestants and enforce adherence to the new lines of policy. In Upper Austria a combination of Bavarian occupation and Imperial Counter-Reformation unleashed in 1626 the most violent peasant disturbances of the Thirty Years' War.

The man behind this policy has always puzzled historians. Not surprisingly, since contemporaries themselves formed very diverse judgements of Ferdinand. Some found him friendly and mild of manner—he was certainly not unsociable and could charm even those who disapproved of his actions; others stressed rather his toughness and inflexibility. Some saw him as self-reliant; others pointed to the role (benevolent or malignant, according to taste) of his confidants. But on one matter all could agree: the emperor's Catholic convictions amounted to a consuming passion. He attended Masses at all hours of the day and night; he revered the Blessed Virgin and the relics of saints; he showed conspicuous favour to the priesthood and to the institutions of the Church, especially its monasteries; he went on pilgrimages and endured self-abasement; his private life was a model of piety and familial virtue. This devotion was not merely common knowledge: it was publicly paraded, most of all at the end of Ferdinand's life in a celebrated homiletic tract by his Jesuit confessor, Lamormaini. Indeed, the ascetic faith lies at the root of all the emperor's political activity. Not for nothing did he restore the clergy to first place in Bohemia's constitutional hierarchy after the White Mountain. While he certainly thought that heresy would always breed insubordination in his realms, the resolve to extirpate it came first.

To understand the drama of the 1620s we need to return to Ferdinand's political origins. For, only a few years earlier, this international warlord, the king-emperor linked by family marriages with Spain and Poland, Bavaria, Mantua, and Tuscany, had still been merely a junior archduke, ruling in provincial Styria under the general aegis of the Habsburg house. There can be no doubt that Ferdinand was moulded by that experience, and that the capital of Inner Austria, Graz, continued to occupy pride of place in his affections: he personally supervised the building of a mausoleum there, where his remains were interred in 1637. As a youth, he had witnessed the fierce struggle of his parents, especially his zealous, formidable Bavarian mother, against the overbearing and self-righteous leaders of the Styrian Protestant Estates. He had observed how, in these circumstances, princely consolidation might march hand in hand with Catholic consolidation, splitting the ill-knit opposition camp of nobles, burghers, and preachers, leaning on the faint-hearted with multifarious forms of spiritual and material suasion, helped above all by a freshly established Jesuit university. On reaching his majority, fortified by a visit to the shrine at Loreto and a meeting with the pope, Ferdinand set out to perfect the methods of political Counter-Reformation. Between 1599 and 1602, his commissioners, lay and clerical, toured towns and villages, enforcing adherence to the

Roman Church. The citizens had to swear a Catholic oath, to present evidence of absolution, to abandon all sectarian books and schooling. Those who proved intransigent were forced to accompany their Protestant ministers on the road into exile.

The gamble paid off triumphantly. Henceforth Austria's southern province remained obedient to the Habsburg will; the nobility, though still predominantly Lutheran, stood isolated and pacific. Neither the heady events of 1608–9, nor the subsequent insurrection, provoked it to any disloyalty. For his part, Ferdinand, confident now of a mission in the service of Mother Church, bided his time, and intrigued with the extremer, Spanish-Bavarian faction at the courts of his Imperial cousins, Rudolf and Matthias. On gaining the succession, he removed to Vienna, eager to enforce a similar code of godly discipline upon a wider homeland. Significantly, many of his closest associates had likewise risen to political maturity in Graz: the chancellor Werdenberg, the confessor Lamormaini, above all the shrewd and supple chief minister, Eggenberg. Within a very few years the whole pattern was repeated: commissioners, confession-slips and oaths, Jesuit-dominated education and censorship, pressure for conformity, mixing blandishments towards those of higher social standing with an unyielding assault on dissenters. Now the last heretics in Styria too, however refined their pedigree, had to make a choice; hundreds of them followed their consciences into emigration in Germany.

The resulting solution has frequently been called 'confessional absolutism'. The term may serve, but we must rather define it in negative terms, by demonstrating what it was not. In the first place, it was no abstract political ideal. Ferdinand's notions could be thoroughly legalistic, a kind of radical conservatism, claiming that Protestant Estates in Central Europe had never owned constitutional rights, and might therefore be dispossessed at their sovereign's will. But one would search in vain amid the thousands of pages compiled by the emperor's faithful diplomat and chronicler, Count Khevenhüller, for any theoretical statement of such a principle, just as Vienna found no one in 1619 who could adequately refute the well-argued *Apology* of the Bohemian rebels. Besides scraps from Jesuit authorities picked up during his impeccably orthodox training at the Bavarian university of Ingolstadt, Ferdinand's mind was innocent of philosophy. He won through by determination married to practical resource.

In the second place, confessional absolutism was not theocracy. For all that he might trust in divine intervention, the emperor kept his earthly clerical supporters on a tight rein. In particular the stories from his enemies about domination by the Jesuits were much exaggerated, and such power as Ferdinand devolved upon them and their kind he devolved consciously and willingly. Throughout his life he was made aware of the inseparability of Church and politics when matters like sovereignty over ecclesiastical lands were at stake. His Bavarian cousins ruled in a string of German sees, his younger brothers Leopold and Charles both became bishops at an early age. The immediate cause of the revolt in Bohemia lay precisely at this intersection of clerical and lay spheres: if Protestants could now (since the Letter of Majesty) build churches on lands belonging to the crown, were they therefore entitled to build on monastic estates? Whereas Ferdinand backed to the hilt the claim that Catholic possessions were in this respect inviolable, he had no doubt about the practical corollary (however inconsistent in theory): that a *Catholic* sovereign could interfere with them. When Melchior Khlesl, long-serving councillor of Matthias and strongest arm of the Austrian Counter-Reformation till that time, tried as an elder statesman to negotiate a settlement with the insurgents, Ferdinand

had him apprehended and forcibly detained in a distant abbey. Nor was he loath to pick a fight with Rome itself (whither Khlesl at length withdrew in dudgeon). The alienation between Ferdinand and Pope Urban VIII became a major international factor during the 1620s and 1630s. The Edict of Restitution made perfect sense, to Vienna at least, as an expression of the sovereign imperial will, though it caused almost as much annoyance among some Catholics as among the Protestants.

Finally, confessional absolutism did not involve any consistent centralization of government or any clear view of a freestanding 'Habsburg Empire'. The 1620s indeed saw the creation of one new administrative organ, the Austrian court chancery, but its title did not (at this stage) imply any new political entity—the purpose was to circumvent the authority of Germany's arch-chancellor, the Catholic Elector of Mainz—still less any radical new conduct of business. In the Tyrol and Alsace, Ferdinand happily allowed his brother Leopold (now released from clerical vows) to rule with almost plenary powers; and when Leopold died in 1632, his widow, an Italian princess, took over. Even in Bohemia, once the dust had settled, the former institutions of government were seen to remain in practice largely intact. Everywhere local Estates, provided they adopted a Catholic and loyal stance, survived and even prospered.

Despite all the expulsions and the wave of ennoblements during the 1620s, the Habsburg system of government created no new social elite. Few military adventurers or court favourites gained a lasting foothold, while fresh titles largely adorned families already powerful somewhere within the Monarchy. Habsburg policies continued to be executed primarily by local notables (just a little more oligarchic than before), who adapted them to suit their own essentially provincial circumstances. Ferdinand might well reflect, as he remembered the dangerous Protestant confederations of the years before 1620, that efficient and centralized government of such multifarious realms could easily call forth a correspondingly cohesive and international opposition. Besides, two further elements, vital for any royal absolutism worth the name, were lacking in the Habsburg lands. There existed no advanced network of financiers or entrepreneurs. Indeed, the emperor had already done his best to cripple commercial life by his destruction of the Protestant burgherdom (though he did show some favour to the Jews). Towards the end of his reign Ferdinand even nominated two abbots to be president of his treasury: the Counter-Reformation state was still conceived rather like a gigantic monastic latifundium. At the same time the army exercised no decisive public influence. Ferdinand himself hardly possessed better credentials as a soldier than his immediate Imperial predecessors. The whole Wallenstein episode shows a lack of established channels of military control, as well as the fact that Imperial troops (like those of other countries) tended to win battles despite—and not because of—attempts to impose any religious or moral authority upon them.

The revived Habsburg Monarchy thus underwent only a moderate amount of structural change. By the 1630s the new ideological sanctions of the civil power, together with its triumphs abroad, tended to conceal the still shallow roots of the edifice. But one Achilles' heel was evident enough: royal Hungary. In Hungary the Turkish threat had faded for the time being, and been replaced by a national revolt against Austria on broadly Protestant lines. The princes of Transylvania, Bethlen Gabor and George Rákóczi, Calvinists with good Ottoman connections, found little difficulty in securing the allegiance of the ruling class over most of the Habsburg-controlled area, despite Ferdinand's election as king in

1618, just a few weeks after the defenestration of Prague. The Counter-Reformation in Hungary, which had done much to precipitate this disaffection, managed to stem the tide of rebellion during the 1620s, thanks to firm leadership from the indefatigable Palatine, Nicholas Esterházy, and from the buoyant controversialist, Archbishop Pázmány. But the situation remained fragile: even the Catholic Church could not always be relied upon, and Esterházy and Pázmány stood at odds with each other on matters of principle. In the absence of deep reserves of loyalty, obedience to Ferdinand's regime was still conditional on good behaviour. Hungary might nevertheless have been pacified (plans were ready, to be drawn on later) if only the Habsburgs could disengage in Germany. But that antithesis was an unreal one for Ferdinand II. His greatest act of faith, faith in his own divine calling, involved claiming the patrimony of the Christian emperors undiminished. Beside the splendour of Charlemagne's legacy, the thorns in the holy crown of St Stephen seemed a mere provincial irritant.

Any account of the rebuilding of Catholic Austria must concentrate on Ferdinand II. But what of his talented son, Ferdinand III, whom posterity has so consistently neglected? The younger Ferdinand was reared in the struggle: born in the year when Matthias took up arms against Rudolf; crowned king of Hungary during a pause from the campaigns against Bethlen Gabor; king of Bohemia in the year of the new constitution; then the first Austrian Habsburg for generations personally to direct, at Nördlingen, a major military victory. Following his accession in 1637 he had to cling to the task, despite his private commitment to intellectual and artistic pursuits (he was, for example, the founder of his family's tradition of practical musicianship). Yet Ferdinand III proved even less of a genuine innovator in government than his father. Changes in emphasis were hesitant and slight. In his unspectacular way the new emperor simply confirmed the gradual shift towards a more Danubian, orthodox, Vienna-based Monarchy, self-sufficient as a whole and interdependent in its several parts.

Of course, Germany was still worth fighting for. Now, however, the most crucial aim became to secure existing Counter-Reformation gains by seeing off the Swedes, with their own Central European designs and their continued backing for émigré Protestants. Ferdinand settled in the end for minimum demands abroad, to be sure of a free hand nearer to home. By 1648 the Habsburgs were left with institutions of state half-consolidated vis-à-vis Germany on the one hand, where their sphere of influence contracted, and Bohemia and Hungary on the other, where it was correspondingly enlarged. But if the House of Austria still lacked the substance of absolute rule, it could now at least pursue the shadow unhindered.

ii The practice of absolutism I: 1621–1626

The first consequence of Ferdinand II's victory over his rebels to be felt by most ordinary people was the collapse of the currency. It began, like the revolt itself, in Bohemia. Even under the government of the Estates, the coinage of Bohemia had been debased in order to make the same amount of silver go further. But the scale of the operation was modest in comparison with the next regime, headed by Ferdinand's lieutenant, Karl von Liechtenstein: during the year 1621, a 25 per cent devaluation took place. But this, too, was modest in comparison with 1622. On 18 January of that year, a contract was signed

between the Imperial treasury and a consortium of fifteen prominent subjects of Ferdinand who agreed to lease all the mints in Bohemia, Moravia and Lower Austria, and to control their coinage for one year. The consortium, whose composition was kept so secret that even today only five members can be identified with any certainty, managed to destroy the Bohemian economy totally within its brief period of office. The market was flooded with 34 million thalers of consortium coins, their face value cried up by 25 per cent, their silver content drastically reduced. A debasement of about 90 per cent was effected, which made it almost impossible to exchange the consortium's money (called 'long coins') outside the Habsburg lands. Whereas an Imperial thaler had been obtained for 90 Bohemian kreuzer in 1618, by 1623 the commercial rate of exchange was 675 kreuzer. Nor did matters end here, for some members of the consortium were also members of the 'Confiscations Court', created late in 1620 to determine the guilt of those accused of supporting rebellion. Over 1,500 landowners were tried, and almost half were condemned to lose all or part of their estates. The court invariably confiscated the entire property of those suspected of involvement in the revolt, and when only a portion—one-half, one-quarter and so on—was judged forfeit, the remaining land was not returned. Instead, its value was assessed and the equivalent paid in 'longcoins'. This meant the ruin of even those nobles whose property was only partially confiscated (perhaps 600 in all) and the loss of almost all town land. By the time the consortium and the court were dissolved, in the autumn of 1623, the power of both towns and nobles in Bohemia was broken, while the economy of the kingdom was so crippled by the lack of reliable currency that students were forced to stay away from schools and universities, those dependent on money wages or pensions became destitute, and craftsmen and tradesmen would only barter their wares ('We will not sell good meat for badcoin,' the butchers protested). In his *Republic of Bohemia,* published in 1633, Pavel Stránský wrote:

> It was then, for the first time, that we learned from experience… that neither plague, nor war, nor hostile foreign incursions into our land, neither pillage nor fire, could do so much harm to good people as frequent changes in the value of money.[1]

The monetary confusion caused by these developments could not be confined to Bohemia. Everywhere, the 'long coins' of the consortium were imitated by rulers anxious to increase their profits from coining. From 1621 until 1623, the currencies of the Empire were in total disarray. In some places, even the government could not cope. The clerks of the city treasury at Nördlingen in Swabia, for example, were no longer able to calculate any totals for municipal income and expenditure: so rapidly did the value of coins change that, after 1621, they merely made individual entries and tried to keep as many silver coins in their coffers as possible.[2] In several areas, especially in Saxony, there was rioting against those public authorities which failed to maintain a stable currency. And, all over Germany, popular songs and poems preserved the memory of the *Kipper-und Wipperzeit* (the 'see-saw era'), when, for over two years, the Empire had perforce to maintain a copper standard.[3]

While their economic position was thus under heavy attack, people in many parts of the Empire were also subjected to pressure of another type: recatholicization. The pace of this operation was slower than the recoinage, although its effects lasted longer. In the

Upper Palatinate, for example, conquered by the troops of Maximilian of Bavaria in 1621, Catholicism had not been practised since the 1540s, so that the first priests to celebrate Mass again—two Jesuit chaplains with the Bavarian army—had difficulty in finding the necessary accessories, such as a chalice. Recatholicization proceeded slowly until 1625, not least because the administration remained in the hands of Frederick V's officials, many of them Calvinists; but eventually they were purged, and Catholic churches, a school, and a Jesuit mission were opened in Amberg, the territorial capital. Then, in 1626, Calvinist ministers were expelled; in 1628, even Lutherans were given six months either to convert or to leave, and the Catholic clergy introduced compulsory catechism classes for all. The following year, a plan for a permanent hierarchy was adopted by the Bavarian authorities and implementation began immediately. The Catholic congregation at Amberg rose from 1,000 in 1625 to 5,000 in 1629 and (after some losses in the 1630s) to 10,000 and more by 1645.[4]

Progress across the border in the Habsburg lands was likewise slow. Although the Catholics, supported to the hilt by Ferdinand, proved highly successful at closing down the churches of their Protestant rivals, for some time they seemed incapable of replacing them. Even in the 1640s, about half of the parishes of Bohemia lacked an incumbent, and Polish priests (whose language was not always intelligible to their Czech congregations) had to be brought in to help. In Moravia, in 1635, there were still only 257 resident clergy (most of them regulars) to serve the 636 parishes, while in Hungary the normal requirements for ordination often had to be waived in order to secure a respectable number of priests.[5] In Upper Austria, as we shall see, the government found it necessary to import Italian priests to augment the small number of local Catholic clergy.

It was the same story further west. Recatholicization in the Rhineland was led by Philip Christopher von Sötern, bishop of Speyer, an early supporter of the League who had been driven into exile in 1621 by the armies defending the Rhine Palatinate for Frederick V. Apart from the disgrace and inconvenience, he estimated that the Palatine war had caused losses to his domains worth 8 million thalers. Now he resolved to exact his revenge, and his elevation as Elector of Trier in 1623 increased his power to do so. The primary aim of Sötern and his fellow-prelates was to reclaim all the church lands in the Rhine Palatinate which had been secularized; their second was to root out Protestant worship there and replace it with Catholicism. At first all went well: in February 1623 the Bavarian governor of the Palatine territories to the east of the Rhine ordered the expulsion of all Calvinist preachers; two years later the Spanish governor of the far more extensive west bank territories did likewise. At the same time, the Elector of Mainz's officials prepared a programme for recatholicizing the Calvinist county of Nassau. It was put into effect in the autumn of 1626, and the pace of restitution was accelerated the following year when Tilly's forces were quartered in the area.[6] But, as in the Habsburg lands, it was one thing to destroy and quite another to rebuild. Once again, there were simply not enough priests available to take over all the regained parishes: by the end of 1630, scarcely 20 per cent of the livings in the Palatinate had a Catholic priest, and congregations everywhere were small. Nor was the restitution of church lands pressed home with much enthusiasm, for the 5,000 Spanish troops quartered in the area often retained the Church's former lands for their own sustenance.[7] Perhaps, however, a gradual approach in this matter was the best policy. At least such moderate

recatholicization in the Palatinate provoked little or no popular opposition; in Upper Austria, by contrast, there was a major revolt.

In 1620 the Estates of Upper Austria, led by Tschernembl, had openly endorsed the cause of Frederick of the Palatinate. Within weeks, Maximilian of Bavaria put down the insurrection, leaving behind a garrison of 5,000 men, whose wages he tried to meet from the payments of the local taxpayers. In 1621, Ferdinand agreed that the Bavarians should continue to hold Upper Austria and the Upper Palatinate, as a pledge, until Maximilian's considerable war-expenses had been repaid.[8] In lieu of interest on this debt, Maximilian was allowed to levy taxes yielding 240,000 thalers annually from each occupied territory. The arrangement worked well in the Palatinate, whose ruler was outlawed; but in Upper Austria, the Bavarian occupation forces were supposed to act in the name not only of Maximilian but of Ferdinand, as archduke. There was an important conflict of interest between the two overlords. To Maximilian, Austria offered an important source of revenue with which to pay his army: he therefore desired to maintain peace and prosperity in the duchy at all costs, so that taxes would be paid promptly and in full. Ferdinand, on the other hand, was interested not in money but in loyalty: he wanted the duchy purged of traitors and heretics, and as territorial prince, under the *cuius regio* clause of the peace of Augsburg, he felt entitled to do this. Reluctantly, the Bavarian occupation authorities, led by the well-meaning Adam von Herberstorff, in October 1624 ordered the expulsion of all Protestant pastors and schoolteachers, and allowed Catholic creditors to foreclose on Protestants in order to force the sale of their property. In October 1625, the government created a Reformation Commission charged with recovering all secularized church lands and endowments, and it was decreed that, by Easter 1626, residents of the duchy must either attend Catholic worship or leave. Only the nobles were spared: they were allowed up to fifty years to convert.

The final catalyst for the revolt was provided by the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, founded in Rome by Gregory XV expressly to derive maximum benefit for the Catholic Church from the victories of Ferdinand and his allies beyond the Alps. In 1625, the Congregation authorized the dispatch of numerous Italian missionaries to the Empire to carry out the work of recatholicization—partly because there were not enough German-speaking priests of suitable quality, partly because the Italians' Latin was excellent, and partly (in the Congregation's own words) 'because the Italians are not so addicted to wine and drinking' as the natives. But these virtues were less apparent to the Austrian laity, who offered some opposition to the foreign priests installed in formerly Protestant parishes. Under pressure from Ferdinand, Governor Herberstorff decided to make an example of one area: the men of several parishes were summoned to Frankenfeld Castle, and on 15 May 1626 were reproved for their unruly and disrespectful behaviour towards the new priests. Then Herberstorff accused the local officials of causing the trouble and ordered the immediate execution of seventeen of them, chosen by lot.[9]

This frighteningly arbitrary behaviour, albeit forced on Herberstorff by the emperor, provoked a group of Protestant lay officers, led by Stephen Fadinger (a modest farmer and an assistant of the local magistrate), to organize a general revolt which all but succeeded in driving out both Bavarian and Austrian overlords. Unlike earlier peasant uprisings, which were antiseigneurial, this time the rebels' objective was Linz, the government's capital. Support for Fadinger was widespread, and it came from Catholics

as well as Protestants: all had suffered from the fourteen-fold increase in taxation required to pay for the Bavarian forces of occupation, and from the collapse of the currency between 1621 and 1623. In May 1626 a small army under Herberstorff was routed by the rebels, and a regular siege of Linz began. But Fadinger was killed in the trenches in July and the siege was abandoned. The peasants also failed to secure foreign aid, although contact was made with Scultetus, a Palatine court preacher who acted as ambassador for Christian IV, then also in arms against the emperor. The rising soon became more a guerrilla war than a peasant revolt. It nevertheless required some 12,000 regular troops and a series of pitched battles before the situation was brought under control (see Map 2). The only successes which the rebels could claim were the end of Bavarian occupation and the removal of the Italian priests. In May 1628, after prolonged negotiations in which Count Max von Trauttmannsdorf made his diplomatic début for the emperor, the Upper Palatinate was sold to Maximilian for 10 million thalers, the exact amount agreed as Ferdinand's debt to Bavaria and the League. In return, Austria was restored to Habsburg control. At the same time, in place of the unpopular Italians, the papacy gave permission for 300 regular clergy in Upper Austria to serve in formerly Protestant parishes (for there were still not enough Catholic priests to go round).[10]

None of this, however, deterred the emperor and his allies in their crusade against the heretics. 'God is on our side, not on theirs' was the jubilant refrain of Father Hyacinth of Casale (who had done so much to bring about the Electoral transfer) in the spring of 1624.[11] Unknown to him, at much the same time in Vienna, Emperor Ferdinand took a solemn vow in the presence of his confessor, that 'he would undertake whatever the circumstances seemed to permit' for the good of the Catholic religion. The confessor, William Lamormaini, entertained no doubts about the implications of this declaration: 'great things can be accomplished by this emperor', he triumphantly informed the Vatican. Perhaps even all Germany [may] be led back to the old faith, provided…[pope and emperor together] take up the matter vigorously and see it through with persistence.[12] Events were to show how perfectly Lamormaini knew his man.

iii The practice of absolutism II: 1626–1629

It seems strange that the gains of the Habsburgs and their Catholic allies in the five years after the White Mountain provoked so few protests from the Lutherans. There were some critics of Imperialism, of course, but they carried little weight.[1] More typical, and more influential, was the Elector of Saxony, who in 1626 tried to convince his neighbours in the Lower Saxon Circle that they were wrong to oppose the emperor. In a lengthy argument, John George accused his co-religionist, King Christian IV of Denmark, of foreign aggression, and his fellow Germans, Christian of Brunswick and the dukes of Saxe-Weimar, who had joined the Danes, of treason. He argued that Ferdinand was waging a just war against rebels and not a religious war of conquest; that fears of Spanish Habsburg domination of Germany were crude exaggeration; that the conspiracy theory of a Jesuit reconversion of Lutherans was disproved by Ferdinand's moderate actions (this was in 1626!); and that Luther's injunction to 'Obey the powers that be' still applied to Ferdinand, since he had offered no cause for resistance. What the emperor chose to do in Bohemia and Austria, according to John George, was covered by the *cuius regio*

principle. And, as if all that were not enough, the Elector even claimed that Tilly was a patriotic general, defending loyal Germans against the Danes and the Dutch-paid freebooters of Mansfeld, and that the Army of the League should therefore be supported by all Lutherans in a concerted campaign for peace, justice and obedience in the Empire.[2]

Saxony's argument amounted to a conservative plea for peace and unity, with loyalty to Ferdinand as duly-elected emperor. Its flaw lay in the assumption that Ferdinand was thinking along exactly the same lines. It is nevertheless the most confident statement that we have of German Lutheran pacifism, quietism, legalism and xenophobia just before the emperor's maladroit and militaristic policies forced even Saxony to consider opposition. But even in this lengthy policy statement of 1626, John George was ominously silent about the two new Habsburg armies—one Spanish, one Imperial—which had begun to operate in the Empire.

The members of the Catholic League had become alarmed, over the winter of 1624–5, by the persistent rumour that Christian of Denmark was preparing to invade Germany. They feared for the League's forces, vulnerably encamped in north-west Germany. 'Tilly cannot gain superiority alone', Maximilian of Bavaria was warned. 'The Danes hold great advantages: they will act first and overwhelm us.'[3] The new Elector took the matter up with the emperor. Some reinforcement was all he desired, but to Ferdinand the matter was not so simple. In the first place, there were also rumours that Bethlen Gabor of Transylvania was mobilizing for another attack on the Habsburg heartland. Spain, which had offered help in the past, could spare no troops; on the contrary, of the sixteen Imperial regiments then in existence, six were in the Netherlands assisting at Spínola's siege of Breda and one was in Spanish Lombardy. There were not enough men left to defend Vienna, let alone to reinforce Tilly. So on 7 April 1625, Ferdinand signed a patent naming Albert of Wallenstein (duke of Friedland in Bohemia since 1623) to be 'chief over all our troops already serving at this time, whether in the Holy Roman Empire or in the Netherlands', and ordering him to create 'a field army, whether from our existing units or from newly raised regiments, so that there shall be 24,000 men in all'. In September 1625 the 'Friedlandsche Armada', leaving a skeleton force to defend Vienna, moved northwards from Bohemia to the borders of Lower Saxony, to take up position on the right of Tilly's army.

On Tilly's left were detachments from the Army of Flanders. After the triumphant capture of Breda, in June 1625, some 11,000 troops from the South Netherlands were sent into garrisons along the Rhine, Ems and Lippe to enforce a strict economic blockade of the Dutch Republic, by land and sea. They remained until 1629. At the same time, a new body—the *Almirantazgo,* or Admiralty—was created in Seville to check that no Dutch goods were brought into Spain and (to a lesser extent) that no Spanish wares were shipped to the Republic. These measures were not popular in Germany. The Hanseatic ports protested long and loud about the rigorous scrutiny to which their cargoes were subjected by the officials of the *Almirantazgo;* and the river blockade was denounced by the territorial rulers of the Rhineland, whose subjects were deprived of valuable trading contacts as well as being required to quarter and placate the ill-paid troops of Spain. The Elector of Cologne's bishoprics of Münster, Osnabrück, Paderborn and Minden were in the front line of this economic warfare, and he complained bitterly that 'The Spaniards have no respect for the Imperial Constitution;…they are always claiming that their alleged "necessity" or "commodity" must prevail.'[4]

In 1627, the Spaniards gave further offence when they enforced a judgement of the Imperial Chamber Court concerning the partition of Hesse. In 1604, upon the extinction of the Marburg line, Maurice of Hesse-Kassel had occupied the entire inheritance (page 19 above); now, by Imperial decree, he was compelled to hand most of it over to his cousin, George of Hesse-Darmstadt, and in addition to pay just over 1 million thalers in damages for wrongfully holding Marburg.[5] The outrage caused in Germany by this exercise of Imperial power was surpassed, however, by the simultaneous deposition of the dukes of Mecklenburg, again by the decision of the Imperial Supreme Court, on the grounds that they had supported Christian of Denmark. This time the confiscated estates were transferred, not to a relative, but to Wallenstein. At first (February 1627) they were only given as a pledge for the money owed by the emperor to his general; but the following year Wallenstein was recognized as duke and began to reside, with a court of over 1,000 persons, in the great palace at Güstrow.[6]

There will never be agreement about the character and role of Wallenstein, but his alleged treason and murder in 1634 have tended to turn the matter into a historiographical hornets' nest, thus overshadowing his real importance as an unscrupulously innovatory but loyal Habsburg military entrepreneur during his first Imperial generalship, 1625–30. These were the crucial years of his life; this was the period of his truly significant influence on events. But even so, in these years, Wallenstein did not make major policy decisions; he merely executed those made by his master. On matters of religion, for example, he remained as calculating and pragmatic as any modern business executive running a multi-national company.[7] When his pro-Danish enemies, Christian of Brunswick and John Ernest of Saxe-Weimar, tried to gain the support of Lutheran Magdeburg in 1626 by saying that the Imperial army which wished to occupy the city was taking the first step in a religious war of aggression to recatholicize all Germany, Wallenstein requested the emperor[8]

> To be so good as to assure the city of Magdeburg that this is not a war of religion in any way; but that as a loyal and devoted city, their privileges of religious and secular peace will not be harmed in the slightest, rather that they will be protected graciously and also defended against anything to the contrary.

But Magdeburg's fears were well founded. Three years later the city was suffering from the attentions of Franz Wilhelm von Wartenburg, bishop of Osnabrück, acting as a special Imperial commissioner, who made a bid to infiltrate the traditionally Lutheran Cathedral Chapter by confiscating ten key prebends in order to facilitate the election, for the first time in almost a century, of a Catholic ruling bishop. Having tried to get that far, the plan in July 1630 was to apply *autonomia,* i.e. the constitutional right of a Catholic ruler to impose religious uniformity on his territorial subjects.[9] Nor was this an isolated case: the events at Magdeburg were part of a grand campaign waged all over the Empire to recover church lands for the Catholic cause once and for all (see Plate 5).

The operation was planned at Mühlhausen in the autumn of 1627, when the Electors (or their representatives) met to discuss the implications of the defeat of Denmark. The emperor's envoy to the meeting was instructed to say that, after nine years of war, the time had come to reconsider the religious state of Germany, and in particular the

restoration of church lands illegally taken from the Catholics. This, according to Ferdinand, was 'the great gain and fruit of the war' on which he had his eye, and he assured the Catholic party at Mühlhausen—who clamoured for some action—that 'just as up to now we have never thought to let pass any chance to secure the restitution of church lands, neither do we intend, now or in the future, to have to bear the responsibility before posterity of having neglected or failed to exploit even the least opportunity'.[10]

But for months no concrete steps were taken, and in September 1628, five south German prelates sent a joint letter beseeching the emperor to keep his promise. The next month a preliminary draft of the document known as the Edict of Restitution was sent to the Imperial Privy Council, and to the Electors of Mainz and Bavaria, for comment. Ferdinand claimed, in the preamble, that he was merely restoring the status quo of 1555, immediately after the peace of Augsburg, and that the Edict was thus designed merely to enforce respect for the laws of the Empire. The opening sections of the draft Edict seemed to confirm this: all church lands seized since 1552 (the 'normative date' in the Augsburg peace) were to be restored. But the Edict also declared that ecclesiastical princes had the same right to enforce religious conformity on their subjects as secular rulers. This went far beyond the settlement of 1555 because it effectively rendered the *Declaratio Ferdinandei* (page 17 above) invalid. Yet even this was not enough for the Catholic prelates: they proceeded to demand the inclusion in the Edict of a new prohibition of Calvinism, and the application of its terms to the Imperial Free Cities, too. After five months of discussion, the emperor and his advisers finally decided to include the ban on all Protestant sects other than Lutheranism, but to leave the cities out. The rest of the document remained more or less as it stood.

Five hundred copies of the Edict were secretly printed in Vienna and distributed to the Directors of the Imperial Circles and the major princes, with instructions to publish multiple copies simultaneously on 28 March 1629. The document looked disarmingly simple—a single sheet of paper bearing four columns of small print and the emperor's signature—but appearances were deceptive. On a version printed in Würzburg, a contemporary hand has added to the title page the words *Radix omnium malorum:* the root of all evils.[11] For a whole year, the Edict and its execution became the central issue of German politics. The bishoprics and archbishoprics of Lower Saxony and Westphalia were immediately affected, as were some 500 monasteries, convents and other church properties secularized by a host of Protestant rulers since 1552. The duke of Württemberg alone was to be deprived of the lands of fourteen large monasteries and thirty-six convents; the dukes of Brunswick faced demands only slightly less exorbitant (see Map 2 and Plates 6–7).

Although as yet the territorial church lands in Brandenburg and Electoral Saxony seemed safe, having been secularized long before 1552, there were reasons to fear that another Edict might one day challenge their immunity. In the first place, some of the former church properties claimed in other areas had become Lutheran before 1552: thus, out of forty-five Imperial cities affected by the commissioners' demands between 1627 and 1631, only eight had clearly broken the post-1552 moratorium on further Protestantization (indeed one—the Imperial city of Lindau—had been Protestant since 1528). In the second place, the appearance of the Edict was closely followed by publication of an influential tract which seemed to reveal in detail the philosophy which underlay Ferdinand's decree: Paul Laymann's *Pacis Compositio*. The author—a Jesuit—

argued that ‘Whatever is not found to have been explicitly granted, should be considered forbidden’, and that therefore the Protestants should restore everything they held unless a valid title to it could be produced. The pamphlet, not surprisingly, caused a sensation. When Gustavus Adolphus arrived in Germany the following year, he announced that he intended to execute three men whose names began with ‘L’—one was Laymann.[12] The third reason for disquiet in Brandenburg and Saxony arose from more practical matters: the size of the Catholic armies massed close to their borders, and their role in enforcing the restitution of church land. Tilly and his League troops assisted the Imperial commissioners in the dioceses of Osnabrück, Bremen, Verden and Hildesheim, as well as in key cities like Augsburg. If the forces of Wallenstein were as yet less forward, it was only because they had to undertake major operations against the Danes and against the Hanseatic port of Stralsund, one of the places designated to receive an Imperial garrison in the treaty of submission signed with Wallenstein in 1627 by Duke Bogislav of Pomerania.

Stralsund, a town of some 15,000 inhabitants, had been on bad terms with the dukes of Pomerania for some time. In 1612 a ducal army had occupied the defiant city in order to impose more effective control, but there had been rioting against the new order almost immediately and disputes between duke and magistrates continued for some years thereafter. In 1627, fearful of Wallenstein’s approach, the city magistrates employed a team of Swedish engineers to construct a new chain of powerful fortifications, and the militia was increased to almost 5,000. They refused the ducal order to admit the Imperialists. This defiance was welcomed by Christian IV, but he had few troops to spare; he therefore signed an agreement with Sweden guaranteeing that both powers would defend Stralsund if she were attacked. No sooner had the siege begun (May 1628) than seven companies of Scottish veterans in Danish service arrived, and 600 Swedes followed the next month. Together, these foreign troops beat off the Imperialists’ assaults on 27–9 June, and more reinforcements—Scottish, Swedish, Danish and German—poured in. The siege was lifted on 24 July.[13]

The successful defence of Stralsund did not create a state of war between the emperor and Sweden, whose king was still campaigning in Poland, although Ferdinand was encouraged to send the Poles substantial military aid in 1629 (page 110 below). Nor did the Imperialists’ failure seriously affect their overall military position—Denmark was still losing the war. But it was nevertheless a devastating political blow. Already in September 1628 Wallenstein warned Ferdinand, from his camp at Breitenburg in Holstein, that his presence was so unpopular that he could only continue to operate if he possessed such a great number of troops that they could coerce the native inhabitants into providing tribute at fixed rates every week. Wallenstein’s advice to the emperor was to recruit and arm more and more men, and to occupy as much of the Empire as possible. Only in that way, he argued, would territorial princes like Saxony and Bavaria be forced to remain loyal and give up any plans to call upon foreign support, or to offer assistance to the Palatine exiles.[14] But it was simply not possible to continue troop-raising indefinitely: there were already too many men in arms for the Empire to support. Wallenstein’s own army lists indicate the scale of the problem he had created (see Table 3). And, on top of this, the Empire also had to pay for the forces of Spain and the Catholic League in the north-west.

Table 3 Wallenstein's army lists, 1625–30[15]

Year	*Foot*	*(% of whole)*	*Horse*	*Total*	*% increase over previous year*	*%German troops*
1625	45,300	(73)	16,600	61,900	–	61
1626	86,100	(77)	25,000	111,100	79	72
1627	83,100	(74)	29,600	112,700	1	79
1628	102,900	(79)	27,300	130,200	16	74
1629	111,000	(86)	17,900	128,900	−1	80
1630	129,900	(86)	21,000	150,900	17	87

The first concerted political attack on Wallenstein and his system was delivered at the same Electoral meeting of Mühlhausen, in November 1627, at which the Edict of Restitution was planned. The Catholic Electors criticized both the level of taxes raised by Ferdinand's general, and the way they were distributed: 'His war taxes guarantee exorbitant rates of pay to regimental and company staff officers', they claimed, asserting that Lieutenant-General Arnim alone received 3,000 florins a month. They also censured Wallenstein's practice of selling commissions 'for up to four regiments at a time to anyone offering his services, including criminals, foreigners and those ignorant of military administration', and the poor discipline that he kept. They mentioned the recent mutiny of the duke of Saxe-Lauenburg's regiments in the Wetterau. But, of course, their main grievances were the destruction and depopulation that the army caused, and their inability to control the Imperial forces stationed in their own domains. 'Territorial rulers', they lamented, 'are at the mercy of Colonels and Captains, who are uninvited war profiteers and criminals, breaking the laws of the Empire.[16]

The Electors demanded that Ferdinand should stop all new recruitment, and instead reduce the strength of Wallenstein's army (especially in the Rhineland, where both Habsburg troops and the League's members were numerous). They also asked that he provide a new system of command which would inspire the confidence of territorial rulers in the Empire; and that, in order to save 'the poor widows and orphans', the Imperial army be deprived of the right to levy its own taxes by the so-called 'contributions system', and instead be put under civilian economic control. Wallenstein was to be forbidden to levy more troops without the approval of Imperial commissioners, and was no longer to raise war taxes without the consent, administration and audit of those territorial rulers who were his hosts.

As long as there was a war to fight, the emperor was prepared to ignore the complaints. But in December 1629, with Denmark defeated, the new Elector of Mainz, Anselm Casimir von Wambold, organized a meeting of the Catholic League at Mergentheim, and for the first time openly insisted that Wallenstein be dismissed,

> Since the Duke of Friedland [Wallenstein] has up to now disgusted and offended to the utmost nearly each and every territorial ruler in the Empire; and although the present situation has moved him to be more cautious, he has not given up his plans to retain Mecklenburg by virtue of his Imperial command.

According to the Elector, as long as Wallenstein remained in charge of the Imperial host and in possession of Mecklenburg, there would never be peace in the Empire.[17] In March 1630, acting as arch-chancellor of the Empire, Wambold summoned the seven Electors to meet at Regensburg on 3 June in order to resolve the problem.

This time, Ferdinand had to listen to the complaints of his German allies, for he now had few others. Urban VIII, who had been elected pope in August 1623, did not share the pro-Habsburg stance of his predecessors. He ended the subsidies sent by Rome to Ferdinand and the League, preferring to concentrate on what he perceived as the interests of the papal states in Italy—a task which he believed required the neutralization of Habsburg influence in the peninsula. Sigismund of Poland, another sometime supporter of the emperor, was also now deaf to his appeals for help. In the summer of 1629, his kingdom exhausted, Sigismund had gratefully made a six-year truce with Sweden which left Gustavus free to intervene in the Empire, if he chose: he already possessed a bridgehead at Stralsund. France, with her Huguenot rebellion crushed at last, was also free to offer support to the emperor's opponents once again—and was already doing so in Italy. Worse still, Spain was at this point obliged to withdraw her aid from Ferdinand's cause by serious reverses in the Low Countries' Wars. In 1628, a Dutch task force captured the entire treasure fleet sailing from the Caribbean to Spain, thus simultaneously providing the Republic with the resources to launch a major assault on the Spanish Netherlands and depriving Philip IV of the means of mounting an effective resistance. Early in 1629, confident of success and with the unprecedented number of 128,000 men at his disposal, the Dutch commander-in-chief Frederick Henry (Maurice's brother) laid siege to the important city of 's Hertogenbosch. The Habsburgs retaliated by sending two columns—one of 10,000 Imperialists, the other from the Army of Flanders—deep into Dutch territory. In August they captured Amersfoort, only 40 kilometres from Amsterdam. Sadly for the Habsburgs, in the same month the Dutch took Wesel by storm, and in September they forced the surrender of 's Hertogenbosch thus compelling the Habsburg forces at Amersfoort, now uncomfortably isolated, to retreat in disorder. Nor was this all. Over the winter of 1629–30 the Dutch chased almost all the Spanish garrisons out of north-west Germany. The river blockade collapsed, and in July 1630 Spain handed over the remaining strongpoints to Tilly's League forces.[18]

The truth was that Tilly now shouldered the burden of defending the Catholic cause in Germany almost alone, since the Army of Flanders had become too weak to defend any place outside Philip IV's patrimonial lands and the troops of Ferdinand II were too involved elsewhere to help. The principal reason for both developments was simple. In the course of 1629, both branches of the House of Habsburg, thanks to the tireless diplomacy of the count-duke of Olivares, had become fatally involved in a major war with France in Italy.

iv Spain and the war

'God is Spanish and fights for our nation these days.' There must have been moments in 1625, that *annus mirabilis* for Spanish arms, when even Spain's enemies may grudgingly have conceded that the count-duke of Olivares was not entirely unjustified in his confident assessment of the divinity's national affiliation.[1] During the course of that year

Breda surrendered to the Army of Flanders under the command of the incomparable Spínola; the republic of Genoa, Spain's ally and client, was rescued from the onslaught of the combined forces of France and Savoy; a joint Spanish-Portuguese naval expedition drove the Dutch from Bahía in Brazil; and an English expeditionary force was humiliatingly defeated when it attempted an attack on Cadiz. Add to this the Habsburg victories in Central Europe, and it certainly seemed that, if God was not Spanish, at least He had a strong predilection for the House of Austria.

Yet to Olivares, poring over the maps of Europe in his map-room in Madrid, the victories of 1625, although immensely encouraging, offered little more than a breathing space. Spain needed peace—needed it to restore the exhausted crown finances and the shattered Castilian economy, and to undertake those great reforms which he saw as essential to his country's survival. Yet peace was painfully elusive. The king of France, although temporarily embarrassed by the problem of the Huguenots, presented a permanent threat to that *pax austriaca* which Madrid regarded as indispensable for the survival of Catholicism and the maintenance of stability through large parts of Europe. The attack on Cadiz in November 1625 (page 69 above) had initiated a state of war between England and Spain. The condition of Italy was precarious, with Venice forever engaged in anti-Habsburg machinations, Charles Emmanuel of Savoy hopelessly volatile, and the Barberini Pope Urban VIII not to be trusted. But above all, the problem of the Dutch seemed consistently to evade solution. It was not only that the war in the Netherlands imposed a continuing and almost intolerable strain on Spain's resources in manpower and money, although this was bad enough. It was also that the hand of the Dutch was to be found behind every new anti-Habsburg coalition; that the activities of the Dutch East and West India Companies imperilled the overseas possessions of the crown of Castile and Portugal; and that the economic life of the Iberian peninsula was being remorselessly undermined by the success of Dutch mercantile and entrepreneurial activities.

Olivares entertained no illusions about the possibility of bringing back the United Provinces of the Netherlands into allegiance to the king of Spain. The days for that were long since passed. But he believed, and with some justification, that the terms on which the 1609 truce had been negotiated had proved disastrous for the Spanish Monarchy, and he hoped that it might be possible to induce the Dutch, by means of military and economic pressure, to negotiate a new, and more permanent, peace settlement on terms with which Spain would be able to live. But to achieve this, Spain needed help—help that could only come from the Empire.

It was the central axiom of the count-duke's foreign policy that 'not for anything must these two houses [the Austrian and Spanish branches of the Habsburgs] let themselves be divided'.[2] The breakdown of the English marriage negotiations made it possible for him to strengthen the existing ties between the two houses by arranging for a marriage between Philip IV's sister, the Infanta María, and Ferdinand, king of Hungary, the emperor's son. But he also believed that a more formal arrangement was needed, which would guarantee to both parties mutual assistance in time of trouble. It was in 1625 that the council of state in Madrid first discussed the possibility of a formal alliance between Spain, the emperor and the princes of the Empire, Protestant as well as Catholic, since it was considered essential to divide the Lutherans from the Calvinists.[3] In the following years Olivares pursued with tenacity this plan for an offensive and defensive military

alliance between Madrid and Vienna, which he regarded as the only effective key to permanent stability in Central Europe and to the solution of the Netherlands problem. If he could once involve the emperor in Spain's war with the Dutch, perhaps by persuading Ferdinand that a final peace in Germany depended on the pacification of the Netherlands, those rebellious vassals might yet be brought to heel.

The Habsburg victories in Germany created what seemed an ideal opportunity for united Spanish-Imperial action. From 1625 Olivares had been actively negotiating with the emperor and with Maximilian of Bavaria about the possibilities of realizing a great 'Baltic design'. The intention of this design was to provide Spain with a naval base in the north. This would serve as the home port for a new trading company, which would be well placed to wrest from the Dutch their control of the lucrative Baltic-Mediterranean trade—a trade which Olivares correctly identified as the foundation of their economic prosperity and military resilience. One way of realizing this ambitious design would be for the armies of the emperor and the Catholic League to expel the Dutch from the territory of East Friesland, adjacent to the Republic, which had good ports available. But Maximilian of Bavaria, who was congenitally suspicious of Spanish ambitions, showed no enthusiasm for associating the League with this scheme, and Madrid was forced to look for alternative solutions.

The spectacular rise of Wallenstein gave Olivares another chance. The count-duke's overtures to Wallenstein in 1627 evoked an encouraging response: it seemed that he would be happy to lend help against the Dutch. There were two ways, by no means mutually exclusive, by which this help could be provided. He could send his army to occupy one of the Baltic ports, and he could order his forces into East Friesland and invade the Dutch provinces across the Ems, which might subsequently be used to satisfy his territorial ambitions. If at the same time the Army of Flanders could bring pressure to bear on the Dutch from the south, then surely the Republic would be forced to accede to a settlement which would guarantee peace with honour for Spain.

The prospects for Spain improved in June 1627 with the outbreak of hostilities between France and England. Hoping to capitalize on Richelieu's difficulties, Olivares switched course abruptly, and held out to Paris the bait of a Franco-Spanish rapprochement. The Spanish ambassador in Paris was instructed to win Louis XIIIs support for an alliance against all mutual enemies: the French Protestants, the English and, if possible, the Dutch. As a token of good faith, Spain's Atlantic fleet moved up from Cadiz to the Gulf of Morbihan to assist Louis with the siege of La Rochelle, whose Huguenot population, counting on promises of English aid, had rebelled against their king. Nevertheless the Franco-Spanish alliance, though eagerly welcomed by the papacy, was never easy. There was opposition in Madrid—where one of Philip's councillors warned that 'there is nothing in theology which obliges Your Majesty to send his armed forces against heretics everywhere'—and there was suspicion in Paris of Spain's motives.[4]

The situation deteriorated dramatically in 1628. The emperor gave his approval to the 'grand design' in the Baltic, but almost at once Wallenstein's army was forced to raise its siege of the port of Stralsund, and all immediate hopes for the project were dashed. But worse was to follow, for almost simultaneously an ill-considered venture on which Olivares had embarked in Italy jeopardized, and then wrecked, his plans for ending the war with the Dutch, and brought about a transformation of the international scene.

The renewal of the dispute (see page 36 above) over the succession to Mantua and Montferrat, following the death of Duke Vincent II in December 1627, created dangers in Italy which Olivares was unable to ignore, and temptations which he was unable to resist. If the French-born duke of Nevers, the strongest claimant, succeeded to Duke Vincent's inheritance, the French would be in a position to outflank Milan, the base from which Spain dominated northern Italy. Milan was also the startingpoint of that vital strategic system of military corridors which ran by way of the Valtelline (see Map 2) to Central Europe, or up the Rhine to the Netherlands. It was unfortunate for Spain that the duke of Nevers, forewarned of his kinsman's impending death, managed to arrive in Mantua in mid-January 1628 and at once took over the government. He immediately sent an envoy to Vienna to convince the emperor (whose new wife, the late duke's sister, was already sympathetic) of his right to succeed.

Alarmed by these dangers, and under heavy criticism at home for the alleged failures of his government, Olivares authorized Don Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, the commander of the army of Milan, to lay siege to the fortress of Casale in Montferrat. The capture of this almost impregnable stronghold would represent a brilliant coup, enhancing the reputation of Spanish arms and consolidating Spain's hold over the Lombard plain. But Don Gonzalo's army, ill-provisioned in spite of all the count-duke's efforts to send it money, became fatally bogged down outside the walls of Casale, and what had originally been planned as an overnight triumph turned instead into an interminable nightmare. It was the one political act for which Philip IV later expressed regret: 'lf ever I have erred and given God cause for dissatisfaction', he admitted to a confidante in 1645, 'it was in this.' Pope Urban VIII, for his part, lamented in 1632 that the war of Mantua had caused the downfall of the Catholic cause, 'for everyone knows that, before the war, the Habsburgs, the French and all the other Catholic princes were in accord on foreign matters, and that the…progress of the Catholic religion proceeded most favourably in Germany, in France, everywhere.'[5]

The long siege of Casale imposed heavy new demands on the finances of the Spanish crown, and made it necessary to divert scarce resources from the Army of Flanders to the forces in Italy. This in turn had disastrous repercussions on the war in the Netherlands at a moment when peace negotiations with the Dutch were under way. As noted above, reinforced by the windfall of Spanish silver seized off the treasure fleet from America in 1628, the Dutch were able to move over to the offensive in 1629 against the Army of Flanders, now weakened by the departure of Spínola, who had gone to Madrid to argue the case for a peace settlement with the Republic. Once again, therefore, Madrid found itself confronted in 1629 with an age-old dilemma: Flanders or Italy? After agonized debate, the council of state, under the influence of Spínola and against the count-duke's wishes, authorized the Archduchess Isabella in Brussels to reach an agreement with the Dutch, so that the war in Italy could be given priority. The consequences of this decision were just as Olivares feared. The Republic, perceiving Spain's new weakness in the north, lost any immediate interest in a peace settlement, while the loyal provinces of the southern Netherlands, desperately war-weary and demoralized by a string of defeats, came within an ace of revolt.

This, however, was only one of the many troubles that nearly overwhelmed Olivares during those critical years of the Mantuan war between 1628 and 1631. The economic condition of Castile steadily deteriorated. 1627 had been a particularly bad year: prices

rose sharply under the combined pressure of poor harvests and the effects of the minting by the government of excessive amounts of debased *vellón* (copper) currency during the first years of the reign, in an effort to meet its financial needs. The productive forces of Castile were crippled by an inequitable system of taxation; soaring prices threatened to provoke unrest in the towns; and the reform programme on which Olivares had embarked with such high hopes in 1621 had virtually come to a halt, paralysed by the resistance of the Cortes, the urban oligarchies, and the governmental machine itself. The regime was deeply unpopular, and its various contradictory attempts to grapple with the problems of inflation only served to increase its unpopularity and add to the general distress. The involvement of Spain in a costly and apparently unsuccessful war in Italy gave further ammunition to Olivares's enemies. Manifestos and satires circulated in Madrid during 1628 urging Philip IV to get rid of his favourite and become a real king.

Philip showed no immediate inclination to accept the advice of the count-duke's enemies, but there were signs of tension between king and minister in the spring and summer of 1629, as the king leant towards the majority of his council of state, and even began to talk of leading an army in person to Italy. In according preference to Italy, and approving the idea of a settlement with the Dutch, the council of state had succumbed to Spínola's arguments in favour of peace in the north. But a major consideration was the behaviour of the French. Olivares had always gambled that Don Gonzalo de Córdoba would capture Casale before Louis XIII defeated the Huguenots of La Rochelle; but once again he miscalculated. In October 1628 La Rochelle surrendered; in January 1629 Olivares warned the papal nuncio, with uncanny prescience, that if a French army crossed the Alps, France and Spain would be involved in a war which would last for thirty years. A month later, ignoring the warning, Louis XIII led his army over the Mount Cenis Pass through heavy snows, and Don Gonzalo, shaken by the approach of the French, was forced to raise the long and abortive siege of Casale.

As the count-duke had foreseen, Louis XIII's decision to follow Richelieu's advice and lead an army across the Alps set France and Spain on a collision course. Neither side was ready for a full-scale war, and the Mantuan confrontation was therefore contained. But from the spring of 1629 the requirements of an assertive foreign policy were assuming precedence in both Paris and Madrid over all considerations of domestic reform. Both Richelieu and Olivares now struggled to mobilize their resources of money and manpower with an eye to the impending conflict. Both hastened to make peace with England—France in April 1629, Spain in November 1630—and assiduously courted potential allies while they engaged in a complicated game of political chess for control of that strategic section of the board running from northern Italy to the Netherlands frontier.

In his search for allies Olivares turned once again to Vienna for help, and this time with some success. But the price of success proved high. The presence of the French in Italy was a source of greater concern to Ferdinand than the course of the war in the Netherlands, and in the summer of 1629 he revoked the permission he had given Wallenstein to deploy part of his army against the Dutch in Friesland. Instead, his troops were ordered to Italy. This diversion of Imperial forces across the Alps redressed the balance in Mantua (at a terrible cost to that unhappy duchy) but it also destroyed a probably unrepeatable chance to realize Olivares's plans for a combined Imperial-Spanish operation against the Dutch. And, even in Italy, the presence of some 50,000

Imperial soldiers did not bring the clear-cut Habsburg triumph for which Olivares had hoped.

Relations between Madrid and Vienna were dangerously soured over the Mantuan question, which once again made it painfully clear that the two courts did not possess identical views and priorities. Olivares deeply distrusted the influence wielded over Ferdinand by his Gonzaga wife and by his confessor, Lamormaini, and felt that, of the Imperial councillors, only Eggenberg was a true friend of Spain.[6] The count-duke regarded the peace of Regensburg of 1630 (pages 101–2 below) as an Imperial betrayal of Spain's interests—'the most discreditable peace we have ever had'—and was not sorry to see it repudiated by France.[7] But he could do no better himself. When the Mantuan question was finally tidied up by the peace agreements of Cherasco in the spring of 1631, the duke of Nevers still retained his inheritance; the French contrived to keep for themselves the fortress of Pinerolo as a military base on the Italian side of the Alps; and the Spaniards failed to get their hands on Casale.[8]

The final phases of the Mantuan question were inevitably over-shadowed by the apparently irresistible advance of the Swedes. Olivares, looking anxiously at Europe in 1631 and 1632, detected a great international conspiracy against the House of Austria—a conspiracy in which those who professed loyalty to the Catholic cause, France, Bavaria and the pope himself, were unleashing forces which would submerge large parts of Christendom beneath a tidal wave of heresy. It was for Spain, as the true champion of the faith, to stem this tide as best it could. But the conflict of the giants which was precipitated by Olivares's intervention in Mantua was only to prove irrefutably that God, after all, was not Spanish, but French.

IV
Total war

Although he was emperor for almost eighteen years, Ferdinand II never convened an Imperial Diet. Instead he chose to rule the Empire by decrees issued either on his own authority, or after consultation with the Electors and other sympathetic rulers. This might have proved acceptable had the emperor been content to pursue non-controversial policies; but he was not. The deposition of rulers such as the Elector Palatine or the dukes of Mecklenburg, the Electoral transfer, the maintenance of Wallenstein's army, the Edict of Restitution—these were issues that would have excited debate and opposition under any circumstances. But because no Diet assembled between 1613 and 1640, the legality of these (and other) measures taken by the Imperial government became subjects of controversy at every ruler's court: political advisers and academics circulated countless pamphlets, or position papers known as *Denkschriften,* which either justified or criticized a given decision in terms of the Public Law' of the Empire ('public' because it involved relations between corporate states).

The audience for these publications was huge. Law was, after theology, the commonest intellectual pursuit in Germany, and almost half the 8,000 or so young men entering the universities of the Empire each year in the early seventeenth century studied it.[1] Moreover, the arguments of the *Denkschriften* and the learned pamphlets filtered down to other classes of society by means of illustrated flysheets and chapbooks, of which thousands were printed during the war. In effect, this created an informed 'public opinion' which, on certain issues, came to exercise a considerable influence. The degree of support manifested for the Bohemian rebellion, to take the outstanding example, was affected to a high degree by the opinions expressed in popular literature. Of the 1,000 surviving flysheets from the war in the Gustav Freytag Collection at Frankfurt, almost 400 were published between 1618 and 1621. There was only one more similar burst of literary activity during the war: between 1629 and 1633, as the major participants in the struggle sought to win the support of the uncommitted. Some 229 items in the Freytag Collection come from these years.[2]

Since all the items under discussion were published in Germany, and for the edification of the people of the Empire, it is tempting to argue that the Thirty Years' War remained, despite appearances to the contrary, very much a German affair. It has even been suggested that The "Thirty Years' War" should really be called "The German religious war"'.[3] But this viewpoint is highly misleading. The last date at which the political leaders of Germany were free to determine their own destiny was the interlunary period between July 1630 and March 1631, the months that separated the Electoral Meeting at Regensburg from the Protestant Colloquy at Leipzig. Both assemblies, and several smaller meetings in between, attempted to create a realignment of forces within the Empire that might preserve the peace—for, as long as the German princes remained neutral and unattached, there was still a chance for peace. But in the spring of 1631.

Sweden's shotgun marriage with Brandenburg and the Franco-Bavarian treaty of Fontainebleau broke the unity and led the statesmen of Europe headlong over the edge of the abyss. A general European war became unavoidable.

i On the edge of the abyss

Both the emperor and his League allies welcomed the Electoral meeting *(Kurfürstentag)* at Regensburg in the summer of 1630, since it offered an opportunity to resolve the differences that had recently developed between them. Its importance in the eyes of all participants is shown by the roll-call of those who attended in person: the emperor, all the Catholic Electors, the papal nuncio, with diplomatic representatives from France, Spain, Venice, Tuscany and England. The Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg refused to appear in person because of their opposition to the Edict of Restitution, but they did send delegates. In all, there were some 2,000 participants and observers.

Ferdinand needed to win the Electors' approval for his financial and military aid to Spain in the war against the Dutch Republic. He also needed their support against the threat of French and Swedish aggression and, more immediately, for the election of his eldest son as king of the Romans, heir apparent to the Imperial crown. The prime concern of the Electors, on the other hand, was to secure the dismissal of Wallenstein, which they formally demanded on 16 July, after only a week of deliberation. In this they were aided by the sphinx-like posture of the man himself, who spent the summer at Memmingen, not far from Regensburg. He was tired and depressed by the deepening financial crisis in which he found himself: indeed, the cost of his army so far exceeded the income received from the emperor that Wallenstein simply could not afford to remain as commander-in-chief. He seems to have been almost relieved when, on 13 August, the emperor bowed to the vociferous demands for his dismissal. The general retired to his estates in Bohemia; his chief financier, Hans de Witte, committed suicide. It was left to Count Tilly, still general of the army of the League, to reduce the Imperial host by 75 per cent and merge the surviving units with his own. But Tilly was denied the means to maintain even these reduced forces, which required some 5 million thalers for their annual sustenance: payment was now to come from the Circle Assemblies, and the territorial governments represented there consistently failed to produce their quotas on time. The army's problems were increased when the bulk of its forces were concentrated at the siege of Magdeburg, a city which openly defied the emperor after August 1630. Local resources were quickly consumed; without Wallenstein's contributions system, the troops became restless.

A thorough military reformation was not the only concession wrested from the emperor at Regensburg. The Electoral meeting in effect turned into a court of enquiry concerning Ferdinand's foreign and domestic policies. Its verdict was devastating, and several innovations of the 1620s had to be abandoned: the Imperial Supreme Court at Speyer came back under the general supervision of the territorial rulers, rather than of Vienna; and the emperor was made to promise that, in future, 'no new war will be declared other than by the advice of the Electors'. In return for all this, Ferdinand gained virtually nothing: no king of the Romans was elected and no League support for the Habsburg armies in the Netherlands was pledged. His only victory was to maintain the

Edict of Restitution in its pristine form, even though several of his Catholic allies (led by Bavaria) considered some relaxation advisable. According to an account of an interview between Maximilian (who favoured minor concessions to the Protestants) and the emperor's confessor, Lamormaini (who did not), the full implementation of the Edict was equated with Imperial salvation:

> [Lamormaini] closed his eyes and answered…the Edict must stand firm, whatever evil might finally come from it. It matters little that the emperor, because of it, lose not only Austria but all of his kingdoms…provided he save his soul, which he cannot do without the implementation of the Edict.[1]

Instead of solving the problems confronting Empire and emperor in 1630, the Regensburg Electoral meeting had thus only made them worse. By sacrificing Wallenstein, Ferdinand lost the one man whose ability and power might conceivably have enabled him to consolidate his recent gains and unite a weak and divided Germany under a strong Habsburg monarchy. By retaining the Edict of Restitution, the emperor and the League princes further alienated the north German Electors, thereby exacerbating existing Protestant-Catholic divisions. The events at Regensburg had, in effect, created a power vacuum. No one was now in control of the empire.

It was precisely at this moment of weakness and crisis that France and Sweden, in their different ways, were sucked into the struggle. A French delegation had been sent to the emperor in the summer of 1630 with orders to seek a solution to numerous points: control of the Valtelline (still disputed despite the peace of Monzón in 1626); sovereignty in the three Lorraine bishoprics (seized by France in 1552 and still claimed by the Empire); and the duke of Nevers's title to Mantua and Montferrat. Talks dragged on throughout July and August, with the French diplomats using their spare time to foment opposition to the emperor (for example, by encouraging the Electors to refuse recognition to Ferdinand's son as heir-apparent). But then sensational news reached Regensburg: on 18 July the Imperialists had taken the city of Mantua, and the duke of Nevers with it. A swift solution to the war in northern Italy now seemed a pressing necessity to the French negotiators, before the situation deteriorated further. They appealed to Paris for immediate powers to conclude a settlement; but none came. Eventually, with considerable misgivings, on 13 October, they signed a treaty which not only stipulated joint French and Imperial evacuation of northern Italy, but committed Louis XIII to refrain from offering support to anyone who opposed the emperor.

It is not hard to imagine the impact of these concessions at the French Court. The king had hitched his wagon to the star of Mantua since the capture of La Rochelle in October 1628. To permit the speedy relief of the duchy, the French government had made extensive concessions to the defeated Huguenots (the 'Grace of Alais', June 1629); it had swallowed its pride and made a peace with England which brought no direct benefits (the treaty of Susa, April 1629); and it had renewed its expensive alliance with the Dutch Republic (June 1630). In all these compromises with Protestant groups, France had enjoyed the active encouragement of Urban VIII, because they were done for the sake of liberating Italy from the 'Spanish yoke'—an issue dear to the pope's heart.[2] Now, thanks to the unauthorized initiative of the envoys in Regensburg, all this had been signed away:

instead Louis was required to refuse support to the Habsburgs' enemies. The king's prestige and credibility were gravely compromised and he was livid. The extent of his fury shows in a letter written to his ambassadors a week later:

> This treaty is not only contrary to your powers, to the orders in the Instructions you took with you, and to those I have sent you at various times since, but it even contains several items that I have never even thought about, and that are so prejudicial that I could not hear them read out to me except with extreme displeasure.[3]

In the event, the king refused to ratify the peace of Regensburg, and a few weeks later, since Richelieu's authority appeared to have been compromised by this episode, a major attempt was made to remove him from power. The 'Day of Dupes' (11 November 1630), engineered by the extreme Catholic faction at Court, came within an ace of success. Mantua remained, for the time being, in Habsburg hands.

And yet, in the long term, French diplomacy could hardly have been more successful: by appearing to agree at Regensburg, and then reneging, France caused far more damage to the Imperial cause than refusal at the outset would have done. Temporarily fortified by Louis's apparent withdrawal from the struggle, Ferdinand II not only declined to moderate the Edict, but decided that he could tackle the small Swedish army, which King Gustavus Adolphus led ashore in Pomerania on 6 July 1630, without any attempt to render his policies more acceptable to German Protestants. It was a fatal miscalculation for, by the time the Imperialists realized that their troops could not be withdrawn from Italy, the Swedes could no longer be dislodged from Pomerania.

The principalities most immediately affected by the Swedish invasion were the north German Protestant states. How their rulers, especially the two Electors, would react was crucial for the future course of the war. John George of Saxony and George William of Brandenburg, the one a Lutheran, the other a Calvinist, had seldom maintained cordial relations in the past. As the Empire's 'foremost Lutheran prince', John George saw himself as 'the protector of the cradle of the Reformation' and, like most of his co-religionists, he distrusted Calvinists more than Catholics. As a political conservative, he had generally supported the emperor. The role of the Elector of Brandenburg was more difficult. Although, after the disgrace of Frederick of the Palatinate, George William was as much the leader of the German Calvinists as John George was of the Lutherans, in reality his position was far weaker. The Elector would have chosen the course of armed neutrality during the 1620s, but Brandenburg's powerful Lutheran Estates, fearful that they might be drawn into the conflict, refused to grant their Reformed ruler the necessary support for such a policy. Then, in 1626, with both Danish and Imperial troops crossing the Electorate with impunity, a choice between the two sides had to be made. Although the majority of George William's councillors were (like him) Calvinists, his principal adviser, Count Adam of Schwarzenberg, was a Catholic and he played upon the desire of the Lutheran Estates for economy and security in order to bring his Elector into an alliance with the emperor (the treaty of Königsberg, May 1627). But the Imperial alliance was not a happy one: the Brandenburgers soon complained about the harsh treatment that they suffered at the hands of the Imperial troops who came streaming into the country in pursuit of the Danes.

The two Protestant Electors met for a week in April 1630, at Annaburg in Saxony, to discuss recent political developments and the coming Electoral meeting in Regensburg. Reaffirming an earlier decision not to attend the meeting in person, they agreed to provide their delegations with similar instructions. George William's Reformed advisers would have preferred the Electors to have taken a more definite stand against the emperor—they even contemplated the possibility of a Protestant defensive alliance—but the Saxons were not yet ready for such joint ventures. By early September, however, when the two Electors and their advisers met again, this time at Zabeltitz Castle (Saxony), the Saxon attitude had changed considerably. John George was deeply disturbed by the Swedish invasion and the proceedings at Regensburg, particularly the Catholics' uncompromising stand on the Edict of Restitution, and this provided the Brandenburgers with an ideal opportunity to resubmit their proposals and receive a more favourable response. George William's privy councillors, who were already advocating a more resolute stand vis-à-vis the emperor, now called for a similar strategy towards the Swedish king. Indeed, their Swedish policy must be seen as the direct corollary of their Imperial policy: both aimed to preserve the integrity and the constitution of the Empire in general, and the rights and liberties of Protestant states in particular; both were designed to create a neutral third force between king and emperor to keep the war from spreading further. At Zabeltitz, the Brandenburgers' proposals carried the day and John George announced that he would call a meeting of all German Protestant rulers at Leipzig in the very near future to discuss their grievances and to consider appropriate counter-measures.

John George's resolve, however, was short-lived. As a Lutheran, and a firm believer in the Imperial constitution, he continued to oppose a direct confrontation with the emperor. Not surprisingly, therefore, the combined pressures of the Catholic Electors and of his fellow-Lutherans (particularly his son-in-law, the arch-conservative Landgrave George II of Hesse-Darmstadt) soon convinced John George that bilateral negotiations with the emperor would be more fruitful than any multilateral efforts made with other Protestant rulers. Then in November the Catholics, alarmed by the French repudiation of the peace of Regensburg, suddenly let it be known that concessions on the Edict of Restitution might still be possible, and they proposed a meeting with the Protestants early in 1631, at Frankfurt, to discuss the execution of the Imperial Edict. 'We sensed', the Catholic Electors explained later, 'that the complete denial of all gestures of kindness on our part would have endangered the Holy Roman Empire, especially the…Catholic faith.'[4] The Frankfurt meeting, in other words, was deliberately scheduled to keep the Protestants from pulling together (see Plate 8).

That the gathering of Protestants at Leipzig eventually took place at all was due mainly to Brandenburg's Calvinist councillors, who kept on prodding the Elector of Saxony, insisting that a meeting of Protestant rulers was needed, if for no other reason than to devise a joint evangelical strategy for Frankfurt. John George, despite the objections of some of his own advisers, was eventually persuaded, and in January 1631 notices went out to some 160 states informing them that the long-expected conference would finally commence on 6 February. The response was overwhelming: except for George of Hesse-Darmstadt, every major Protestant prince attended and several Imperial cities also sent representatives.

But the main problem remained the attitude of John George: would he insist that the Leipzig conference must remain merely a preparatory meeting for the coming Frankfurt

talks? Or would he also support defensive measures? Five days before the conference began, Ferdinand II had sent a threatening letter to the Elector which forbade the Protestant rulers to arm. But others were urging him to consider joint defensive measures, among them the influential Saxon court preacher, Matthias Hoë von Hoënegg, who in years past had distinguished himself by his vociferous anti-Calvinist polemics (pages 19–20 above). The Edict of Restitution, however, had changed his tune. Only a few weeks before the Leipzig conference, Hoë had told John George that if the Edict were not repealed, it would be the Elector's duty as a Lutheran to fight the emperor. Similarly, in a sermon that he delivered on the first day of the convention, Hoë urged the assembled rulers to unite and to defend themselves against the arbitrary rule of Ferdinand and his allies.[5]

The Calvinist pastors at the court of Berlin welcomed Hoë's sentiments. For years they had urged, without much success, greater cooperation with the Lutherans, and their more militant policies received ideological support from Reformed irenicism whose leading spokesman in the 1620s and 1630s was John Peter Bergius, Hoë's counterpart in Berlin. Bergius's studies in Heidelberg, Strasbourg and Cambridge, and his visits to France and Holland, had brought him into contact with international Protestantism. As a theological moderate he was convinced that most Lutheran-Calvinist disagreements could be overcome, since the two Protestant Churches agreed on the 'fundamental articles' of the Christian faith. His views reflected the official confessional position both of Brandenburg's Calvinist Church and of the Elector and his councillors. Like Hoë, he urged the princes at Leipzig to unite and defend themselves.[6]

While the politicians met, the theologians held their own colloquy. Hoë and two of his Lutheran colleagues from Saxony met with Bergius of Brandenburg and two other Calvinists from Hesse-Kassel. Using the Augsburg Confession as the basis for their deliberations, these six men demonstrated an almost unprecedented harmony. To be sure, the major issues dividing Lutherans and Calvinists—the doctrines of the Lord's Supper and predestination—were not resolved; but the two sides agreed to consider these differences further at later meetings. They also promised to 'show each other Christian love in the future'. The religious colloquy was important because it helped to create an atmosphere of good-will and thus provided a valuable ideological basis for the political and military cooperation that the princes were seeking in their own meeting at Leipzig.[7]

Yet the surprising harmony which existed on the theological front did not entirely prevail in the political deliberations. Initially, John George and his more timid secular advisers seemed prepared to talk about nothing apart from the coming meeting at Frankfurt. But the Brandenburgers were obviously expressing a common concern when they raised on 15 March the question of military resistance.[8] A Protestant defensive alliance, they suggested, could be organized without violating the Imperial constitution. Such an alliance would not be aimed against anyone in particular, but it would safeguard the princes' rights against anyone who might endanger them, regardless of whether this was the Emperor Ferdinand or the king of Sweden. The response was so encouraging that the Brandenburgers decided to draft a formal proposal for the creation of a defensive alliance. This became the basis for the Leipzig Manifesto—the final resolution issued by the princes on 12 April 1631 which created a defensive association, the *Leipziger Bund,* with an army of 40,000 troops to be used for defensive purposes only. Their recruitment and financing was left to individual Imperial Circles, whose defensive efforts would be

coordinated by a committee over which John George of Saxony presided. The purpose of this armed association was clearly stated: it was to protect and 'uphold the basic laws, the Imperial constitution, and the German liberties of the Protestant states'.[9]

The Leipzig Manifesto was an eleventh-hour attempt to protect the religious and political interests of the Protestant rulers. It served clear notice on Ferdinand II and his allies that the Protestant princes would resist military oppression and further recatholicization. It also warned Gustavus Adolphus that the Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony, and most other Lutheran states, would not willingly become his allies. In short, the Manifesto sought to defend the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire by creating a neutral third force between the Imperial, the League, and the foreign armies whose aggression threatened to turn the war in Central Europe into a major international conflict.

Maximilian of Bavaria, too, was deeply disturbed by developments in the summer of 1630. At first glance, his anxiety may appear somewhat unwarranted, for more than any other German prince he had benefited from Wallenstein's dismissal. Tilly, the League general, now also commanded the Imperial army, and the way seemed clear for Maximilian to regain that military dominance over Ferdinand which he had possessed before 1625. But, besides safeguarding his rights and interests as a German prince and a Roman Catholic, Maximilian was concerned with protecting the Electoral title and lands he had recently acquired. And for this he needed a period of peace. The growing divisions within the Empire and the widening conflict in 1630 seemed to threaten his gains, forcing him to explore new ways to safeguard his rights and interests. Maximilian's predicament was exacerbated by his support for the Edict of Restitution (which kept him from making common cause with any of the Protestants) and even more by France's geographical proximity and growing hostility to the Habsburgs.

The French and the Bavarians had already conducted negotiations for a possible alliance in the mid-1620s. In an effort to weaken the power of the Habsburgs, Richelieu had tried to persuade Maximilian to organize and lead a confessionally mixed group of princes, but the Bavarian, eager to preserve his political independence, looked to France only to protect his Electoral title and land. Since the French government could not bring itself to do this, negotiations had been broken off in 1627 (page 63 above). However, the threat of a Habsburg absolutist regime in the Empire, posed principally by Wallenstein's army, made Maximilian again more receptive to French overtures. The arrival of Hercule de Charnacé, Richelieu's agent, in Munich on 16 March 1629, set the stage for another round of negotiations.

For a while it looked as if once more the talks would lead nowhere, and Charnacé moved on. However, by October 1630, French agents at Regensburg could report that Bavaria was now ready to discuss the alliance seriously. There were several reasons for this change of heart. One was Maximilian's fear that Spain had secretly promised Charles I of England that both the Palatinate and the Electoral title would eventually be restored to Frederick.[10] Another was the deepening political crisis in the Empire: fear of Wallenstein and opposition to involvement in Mantua were now replaced by fear of Gustavus Adolphus. Although the extent of Sweden's involvement in the war was not immediately evident, Gustavus's presence on German soil, perceived as a serious threat to the Imperial constitution and to Bavaria's interests, inexorably pushed Maximilian in the direction of a French alliance. An agreement with France was desirable in the autumn

of 1630 because of the still uncertain attitude of Sweden and the Protestant princes; it became urgent for Maximilian after the treaty of Bärwalde (January 1631), which allied France and Sweden in the cause of 'the restitution of the suppressed Estates of the Empire'.

Yet, as was the case with the Protestant Electors, religion also underpinned Maximilian's political outlook. His confidant and confessor, the Jesuit Adam Contzen, had urged a treaty with France since the spring of 1629 in the hope that such an alliance would further the Catholic cause in the Empire. He dreamed of a Europe-wide Catholic front (a very unrealistic scheme as long as Habsburg-Bourbon rivalry continued), but Contzen's pro-French arguments—backed to the hilt by papal diplomats—clearly did influence Maximilian and his secular advisers, especially when it became evident that Sweden's Lutheran king would use his military might to roll back the Catholic position in the Empire.[11]

The major stumbling-block in the Franco-Bavarian talks was Richelieu's refusal to commit himself on two points which Maximilian deemed basic for the protection of his own rights and the Imperial constitution. Bavaria wanted France to accept his family's hereditary right to the Electoral title which he had acquired; but Richelieu would only acknowledge Maximilian's personal claim and declined to guarantee it for his descendants. In addition, the Elector wanted a special clause in the treaty recognizing his constitutional obligations to the Empire and the emperor; Richelieu, who wanted to enlist Bavarian support against the Habsburgs, refused. Eventually, in order to secure an alternative ally to the Swedes, and to appease his Catholic critics, Richelieu gave in: Maximilian received the guarantees and the recognition he sought. The treaty of Fontainebleau was signed in May 1631. It was to last for eight years, and it was to remain entirely secret. Both parties agreed not to attack each other or to assist each other's enemies. However, the League princes were not included in the treaty—an omission that was to have grave consequences the following year.[12]

The treaty of Fontainebleau can be seen as the Catholic counterpart to the Protestants' Leipzig Manifesto issued only a few weeks earlier. Both were direct responses to the failure of the Regensburg Electoral meeting to restore order. Both sought to protect the constitution of the Empire and the rights and liberties of the princes. Both aimed at the creation of a neutral third force that would stand as a buffer between the emperor and his foreign enemies in order to prevent the war from spreading further. But both efforts—and this was Germany's great tragedy—in the end failed because neither could stop the Swedes, who had their own idea of what the Empire wanted, and had the strength to trample underfoot all whose opinion on the subject differed from theirs.

ii 1630–1632: The intervention of Sweden

An anonymous English pamphlet of 1638, entitled *The civil wars of Germany,* offered to readers a useful guide to both the war and its commanders. There were twenty-one portraits of the military leaders on each side, together with a succinct *curriculum vitae;* and the war itself was divided into 167 numbered 'episodes', each one briskly narrated and bristling with facts. It was significant, however, that only thirty-two of the selected episodes occurred during the first twelve years of the war: for the English spectators, as

for most Germans, the war only began in earnest with 'episode 33', the arrival in the Empire of King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, and his army, in July 1630 (see Plate 9).

The king did not arrive at Peenemünde with the express intention of plunging Europe deeper into war. His *Declaration* of June 1630, which had the widest circulation of any known pamphlet of the time (twenty-three editions in five languages) was couched in modest terms. It opened, innocently enough, with a list of minor personal grievances: 'His Majesty of Sweden has suffered many outrages and injuries without being able to receive any satisfaction for them, such as having his letters [to other princes] intercepted, opened, falsely deciphered and interpreted', or being refused permission to participate in the peace of Lübeck or send an embassy to the emperor. Then came a denunciation of Wallenstein's aid to the king of Poland in 1629—'[the emperor] has caused whole armies to march into Prussia against His Majesty and the kingdom of Sweden'. Next, Gustavus complained of the Habsburgs' 'Baltic design', which, he argued, was directed against the maritime supremacy currently enjoyed by Sweden. Only at the end, and with some reticence, did the manifesto note the oppression of German liberties by the emperor as a motive for invasion. There was no mention at all of what Sweden hoped to gain by her intervention, nor of any desire to save the Protestant cause from extinction at the hands of Imperial troops.[1] As late as August 1630, the king was still protesting that his campaign was 'in no way directed against his Imperial Majesty…but only and solely for defence against the disturbers of the public peace, both ecclesiastical and secular'. This constitutionalist stance was clearly designed to appeal to public opinion in Germany—the king well knew the value of fighting a war that contemporaries considered to be 'just'—but Gustavus probably himself believed his manifesto to be a true statement of his mission. In 1636, four years after the king's death, his close collaborator, the chancellor Axel Oxenstierna, still denied that the invasion of 1630 had been primarily a Protestant crusade. It was, he reminded the council of state (to whom there was little point in lying), 'not so much a matter of religion, but rather of saving the *status publicus* [the general political situation], wherein religion is also comprehended'.[2]

And the *status publicus* of northern Europe in the summer of 1630 certainly gave Sweden's leaders cause for concern. Three years previously, following the defeat of Christian IV and his allies, the armies of Tilly and Wallenstein had advanced northwards to the Baltic. The Jutland peninsula was entirely occupied; the dukes of Mecklenburg were deposed, and Wallenstein installed in their place; the duke of Pomerania was compelled to admit Imperialist garrisons to his territories. Although Stralsund held out against the Imperialists' siege, in September 1628 a new offensive by Christian IV, reinforced by the Scots from Stralsund, was heavily defeated at Wolgast. This left Wallenstein free to loan 12,000 of his troops to the emperor's brother-in-law, Sigismund of Poland, who had been fighting off a Swedish invasion since 1625 (page 68 above). At first Gustavus's forces had prevailed: Dorpat was taken almost at once and all Livonia fell to the Swedes; in 1626 several ports in Prussia were captured. But here the Swedish advance stopped. Whereas the gentry who controlled the Polish state were not prepared to fight for Livonia, a recent acquisition which they regarded as bringing benefit only to the crown, Prussia was a part of the Commonwealth for which they were prepared to fight to the end. Gustavus and his men were therefore pinned down by the Baltic shore, steadily exhausting the lands they controlled and draining the Swedish treasury.[3] They were no match for the Polish-Imperial army which advanced down the Vistula in the summer of

1629. At the battle of Honigfelde (or Stuhm) on 27 June, the Swedes suffered a heavy defeat from which Gustavus was lucky to escape with his life.

He was also fortunate that, shortly after this defeat, a French envoy arrived at the Swedish camp. Hercule de Charnacé, Richelieu's special envoy in Germany, having failed either to persuade Maximilian of Bavaria to break with the emperor or to convince Christian of Denmark to continue his war, was now instructed to extricate Gustavus from the Polish conflict as a preliminary to Swedish intervention in Germany. This time he succeeded. At Altmark, between the two hostile camps, French diplomats (aided by Sir Thomas Roe representing Charles I) persuaded the Vasa cousins to sign a six years' truce on 25–6 September, which confirmed Swedish control of Livonia but involved the restitution of all other gains except a few ports in Prussia. Sweden only accepted these harsh terms in return for the grant, for the duration of the truce, of all tolls on shipping using the ports of Poland and Prussia. This was an extremely lucrative source of revenue, for most of the 1,500 or so ships entering the Baltic annually at this time were bound for the ports of Danzig, Königsberg and Elbing. The tolls produced, in fact, a sum equal to one-third of Sweden's total revenues. When the concession expired in 1635 Oxenstierna exclaimed petulantly to his brother: 'I assure you that Sweden is not more than half the kingdom she was last year.'[4]

But that lay in the future. In the autumn of 1629, with peace in Poland, a new source of wealth in his pocket, and the promise of future French support, Gustavus Adolphus was ready to intervene in Germany. He was, in many ways, well equipped to do so. He commanded a disciplined and experienced army; he ruled over an orderly and loyal country; he possessed important reserves of war material—particularly iron and copper. On two separate occasions, the Swedish Diet had declared its support for a campaign in Germany, agreeing to leave the timing of operations entirely to the king's discretion. Gustavus chose, as we have seen, to use Imperial intervention in Poland as his principal *casus belli,* but it left no time to find allies beforehand. When he landed in Germany in July 1630, Sweden's sole ally in the Empire was the city of Stralsund. Over the next few months, the situation scarcely improved: only the dispossessed (the dukes of Mecklenburg and Saxe-Weimar), the expectant (one of the claimants to Brunswick-Lüneberg), or those directly threatened or occupied by Imperialist troops (Hesse-Kassel and the secularized bishopric of Magdeburg) declared for Gustavus. Among the foreign powers, only Russia offered practical assistance—and that only amounted to a licence to export large quantities of grain from Narva to Amsterdam duty free, so that it could be sold at a profit to finance Sweden's war effort. In the course of the year 1630, the Swedish treasury only received 78,000 thalers from this source.[5]

This uncoordinated concert of allies was scarcely a match for the victorious Catholic armies facing them, and at first Gustavus's cause advanced but little. His diplomats secured neither an agreement with the major states of north Germany nor a firm promise of continued financial aid from France, and without these vital supports his troops proved unable to break out of their Baltic bridgehead. The reason for the neutrality of the German Lutherans was no secret: the princes made it clear to everyone that they were anxious to avoid open treason, preferring instead to use the Swedish threat to wrest concessions from Vienna without themselves breaking with the emperor. Their hopes were pinned on the discussions at Leipzig and Frankfurt, not on the restless armies in Pomerania and Mecklenburg. The reason for French reticence was, however, rather less

visible to the anxious watchers by the Baltic shore. France, like Sweden, had been engaged in a full-scale war for several years, and her leaders could see clearly enough the advantages which peace and demobilization would bring. Had the emperor weakened and made concessions—whether over the Lorraine bishoprics, the Valtelline or Mantua—in the summer of 1630, Richelieu might well have abandoned Sweden; but after the Imperialists' capture of Mantua, an alliance with Gustavus seemed inescapable. The severe challenge to Richelieu's personal power in the autumn of 1630 (page 103 above) delayed an immediate agreement, but on 23 January 1631, by the treaty of Bärwalde, France undertook to provide 400,000 thalers annually for five years to subsidize Sweden's war for German liberties and the freedom of Baltic trade. It was agreed that Catholic worship would be allowed to continue in conquered areas where it already existed, and that the territory of members of the Catholic League would be treated as neutral, unless they themselves provoked aggression.[6]

The French subsidy was not large—substantially less than the yield of the Prussian port tolls—but it came at a critical moment for Sweden's war-finances. Gustavus's treasury now had to support 50,000 men in Germany and Livonia, with a further 20,000 in Sweden and Finland, and the cost was exorbitant: 2.3 million thalers from the royal treasury were actually spent in 1630—far more than the entire year's revenues—but it met less than half of the troops' needs. The king had gone to war in the expectation that the majority of the army's needs would be met by the occupied territories; but until August 1631 these were simply not extensive enough to support such a concentration of troops (in the second half of 1630 they provided only 35,000 thalers a month, and in the first half of 1631 only 75,000). Nor could the Baltic provinces, already picked clean by successive armies of occupation, shoulder the burden for long. Even a previously unscathed area, the county of Memel, which was temporarily ceded to Sweden in 1629, was devastated within a year by the seventeen cavalry companies billeted on it. Where, before the occupation, there had been 154 horses, 236 oxen, 103 cows, 190 pigs and 810 sheep, there were in 1631 just 26 oxen and 1 cow: all the rest had gone, either killed or taken by the soldiers. Even the Swedish authorities described the area as 'laid waste'. Richelieu's gold could hardly have arrived at a more opportune moment.[7]

Yet if the French subsidies alleviated the immediate cash crisis, they did not, by themselves, win allies. In the west, Tilly's forces still had Magdeburg under siege and Hesse-Kassel under occupation; Gustavus's army was still 250 kilometres away at Stettin, his 30,000 men hemmed in by a superior force of Imperialists. In the east, the Protestant princes' meeting at Leipzig showed no interest in an alliance with Gustavus. Sweden would clearly have to undertake some 'rough wooing'.

Accordingly, in April 1631, the Swedish army advanced southwards into Brandenburg, taking and sacking the towns of Küstrin and Frankfurt-on-Oder (which were defended by Imperial garrisons). But it was too late to save Gustavus's sole ally-in-arms, Magdeburg, which was captured by the Imperialists on 20 May. The entire city was promptly sacked by the enraged soldiery, who had suffered terrible privations in the siege trenches. A large part of the population was massacred, and even more perished in the fire which broke out soon after capture. Only a few, like the inventor Otto von Guericke, managed to save themselves. There was nothing special about the level of brutality at Magdeburg—to sack a town that resisted was standard practice during the war—but the scale of the slaughter was unusual. A village or market town plundered or burnt was one

thing; the annihilation of a city of 20,000, and a capital of Protestantism at that, was quite another. No less than 20 newspapers, 205 pamphlets and 41 illustrated broadsheets describing the horror were published, circulating all over Europe, so that observers in London, Paris, Amsterdam, Stockholm, Rome and Madrid, as well as in the princely courts of Germany, were made aware of how the emperor treated his Protestant subjects. Unquestionably, the widely publicized fate of Magdeburg, just across Brandenburg's borders and administered by the Elector's uncle (Margrave Christian William), helped convince the reluctant George William to throw in his lot with Gustavus (21 June 1631).[8]

The pact with Brandenburg was most opportune for Sweden. The peace of Cherasco (ratified by Ferdinand on 19 June) at last freed the large Imperialist army in northern Italy for service within the Empire, encouraging Tilly to move north-eastwards from Magdeburg to confront Gustavus. The key to the military situation was now held by Saxony, trapped between the Swedes and the Imperialists, for each side had to cross the rich lands of the Electorate, so far untouched by war, in order to attack the other. In August, Tilly asked permission for his army, which was running short of food, to cross the frontier, but John George refused (see Plate 12). He declared: 'Now I see that the Saxon sweetmeats, so long spared, are to be eaten; but you may find that they contain hard nuts that will break your teeth.[9] When, on 4 September, Tilly led his army to feast on the 'Saxon sweetmeats', John George at once joined forces with the Swedes, adding his 'Leipziger Bund' army of 18,000 untried recruits to Gustavus's 23,000 veterans. An alliance between the two rulers was signed a week later, and they determined to give battle to Tilly at Breitenfeld, a little to the north of Leipzig. The allies enjoyed a clear numerical superiority over the Imperialists, who only had 31,000 troops, including 7,000 tired men just arrived from Mantua (a further 5,000 were on the way, but were still 320 kilometres to the south). The Protestants were thus 30 per cent stronger than their adversaries, and they possessed a crushing superiority in artillery: whereas Tilly had twenty-seven standard field pieces, the Swedes disposed of fifty-one, supported by a battery of four mobile (and highly effective) 3-pounders attached to every regiment. The Swedes were also more flexible: although in the battle on 17 September the Saxon infantry broke when the Imperialists charged, the Swedish formations, only six men deep (compared to the thirty-deep Imperial formations), quickly extended to fill the gaps. It took a mere two hours for the cannonade, the continuous musketry salvoes and the superior tactics of Gustavus's army to force Tilly's troops into headlong flight. Seven thousand six hundred Imperialists lay dead on the field, most of them killed by Swedish gunfire; 9,000 others were captured, or else deserted; still more fell in the retreat. Two-thirds of the Imperialist army, previously undefeated, was lost, together with all its artillery and 120 regimental and company standards.[10]

Breitenfeld was the first major Protestant victory in the field since the war began. But how was it to be exploited? Gustavus had intended to make the Baltic safe for Sweden by driving the Imperialists from its southern shore, and this he had triumphantly done. But the king had made no contingency plans for a victory on this scale—indeed, he did not even possess any detailed maps covering the lands south of Brandenburg or west of Magdeburg.[11] So Gustavus may perhaps be forgiven if he failed to eliminate his principal enemy, Tilly (who withdrew beyond the Saale and Weser), preferring instead to lead his tired veterans southwestwards into luxurious quarters amid the Catholic lands along the Rhine and Main, while his Saxon allies moved south-eastwards through Silesia into

Bohemia. Frederick V and the dukes of Saxe-Weimar accompanied Gustavus to winter at Mainz, while most of the Bohemian exiles travelled with the Saxons and entered Prague again on 15 November 1631.

This strategy at least ensured the destruction of the 'third force', whether led by Protestant Saxony or Catholic Bavaria. The Frankfurt Convention had eventually assembled on 4 August, but only thirteen Catholic states (ten of them ecclesiastical) and a handful of Protestants (led by Saxony) attended. The Brandenburg delegation only appeared in September and scarcely any business had been transacted when, on 14 October, the Catholic participants fled, rather than fall into the hands of the advancing Swedes. The Elector of Mainz, who had vainly reinforced the garrisons of his state, fled to Cologne, closely followed by the bishop of Würzburg, who had equally vainly created a militia of 1,700 men. Their subjects fled to wherever they could find refuge—to Westphalia, to French Lorraine, to the Swiss cantons.[12]

Yet, strangely enough, the Swedish standard continued to attract few supporters except those with little to lose. Thus the first—and for some time the only—potentates to declare for Gustavus in Franconia were the Imperial Knights, lords of minute estates. More substantial rulers were less enthusiastic about the king's great victory, for the arrival of the Swedish host was invariably followed by demands that princes abandon their neutrality and declare war on the emperor. Margrave Christian of Brandenburg-Kulmbach, for example, a staunch Lutheran, had managed to keep neutral throughout the early phases of the war: although a leading figure in the Protestant Union (page 22 above), he refused the requests of the Elector Palatine for help; and although a loyal subject of the emperor, he likewise refused to assist the Imperial armies as they moved north against Denmark. He attended the Leipzig Colloquy (one of his many visits to Saxony for political discussion), and afterwards raised a militia of 1,200 men to protect his frontier. But it was all in vain. Within a month of Breitenfeld, a letter arrived from Gustavus asking if he were friend or foe. With the Swedish host advancing, there was no choice: on 31 October, Margrave Christian had an audience with the king, swore to be his ally against the emperor, and agreed to provide quarters and contributions for the army. The margrave's subjects were thereby subjected to unprecedented hardship at the hands of troops, quartermasters and tax-collectors. When the peasants attempted to drive out the intruders, in November 1632, they were massacred: a chronicler who visited the site of

BEFORE THE SWEDES

1 *The Fettmilch uprising in Frankfurt (1612–1616)* The revolt of the citizens of Frankfurt which began in 1612, during the celebration of Matthias's election as emperor, was both anti-patrician and anti-semitic in character. At first the burghers, led by the charismatic pastry-baker Vincent Fettmilch, called for a more democratic city council and for the expulsion of the city's large Jewish population (which, many thought, derived unfair advantage from the protection provided by the council). In 1614, since the councillors refused to mend their ways, the citizens deposed them and looted the Jewish ghetto (as seen in this print). All the Jews were

driven from the city. These new disorders, however, forced the emperor to intervene and, eventually, Fettmilch was seized by his fellowcitizens and his movement collapsed. In 161 6 he was executed and the patricians returned to power. The disorders in Frankfurt were but the most extreme example of the tension between councils and citizens which erupted into violence in a score of German cities in the years before the war (see Map 1).

From J.L.Gottfried, *Historische Chronica* (Frankfurt, 1633), p. 1142. Courtesy Historisches Museum, Frankfurt-am-Main



2 *The finances of Christian of Denmark (1618)* The holograph diary of Christian IV, for New Year's Eve 1618, summing up his capital assets (in Danish *daler*). In translation the text runs: Totals of this year's revenue and expense as well as the reserve, recorded in this book:

revenue	1,143,954
expense	179,784
reserve	974,170

This reserve includes some thousand *daler,* which have been sent to Holstein.

This astonishingly healthy financial position-of which the king's diary is the only record-helps to explain why the king of Denmark was to be so assiduously courted by the supporters of Frederick of the Palatinate. From Copenhagen, Rigsarkivet, Kongehusets arkiv: Christian IV



3 *The Neuburg Wedding (12 November 1614)* If the Protestant 'Wedding of the Year' in 1613 was that of Frederick of the Palatinate with Elizabeth Stuart in London, the Catholic equivalent was unquestionably between Wolfgang William, heir to the duchy of Pfalz-Neuburg, and Anna Magdalena, sister of Maximilian of Bavaria, in Munich. This print, one of a set of twelve (by Wilhelm Peter Zimmermann of Augsburg) commemorating the festivities, shows the newly married couple proceeding out of the church to the accompaniment of a volley of muskets. The wedding cemented Wolfgang William's adhesion to the Catholic cause-he had only left the Lutheran faith the previous July—and also served as a guarantee of Bavarian support for the Neuburg claim to the Cleves-Jülich succession.

From Munich, Staatliche Graphische Sammlung 94.451

4 *The surrender of Bautzen to John Georgeof saxony (1620)* Although the support of Bavaria for the Habsburg cause in 1620 is the more famous, the campaign of saxony to assist Fredinand II was also important. It was, however, largely bloodless. Where Maximilian has to fight his way through Upper Austria and Bohemia to prague, John George occupied Silesia and Lusatia with scarcely a blow. Only the Lusatian capital, Bautzen, put up serious resistance and (as the engraving shows) even that did not last long. The defenders were soon compelled to make their formal surrender to the stout Elector.

From J.P.Abelinus *Theatrum europaeum,* I (Frankfurt, 1639), p.p. 421–2

5 *General Tilly joins the Jesuits in the spinning-room (1632)* It was Tilly rather than Wallenstein who symbolized, for Protestant propagandists, the Imperial and Catholic threat; and he became the butt of endless satirical prints and broadsheets, especially after his fortunes began to fail with the battle of Breitenfeld. This savage lampoon, for example, shows the aged general surrounded by Jesuits and monks in a decrepit spinning-room. No longer able to spin their plots, they are now reduced to spinning flax in the manner of old village women.

From Wolfenbüttel, Herzog-August-Bibliothek, *Sammlung Illustrierte Einblattdrucke* JH 170



6 *TheEdict of Restitution (1629)*
Seldom has a scrap of paper proved so controversial as the Edict on religion, issued by Ferdinand II on 6 March 1629. It contained only four columns of text, yet it was to prove the downfall of all his ambitious plans. This copy, signed by Ferdinand himself, was sent in advance to Maximilian of Bavaria, as Director of an Imperial Circle, with orders to have it reproduced and distributed widely in his area by the official date of publication, 28 March.

From Munich, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, *Kasten Schwarz* 60 fo. 106

Der Röm. Käyſ. auch zu
Hungarn vnd Böheimb Kön. Mayſt.
FERDINANDI II.
Außſpruch/Deciſion/vnd Käyſ. Edict/
Radix omnium Vber malorum.
Etliche Puncten den Religion Frieden/ſonderlich
die Reſtitution der Geiſtlichen Gütter betreffendt.
Auß dem Original mit fleiß nachgedruckt.
Gedruckt in der Fürſtl. Hauptſtatt Wirtzburg/
bey Stephan Fleiſchmann.
Anno M. DC. XXIX.

7 *The Edict: 'root of all eviil'* This edition of the Edict was reprinted in pamphlet form from the copy sent to the bishop of Würzburg. It was one of the thirty-five different versions known and bears the handwritten judgment of an anonymous (but certainly Catholic) contemporary: *Radix omnium malorum*.

From Nuremberg, Stadtbibliothek, Hist. 494.4°

Lutherisch: vnd Calvinisch jüngsthin gehaltener Rathschluß.
Darinnen ein jedweder sein Mainung fürbringt/ wie darge
gen dero geordneten wahren bekandtnuß nach/ Ihr Intent wider Kay. May. zurugg gehet/

8 *The Leipzig Colloquyd (1631): a Protestant Plot* To the Catholics, the meeting of the Protestant states of the empire in the spring of 1631 seemed to presage an international conspiracy involving England, France, Sweden and the Dutch as well as German Lutherans and Calvinists. A 'restless spirit' *(unruhiger Geist)*-in fact the Devil himself-is shown as the conference secretary and is blamed for sowing opposition to the lawful authority of the emperor (on the right) and the true church (on the left). This is one of only three known pamphlets hostile to Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden. Broadsheets of a Catholic persuasion were rare in the years after 1629: however they fared in battle, the Protestants retained a crushing superiority in the propaganda war.

From Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Einblattdrucke V, 8a, no. 37

SWEDEN AND FRANCE INTER VENE

9 *The Swedish progress (1630–1632)*
The rich allegorical content of this broadsheet from 1632 is typical of the period. The victorious king of Sweden is shown advancing towards the Holy Roman Empire in a chariot pulled by animals symbolizing the magnanimity, speed, forthrightness and exalted ancestry of the charioteer; these beasts are, in turn, guided by the hand of God. A team of dispossessed Protestant princes helps to push the chariot forward, while Imperial peace overtures (‘Pacem’) are spurned so long as ‘Religion’ (G) points accusingly at the gagged and bound true church (‘R’).

From British Library, Call no. 1750, b. 29/47

10 *The siege of Smolensk (1632)*
Sweden had been at war with Poland throughout the 1620s, and Gustavus Adolphus was concerned that his cousin Sigismund III might, despite the six-year truce of Altmark (1629), launch a further attack designed to recover some of his losses while Sweden was fully occupied in the German war. It was to counter this threat that Gustavus encouraged the Russians to declare war on Poland, weakened by the death of Sigismund in the spring of 1632. The Russian army, aided by English and Scottish volunteers, laid siege to Smolensk and besieged it over the winter of 1632–3 with all the latest military techniques (shown in this print by Hondius). Nevertheless, partly due to quarrels among the British mercenaries, the siege failed and peace was concluded early in 1634. Poland was now free to work towards the removal of the Swedes from the Baltic when the truce of Altmark expired the following year.
Courtesy Dr Paul Dukes

11 *The Swedish Hercules (1631)* Another, rather more obvious allegory concerning the amazing king of Sweden, whose embodiment of the Protestant cause was a feature of almost all the propaganda of these years. From Wolfenbüttel, Herzog-August-Bibliothek, *Sammlung Illustrierte Einblattdrucke:* 'Der Schwedische Hercules'

12 *'The Saxon Sweetmeats' (1631)* At a meeting between the Elector of Saxony and representatives of General Tilly, the former was said to have warned the Imperialists that if they tried to devour the hitherto untouched 'confection' of Saxony, they would find that it contained some hard nuts to crack (see page 126). This exchange gave rise to a whole series of broadsheets. Here we see Tilly trying to seize the tasty dishes labelled 'regio' and 'religio' while John George fends him off with the staff of 'clear conscience' and Gustavus Adolphus brandishes the chalice of justice. The Saxon stands on solid blocks entitled 'just cause' and 'sure hope', while Tilly balances precariously on balls labelled 'malice' and 'falsehood'!

From British Library, Call no. 1750.b. 29/32



13 *Swedish progress continues* Some broadsheets were closely linked to the changing daily news. Here we see Gustavus Adolphus forcing the pope, as a symbol of the Catholic cause, to disgorge cities and fortresses captured from the Protestants during the 1620s. The sequence, almost resembling a strip-cartoon, includes the places taken or relieved by the Swedes on their march from Stralsund on the Baltic to Kreuznach in the Rhineland. Space has been left for the insertion of further victories in later editions of the print!

From British Library, Call no. 1750.b. 29/67*

14 *GustavAdolphiana* After the great victory at Breitenfeld a veritable ‘Gustavus industry’ grew up. Some items were individually crafted, but others were mass-produced: ivory reliefs, silver statues, gold rings, pendants and medallions were made in the likeness of the Swedish king. The ceremonial beaker offered yet another way to commemorate the Protestant hero.

From London, Victoria and Albert Museum, item 1885A–1898

15 *Gustavus redivivus (1633)* The king's death did not immediately bring to an end the flood of broadsheets associated with his achievements in Germany. This print of 1 633 presents in maudlin fashion the king's apotheosis: borne up by the 'three crowns' (Sweden's national emblem), Gustavus rises indestructible from the waves. The title reads: 'The Swede lives on'.

From Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Einblattdrucke V, 8a, no. 89



Raisons pour faire la guerre

V

On ne doit point douter que le dessein des Espagnols ne soit d'attaquer la france: tout effort qu'ils pourront, soit en soumettant, soit en faisant des troupes et de l'argent a la Reyne Mere et a mon frere, ou a quelques malcontents du Royaume. Ils en tesmoignent fort que je ne le voy par presentement. Nous voyons encor par les depesches prises a Calais la continuation de leur mauvaise volonté contre cet Estat et par le traité qu'ils veulent faire avec Angleterre contre nous, et pourquoy n'ay je droit de croire les avoir presentement que j'auray ce traité

118 [illegible]

nous attaquent.

2

Secondement il ny fut jamais Roy, ny ne sera pour les raisons que voicy. Les peuples de Flandre du pays bas sont bien mal contents de leur domination et porte a la Revolte.

3

Ils n'auront ny n'auront jamais tant d'affaires de tous costez qu'ils en ont presentement.

4

Jamais ne furent si foibles ny d'hommes ny d'argent.

Nous ne devons point craindre de rompre avec le Royaume. Les Huguenots estans bas, ny de division en Italie, en ayant

16a and b *Louis XIII prepares for war(1634)* On 4 August 1634 the king of France wrote a top secret memorandum (‘Not a living soul has seen it according to the document) to his chief minister, Cardinal Richelieu, concerning the correct policy to be followed towards the Habsburgs. At

this stage, Louis's view was primarily defensive. He argued that France could not afford to be left isolated if the Dutch signed a new truce with Spain, or if the Swedes and their Heilbronn allies made peace with the emperor. A French declaration of war against Spain, on the other hand, would forestall a Dutch truce and give new heart to the German Protestants. The underlying assumption was that the Spanish, not the German war would be the central concern; after Nördlingen, just a month later, this viewpoint had to be considerably amended. From Paris, Archive du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, *Correspondance politique: Allemagne,* vol. 23, fos 338–40

DESTRUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION

17 *Amore Pacis (1648)* This enormous broadsheet incorporated a map prepared on the orders of Quarter-Master-General Cornelis van den Büsch and accompanied by details on the leading battles of Sweden's war (1630–48), the location of the various garrisons of Sweden and her allies at the end of the war, and other useful military information. It served both to advertise Sweden's successes and to locate her far-flung garrisons ready for evacuation.

From Stockholm, Krigsarkivet, *Hist. Plan. 1648:*24 fol.

18 *The Great European War-Ballet (1647–1648)*This simple satire on the seemingly endless diplomatic quadrille at Westphalia shows the various European rulers trying to move in unison, as angels scatter olive-branches and apples of discord before them. On the right, watched by the Turkish Sultan and the prince of Transylvania, the infant Louis XIV holds hands with John IV of Portugal, the prince of Orange and General Torstensson (an interesting choice to represent Sweden). They dance in front of the coffin of Frederick of the Palatinate while Gustavus lies dead on the ground. On the side, the emperor and his allies are watched by a group of Italian princes, while Saxony and the Swiss cantons seek advantage in the foregound.

From Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek

19 *The battle of Jankov (1645)* One of the superb engravings by the Frankfurt engraver and bookseller Matthaeus Merian (1593–1650), published in the volume *Theatrum europaeum* as a sort of contemporary history, printed as the war proceeded. The perceived importance of Jankov is reflected in the fact that four separate illustrations of the battle were included in the work, as against two for Breitenfeld and three for Lützen.

From M.Merian, *Theatrum europaeum,* V (Frankfurt, 1647), pp. 716–17

20 and 21 *Nuremberg: the end of the war (1650)* Although the peace of Westphalia brought the fighting to an end in October 1648, it took almost two more years before a formula for demobilizing the army was agreed by all parties. The leading role was played by Prince Charles Gustav of Pfalz-Zweibrücken, commander-in-chief of the Swedish army and heir apparent to the Swedish throne (to which he ascended in 1654 as Charles X). Here he sits to the left of the Imperial commander, Ottavio Piccolomini, at the end of the table (left foreground), awaiting the feast which celebrated the final agreement, while outside a firework spectacular takes place . At last, Germany was at peace.

From M.Merian, *Theatri europaei oder historischer Beschreibung…sechster und letzter Teil* (Frankfurt, 1652), pp. 939 and 1076



22a and b *Contemporary sketches of the battle of Lützen (1632)* The Catholic defeat at Breitenfeld arose because the Swedish battle order-with thinner, longer lines, more field artillery, and more musketeers-proved superior to the traditional way. Therefore the defeated Imperialists, directed by Wallenstein, now adopted the Swedish technique. At Lützen, both sides were deployed more or less in the same new fashion, and the result was a draw. By a happy chance, two

contemporary sketches of the battle lines at Lützen have survived: one from the Protestant side (although anonymous, Wallenstein's *'munitionslager'* is described as *'vom Feind'*-'of the enemy'); the other perhaps drawn up by Wallenstein himself and given to Pappenheim (it was found on the dead count, stained with his blood, after the battle). Wallenstein's right flank is shown to have been anchored on Lützen village and the windmills, while Gustavus's position (*'König'* in top map at bottom right) was on the opposite flank, which is why his funeral monument is today located some two miles away from the village. The massed artillery of the Swedes, which caused such heavy losses among the Imperialists, is shown in the centre of their line *('Samptstücke')* in the more schematic 'Protestant sketch'.

Top from Stockholm, Krigsarkivet, *Sveriges Krig,* 3:86; bottom from Vienna, Heeresgeschichtiches Museum (Kat. Erben/John 1903), nr 75/3





23a, b and c *The lamentations of Germany* An English booklet on the war published in 1638, entitled *The lamentations of Germany,* included letters from some Protestant ministers

in the Palatinate to their exiled colleagues in London. But the main text was a long report on ‘the miserable estate of Germany’ compiled by the refugee G.R.Weckerlin with chapter-headings such as ‘Of tortures and torments’, ‘Of rape and ravishing’, ‘Of bloodshed and killing’… These are but a few of the less horrifying illustrations to his chilling account of man’s inhumanity to man.

From *The lamentations of Germany* (London, 1638), plates facing pp. a2, 26, 61

Priests slaine at the Altars
Croats eate Children
Noses & eares Cut of to make hatbandes
Snailes and froges eagerly eaten
Eatinge dead mens guts and Interalls
A diuines wife saw 6 of her Children ley starued before her eyes. Corne 7 pounds 18 shilling a bushell.

24a and b *At the court of Christian IV*
An extract from the diary of Christian's councillor, Esge Brock, during the king's visit to Norway by sea in 1604. The crosses at the end of each entry register the degree of intoxication at the end of each evening. The entry for 20 July, on the lower right hand page, runs 'His Royal Majesty and ourselves were the guests

> of the mayor and the council (of Bergen) at the city hall. Later the same night we entered the city and the lodgings of Jørgen Friis and Mogens Gøye. Libera nos domine!' The four crosses, and the prayer, appear to indicate a night of unparalleled excess which left even the hard-drinking Brock with a hangover. The royal court set the tone for heavy drinking which became fashionable in so much of Protestant Europe.
>
> From Copenhagen, Rigsarkivet, Privatarkiver no. 5212: Esge Brock C: Dagbøger 1604–1622

the peasants' last stand was appalled to find the vineyards and fields red with blood, with corpses scattered in bizarre positions over a three-mile radius. Meanwhile the margrave locked himself in his only defensible castle, the Plassenburg, and waited for the storm to subside. Such were the consequences for the former 'neutrals' of Sweden's victory at Breitenfeld.[13]

All over the Empire the same agonizing choice confronted Protestant princes. George of Hesse-Darmstadt was in particular difficulty because his title to the Marburg inheritance rested exclusively upon Imperial goodwill. Early in 1632, forced to decide between the Lutheran Swedes at the gate and the Catholic emperor in far-away Vienna, Landgrave George summoned a meeting of his counsellors and court theologians to answer the pressing question: 'lf his princely Grace is forced to choose between one of the two warring parties in the Empire,…with which side must he unite himself?' Incredibly, the theologians inclined more to the Imperial side than to an alliance that included Calvinists and—worse still—William of Hesse-Kassel. But in the end the Edict of Restitution, and the example of the landgrave's father-in-law, John George of Saxony, tipped the scales: George too threw in his lot with Sweden.[14]

Thanks to the resources of these reluctant new allies, the troops of Gustavus were at last adequately provided for. The efficiency of the Swedish supply system was unconsciously reflected in the report from their camp early in April 1632, printed by an English weekly newspaper. There was an abundance of livestock, the account began: a horse for £1, an ox for half that, and geese and poultry for almost nothing; indeed, all over Swabia, where the army was quartered, the troops found abundant and cheap food. Clearly this situation was the consequence of massive extortion. Only wine was in short supply, the reporter noted, speculating that the Catholics had 'cherished their fainting hearts…withall before their doleful departure'.[15]

Actually, with or without the comforts of alcohol, the Catholic army was busily re-forming beyond the Weser. The garrisons in the north-west, under the direction of Count

Pappenheim, harassed Sweden's communications; the main army, under Tilly, moved in November to the safety of Bavaria and recruited reinforcements for the new campaign. In theory, under the terms of the treaty of Bärwalde, Gustavus was obliged to regard all the territories allied to France as neutral, but Tilly seems to have lost his nerve. Now aged seventy-three, according to a Bavarian councillor at headquarters, the commander-in-chief was 'Wholly perplexed and seemingly cast down, wholly irresolute in council, knows not how to save himself, abandons one proposal after another, decides nothing, sees only great difficulties and dangers—but has no idea how to overcome them.' In March he rashly forfeited the protection afforded by Bärwalde by driving a Swedish detachment out of Bamberg. Within three weeks Gustavus was advancing southwards with 37,000 men against Tilly's 22,000. Remorselessly he forced his way across the River Lech at Rain, in the teeth of the main Bavarian army: beneath a Swedish barrage of seventy-two heavy guns, a bridge was built, over which Gustavus sent his men. In the slaughter that followed, Tilly was mortally wounded.[16]

With Tilly dead and his army routed, there was now nothing to stop the plundering of Maximilian's beloved duchy: many towns, even sixty and seventy kilometres away, made haste to surrender to the victors; many more were pillaged; only a few places escaped. 'Your Grace would no longer recognize poor Bavaria', Maximilian wrote to his brother, Ferdinand of Cologne; 'such cruelty has been unheard of in this war.' Gustavus and Frederick V held a triumphal entry into Munich on 17 May, reviewed their victorious troops, played tennis together on the ducal courts, surveyed the ducal art collection, and plundered it as thoroughly as the Bavarians had plundered Heidelberg ten years before. They also captured over 100 pieces of artillery, much of it formerly belonging to Frederick and his allies. Maximilian was unable to return to his capital for three full years (see Plate 13).[17]

The Catholic cause now appeared to be in ruins. The army of the League was shattered; its mainstay, Bavaria, in ashes. For a moment, it seemed that Spain might come once more to the rescue, for her forces regained Speyer and some other minor places along the Lower Rhine in the spring of 1632; but then Philip IV all but lost control of the South Netherlands. In June the Dutch army captured, in rapid succession, Venlo, Roermond, Straelen and Sittard, forcing the recall of a Spanish relief army sent to defend the Palatinate against the Swedish onslaught. But it was not enough to prevent the Dutch from laying siege to the great fortress of Maastricht, commanding all communications between Brussels and the Catholic party in Westphalia. At this point, a small group of Netherlands nobles, led by Count Henry van den Bergh, fled to join the Dutch army in Limburg and called upon their compatriots to throw off 'the Spanish yoke'. Nobody stirred, save only the Dutch who carried their siege of Maastricht to a successful conclusion on 23 August, in spite of the desperate assault of an Imperial relief army under Pappenheim on the siegeworks, less than a week before. Somewhat shaken by these developments, a second group of conspirators, who (unaware of the first group's existence) had intended to call in the French, decided not to act.[18] Spanish rule over the South Netherlands was thus, almost miraculously, preserved—but it was some time before Brussels could again come to the aid of Vienna.

Italy, too, was unable to offer assistance to the emperor in 1632. The end of the war of Mantua coincided with a plague epidemic which devastated the northern half of the peninsula with unprecedented ferocity. In April 1631, the governor of Spanish Milan

complained that 'The plague has left [this province] so reduced in population that it is impossible to raise any troops', and thus it remained for some time.[19] The papacy, too, pleaded hardship when asked by the emperor for support. Although subsidies to the German Catholics were resumed in December 1631, they amounted to a mere 5,000 thalers per month: during the whole quadrennium 1631–4, only 550,000 were sent, and even that sum was remitted solely on condition that 'lf peace is made with the Protestants … His Holiness will withdraw his aid, the more so because, since the eruption of Mount Vesuvius, the collection of tithes has become more difficult.'[20] The Imperial cause was indeed in desperate straits. As a Viennese courtier wrote in April 1631, just after the Swedes took Frankfurt-on-Oder: 'We cry "Help, Help", but there is nobody there!'[21]

As the tide of Swedish success approached Munich and Vienna, even Maximilian had to recognize that salvation could only come from the creation of a new Imperial army, and that only Wallenstein was capable of raising, maintaining and leading it. Accordingly, in April 1632, after three months of recruiting, the general was restored to full command. His tactics during the new campaign were extremely cautious: he was aware that, with all Ferdinand's allies out of action, and another peasant uprising in Austria (fomented by exiles in Swedish service), the Imperial cause could not survive a further defeat. So, in July, he moved into a heavily fortified position around a medieval castle, called the Alte Veste, just outside Nuremberg, which the Swedes were besieging. Gustavus and his men were tied down in a fruitless confrontation there for two months while Wallenstein's lieutenants drove the Saxons out of Bohemia and Silesia. The Swedes launched several costly yet unsuccessful assaults on the Alte Veste, but the siege continued into October, until the area around Nuremberg was totally devastated ('For three months we were besieged by our enemies; for four months we were eaten out by our friends' was the terse verdict of the Nuremberg patrician Lukas Behaim on the year 1632).[22] Eventually Gustavus led his dispirited and depleted army back towards the north-west, while Wallenstein moved north-east and overran the lands of Sweden's crucial ally, the Elector of Saxony. Leipzig fell on 1 November.

But now Wallenstein made the most serious error of his professional career. After holding his army at battle stations for two weeks, he apparently concluded that the campaign was over: on 14 November he gave orders for his host to disperse into winter quarters. The very next day he received reports that the Swedes were advancing on his headquarters at Lützen. Hastily, he recalled all units. But on the 16th, when battle commenced, he still only had 19,000 men, exactly the same number as the Swedes, after all their losses over the summer. As usual when the two sides were equally matched, the battle was prolonged and losses were heavy. Nevertheless, when dusk fell, both sides remained at their posts. After dark, according to the English captain Sydnam Poyntz, who was in Wallenstein's army, 'wee were scarcely laid down on the ground to rest and in dead sleep, but comes a command from the Generall to all Coronells and Sargeant Maiors to give in a note how strong every regiment was found to *be*'. The replies were discouraging. Poyntz had only three officers left out of twelve, and casualties in other units were equally high, so that Wallenstein felt it prudent to withdraw from the field, abandoning baggage and artillery to the enemy, relinquishing his Saxon conquests and withdrawing to Bohemia. He also left behind some 6,000 dead, including his lieutenant-general, Pappenheim. But he took with him the conviction that victory had been forfeited through the treachery or desertion of some of his hastily raised Lutheran troops. After the

battle he had seventeen of them (including twelve officers) executed for cowardice, gave seven officers a dishonourable discharge, and put a price on the head of forty others—actions that did much to alienate the army from its mercurial commander and thus made it easier, at a later date, to eliminate him.[23]

On the Protestant side there were also reprisals—the commander of the Leipzig citadel was executed for precipitate surrender—but Gustavus Adolphus took no part in the proceedings. He had died in the battle on 16 November, shot three times—in the arm, in the back and in the head. For some weeks, news of his death was not believed. Wallenstein himself was not convinced until 30 November; in England, £200 was wagered at Court in December that Gustavus was still alive. The intervention of Sweden had captured the popular imagination to such an extent that even Frederick of the Palatinate, who also died in the autumn of 1632, was later remembered in England as 'the prince for whom Gustavus fell'; and when, in the same year, the grandson of Axel Oxenstierna and the nephew of Gustav Horn were given honorary degrees by the University of Oxford, the vice-chancellor's laureation compared their illustrious relatives to 'two thunderbolts of war,…[who] to the terror of the house of Austria, have now for long been conspicuous in fighting for the hearth and home, the religion and indeed the liberty of the whole of Germany'.[24] (See Plates 14 and 15.)

It was because it put an end to the brief Protestant tide of success that Lützen, although a drawn battle, was so important. Another Swedish victory like Breitenfeld or Rain would have destroyed the Imperial cause beyond all hope of recovery. Now the two sides were again more or less equal, leading each combatant to seek desperately for more foreign support which might tip the scales—the hopes of Sweden pinned ever more firmly to France, those of the emperor fixed increasingly on Spain.

iii Oxenstierna versus Wallenstein

The Swedish campaign of 1631–2 had been disastrous for Spain as well as for the German Catholics. The troops of Philip IV were driven from the Palatinate, those of her allies were expelled from Alsace: the 'Spanish Road' was blocked. At first the count-duke of Olivares had hoped that the link between Lombardy and the Low Countries might be restored by the Army of Flanders; but the crisis of 1632 in the South Netherlands (page 116 above) prevented this. So in the summer of 1633 a force of some 20,000 men under the duke of Feria, governor of Spanish Lombardy, marched through the Valtelline to south Germany and began to restore Habsburg influence: Constance and Breisach were relieved; Bregenz and Rheinfelden were recaptured. The road through Alsace was again secure. But that was no longer enough: even as Feria marched, the French invaded the duchy of Lorraine, occupying Nancy and all other major strongholds and driving the duke into exile. In desperation, the Spanish government authorized Feria to proceed from Breisach to recapture Nancy, thus in effect sanctioning a new war with France; but the campaigning season was over, and the duke retired to the apparent safety of the Alpine foothills, where both he and most of his army died of plague in the course of the winter.[1]

Yet the war in south-western Germany was just a sideshow in 1633: it was fought by small armies campaigning largely independently of the main protagonists further east.

The same was true of operations in the north-west, where William of Hesse-Kassel had joined his private army to a Swedish force under Duke George of Brunswick-Lüneburg. Together, they occupied the ecclesiastical territories of Paderborn and Fulda, captured several minor towns on the Weser, and defeated an Imperial army at Hessisch-Oldendorf.[2] But this too was a sideshow; it seemed important only because the main armies scarcely fought. The central problem was the vacuum created by Gustavus's death at Lützen. His heiress, Queen Christina, was aged only six, and the direction of Swedish foreign policy therefore came into the hands of the late king's closest collaborator, Axel Oxenstierna. This remarkable man, now aged fifty, commanded a prestige in Europe enjoyed by few mere subjects before him. He treated princes as his equals and spoke freely in the presence of kings; he was in sole charge of the operations and supply of some 100,000 men, and of the cumbersome administrative machine which had been set up in Germany in the wake of the Swedish conquests. And, as if that were not enough, as chancellor of Sweden and head of the regency government he was also besieged by requests for innumerable decisions on domestic matters (often minute, such as the selection and dispatch of Rhine wine for the Court in Stockholm, the precise regalia to be placed on Gustavus's catafalque, or the correct policy to be followed by the Mint). The range of precise information displayed in his vast correspondence, on an incredible variety of public business concerning Sweden and her neighbours, is overwhelming. But his skills, great as they might be, were not equal to the challenges that he faced in 1633; it is indeed doubtful whether any human faculties could have overcome them.[3]

At first, the outlook did not seem too bleak. The outbreak of war between Poland and Russia in 1632, the 'war of Smolensk', offered a respite in the danger from that quarter which might allow the conclusion of a permanent settlement of the German question that was favourable to Sweden.[4] Early in 1633 Oxenstierna submitted a lengthy memorandum to the regency council in Stockholm concerning the correct foreign policy to be followed, now that the king was dead. Out of thirty-six clauses, only six dealt with Germany, but those laid down a clear line of action. The chancellor advocated a double-security arrangement: first, making permanent the Swedish presence in Pomerania and Prussia, in order to secure the Baltic against both Poland and the emperor, but keeping only a few outposts further south; and, second, organizing a confederation of friendly princes in central Germany to serve as a buffer in case of further Imperial aggression. He therefore proposed to dissolve the main field army and move most of the Swedish national units north into Pomerania. But not all units were to be withdrawn; not all the southern conquests were to be abandoned. In particular, Oxenstierna had no intention of surrendering Mainz, which had served as Gustavus's headquarters in the winter of 1631–2. The strategically placed Electorate was given a separate government, staffed largely by the Imperial Knights who had been Sweden's earliest supporters in the area, and there was a major redistribution of Catholic land to loyal Protestants. A programme of economic regeneration was drawn up, a new currency was issued, and a Lutheran hierarchy and church order were introduced. But the cornerstone of 'Swedish Mainz' was a vast fortified camp, the 'Gustavsburg', at the junction of the Main and the Rhine, with bridgeheads across both rivers and enough room to shelter 17,000 men if necessary. The fortress, adjoining the reconstructed walls of Mainz, was intended both to guarantee control of the area and to serve as a refuge in case of need—a military bulwark to underpin Swedish power in western Germany. It was the fulcrum of the elaborate balance

of power that Sweden sought to create by 'atomizing' Germany into a host of loosely organized but mutually suspicious independent units. From Mainz, Oxenstierna could ensure that no one else won the upper hand in the west.[5]

But how were the garrisons of these Swedish outposts, far from their home base, to be paid? And what of the other troops in Swedish service, who still numbered over 100,000 fighting men? Oxenstierna was determined that the cost to Sweden would never again approach the level of 1630–1, when expenditure on the German war exceeded the country's ordinary revenues ten-fold. For a time, at least, there were the toll revenues from Prussia, Pomerania and Mecklenburg, and the subsidies from France and the Dutch, which enabled him to reduce the immediate pressure on Sweden still further. But the former were due to expire in 1635, while the latter arrived, after 1632, tardily and sometimes not at all. Other expedients of the first years of conquest—indemnities from towns spared from sack (100,000 thalers from Nuremberg, for example) and gratuities from princes restored to their lands by Swedish arms (60,000 thalers from the Elector Palatine; 220,000 from Baden-Durlach)—were likewise inapplicable after Lützen. Yet the army could not be supported by Sweden and Pomerania alone. Gustavus had made his soldiers swear an oath of loyalty to the Swedish crown in return for an undertaking to pay their wages; Oxenstierna therefore resolved to transfer both loyalty and financial obligation to other shoulders.

As early as October 1632, the king had deputed his chancellor to convene a meeting of the Franconian, Swabian and Rhenish Circles at Ulm, to discuss the formation of a defensive League, in alliance with Sweden. The meeting actually took place the following January. Those present debated ways of creating this association, raising an army, and paying for it. In March, after the Circles had discussed the various matters separately, the assembly reconvened at Heilbronn (a safer place than Ulm) and on 23 April 1633 signed the league that Sweden desired. They agreed to fight, and to go on fighting, until three goals had been achieved: first, 'until such time as the liberties of Germany, and respect for the principles and constitution of the Holy Roman Empire, are once again firmly established'; second, until 'the restoration of the Protestant estates is secured, and a certain and just peace, in spirituals and temporals…is obtained and concluded'; and, third, 'until the crown of Sweden has been assured of an appropriate satisfaction'. Moreover, the achievement of these aims was placed firmly in the hands of Chancellor Oxenstierna: in respect (so the allies handsomely affirmed) of his 'God-given, exceptional qualities', he became sole Director of the Heilbronn League.[6]

But the political organization of the new alliance was better than its financial base. The League agreed to maintain an army of 56 1/2 infantry regiments and 216 cavalry companies, at an annual cost of almost 10 million thalers; to this effect the French and Dutch subsidies were diverted into the League treasury. But over and above this commitment—and here lay the fatal weakness—the allies also agreed to pay the arrears of the units already in service. These were so monstrous, stretching back in some cases to 1627, that it proved impossible to agree upon a total figure. Moreover, even before the ink was dry on the treaty of confederation, the army in south Germany mutinied. In this emergency, Oxenstierna made over to the local commanders the right to levy contributions directly, under the general supervision of a military entrepreneur, Colonel Brandenstein. Thus Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, in Franconia, was allocated the bishoprics of Würzburg and Bamberg for the satisfaction of his troops' arrears: it was more or less a

licence to plunder. In addition, the commanders were allowed to purchase lands under Swedish control at nominal prices, and officers in Gustav Horn's Swabian army were given cash rewards by the Swedish treasury. These measures solved the short-term crisis, although the campaigning season had largely slipped away by the time the mutiny subsided in August; but it created a serious long-term obstacle for the Heilbronn League, which was now deprived of many taxable areas required for the current remuneration of the troops. The problem grew worse almost daily for, as more areas were allocated to settling arrears, less remained to meet present pay. Before long the troops took to exacting their wages directly, with all the inevitable brutality and devastation. By the end of 1633, it was clear that the League was unequal to the burden of the army; to survive it must expand.

For a time, Oxenstierna pinned his hopes on Brandenburg, whose Elector was Queen Christina's uncle and whose Calvinist advisers still seemed to favour a policy of active anti-Imperial aggression. But George William remained under the influence of the Catholic, pro-Imperial Count Schwarzenberg, and he also had a private grievance against Sweden that overrode all other motives. In 1529 the Estates of Pomerania, Brandenburg's northern neighbour, had recognized the then Elector, and his heirs, as eventual successors to their duchy should the ruling line die out. Now, that situation seemed near: Duke Bogislav XIV (who died in 1637) was indeed the last of his line. But in 1630, the duke had been forced to sign a treaty which granted Sweden total control of the duchy as long as the war lasted: so what would happen if Bogislav died before the peace? Sweden made it clear that she could not surrender Pomerania, and the evacuation of her national units from central Germany to the duchy, after Lützen, confirmed George William's worst fears: that Sweden intended to annex Pomerania in spite of Brandenburg's rights. The Elector sent his son and heir, Frederick William, to reside at Bogislav's court in Stettin in 1633–4, but to no avail: the Swedes proved immovable.

George William was already convinced that a reconciliation with the emperor was the only way to achieve peace, and thus free his states from foreign occupation. In January 1633 he sent envoys to Dresden to persuade John George to join him in a peace initiative. But the Saxon capital was already seething with diplomats and foreign dignitaries, all trying to win the Elector's support. Oxenstierna arrived first, and spent Christmas 1632 persuading his host to participate in a new invasion of the Habsburg heartland. Shortly afterwards, Landgrave George of Hesse-Darmstadt came to invite John George to join him in formal discussions with an Imperial delegation on the terms of a possible peace settlement. In the event the Habsburgs' terms proved too harsh, and John George (like Brandenburg) threw in his lot with Sweden for another campaign. But he exacted a high price for his participation: above all, he ensured that the main Protestant offensive would be launched in the east, into Silesia, under commanders chosen by himself.

The tension between Sweden and her German allies could not be kept secret for long. As Wallenstein shrewdly observed: 'I believe that Sweden wants peace, that she wants to bring her forces home, and to leave the two Electors [Brandenburg and Saxony] to find their own way out of the labyrinth.'[7] The Imperial general therefore concentrated his attention on exploiting the rift. First he tried to seduce the Czech exiles at the court of Saxony, leading them to believe that he—also a Czech—might be able to secure for them a favourable settlement with the emperor. It was to parry this threat, and to keep a finger on the exiles' pulse, that Oxenstierna was forced to take the unpalatable step of accepting

John George's nominee, Count Thurn, the unsuccessful general of the Bohemian confederation a decade before, as Swedish commander in Silesia. But in June 1633 Wallenstein managed to split the Saxon and Swedish units in Silesia when he arranged a cease-fire of one month to allow peace negotiations with Arnim, once his subordinate and now the Saxon commander. The talks proved inconclusive and, to the chancellor's relief, hostilities resumed in July. But in August Arnim agreed to a second truce to allow further negotiations, and when, on 27 September, fighting resumed, Wallenstein suddenly launched a massive attack on Thurn's Swedish force at Steinau, cut them off and forced 8,000 men to surrender within a week. Thurn himself was captured and agreed to surrender all the towns in Silesia held by his fellow-exiles in return for his freedom. These were devastating blows, and Wallenstein followed up his success by making renewed offers of a peaceful settlement to both Saxony and Brandenburg. Oxenstierna found it necessary to make a personal visit to George William early in 1634 in order to secure their rejection.[8] But on 25 February, the chancellor was unexpectedly saved from further difficulties by the assassination of his principal adversary.

Although a full-scale investigation of Wallenstein's last days was mounted by Imperial Commissioners soon after his murder, and although literally thousands of poems, plays, pamphlets and books have subsequently been published on the subject, the labyrinthine process by which the general was removed is still obscure. But this was the intention of the conspirators, one of whom explained to a close colleague:'Put briefly, dissimulation is the alpha and omega of this business.'[9] Nevertheless, certain reasons for the assassination can be discerned. In the first place, the emperor was clearly incensed that he had paid for the upkeep of an enormous army throughout the year 1633 which, in military terms, had achieved very little: Bavaria was still partly occupied by Protestants; Heidelberg and Regensburg had been lost; Silesia was only liberated in October. Furthermore, Wallenstein insisted on quartering his hordes on the Habsburg provinces once more, over the winter of 1633–4, creating a severe risk of peasant revolts against the exactions of the troops. Then there was the Spanish dimension. It had been decided by the governments of Madrid and Vienna that in 1634 a large army would cross from Lombardy to the Empire, under the personal command of Philip IV's brother, the Cardinal-lnfante Ferdinand, and join with the Imperial army to clear southern Germany of all enemies. According to Wallenstein's commission, the cardinal-infante and his men would have to serve under the commander-in-chief's orders, and Spain made it clear that this was unacceptable. However, probably none of these arguments led the emperor to contemplate assassination. More damaging to Wallenstein's standing in his master's eyes were the quasi-independent diplomatic manoeuvres with Saxony and Brandenburg. Yet for these he appears to have had full authority. In April 1632, after he had assumed control of Ferdinand's armies, unusually broad powers were conferred on Wallenstein. At a secret meeting at Göllersdorf, halfway between his headquarters and Vienna, it was agreed that the commander-in-chief might quarter his troops wherever he wished, even within the Habsburg hereditary lands; that he was to control all Catholic troops fighting for the Imperial cause (thus including any units sent from Spain); and that he was to exercise authority 'in absolutissima forma'. Since the original text of the ten-point Göllersdorf agreement has not survived (if, indeed, it was ever written down) it is impossible to say what, precisely, this last clause meant. Certainly Wallenstein behaved as if it conferred power to negotiate cease-fires and even a peace with his enemies, and he

kept in constant contact with Dresden, believing that Saxony (certainly) and Sweden (possibly) wished to end the war; but he did so with minimal reference to Vienna.[10]

Wallenstein had always had his enemies at the Imperial Court and, although in 1631 they failed to prevent his recall, they maintained throughout his second generalship a constant barrage of criticism, aimed at the general's personal habits almost as much as at his public policy. Both seemed more extravagant than before. For example, Wallenstein could now not endure any noise. On arrival in any town, it was alleged, he ordered all dogs and cats to be killed; he forbade the wearing of boots and spurs in his presence; and he punished severely and arbitrarily those who talked loudly or shouted. His behaviour towards his entourage varied between excessive generosity and frightening cruelty (penalties were carried out instantly by his household executioner). His utterances on politics ranged from inscrutable forecasts to brutal threats. As a pamphlet written after his death observed, he was 'a subject become a soveraigne'. He had been 'advanced to supreame charge, such as formerly hath not binn conferred on any other'; and the experience of supreme power no doubt encouraged exaggerated behaviour.[11] Certainly, his enemies had no difficulty in finding, among his boastful or careless words and his extravagant actions, ample grounds for impugning his loyalty to the emperor. Wallenstein had consistently criticized (and had sometimes thwarted) Vienna's efforts to assist Spanish ambitions in Italy and the Netherlands; he had also shown a marked lack of enthusiasm for the Edict of Restitution. Moreover, he had often argued in favour of a negotiated settlement between the emperor and at least the Lutherans. Now he conducted his own diplomatic offensive towards this end, refusing to take the military actions ordered by Vienna because they might jeopardize his peace initiative. As if all this were not enough to spread alarm at the Imperial Court, on 12 January 1634, at Pilsen, Wallenstein exacted an oath from his colonels that they would be loyal to him before all others. The emperor and his entourage naturally saw this as open treason and acted accordingly.[12]

It proved relatively easy to get rid of Ferdinand's over-mighty vassal. By the end of 1633 no one trusted Wallenstein: not Sweden, whose troops he had captured, by a ruse, at Steinau; not Saxony or Brandenburg, who were unsure how far his promises had Imperial backing; not Bavaria, whose lands were left unprotected; and not the Bohemian exiles, who by now realized that Wallenstein had no interest in restoring the lands he (and his colleagues) had taken. On 24 January, immediately after hearing of the 'Pilsen oath', Ferdinand declared Wallenstein to be a 'notorious rebel' and dismissed him from office; but the decree remained secret until 18 February. Even so, the risk of failure seemed high, and Ferdinand begged his confessor to seek the prayers of Jesuits throughout the world for a favourable outcome. The Order took this appeal very seriously indeed. Its Superior-General decided to apply 'another one thousand Masses weekly for the safety of the emperor and the happiness of the Empire', and later noted (with satisfaction) that at just that moment 'marvellous deeds were done by the arm of the Most High'. The more intently I look,' he boasted, 'the more clearly I see that the merciful God was moved by our prayers.'[13] Hereferred, of course, to the brutal murder of Wallenstein and his escort, as they fled towards Saxony after hearing about the emperor's order, on the night of 25 February 1634. And perhaps it was indeed miraculous that there should have been virtually no unrest among the Imperial troops after the general's assassination. Supreme command was now assumed by the emperor's son, Ferdinand, king of Hungary, aided by

a triumvirate of senior officers: Piccolomini, Gallas and (for the Catholic League's forces) Aldringen.

Nevertheless, the murder of Wallenstein offered Sweden a moment in which to repair some of the divisions that had appeared in the Heilbronn League. Oxenstierna convened a meeting of the Protestant states of the Empire at Frankfurt which, he hoped, would expand the League to include Saxony, Brandenburg and the other territories of the north-east, and would also determine in precise terms which German lands Sweden would retain after the war. The meeting went well until, in April 1634, George William took the crucial step of insisting that, unless Sweden renounced her claim to Pomerania, he would not join the League. In June, the members of the Lower Saxon Circle agreed to support him. Next the Elector of Saxony, affecting to be above such mundane matters, tried to win support for the peace talks begun by Imperial officials at Leitmeritz with George of Hesse-Darmstadt.

So the Protestant cause was deadlocked even before hostilities recommenced in July with, once more, two separate theatres of operations: the Saxons under Arnim pushing into Silesia, while the Swedes and their Heilbronn allies, under the joint command of Gustav Horn and Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, sought to conquer south-eastern Germany. At first the campaign went well: Arnim invaded Bohemia and soon arrived once more before the walls of Prague, while the Heilbronn forces took Landshut in Bavaria by storm, killing Johann von Aldringen, Maximilian's commander-in-chief, in the process. But these successes were counterbalanced by the recapture of Regensburg and Donauwörth by the Imperialists, under Ferdinand of Hungary, who thus restored contact between Bavaria and the Habsburg lands. Arnim deemed it prudent to withdraw from his now exposed position before Prague. Next, Ferdinand laid siege to the Protestant city of Nördlingen and awaited the arrival of his cousin, the Cardinal-Infante Ferdinand, and his 15,000 men from Spain and Spanish Italy. They arrived on 2 September, just ahead of the forces of Bernard and Horn. The two Ferdinands realized that a confrontation would probably be to their advantage and they prepared a heavily fortified camp in the hills south of the city. Their confidence was not misplaced. When the two armies met in battle, on 6 September, the Habsburg armies numbered 33,000 and the Protestants only 25,000. By the end of the day, after 'the greatest victory of our times' (as Olivares jubilantly termed it), some 12,000 Protestants lay dead on the field and some 4,000 more, including Gustav Horn, were captured. Nördlingen fell at once, and the remnants of the defeated army, under Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, retreated into Alsace while Sweden reluctantly withdrew all her garrisons from south of the Main.[14]

Oxenstierna's spirits at last began to flag. In November 1634 he wrote to Johan Baner, the only capable Swedish general left in Germany, 'I will struggle no longer, but drift where the tide may take me… We are hated, envied, harassed.' At home there was open criticism of his policies by the regency council, prompting him to lament to his brother, 'Such proceedings make me weary of my life.'[15] Abroad, the diplomatic situation was fast changing for the worse—and not all due to Nördlingen. Although in 1633, to Sweden's delight, both the Turks and the Russians had attacked Poland, the following year, as the Turks once more concentrated their forces against Persia, Poland and Russia made peace. A serious risk now existed that, when the truce of Altmark, so favourable to Sweden, ran out in 1635, it might not be renewed—or, at least, not renewed on the same advantageous terms. Sweden's position in the Empire also became critical. The members

of the Heilbronn League, who were now exposed to the Imperialists' undivided attentions, mounted a mission to Paris in November 1634 without Oxenstierna's knowledge. They offered extensive concessions in return for a declaration of war against Spain and the emperor (see page 133 below for details). The following month, Oxenstierna withdrew from the League, never to return. Even to Sweden's oldest ally, William of Hesse-Kassel, it had become clear that only Catholic France was now capable of saving the Protestant cause. In November 1634 he wrote:

> The House of Austria wishes to subjugate all Germany, extirpating liberty and the Reformed religion. So in this extremity we must look to France.

The landgrave even wanted to elect the king of France as emperor because, he considered, only that would guarantee the continuation of 'German liberties.'[16]

But these defections from the cause were as nothing compared to the loss of Saxony. A mere ten weeks after Nördlingen, the negotiations of Hesse-Darmstadt and Saxony with the Imperialists (moved from Leitmeritz to Pirna in the course of the summer) produced an agreement. The 'Preliminaries of Pirna' offered major advantages to both sides: Saxony gained full rights to Lusatia (ceded in 1620 as security for the Elector's aid to Ferdinand during the Bohemian revolt) and the territory of Magdeburg; a single army of Saxon, Bavarian and Imperial troops was to be formed for use against all foreign forces in the Empire; and the transfer of the Palatine Electorate to Bavaria for all time was accepted. Above all, the 'normative date' for the restitution of church lands and the exercise of permitted faiths was taken as November 1627—a crucial compromise which allowed the Catholics to retain their gains in the south and south-west but offered complete security to the secularized lands of the northern princes (the Edict of Restitution itself was declared suspended 'for forty years').[17]

The further military successes of the Imperial army over the winter of 1634–5 weakened the negotiating position of the Saxons, however. A Protestant pamphleteer later claimed to have noted 371 changes detrimental to his faith between the text of the 'Preliminaries of Pirna' and that of the final agreement, signed at Prague in May 1635. John George eventually agreed to the withdrawal of the amnesties promised to the Palatine family, to Hesse-Kassel and several others, and to the enforcement of the Edict in many additional areas. There might have been still more concessions, had French troops not invaded the Empire, in the winter of 1634–5, to defend Heidelberg against the emperor's forces. Although there was no declaration of war, almost everyone at the Imperial Court realized that peace must be made with Saxony before further support for the Protestant cause materialized. Even the papal nuncio in Germany, who consistently opposed any settlement that sacrificed the Edict of Restitution, noted that 'lf the French intervene in Germany, the emperor will be forced to conclude peace with Saxony on whatever terms he can.' So it made sense to settle more advantageously beforehand. The pragmatic primate of Hungary, Cardinal Pázmány, declared himself content to accept any settlement with Saxony 'so long as the Catholic religion is preserved in the patrimonial provinces without allowing any other creed'.[18]

In February 1635 Ferdinand put his peace proposals to a panel of twenty-four theologians, including his trusted confessor. Lamormaini, true to the providentialist philosophy he had always advocated where the emperor's affairs were concerned, argued

that the great victory at Nördlingen was yet another sign of God's continuing favour, and called for a rejection of any peace with the Protestants. But this time, only six members of the panel voted with him. The rest saw Nördlingen as a narrow escape, and the emperor agreed with the majority. Later the same month, a cease-fire was concluded not only with Saxony but with Brandenburg, still resentful towards Sweden over Pomerania. The peace of Prague was published, amid general rejoicing, on 30 May 1635. The Saxon army, still occupying parts of Silesia, now became part of the Imperial host (as did the troops of Bavaria, much to Maximilian's regret), and most Lutheran states hastened to make peace with the emperor on the same terms as the two Protestant Electors. Colonel Brandenstein, whose allocation of Catholic lands to the Protestant armies had caused such misery, was imprisoned, and died, in 1640, a debtor in a Saxon jail. Those who, like William of Hesse-Kassel, rejected reconciliation, and instead accepted the promises of aid freely given but poorly performed by France and the Dutch, were mercilessly attacked and hunted down by the new, enlarged Imperial armies. The Calvinist landgrave was driven out of his territory by a force led by his Lutheran rival, George of Hesse-Darmstadt. He died, penniless, in exile. Later in the year, the great fortified camp outside Mainz, the Gustavsburg, came under siege and in January 1636 the 5,000-man garrison surrendered. Now only Hanau held out for the Protestant cause in the Rhineland, and in 1637 that too fell, in spite of its formidable defences and desperate resistance. Already the Swedes had abandoned Bremen and Verden, in the north-west, to their old rival Christian IV of Denmark.

The peace of Prague marked a significant turning-point in the Thirty Years' War. On the one hand, it brought about a notable scaling-down in the religious aspect of the struggle. No longer were Protestants ranged against Catholics in almost monolithic blocs; no longer did the ultra-Catholics monopolize Imperial policy. The rejection of the advice so explicitly and tenaciously proffered by Lamormaini was, in this context, of crucial importance: the formation of Imperial policy was now in the hands of pragmatists, such as Trauttmannsdorf (Director of the Imperial Privy Council from 1637), who realized that sacrifices would be required if the gains of the 1620s were to be recovered. Yet the making of peace with the German Lutherans was not only a triumph for the pragmatists; it was also a vindication of the policies of Olivares who had, for over a decade, urged the emperor to make an agreement with his domestic foes in order to destroy his remaining foreign enemies and deploy his resources against the Dutch and, if necessary, France. But Spanish rejoicing at the peace of Prague proved short-lived. The destruction of the Swedish army at Nördlingen, swiftly followed by the defection of so many of her allies, seemed to call into question Oxenstierna's ability to orchestrate successful opposition to the Imperialists—particularly if they could count on further aid from Spain. In the same month that the peace of Prague was signed, therefore, the king of France declared war on Philip IV.

iv France's 'war by diversion'

The French declaration of war against Spain in May 1635 followed the arrest on 26 March of the Elector of Trier, a French ally, by a column of Spanish soldiers. The council of state of Louis XIII, discussing the event, concluded that 'The king cannot avoid taking

up arms to avenge the affront which he has received by the imprisonment of a prince who has been placed under his protection.'[1] The Spaniards argued that the issue of the Elector of Trier was simply a pretext, and that the French intended to make war in any event. In a sense they were right: a secret memorandum from Louis XIII to Cardinal Richelieu, dated 4 August 1634, argued at length the case for a 'vigorous open war against Spain in order to secure a beneficial general peace'.[2] For his part, however, Louis XIII was genuinely convinced that the Spaniards intended to invade France whenever it suited them, and he too was right. The Spanish council of state had discussed on 13 April 1634 whether to declare war on France, and although they decided against it, an alliance was signed a month later with Gaston of Orléans, the French heir-presumptive who was in exile in the Spanish Netherlands.[3] In such a tense situation, there were strong arguments in favour of a pre-emptive French strike, making the Habsburg territories the field of battle rather than fight a defensive war 'in the bowels of France'.[4] (See Plate 16.)

Both sides were thus more or less ready for hostilities to commence. Between 1630 and 1635, the French government had made commitments to a disparate collection of allies which were almost certain, at some point, to produce international conflict. The most famous of these alliances were with the Dutch Republic (a subsidy arrangement had existed since June 1624; it was renewed in June 1630 and the amount of subsidy increased in April 1634), and with Sweden (after January 1631; it lapsed temporarily with the death of Gustavus Adolphus, on the grounds that it was an agreement between two kings and was abrogated by the death of one of them, but it was renewed in April 1633). The purpose of these alliances was to fight the Habsburgs by proxy and to avoid open French intervention in the Thirty Years' War, since this was a bitterly contested issue in domestic politics. At the 'Day of Dupes', Richelieu's opponents had almost succeeded in ousting him from power, and criticism of his foreign policy—particularly the intervention in the war of Mantua—had figured prominently in their grievances. The threat posed by domestic conspiracy and faction was a powerful element in delaying direct French intervention in the German conflict.

Among the other strategic considerations were the vulnerability of the French frontier to invasion, and the proximity of two Habsburg client states (Savoy and Lorraine) whose dukes had on occasion given refuge to, or otherwise assisted, aristocratic critics of the French government. Louis XIII and Richelieu decided to strike first at Charles Emmanuel of Savoy, who made the fatal mistake in 1628 of trying to partition Montferrat with Spain, at the expense of the French candidate, the duke of Nevers. With the connivance of the papacy, the French army invaded Savoy twice in 1629–30 and retained first the fortress of Susa and later the more considerable one of Pinerolo. Victor Amadeus I, who succeeded his father as duke in 1630, agreed to the permanent transfer of Pinerolo to France (contrary to the terms of the peace of Cherasco, which stipulated that both France and Spain should withdraw from all their conquests), and in 1635 Savoy was one of the few states to join a French-inspired league against Habsburg power in Italy.

The quarrel with Charles IV of Lorraine was more complex. In part, it was a struggle for jurisdiction: the duchy of Bar was claimed as a fief of the French crown for which Duke Charles had failed to pay homage (he did not do so until 1641); other territories were claimed to have been 'usurped' from the sovereignty of the French king; while the emperor claimed that the duchy of Lorraine was purely and simply a fief of the Empire. These disputes would not have assumed such importance had not Duke Charles given

Gaston of Orlèans refuge in his lands on two occasions in 1629–32 and allowed him to marry Marguerite of Lorraine, the duke's sister, without Louis XIIIs permission. Moreover, in February 1630 the duke had allowed Imperial troops to occupy the two fortresses of Vic and Moyenvic, which dominated the road from Strasbourg to Nancy. In December 1631, Louis XIII issued an ultimatum for the withdrawal of these Imperial troops: when it was ignored, three French invasions followed in the space of the next two years. Each time, the duke submitted, agreed not to assist the Habsburgs, and handed over territorial guarantees; each time he went back on his word. Finally in 1634 all resistance to Louis XIIIs army of occupation collapsed, a French administration was installed and the duke took up permanent exile as a Habsburg general. Except for a brief interlude in 1641, the exile was to last for twenty-eight years.

In Savoy and Lorraine the French king strengthened his borders by neutralizing, or evicting, an unreliable neighbour. From December 1631, however, much more was attempted: Louis XIII would protect all Catholic princes who needed his help, against either Spanish or Swedish troops. Of the three ecclesiastical Electorates in the Rhineland, only Trier took up this offer, but the territory was of the greatest strategic importance. The key points were the great fortresses of Coblenz and Ehrenbreitstein, together with Philippsburg which belonged to the Elector in his capacity as bishop of Speyer. In April 1632 Gustavus Adolphus recognized the neutrality of the Electorate and agreed that the key strongpoints should be occupied by the French (the first two were taken over in May and June 1632; Philippsburg was not obtained until August 1634, and its recapture by Habsburg forces in January 1635 was one of the factors precipitating French intervention in the war). Trier was merely a testing-ground for the principle of French protection, however: once the war was over, it would revert to its former status within the Empire. Likewise, in the subsequent treaties of protection with the mostly Protestant territorial rulers in Alsace in 1633–6, this was also to be the case. But the complexity of the rival territorial jurisdictions in Alsace, the competing interests of France, the Swiss cantons, and the Habsburgs, and the power vacuum resulting from a distant archducal authority, facilitated the gradual installation of French political, as well as military, control. Until Nördlingen, France desired only enough authority in Alsace to guarantee access to the Rhine; afterwards she urgently needed the power to keep the Habsburgs beyond the east bank of the river. Therefore Richelieu enforced French protection over the states of Alsace more energetically between 1634 and 1636, and then took steps to consolidate the rights he had acquired into a compact lordship.

The exact timing of the declaration of war between France and Spain was determined by tactical considerations: the successful campaign of the cardinal-infante, which caused Spain to keep the peace in 1634, provoked France to break it in 1635. The defeat and dispersal of the Swedish army at Nördlingen, and the collapse of the Heilbronn League, necessitated decisive intervention by France in order to prevent Swedish capitulation. But, at first, the French intended their intervention to be both limited and indirect. France would make a powerful 'war by diversion' but keep its commitment in Germany to a minimum. The assumption behind this strategy was that it was the king of Spain, not the emperor, who constituted the most serious threat to European security: if Philip IV's power was decisively weakened, the French believed that the emperor would no longer make war 'according to the appetite and passion of the Spanish'.[5] Of course, the French were committed to 'freedom and peace for Germany', just satisfaction for all interested

parties at a free Imperial Diet (in which the French would be full participants), and an inter-confessional alliance against the attempt to establish a Habsburg monarchy in Germany; nor had Richelieu lost sight of his objective of enticing Maximilian of Bavaria away from the Habsburg alliance in return for his retention of the Electoral title. But the French declaration of war was directed against Spain, not the emperor. The French fought under the nominal authority ('sous le nom') of Sweden in Germany in 1635, and a tight rein was kept on the actions of the French troops within the Empire.[6]

From the death of Gustavus Adolphus, Richelieu had always envisaged overall command in Germany going to Bernard of Saxe-Weimar as the most experienced general with a mercenary army at his disposal; yet, as a Lutheran with his own territorial and dynastic ambitions, he could not be entrusted with the command of French troops. The French forces in Lorraine and Germany in 1635 therefore had their own commanders (respectively the duke of La Force and Cardinal de la Valette, with the viscount of Turenne as a secondary commander), their own supply system, and independent finance controlled by French army intendants. A volte-face by Duke Bernard would thus be a serious blow to the French war effort, but not total disaster. Different estimates have been produced of the size of the French forces on all fronts in the years 1634–6. The lowest figure was 9,500 cavalry and 115,000 infantry, but it is difficult to be sure that even these forces were actually mobilized, because no series of muster rolls survives. Since 6,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry were committed to the Low Countries campaign of 1635, and other forces were sent to Savoy and the Valtelline, it follows that the French armies operating in Lorraine and Germany were relatively small. Twelve thousand men had to be levied to defend Lorraine from a threatened Imperial offensive in 1635, and it was hoped to raise 15,000 cavalry and 35,000 infantry to relieve Corbie in 1636. Most of the French troops were fighting outside Germany in the early years of the war, and the losses on some fronts were catastrophic: in the Low Countries campaign of 1635, the French force fell from 26,000 to 8,000 men.[7]

In view of these large commitments on several fronts, the French were naturally cautious in Germany itself; indeed, the declaration of war on the emperor was delayed until the Franco-Swedish pact was renewed at Wismar in March 1636. None of this was much to Sweden's liking. The French still remained committed to maintaining the Swedish alliance, to ensuring that Sweden obtained Pomerania in order to 'keep a tight hand over…the House of Austria', and even to bolstering up Sweden's position after the peace, if that proved necessary;[8] but they were not prepared to give Sweden a free hand in the conduct of a war that was waged with such massive French contributions of men and money. It is true that Feuquierès, the French ambassador extraordinary in Germany, offered greatly augmented French assistance at one point; but even after Nördlingen, the Heilbronn League's envoys to Paris found in November 1634 that what they were being offered fell far short of a French declaration of war against the emperor. In return for a guarantee of assistance in case of attack for twenty years after the peace, Sweden was to surrender the supreme direction of the war effort and the French subsidy. Not surprisingly, Oxenstierna refused to ratify the arrangement, and Feuquierès was instructed to withhold French support until he did. When even Sweden's special envoy, Hugo Grotius, failed to obtain concessions from the French, Oxenstierna was forced to visit Louis XIII and his chief minister in person in the spring of 1635. Richelieu found the Swedish chancellor 'a bit gothic and very wily',[9] and the upshot was the treaty of

Compiègne on 28 April, by which both parties undertook to assist the Protestant party in Germany by force of arms, with neither concluding a separate peace or armistice. Yet the size of the French army and subsidy alike was left unspecified, and it remained so until the treaty of Wismar in March 1636. Moreover, Richelieu sought to attract former Swedish commanders into the service of France, and by the summer of 1635 he had already won Bernard of Saxe-Weimar over. A formal arrangement was signed on 27 October, by the terms of which Bernard was to receive 1.6 million thalers a year (about four times the annual French subsidy to Sweden), in return for his keeping an army of 18,000 men in the field. From that time onwards, military operations in southern Germany were firmly under French control.

The relative ease with which Bernard was suborned from the Vasa to the Bourbon allegiance (and by the spring of 1636 he was receiving his orders at Paris) demonstrates both the strength and the weakness of the French position. The weakness was the lack of experienced commanders and battle-hardened troops. Montglat, a secondary commander who served in most of the campaigns and whose memoirs provide a good account of the fighting, records that in 1636 a Frenchman who had served in the Low Countries was listened to as an oracle. The French, he concluded, had forgotten the arts of war in a long period of peace.[10] His comments may seem surprising when one considers the French civil wars in the 1620s, the intervention in the Valtelline in 1624–6, the participation in the Mantuan war in 1628–31, and the occupation of Lorraine in 1632–4; but each campaign had been of short duration, and few had been overwhelming successes. The French had to wait until 1643 for their first great victory against the Spaniards in a straight fight (at Rocroi).

Nevertheless, the great strength of the French position arose, at least in part, from her relatively passive role in the German conflict between 1618 and 1635. France came into the conflict fresh, and with an ability to finance war on several fronts at the same time. Indeed, one reason why Richelieu had delayed intervention in the Thirty Years' War for as long as possible (apart from the need to deal with domestic criticism of his policy and aristocratic rebellion) was precisely to improve the financial position of the French Monarchy and its capacity to sustain a long war. Thus in 1635, at the lowest point in the fortunes of the Swedish and Protestant cause in Germany, a powerful new war fund was provided which neither the emperor nor the king of Spain could match (see Table 4). At the prevailing rate of exchange, French war expenditure on all fronts (including the Mediterranean) in 1635 was the equivalent of 16.5 million thalers. The average expenditure in the years 1636–9 was just under 13 million a year, and just under 16 million annually in the years 1640–5.[11] This was indeed a powerful 'war by diversion'. It should not be supposed that military success necessarily follows upon an influx of funds; but in a long war of attrition, such as the German war had proved to be, an influx of funds late on in the conflict was well worth having. It constituted a new factor in the balance of power.

In fact, virtually nothing went right in the first two French campaigns. In 1635 it was hoped that a sudden strike against the Spanish position in the Low Countries, Italy and the Valtelline would decisively weaken the position of Philip IV and encourage a rebellion by his disaffected subjects, particularly in the Spanish Netherlands (as had almost occurred in 1632). However, no rising comparable to that of the Burgundian lands in 1477 took place; when rebellion eventually broke out, in 1640, it unexpectedly took

Table 4 French military expenditure, 1618–48

Date	*Military expenditure in millions of thalers*	*Internal political event*	*External war*
1618	3.2		
1619	4.5		
1620	5.2	Revolt of the Queen Mother	
1621	7.5		
1622	9.0	Revolt of the Huguenots	
1623	4.8		
1624	4.6		
1625	6.9		
1626	4.9	2nd Revolt of the Hugenots	Valtelline War
1627	5.7		English invasion
1628	7.8	3rdRevolt of	
1629	7.4	the Huguenots	War of the Mantuan Succession
1630	9.2		
1631	6.0		
1632	7.4	Revolt of Gaston of Orléans	Occupation of
1633	6.7		Lorraine
1634	99		
1635	16.5		War against Spain declared
1636	13.5		
1637	11.0		Habsburg invasions of France
1638	12.8		Breisach
1639	12.8	Peasant revolt (Normandy)	
1640	12.5		
1641	13.4	Revolt of Count of Soissons	French assistance to Catalans
1642	13.0	Cinq-Mars conspiracy	
1643	19.4	Cabal of the *Importants*	Rocroi; Tuttlingen
1644	19.0		Freiburg
1645	18.0		Allerheim
1646	15.4		
1647	15.8		

1648		13.0 Beginning of Fronde	Zusmarshausen; Lens

Source: R.J.Bonney, *The King's Debts. Finance and Politics in France, 1589–1661* (Oxford, 1981), appendix two, table 2.

place in the Iberian peninsula. The Franco-Dutch campaign of 1635 was a total failure—none of the objectives was attained, least of all partition of the Spanish Netherlands—and it ended in mutual recriminations among the allies. The Spanish Army of Flanders managed to recapture several towns as well as repulsing the French invaders (who had to be evacuated, by sea, by the Dutch). In 1636, when the Army of Flanders invaded France, the Dutch army did nothing to distract them. And little of importance was achieved in Italy, either, until the French managed to relieve Turin in 1639 and take the war to the borders of Lombardy. The French occupation of the Valtelline, under Rohan (the erstwhile Huguenot leader), started quite auspiciously until, in 1637, the failure to pay subsidies regularly provoked a general rising in the valleys against all foreigners. Bernard of Saxe-Weimar and Cardinal de la Valette led a coordinated French invasion of southern Germany in September 1635, but the Imperial commander Gallas almost succeeded in cutting off their lines of communication near Frankfurt-on-Main and the invaders had to endure a forced march of thirteen days before they reached safety again in Lorraine.

It was scarcely surprising that Richelieu could not disguise his displeasure at the lack of success in the first French campaign. He is said to have been 'astonished' at the military failure despite 'many millions' spent on the war effort.[12] In February 1636 he accused the finance ministers of unwarranted delays in the transfer of funds: 'I say this… without [seeking] a quarrel but with great resentment and displeasure: …matters are not proceeding as the king's service and the good of the state require…'[13] The ministers replied that they could do no more and feared a general bankruptcy which would force France out of the war on disadvantageous terms and spell an end to 'war by diversion'.[14] The king had to choose between his ministers, since Finance Superintendent Bullion blamed Abel Servien, who had served as war minister for nearly six years, for the failure: in March 1636 Servien was forced to resign. His replacement, who remained in office until April 1643, was François Sublet des Noyers. He had already acquired considerable experience of financial and military administration (as intendant of the army he had helped to plan a new line of defence in northern France), which was to prove invaluable in the crisis of 1636.

France's second campaign started quite differently, with Bernard of Saxe-Weimar seeking to advance into Alsace, where the French already enjoyed protectorates, and Condé besieging Dôle in Franche-Comté. By the late autumn, the fighting had turned into a rout: Condé was forced to retreat in late October in order to save Dijon from capture by an invasion force under Gallas, and the Imperial advance was halted less by French resistance than by the Swedish victory at Wittstock and the flooding of the River Saône. In northern France, the Habsburg advance was equally spectacular, partly as a result of the precipitate capitulation of three fortress commanders who were subsequently condemned to death for cowardice (Le Bec of La Capelle, Saint-Léger of Le Câtelet and Soyecourt of Corbie). This invasion force, of Spanish and Imperial units combined, swept down from the South Netherlands and reached Corbie, a town situated on the River Somme about 120 kilometres from Paris, on 15 August. It was not retaken until 9

November (see Map 3). Had the planned invasion of Languedoc from Spain taken place then, instead of being delayed until 1637, the kingdom of France might have been forced into ignominious surrender. But the great opportunity for the Habsburg cause in 1636 was lost. By comparison with the *année de Corbie,* the subsequent invasions of France were halfhearted affairs.

But for the next three years, the outcome of the war hung in the balance. The French combined an over-ambitious strategy with poor generalship and an unprepared military machine.[15] The great French commanders—Harcourt, Condé the younger, Turenne—had either not yet risen through the ranks or else were not given the resources with which to make an impression. One of the few French successes of the first four years was Bernard of Saxe-Weimar's capture of Breisach in December 1638; but even that would have proved an illusory gain for the French had not the victor died the following July without a son, for France was committed to allow Bernard to establish his own dynasty in the parts of Alsace that he captured with the aid of Louis XIIIs money. His death without an heir presented France with all the benefits and few of the dangers of this policy.[16] Bernard's successor, Erlach, was also a Lutheran, and there were fears that he might revert to the Swedish alliance;[17] but his loyalty never wavered, because the French paid his subsidies regularly, and in any case he was not allowed the dynastic rights accorded to Bernard.

Although the great French victories in the war against the Habsburgs only came after the revolt of the Catalans in May 1640, the years of 'war by diversion' had thus not been entirely fruitless. To be sure, France proved unable to impose her own solution in the war for German liberties: that would require both a resurrection of Swedish military power and renunciation of the peace of Prague by the German Protestant princes. But France did provide, albeit at an awesome cost in taxation at home and destruction of life and property abroad, important tactical support for the Protestant party through the creation of 'gateways' into Germany, such as Ehrenbreitstein, Philippsburg and, most important of all, Breisach. The real achievement of the 'war of diversion' was to ensure that there could never be another Nördlingen: a joint Habsburg military solution to the Thirty Years' War.

V
Countdown to peace

There were three critical stages in the transformation of the revolt of Bohemia into a major European war. The first was the involvement of Frederick of the Palatinate and Spain in 1619; the second was the Swedish invasion of Pomerania in 1630; the third was, paradoxically, the peace of Prague. Although the peace of May 1635 reconciled the emperor with so many of his enemies, opposition to the Habsburgs thereby fell almost exclusively into the hands of foreigners. It was not, as Table 5 shows, that more foreign countries were involved in the war than before—on the contrary there were less. It was the attitude of the interventionists that had changed. Few outside the Empire now spoke sincerely of the 'Protestant cause'; not many more felt genuine enthusiasm for 'German liberties'. The statesmen who now dominated the war saw Germany primarily as a theatre of operations. The costs and consequences of their policies to the Empire caused these men little or no concern; what mattered was their own advantage and prestige.

It is natural to see Richelieu and (after 1643) Mazarin as the archexemplars of the new *Realpolitik,* but they were less influential in this respect than Oxenstierna. France fought on several fronts, dividing her strength almost equally between Italy, Spain, the Low Countries, and the Empire; her inferiority to Sweden in the German war was manifest. It emerged most clearly in the size of the armies opposing the emperor: Oxenstierna controlled roughly twice as many men as Mazarin. Even in 1648, at the war's end, there were 127 Swedish, 52 French and 43 Hessian garrisons in the Empire, representing, together with the field armies, a total of 915 Swedish, 432 French and 224 Hessian companies.[1] Sweden held the initiative in the later stages of the war just as surely as the emperor had done in the 1620s. After the peace of Prague, if not before, her aims and her demands were central both to the making of war and to the making of peace. A knowledge of the internal debate on foreign policy, carried on with some bitterness for almost ten years within the Swedish council of regency, is therefore crucial to a proper understanding of the second half of the war.

TABLE 5 *States involved in the Thirty Years' War*



i The Swedish dilemma

With the death of Gustavus Adolphus, the nature of Sweden's involvement in the German war underwent an immediate change. Such plans as he may have entertained for altering the constitution of the Empire were at once abandoned. Already before his death members of the council in Stockholm had been saying that Sweden's war aims had been attained, and that there was no point in fighting any longer. This was not Oxenstierna's opinion. He did indeed share with his colleagues at home a conviction that Sweden must now get out of the war; but he did not always agree with them as to how this could best be effected. Granting that the objective was now peace, two important questions remained: peace by what means? and peace on what terms? He never doubted that he must if possible negotiate from a position of strength; and though circumstances would force him to infringe that principle, he departed from it only provisionally, and with deep chagrin. Sweden, then, must go on fighting, as the surest road to peace; but she must fight by methods which differed from the old. Early in 1633 Oxenstierna began the complete withdrawal of all purely Swedish units from central Germany to the coast; and he had laid it down as a principle that in future the task of carrying on the struggle must be the responsibility of the German princes themselves. Henceforth Sweden would 'lend her name' to the war; but if possible no more than that. Hostilities were to be conducted by proxy.[1] The overriding consideration for Sweden must now be to secure herself against possible attacks by her neighbours: attacks from Denmark, but above all from Poland. 'The Polish war', wrote Oxenstierna a little later, 'is *our* war; win or lose, it is our gain or loss. This German war, I don't know what it is, only that we pour out blood here for the sake of reputation, and have naught but ingratitude to expect.'[2] It followed that 'we must let this German business be left to the Germans, who will be the only people to get any

good of it (if there is any), and therefore not spend any more men or money here, but rather try by all means to wriggle out of it'.[3]

It was an appreciation which was warmly endorsed by Oxenstierna's colleagues at home. But if peace were to be concluded, they were all agreed that it must embrace three main elements: first, that 'recompense and debt of gratitude' which they considered was due to them from the Protestant states they had delivered, and which they envisaged in terms of large territorial acquisitions in Germany; next, security against invasion, which meant a Swedish command of the ports of the Baltic; and finally, a wider concept of security which implied the destruction of Habsburg pretensions to a real sovereignty in Germany. Gustavus Adolphus had expressed this idea when he said, 'While an Elector can sit safe as Elector in his land, and a Duke is Duke and has his liberties, then we are safe.'[4] Germany, then, must be restored to the 'free' position of 1618—not only, or even mainly, for the sake of the Protestant cause, but for Sweden's sake. It was a programme which conveniently forgot that in the Germany of 1618 there had been no place for a Swedish territorial recompense.

The Heilbronn League (see Map 3) seemed to take care of most of these objectives: it was pledged to fight for German liberties, and to go on fighting until Sweden had obtained her due compensation; it was firmly under Oxenstierna's direction, and represented the defeat of Richelieu's plan to launch John George as Gustavus Adolphus's successor; and in theory it provided the means to fight the war by proxy. But for the League to be equal to performing all that Oxenstierna expected of it, it was essential to expand it: the four Circles of Upper Germany were too weak, militarily and financially, and above all politically, to carry the burden he designed for them. Hence the attempt, at the Frankfurt Convention of 1634 (pages 125–6 above), to persuade the Upper and Lower Saxon Circles to adhere. That attempt revealed a fatal clash between the need for security and the desire for compensation. For Sweden's refusal to drop her claim to Pomerania ensured that George William of Brandenburg would refuse to join the League, and his refusal in turn entailed that of the two Saxon Circles. From that moment, the Heilbronn solution was doomed. Before the Frankfurt meeting ended, the League's military effectiveness was dealt a crushing blow at Nördlingen; before the year was out the Preliminaries of Pirna opened the way to its disintegration. Oxenstierna could no longer save it.

It now became urgently necessary to find some substitute for Heilbronn. Central Germany seemed as good as lost; Sweden's truce with Poland was due to run out within the next year; and the government in Stockholm, in panic at the prospect of a renewal of war in that quarter, clamoured for peace on any terms, or even on none at all. For Oxenstierna it seemed clear that in the immediate future the only substitute for Heilbronn was France. His object now became to involve Richelieu in Germany and, while avoiding binding commitments, to use France as Sweden's proxy, as once he had used the League. After the peace of Prague Sweden's position appeared desperate: by the end of 1635 almost all her former allies had accepted the emperor's terms, and Sweden's military resources in Germany had dwindled to Baner's small army in Pomerania. She was now confronted with a resurgence of German patriotism under the emperor's leadership, with a universal desire for peace, with a fierce hatred of the foreigner: a situation more menacing by far than that of 1629. It was no wonder that the Regents were ready to pay what Oxenstierna bitterly condemned as a disastrous price for the renewal of the truce

with Poland at Stuhmsdorf (20 September 1635). The overwhelming majority of the 'Swedish' forces in Germany (and their officers) were Germans, threatened now with proscription if they resisted the emperor's summons to return to their allegiance. Where now could they look for their massive arrears of pay? In August 1635 their mutinous officers kept Oxenstierna a prisoner in their camp near Magdeburg, as a hostage and a bargaining-counter in negotiations with John George of Saxony; and before he escaped he had been driven to promise that if he did not at the peace obtain sufficient cash to pay their arrears, they might come over to Sweden to collect them. It was an appalling prospect, a pledge impossible to redeem. From this moment, 'the contentment of the soldiery' became an essential element for Sweden in any peace settlement.

The government at home was now plainly defeatist. Already in 1634, under the impact of Nördlingen, one prominent member of the Council had cried, 'What good does it do us to acquire many lands and spend all our money on it?'; a year later, another pronounced the whole idea of territorial recompense to have been a mistake from the beginning; and in April 1636 even Oxenstierna's brother declared, 'It is intolerable to go on fighting in a war in which we have no interest.'[5] In the face of this attitude, Oxenstierna was driven in the autumn of 1635 to explore the possibility of peace through the intermediary of Saxony. The exploration exposed him to intolerable humiliations and rebuffs: John George demanded Sweden's immediate evacuation of Germany and her adherence to the peace of Prague (which meant sacrificing her last ally, William of Hesse-Kassel), and only then was he prepared to offer a quite inadequate cash payment, with no territorial concessions; furthermore, he made it clear that no guarantee could be given that the emperor would ratify any peace that might be concluded. Such terms meant the end of Sweden's search for security, the end of her hope of financial recompense, the end of any prospect of a Baltic naval base, and no prospect for the contentment of the soldiery.

It might now seem that the only hope of salvaging anything from the wreck was a French alliance. But a French alliance would bar the way to any separate peace for Sweden if the military situation should improve sufficiently to make it possible to get out of the war on relatively tolerable terms. It was this dilemma which continued to confront Oxenstierna until his final decision in 1641. For the moment, his solution was to try to have it both ways. On the one hand, he concluded in March 1636 the treaty of Wismar, which assured to him—subject to ratification—the French alliance. On the other hand, he took care not to ratify it. And on his return to Sweden in July he succeeded, by sheer force of personality, in stiffening the morale of his colleagues and rallying them to his delicately balancing, procrastinatory policy. They would not, they said, sacrifice Sweden's liberty of action for 'a squirt of money'; and perhaps they realized that, in the year of Corbie, France needed Sweden almost as much as Sweden needed France. So they would keep the French option open; they would, if possible, get their hands upon French gold; but they would try again for a negotiated peace in Germany. They had long since abandoned the grandiose ideas of territorial gains which they had entertained in 1633; and some of them believed that if they made no such demands at all, if they renounced even the claim to Pomerania and asked only for the contentment of the soldiery, the chances of peace were reasonably good. Even so, the idea of security was not simply to be jettisoned; but it now took a new form—the demand for an amnesty for those princes and towns excluded from the peace of Prague: Sweden must, if at all possible, keep alive a party in Germany committed to the defence of 'German liberties'.

But in July 1636 the military situation was such that in the last resort even this must be sacrificed: as Per Brahe remarked in the Council, 'Amnesty is honourable; compensation is useful; but the contentment of the soldiery is essential.'[6] Still, if they could realize even a part of this programme, an alliance with France seemed decidedly a second best.

The limiting factor in regard to this policy, however, was the doubt whether, if Sweden went on fighting until she obtained a negotiated peace, war could be made to sustain war, as in the great days after Breitenfeld. It could hardly do so if Sweden was penned into a narrow and exhausted base in Pomerania and Mecklenburg. For negotiations to have any teeth in them, war must be waged offensively; a break-out from the base must occur; fresh supply—and recruiting—areas must be brought under Swedish control. And the question was whether this could be achieved without French money, and hence without the French alliance. Baner's great victory at Wittstock in October 1636, and his vigorous offensive campaign in the opening months of 1637 (see page 146 below), seemed to show that the trick could be done. The decision to fight and negotiate, and in the meantime keep France on a string—the decision to which Oxenstierna committed the Regents in August 1636—seemed to have been the right one. But it was speedily contradicted by events in the second half of 1637. Baner's offensive was followed by his tactically brilliant but strategically disastrous retreat from Torgau; and by the end of the year the Swedish armies were fighting with their backs to the sea, clinging with the utmost difficulty to the last shreds of Pomerania. There was now only one way out. The negotiations with the French were resumed, and in March 1638 the treaty of Wismar was at last ratified by the treaty of Hamburg, which bound each party not to make a separate peace for the next three years, and provided. Sweden with the subsidies of which she stood in urgent need.[7] The option which Oxenstierna would have preferred was now closed to him, at least for the present. It was a diplomatic defeat. But the French subsidies immediately transformed the military situation—though not before Oxenstierna, violating the principle upon which he had been conducting the war since 1633, sent 14,000 troops from Sweden to Baner's assistance. A military revival duly occurred; and with batteries thus recharged Baner could embark on campaigns so successful that for the first time since 1632 it was possible to dream of ending the war by the capture of Vienna.

In this happier situation, the temptation presented itself to violate the terms of the French alliance while the going was good: the idea was canvassed in the Council more than once, and derived some support from Swedish indignation at France's 'debauching' of the army of Bernard of Weimar (recruited by Gustavus Adolphus, and bound to Sweden by oath) after Bernard's death in 1639. But even though so gross a breach of faith was avoided, it still seemed a fair question whether in the existing, relatively favourable, military situation it would really be wise to renew the French alliance after it expired in 1641. What put an end to all such ideas (at least for Oxenstierna) was another formidable outbreak of mutiny, which paralysed the Swedish armies immediately after Baner's death in May 1641. The basic cause of the trouble was, once again, the question of arrears of pay; and French money now seemed absolutely essential if the new commander, Lennart Torstensson, were to be enabled to restore the army as an effective fighting force. And so, when in 1641 the alliance was in fact renewed, Sweden bound herself, in exchange for subsidies at an increased rate, to fight alongside France—not for a limited period, but for the duration of the war.

The attempt to regain a free hand had failed. In 1641 Oxenstierna had made his final option; and the outcome would prove that he was justified in sticking to it. But by this time he had made another option, too. Territorial compensation was now firmly relegated to a subordinate place among Sweden's war aims. Some hold on the Baltic coast must indeed be retained; but if Sweden could keep a few naval bases, the acquisition of German land was now a minor consideration: what mattered was amnesty and restoration. Oxenstierna was now ready to forget about Pomerania, if only the Germany of 1618 could be restored.[8] In April 1641 he defined his main objectives as the prevention of the enslavement of the Empire, and the contentment of the soldiery: 'These points are *real;* but our compensation is not to be so regarded.'[9] The essential war aim was now the destruction of the peace of Prague, rather than the enlargement of Sweden's territories. At Westphalia it turned out that the attainment of the essential made possible the attainment also of the desirable, and Sweden secured terms such as could never have been obtained by Oxenstierna's balancing tactics of 1635–8: the peace of Prague destroyed, German 'liberty' restored, a comprehensive restoration and amnesty, Sweden herself an Estate of the Empire. It was a full security. But it also brought with it, as 'compensation', territorial gains which seemed to make strategic and economic sense, a large cash indemnity, the contentment of the soldiery firmly placed on German shoulders—and incidentally (though this had long since ceased to be a major preoccupation) the Protestant cause upheld. All this without Sweden having been trepanned (as Oxenstierna always feared that she might be) into serving as a catspaw for the slippery French.

ii 1635–1642: The deadlock broken

At the time of the peace of Prague, Ferdinand II was already fifty-seven years old. He had faced opposition from many quarters since he first exercised power in 1596, but he had, by and large, overcome it. In the course of his term as emperor he had deposed an Elector and a number of dukes, margraves and counts. He had restored Imperial power to a level unequalled since the reign of Charles V. But he had failed to persuade the Electors to recognize his son Ferdinand, the victor of Nördlingen, as emperor-designate. Now, the chances seemed better: Ferdinand himself was Elector of Bohemia; Saxony and Brandenburg, newly reconciled to the emperor by the peace of Prague, were anxious to please; the anti-Habsburg Elector of Trier, Philip von Sötern, languished in prison (where he was to remain until 1645) for openly placing himself under French protection. This left only the Wittelsbach brothers, Electors of Bavaria and Cologne, and the refugee Elector of Mainz, Anselm Casimir von Wambold, who had been in exile at Cologne since 1631. Ferdinand felt confident that he could secure recognition of his son's title to succeed from these men, and a meeting of the Electoral College was summoned to Regensburg for September 1636.

The power of the Electors, however, was formidable. In the absence of Diets, they were able (in the caustic phrase of David Chytraeus, a Protestant constitutional lawyer) to 'deck themselves with an eagle's plumage' and usurp certain functions of both the Diet and the emperor. Although, in 1636, young Ferdinand was effectively the only serious candidate—French efforts to run first Władisław of Poland and then Maximilian of Bavaria came to nothing—the Electors managed to postpone acknowledging him until

December while they attempted to force the emperor into making peace with his enemies. There was some success on the internal front: Ferdinand reluctantly agreed that he would pardon any prince who was prepared to submit to him. He also promised to hold an international peace conference to settle the claims of the foreign powers involved in the war, but further progress on this score was prevented by the extreme demands of the Electors themselves. Maximilian of Bavaria required that France should evacuate Lorraine and restore his dispossessed cousin, Duke Charles IV; George William of Brandenburg, still obsessed by the Pomeranian question, insisted that Sweden 'should not retain one foot of territory on Imperial soil, still less any town or fortress'.[1] In the end, the Electors had to be content with Imperial promises that negotiations would soon begin. But on 15 February 1637, Ferdinand died. No serious talks with foreign powers took place.

The war therefore continued. While the French tried unsuccessfully to overrun the South Netherlands and the Rhineland (pages 134–6 above), the Swedish main army under Johan Baner prepared to meet the forces of the emperor, uneasily combined since the peace of Prague with those of Bavaria, Saxony and Brandenburg. In the autumn of 1635, Baner fought a number of engagements against the Saxons, in preparation for a major thrust down the Elbe and Saale to Naumburg in the spring of 1636. As he had intended, this drew upon him an attack by the Imperialists which Baner defeated decisively at Wittstock on 4 October 1636. The Swedes captured their enemies' supplies, equipment and over 100 field guns. This victory effectively eliminated Brandenburg from the war: Elector George William cowered henceforth at Königsberg in East Prussia, one of the few places still under his control, while the Swedes extended their authority to the Elbe.

Baner now had three aims: to keep his enemies away from Sweden's newly acquired Baltic possessions, to provide support (if needed) to his allies George of Brunswick-Lüneburg and William of Hesse-Kassel, and to overawe—if not to overrun—Electoral Saxony. But he was outmanoeuvred. In January 1637 his siege of Leipzig failed, and he withdrew to Torgau on the Elbe. In June he was driven from there too, and Imperial and Saxon forces compelled him to retreat to Pomerania. Here, short of money and munitions, the Swedish army remained confined for over a year. The only actions of the 1638 campaign which attracted international attention were Bernard of Saxe-Weimar's victory at Rheinfelden and his capture of Breisach.

On the local level, however, the war never seemed to stop. Large armies starved and small ones were beaten, but nothing could check the marauding of garrison commanders and freebooters. The account of William Crowne and the engravings of Wenceslas Hollar, both of whom accompanied Charles I's ambassador to the Electoral meeting at Regensburg in 1636, provide a horrifying picture of war-torn Germany. Although they only passed through one actual battle zone (at Ehrenbreitstein on the Rhine, where there had to be a pause in the siege to allow the embassy's barges to pass upstream), devastation was apparent everywhere. They found the entire territory between Mainz and Frankfurt to be desolate, with the people of Mainz so weak from hunger that they could not even crawl to receive the alms that the travellers distributed. At Nuremberg, the ambassador (Thomas Howard, earl of Arundel) purchased the fabulous Pirckheimer library, with manuscripts illustrated by Dürer and other masters, for 350 thalers because its owner was short of money 'in consideration of the hard times and the difficulty of obtaining food'.[2] Beyond Nuremberg, as far as the Danube, there was again total

devastation: the English party came across one village that had been pillaged eighteen times in two years, even twice in one day. In several other places there was no one left to tell what had happened, and the company had to camp amid the abandoned ruins and live off the supplies it had prudently brought along, washed down with rainwater. Elsewhere their approach, with eighteen horse-drawn wagons and cavalry escort, was mistaken for an enemy attack and provoked panic defence measures. Finally, in Linz, capital of Upper Austria, they witnessed the execution of Martin Laimbauer, the leader of yet another peasant uprising against the Habsburgs, which had achieved considerable local support earlier in the year.[3]

The English were lucky to be spectators only. Others were less fortunate. 'Men hunt men as beasts of prey, in the woods and on the way.' wrote one observer, and there are even well-documented cases of cannibalism from the Rhineland in 1635.[4] No one was safe from attack. In January 1638 a column of Nuremberg merchants, with seven wagons, was returning from the Leipzig Fair when it was ambushed by some cavalry. The soldiers demanded 1,000 thalers in cash; the convoy leader offered only 300, and the troops attacked and plundered the wagons. They killed several of the merchants and took perhaps eighty horses which they loaded with booty, spoiling what remained. The loss was estimated at 100,000 thalers yet the identity of the attackers was never established (although many suspected the Bavarian army). That was the seventh convoy to be lost by the merchants of Nuremberg in less than two years, and the city now launched a diplomatic mission to all major combatants, and to the other free cities of the Empire, demanding better protection for trade.[5] It was, of course, fruitless.

The plight of Nuremberg was typical. Between the battles of Breitenfeld and Nördlingen the territories of central Germany suffered appallingly, as the Swedish troops demonstrated how far they could make war pay for itself. The bishopric of Würzburg between 1631 and 1636 suffered losses estimated at over 1 million thalers. During the same period the city of Mainz, under continuous Swedish occupation, lost perhaps 25 per cent of its dwellings, 40 per cent of its population and 60 per cent of its wealth. The Elector's library was broken up, most of his books going to Västerås in Sweden and some of the manuscripts ending up (thanks to the intervention of Archbishop Laud, Chancellor of Oxford University) in the Bodleian Library.[6] After Nördlingen, it was the turn of the Protestants to suffer. In the three months immediately following the Habsburgs' great victory, according to the ministers of George of Hesse-Darmstadt (then lurking in Dresden), 30,000 horses, 100,000 cows and 600,000 sheep had been lost, and damage worth 10 million thalers inflicted on their territory. In 1635 the counts of neighbouring Nassau also abandoned their lands, taking refuge in Metz from what the chronicles later referred to as 'The year of great destruction in the land'.[7] The duchy of Württemberg, occupied by Imperial and Bavarian forces between 1634 and 1638, suffered damage estimated at 34 million thalers and its population fell to less than a quarter (from 450,000 inhabitants in 1620 to less than 100,000 in 1639).[8] Admittedly, Swabia was ravaged with particular severity during the 1630s, but matters were scarcely better further north. In Mecklenburg, a partial survey of the duchy in 1639–40 revealed only 360 cultivated farms where, before the war, there had been almost 3,000. In Brandenburg, Werben (once the headquarters of Gustavus Adolphus) sank from 267 occupied houses to 105 during the same period; while the Elector's capital, Berlin, with a population of 12,000 in 1618, could boast only 7,500 inhabitants twenty years later, and the demographic decline of

several rural areas—whether through war, famine or plague—exceeded 40 per cent.[9] At the Elector of Saxony's capital, Dresden, which was never captured, the ratio of burials to baptisms changed from 100:121 during the decade before 1630, to 100:39 during the decade following. Only immigration maintained the city's population.[10] And to these misfortunes must be added the heavy taxation levied by all governments to pay for defence: it was seldom enough to guarantee security, but it was always sufficient to create hardship.[11]

All these reports of misery and cruelty, generalized and impersonal as they may seem, in fact concerned countless individuals, whose personal suffering was not reduced because it was shared. The autobiography of Johann Valentin Andrea', writer of Rosicrucian and Utopian tracts in his youth and supervisor of the Lutheran churches in Calw (Swabia) in the 1630s, reminds us of the agony endured even by survivors. In 1639, he wrote despondently that of his 1,046 communicants of 1630 only 338 remained. 'Justin the last five years [that is, since Nördlingen], 518 of them have been killed by various misfortunes.' Among these, he noted five intimate and thirty-three other friends, twenty relatives, and forty-one clerical colleagues. 'I have to weep for them', he continued, 'because I remain here so impotent and alone. Out of my whole life I am left with scarcely fifteen persons alive with whom I can claim some trace of friendship.'[12]

Dr William Harvey, who accompanied Arundel's embassy to Regensburg in 1636, noted the dangerous implications of such extreme war-weariness and desperation. This warfare in Germany', he wrote to a colleague, 'threateneth in the ende anarchy and confusion'; and he commented on 'The necessity they have here of making peace on any condition, where there is no more meanes of making warr, or scarce of subsistence'.[13] It was only a short time after this that Pope Urban VIII took the first steps towards the organization of peace talks to bring the war to an end. A papal legate arrived at Cologne in October 1636 and invited all interested powers to send representatives to a general peace congress. But nobody came: neither France nor Spain trusted the pope to be impartial; and the Protestants rejected papal mediation altogether, convening a conference of their own at Hamburg instead. This meeting arose from an agreement between France and England in March 1637, under which Charles I promised to allow French recruiting in England and the loan of thirty ships for a new campaign against the emperor. In return, Louis XIII undertook to conclude no settlement that did not involve the restoration of the Palatine family to their lands and titles, and to convene a peace conference at either Hamburg or The Hague where Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and France could prepare articles to present to the emperor for redress. Although France eventually refused to ratify the treaty, she did send envoys to Hamburg, where Swedish diplomats were already engaged in talks with the Imperialists. France soon stopped this (by the subsidy treaty noted on page 143 above), and, in the end, the Hamburg protocol was only signed by Denmark and England—states no longer actively involved in the war—in April 1639.[14]

The German territorial rulers, however, were bound to take more seriously the prospect of 'anarchy and confusion' unless a formula for peace were found. As the prospect of a general settlement temporarily receded, several princes attempted to make a separate, local agreement. Wolfgang William, duke of Neuburg and Jülich, concerned about the unrest in his Rhineland duchy caused by the presence of large Imperial forces over the winters of 1635–6 and 1636–7, proposed to an assembly of the Lower Rhenish

Circle that the entire area should be declared neutral. In 1639 he opened direct negotiations with the local commanders—Imperial and Protestant—to this end, even asking the Dutch Republic to guarantee his neutrality. But this peace initiative, like many others, came to nothing: the duchy of Jülich, with its Rhine crossings, presented strategic advantages that the rival armies could not afford to neglect.[15]

All these developments—the victories of his enemies, the widespread destruction and demoralization of Germany, and the attempts to make a separate peace—were warning signals that the new emperor, Ferdinand III, could not ignore. Therefore, in February 1640, he held another Electoral meeting at Nuremberg. When this failed to make headway, he proposed that the Imperial Diet should meet again, for the first time since 1613, in order to clear the way for a general peace. The opening ceremony took place at Regensburg in September 1640 and for more than a year the three colleges of the assembly discussed intensively the disputes that kept their country at war. The Electors held 185 formal sessions, and the princes 153; there were also twenty-six joint meetings. Naturally the territorial rulers themselves did not attend for the entire year—some dared not come at all—so there were innumerable delays for correspondence between the princely courts and their delegations in Regensburg; letters from Munich took two or three days, letters from Mainz and Vienna took between five and eight days, and letters from Königsberg (where the Elector of Brandenburg now resided) took three weeks in summer and five weeks in winter. Some rulers did not even send delegations: Ferdinand excluded the Protestant administrators of dioceses affected by the Edict of Restitution, and those princes in arms against the emperor. Indeed, one of the weightiest problems to be solved by the Diet was the readmission of these rulers. In the end only Brunswick, the Palatine family and Hesse-Kassel refused to stop fighting and accept Imperial authority again; the rest were reconciled. The difficulty of this issue was dwarfed, however, by the problem of secularized church lands. Again the emperor gave way. In spite of papal protests, which were formally tabled at the Diet by the nuncio in April 1641, the emperor abandoned the Edict of Restitution: ecclesiastical property which had been in secular hands on 1 January 1627 was so to remain. Although the papacy continued to condemn all future settlements, including the final peace, that included this abrogation of the Edict of Restitution, in effect the issue was resolved for ever at Regensburg.[16]

Ferdinand had no choice but to make these substantial concessions, for he was losing the war. Late in 1638, after a year on the defensive in Pomerania following his retreat from Torgau, Baner—with Swedish reinforcements at his back and French subsidies in his pocket—drove the Imperialists into Silesia again. The next year, while Bernard of Saxe-Weimar overran Alsace and attacked Spanish Franche-Comté, Baner defeated the Saxons at Chemnitz (April 1639) and threatened Prague. The Swedes were obliged to withdraw from Bohemia in June, but the following year, for the first time, they were able to mount a combined operation with their French allies. Baner was joined in Saxony by the troops formerly commanded by Bernard of Saxe-Weimar (who had died in July 1639) as well as by contingents supplied by Brunswick and Hesse-Kassel (the latter now directed by William V's widow, Amalia, countess of Hanau). The combined force of 40,000 men campaigned on the Weser somewhat ineffectually, but in January 1641, as the Diet sat in conclave, they appeared before Regensburg and briefly shelled the city. It was a fearful reminder of the need for a settlement. Shortly afterwards there came another: Brandenburg made a separate peace with Sweden.

Ever since the peace of Prague, by which George William had exchanged a Swedish for an Imperial alliance, Brandenburg had become a war-zone. After the battle of Wittstock the following year, his lands had come almost entirely under Swedish control: Cleves and Mark were wholly occupied; Brandenburg was regularly fought over; only Prussia remained free, although Sweden levied tolls even there. The Elector's army numbered scarcely 6,000 men, all of them in garrisons. When George William died in December 1640, after over a year of semi-inertia (euphemistically termed 'melancholy' by contemporaries), his son Frederick William (aged only twenty-one) lost no time in proposing a separate peace with Sweden to the Brandenburg Estates (or what was left of them). Following the death of his father's chief adviser, the pro-Imperial Count Schwarzenberg, in March 1641, envoys were sent to Stockholm to arrange a cease-fire. In July, almost precisely ten years after Gustavus Adolphus had brought his army to Brandenburg, the fighting there stopped. The 'Great Elector' was not prepared to see his patrimonial lands destroyed by the Swedes simply because he was allied to an emperor who could offer him no protection.

Another successful disengagement from the war was made shortly afterwards by Brandenburg's western neighbours, the dukes of Brunswick—the several members of the Welf family who jointly dominated the lands between the middle Elbe and the Weser. They had been inconstant allies of both sides in the past. Led by Duke George of Brunswick-Lüneburg, they had supported Ferdinand II until 1630, when Imperial commissioners demanded the surrender of the secularized bishopric of Hildesheim. Rather than return it, Duke George and his cousins signed an alliance with Sweden and formed an army which kept the Imperialists at bay. In 1635, Duke George quarrelled with Oxenstierna and eventually accepted the peace of Prague, but the emperor still insisted on the return of Hildesheim so George signed a new alliance with Hesse-Kassel and Sweden. It was as he led his forces south to do battle with the Imperialists again that, in April 1641, he died. His cousins lacked the same diplomatic and military agility, and in the course of the summer the emperor's troops overran large areas of Brunswick. Then, in the winter, the Swedes returned, and heavy fighting in the duchies took place. It was this, above all else, that persuaded the Welf dukes to sign a preliminary accord with the emperor in January 1642 (the peace of Goslar), even though it meant the return of the secularized lands of Hildesheim, duly handed over a year later to the bishop, Elector Ferdinand of Cologne. In return, the Protestants were granted toleration (even in Hildesheim, where six churches were reserved for Lutheran worship) and the whole of Brunswick was henceforth regarded as neutral.[17]

These developments brought relative peace to considerable areas of the north-east and north-west of Germany, but the war continued elsewhere just the same. The death of Baner in May 1641, followed by the mutiny of some units of his army for their pay, provided a brief respite for the Imperialists. But on 30 June Oxenstierna's envoys at Hamburg concluded a final alliance with France, to last until the peace, and Lennart Torstensson, one of Sweden's most successful commanders, was sent to Germany to win the war. In the spring of 1642 the new commander-in-chief invaded Saxony, defeating the forces of John George yet again (at Schweidnitz), and advanced through Silesia into Moravia. He captured the capital, Olomouc, in June and threatened Vienna before withdrawing his main army to Saxony, where he laid siege to Leipzig. There, on 2 November, the Imperial army (under the personal command of the emperor's brother,

Archduke Leopold William) challenged the Swedes to battle. Torstensson withdrew a little northwards to Breitenfeld, and there won a victory almost as complete as that of Gustavus, on the same terrain, eleven years before. The Imperialists lost 5,000 men on the field, and a further 5,000 as prisoner—as well as forty-six field guns, the archduke's treasury and chancery, and the supply train. Leipzig fell a month later, paying an indemnity of 400,000 thalers. It remained in Swedish hands until 1650.[18]

This sequence of disasters terrified the emperor's Catholic allies in western Germany, especially Bavaria. In January 1640, even before the Electoral meeting at Nuremberg, secret talks with French representatives had been held at Einsiedeln at which Maximilian offered to make a separate peace with France on three conditions: recognition of the Electoral title for himself and his descendants; French withdrawal from Alsace; and a repudiation of France's alliance with Protestant Sweden. These haughty terms were angrily brushed aside by Richelieu, who had already decided to renew the Swedish treaty. Soon, however, the success of the allied army under Baner and the resolution of so many issues at the Regensburg Diet led Maximilian to try a different tack. This time he hoped to enlist the support of the pope and of the other Catholic Electors in order to persuade the French that they could accept the compromises reached at Regensburg and make peace, even if Sweden could not. In April and May 1642 he held discussions with the Electors of Mainz and Cologne in order to prepare a common platform for the intended negotiations, after which a deputation was sent to Paris for discussions.[19] After almost a quarter-century of war, the emperor had at last been abandoned by almost all his German allies. The deadlock in the struggle, which had prevailed since Lützen, was at last broken; now it only remained to compel the Habsburgs to bow to the inevitable.

iii 1643–1647: The defeat of the Habsburgs

Ferdinand III was encouraged to respond positively to calls for peace by the sudden and apparently total collapse of Spanish power. Ever since Nördlingen, Philip IV had given his brother-in-law extensive aid. He maintained garrisons in the Palatinate; he provided a subsidy worth around 500,000 thalers a year; and by supporting armies in Lombardy, the Low Countries and Catalonia, he tied down the major part of French military strength.[1] His brother the cardinal-infante, who governed the Spanish Netherlands until his death in 1641, even managed to threaten Paris (page 136 above). The French, however, were not Spain's only enemies. The cardinal-infante was still forced to commit most of his troops against the army of the Dutch Republic (which in 1637 recaptured Breda, lost to Spínola twelve years before); and Philip himself deployed important resources on the defence of the overseas possessions of his Spanish and Portuguese crowns (especially in South America, where the Dutch had held the northern province of Brazil—Pernambuco—since 1630). In October 1639, a great fleet of warships carrying troops and supplies from Spain to the Netherlands was intercepted by the Dutch in the Channel and almost totally destroyed (the battle of the Downs); another, sent to relieve Brazil, met the same fate off Recife three months later.

As if this were not enough, the year 1640 saw even worse defeats. In May the province of Catalonia rebelled and at once attracted French aid; in December, the kingdom of Portugal followed suit, securing immediate support from both France and the

Dutch. Philip IV was reluctantly compelled to divert his attention from northern Europe to the troubles in the peninsula. Some of his advisers—including the once bellicose count of Oñate—urged Spanish withdrawal from overseas commitments; but to no avail.[2] Instead there were losses on all fronts: Arras and most of Artois in 1640; Salces and Perpignan in 1642. The count-duke of Olivares, who had survived many defeats, could not now withstand the campaign of criticism waged against him. In January 1643, he resigned. But the change of ministry did not affect Spain's foreign policy: no talk of peace was countenanced. Then in May the Army of Flanders was decisively defeated at Rocroi. Although the battle was perhaps less influential than has sometimes been claimed—for it had no immediate effect on Spain's control over the South Netherlands—it did bring to an abrupt end all chance of launching another invasion of France from the Low Countries. With Trier, Alsace and Lorraine in French hands, and with the Dutch in command of Limburg, the Channel and the North Sea, Philip IV's government was now physically unable to send reinforcements to the Low Countries. The 'Spanish Road' was blocked; the Spanish Netherlands were therefore unable to resist effectively the progress of French and Dutch arms—Gravelines was lost in 1644, Hulst in 1645, Dunkirk in 1646.

But France was by now also experiencing grave difficulties in maintaining her war effort. A succession of serious popular rebellions broke out between 1636 and 1643, affecting both towns and countryside, and detachments of the regular army had to be withdrawn from the front to put them down. There was also opposition from the royal bureaucracy, which either refused to collect taxes or else pocketed the proceeds, while a series of aristocratic plots were hatched against the chief minister, Cardinal Richelieu. In 1641 a conspiracy, led by the king's cousin (the count of Soissons) and advocating a programme of peace and disengagement abroad, rapidly attracted a great following. Only the accidental death of Soissons saved the government. It was followed the next year by a plot led by the king's favourite, the marquis of Cinq-Mars, who had rashly promised Spain that France would make peace as soon as Richelieu fell. But, three months after Cinq-Mars's execution, Richelieu died; and though there was no policy change at first, in May 1643—just before the great victory of Rocroi—death also claimed Louis XIII. Power was now left in the hands of the Spanish-born regent, Anne of Austria, sister of Philip IV of Spain and the cardinal-infante, and sister-in-law of Ferdinand III. She was, naturally, somewhat less opposed to peace with her Habsburg relatives than Louis had been, but in matters of foreign policy she accepted the advice of the chief minister who succeeded Richelieu, Cardinal Jules Mazarin. Although born a subject of Philip III and educated partly in Spain, Mazarin's training as a diplomat under first Urban VIII and then Richelieu had made him a convinced enemy of Habsburg power. His overriding aim was to weaken, and if possible to divide, the Austrian and Spanish branches of the family; and in this he was ultimately successful. But in 1643, newly installed, Mazarin was inclined to be cautious. He could not ignore the risk that eternalizing the costly war might provoke a revolution that would topple the monarchy—as seemed to have happened across the Channel, in the states ruled by Charles I and his French queen, Henrietta Maria. The English Civil War, which broke out in August 1642, was a fearsome warning: it encouraged prudence amongst princes.

In Sweden, too, the government was conscious of the intense hostility towards the war and its attendant taxation and conscription—felt by the population at large. 'The common man wishes himself dead' noted Oxenstierna's lugubrious brother, whose long,

despondent reports on affairs of state were one of the many crosses the chancellor had to bear. 'We may indeed say that we have conquered our lands from others, and to that end ruined our own.' 'While the branches expand,' he continued remorselessly, 'the tree withers at the roots.'[3] And wither it certainly did, for Sweden's military losses were fast becoming insupportable: whole villages became depopulated of young men, for a conscription order (as noted on page 173 below) was virtually a sentence of death.

If censorship tended to limit the public expression of discontent in Sweden, there was no such constraint in the Empire. All over Germany, tracts calling for peace proliferated, and the call was taken up in a variety of media: prayers, pamphlets, illustrated flysheets, music, medals and plays. The latter were all the more influential, because the best 'peace plays' were written by men who shared the 'pietist' outlook which had begun to rejuvenate Lutheranism. The emotional fervour and moral righteousness of the language in plays such as 'The Victory of Peace' (*Friedens Sieg* by Justus Schöttel, a pastor's son) or 'The Mirror of Peace' (*Friedens Spiegel* by Johan Rist, a Hamburg pastor) was powerful indeed. And it reached a wide audience. Schöttel was a councillor to the dukes of Brunswick, and the first production of *Friedens Sieg* was performed by the duke's children, while Frederick William of Brandenburg watched.[4]

So, by the beginning of 1643, peace was unmistakably in the air breathed by the non-German as well as by the German participants in the war, and before long there were two peace conferences in session. At Frankfurt, representatives of many German princes, including most of the Electors, assembled in January 1643 to resolve the remaining purely German issues, and to determine the best form in which to negotiate with the foreign powers. Plenipotentiaries of the latter were meanwhile converging upon Münster and Osnabrück, the towns specified for negotiations in the Franco-Swedish treaty of 1641, which now became a special 'demilitarized zone'. France, Spain and other Catholic states made their base at Münster; Sweden and her allies negotiated forty-five kilometres away at Osnabrück.

It was Ferdinand III's intention to keep the assemblies separate, since he hoped that his own envoys would be able to conduct talks with the foreign powers in the name of the whole Empire. The Catholic rulers seemed agreeable to this—'vox caesaris est vox catholicorum', as one of them later noted—but the Protestants were not. Firstly, they were heavily outnumbered in the early days at Frankfurt: two against four Catholics in the Electoral College, four against ten in the Princes' College. Secondly, several leading Protestants were still technically outlaws and thus could not attend the discussions at Frankfurt. The opposition to Ferdinand's binary peace policy was led by Frederick William of Brandenburg from within the assembly, and by Amalia of Hesse-Kassel from without. But they would probably not have had their way without the support of France and Sweden. The views of these two powers were clearly set out by the Swedish plenipotentiary, Johan Adler Salvius, in an open letter to the Protestant princes of April 1643. 'For thirty years', he claimed (incorrectly), 'no Imperial Diet has been held, and in the interim the emperor has managed to usurp everything by right of sovereignty. This is the highroad to absolute rule and the servitude of the territories. The crowns [of Sweden and France] are seeking, as far as they are able, to obstruct this, for their security rests on the liberty of the German territories.[5] Gradually the Protestant delegations moved their headquarters to Osnabrück. But still the emperor remained obdurate, refusing to recognize the right of his vassals to vote in the congress meetings. Only on 29 August

1645, a key date in the peace-making process, was the *ius belli ac pacis* conceded to all independent territorial rulers. The deliberations at the conference in Westphalia were now accorded the status of a Diet, so that its resolutions would have the force of Imperial laws. The Frankfurt assembly closed.

In fact the emperor had only been able to prolong the talks at Frankfurt for so long because of a brief stroke of military good fortune: in 1643 Sweden suddenly went to war with Denmark. There were many reasons for this surprising development. Christian IV, his desire for foreign glory unquenched by either advancing years or previous defeats, had long made as much mischief for his northern neighbour as possible: he gave shelter to vengeful political enemies of the Stockholm government; he blockaded Sweden's ally, the port of Hamburg; he harassed and even arrested Swedish shipping in the Baltic. When news leaked out that Christian was secretly negotiating an alliance with the emperor, Sweden decided to strike first. Her best generals, Torstensson and Königsmarck, were instructed to march from the borders of Bohemia (where they had operated since their victory at Breitenfeld in November 1642) towards Denmark. Königsmarck overran the secularized bishoprics of Verden and Bremen, which had enjoyed neutrality since Sweden restored them to Danish control after Nördlingen. Now they were swiftly occupied and placed under a proconsular government, headed by Königsmarck, which paved the way for Swedish annexation after the peace of Westphalia. Meanwhile Torstensson occupied Holstein and in 1644 began the conquest of the Jutland peninsula with the same ease as Tilly and Wallenstein sixteen years before.[6] In October a major naval engagement at Femmern, in which Christian's forces were defeated, opened the islands to the threat of Swedish invasion; peace talks began the following month. A formal conference, which opened in February 1645, drew up the pro-Swedish peace of Brömsebro on 23 August.

This was far from the outcome that the emperor had anticipated. No sooner had Sweden made clear her intention to invade Denmark than Ferdinand promised to assist Christian IV, and he despatched his field army, under Count Gallas, to pursue Torstensson into Holstein. The Swedes, however, had foreseen this development, and had concluded an alliance with George Rákóczy, successor to Bethlen Gabor as ruler of Transylvania: the prince, with the blessing of the Ottoman sultan, and subsidies from France, promised to invade Habsburg Hungary. This he did in February 1644, seriously compromising Ferdinand III, who was obliged to recall the field army he had sent to aid Denmark. But Torstensson adroitly compelled the Imperialists to retreat through areas so devastated that most of them died of starvation. According to the (admittedly hostile) chronicler Chemnitz, of the 18,000 men who began the retreat, barely 1,000 reached the safety of Bohemia, so that 'it would be hard to find a similar example of an army brought to ruin in such a short time without any major battle'.[7] Gallas, who had also led the disastrous retreat from Burgundy in 1636, was dismissed.

But it needed more than a change of general to stop the Swedes. Early in 1645, with Denmark clearly out of the war for good, the Swedish high command determined to mount an operation that would bring about the immediate collapse of Habsburg resistance. An invasion of Bohemia in full strength, and in conjunction with the Transylvanians, seemed to offer the best chance of this, because it would 'wound the emperor right to the heart'. In addition, the French army of the Rhine was to invade Bavaria, so that Ferdinand III would receive no relief from that quarter. This, however,

was easier said than done. The French had not done well in the Rhineland since the death of Bernard of Saxe-Weimar. The need to send support to Catalonia and Portugal, as well as to continue the war along the Netherlands frontier (which Mazarin always deemed critical), tended to reduce the supply of men and money to the French troops in Germany. At first, the military opportunities offered to Bavaria by this situation were ignored, for Maximilian still hoped to make a separate peace with France (see page 152 above). But when the French invaded Württemberg, the Bavarian army under Franz von Mercy delivered a masterly attack at Tuttlingen (November 1643) which forced the French to retreat to the Rhine, abandoning all their baggage and equipment. The retreat, carried out in the depths of winter, caused the loss of perhaps two-thirds of the French force of 16,000 (the 'Bernardines' or 'German Brigade', made up of the regiments formerly commanded by Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, was particularly hard hit). Although reinforcements were sent to Alsace in 1644, the French proved unable to break out of the Rhine Valley. At Freiburg, in August 1644, Mercy again inflicted heavy losses on the French, now commanded by the aggressive Viscount Turenne, but they held the field. Another battle, at Mergentheim, in May 1645, failed to establish the local superiority of Bavarian over French forces in the area.[8] But the arrival of reinforcements enabled Turenne to counter-attack and, at the battle of Allerheim on 3 August, the French defeated and killed Mercy, and destroyed his army as a viable fighting force.

Meanwhile, the Swedish army in Germany had scored another great victory five months earlier. The Swedish 'Hauptarmee' had begun its march from Saxony into Bohemia before the spring. Torstensson led a fighting force of only 15,000, and the Imperialists—despite the Transylvanian advance up the Danube—were able to field the same number. But the Swedes had an overwhelming advantage in artillery: sixty field guns against only twenty-six. After some preliminary skirmishing, the two sides met in a prolonged pitched battle at Jankov, south-east of Prague, on 6 March. The result was decisive: the Imperialists lost their artillery, half their men, their field chancery and even their commanders (see Plate 19). Immediately, the emperor and his family fled to Graz.[9] Nor was this an idle precaution, for by the end of the month Torstensson's men had taken Krems, where they created a bridgehead across the Danube (and restored Lutheran worship). The Swedes and Transylvanians now prepared for a siege of Vienna, and the few Lutherans left in the city openly rejoiced and awaited their liberation. But it never came. The emperor was saved by the Turks.

In the spring of 1645, the Ottoman sultan determined to go to war with the Venetian Republic over possession of Crete. He began the campaign in June, and promptly diverted all his military resources to the task: aid for Rákóczy was ended. The prince, thus abandoned and in financial difficulties, lent a favourable ear to Habsburg overtures for peace and—despite a new alliance with France, signed in April—concluded the treaty of Linz with Ferdinand on 16 December 1645. Religious toleration in Hungary was restored and guaranteed, and extensive territories were ceded anew to Rákóczy. For a state which lacked almost every resource for the conduct of sustained hostilities, Transylvania had done surprisingly well from the Thirty Years' War.

But the defection of Transylvania did not alter the critical importance of the 1645 campaign. That is why it was so hard fought. The battle of Jankov, for example, lasted longer than almost any other engagement in the war precisely because everyone recognized its decisive nature: the emperor hazarded all his economic and military

resources, the prestige of his house, and his own reputation as a commander of superior ability. The fact that he lost them all, through defeat, made it almost inevitable that the final peace settlement would be unfavourable to the Habsburgs. After Jankov and Allerheim, there was no longer any Catholic field army able to withstand the Swedes and their allies; and everyone knew it. On 6 September, John George of Saxony reluctantly signed a cease-fire with Sweden at Kötzschenbroda and abandoned the war. Meanwhile, in Westphalia, Oxenstierna noted that 'the enemy begins to talk more politely and pleasantly' and the Imperial representatives at the peace conference offered substantial concessions.[10] The agreement that all princes and towns with a seat in the Imperial Diet should be allowed effective representation at the peace talks came in August 1645; in September, the emperor reluctantly agreed not to seek any advantage in the peace treaty for Catholics living in Protestant territories in the Empire. Shortly afterwards, he issued an amnesty for all his rebellious vassals, to allow them to attend the conference and put forward their own demands in person; and on 29 November 1645, the emperor's confidant and chief negotiator, Count Maximilian von Trauttmannsdorf, arrived at Münster with broad instructions to make whatever concessions were needed to secure peace.

It was at this point, just as serious discussions about a settlement of the German war began, that representatives from the Dutch Republic chose to arrive in Münster to settle their disagreements with Spain. As early as January 1642, the captain-general of the Republic, Frederick Henry, prince of Orange, had invited the States-General to nominate plenipotentiaries and formulate terms; but delegates and instructions were not finally agreed upon until October 1645. The Dutch embassy left for the peace conference in January 1646.[11] Their presence both completed the jigsaw of political allegiances and complicated the task of making a German peace. It may have been true, as Gustavus Adolphus had once said, that 'all the wars that are on foot in Europe are fused together and have become one war'; but the alliances that bound the various combatants together could not disguise serious divergences of interest. Even the same state (most notably France) might have two policies at the conference: one for Germany, another for the Low Countries. Sometimes different, even contradictory, instructions were issued to the various delegates; sometimes different members of the same delegation acted in contrary ways. The first peace conference of modern times was a law unto itself. (See Plate 18.)

The negotiations were handled by 176 plenipotentiaries (almost half of them lawyers by profession) who acted for 194 European rulers, great and small. Not all of the states represented at the congress sent delegations of their own—only 109 did so—but nevertheless several thousand diplomatic personnel thronged the streets of Münster and Osnabrück between 1643 and 1648. The size of the various embassies ranged from the 200 men, women and children in the French delegation to the lone envoys of the smaller German principalities.

Life at the conference was a curious mixture of scarcity and plenty: on the one hand, the norm for accommodation was often two to a bed (thus, in the Bavarian embassy, the twenty-nine staff had to share only eighteen beds); on the other, food and drink were plentiful (the same Bavarians each appear to have consumed between two and three litres of wine daily, so perhaps they were too befuddled to argue about the beds).[12] But, drunk or sober, the principal activity of the delegates was to communicate and to negotiate, and the outpouring of ink by the diplomats was indeed prodigious. A complex postal network

was specially erected to permit the regular exchange of verbose *Denkschriften* and endless letters between the envoys and their principals, so that nothing should be concluded without the full and express consent of every government.[13] Naturally, this caused serious delay in the negotiations, for each letter took between ten and twelve days to travel from Münster to either Paris or Vienna, and between twenty-three and thirty days to reach Madrid. A letter from Osnabrück to Stockholm might take twenty days or more (before the peace of Brömsebro with Denmark, considerably more); and the reply, of course, took just as long. But these delays did not cause any reduction in letter-writing. The correspondence between the delegates of the duke of Württemberg at Osnabrück and their master at Stuttgart was fairly typical: from 1644 until 1649, in theory they wrote to each other only once a week, usually on a Friday, but by the end each side had written almost 400 epistles.[14]

With so many participants and so many conflicting interests, it is hard to see—let alone summarize—the salient trends; nevertheless, it may be argued that negotiations fell into three phases. The first, which was largely procedural, began with the Frankfurt meeting in January 1643 and lasted, with many fits and starts, until November 1645 when Count Trauttmannsdorf arrived in Münster. The second phase of the Congress lasted from this point until the count left again, in June 1647: a period of intense negotiation during which almost every outstanding dispute between the protagonists in both the Dutch and the German conflicts was settled. During the final phase, which lasted until the three peace treaties were signed in 1648, negotiations centred on securing financial remuneration for the Swedish army and persuading the Emperor to offer no further assistance to Spain. Throughout the five years, the pace of negotiations, as well as the nature of the concessions, was constantly altered by the fortunes of war. In the cynical phrase of Prior Adami of Murrhart, one of the hard-line Catholics at the conference: 'In winter we negotiate, in summer we fight.'[15] The pathway to peace was narrow and far from straight.

iv The making of peace

> They say that the terrible war is now over. But there is still no sign of a peace. Everywhere there is envy, hatred and greed: that's what the war has taught us… We live like animals, eating bark and grass. No one could have imagined that anything like this would happen to us. Many people say that there is no God…

This desperate entry in a family Bible, from the Swabian village of Gerstetten, was written on 17 January 1647, after the arrival of yet another band of refugees with news of predatory troops on their heels. 'But we still believe that God has not abandoned us,' the entry continued. 'We must all stand together and help each other.'[1] Alas,there were still twenty months of fighting ahead before the peace finally came: a period in which Swabia (like Bavaria, Austria and many other parts of the Empire) was ravaged once more. In fact the fighting in most of Germany continued right up to the moment when the last

signatures on the treaties of peace dried on 24 October 1648. Although by then several of the most intransigent figures in the conflict had been removed by death or disgrace—Richelieu and Olivares, Ferdinand II and Gustavus Adolphus, Bernard of Saxe-Weimar and William of Hesse-Kassel—their successors were no less determined to exact the best possible return from the prolonged and prodigal expenditure of blood and treasure. They negotiated as hard as they fought.

Although most of the questions at issue were discussed at the Peace Congress simultaneously, the French and Swedish diplomats strove to ensure that the purely German problems should not be resolved first. As the count of Avaux, wrote from Münster in April 1644: 'It would seem that…the honour and profit of France will best be served by placing first on the table the items concerning public peace and the liberties of the Empire…because if they [the German states] do not yet truly wish for peace, it would be prejudicial and damaging to us if the talks broke down over our own particular demands.' The French feared that, if the German states resolved their issues first, they might unite against the foreigners and refuse all their claims. On the Swedish side, in December of the same year, the wily Oxenstierna wrote to his son (who was a principal negotiator at Osnabrück): 'So long as "the restitution of the affairs of the Empire to their original *state*" is our pretext for wanting changes in our favour…we must justify all our doings in the light of the same.'[2] But he too had no intention of seeing Sweden become isolated.

Many of the parameters of 'German liberty' had already been laid down in the peace of Prague and the decisions of the Diet of Regensburg, but the outstanding points were inevitably the thorniest: official toleration for Calvinism, the restitution of secularized church land, the restoration of the Elector Palatine, and a general amnesty. The last, as already noted, was granted in the aftermath of Jankov. The third, although the subject of prolonged haggling, was already envisaged in the emperor's secret instruction to Trauttmannsdorf in October 1645: 'in extreme need, and when there can be no other way', an eighth Electorate was to be created so that both Bavaria and the Palatine might have seats in the Electoral College.[3] But these were matters that could be decided mainly by the emperor alone. It was the other two issues—toleration and restitution—that proved truly divisive, for they raised the fundamental questions of who was competent to decide religious issues and whether all territorial rulers possessed the right to ignore Imperial decrees. The Catholic party had often argued that the Augsburg settlement of 1555 had only been a temporary, emergency measure; but everyone realized that the new balance of faith which the Peace Congress established would be permanent. That was why the bargaining was so tough.

Battle was joined in earnest after August 1645, when the first meeting of all the delegations at the Congress took place. Just over a month later the Catholic princes of the Empire held their first separate discussion at Münster, and shortly afterwards the Protestants began to hold regular separate meetings at Osnabrück. Although membership of the two sides was fairly evenly divided (there were seventy-two members of the *Corpus Catholicorum* against seventy-three in the *Corpus Evangelicorum*) the Catholics seemed initially to hold the advantage. Firstly, the Imperial representatives were clearly on their side; secondly, there was more coherence among the Catholics because several members held more than one vote. The Elector of Cologne topped the list with fifteen, exercised by his chief adviser—and cousin—Bishop Wartenburg of Osnabrück (who also

held five proxy votes of his own); Prior Adami of Murrhart represented several Swabian abbeys and forty-one Swabian prelates. It was the same with the Imperial cities: the Augsburg representative, Johann Leuchselring, was empowered to cast the vote of fifteen other towns.[4] Yet this semblance of strength was deceptive. Although the emperor was on the side of the Catholics, not all Catholics were on the side of the emperor. There was a powerful group of anti-Imperialists, led by the Elector of Trier (still smarting from his ten years of Imperial captivity), who favoured concessions to the French, and if necessary to the Protestants, in order to win peace. Ranged against them, within the Catholic camp, were a group of fifteen or so extremists, led by Wartenburg, Adami and Leuchselring—known as 'the triumvirs'—and supported by Spain. These men were determined to make no concessions of substance on religious matters. And, as if this division were not enough to undermine the Catholic cause, differences also occurred between individual voting princes. Thus Maximilian of Bavaria and the duke of Neuburg both claimed the Upper Palatinate, the former as a return for his war costs, the latter because he was the closest Catholic relative to the outlawed Palatine family. The bloc-votes controlled by the main participants, far from being a source of strength, in fact meant that such disunity was paralysing. By the end of 1646 it was already impossible for the *Corpus Catholicorum* to compose common declarations for the Congress; and, early in 1648, the extremists abandoned Münster, in protest against the 'dove-like' attitude of their colleagues, in order to deliberate separately.

The *Corpus Evangelicorum* was, on the surface, no more united than the Catholics. To begin with, the party lacked a leader comparable in stature with Maximilian of Bavaria: neither the young Elector Palatine (Charles Louis, son of Frederick V) nor the old Elector of Saxony (still John George) would do; and Frederick William of Brandenburg, by far the most impressive figure among the Protestants, had already made his peace. Perhaps the most active party member was one of the few women at the Congress, Amalia of Hesse-Kassel, widow of William V and regent for their young son. She and a group of lesser princes, including the dukes of Saxe-Weimar and the Calvinist princes of the Rhineland, desired safeguards for Protestantism in predominantly Catholic areas and demanded the total revocation of the Edict of Restitution. Against them were ranged the larger Lutheran states, which desired peace at almost any price. Furthermore, as with the Catholics, there were also disputes among members about territories—the eternal argument between the landgraves of Hesse over Marburg; between Brandenburg and Brunswick over who should have Halberstadt; between Brandenburg and Sweden over who should have Pomerania. But in the end, the *Corpus Evangelicorum* possessed both the coherence and the will to put aside these 'vanities' (as they were called in an important resolution of March 1646) and vote as a single block whenever issues of confessional importance arose.[5] The Protestants thus managed to hold their own until the fragmentation of the *Corpus Catholicorum* delivered them the victory. A final agreement on all religious issues—highly favourable to the Protestants—was concluded by the Congress on 24 March 1648. The 'normative date' for all religious matters was now 1 January 1624. Toleration for the private worship of religious minorities was to be allowed wherever this had existed on the 'normative date'; church lands which were in secular hands on the 'normative date' were to remain under Protestant control. Thus the *cuius regio* principle and the *declaratio Ferdinandei* of 1555 were finally abandoned, and the *reservatum ecclesiasticum* was reapplied only to property under Catholic control at the

beginning of 1624. Furthermore, any change in these arrangements was to be decided by 'friendly composition' in the Diet between Catholics and Protestants, rather than by simple majority vote.[6]

With the 'items concerning public peace and the liberties of the empire' thus settled first, as the French and Swedish governments had desired (pages 106–1 above), the Congress now had to deal with the demands of the foreign powers. To some extent, these varied according to the fortunes of war, which confused some observers. As the dour Glasgow Presbyterian, Robert Baillie, remarked in 1638: 'For the Swedds, I see not what their eirand is now in Germany, bot to shed Protestant blood.'[7] Yet in fact their targets remained remarkably consistent: they still strove to achieve 'satisfaction' (in the shape of some north German lands); 'security' (in the form of a guarantee that no power in the Empire would ever again pose a threat to Sweden's interests); and an indemnity. The only difference was the scale of these demands. Instead of just Pomerania, the Swedish government now required in addition parts of Mecklenburg and the secularized bishoprics of Bremen and Verden. Instead of the Heilbronn League, the Swedes aimed at 'atomizing' the Empire in order to create a permanent balance of power between the various creeds and princes. Instead of a modest cash indemnity which might be exchanged for Pomerania, the Swedish troops' envoy, Colonel Erskine, in the summer of 1647 put forward a claim for 30 million thalers.

Naturally there was heated opposition at the Peace Congress to all of these demands, even though Sweden backed them up by overwhelming military strength. The question of Pomerania was particularly vexed. The Stockholm government felt it was imperative to keep its Baltic acquisitions and especially Stralsund and Wismar because, as a royal counsellor pointed out in January 1647: 'These two seaports are not only the gateway to Germany, but also the very places where royal fleets may be prepared, and therefore the places whence danger for the crown of Sweden may come.'[8] But Sweden had no legal title to Pomerania: Frederick William of Brandenburg was without question the legitimate successor to the last native duke, who died in 1637 (page 122 above). When in 1643, during Sweden's war with Denmark, the Elector refrained from rendering any assistance to Christian IV, he did so in the hope of gaining Swedish goodwill and concessions. The following year he was rewarded by Swedish evacuation of Frankfurt-on-Oder, but there was no withdrawal from Pomerania. So Frederick William began a diplomatic campaign to persuade the courts of Europe that Pomerania must be restored. In 1646 he moved to Cleves in order to be nearer the peace talks, and it was his sustained diplomacy in and around the conference, more than anything else, that raised Brandenburg from its natural obscurity to the status of a major power. Above all, he enlisted the support of Cardinal Mazarin, who feared that Sweden might become as dominant in north Germany as the emperor had been in 1627–9. France therefore embarked on a policy, which she was long to follow, of building up the power of Brandenburg as a counterweight to Sweden.[9] At last, in February 1647, alarmed by the degree of foreign support for Brandenburg, Sweden resolved to partition Pomerania, keeping only the western part, with its strategic ports, and ceding the east to Frederick William (whose rights over the secularized bishoprics of Halberstadt and Magdeburg and over the duchies of Mark and Cleves were, in addition, confirmed). A settlement with Denmark, which transferred Bremen and Verden to Sweden, was concluded shortly afterwards.

With ‘satisfaction’ thus achieved on such a heroic scale, ‘security’ was somewhat less important. It was also more elusive. The Imperial negotiators, led by Count Trauttmannsdorf in 1645–7 and by Dr Isaac Volmar thereafter, proved adept at playing off France against Sweden, and at mobilizing a residual German patriotism against both. Thus, although Sweden pressed for toleration to be granted to Protestants living in the Habsburg provinces, the Imperial plenipotentiaries allied with France to prevent it. And they also conspired to stop either France or Sweden from gaining a preponderant voice in the Empire. As Count Salvius reported in exasperation to his principals from the Congress late in 1646: People are beginning to see the power of Sweden as dangerous to the “balance of power” *[Gleichgewicht]*. Their first rule of politics is that the security of all depends on the equilibrium of the individuals. When one begins to become powerful…the others place themselves, through unions or alliances, into the opposite balance in order to maintain the equipoise.’ But the idea was scarcely new. As early as 1632 the Papal Curia had advised its diplomats abroad that ‘the interest of the Roman Church’ was better served by a balance of power than by the victory of any individual state. And this was a principle that Sweden herself had invoked in former days often enough: in 1633 Chancellor Oxenstierna claimed to a foreign dignitary that the chief reason for Swedish intervention in Germany was ‘to preserve the *aequilibrium* in all Europe’.[10] Now he was being forced to abide by his own rules. It was the beginning of a new order in Europe—of an international balance of power with its fulcrum in Germany—and eventually Sweden was compelled to respect it.

The territorial demands of France were more modest. Mazarin sought recognition of the conquests made in the Rhineland—the bridgeheads of Breisach and Philippsburg across the Rhine; jurisdiction over most of Alsace—and the legalization of French control over the three Lorraine bishoprics acquired in 1552. There was considerable reluctance among the emperor’s advisers to agree even to this, since Alsace was one of the oldest patrimonial provinces owned by the Habsburg family (a fact of which Ferdinand was constantly reminded by his plenipotentiary at Münster, Isaac Volmar, who had formerly been chancellor of Alsace). But in September 1646, in return for a cash payment of 1.2 million thalers, Alsace was abandoned and a preliminary peace was concluded between France and the emperor.

Yet the war continued for another two years after this agreement. Why? One reason was the policy of Maximilian of Bavaria. In 1646, the Swedish high command determined to concentrate its efforts against Bavaria rather than against Austria for the next campaign. Early in the year, the main army withdrew westwards and, in August, Krems and the other Swedish strongholds in Lower Austria were abandoned. But the Habsburgs found it impossible to counterattack. Although they managed to collect a field army of 40,000 men, which marched as far as Hesse-Kassel, they were no match for the enemy’s ‘Hauptarmee’ of 34,000 veterans under the joint command of Turenne and Karl Gustav Wrangel. Although there was no pitched battle, the Habsburg army was driven back towards Bohemia, leaving Bavaria and the Rhineland to be systematically plundered over the winter of 1646–7. It was scarcely surprising that on 14 March 1647 the desperate Electors of Bavaria and Cologne, with some of their allies, signed a cease-fire at Ulm with the representatives of France, Sweden and Hesse-Kassel. Mainz followed suit in May. It was agreed that the anti-Imperialists would be allowed to occupy three strategic towns in Maximilian’s duchy, and that the Catholic Electors would no longer fight on the

Imperial side but instead discuss terms for a separate peace. Meanwhile, Wrangel led his forces back into Austria, this time invading the Vorarlberg, taking Bregenz and plundering the surrounding area.

At this point, many observers (like the peasants quoted at the beginning of this section) believed that the war was over. And so it might have been, but for Mazarin's decision to increase his demands. His negotiators at Münster now sought for Louis XIV the status of a prince of the Empire (with a seat in the Diet), a war indemnity, and a solution to the Palatine question that was of no use to Bavaria. Maximilian concluded that 'the French crown does not wish to make a peace that will restore Liberty, but rather to oppress Germany with a new form of Imperialism', and in September 1647 he renewed his former alliance with the emperor. It was a rash move: since the loss of his best men at Allerheim (page 157 above), Maximilian's army was no match for the French. Imperial reinforcements (raised through the efforts of Ernest von Traun, Ferdinand III's able quartermaster-general) were rushed into Bavaria, but to no avail. On 17 May 1648 the last field army to fight for the emperor in the war was cut down at the battle of Zusmarshausen. Maximilian fled to Salzburg.[11] Perhaps Mazarin could have exploited this victory, too, in order to make further gains, but he was hampered by the outbreak of a serious rebellion in France the same month. At first the revolt (known as the Fronde) remained confined to Paris, where the civil servants went on strike; but this example of disobedience quickly spread to the provinces, depriving the government of all tax revenue. Since January, the Cardinal had been convinced of 'our need to make peace at the earliest opportunity'; now he instructed his envoys in Münster to reach a settlement as soon as possible, since 'It is almost a miracle that, amid so many self-made obstacles, we can keep our own affairs going, and even make them prosper; but prudence dictates that we should not place all our trust in this miracle continuing for long.[12]

Sweden, too, was now anxious for a settlement. By the summer of 1648 there was really only one major point left at issue—the size of the indemnity due to the Swedish army—and in June 1648, after prolonged haggling, the Swedish delegation agreed to accept as a final settlement 5 million thalers (1.8 million in cash, 1.2 million in assignations, and the remaining 2 million within two years). This opened the way to a 'preliminary peace' between Sweden and the emperor, similar to the 1646 agreement with France, and this was signed at Osnabrück on 6 August. The fighting, however, continued and once more the Swedes invaded Bohemia, laying siege to Prague. Lutherans in the area flocked to hear the army chaplains, and the Swedes made a final effort to secure toleration for their co-religionists in Bohemia. But, receiving no support from the French on this point, they failed: although the Protestants of Silesia received guarantees for their faith at the peace of Westphalia, Ferdinand III stood firm on the situation elsewhere. There was to be no restitution of confiscated estates and no toleration for non-Catholics.[13] But the emperor could not withstand French pressure on another issue: in spite of the Fronde, Mazarin was clearly determined to keep on fighting until the Austrian Habsburgs agreed to abandon Spain.

There was no doubt that Philip IV now stood in need of Imperial aid more than ever before. The revolts of Catalonia and Portugal still continued, thanks to French support; in 1647 a major rebellion broke out in the city of Naples which won the backing of an important segment of the aristocracy and the promise of French aid; shortly afterwards there were urban uprisings in Sicily and Andalusia, and the whole of Spain was afflicted

by a virulent outbreak of plague. Some in the royal council favoured an immediate agreement with France, but they were outnumbered by those who preferred to settle with the Dutch instead. This party was led by Don Gaspar de Bracamonte, count of Peñaranda, who was Philip IV's chief plenipotentiary at Münster. As soon as the Dutch delegation arrived there, in January 1646, Peñaranda began to offer concessions. He at once indicated Spain's willingness to recognize Dutch sovereignty and independence. Then, in May, he agreed to the permanent closure of the River Scheldt to all traffic, except under Dutch licence; to the cession of extensive lands in North Brabant (the Meierij of 's Hertogenbosch); and to the imposition of Dutch tolls on the ports of Flanders. The only important outstanding point was overseas trade. The Dutch delegates, under pressure from the East and West India companies, wished to secure total freedom to trade in any part of the Iberian world. This Spain would not concede, and negotiations flagged for a while. But in December 1646 Philip IV consented to recognize all Dutch conquests from the crown of Portugal, in return for an undertaking that the Republic's ships would keep away from Spanish America. A provisional agreement between the negotiators was signed in January 1647, which was ratified, despite Mazarin's efforts at sabotage, in January 1648. The 'Dutch Revolt' was over at last.[14]

Spain was now free to deploy the Army of Flanders solely against France, and some small gains were registered in the early months of 1648. But Mazarin profited from the defeat of Bavaria at Zusmarshausen to transfer to the northern front a large detachment of troops from south Germany. With their aid, on 20 August the French inflicted a crushing defeat at Lens on the Spanish army under the personal command of the emperor's brother, Leopold William, who lost his baggage along with 8,000 men and thirty field guns. It was a poignant moment for Ferdinand III. On the one hand he earnestly desired to send aid to his brother-in-law; on the other he had to consider the precarious situation of Bohemia. Already, on 26 July, the 'New Town' suburb of Prague, containing the Hradschin Palace, had been captured by the Swedes. The emperor risked losing the entire kingdom unless he swiftly signed the peace. In late September, under relentless military pressure from his enemies and desperate diplomatic urging from his friends, Ferdinand crumbled: he could not afford to fight on simply for the sake of Spain.[15] The links between Spain and Austria, which had so destabilized European politics since the accession of Charles V, were fatally weakened. Since there was no further obstacle to peace, the final instruments to end the war—128 clauses, including the issues resolved in the preliminary agreements—were signed at Münster on 24 October 1648.

Attention now shifted to implementing the numerous provisions of the treaty, beginning with ecclesiastical matters. In Württemberg, where thirty convents were recatholicized in 1630 following the Edict of Restitution, and again after Nördlingen, the Protestants were allowed back over the winter of 1648–9. In April 1649, the Imperial cities which had been ordered to admit parity of religions complied with the treaty: even Augsburg, whose representative (Leuchselring) had been a leading Catholic extremist at Münster, was forced to admit fourteen pastors who swiftly restored a full Protestant church order alongside the Catholic one.[16] Simultaneously, those whose lands had been forfeited for alliance with Sweden or France (but not for rebellion) were restored. The general amnesty was proclaimed and the Elector Palatine resumed his seat in the Electoral College. Before long the diplomats were packing their bags, exchanging farewell presents (reliquaries proved a favourite gift among the Catholic

plenipotentiaries), and writing their last letters. The total cost of their five years of activity was some 3.2 million thalers: about 500,000 each for France and Spain, around 250,000 each for the emperor, Sweden, and the Dutch, an average of 60,000 for each Elector, and so on. These sums were substantial, and were in part paid by the various sovereign territories of the Empire. But it was as nothing, in most cases, compared to the cost of demobilization.[17]

Many of the delegates at Westphalia soon reassembled at Nuremberg, where a new conference opened to supervise paying off the 200,000 soldiers still mobilized. The smaller formations were dealt with first. Late in 1648, for example, three months' severance pay was given to the troops raised by Catholic princes (the so-called *Mediatarmee* units, such as the Westphalian army maintained by Elector Ferdinand of Cologne), while the members of the Bavarian Circle became responsible for paying the arrears of the Bavarian army (the archbishopric of Salzburg, for example, was required to pay 240,000 thalers).[18] Next, in January 1649, all Imperialist garrisons were withdrawn from Bavaria. But greater difficulties arose with the main field armies. In August 1649, when the 500 Imperialist troops in Lindau were ordered to march out, a mutiny resulted which lasted two months. The French army, too, was restless. The outbreak of the Fronde interrupted the flow of funds to the troops in Alsace, and even the experienced Erlach could not prevent his men from running amok.

Only the Swedes, occupying the larger part of Germany and in receipt of the first instalment of their 5 million-thaler indemnity, seemed relatively unaffected by the delays in demobilization. But their forces still earned pay—almost 1 million thalers a month—and therefore built up further arrears as they waited in their garrisons. In the autumn of 1649 the Swedish commanders threatened to reopen hostilities unless a proper schedule of withdrawal was agreed. But on 26 June 1650, amid firework displays and general rejoicing, the Swedish delegates (led by Prince Charles Gustav) and the Imperialists (led by the indefatigable Ernest von Traun, one of the unsung heroes of the war) signed an agreement for the phased withdrawal, on prearranged days, of all troops from those areas of Germany not ceded to France, Sweden or the emperor (see Plates 20 and 21).

The operation proved protracted. The congress at Nuremberg remained in session until July 1651; a Spanish garrison remained in Frankenthal in the Palatinate until 1653 (when the emperor offered Philip IV the Imperial city of Besangon in exchange); and the last Swedish troops were not withdrawn to the Baltic until 1654. Nor was the demobilization accomplished without some infringement of the peace of Westphalia, especially by the emperor. Although his troops were withdrawn promptly from Alsace (ceded to France), Upper and Lower Lusatia (given to Saxony) and two Silesian duchies (granted to the Polish crown as security for debts owed by Ferdinand III), some regiments were sent, in clear contravention of clauses III and IV of the Westphalian agreement, to fight for Spain in the South Netherlands and in northern Italy. However, the larger part of the Imperial host, some 25,000 men, was retained in Ferdinand's service. Some entered garrisons in the patrimonial provinces, but the majority went to the Hungarian frontier, which had been dangerously neglected during the last years of the war. The veterans formed, the government observed, 'the core of a good standing army', commanded by experienced generals like Ottavio Piccolomini (who had fought in the war since 1618) and Raimondo Montecuccoli (a field commander since Lützen), and they later proved themselves a match for the French, the Poles, the Turks and any other enemy of their master. The

regiments retained in 1648, some of them already with a collective history dating back thirty years, continued to fight for the Habsburgs until the final collapse of the Austro-Hungarian army in 1918.[19] Like Grimmelshausen's 'Mother Courage', many of those who had fought in the war knew no other life and had no wish to leave the ranks: for them, the agreements at Westphalia and Nuremberg were only the transition from one chapter to another, not the end of the tale. But for the rest of humankind, they marked the end of the war. As the poet Johann Vogel of Nuremberg wrote:

> Something you never believed in
> Has come to pass. What?
> Will the camel pass through the Needle's Eye
> Now that peace has returned to Germany?[20]

VI
The war in myth, legend and history

The fifteenth-century Scots poet Gavin Douglas concluded his translation of the *Aeneid,* with an audible sigh of relief, 'Here is endit the lang desparit work.' But history, unlike literature, unfortunately has no obvious conclusion. The significance of the Thirty Years' War has been a bone of contention for both historians and politicians ever since it came to an end, and the debate has been hottest around three topics: one military, one economic, the other political. On the first, there have been, inevitably, the traditional military histories, written f rom nationalistic points of view, which extol the heroic leaders and indefatigable troops of each army; but, against this, several writers (beginning with eye-witnesses such as Grimmelshausen and Moscherosch) have portrayed the soldiers who fought the war as the most brutal and unprincipled warriors ever seen in Europe, led by officers who were as ineffectual as they were corrupt. The social and economic impact of the war has likewise been evaluated in radically different fashions. Some have argued that the war crippled a booming economy and caused unequalled devastation; others claim that the thirty years of conflict had virtually no adverse economic consequences. Finally, assessments of the political aims and achievements of the statesmen involved in the war show little uniformity. Most non-German analysts confer almost divine powers of foresight and prudence upon such political leaders as Oxenstierna and Richelieu, but dismiss their German allies as incompetent, unprincipled and selfish. German scholars have usually reversed the image. After three hundred years of discussion it is still, regrettably, not possible to offer an open-and shut verdict on any of these three central issues. However, historians now have to hand a great deal more evidence than ever before: a new look at each controversy is therefore justified.

i The universal soldier

When the peace of Westphalia was signed, the opponents of Ferdinand III—France, Hesse-Kassel and above all Sweden—were maintaining perhaps 130,000 men in the Empire. The Imperialists and their few remaining allies were considerably weaker, although still a force to be reckoned with: perhaps 70,000 men in all. Today, such concentrations of men under arms in Europe would be insignificant; in the seventeenth century, they were unprecedented.

Who were these men who made their living by killing others? Alas, the evidence is exiguous, unsystematic and insufficiently studied to permit broad generalizations.[1] To begin with, we do not know what soldiers looked like, for even the dress worn by the troops who fought the Thirty Years' War is a matter for debate. It would seem, to judge from the art of the period and from the military costumes preserved in various museums, that (at least in the earlier phases of the war) soldiers were often permitted to wear what

they wished.[2] But there were efforts in some quarters to standardize dress, and create 'uniforms'. Thus when the duke of Neuburg created a militia in 1605, all men were to be equipped in 'similar military livery'. The city of Nuremberg's guards, raised in 1619, were all to be dressed alike; and the duke of Bmnswick-Wolfenbüttel's two new regiments of the same year were all to be clothed in blue. A little later, both Mansfeld and Gustavus Adolphus commanded regiments that were known by colours ('the red' or 'the blue'), but this seems to have referred only to the regimental standards under which they fought. The military colours of the Thirty Years' War, most of them six feet square (with a swallowtail or pointed end for cavalry), excited all the more devotion for being the only common collective symbol possessed by a company or a regiment. Indeed, most contemporary accounts seem to have assessed victory or defeat according to the number of colours won or lost, and captured pennants were soon prominently displayed by the victors.[3]

In his 'Handbook of War', published in 1651, Hans Conrad Lavater of Zürich advised would-be soldiers to wear *sensible* clothes: strong shoes, breeches and stockings, two thick shirts (if not more: Gustavus Adolphus was wearing three at Lützen), a buff coat of leather shielded from the rain by a cloak, and a wide felt hat. The garments should be generously cut, Lavater advised, for added warmth, yet should have no fur and few seams (to deny breeding-grounds to vermin). But, by the time he wrote, the scope for individualism was fast receding. In 1647 the French secretary of state for war, Michel le Tellier, ordered clothes to be made for the army in one of three fittings—half 'normal', a quarter 'large' and a quarter 'small'—but said nothing about the quality or the colour.[4] The Imperial army, however, had already begun to favour the pearl-grey uniforms that were universally adopted in the eighteenth century. Thus, in 1645, when Count Gallas placed an order with Austrian clothiers to supply 600 uniforms for his regiment, he enclosed a sample of the precise material and the colour (pale grey) to be copied. He also sent samples of the powder-horns and cartridge-belts to be manufactured *en masse* by local suppliers.[5] That such artefacts could indeed be mass produced may be seen from the collection of seventeenth-century arms and armour in the Arsenal at Graz: thousands of weapons and their accoutrements, all standardized to a high degree though made in various workshops, lie ready for immediate use. Eight thousand men could be equipped within a single day. In Sweden, a factory was established at Vira to produce sword-blades for the entire Swedish army according to a single approved design.

But further standardization lay beyond the power of most European states at this time. In the first place, not all the troops in all army belonged to the same warlord. Among the Imperialists during the 1640s were Saxon, Bavarian, Westphalian and Spanish units, as well as Austrian regiments. Secondly, even a single formation would include men raised at a wide variety of times and places. In 1644, a Bavarian regiment for which detailed records have survived could boast men from no less than sixteen national groups, of which the largest were Germans (534 soldiers) and Italians (217), with smaller numbers of Poles, Slovenes, Croats, Hungarians, Greeks, Dalmatians, Lorrainers, Burgundians, French, Czechs, Spaniards, Scots and Irish. There were even fourteen Turks.[6] Even if all these men had been issued with the same uniform upon joining the regiment, clothes would soon wear out and require replacement by items either plundered from the civilian population, stripped from the dead, or purchased during rare moments of leisured affluence. Lacking a uniform, troops on the same side were therefore obliged to adopt

distinguishing marks. The soldiers of Gustavus Adolphus normally wore a yellow-edged blue band around their hats, and when they joined forces with the Saxons, who had different distinguishing marks, just before the battle of Breitenfeld in 1631, both armies placed a green token (often a leafy branch or a fern plucked from a forest on their line of march) in their hats. Similarly, the soldiers of the Habsburgs—both Spanish and Austrian—could be recognized everywhere by their red tokens (usually a plume or a sash). In May 1632, Wallenstein ordered that they were to wear tokens of no other colour. So although clothing of one particular style may have predominated for a period in a given regimental wardrobe, before long the men would become either thread-bare and dust-covered veterans or else the harlequin figures, promiscuously arrayed in rainbow attire, portrayed by the military artists of the period.

One might wonder why any man would freely join such a force; and, indeed, many soldiers served in the ranks against their will. The troops from Sweden and Finland, for example, were recruited by a form of conscription known as the *indelningsverk,* which obliged a specified community to provide a certain number of soldiers. Most of them were peasants: in the voluminous (but as yet little analysed) records of the Swedish and Finnish forces serving Gustavus Adolphus and his daughter, *bönde* (peasant farmer) is by far the commonest entry in the enrolment lists. They came from villages like Bygdeå in northern Sweden, which provided 230 young men for service in Poland and Germany between 1621 and 1639, and saw 215 of them die there, while a further five returned home crippled. Enlistment was thus virtually a sentence of death and its demographic impact was profound. The number of adult males in Bygdeå parish steadily decreased—from 468 in 1621 to 288 in 1639—and the age of the conscripts gradually fell as more and more teenagers were taken, never to return. The social impact was also high: at first, the 'idle poor' tended to furnish most of the recruits, but after a while it became the turn of the younger sons of more prosperous families, and finally the only sons of even rich peasants were called away to die in Germany. In some smaller settlements, by the end of the 1630s, every available adult male was either on the conscription lists, already in the ranks, or too crippled to serve. Total losses in the Swedish army between 1621 and 1632 have been estimated at 50,000 to 55,000; those between 1633 and the war's end were probably twice as high. Clearly the war was causing depopulation in Sweden and Finland on an unprecedented and—ultimately—unbearable scale.[7]

Several other countries, while reluctant to introduce conscription, resorted to sentencing felons to military service, or to commuting terms of imprisonment in return for enlistment, since there were seldom enough volunteers. The armies of Spain were regularly augmented by released prisoners. Likewise, of the 25,000 or so Scots who fought for the Protestant cause in Germany during the war, a good number were 'masterless men' (i.e. unemployed); others were local troublemakers whom the magistrates allowed to be kidnapped; and not a few were outlaws—in 1629 Colonel Sir James Spens received forty-seven convicted felons (including one woman) from the prisons of London.[8]

Nevertheless, the majority of the men who fought in the Thirty Years' War—even on the Swedish side—were volunteers. In normal times, a disproportionate number of them came from three broad areas: the mountains, the towns, and the war zone itself. The sub-Alpine lands of Germany, Austria and the Swiss cantons had always been rich recruiting areas, and this seems to have remained true throughout the seventeenth century. The

primacy of the other two areas—towns and the war zone—is reflected in a pioneering study of some 1,500 veterans recruited into the French army before 1648 who survived to enter the Invalides in Paris in the 1670s and 1680s: of those born in France, about half came from the towns (which contained only perhaps 15 per cent of the French population), the other half mainly from villages in the north and north-east, near to the main war theatres. The average age of these men at enlistment was twenty-four and almost a quarter joined up before the age of twenty.[9]

Why did they choose to fight? First among the motives of many volunteers came hardship of one sort or another. Recruiting was always easier in years of high prices, or of political and religious disturbance. Thus in April 1633 Wallenstein was joined by many Protestant recruits from Austria, driven to enlist by the campaign of recatholicization waged by the Emperor Ferdinand.[10] Even when economic recession or religious persecution did not directly threaten, an enlistment bounty paid in cash and a new suit of clothes, plus the promise of pay and plunder to follow, could seem an attractive alternative to a civilian existence in which work and wages were often hard to come by and the risk of being plundered or bankrupted by taxes was high. Although the soldiers' pay was low, it was often *safer* to be inside an army in wartime Germany!

But we must not make the soldiers of the Thirty Years' War into craven economic determinists. Many men explained their reasons for enlisting in some detail, and they seldom mentioned hardship. Instead they stressed the excitement and danger of military endeavour, the chance of winning glory, and the thrill of belonging to an exclusive 'in-group' (which even created a vocabulary of its own).[11] Sir James Turner, a Scot who fought for Denmark and Sweden, wrote that 'a restlesse desire entered my mind to be, if not an actor, at least a spectator of these wars'. Other volunteers, who might be impervious to curiosity, could still be moved by ties of friendship or kinship with their officers: many of the Scots troops brought by James, marquis of Hamilton, to serve Gustavus Adolphus in 1631 bore the same name a their colonel; several members of the Leslie family from Aberdeenshire fought together; and so on. Other men might be induced by their status as tenants-at-will to enlist when their landlord summoned. A fuller range of motives was given by another Scotsman in Swedish service, Robert Monro, who wrote the first regimental history in the English language: he admitted to a desire for travel and adventure, and for military experience under an illustrious leader, but placed above these motives the desire to defend the Protestant faith and the claims and the honour of Elizabeth Stuart, his king's sister and the widow of the 'Winter King' of Bohemia. At more than one point in *Monro his expedition with the worthy Scots regiment called Mackays,* the author stated his belief that the 'cause of Bohemia' was his main reason for fighting, and that high religious motivation explained why so 'few of our Nation are induced to serve these Catholic Potentates'.[12]

This admirable boast of fidelity was a slight exaggeration, however. There were in fact several Scots (and English) who fought in Catholic armies, especially for the French; there were also some, like Captain Sydnam Poyntz (another officer who left an interesting account of his service), who changed sides more than once. Even Sir James Turner later confessed that he 'had swallowed, without chewing, in Germanie, a very dangerous maxime, which military men there too much follow, which was, that soe we serve our master honestlie, it is no matter what master we serve'.[13] This behaviour was particularly common among Lutheran troops, because their political leaders, such as John

George of Saxony, stressed (for most of the war) the need for loyalty to the Catholic emperor. Commanders were left to make their own choice between competing religious and political loyalties. General Hans Georg von Arnim, who changed sides more frequently than most during the war, did so for the sake of conscience and not for gain. The number who fought indifferently for any master was probably no larger than in other wars.

The firm allegiance of senior officers like Turner, Monro and Arnim was of more than usual military importance during the Thirty Years' War because of the way in which their armies were organized. From the beginning, the financial weakness of the governments involved in the war was such that they could not afford to raise any troops at all from their current resources. A class of 'military enterprisers' therefore came into existence, advancing cash to recruiting officers on behalf of the government. About 100 individuals operated at any one time during most of the war, increasing to perhaps 300 in the years of maximum hostilities, 1631–4. In the course of the entire conflict, some 1,500 enterprisers are known to have acted in this way, funding the mobilization of a regiment or more for one of the warlords. There were also several successful attempts to raise entire armies in this way, with a 'general contractor' undertaking to recruit a corps of many regiments for an impoverished prince. Although Wallenstein, who raised a whole Imperial army on two occasions (in 1625 and 1631–2), is the most famous example of this extreme form of military devolution, there were others: Count Mansfeld in the service of Frederick V, the marquis of Hamilton in that of Sweden, Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar in that of France.

This system of raising armies created several conflicts of allegiance for both junior officers and the rank and file, since the enterprisers rather than the warlords were now the principal source of pay and profit. The choice between following a general (or a colonel) who fed and paid them, and a sovereign who did neither, was not easy. On the whole it is surprising that clear treason was so rare, and that no military enterpriser is known to have raised a force without a valid commission and then offered it for hire (as had often occurred during the Hundred Years' War). But some sailed very close to the wind. The army raised for France in 1635 by Bernard of Saxe-Weimar almost changed sides early in 1639, and even after the death of its creator later that year, the 'Bernardines' or 'German Brigade' (as the regiments were known) continued until the final peace to fight as a semi-autonomous unit within the French army, under the command of its senior officer, the Swiss-born Hans Ludwig von Erlach.

The behaviour of Wallenstein during his first generalship, issuing recruiting patents in his own name, was not of the same order. His reason was purely financial: because the Imperial treasury could not pay wages or purchase equipment, the commander-in-chief was obliged to find men who could, and commission them to do so. The colonels and generals thus provided credit to the government: Wallenstein himself advanced over 6 million thalers to the emperor between 1621 and 1628, and his colonels lent smaller sums to the junior officers of the regiments they had raised. This required considerable financial resources, and it is not surprising to find that several military entrepreneurs were rich: Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, whose inheritance as a younger son was tiny, in 1637 estimated his personal fortune at 450,000 thalers (roughly one-third of it in cash, one-third in letters of exchange and one-third in a Paris bank); the Imperialist commander Henrik Holck, once a poor man, returned to his native Denmark in 1627 rich enough to pay 50,000 thalers in cash for an estate in Funen; the Swedish general Königsmarck, who

had formerly served as both a page and a common soldier, died in 1663 with assets worth almost 2 million thalers (183,000 in cash, 1.14 million in letters of credit, 406,000 in lands).[14]

But naturally the credit of even these individuals was not inexhaustible: they could not continue to pay their men indefinitely. Indeed, they could not afford to pay their men very much at all—even Wallenstein's soldiers agreed to serve for wages that were scarcely higher than those of farm hands. The various army commanders therefore evolved a complicated scheme of money-raising, modelled on that perfected by the Dutch and Spanish armies fighting in the Netherlands. The first essential ingredient was a regular (albeit inadequate) input of cash from the state treasury. In a famous letter of January 1626, written at the beginning of his first generalship, Wallenstein informed the Imperial finance minister that he needed 'a couple of million thalers every year to keep this war going'. The money was required to maintain the credit of the military enterprisers, including the general, who had advanced vast sums to the men under their command; it was not paid directly to the troops. This system was bitterly satirized in a famous novel about the war: *The Adventures of Simplicissimus the German*. The author, Hans Jakob Christoph von Grimmelshausen, devoted to the subject an elaborate simile, which compared the army hierarchy on paydays to a flock of birds in a tree.[15] Those on the topmost branches, he claimed,

> were at their best and happiest when a commissary-bird flew overhead and shook a whole panful of gold over the tree…for they caught as much of that as they could and let little or nothing at all fall to the lowest branches, so that, of those who sat there, more died of hunger than of the enemy's attacks.

In fact Grimmelshausen's vision was somewhat distorted, because the birds on the lowest branches—the army's rank and file—actually received considerable sustenance by other means. Most important was the provision of free accommodation: for much of the time, soldiers lived in more or less comfortable lodgings, with a bed, service and perhaps food supplied by the householder. This was fortunate, because troops did not long survive in barracks or a military encampment, where they had to supply these items themselves. As Michel le Tellier, then an inspector of the French army in Italy, wrote in 1642: 'two months' pay and lodgings with the peasants in [France] is worth a lot more [to the troops] than three months' pay and a barracks in Turin'.[16] But, after a while, local resources always proved inadequate and had to be supplemented. This was the reason for introducing 'contributions': tax assessments levied directly from each community in the army's vicinity, paid either in cash or in goods needed by the troops (food, clothes, munitions, transport). The exact mechanics of the transfer of goods and services was worked out between the regimental and company clerks on the one hand and the local magistrates on the other. In areas frequently visited by troops, such as Franconia, there was an 'early warning system' among communities along an army's projected line of march, so that the necessary provisions for the troops could be made ready in advance.[17] When prior liaison between military and civilian administrators seemed unlikely to produce sufficient victuals, contractors from areas unaffected by the war might be persuaded to step in. Some generals purchased cattle in bulk from Switzerland, or cloth

from England; Wallenstein organized the regular delivery of beer, bread, clothes and other necessaries from his own extensive estates in Bohemia to his army. As Le Tellier was later to observe: 'to secure the livelihood of the soldier is to secure victory for the king'. By the end of the war, most military administrators reckoned to supply two-thirds of their troops' wages in kind.

The administrators also needed to arrange bulk supplies of the cumbrous weapons common to mid-seventeenth-century armies. Half the infantry required thirteen-foot pikes, helmets and body-armour; the rest needed five-foot matchlock muskets, with their forked rests, powder flasks, shot and slow match; and all troops, including the cavalry, needed pistols and swords.[18] Although these weapons did not have to be standardized (every soldier was expected to cast bullets from his own lump of lead), nonetheless the task of equipping a field army of 30,000 should not be underestimated. At the siege of Stralsund in 1628, some 760 cannonballs (some of them 50 kg mortar shots) were discharged against the Frankentor alone on the day of the first assault; at the siege of Kronach (in Franconia) in May and June 1632, 1,260 shots were fired against the walls.[19] Nor was the feeding of the multitude achieved with five loaves and two fishes. The daily allowance of 1 kg of bread, 1/2 kg of meat and 2 litres of beer (which was the notional ration due to every soldier, equerry and officer) required the baking of 30 quintals of bread, the slaughter of 225 bullocks (or the equivalent), and the brewing of 90,000 litres of beer, every day.[20] And then there were the horses: the artillery, the cavalry, the officers, and the baggage wagons all required them, raising the total to perhaps 20,000 beasts with a major field army, consuming some 90 quintals of fodder, or 400 acres of grazing, daily. And the horses themselves often required replacement. At the first battle of Breitenfeld some 4,000 of the 9,000 horses present were killed; at the battle of Lützen General Piccolomini alone had seven horses shot under him. Gustavus Adolphus's massive battle charger, 'Streiff', carried his master to his death at Lützen, and died of wounds shortly afterwards.[21] Organizing such concentrations of military equipment posed serious logistical problems.

Moreover, no early modern army consisted only of combatants and their horses. Many soldiers were accompanied by wives or mistresses; more still had servants or lackeys.[22] When the Spanish Army of Flanders returned to the Netherlands in 1622, after the conquest of the Palatinate, it marched straight to the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom, where three Calvinist pastors in the beleaguered town recorded virtuously that 'such a long tail on such a small body never was seen:…such a small army with so many carts, baggage horses, nags, sutlers, lackeys, women, children and a rabble which numbered far more than the army itself. It may have been true, for although the archives of the Army of Flanders suggest that camp followers in the Low Countries' Wars rarely numbered more than 50 per cent of the total troops, in 1646 two Bavarian regiments consisted of 480 infantrymen accompanied by 74 servants, 314 women and children, 3 sutlers and 160 horses, and 481 cavalry troopers with 236 servants, 9 sutlers, 102 women and children and 912 horses.[23]

This inflation of numbers in fact elevated the problems of military logistics beyond the resources of European governments. It was still possible to maintain—by a combination of direct finance, credit, contractors and contributions—an adequate supply of provisions to either small or stationary bodies of men. Thus the 2,000 English and Scots soldiers who spent the winter of 1627–8 defending Christian IV's new stronghold of Glückstadt

actually received (and signed receipts for) 313,000 kg of bread, 33,500 kg of cheese and 36 barrels of butter, 8 barrels of mutton and 7 of beef, 8 barrels of herring and 9,000 kg of bacon, 37 barrels of salt and 1,674 barrels of beer (most of it a fairly weak concoction known as 'regimental brew'). This constituted a not unreasonable diet.[24] But normal provisioning arrangements often broke down in action, or on the march. With so much to move, it was imperative for armies to keep within easy reach of navigable rivers: only boats and barges could supply war in the seventeenth century. No locality could provide sufficient carts and horses (even though a large four-wheeled wagon could carry up to seven tons of goods). So when the troops moved away from the German river-system, serious difficulties arose. On the night before the first battle of Breitenfeld, for example, the Swedish army slept in the fields in battle order; thereafter they fought for seven or eight hours, towards the end in the midst of a dust-storm; yet even after the victory they got neither food nor drink until they reached the abandoned camp of the Imperialists, at Leipzig, the next day.

At other times, the troops moved faster than their supply trains, sometimes covering twenty-five miles in a day—and on one occasion in 1631, to make a surprise attack on Ochsenfurt (north of Würzburg), they marched twenty miles in seven hours at night. It was on occasions such as these, when the troops outstripped their supply train, that plunder, pillage and looting became a major problem. Naturally there was always the temptation of the strong to exploit the weak. There was a saying during the war that 'Every soldier needs three peasants: one to give up his lodgings, one to provide his wife, and one to take his place in Hell.' Looting was normally led by the musketeers in a regiment, who were both more mobile and lower-paid than the pikemen, and sometimes they caused major disorders. Thus, when the Swedish army entered Bavaria in the summer of 1632, according to Colonel Monro:

> The Boores [i.e. peasants] on the march cruelly used our souldiers *(that went aside to plunder)* in cutting off their noses and eares, hands and feete, pulling out their eyes, with sundry other cruelties which they used; being justly repayed by the souldiers, in burning of many Dorpes [i.e. villages] on the march, leaving also the boores dead, where they were found.[25]

But on most occasions, soldiers of Gustavus who oppressed civilians were severely punished—by whipping, extra sentry duty, or public humiliation. At least five men in Monro's regiment were executed by firing squad, and several others were condemned to death by the military provost for the maltreatment of the civilian population: the army could not afford to alienate those who supplied labour, guides, and intelligence of the enemy, as well as food and quarters.

Normally, the only other reasons for military execution were cowardice, mutiny and desertion. Seventeen officers and men were decapitated in 1632, at Wallenstein's command, for alleged cowardice during the battle of Lützen (their sentence being carried out in the same square in Prague where the Bohemian rebel leaders had met their end eleven years before—a coincidence which increased the soldiers' disgrace). Commanders who surrendered places entrusted to them before their superiors considered it was necessary might also be executed, *pour encourager les autres;* so might deserters (as

happened to several men from the cardinal-infante's army in 1634, who were caught returning to Lombardy before they could become involved in the wars of Germany).[26]

Mutinies were far less common, although the German soldiers had a tradition, when they were either unpaid or mistreated, of electing leaders to negotiate with their warlords, and withholding their services until grievances were redressed. In 1633, the Swedish army—which had marched (according to Monro's exact count) 4,200 kilometres since their landing at Peenemünde three years before—refused to carry out any duties until their arrears had been paid. In 1635 they repeated the exercise, kidnapping Chancellor Oxenstierna for some weeks to improve their bargaining position. In 1638, the French army refused to cross the Rhine into Germany until it received some wages. But these were exceptional moments. The more usual reaction of the troops to low pay or poor conditions was to desert.

The military records of most armies do not, unfortunately, note desertion rates.[27] However, the comparison of the overall wastage rates of French regiments fighting at home, a German regiment (Wallenstein's life guards: the Upper Austrian troops of Count Julius of Hardegg) and those of selected foreign units reveals a somewhat higher loss among the locally raised troops (see Table 6). This difference is almost certainly explained by desertion, since the losses of foreign soldiers from injuries and death incurred on active service tended to be very high. Thus Mackay's Scots regiment, which defended a crucial section of the walls of Stralsund during the siege of 1628, was on duty under fire for six weeks continuously. Their food was brought to them at their battle stations, and 'we were not suffered to come off our posts for our ordinary recreation, nor yet to sleepe'. Even the colonel's 'cloathes never came off, except it had been to change a suit or linings'. Thanks to this prolonged exposure to danger, of 900 men in the regiment, 500 were killed and 300 more (including Monro) were wounded. Yet the Scots considered themselves lucky, for had Stralsund been taken by assault, they would all have been killed, like the garrisons of Magdeburg or Frankfurt-on-Oder in 1631, who were slaughtered in defeat where they stood. After the sack of Frankfurt, where the Imperialist defenders lost 3,000 men and the Swedish army 800, it took six days to bury all the dead and 'in th' end they were cast by heapes in great ditches above a hundred in every grave'.[29]

Of course, there were many other causes of military losses unconnected with fighting. When Christian IV's headquarters were at Tangermünde on the Elbe, in 1625, 'the stink of the camp got up one's nose' (in the words of a chronicler) and, before long, disease had reduced the Danish forces substantially. The Imperialists quartered in Hesse-Darmstadt during the winter of 1634–5, after their victory at Nördlingen, were forced to sleep ten and twenty to a house; it was theref ore not long before illnesses due to overcrowding took their toll.[30] In the Scots Brigade serving in Germany between 1626 and 1633, some 10 per cent of the regiments were sick at any one moment, with epidemics increasing the rate dramatically from time to time. For example, the Scots who garrisoned the lower Oder in 1631 lost 200 men a week from plague, and more still from camp fever (typhus) and the other illnesses common among early modern armies.

TABLE 6 *Wastage rates in selected regiments*[28]

	4 English regiments		4 Scots regiments						5 Swedish regiments		Hardegg's German regiment of guards		10 French infantry regiments	
Date	no.	monthly loss %	Hamilton & Meldrum	Hepburn	Spens	Mackay	total	monthly loss %	no.	monthly loss %	no.	monthly loss %	no.	monthly loss %
1627 June	4,915	6				2,000		13						
Oct.	3,764					900								
1628 Apr.	1,882	8												
May	1,650	13												
1629 Aug.			2,219					7						
1630 Jan.							1,900							
June			600			1,000								
1631 Mar.				1,402	850	658		2						
May				837	608									
Sept.				829					2,577	9	c.1,400	6		
1632 Mar.				1,248		518	1,300		1,212					
Oct.					416					4	866			
Dec.				936	360	500		3	828					
1634 Feb.											1,156	11		
June											654			
Oct.							200							
1635 June													5,571	20
July													4,470	
Oct.											1,101	9		
1636 Jan.											796	4		
Aug.											600			

But always, for the foreign units at least, the greatest single cause of declining strength was death in action. Losses in battle usually seem to have been heavy, however long the engagement itself lasted, and the foreign troops were always in the front line. If the two sides were evenly matched—as at Lützen in 1632, at Rocroi in 1643, at Freiburg in 1644 or at Jankov in 1645—the slaughter on the field was terrible. If, on the other hand, the odds were uneven, the defeat of the smaller force would be followed by hot pursuit and perhaps greater slaughter: many fugitive soldiers, and sometimes entire units, might be killed in cold blood either by their adversaries or by the local peasantry. And even if the defeated host managed to keep together, their retreat might turn into a debacle. Gallas's withdrawal from Burgundy (1636) and Holstein (1642), Baner's from Torgau (1637) and Turenne's after Tuttlingen (1643), all noted above, were major catastrophes on account of the number of troops who died by the wayside.

Carnage was sometimes limited, however, by the practice of ransoming prisoners-of-war. After Jankov (1645) the entire Imperial general staff was offered for ransom by the victors at 120,000 thalers. After other, less catastrophic defeats, ransoms were agreed according to a published tariff: 25,000 thalers for a general, 100 for a colonel and so on down the scale. Sometimes prisoners were simply exchanged, as Torstensson (the Swedish general) was traded for Count Harrach (the Imperial treasurer). It was rare for a commander to be refused the chance of release, but it sometimes happened. Thus Gustav Horn, Oxenstierna's son-in-law, was kept in prison for eight years after his capture at Nördlingen in 1634 (although Maximilian of Bavaria did contemplate, at one point, bartering Horn against all the treasures plundered from Munich during the Swedish occupation; Stockholm, however, was not interested in the deal). But the common soldiers, especially those raised in Germany, were normally neither ransomed nor exchanged: either they were freed, after swearing not to bear arms against the victor for a certain period, or they were encouraged to join the army that had captured them—a development often facilitated in the later phases of the war by the presence in every army of at least a few men who had fought on all sides and might therefore know the captives, and ease their scruples on transferring from one allegiance to another. In 1631, even the Italians captured by Gustavus Adolphus in his Rhineland campaign were welcomed into

the Swedish army (though they deserted as soon as they reached the foot-hills of the Alps the following summer).

Soldiers taken prisoner were nevertheless fortunate. Few commanders seem to have had much time for their wounded, except on special occasions—such as at the height of a Swedish attack on the Alte Veste in 1632, when Wallenstein went around his defenders throwing handfuls of coins into the laps of the wounded, to encourage the rest. There seldom seems to have been any provision of medical care for the sick, nor any military hospitals and pensions for the wounded, except in the Swedish and Spanish expeditionary forces; and even there the services provided were far below the level maintained by (for example) the Spanish army in the Netherlands, with its 330-bed military hospital at Mechelen and its home for army pensioners at Hall. The armies of the Thirty Years' War only equalled the Army of Flanders in their chaplaincy service. The troops of the League were normally attended by Jesuit field chaplains, and a full ecclesiastical hierarchy of Lutheran pastors was attached to the Swedish army which invaded in 1630. But, in terms of military administration, despite the semi-permanence of the fighting, the armies of the Thirty Years' War introduced remarkably few innovations. Even Wallenstein's famous contributions system was closely modelled on that of the Spanish army, imposed by Spínola in the Palatinate in 1620, but originally devised in the 1570s.[31]

The one area in which the war gave rise to major changes was tactics and strategy: not for nothing did Napoleon Bonaparte, confined in Egypt in 1798–9, ask his government to send him histories of the Thirty Years' War to read. The starting-point of the new warfare was the military reformation wrought by Maurice of Nassau upon the Dutch army during the 1590s. Inspired by the Roman tactics described by Aelian and Leo VI, Maurice devised new ways of deploying his troops in action. In place of the phalanxes of pikemen, forty and fifty deep, which had fought the battles of the sixteenth century, he drew up his men only ten deep. His formations were smaller, and they achieved their impact more by firepower than by pike charges. No less than half the soldiers in Maurice's army were musketeers. These changes sound simple, but they rendered profound adjustments necessary in military organization. In the first place, reducing the depth of the line inevitably meant extending it, thus exposing more men to the test of hand-to-hand combat; second, because the line was thinner, more discipline and more coordination were required from each man. For example, in 1594 the Dutch army perfected the technique of the 'salvo', which involved each rank firing their muskets simultaneously at the enemy, and then retiring to reload while the other nine ranks followed suit, creating a continuous hail of fire. But to perform this manoeuvre in the face of the enemy required considerable fortitude, perfect coordination and great familiarity with all the actions involved. Therefore Maurice reintroduced the drill used in the Roman army. The journal of one of his political advisers, present at a siege during 1595, records the troops being trained almost constantly in exercises, forming and re-forming ranks, drilling and using their weapons. According to an English edition of Aelian's *Tactics* published in 1616:

> The practise of Aelian's precepts hath long lien wrapped up in darkness and buried (as it were) in the ruines of time, untill it was revived and restored to light not long since in the United Provinces of the Low-Countries, which Countries at this day are the schoole of war, whither the

> most martial spirits of Europe resort to lay downe the apprenticeship of their service in armes.[32]

This treatise was by no means the first to draw attention to the new methods of warfare developed in the Dutch Republic. Maurice's insistence on precision and harmony in war mirrored the general preoccupation of the age with geometrical forms—whether in building, riding, dancing, painting, fencing or fighting. As early as 1603 a French military work devoted an entire chapter to 'The exercises used in the Dutch army', and in 1607 the first pictorial drill manual of western Europe, composed by Maurice's cousin, John of Nassau, was published at The Hague as *The Exercise of Arms* under the name of Jacob de Gheyn, a well-known engraver. Many other works imitated de Gheyn's technique of a numbered sequence of pictures to illustrate the various manoeuvres required to handle military weapons and to organize troops for war. In 1616 Count John opened a military academy at his capital, Siegen, expressly to produce an officer corps for Calvinism. The first director of the *Schola Militaris,* Johann Jacob von Wallhausen, published several manuals of warfare, modelled on the Dutch example, which was the basis of all teaching at Siegen (where training took six months: arms and armour, maps and models for instruction were provided by the school). At the same time, other authors published a range of works explaining the advantages of Dutch-style fortifications, which (characteristically) combined maximum efficiency with minimal cost.[33]

The diffusion of the new warfare did not occur merely in print: Maurice was also asked to supply military instructors to foreign states. Brandenburg requested, and received, two in 1610; others went to the Palatinate, Baden, Württemberg, Hesse, Brunswick, Saxony and Holstein. Even the traditionally minded Swiss, who had first demonstrated the potential of the pike in their struggle against fifteenth-century Burgundy, were forced to take note. In 1628 the Berne militia was reorganized on unashamedly Dutch lines, with smaller companies and greater firepower, by Hans Ludwig von Erlach, the future commander of the 'Bernardines'. However, Maurice's most influential disciple was unquestionably Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden. John of Nassau himself went to Sweden in 1601–2 and gave some advice on how the Swedish army could be improved, but the main influx of Dutch expertise came two decades later. On a tour of Germany in 1620 Gustavus saw many different forms of military organization and fortification, and he read all the major books on the subject. He took Maurice's reforms slightly further, by reducing the depth of his line from ten to six ranks, and by increasing its firepower through the addition of four light field pieces per regiment (the unsuccessful prototypes, which became more famous than the real thing, were 3-pounders made out of light metal reinforced with wood and leather). Gustavus also introduced a new tactical unit, the brigade, made up of four squadrons (or two field regiments) in arrow-shape formation, the fourth squadron in reserve, supported by nine or more field guns. Every man was given rigorous training in his work by the numerous officers and NCOs. An effort was made to keep the troops busy all the time, digging ramparts, scouting, or in drill. The king even gave his troops personal instruction in the new discipline: he would himself show new recruits how to fire a musket standing up, kneeling, and lying down. Units recruited abroad were made to watch demonstrations of the 'Swedish order of discipline' by the veterans, and then had to practise until they were perfect.[34] This included the double salvo, with the musketeers standing but three deep,

one rank on their knees, the second crouching, the third upright, in order to 'pour as much lead into your enemies bosom at one time [as possible]…and thereby you do them more mischief…for one long and continuated crack of thunder is more terrible and dreadful to mortals than ten interrupted and several ones' (according to Sir James Turner, who saw the deadly salvo in operation).[35]

The most important difference between the Swedish and Dutch 'military revolutions' lay not in innovations but in application and in scale. Maurice of Nassau rarely fought a battle (and, when he did so, his field army numbered scarcely 10,000 men), because the terrain on which he operated was dominated by a network of fortified cities which made battles largely irrelevant—the towns still had to be besieged. But Gustavus operated in areas which had been spared from war, and even the threat of war, for seventy years and in some cases (such as Bavaria) for even longer. There were therefore far fewer well-defended towns—although, where they existed, they had to be besieged in the 'Dutch manner'—and control of many areas depended upon the ability to win battles. The most favourable publicity that the Dutch system could have found was Gustavus's victory at Breitenfeld. It was the classic confrontation between the traditional battle order, used since the Italian wars, and the new: Tilly's men, standing thirty deep and fifty wide, faced a Swedish army six deep for musketeers and five for pikes, with twice as many field guns. The superiority of firepower was overwhelming. The Swedish artillery could throw a 9 kg iron shot about 1,700 metres every six minutes; Gustavus's musketeers—who made up slightly more than half the total—could fire repeated salvoes of lead shot, each about 20 mm in diameter, with considerable accuracy up to 50 metres (and with about 50 per cent accuracy up to 75 metres). Sharp-shooters, who were armed with special 'long guns' resembling fowling pieces, were accurate at far greater distances (though still nowhere near the 400 metres of modern rifled guns). And these engines of death were manipulated by ever larger concentrations of men. During the decade 1625–35, when the war was at its height, the Empire was fought over by a quarter of a million troops—more than ever before; in the course of the thirty years of conflict, well over a million men must have served in the ranks. Among such unprecedented numbers, there is evidence to support every view on the true nature of the early modern soldier and on the impact on Germany of the war he fought.

ii The war and German society

On 11 August 1650, after the last Swedish soldiers had left, a celebration of peace and thanksgiving took place in the Imperial city of Rothenburg ob der Tauber. Accompanied by musicians, the schoolchildren of Rothenburg, many of them wearing wreaths and carrying bouquets, assembled in the city's broad marketplace. Nineteen years earlier their parents and grandparents had knelt in the same square, begging the dreaded General Tilly to spare their city from the fate of Magdeburg. And so he had. For two decades, however, Rothenburg had remained a focus of military activity; the boys and girls who gathered that morning in 1650 had hitherto known only war. But now peace had come, and the children marched solemnly from the marketplace to the great parish church, where they sang hymns of thanksgiving before the city's assembled adults and heard an earnest sermon by Pastor Johann Dümmler before disbanding.[1]

Similar scenes took place in cities and villages all over Germany. Rothenburg itself ruled over a region of 400 square kilometres in southwestern Franconia, and sermons of thanksgiving were heard in village churches across the territory. But not everywhere: not, for example, in Linden.

Located in a wooded area north-east of the city, Linden was a small village: in 1618 it had had a total of nine taxable peasant households, plus four landless peasants. Like other subjects of Rothenburg, the inhabitants of Linden had suffered frequent financial exactions since the start of the war, especially after Imperial and Swedish armies began to vie for control of the region in the early 1630s. But the horrors of war really came home to the people of Linden only at the beginning of 1634, when the area lay under Swedish occupation. Late on a January afternoon, twenty Swedish soldiers rode into the village, demanding food and wine, breaking down doors and searching for valuables. Two of them entered the cottage of George Rösch, raped his wife and chased her screaming through the village. But the villagers of Linden roused the neighbouring communities—and from all sides peasants rushed through the woods to Linden, where they seized the soldiers, stripped them of their booty and made off with some of their horses. The next day the soldiers headed to Rothenburg to lay complaints of theft against the villagers, and when the Rothenburg beadle arrived in Linden he arrested four peasants. But soon he acquired a more accurate view of the situation, especially since Rösch's wife was able to identify one of the rapists—a soldier from east Finland. The beadle rode from village to village retrieving the soldiers' horses, saddles and clothes; but the episode was also reported to the Swedish commander, General Horn, who severely reprimanded the responsible officers and reminded them that soldiers were not to molest the peasantry.[2]

By 1641 there were no peasants left to molest in Linden for the village was uninhabited—and it remained so for the rest of the war. But Linden did not become a permanent ghost village. In the decades following the war, settlers returned, and by 1690 the village had eleven peasant holdings—bringing it, in short, back to its pre-war size.[3]

How typical was Linden? In 1641 Rothenburg officials conducted a house-to-house survey of the villages under their rule, and their report offered a depressing picture of conditions in the region. According to this calculation, the Rothenburg territory, comprising about 100 villages, had included 1,503 taxable peasant households in 1618; but by 1641 there were only 447—a loss of 70 per cent. About twenty-five settlements—mostly small ones, like Linden—were completely uninhabited in 1641, and a few more were added to the list before the end of the war. But other communities fared better: Oberstetten, a substantial village of seventy-five households, had lost only five of them by 1641: far to the west of the main march route, it was little affected by the tumult of military activity. In 1700 Rothenburg officials counted a total of 1,558 taxable peasant households in their territory—a slight increase over the pre-war total.[4]

Seventeenth-century Germans were scrupulous record-keepers, and the Thirty Years' War did little to change their habits of meticulous documentation. Here and there crucial records were destroyed by negligence or acts of war, but enough documents have survived to provide vast amounts of data about local conditions in central Europe during the war. Stories like that of Linden could be reproduced from almost any part of Germany: everywhere the records describe frequent brutality by soldiers, sporadic resistance by peasants, cautious compliance by towns-people, and desperate efforts by civilian and military officials to maintain minimum standards of justice and prevent a

total collapse of law and discipline. Information about the economic and demographic impact of the war also abounds in the tax records, parish registers and other series which German clerks and clerics maintained with such care. Historians can pinpoint hundreds of depopulated villages and reduced cities—along with hundreds of towns and villages which survived the war almost intact.

Despite the wealth of local data, however, it has proved almost impossible to agree on the overall impact of the Thirty Years' War on Germany and the surrounding lands. This is not for want of trying, however; for over a hundred years, historians have debated the economic, social and demographic effects of the war. The debates were first stimulated in the mid-nineteenth century by two literary works. One was Hans Jakob Christoph von Grimmelshausen's *Simplicissimus*. Though written in the 1660s, this early picaresque novel was largely forgotten until the nineteenth century, when its harrowing picture of life during the Thirty Years' War began to attract wide attention. The other influential work was Gustav Freytag's *Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit* (Scenes from the German Past), whose third volume, originally published in 1859, combined carefully documented details with sweeping generalizations about the economic and moral devastation wrought by the war. The impact of these two works was reinforced by the writings of some careless historians whose statements added authority to what has been called the 'myth of the all-destructive fury of the Thirty Years' War'.[5]

Other scholars, however, have taken great pains to rebut this myth, using carefully conducted local research to show that the amount of death and destruction attributed to the war has often been exaggerated. All the evidence is local, or at best regional, since no pan-German censuses or economic surveys were conducted in the seventeenth century. But the gradual cumulation of local data has at least made it possible to advance more reliable suggestions about the impact of the war than were possible a hundred years ago.

This is particularly so with respect to the war's demographic effects. Earlier estimates that the war had destroyed half or two-thirds of the German population are no longer accepted. More recent estimates are much more conservative, suggesting that the population of the Holy Roman Empire may have declined by about 15 to 20 per cent, from some 20 million before the war to about 16 or 17 million after it. Nor were the population losses necessarily permanent: the post-war decades saw a considerable growth of population, and some experts suggest that the losses were already made good by 1700.[6]

The patterns for different regions, moreover, were extremely varied. The German north-west, which saw little fighting after the first years, experienced almost no population loss, while the war zones of Mecklenburg, Pomerania and Württemberg lost over half of their inhabitants. The population loss was always greater in villages than in cities, whose walls normally protected them from wanton destruction—the sack of Magdeburg in 1631 was such a shock to contemporaries partly because it was an exception to this general rule. In many cases, moreover, what appeared to be a population loss was really a population transfer—while villages emptied, for example, nearby cities often bulged with refugees seeking protection. Thus in 1637, as famine and illness spread across the Saxon countryside, it was reported that over 4,200 persons had sought refuge in Leipzig—temporarily increasing the city's population by over one-third.[7]

There is no doubt, however, that central Europe did experience a generation of substantial demographic decline. The exact causes of the population loss cannot always

be determined, but one thing is certain: deaths due to military action represented only a minor element in the total picture. War-related food shortages and outbreaks of epidemic disease were much greater killers. The most spectacular episodes of mortality were due to the bubonic plague, which broke out in many parts of central Europe during the war. The city of Nördlingen in northern Swabia vividly illustrates the lethal impact of the plague. Between 1619 and 1633 there occurred an average of 304 deaths a year among the city's inhabitants, but in the plague year of 1634 the death rate sextupled: a total of 1,549 inhabitants died, along with over 300 refugees then in the city.[8] Yet it would be inaccurate to say that all the plague deaths were due to the war. Many epidemic diseases were spread by the movement of infected soldiers or civilians, but the plague was not among them. For bubonic plague is actually a disease of rats, transmitted to human beings by fleas—and the cycle of infection among rats is influenced by ecological factors that have little to do with the events of human society; the old notion that infected rats and fleas travelled in army baggage is now discounted by demographers. In addition, plague epidemics were of relatively short duration in any one place, and were often followed by a year or two of rapid demographic recovery. In fact the long-term population losses associated with the war were generally due to less spectacular but more persistent diseases spread by human contact—typhus, influenza, dysentery and other illnesses which recurred, year after year, in communities whose inhabitants were already weakened by war-induced malnutrition and stress (see Plate 23).

To establish the demographic impact of the Thirty Years' War is hard enough; to determine the war's economic effects is even harder. There is once again no shortage of local data, but the information is often difficult to interpret: to use local tithe revenues, toll receipts and tax records to establish national trends of output or overall levels of economic activity is, at best, a chancy business.

Nevertheless, when comparisons are made between, say, 1615 and 1650, almost every section of Germany shows a significant decline in economic activity. There were some exceptions, notably port cities like Hamburg and Bremen, which sustained a brisk maritime trade throughout the war. But most cities and territories experienced a substantial reduction in the output of agricultural products and manuf actured goods and in the volume of trade. Furthermore, many once-prosperous families, institutions and governments fell deeply into debt between 1620 and 1650.

Growing indebtedness was a particularly serious problem for Germany's municipal governments. Before the war, many cities had enjoyed comfortable surpluses from taxation and from rural rents. After the war, however, many of the same cities found themselves deeply in debt. The reason is easy to trace. Time and again a city would spare itself from conquest and pillage by agreeing to render financial 'contributions' to the army stationed before its gates. But even grossly escalated taxes usually proved inadequate to cover these payments; and, as a result, the municipal government would have to borrow—from its own citizens, from regional noblemen, or from profiteering soldiers. When the war stopped, the demand for 'contributions' ended, but the cities were left with massive debts. The municipal debt of Nuremberg, for example, quadrupled from 1.8 million gulden in 1618 to 7.4 million at the end of the war.[9] To pay off such loans normally required decades—meanwhile the cities were burdened, year after year, with massive interest payments to their various creditors.

Developments such as these were obviously caused by the war. Yet, even so, evidence of economic decline must often be interpreted with caution. After the war, for example, many municipal and territorial governments compiled detailed statements of the sums they or their subjects had been obliged to pay out to soldiers, whether by force or negotiation. But these statements, despite their down-to-the-penny detail, sometimes give a misleading impression of a region's losses. For at least some of the money given to soldiers generally circulated back into the local economy in the form of payments for goods and services. The city of Schwäbisch Hall, for example, reported after the war that it and its citizens had lost a total of 3,644,656 gulden to soldiers during the war. But the total value of all the citizens' real and personal property before the war had been assessed at slightly over 1 million gulden, and they possessed property worth about 750,000 gulden in 1652.[10] If indeed the citizens of Schwäbisch Hall had paid over *31/2* million gulden in tribute during the war, much of this must have been pumped right back into the city's economy as soldiers paid local inhabitants for food, lodging and services.[11]

In fact, what appears in local records as a loss of wealth often turns out to have been just a transfer of property. This was particularly the case in rural districts which experienced a massive—but often temporary—collapse of agricultural output. Many peasants were driven off their land when the soldiers appeared. But sometimes, as in Linden, they fought back. And often they relied on a sophisticated warning system to notify them of the soldiers' approach—for with sufficient notice, the peasants could rescue most of their livestock and moveable goods. As one Franconian village official wrote to his prince in 1645: 'None of your subjects are here; they have all gone to Nuremberg, Schwabach and Lichtenau with every bit of their possessions, down to goods worth scarcely a kreuzer.[12] Whenthethreat passed, the peasants—or their heirs -might return to the land. And even if they did not, their fields would not necessarily remain permanently fallow. For vacated holdings normally reverted to the landlords who, after the war, often consolidated vacant plots into larger and more productive estates. This was particularly common in eastern Germany, where the war accelerated the collapse of an independent peasantry and contributed to the rise of large-scale estate farming.

Facts like these explain why many historians have tried to judge the war's economic impact by looking at the long-term context instead of simply comparing data from before and after the war. Some have claimed, for example, that Germany was already suffering economic decline before 1618 due to its inability to compete with the rising Atlantic economies. Thus, they argue, the visible decay of the German economy during the war years was simply the continuation of a long-term trend. Other historians reply that the German economy remained vigorous right up to 1618: though Germany's role in international trade may have diminished before then, they insist that agricultural and craft production was thriving until the outbreak of war. The debate between what has been called the 'earlier decline' and 'disastrous war' schools of thought has raged for many years.[13] But the 'earlier decline' theory seems to be gaining ground, since German developments are increasingly placed in a pan-European context: it is now recognized that the seventeenth century represented a period of overall economic contraction in Europe after the boom years of the sixteenth century. One recent historian, in fact, has argued that the Thirty Years' War should itself be seen as an economic phenomenon, intimately linked with the cycle of economic expansion and contraction: The Thirty Years' War as a social occurrence', Heiner Haan argues, 'resulted from the long-term

economic growth of the sixteenth century; it lived off the wealth produced in this expansion, and in the end it destroyed that very wealth.[14]

It is equally important, of course, to look at economic developments following the war. Here again the dangers of drawing conclusions from the state of things in 1650 are evident. For many regions of central Europe appear to have experienced a rapid economic recovery in the decades following the war: fields were reclaimed, buildings reconstructed, old patterns of production and trade resumed. The evidence of this recovery, however, is sometimes obscured by its short-lived character; for within less than twenty years Germany had been plunged into a new round of expensive wars: beginning in the mid-1660s, the Holy Roman Empire was engaged in a long series of wars against the Turks and the French. These wars had a smaller physical and demographic impact on Germany than the Thirty Years' War, for most of the fighting took place on the frontiers of the Empire. Yet their financial burden was huge. For some communities, in fact, especially in the tightly organized Swabian Circle of the Empire, the financial demands of the French and Turkish wars proved even more burdensome than those of the Thirty Years' War.

What all this suggests is that the short-term economic and demographic catastrophe which made such an impression on contemporaries seems exaggerated when placed in the context of Germany's overall development between about 1550 and 1700. But the perspective of the historian is always different from that of the people who live through the events of their time. The Germans who experienced the Thirty Years' War little knew or cared whether the peaceful half-century before 1618 had been a period of gradual economic decline; nor could they know or care whether the post-war period might bring opportunities for economic renewal or reconstruction. For meanwhile they had to live with the uncertainties and horrors of the longest, most expensive and most brutal war that had yet been fought on German soil. To George Rösch's wife, raped by the 'fat soldier' from east Finland and his friend the 'white-haired young soldier', the war was a personal catastrophe.[15] To Dr Johann Morhard of Schwäbisch Hall, who marked his seventy-sixth birthday in 1630 by contributing a pile of family silver to help save his city from Imperial occupation, the war was a nagging drain on his wealth and security.[16] To Hans Heberle, the shoemaker of Neenstetten whose diary recorded thirty separate occasions when he fled with his family to safety in the city of Ulm, the war was an endless source of fear and disruption.[17] Those Germans who survived the war to its end knew that it had been an unprecedented catastrophe for the German people and they knew, better than their children and better even than some modern-day historians, why the making of peace and the departure of the last Swedish soldiers provided an occasion for hymns of praise and sermons of thanksgiving all over Germany.

iii The war and politics

Until 1939, the Thirty Years' War remained by far the most traumatic period in the history of Germany. The loss of people was proportionally greater than in World War II; the displacement of people and the material devastation caused were almost as great; the cultural and economic dislocation persisted for substantially longer. These social consequences attracted the attention of nineteenth-century men of letters, such as Gustav

Freytag; and they were also used by various nationalist political groups who wished to represent the peace of Westphalia, and indeed the entire war, as a monstrous iniquity perpetrated on Germany by foreign powers, especially France. After 1919, parallels were even drawn between the peace of Westphalia and the settlement at Versailles.

That was not, however, the view taken by eighteenth-century Germans, nor by Germany's eighteenth- and nineteenth-century neighbours. Until 1806, the Westphalian settlement was widely regarded as the fundamental constitution of the Empire, and even after that it was sometimes hailed as the principal guarantor of order in central Europe. In 1866, the French leader Alphonse Thiers stated in all seriousness that: The highest principle of European politics is that Germany shall be composed of independent states connected only by a slender federative thread. That was the principle proclaimed by all Europe at the Congress of Westphalia'; while in the 1780s, Catherine the Great of Russia criticized the Emperor Joseph II because his policies ran counter to 'the Treaty of Westphalia, which is the very basis and bulwark of the constitution of the Empire'.[1] Perhaps the most extreme eulogy of the beneficial legacy of the Westphalian settlement came in 1761 from the pen of that incurable Romantic, Jean-Jacques Rousseau:

> What really upholds the European state system is the constant interplay of negotiations, which nearly always maintains an overall balance. But this system rests on an even more solid foundation, namely the German Empire, which from its position at the heart of Europe keeps all powers in check and thereby maintains the security of others even more, perhaps, than its own. The Empire wins universal respect for its size and for the number and virtues of its peoples; its constitution, which takes from conquerors the means and the will to conquer, is of benefit to all and makes it a perilous reef to the invader. Despite its imperfections, this Imperial constitution will certainly, while it lasts, maintain the balance in Europe; no prince need fear lest another dethrone him. The peace of Westphalia may well remain the foundation of our political system for ever.[2]

Such rhetoric, especially when also found in the writings of influential German writers such as Leibniz or Schiller, is highly persuasive. But the balance of power created by the Thirty Years' War and preserved by the peace of Westphalia did not of course remain the basis of Europe's political system for ever; nor, indeed, did it solve all of Europe's difficulties. However, it achieved a great deal more than most modern historians have been prepared to concede. C.V.Wedgwood, for example, in her classic study of 1938, stated baldly:

> The war solved no problem. Its effects, both immediate and indirect, were either negative or disastrous… It is the outstanding example in European history of meaningless conflict.[3]

This is both untrue and unfair. The war in fact settled the affairs of Germany in such a way that neither religion nor Habsburg Imperialism ever produced another major conflict there. The territorial rulers of the Empire were granted supreme power (*Landeshoheit,* not

quite as extensive as sovereignty) in their localities, and collective power, in the Diet and the Circles, to regulate common taxation, defence, laws and public affairs without Imperial intervention.[4] Religious issues were now decided not by majority votes but by the 'amicable composition' of the Protestant and Catholic blocs. The Thirty Years' War also produced a permanent settlement in the lands of the Austrian Habsburgs. There was now little Protestant worship and the Estates (except in Hungary) were largely tamed; moreover there was no restoration of the exiles, so that those granted lands after 1619 were safe at last. The 'Habsburg monarchy', born of disparate units, some held by right of inheritance and others by election, was now a far more powerful entity. Largely purged of dissidents, and cut off from Spain, the compact private territories of the Austrian Habsburgs were still large enough to guarantee them a place among the foremost rulers of Europe, and to perpetuate their hold on the Imperial title until the Empire was abolished in 1806.

These were solid and lasting achievements, which are by no means diminished by the fact that war did not immediately cease in 1648 in all areas. In the east, tension between the emperor and the Turks steadily increased in intensity, and only the war between the sultan and Venice for control of Crete delayed the outbreak of a major conflict in Hungary until 1663. Even within Germany, certain provisions of the peace of Westphalia threatened, or actually caused, new hostilities. Although Sweden and Brandenburg eventually partitioned Pomerania in 1653, creating their own administrations and even marking out their common frontier with boundary stones, Frederick William almost came to blows in the year 1651 with the duke of Neuburg over the partition of Cleves-Jülich. There were minor hostilities—dubbed 'the Düsseldorf cow-war' by contemporaries—before the exact possessions of the two claimants, disputed for almost half a century, were finally fixed.[5] But the position of the French in Alsace and Lorraine was not so swiftly settled. In Alsace, although the Habsburgs' lands and rights had been ceded to France, the ten largest cities in the area (which also became French) remained members of the Empire with representatives in the Diet. The intricacies of the situation so perplexed the Paris government that in March 1650 a special envoy was sent to the area to investigate. 'You will return', a mystified Mazarin commanded, and 'shed more light than we have at present.' But the ambiguity was not accidental: Isaac Volmar, Imperial plenipotentiary at Westphalia and former chancellor of Alsace, wanted both France and the Empire to retain a grip on the area so that 'the stronger will prevail'. Thanks to this resolve, the hapless province became a battleground whenever Habsburg and Bourbon clashed.[6]

But at least Alsace enjoyed a respite, however brief, in which to recover from the Thirty Years' War. Lorraine was less fortunate. Although French control over the 'three bishoprics' was ratified, the status of the rest of the duchy, conquered by Louis XIII in 1632–3, was intentionally left unresolved until France and Spain should also make peace. To secure an agreement between these two Catholic powers had been one of Ferdinand III's dearest wishes but, as noted above, the emperor was forced to abandon his ally: Spain and France fought on until the peace of the Pyrenees (November 1659). Even after that, hostilities generated by the Thirty Years' War still continued in the Baltic, where Russia, Denmark, Poland and Brandenburg all resented the gains made by Sweden—largely at their expense—in 1648. Only the death in 1660 of the redoubtable Charles X (formerly Prince Charles Gustav, who succeeded Queen Christina in 1654) opened the

way to the treaties of Oliva (1660, with Poland), Copenhagen (1661, with Denmark) and Kardis (1661, with Russia), which at last brought peace to northern Europe.

Even these agreements proved short-lived, however. Europe did not enter upon an era of peace in the later seventeenth century, for both Sweden and France—the unquestioned victors of the Thirty Years' War -continued to fight their neighbours for another sixty years. But the struggle against Swedish and French imperialism after 1648 differed, in at least one crucial respect, from the wars of the earlier seventeenth century: there was now no strong religious bond among the various allies. Religion did of course continue to be politically important—for example, it enabled William III to unseat the Catholic James II in 1688 with minimal effort; likewise, fear of Louis XIV's anti-Protestant policies after 1685 certainly helped to unify his northern enemies. But religion no longer dominated international relations as it once had done. Calvinist William's most important ally in the wars against Louis XIV was the Catholic Prince Eugene of Savoy, who served the no less Catholic Austrian Habsburgs; while in the Baltic wars, Lutheran Sweden was eventually laid low by a coalition of Lutheran Denmark, Calvinist Brandenburg, Catholic Poland and Orthodox Russia.

It is hard to date precisely the demise of confessional politics. When a perceptive observer, just after the Westphalian peace congress, noted that 'Reason of state is a wonderful beast, for it chases away all other reasons', he in effect paid tribute to the secularization that had recently taken place in European politics.[7] But when did this process begin? Perhaps the extent of 'foreign intervention' in the conflict offers a clue, for without question those German princes who actually took up arms for and against the emperor were strongly influenced by confessional considerations. The religious sincerity of Frederick V and Anhalt, of Julius Echter and Maximilian, of George of Baden-Durlach and even Christian of Brunswick, is beyond doubt. As long as these men and their German supporters predominated, so too did the issue of religion. But they failed to secure a lasting settlement. As the task of defending the Protestant cause fell into the hands of the Lutherans, less militant and less intransigent than the Calvinists, and as the extent of non-German participation increased, so 'reasons of state' came to the fore. Naturally the balance did not swing entirely away from religion: Maximilian of Bavaria remained invincibly attached to securing a Catholic peace; and although Frederick of the Palatinate died, disillusioned, in 1632, his cousin Charles Gustav of Pfalz-Zweibrücken in 1648 had the satisfaction of leading the Swedish sack of the Imperial Palace in Prague. Yet, despite such evidence of apparent continuity, the place of religious issues relentlessly receded.

The abatement of this major destabilizing influence in European politics was one of the greatest achievements of the Thirty Years' War. Ever since the 1520s, the diplomatic balance of Europe had been constantly rocked by the conflicting tensions of political and confessional allegiance. There were two distinct aspects to this problem. In the first place, the growth of religious divisions destroyed for over a century the internal cohesion of most states. France, for example, was paralysed by a series of civil wars, motivated at least in part by religion, for much of the period between 1559 and 1629. Successive English monarchs, for a century after 1540, were seriously weakened by the failure of all their subjects to conform fully to the religious policy of the sovereign. Except in Spain and Italy, confessional divisions created groups of subjects in every state who refused all compromise or accommodation with their rulers on a whole range of vital issues. The

demands framed by these subjects were not negotiable. They were prepared to go to any lengths—even concluding treasonable liaisons with foreign powers—in order to have their way.

It was here that the second political consequence of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation came into play. The diplomatic system created in the century after 1450, first in Renaissance Italy and later elsewhere, permitted the construction of elaborate and sophisticated networks of alliances aimed primarily at preserving the status quo. Larger states found security in weakening their neighbours, rather than in dominating them; threatened states sought to divert their more powerful enemies by creating difficulties for them elsewhere. But the success of the Reformation cut clean across these recently established political affiliations. The traditional amity between England and Castile, for example, was fatally undermined when the Tudor dynasty embraced Protestantism; and the 'auld alliance' between Scotland and France was likewise wrecked by the progress of the Reformation in Scotland after 1560.[8] But these new orientations in international affairs did not discourage diplomatic intercourse; on the contrary, they intensified the creation of alliances, the exchange of ambassadors, and the signature of mutual defence pacts. Periods of relative peace, such as the decade before 1618, saw frenzied attempts to create international alignments which would guarantee support in case of attack; in wartime, governments sought to turn military defeat into political victory by enlisting further allies against their temporarily victorious opponents. As the experienced Spanish diplomat, Count Gondomar, warned his government presciently in 1619:

> The wars of mankind today are not limited to a trial of natural strength, like a bull-fight, nor even to mere battles. Rather they depend on losing or gaining friends and allies, and it is to this end that good statesmen must turn all their attention and energy.[9]

But on what criteria were these 'friends and allies' to be chosen? It was here that the polarization of Europe into separate religious camps between the 1520s and the 1640s proved so unsettling, for confessional and political advantage seldom totally coincided. The foreign policy of France and the Stuart Monarchy, for example, oscillated during the Thirty Years' War so often and so markedly precisely because there was no consensus among the political elite concerning the correct principles upon which foreign policy should be based. Some saw international conspiracies directed against either their state or their Church; others did not. Some perceived the war as a struggle for religious freedom; others refused to consider anything beyond the specific political issues. Richelieu against the *dévots,* Buckingham against advocates of 'the Protestant cause': during the 1620s, in particular, the posture of the French and British governments towards Germany remained the weathercock of faction.

Clearly this tendency towards political inconstancy—which may also be discerned in The Hague, Vienna, Madrid and elsewhere—goes a long way towards answering the question 'Why did the Thirty Years' War last so long?' But there are other explanations. Many eminent historians have found a cause in long-term social and economic factors, such as the economic dislocation caused by overproduction and overpopulation in the early decades of the century, or the worsening climate, or the widespread destruction and depopulation caused by the war itself. There is, indeed, much evidence for this. Almost

all of Europe was affected by what has been called ‘the General Crisis of the seventeenth century’, a combination of economic, social, climatic, political and intellectual changes which made confrontations between governments, and between governments and governed, far more likely.[10] But none of these forces, by themselves, could cause a war to last thirty years. And, in any case, much of the evidence marshalled in their support crumbles under closer scrutiny. As has been skilfully shown by Gerhard Benecke and Christopher Friedrichs, even the seemingly unequivocal post-war records of material destruction may not be entirely trustworthy: the precise estimates of damage sustained are strangely silent on deaths and injuries caused by the war; space is devoted instead to a minute catalogue of every stick of furniture and each brick or garment destroyed or lost. In some cases, the damage claimed far exceeded the total wealth of the community at any time during the century. Like Brecht’s ‘Mother Courage’, the authorities of post-war Germany were ready to sell their sons for profit.[11] Even today, a visitor to the lands of the former Holy Roman Empire meets with numerous surviving edifices which date from the war years or just afterwards, when Germany was allegedly on its knees: the new churches and palace at Neuburg, on the Danube, begun in 1640; the fine wartime buildings and fortifications of Augsburg, Münster, Ulm and Nördlingen; and so on. But for the bombing of 1939–45, there would be far more. The journals left by travellers to Germany after 1648—such as the Englishmen Edward Brown and Philip Skippon, who both toured the Empire in the early 1660s—contain numerous references to buildings constructed during the war years, yet they seldom, if ever, mention traces of devastation or disaster. Indeed, if their records were the only available source, one would never guess that a major war had taken place! Until the depredations of Louis XIV’s armies, Germany made a surprising economic recovery (despite the continuation of ‘the General Crisis’ elsewhere).[12]

Other explanations of the longevity of the Thirty Years’ War have concentrated less on the incompetence of the armies and more on the ineffectiveness of the governments that raised them. Armies once afoot, it is argued, could not be paid, controlled or organized to achieve rapid and decisive victories; so war eternalized itself. Once more, there is much supporting evidence available. Richard Bonney has made manifest, in his admirable study of the interplay between finance and policy in early Bourbon France, that time and again the aims of the French government had to be either altered or abandoned through financial weakness. The entire policy of ‘war by diversion’ from 1629 to 1635 was rendered necessary principally by the lack of funds to allow total commitment; and in 1647–8 the pace of the peace talks at Westphalia was critically affected by the state of the French treasury.[13] The rhythm of Spanish, Danish and English intervention, as has been stressed in the chapters above, was likewise heavily influenced by financial considerations. Clearly, all these states were engaged in a war that was beyond their means; that is why they fought themselves to a standstill. Yet, surprisingly enough, this experience was not universal. Sweden, the emperor, Bavaria and Hesse-Kassel all managed to maintain large armies in the field until the war’s end without provoking internal collapse. It is true that Ferdinand II’s financial position in the early 1630s became precarious; but, apart from that brief tremor, from 1625 until 1648 (and of course beyond) the Imperial Court constantly directed the operations of up to 50,000 fighting men. The tax-burden on the Habsburgs’ subjects grew inexorably—taxes on property; taxes on produce (especially wine); taxes on luxury goods; taxes on noble status and

wealth—but, after the Inner Austrian revolt of 1635, there was no organized resistance resembling that of Normandy against Richelieu, or of Catalonia or Naples against Olivares. Likewise Sweden, from 1630 until 1650, maintained an even larger army (although its pay was partly provided by foreign subsidies, while provisions were mostly extorted from occupied lands rather than from the homeland). Perhaps the most remarkable force was the Hessian army, which in 1648 garrisoned forty-three strongpoints—almost as many as did the French—and yet had virtually no home base, for Hesse-Kassel had been occupied in the 1630s by hostile forces and thereafter was largely devastated.[14] Certainly the Hessians were seldom major actors in the drama, yet they, above all others, demonstrated how far the maxim *bellum se ipse alet* could be put into effect. As long as an almost landless ruler like Amalia of Hesse could maintain 10,000 and more men in arms, despite twenty-five years of continuous hostility on the part of the Holy Roman Emperor, the war in Germany might indeed last for ever.

Nevertheless, the Hessians, although they could keep their own flag flying, lacked the strength to win the war themselves. The Swedish army, too, for all its great victories, failed to impose unconditional surrender on the emperor: not Breitenfeld, or Wittstock, or Jankov produced the total collapse of the Imperialists. Even the 1648 campaign, in which the Swedish army seemed about to take Prague, would probably not have proved militarily decisive either: Prague had fallen twice before (in 1618 and 1631), yet had been twice recovered; in 1645–6, Vienna had seemed equally doomed and yet survived intact. It took more than the capture of a town or two to bring the Thirty Years' War to an end.

A state of military and political paralysis had, it seems, set in. This was a fact of the utmost significance for, with the military capacity for total victory thus beyond the grasp of any power or group of powers, and with the conflicting considerations of politics and religion so evenly balanced, the quixotic designs and mercurial temperaments of even minor statesmen came to exert a disproportionate influence on the course of events. The prosopography of early seventeenth-century princes and prelates may be neither edifying nor attractive, but it is central to any real understanding of the war's character. Their freedom of action was awesome, and is reflected in the near divine status with which they were credited by their subjects. To quote the funeral address delivered in honour of Landgrave George of Hesse-Darmstadt in 1661:

> Just as the sun in the heavens above is made and fashioned by God, and is a truly wondrous work of the Almighty, so are kings, princes and lords placed and ordered by God in the secular estate. For that reason they may themselves be called gods.[15]

Landgrave George, the last major participant in the war to die, also seems to have been one of the least attractive. A physical coward, vindictive towards his more open and cultivated cousin, Maurice, George's strength of will nevertheless played a crucial role in the war. It was his tireless diplomacy between 1630 and 1635 which, more than anything else, eventually persuaded his father-in-law, John George of Saxony, to make peace with the emperor, thus creating a fatal rift among the supporters of the Protestant cause. No sooner had Gustavus Adolphus landed in Germany than Landgrave George presented the 'Hessische Punkten' to the Regensburg Assembly; when this failed to find favour, he tried—despite Breitenfeld—direct negotiations with the emperor. Almost at once, the

irresistible Swedish advance to the Rhine forced him into Gustavus's camp, but George repeatedly tried to escape through a new accommodation with the Imperialists: at Cologne in 1632, at Leitmeritz in 1633, at Pirna in 1634, and finally (and successfully) at Prague in 1635. And what did the landgrave seek from his sustained peace offensive? Unquestionably he wished to restore peace to the Empire by creating a united front of German princes against all their foreign foes. And reinforcing such political considerations was confessional anxiety: he felt deeply that the inroads of Calvinism, which had recently claimed Hesse-Kassel and Brandenburg, had to be stopped. But these lofty public motives by no means excluded private territorial ambition: George also wished to safeguard the gains made from his domestic enemies in the 1620s, and above all to ensure that Hesse-Kassel (Sweden's oldest German ally) never regained her position of pre-eminence. Given the territorial situation of Darmstadt—surrounded by Catholic and Calvinist neighbours and with only 25 per cent of Hesse (as against 50 per cent for Kassel)—absolute loyalty to the emperor and an unshakeable alliance with Electoral Saxony seemed the landgrave's only guarantee for the future.[16]

Such persistent, painstaking opportunism was characteristic of Germany's political elite during the Thirty Years' War. Perhaps too much attention has been focused upon the seeming irrationality of the Palatine leadership after 1618, with Frederick V embracing the destiny offered him by the Bohemian Estates and Christian of Anhalt. Stressing the messianic elements in the Elector's policy is superficially attractive, for messiahs traditionally come to bring not peace, but a sword. Yet Frederick was advised not only by the impetuous Anhalt, but by the experienced Camerarius, Dohna and Rusdorf. The average age of his principal councillors in 1619 was fifty-seven: they were hardly headstrong boys. If they favoured intervention in Bohemia at all, it was as a pre-emptive measure: to prevent the Habsburgs from building up their strength and using it, one day, against the Palatinate. The far from excitable John Donne visited Heidelberg just before Frederick departed for his new kingdom and preached a valedictory sermon on the text 'Now is our salvation nearer than when we believed', with great (and prolonged) emphasis on the word 'now'.[17]

But it needed more than sermons to move other Protestant princes. Christian IV of Denmark's dissolute ways often left him out of pocket and sometimes out of sorts. He gambled heavily (in the course of 1625, the first year of his intervention in Germany, he won 1,007 thalers and lost 1,510); he was promiscuous; and he was regularly drunk for two or three days on end (between two and three weeks of each year in the 1600s were spent totally intoxicated, according to the diaries of his courtiers—see Plate 24). Age did not weaken his powers. 'Such is the life of that king', complained an English envoy at Copenhagen in 1632: 'to drink all day and lye with a whore every night'.[18] John George of Saxony, for his part, found solace in drinking and hunting when faced by the major political and confessional issues of the day. This Teutonic Nimrod claimed to have shot in person over 150,000 animals; his achievements as Bacchus remain, perhaps mercifully, unquantified. Yet the pressures on John George were indeed severe. On the one hand, throughout the 1620s, the emperor deliberately played upon the Lutheran obligation to obey the powers that be, and upon John George's loathing for Calvinism. On the other hand, Saxony's fear and uncertainty about the future of Lutheranism, if the Catholics defeated all their enemies, was exploited by Gustavus Adolphus and the Palatine court-in-exile. No wonder the Elector took to drink; no wonder he partitioned his lands in 1651

among his four sons, thus ensuring that none of them would face the agonizing decisions that had overwhelmed him.

Not all of the great disputes facing John George and his contemporaries were in fact immediately capable of lasting solution. Although one might have expected more results from such a general conflict, fought over so long a period, it is arguable that almost all the tractable problems of the day were actually resolved, leaving only those that were beyond the powers of better men than the bibulous Elector of Saxony. Part of the difficulty in assessing the achievement of the German princes arises from the inevitable temptation to compare their statecraft with that of the foreign leaders. There was obviously nothing indecisive about Zúñiga and Olivares, about Richelieu and Mazarin, about Oxenstierna and Gustavus Adolphus. But the reason for this contrast is obvious: the German war was not being fought on their doorsteps. 'Win or lose', as Oxenstierna once observed, 'it is not our war.' He could afford to take the longer, more detached view of events simply because he was not directly threatened by them. Except perhaps in 1628–9, Sweden was never in danger of invasion from Germany; nor, except in 1636, was France; still less was Spain. The foreign leaders could therefore pursue their goals single-mindedly by every means at their disposal. Oxenstierna could labour for thirteen years to undermine the peace of Prague; Richelieu and Mazarin could continue to fight on, at least in theory, until their enemies—or even the whole of Germany—collapsed from exhaustion. But the princes of the Empire, lacking the power of these foreign rulers and with the war raging all around them, could not.

Weak or strong, thanks to the paralysis of the normal political mechanisms, the personal determination or the prejudices of individuals thus exerted a decisive effect on the course of the Thirty Years' War. Not all were men born to rule: Laurence of Brindisi's stand over the Donauwörth troubles led eventually to the formation of first the Union and then the League; Oñate and Zúñiga between them helped turn the revolt of Bohemia into a major war; Lamormaini relentlessly undermined the Habsburgs' victory by his insistence on the Edict of Restitution. In the final analysis it was these determined figures, and a mere handful of others like them, who kept the armies fighting and thus made the Thirty Years' War what it was.

Maps



1 Before the war

2 The war in 1618–29



3 The war in the 1630s

4 The war in the 1640s

Abbreviations

AGRB	Archives Gènèrales du Royaume, Brussels, Belgium
AGS	Archivo General, Simancas, Spain
AMAE	Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris, France
ARA	Algemene Rijksarchief, The Hague, Netherlands
BGSA	Bayerisches Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Munich, Germany
BL	British Library, London, England
BNM	Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, Spain
KrA	Krigsarkivet, Stockholm, Sweden
NLS	National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, Scotland
PRO, S.P.	Public Record Office, London, England; State Papers Collection
RAC	Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen, Denmark
ZSM	Zentrales Staatsarchiv, Merseburg, Germany

Notes

In the following pages, incomplete references concern works which are cited in full in the Bibliographical essay. See the Index of Authors for the precise location.

Preface

1 See the detailed discussion by K.Repgen, 'Seit wann gibt es den Begriff "Dreissigjähriger Krieg"?', in H.Dollinger *et al.,* eds, *Weltpolitik, Europagedanke, Regionalismus: Festschrift für Heinz Gollwitzer* (Münster, 1982), 59–70. The term was apparently used for the first time on 6 May 1648 by the deputies of the bishopric of Bamberg at the Westphalian Peace Congress (p. 62). Professor Repgen has subsequently discovered some further information. See: 'Noch einmal zum Begriff "Dreissigjähriger Krieg"', *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung,* IX (1982), 347–52; and Repgen, *Krieg and Politik,* 35–79. *Von dem Dreyssigjährigen Teutschen Krieg Kurtze Chronica* (1650) was the third edition of a pamphlet previously issued as *Von dem Dreissig-Jährigen Deutschen Kriege* (1648) and also as *Summarischer Ausszug des dreyssg-Jährigen Deutschen Krigs* (1649). The first edition was also translated into Dutch. See also further references to the term, from 1648 onwards, in Oschmann, *Der Nürnberger Executionstag,* 2 and n. 6.

2 Quoted in *The Cambridge Modern History* (Cambridge, 1906), IV, v.

3 Repgen, 'Dreissigjähriger Krieg', 63: quotations from Dr Isaac Volmar and the Salzburg delegation; and L.Weber, *Veit Adam von Gepeckh, Fürstbischof von Freising, 1618 bis 1651* (Munich, 1972), 88–90.

4 K.H.Schleif, *Regierung und Verwaltung des Erzstifts Bremen am Beginn der Neuzeit* (1500–1645). *Eine Studie zum Wesen der modernen Staatlichkeit* (Hamburg, 1972), 172; H.Jäger, 'Der dreissigjährige Krieg und die deutsche Kulturlandschaft', in H.Haushofer and W.A.Boelcke, eds, *Wege und Forschungen der Agrargeschichte: Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Günther Franz* (Frankfurt, 1967), 131.

5 Lord Acton, 'The Study of History' [Inaugural Lecture, 1895], in Acton, *Renaissance to Revolution: the rise of the free state. Lectures on modern history* (London, 1906; reprinted New York, 1961), 9 (with a footnote reference to the similar thoughts of Ranke).

6 Dr Paul Dukes of Aberdeen University, who has published an English summary of one of Porshnev's books [see *European Studies Review,* IV (1974), 81–8], has pointed out that, after earlier concentration on France before the Fronde, B.F.Porshnev decided to write a trilogy comprising a synchronic analysis of the development of social, political and international relations throughout Europe during the time of the Thirty Years' War, which he considered to be the first conflict to embrace the whole continent and, as such, one of the principal divisions between medieval and modern times. After a series of articles connected with this ambitious project, he brought out in 1970 its concluding volume, *France, the English Revolution and European Politics at the Middle of the Seventeenth Century*. The second part, not yet published although adumbrated by a further series of articles, was to consider the turning-point that occurred in relations between western and eastern Europe in the mid-1630s. The first part of the trilogy, *The Thirty Years' War, the Entry of Sweden, and the Moscow State,* came out in 1976 after its author's death. It took as its centrepiece the Smolensk War of 1632–4, which has received little or no mention in English-language

accounts of the wider conflict. Porshnev argued that, even before the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, the interconnections of Europe were greater than has recently been thought, placing the conclusion of Muscovy's Time of Troubles in a wider context. I am very grateful to Dr Dukes for this information.

7 Historians have traditionally accorded far more attention to the first half of the war: Moriz Ritter devoted 596 out of 648 pages on the war to the period 1618–35, while Pages allocated 178 pages out of 235, Wedgwood 394 pages out of 515, and Polišenský 200 pages out of 256.

8 This is the title of an excellent brief survey of the war by H.G.Koenigsberger, printed in H.R.Trevor-Roper, ed., *The Age of Expansion* (London, 1968), chapter 5, and in Koenigsberger, *The Habsburgs and Europe 1516–1660* (Ithaca, NY, and London, 1971), chapter 3.

Chapter I Europe between war and peace

1 F.Deloffre and J.van den Heuvel, eds, *Voltaire: romans et contes* (Paris, 1979), 136–7. Voltaire wrote the piece in 1753–4, just as he was completing *Essai sur les Moeurs*. He wrote in some discomfort, 'entre deux rois' (for he had quarrelled with the rulers of both France and Prussia), and 'le cuì a terre', in exile in Alsace.

I.i The Habsburgs and Europe

1 It has been noted that, in the fifty-seven marriages contracted by members of the dynasty between c. 1450 and c. 1650, fifty-one spouses came from the same seven families, and twenty-four came from just three. Philip IV of Spain had only four great-grandparents, instead of eight! Perhaps the repeated incest (in effect) of the House of Habsburg explains the infertility of so many of its members during this period. See P.S.Fichtner, 'Dynastic marriage in sixteenth-century Habsburg diplomacy and statecraft: an interdisciplinary approach', *American Historical Review,* LXXXI (1976), 243–65.

2 Edward Brown, *A brief account of some travels in Hungaria, Servia etc* (London, 1673), *passim* (e.g. pages 114–15, 123, 133, 140).

3 Ferdinand's policy is ably described in K.J.Dillon, *King and Estates in the Bohemian Lands, 1526–64* (Brussels, 1976).

4 Figures on Protestant strength from G.Mecenseffy, *Geschichte des Protestantismus inÖsterreich* (Graz and Cologne, 1956); G.Reingrabner, *Adel und Reformation. Beiträge zur Geschichte des protestantischen Adels im Lande unter der Enns während die 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts* (Vienna, 1976: Forschungen zur Landeskunde von Niederösterreich, XXI); and *idem, Protestantismus in Niederösterreich* (Vienna, 1977: Wissenschaftliche Schriftenreihe Niederösterreich, XXVII). For monastic strength and weakness see Evans, *Making of the Habsburg Monarchy,* 4. It should be noted, however, that the Protestants only had seventy-eight pastors in Lower Austria by 1580 (Chesler, 'Crown, lords and God', 63).

5 Quoted by Schulze, *Landesdefension und Staatsbildung,* 70 n. 119. A slightly different version is given by Franzl, *Ferdinand II,* 17. Perhaps the preacher exaggerated: the permanent imposition of *Türkensteuer* in the sixteenth century in fact enabled many other princes to gain a measure of financial independence from their Estates.

6 Quoted by Schulze, *op. cit.,* 82.

7 Information from A.Posch, 'Aus dem kirchlichen Visitationsbericht 1617', in Novotny and Sutter, eds, *Innerösterreich, 1564–1619,* 197–232, at p. 229; and Reingrabner, *Geschichte des Protestantismus,* 3. There was no printing press at Innsbruck until 1558 and none at Graz until 1559, which inhibited the spread of Protestantism. In Vienna, by contrast, seventeen Lutheran tracts had been printed by 1521!

8 See Evans, *Making of the Habsburg Monarchy,* 45.
9 Quoted by Bireley, *Religion and Politics,* 133–4.
10 See Evans, *Rudolf II,* 41–2, and *Habsburg Monarchy, 39–40,* for further discussion of these points.
11 Evans, *Habsburg Monarchy,* 18; K.Benda, 'Hungary in turmoil, 1580–1620', *European Studies Review,* VIII (1978), 281–304, at p. 295.
12 See Sturmberger, 'Bruderzwist', for details. There had already been a meeting of the Archdukes in 1600, at Schottwein, to discuss Rudolf's alarming incompetence: see K.Vocelka, *Die politische Propaganda Kaiser Rudolfs II (1576–1612)* (Vienna, 1981), 311–16. It has been suggested that the emperor attempted to take his own life in 1600; certainly after that year his behaviour became more erratic (see Evans, *Rudolf II,* 63—and, on Rudolf's personality in general, all of chapter 2).
13 The treaty was renewed five times between 1615 and 1628. See K.Teply, *Die Kaiserliche Grossbotschaft an Sultan Murad IV, 1628. Des Freiherrn Hans Ludwig von Kuefsteins Fahrt zur hohen Pforte* (Vienna, n.d.). See also Heinisch, 'Habsburg, die Pforte und der Böhmische Aufstand, 1618–20', *passim*.
14 Vocelka, *Politische Propaganda,* 311–12 and 314, quotes and discusses the *Liste von Gravamina*. The original is in Vienna, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, *Familienakten,* fasz. 1.
15 There is a rather dull but very thorough biography of this crucial figure by H. Sturmberger, *Georg Erasmus Tschernembl: Religion, Libertät und Widerstand. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Gegenreformation und des Landes ob der Enns* (Linz, 1953). Not much work has been done on Tschernembl since then, but there is an interesting description of his library in *Der oberösterreichische Bauernkrieg 1626,* 137–43. The list of his books, compiled after 1621 by the Jesuits of Linz who secured them, included 1,897 titles (248 of them duplicates): Calvin, Duplessis-Mornay, François Hotman, Luther, Machiavelli and Peter Ramus were all represented. His treatise on resistance was composed *circa* 1600. Tschernembl also possessed a 1612 edition of Mercator's Atlas.

I.ii Germany before the war

1 Maurice of Hesse-Kassel to Louis XIII, 23 March 1615, quoted by A.D. Lublinskaya, *Frantsiya v nachale XVII veka* (Leningrad, 1959), 186. There is, unfortunately, no other edition of this important work: although an English translation was made some years ago by Mr Brian Pearce, it remains unpublished.
2 On Maurice and his world, see E.van den Boogaart, ed., *Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen, 1604–1679. A humanist prince in Europe and Brazil* (The Hague, 1979), 17–38; and also Gräf, *Konfession*. On Maurice's militia see: G.Thies, *Territorialstaat und Landesverteidigung. Das Landesdefensionswerk in Hessen-Kassel unter Landgraf Moritz, 1592–1627* (Darmstadt, 1973: Quellen und Forschungen zur hessischen Geschichte, XXV).
3 Details from J.Petersohn, 'Die Landesdefension in Herzogtum Preussen zu Beginn des 17. Jahrhunderts', *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung, χ* (1961), 226–37; G.Oestreich, *Geist und Gestalt des frühmodernen Staates* (Berlin, 1969—an outstanding collection of essays), 1–79 and 300–55; and R.Naumann, *Das Kursächsiche Defensionswerk (1613–1709)* (Leipzig, 1917). There were two arsenals at Dresden, capital of Electoral Saxony: one, for the army, in the Albertinum, which has now been dispersed; the second, containing precious items for the Elector and his courtiers, in the Johanneum. The inventory of the latter dated 1606, and running to 1,500 manuscript pages, indicates the size of the collection even then; today it includes some 10,000 items from the early modern period: 1,400 pistols, 1,600 long arms and 2,200 swords and daggers, as well as horse and body armour and all the accoutrements. John George I's principal contribution to the collection during his long reign (1611–56) was, appropriately enough for the Chief Imperial Huntsman, a vast collection of equipment for the chase.

4 P.Charpentrat, ‘Les villes, le mécénat princier et 1’image de la ville idéale dans 1’Allemagne de la fin du XVIe et du XVIIe siècles: 1’exemple du Palatinat—Heidelberg et Mannheim’, in P.Francastel, ed., *L’urbanisme de Paris et I’Europe 1600–1680* (Paris, 1969), 267–74 and plate 146. See also K.Wolf, ‘Von der Einführung der allgemeinen Wehrpflicht in Kurpfalz um 1600’, *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins,* LXXXIX (1936–7), 638–704.

5 None of these masterworks of baroque military architecture now survives: Hanau is virtually a suburb of Frankfurt; Ehrenbreitstein, completely rebuilt in the nineteenth century by the Prussian government, is now the National Monument to the German Army. Philippsburg’s fortifications have been razed. All that remains of the great fortress is a few street names, the moat which defended one bastion, the ceremonial spade used by Bishop Sötern to turn the first sod of his proud citadel (in the town museum), and some pages of Grimmelshausen’s novel *Simplicissimus* (for the hero spent some time in the 1630s billeted there). Admittedly Breisach, because of its superb natural position on a rock outcrop above the Rhine, still retains its seventeenth-century appearance, but most of the defences now visible date from the period of French occupation under Louis XIV and XV.

6 John Taylor, *Three weekes, three daies and three houres observations and travel from London to Hamburgh* (London, 1617), 6. Taylor (1580–1653) wrote this and many other pieces to make fun of the more serious travelogues of Thomas Coryat and others; but he nevertheless undertook his journeys in person. In the same year he went on a sort of sponsored walk from London to the Scottish Highlands (narrated in his *Penniless Pilgrimage*), and in 1619 he walked to Bohemia and back (see *An Englishman’s love to Bohemia*).

7 Quoted by H.G.R.Reade, *Sidelights on the Thirty Years’ War,* I (London, 1924), 183.

8 Thomas Coryat, *Coryat’s Crudities, hastily gobled up in five moneths travells… newly digested…and now dispersed to the nourishment of the travelling members of this kingdom* (London, 1611), 443–628, cover ‘my observations of some parts of High Germany’. John Taylor, on his journey through north-west Germany in 1617, noted the number of wooden crosses along all the roads of Westphalia marking the spots where travellers had been murdered by brigands (see *Three weekes,* 36–7). Fynes Moryson, *An itinerary* (London, 1617), gives less detail on what the traveller saw, but in compensation provides far more information on prices, distances and useful tips for tourists. The facts he gave have been tabulated and confirmed by A.Maczak, *Travel in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 1995); and by W. von Hippel, ‘Bevölkerung und Wirtschaft im Zeitalter des dreissigjährigen Krieges. Das Beispiel Württembergs’, *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung,* V (1978), 413–48.

9 See Thies, *Territorialstaat,* 18–19; F.Boersma, ‘De diplomatieke reis van Daniel van der Meulen en Nicholaes Bruyninck naar het Duitse Leger bij Emmerik, Augustus 1599’, *Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis van de Nederlanden,* LXXXIV (1969), 24–66.

10 On the Circles see Dotzauer, *Die deutschen Reichskreise;* J.A.Vann, *The Swabian Kreis. Institutional growth in the Holy Roman Empire 1648–1715* (Brussels, 1975); F.Magen, ‘Die Reichskreise in der Epoche des dreissigjährigen Krieges’, *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung,* IX (1982), 409–60; and R. Endres, ‘Zur Geschichte des fränkischen Reichskreises’, *Würzburger Diözesangeschichtsblätter,* XXIX (1968), 168–83; on the Knights, see M.J.Le Gates, The Knights and the problems of political organization in sixteenth-century Germany’, *Central European History,* VII (1974), 99–136; and T.J.Glas-Hochstettler, The Imperial Knights in post-Westphalian Mainz: a case study of corporatism in the Old Reich’, *ibid.,* XI (1978), 131–49.

11 H.Hiegel, *Le bailliage d’Allemagne de 1600 à 1632. L’administration, la justice, les finances et I’organisation militaire* (Saarguemines, 1961), 148–50: over 200 marker stones, many bearing the arms of Lorraine and each four feet high, were erected between 1605 and 1608; more stones had been erected in 1602–4 by order of Frederick IV of the Palatinate. The tolls on the Elbe in the 1670s are shown in the map of K.Blaschke, ‘Elbschiffahrt und Elbzölle im

17. Jahrhundert', *Hansische Geschichtsblätter,* LXXXII (1964), 42–54, at p. 48. On the Rhine tolls, see Coryat, *Coryat's crudities,* 569 ff.

12 There is an excellent description of the composition of the Diet at this time in Bierther, *Der Regensburger Reichstag von 1640/1641,* 48–57. See also the more general surveys of H.Weber, 'Empereur, Electeurs et Diète de 1500 a 1650', *Revue d'histoire diplomatique,* LXXXIX (1975), 281–97; G.Buchda, 'Reichsstände und Landstände in Deutschland im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert', *Standen en Landen,* XXXVI (1965), 193–226; and K.O.Freiherr von Aretin, *Heiliges Römisches Reich 1776–1806. Reichsverfassung und Staatssouveränität,* I (Wiesbaden, 1967), 1–110 (which examine the institutions of the Empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries).

13 W.Schulze has shown in two recent articles that financial embarrassment was far more serious among German rulers than previously thought: 'Reichstage und Reichssteuern im späten 16. Jahrhundert', *Zeischrift für historische Forschung,* II (1975), 43–58; and 'Die Erträge der Reichssteuern zwischen 1576 und 1606', *Jahrbuch für die Geschichte Mittel- und Ostdeutschlands,* XXVII (1978), 169–85. See also Petersen, 'From domain state to tax state'.

14 For estimates of Germany's pre-war population see H.Kellenbenz's chapter in C.H.Wilson and G.Parker, eds, *Introduction to the Sources of European Economic History 1500–1800* (London, 1977), especially pages 191–6. There is a masterly discussion of the nature of the pre-war crisis in Germany by H. Schilling in P.Clark, ed., *The European Crisis of the 1590s* (London, 1984), 135–56. I am most grateful to Professor Schilling for allowing me to see his paper in advance of publication.

15 E.Klein, *Geschichte der öffentlichen Finanzen in Deutschland 1500–1870* (Wiesbaden, 1974), 8–26. See also C.P.Clasen's chapter in Trevor-Roper, *Age of Expansion*.

16 Maximilian to Duke William, 21 June 1598, quoted by H.Dollinger, 'Kurfürst Maximilian I.von Bayern und Justus Lipsius. Eine Studie zur Staatstheorie eines frühabsolutistischen Fürsten', *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte,* XLVI (1964), 227–308.

17 On the Estates of Bavaria see Carsten, *Princes and Parliaments,* chap. 5; and K. Bosl, *Die Geschichte der Repräsentation in Bayern. Landständische Bewegung, Landständische Verfassung, Landesausschuss und altständische Gesellschaft* (Munich, 1974).

18 On the Augsburg settlement, see H.Tüchle, The peace of Augsburg: New Order or lull in the fighting?' in H.J.Cohn, ed., *Government in Reformation Europe 1520–1560* (London, 1971), 145–65; T.Klein, 'Minorities in central Europe in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries', in A.C.Hepburn, ed., *Minorities in History* (London, 1979: Historical Studies, XII), 31–50; Holborn, *A History of Modern Germany,* 243–6 and chapters 10 and 11; and Bireley, *Religion and Politics* 25–6. I am grateful to Fr Bireley for discussions which cleared up some of my misconceptions about the Peace.

19 On the war of Cologne see M.Lossen, *Der Kölnische Krieg* (2 vols, Munich, 1897); G.von Lojewski, *Bayerns Weg nach Köln. Geschichte der bayerischen Bistumspolitik in der zweiten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts* (Bonn, 1962: Bonner Historische Forschungen, XXI); and D.Albrecht, 'Das konfessionelle Zeitalter', in M.Spindler, ed., *Handbuch der bayerischen Geschichte,* II (Munich, 1969), 358–61.

20 Most of the exceptions concerned Imperial Free Cities, several of which until 1593 claimed the *ius reformandi* and Protestantized their church order: see K. von Greyerz, *The Late City Reformation in Germany*. *The case of Colmar 1522–1628* (Wiesbaden, 1980), and H.Schilling, 'Burgerkämpfe in Aachen zu Beginn des 17. Jahrhunderts. Konflikte im Rahmen der alteuropäischen Stadtgesellschaft oder im Umkreis der frühbürgerlichen Revolution', *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung,* I (1974), 175–231. Colmar (1575) and Aachen (1581) apart, Essen (1563), Hagenau (1565) and Aalen (1575) also adopted the Reformation after the Augsburg settlement.

21 [Andreas Erstenberger], *De Autonomia, das ist, von Freystellung mehrerlay Religion und Glauben* (written c. 1580; printed Munich, 1586). See the learned discussion of this work

and of its significance in M.Heckel, '*Autonomia und Pacis Compositio:* Der Augsburger Religionsfriede in der Deutung der Gegenreformation', *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Kanonistische Abteilung,* XLV (1959), 141–248.

22 References from Heiss, 'Konfession, Politik und Erziehung'; E.Schubert, 'Gegenreformation in Franken', *Jahrbuch für fränkische Landesforschung,* XXVIII (1968), 275–307; and J.Meier, 'Die katholische Erneuerung des Würzburger Landskapitels Karlstadt im Spiegel der Landskapitelsversammlungen und Pfarreivisitationen, 1579–1624', *Würzburger Diözesangeschichtsblätter,* XXXIII (1971), 51–125. Bishop Julius's efforts to end clerical concubinage were not immediately successful because, as he told his chapter in 1581, 'the peasants of their own free will come themselves to the young priests and present their daughters, and a dowry too' (page 80). Not surprisingly, twenty-six of the twenty-nine priests affected by the episcopal visitation of 1579 had a concubine, as did 50 per cent of those visited in 1588. Not until 1619 had the practice entirely disappeared. See also the admirable collection of essays, F.Merzbacher, ed., *Julius Echter und seine Zeit* (Würzburg, 1973).

23 J.Köhler, *Das Ringen um die tridentische Erneuerung im Bistum Breslau: vom Abschluss des Konzils bis zur Schlacht am Weissen Berg, 1564–1620* (Vienna and Cologne, 1973), 155–6. Between 1564 and 1620, sixty-four young men from the 'German college' came to the diocese of Wroclaw (Breslau) in Silesia.

24 The Calvinization of the Palatinate is covered by O.Chadwick, The making of a Reforming Prince: Frederick III Elector Palatine', in R.B.Knox, ed., *Reformation, Conformity and Dissent. Essays in honour of Dr. Geoffrey Nuttall* (London, 1977), 44–69; and B.Vogler, *Le clergé protestant rhénan au siècle de la Réforme 1555–1619* (Strasbourg, 1967). The polemics between the Lutherans and Calvinists in Hesse and elsewhere are discussed by H.Gross, *Empire and Sovereignty: a history of the Public Law Literature in the Holy Roman Empire 1599–1804* (2nd edn, Chicago, 1975), 105ff.

25 On the brief but tempestuous reign of Christian I, father of John George, see T.Klein, *Der Kampf um die zweite Reformation in Kursachsen, 1586–91* (Cologne and Graz, 1962). For the religious change in Brandenburg, the importance of which is often overlooked, see B.Nischan, *Prince, People and Confession;* E.Faden, *Berlin im dreissigjährigen Krieg* (Berlin, 1927), 136ff.; and O.Hintze, 'Calvinism and Raison d'État in early seventeenth-century Brandenburg', in F.Gilbert, ed., *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze* (Oxford, 1975), 88–154. On the 'second Reformation' in the north-west, and for a perceptive general survey of the phenomenon, see Schilling, *Konfessionskonflikt und Staatsbildung*.

26 See Neveux, *Vie spirituelle,* 8–12.

27 On urban disturbances, see C.R.Friedrichs, 'Subjects or citizens? Urban conflict in early modern Germany', in M.U.Chrisman and O.Grundler, eds, *Social Groups and Religious Ideas in the Sixteenth Century* (Kalamazoo, 1978: Studies in Medieval Culture, XIII), chap. 6; and *idem,* 'German town revolts and the 17th-century crisis', *Renaissance and Modern Studies,* XXVII (1983).

28 The best account of the troubles at Donauwörth is by A.de Carmignano, 'La part de S.Laurent de Brindes dans le Ban de Donauwörth, 1607', *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique,* LVIII (1963), 460–86. But see also F.Stieve, *Der Ursprung des dreissigjährigen Krieges. I.Der Kampf um Donauwörth* (Munich, 1875), and R.Breitling, 'Der Streit um Donauwörth 1605/1611. Eine Ergänzung', *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte,* II (1929), 275–98.

29 Quoted by Kossol, *Die Reichspolitik des Pfalzgrafen Philipp Ludwig,* 167.

I.iii The Union, the League and the politics of Europe

1 Schubert, *Camerarius,* 46, 52.

2 van Deursen, *Honni Soit,* 45–6.

3 The dispute over the Cleves-Jülich succession arose from the fact that only John William's four sisters had left heirs and it was not clear whether the duchies could be inherited undivided through the female line. Brandenburg was married to the only daughter of the eldest sister; Neuburg was married to the second sister and argued that their son Wolfgang William had a stronger claim than a daughter. By 1593 Neuburg was prepared to accept a partition, but Brandenburg was not. See Kossol, *Neuburg;* H.Schmidt, 'Pfalz-Neuburgs Sprung zum Niederrhein. Wolfgang Wilhelm von Pfalz-Neuburg und der Jülich-Klevische Erbfolgestreit', in Glaser, ed., *Um Glauben und Reich,* II/i, 77–89; and, above all, Anderson, 'The Jülich-Kleve succession crisis'.

4 As nearest agnate, Neuburg could expect under the terms of the Golden Bull to be appointed administrator of the Palatinate during the minority of Frederick V if, as was widely expected, Frederick IV died in the immediate future. His fervent Lutheranism, however, made him an unpalatable candidate and, in December 1602, Frederick IV revised his will to nominate Neuburg's Calvinist brother Duke John of Pfalz-Zweibrücken instead. When Zweibrücken died in 1604 the will was further revised to transfer the nomination to his son John II, who was ultimately appointed on the death of Frederick IV in October 1610. Neuburg resented his exclusion bitterly.

5 PRO, S.P. 81/9/6, James I to Frederick IV, 8/18 June 1603 (i.e. 8 June Old Style, 18 June New Style).

6 Anhalt's descendants were still demanding repayment as late as 1818! See Bonney, *The King's Debts,* 273.

7*Briefe und Akten,* II, 55–6: Protocol, Rothenburg Assembly, 7–14 August 1608.

8 Quoted by Kossol, *Neuburg,* 218–19.

9 Quoted by Herold, *Ansbach,* 134.

10 E.Sawyer, ed., *Memorials of Affairs of State during the Reigns of Queen Elizabeth and King James I* (London, 1725), III, 83: Winwood to the earl of Salisbury, 2/12 November 1609.

11 Kessel, *Spanien und die geistlichen Kurstaaten,* 59, 66. On the bishops' motives, see Baumgart's chapter in Merzbacher, *Echter*.

12 The refusal of the princes to permit the cities an equal vote to theirs also caused the leagues of the counts of the Wetterau and Franconia to reject invitations to join the Union. See F.Magen, *Reichsgräfliche Politik in Franken. Zur Reichspolitik der Grafen von Hohenlohe am Vorabend und zu Beginn des dreissigjährigen Krieges* (Schwäbisch Hall, 1975: Forschungen aus Württembergisch Franken, X), 114–15, 119.

13 van Deursen, *Honni Soit,* 60.

14 Sawyer, *Memorials,* III, 78:7/17 October 1609. Sir Henry Wotton thought similarly to Winwood: see 'A few humble remembrances upon the proposition of my employment to some of the German princes on my return' (? June 1609), Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Marquess of Salisbury,* XXI (London, 1970), 75–7.

15 Discussed in further detail in Adams, Protestant Cause', 168–9.

16 See *ibid.,* 183–221 *passim*. For the impact of these events in the United Provinces, and on Maurice of Nassau in particular, see van Deursen, *Honni Soit,* 76, 91–101. Christian IV remained neutral at this time through lack of money after the War of Kalmar. Professor E.L.Petersen has kindly drawn my attention to a letter of the king, written early in 1614, in which he lamented that 'ich fuhr meine Persohn [bin] mit gelde itzo nicht versehen…dan ich mit allerhandt wmkosten ihn vergangendem Kriige seindt gewessen' (RAC, Tyske kancelli, udenlandske afdeling II. Brandenburg A.1.8: letters to the Electress of Brandenburg, 12 February-18 April 1614). See also J.Skovgaard, ed., *Kong Christian den Fjerdes egenhaendige Breve,* VIII (Copenhagen, 1947), nos 22, 24–5. Without money of his own, the king had to heed the cautious 'advice' of his council on foreign affairs.

17 In 1612 Nuremberg complained that the princes were dealing with Union affairs at weddings, hunting parties and private meetings: see Herold, *Ansbach,* 152.

18 BGSA, Kasten Schwarz 16688, f. 150, 'PAD' to William Trumbull, 22 July 1614.
19 Schubert, *Camerarius,* 50–1; Herold, *Ansbach,* 171, 184.
20 For the politics of Aachen see Schilling, 'Burgerkämpfe in Aachen'.
21 Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik,* 34; Altmann, *Reichspolitik,* 24.
22 Altmann, *op. cit.,* 13.
23*Ibid.,* 76, 84, 113–14.
24 For Dutch policy in the crisis, see A.Th.van Deursen, *De Val van Wezel* (Kampen, 1967) and Anderson, The Jülich-Kleve succession crisis'.
25 BGSA, Kasten Schwarz 16734, f. 141, Frederick to Winwood, 19 January 1615.
26 For the activities of the cities at the Heilbronn Assembly, see J.Müller, 'Reichsstädtische Politik in den letzten Zeiten der Union', *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Oesterreichischen Geschichtsforschung,* XXXIII (1912), 484–5.
27 Herold, *Ansbach,* 206, 209, 217; Schubert, *Camerarius,* 50–1.
28 Herold, *Ansbach,* 229.
29 BL, Additional MS. 34324, f. 119, Diary of Sir Julius Caesar: notes on privy council meeting on 29 September/9 October 1620. See also NLS, Advocates Library MS. 33.1.12, art. 35, Zweibrücken to James I, 19 March 1612.
30 For the Palatine approaches to Maximilian, see Schubert, *Camerarius,* 82, and Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik,* 35–6. Maximilian's private memorandum on the subject is printed in Altmann, *Reichspolitik,* 480–5. (But see also pp. 199–226 where Altmann discusses the implications of this document.) For Frederick's attempt to gain the support of James I for the scheme and the still mysterious meeting held between him, Bouillon and the English ambassador in France (Sir Thomas Edmondes) at Sedan in July 1617, see BL, Stowe MS. 176, f. 144, Frederick to Edmondes, 21 August 1617; A.Ballesteros y Beretta, ed., *Correspondencia Oficial de Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, Conde de Gondomar* (Madrid, 1936: Documentos Inéditos para la Historia de España, I), 150–1: Gondomar to Archduke Albert, 16 December 1617; and S.R.Gardiner, ed., *Letters and Documents illustrating the Relations between England and Germany …1618–1620,* I (London, 1865: Camden Society, XC), 27–8: *consulta* by Gondomar, 19 January 1619.
31 Altmann, *Reichspolitik,* 199.
32 BGSA, Kasten Schwarz 16688, f. 171, James I to Frederick, 12/22 March 1616.

I.iv The gathering storm

1 Quotations from Sturmberger, 'Die Anfänge des Bruderzwistes in Habsburg', 164; and Franzl, *Ferdinand II,* 116.
2 Quoted in Novotny and Sutter, *Innerösterreich,* 110. Later on, when the Jesuits could boast among their number the confessors of both Maximilian of Bavaria (Adam Contzen) and Ferdinand (William Lamormaini), the General of the Order wrote more than ten times as often to Vienna as to Munich, so frequently was Lamormaini's advice taken by his august charge.
3 See Mecenseffy, *Geschichte des Protestantismus in Oesterreich,* 136; and Reingrabner, *Adel und Reformation,* 17–18.
4 See J.Köhler, 'Franz Kardinal von Dietrichstein, Bischof von Olmütz (1599–1636) und die Prämonstratensen in Mähren', *Archiv für Kirchengeschichte von Böhmen-Mähren-Schlesien,* V (1977), 256–70.
5 Quotations from A.Tenenti, *Piracy and the Decline of Venice, 1580–1615* (Eng. edn, London, 1967), vi, 12,15. On the uzkok war, see Bracewell, *The Uzkoks of Senj;* and, among older studies, P.Geyl, *Christofforo Suriano. Resident van de Serenissime Republiek van Venetië in den Haag, 1616–1623* (The Hague, 1913); S.Gigante, 'Venezia e gli Uscocchi', *Fiume: revista semestrale della società di studi fiumani in Fiume,* IX (1931), 3–87; and H.Valentinitsch, 'Ferdinand II, die innerösterreichischen Länder, und der Gradiskanerkrieg

(1615–18)', in P. Urban and B.Sutter, eds, *Johannes Kepler 1571–1971. Gedenkschrift der Universität Graz* (Graz, 1975), 497–539.

6 On the first Mantuan succession war see A.Bombín Pérez, *La cuestión de Monferrato 1613–1617* (Vitoria, 1976: note, however, that the maps of Spain's Imperial communications included at the back of the book are largely incorrect. The correct itineraries are shown on Map 2 in the present volume.) On the culture of the Gonzaga dukes, see the excellent catalogue of the exhibition displayed in 1981 at the Victoria and Albert Museum: D.Chambers and J.Martineau, eds, *Splendours of the Gonzaga* (London, 1981), especially pages 203–47. There was almost war in Italy in 1610 also, again provoked by the ambitious and fickle duke of Savoy, Charles Emmanuel: see A.Bombín Pérez, 'La Política anti-española de Carlos Manuel I de Saboya, 1607–10', *Cuadernos de investigación histórica,* II (1978), 153–73.

7 Totals from AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas 2a época, 706 and 2059. The Oñate treaty was signed on 20 March 1617 and ratified in July.

8 Franzl, *Ferdinand II,* 169. Heinrich Schütz composed a setting (now lost) of *Apollo and the nine muses* for this occasion. It was practically his first commission as Chapel Director to the Elector of Saxony.

9 There is a fine sonnet by Wordsworth on the Fuentes Fort, and also a description in his wife's journals (1821–2). See: W.Knight, ed., *The Poetical Works of William Wordsworth,* VI (London, 1896), 328–32. See also A.Giussani, *Il forte di Fuentes. Episode e documenti di una lotta secolare per il dominio della Valtellina* (Como, 1905). On the Valtelline crisis of 1618–20, see *The Cambridge Modern History,* IV, chapter 2: The Valtelline'; and A.Rotondò, 'Esuli italiani in Valtellina nel '500', *Rivista storica italiana,* LXXXVIII (1976), 756–91.

10 AGS, Guerra Antigua, 808, unfol., *consulta* of 26 December 1616. In fact the Dutch troops went to help Venice, so hostilities were averted; but the decision illustrates the government's belligerent mood. For an admirable account of developments during the Truce, see Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World,* chapters 1–2, and Brightwell, 'The Spanish system and the Twelve Years' Truce'.

11 Quoted in *The New Cambridge Modern History,* IV (Cambridge, 1970), 280.

12 Quoted by Polišenský, *Thirty Years' War,* 94.

13 See J.V.Polišenský and F.Snider, *War and Society in Europe, 1618–48* (Cambridge, 1978), 202–16.

14 Details from R.Schreiber, *Das Spenderbuch für den Bau der protestantischen Salvatorkirche in Prag, 1610–1615* (Salzburg, 1956).

15 Quoted by J.K.Zeman, 'Responses to Calvin and Calvinism among the Czech brethren (1540–1605)', *American Society for Reformation Research Occasional Papers,* I (1977), 41–52, at page 45.

16 Details from J.Polišenský, 'Die Universität Jena und der Aufstand der Böhmischen Stände in den Jahren 1618–1620', *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena,* VII (1957–8), 441–7; and A.Ernstberger, *Die Universität Nürnberg-Altdorf während des dreissigjährigen Krieges in ihrem Bestande bedroht* (Munich, 1966: Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften philosophische-historische Klasse, Jahrgang 1966, part II).

17 And the hatred was well founded. In 1547 the Ernestine branch was deprived by Charles V of the Electoral title, and most of their lands, in favour of the Albertine branch. The dukes of Saxe-Weimar were descended from the former Electoral family and never forgave either their cousins or the Habsburgs.

18 See R.J.W.Evans, 'Learned societies in Germany in the seventeenth century', *European Studies Review,* VII (1977), 129–51; and M.Bircher and F.van Ingen, eds, *Sprachgesellschaften, Sozietäten, Dichtergruppen* (Hamburg, 1978: Wolfenbütteler Arbeiten zur Barockforschung, VII). The latter note that, of the twenty-three learned societies founded in Germany during the seventeenth century, seven were established in or before 1620 and

thirteen in or before 1649 (page 54). Ironically, so many foreigners belonged to the *Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft* that most of its transactions had to be carried out in French!

Chapter II The indedsive war

1 The importance of faction in the formation of government policy during the 1620s has been argued most convincingly by Simon Adams: see 'The Protestant cause' and 'Spain or the Netherlands: the dilemmas of early Stuart foreign policy'. I have learnt a great deal from both works, and also from frequent discussions with Dr Adams, about these complex matters.

II.i The war for Bohemia

1 AGS, Estado 2503 f. 7, Oñate *parecer* of 30 May 1618; BNM, MS. 18434, unfol., Oñate to the king, 10 January 1619.
2 AGS, Estado 1867, f. 256, Philip III apostil on a consulta of 11 January 1619.
3 Figures from Kessel, *Spanien und die geistlichen Kurstaaten,* 53 n. 171.
4 Details from R.R.Heinisch, *Salzburg im dreissigjährigen Krieg* (Vienna, 1968), 10–11. Salzburg, however, never became a full member of the League—much to Maximilian's chagrin.
5 See Reade, *Sidelights on the Thirty Years' War,* I, 182–3. Savoy's aid had its price, however: the duke asked for the Union's support in his bid to be elected king of Bohemia and, if possible, Holy Roman Emperor, too.
6 Quotation from Toegel, 'Příčiny saského vpádu do Čech', 560 n. 16.
7 M.Lee, ed., *Dudley Carleton to John Chamberlain, 1603–1624* (New Brunswick, 1972), 270–1: letter of 18 September 1619.
8 The treaty is discussed by Geyl, *Christofforo Suriano,* 188–9; and A. van der Essen, 'L'alliance defensive hollando-venétienne de 1619 et I'Espagne', in *Miscellanea historica in honorem Leonis van der Essen* (Louvain, 1947), 819–29.
9 AGS, Estado 2504 f. 110, Pedro de San Juan to Oñate, 21 August 1619. The Palatine vote was originally cast for Maximilian of Bavaria, but the Union leaders demanded unanimity in the final election, so in the end the Palatine vote also went to Ferdinand.
10 Quotations from P.Brightwell, The Spanish system and the Twelve Years' Truce', *English Historical Review,* LXXXIX (1974), 289; and AGS, Estado 1897, f. 375, paper of 10 December 1619.
11 Straub, *Pax et Imperium, 161,* quotes the forecast of the Spanish Council of State that there would be 'eternal war'. See other predictions quoted in G.Parker, *Europe in Crisis 1598–1648* (London, 1979), 163.
12 Lord Digby quoted by Zaller, 'Interest of State', 166.
13 S.R.Gardiner, *Letters and Documents Illustrating the Relations between England and Germany,* II (London, 1868: Camden Society, XCVIII), 7: Carleton to Naunton, 13 September 1619; Smit and Roelevink, eds, *Resolutiën der Staten-Generaal,* n.r. IV, resolutions 332, 585, 759, 1548, 1554, 1779, 3911, 4119, 4178, 4486 and 4535.
14 Quotations from Magen, *Reichsgräfliche Politik in Franken,* 190.
15 Chancellor Lobkovic to Angoulême, quoted by Pages, *Thirty Years' War,* 71.

II.ii Europe and the Palatine war

1 Conway, English envoy in Prague, quoted by Reade, *Sidelights on the Thirty Years' War,* I, 388. Many in England were incredulous; others downcast. Cf. Mr Aylesbury to Sir Henry Martin, 28 November 1620: The news of the overthrow in Bohemia is confirmed, but is too

bad to repeat' (O.Ogle and W.Bliss, eds, *Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers preserved in the Bodleian Library,* I [Oxford, 1872], 19).

2 See the observations of Schubert, *Camerarius,* 96, 194–5. Ferdinand II also employed precedents from the war of the Schmalkaldic League to justify both the publication of the Ban against Frederik in January 1621 without summoning a Diet, and the transfer of the Palatine electorate to Bavaria: Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik,* 49.

3 When Ansbach died in 1625, Christian of Denmark commented savagely 'he should have died seven years ago'. (Quoted by Herold, *Ansbach,* 257–8.)

4 Ten Raa and de Bas, *Het Staatsche Leger,* III, 227–30, 243–4. ARA, Eerste Afdeling, Staten-Generaal, Lias Duitsland 6065 (1622), n.f., Elizabeth, queen of Bohemia, to the States-General, 22 March 1622. See also the comments of Schubert, *Camerarius,* 219–22, and Israel, *The Dutch Republic,* 99,154–7, assessing the policies of Maurice of Nassau.

5 Magen, *Reichsgräfliche Politik,* 228–9; Wertheim, *Braunschweig,* II, 210; Schubert, *Camerarius,* 146. For the Segeberg conference, see Christiansen, *Christians IV,* 43–57, and PRO, S.P. 75/5/235–7, 243–4. Sir Robert Anstruther to Sir George Calvert, 10/20 March, 31 March/10 April 1621. James I provided the security for Christian IV's loan to Frederick: at the time of his death in 1625 both the principal and the interest (18,000 thalers annually) remained outstanding.

6 PRO, S.P. 14/164/11, Bishop Carleton to his brother,? May 1624; W. Notestein, F.H.Relf and H.Simpson, eds, *The Commons Debates for 1621,* V (New Haven, 1935), 203–4. See also, in general, White, 'Suspension of arms'; Straub, *Pax et Imperium,* chapter 5; and M.S.Junkelmann, 'Feldherr Maximilians: Johann Tserclaes, Gräf von Tilly', in Glaser, ed., *Um Glauben und Reich,* II/i, 379–80 (plus copious notes).

7 PRO, S.P. 81/24/42, James to Frederick, 22 April/2 May 1622.

8 See PRO, S.P. 81/26/179–80, Frederick to Elizabeth, 14 August 1622.

9 For French policy toward the Valtelline question, see the two articles by Pithon: 'Les Débuts Difficiles du Ministère de Richelieu' and 'La Suisse, Théâtre de la Guerre Froide'. Spanish policy can be traced in the correspondence and *consultas* of the *consejo de estado* in AGS, Estado K 1492, ff. 20–80; see especially f. 55 for the concern over the military situation in August 1622; ff. 67, 70, 72, 73 for the decision to accept the papal garrisons; and ff. 76, 78 for Olivares's attitude toward the crisis.

10 Digby to Calvert, 12 August 1621, in *State Papers collected by Edward earl of Clarendon,*I (Oxford, 1767), appendix p. xvii.

11 The German edition, *Prodromus,* was published at Emden on 22 March 1622; the Latin version appeared at Amsterdam. Both were the work of the Palatine minister, Ludwig Camerarius. Its 173 pages of document-and-commentary proved sensational—not least because seventeenth-century governments so rarely published official documents—and it was reprinted several times. See Schubert, *Camerarius,* 108–43; and Nolden, *Reichspolitik Kaiser Ferdinands,* 91–7.

12 Quoted by Kessel, *Spanien und die geistlichen Kurstaaten,* 90.

13 It was argued that in 1329, by the treaty of Pavia, the Palatine and Bavarian branches of the Wittelsbach family had agreed that the Electorate should alternate between them, even though the arrangement had never actually operated. But Maximilian's defence betrayed the underlying weakness of the Catholic case, for the reason why the 1329 pact was stillborn lay in the terms of a far more important later document: the Golden Bull of 1356, which vested the Wittelsbach Electorate in the Palatine branch for ever. The treaty of Pavia also detached the Upper Palatinate from Bavaria. See K.F.Krieger, 'Bayerische-Pfälzische Unionsbestrebungen vom Hausvertrag von Pavia (1329) bis zur Wittelsbachischen Hausunion vom Jahre 1724', *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung* IV (1977), 385–413.

14 There is a fine account of the 'Spanish Match' in R.Lockyer, *Buckingham. The life and political career of George Villiers, First Duke of Buckingham 1592–1628* (London, 1981), chapter 5; and of the consequences of its failure in chapter 6.

15 Gustavus Adolphus's propaganda campaign is discussed in S.Arnoldsson, *Krigspropagand i Sverige före Trettioåriga Kriget* (Gothenburg, 1941). We are very grateful to Professor E.L.Petersen for this reference. For Oxenstierna's dominance in the Swedish council see N.Ågren, 'Rise and decline of an aristocracy: the Swedish social and political elite in the seventeenth century', *Scandinavian Journal of History,* I (1976), 55–80. Of seventy-two councillors appointed between 1602 and 1647, no less than fifty-four belonged to a group related to the chancellor and his closest allies.
16 For the war in Poland, see Roberts, *Swedish Imperial Experience,* 33–5, which relies (as does the present account) on A.Norberg, *Polen i svensk politik 1617–1626* (Stockholm, 1974)—described, rightly, by Roberts (p. 33) as perhaps 'the most significant contribution to the debate on the king's foreign policy to appear for forty years'.
17 Camerarius to Baron Rusdorf, 24 December 1623, quoted by Schubert, 'Die pfälzische Exilregierung', 672.
18 Schubert, *Camerarius, 252–4,* 257.
19 For the negotiations leading to the 'French match' see Adams, 'Foreign policy', 157–8. Details of France's resumption of influence on the Rhine, and beyond, are given in Kessel, *Spanien und die geistlichen Kurstaaten,* part III; and Weber, *Frankreich, Kurtrier, passim*.
20 For the complicated terms of the treaty, see Bonney, *King's Debts,* 122.
21 D.L.M.Avenel, ed., *Lettres, Instructions diplomatiques et Papiers d'Etat du Cardinal de Richelieu,* I (Paris, 1853), 85, Richelieu to Sieur Eschieli [= Father Joseph],? May 1625. On the dilemmas of Richelieu's foreign policy, see also the comments of Pithon, 'Débuts Difficiles', 316–18, and Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik,* 124, 127, 144.

II.iii The Danish intermezzo

1 See, on this question, Petersen, 'Defence, war and finance'.
2 On the government of Bremen-Verden, and Christian's relations to Hamburg, respectively, see Schleif, *Regierung und Verwaltung des Erzstifts Bremen am Beginn der Neuzeit,* and H.-D.Loose, *Hamburg und Christian IV. von Dänemark während des dreissigjährigen Krieges* (Hamburg, 1963), chapters I–III.
3 Christiansen, *Die Stellung König Christians IV,* 33; E.Ladewig Petersen, *Christian IV.s pengeudlån til danske adelige. Kongelig foretagervirksomhed og adelig gældsstiftelse 1596–1625* [Christian IV's loans to the Danish nobility. Royal Enterprise and noble indebtedness, 1596–1625] (Copenhagen, 1974), 46–58, 102f., 116–18, 169–71.
4 See BL, MS.Stowe 176 f. 258, Anstruther to Sir Thomas Edmondes, 10 August 1624; PRO, S.P. 84/120/169. Anstruther to Sir Dudley Carleton, 3 November 1624; and S.P. 75/6/30, Abstract of negotiations with Denmark and Sweden, January-February 1625. (References kindly communicated by Dr Simon Adams.)
5 BL, MS.Harley 1584, ff. 29–30, Instructions for Buckingham concerning Denmark, 17/27 October 1625. In the end, the duke managed to persuade the allies to integrate Mansfeld's diminished forces into the Danish army. (My thanks again to Dr Adams.)
6 The text of the 'Hague Convention' is to be found in L.Laursen, ed. *Danmark-Norges Traktater 1523–1750 (Traités du Dänemark et de la Norvège, 1523–1750),* III (Copenhagen, 1916), no. 38; cf. the introduction, pp. 620–37.
7 See, on the battle, the interesting reconstruction by K.J.V.Jespersen, 'Slaget ved Lutter am Barenberg, 1626', *Krigshistorisk tidsskrift,* IX (1973), 80–9.
8 Petersen, 'Defence, war and finance', based upon a study of the royal war ledgers in *Rigsarkivet,* Copenhagen.
9 S.Heiberg, 'De ti tønder guld: Rigsråd, kongemagt og statsfinanser i 1630'erne' [The ten barrels of gold: State council, monarchy and public finance in the 1630s], *Historisk tidsskrift [Dansk].,* LXXVI (1976), 39ff.

10 *Ibid.,* 49–57; on the social and economic consequences of the post-war period, see E.Ladewig Petersen, *Fra rangssamfund til standssamfund, 1550–1700: Dansk socialhistorie,* III (Copenhagen, 1980), 317–413. See also pp. 256–7 below.

Chapter III The Habsburgs victorious

III.ii The practice of absolutism I

1 The most up-to-date survey of the question is A.Klima, 'Inflation in Bohemia in the early stage of the seventeenth century', in M.Flinn, ed., *Seventh International Economic History Conference* (Edinburgh, 1978), 374–86. Figures on the composition of the Bohemian nobility are taken from Polišenský and Snider, *War and Society in Europe 1618–1648,* 202–16, and F.Snider, The restructuring of the Bohemian nobility in the seventeenth century'. There were, naturally, exceptions to this bleak picture—such as the lands owned by Wallenstein (*Terra felix* as his domain was known). Hence Bohemia's grain exports to Saxony, which had averaged 1,800 tons annually in 1597–1621, still averaged 1,300 tons in 1629–43. (See V.Sadova, 'Eksport czeskiego zboza do Niemieć... w okresie przed Biala Gora', *Roczniki dziejów spolecznych i Gospodarczych,* XXII [1960], 37–47.)

2 Friedrichs, *Nördlingen,* 27 n. 45.

3 On the currency fluctuations of the early 1620s, see Kindleberger, The economic crisis of 1619 to 1623'; W.A.Shaw, 'The monetary movements of 1600–21 in Holland and Germany', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society,* new series IX (1895), 189–213; Friedrichs, *Nördlingen,* 27–8, and F.Redlich, 'Die deutsche Inflation des frühen 17. Jahrhunderts in der zeitgenössischen Literatur: die Kipper und Wipper', in H.Kellenbenz, ed., *Forschungen zur internationalen Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* VI (Cologne and Vienna, 1972). It is notable that of forty or so publications condemning the inflation, all of them composed by Lutherans, thirteen were popular tracts, eleven were written by churchmen, but sixteen were produced by jurists (who condemned the coining of cheap money from the standpoint of constitutional law).

4 W.Gegenfurtner, 'Jesuiten in der Oberpfalz. Ihr Wirkung und ihr Beitrag zur Rekatholisierung in den oberpfälzischen Landen, 1621–50', *Beiträge zur Geschichte Bistums Regensburg,* XI (1977), 71–220, at p. 170. See also P.Schertl, 'Die Amberger Jesuiten im ersten Dezennium ihres Wirkens (1621–32)', *Verhandlungen des historischen Vereins für Oberpfalz und Regensburg,* CII (1962), 101–94, and CIII (1963), 257–350.

5 Details from Evans, *Habsburg Monarchy,* 123, and 425–6.

6 See F.Menk, 'Restitution vor dem Restitutionsedikt. Kurtrier, Nassau und das Reich, 1626–9', *Jahrbuch für westdeutsche Landesgeschichte,* V (1979), 103–30—a most important article.

7 See Egler, *Spanier in der linksrheinischen Pfalz,* 134 and map on p. 149; and Kessel, *Spanien und die geistlichen Kurstaaten,* 269ff.

8 On the finances of the League, demonstrating that only Bavaria's contributions were paid promptly or in full, see F.Stieve, 'Das "Contobuch" der deutschen Liga', *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft,* 1st series X (1893), 97–106. Tilly's army cost around 5 million thalers a year and Bavaria paid three times as much to the war-chest in 1619–27 as all the other League members put together. The bishops of Würzburg, for example, may have been mighty warriors in the Lord, but of the 1.4 million thalers they owed in contributions to the Catholic League, 1620–31, less than 500,000 were paid, (See R.Weber, *Würzburg und Bamberg im dreissigjährigen Krieg: die Regierungszeit des Bischofs Franz von Hatzfeldt, 1631–42* [Würzburg, 1979].)

9 *Der oberösterreichische Bauernkrieg,* 8–11; H.Tüchle, ed., *Acta SC de Propaganda Fide, Germaniam Spectantia. Die Protokolle der Propagandakongregation zu deutschen Angelegenheiten 1622–1649* (Paderborn, 1962), 488.
10 Tüchle, *Acta,* 181 (resolution of 4 February 1628).
11 Father Hyacinth to Dr Jocher in May 1624, quoted by W.Goetz, Pater Hyazinth', *Historische Zeitschrift,* CIX (1912), 101–28, at p. 122.
12 Lamormaini quoted by Bireley, *Religion and Politics,* 21.

III.iii The practice of absolutism II

1 See Gross, *Empire and Sovereinty, passim;* and the useful review article of H. Dreitzel, 'Das deutsche Staatsdenken in der frühen Neuzeit', *Neue politische Literatur,* XVI (1971), 17–42. Most helpful of all, however, is the thesis of Nolden, *Die Reichspolitik Kaiser Ferdinands II*.
2 Onno Klopp, 'Das Restitutions-Edikt im nordwestlichen Deutschland', *Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte,* I (1862), 75–132, especially pp. 86–90, which is still the best essay on the subject. John George's patience began to fray when the emperor forced the Protestant canons of Magdeburg to accept his teenage son Leopold William as Administrator, despite the fact that they had already declared their support for John George's son August. (See Ritter, *Deutsche Geschichte,* II, 422–3.)
3 Quoted from Mann, *Wallenstein* [German edn], 369.
4 Kessel, *Spanien und die geistlichen Kurstaaten,* 197n. On the 'Almirantazgo' system and the blockade see Alcalá-Zamora, *España, Flandes y el mar del Norte,* part 2, and Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World,* 204–23. The Elector of Cologne and his fellow prelates clearly suspected that Spain was endeavouring to build up a power-base in the Empire from which to subvert German liberties. They sent envoys to Brussels, and they directed a constant barrage of criticism towards the courts of Vienna and Madrid in an effort to persuade Spain to withdraw her forces. But these spiritual rulers could not afford to protest too loudly: if ever the armies of Frederick V or his allies returned, as they had done in 1622 and 1623, the rich corridor of ecclesiastical territories in the Rhine and Main area would be a prime target. Even as they petitioned for the evacuation of the Palatinate, they felt obliged to plead for guarantees that troops would be sent back from the Netherlands to defend them in case of Protestant attack. Despite their deep desire to remain neutral in the struggle between the Habsburgs and their enemies, the Rhineland prelates were caught in Spain's net for as long as France lacked the power to intervene effectively abroad. The most they could do was refuse to aid Spain's campaigns against the Dutch, in the hope that the war there would prevent the Habsburgs from exploiting their advantage. As the exasperated Elector of Cologne wrote in June 1626: 'The Netherlands must remain divided, with one side controlling just as little territory as the other' (Kessel, *op. cit.,* 190n.).
5 For further details, see K.Beck, *Der hessische Bruderzwist zwischen Hessen Kassel und Hessen-Darmstadt in den Verhandlungen zum westfälischen Frieden von 1644 bis 1648* (Frankfurt, 1978); Thies, *Territorialstaat, passim;* Gräf, *Konfession;* and Keim, 'Landgraf Wilhelm V von Hessen-Kassel'. Maurice abdicated in 1627, in a vain attempt to thwart the sequestration order. Many items belonging to him are displayed in the Landgräfliche Kunstkammer preserved in the Town Museum of Kassel.
6 The ducal palace of Güstrow, extended by Wallenstein, still stands. Besides the antlers of countless giant stags, lavishly mounted and accompanied by helpful notes on the kill by the dukes who shot them, the palace boasts a large collection of hunting weapons and even a dining hall decorated with stags in bas relief bearing real antlers. It was a baroque fantasy which that German Nimrod, John George of Saxony, might have envied.
7 The best account still seems to be that of Gindely, *Waldstein während seines ersten Generalats,* who shows how Wallenstein's actions polarized the various Catholic and Lutheran factions of Germany in reaction to his brutally destructive military methods. It is

worth also re-examining the debate of the 1880s between Hallwich and Gindely about Wallenstein's economic motives and methods, which seems to be as fresh now as it was then, despite all the biographical and archival work on Wallenstein undertaken in recent years by Golo Mann, H.Diwald,J.Kollmann, P.Suvanto, J.Polišenský and others: compare Anton Gindely, *Zur Beurtheilung des kaiserlichen Generals im dreissigjährigen Krieg, Albrechts von Waldstein* (Prague, 1887), with the same author's *Zweite Antwort an Dr. Hallwich* (Vienna, 1887). Despite the attempt of M. Ritter, 'Das Kontributionssystem Wallensteins', *Historische Zeitschrift,* LV (1903), 193–249, to show that Wallenstein kept good military discipline, the fact remains that the cost of his army was too great to be borne by anyone in the long term. As yet, the last word remains with F.H.Schubert, 'Wallenstein und der Staat des 17. Jahrhunderts', *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht,* XVI (1965), 597–611 [reprinted in Rudolf, ed., *Der dreissigjährige Krieg,* 185–207], who saw him as a financier and military mercantilist, far too impatient to be able to influence at a stroke Imperial foreign policy with its laboriously entangled confessionalism and bureaucracy.

8 Hans Schulz, ed., *Der dreissigjährige Krieg,* I (Leipzig, 1917), document 21: Wallenstein to Ferdinand, 6 July 1626. An earlier plea along similar lines is contained in a letter of Wallenstein to Ferdinand, from Stötterlingenburg, 25 October 1625, in J.Kollmann, ed., *Documenta Bohemica Bellum Tricennale illustrantia, IV, 1625–30* (Prague, 1974), document 88.

9 On Bishop Franz Wilhelm, see Klopp, 'Das Restitutionsedikt' (note 2 above); also T.Tupetz, *Der Streit um die Geistlichen Güter und das Restitutionsedikt 1629* (Vienna, 1883). J.H.Gebauer, *Kurbrandenburg und das Restitutionsedikt von 1629* (Halle, 1899) shows how politically unwise extreme Catholics were prepared to be. Above all, see H.Günter, *Das Restitutionsedikt von 1629 und die katholische Restauration Altwirtembergs* (Stuttgart, 1901).

10 Bireley, *Religion and Politics,* 54, quoting Ferdinand's Instructions to his representative (Stralendorf) at Mühlhausen, 4 October 1627. Clearly, the emperor came under some pressure on this point.

11 The Edict is printed in M.C.Lundorp, ed., *Acta publica,* III (Frankfurt, 1668), 1048–54. Over 100 copies still survive of the various editions—a surprisingly large number. For details on how it was published, see H.Urban, 'Druck und Drucke des Restitutionsedikts von 1629', *Archiv für Geschichte des Buchwesens,* XIV (1974), cols 609–54—the *Radix omnium malorum* copy is reproduced at col. 635. Further discussion of the Edict's preparation and significance may be found in Bireley, *op. cit.,* 52–9 and 74–94.

12 'Quicquid concessum non reperitur, prohibitum censeri debet': see *Pacis compositio inter principes et ordines catholicos atque Augustanae confessionis adhaerentes* (Dillingen, 1629), Bk VI, chapter 37, paras 4–7. On Laymann and the 'Dillingen book', sponsored by Bishop Knöringen of Augsburg and distributed with the blessing of the Imperial Privy Council, see Heckel, 'Autonomia und Pacis Compositio', and R.Bireley, The origins of the "Pacis Compositio" (1629): a text of Paul Laymann S.J.', *Archivum historicum societatis lesu,* XLII (1973), 106–27.

13 There is a splendid account of the siege in *Monro his expedition,* part I, 62–80 ('Trailesound'=Stralsund). For a modern, more comprehensive account of the city and its history, see: H.Langer, *Stralsund 1600–1630: eine Hansestadt in der Krise und im europäischen Konflikt* (Weimar, 1970).

14 Schulz, *Der dreissigjährige Krieg,* document 33.

15 Kollmann, ed., *Documenta Bohemica,* IV, 414–46. Although the figures represent only paper-strength, they indicate the scale of the problem. The cost was, of course, awesome. The archbishopric of Magdeburg reckoned its expenditure on contributions by September 1627 at 687,000 thalers; the duchy of Pomerania claimed to have paid 1.7 million by July 1628; and so on.

16 See Klopp, *op. cit.,* 815, 853. The *Kurfürstentag* at Mühlhausen, a Free City in Thuringia, was used by Elector John George as a stage for self-advertisement. He commissioned his court composer, Heinrich Schütz, to write the work *Da pacem* for the occasion. It included an anthem for two choirs, one singing outside the assembly point as each Elector arrived, the other within, intoning the Latin collect for peace. See R.Petzoldt, *Heinrich Schütz and his times in pictures* (Kassel and London, 1972).
17*Die Politik Maximilians I. von Bayern, 4.ii, 1628-Juni 1629,* 348.
18 See the excellent account of these campaigns in Israel, *The Dutch Republic,* 162–81.

III.iv Spain and the war

1 Olivares to count of Gondomar, quoted in Brown and Elliott, *A Palace for a King,* 190.
2 AGS, Estado 2331 f. 126, Olivares in the Council of State, 10 November 1630.
3 A Junta of the Council of State, meeting on 2 June 1625, recommended that the proposed alliance should not be based on religious affiliation—an argument with which Olivares concurred, on the grounds that Saxony's participation was indispensable (AGS, Estado 2327 ff. 371 and 372).
4 Straub, *Pax et Imperium,* 285n.: opinion from December 1627. The Spanish government tried to avoid declaring war on Denmark even as late as June 1626, 'because we find ourselves with so many inescapable enemies, it does not seem right to seek more deliberately'. Olivares believed that the Habsburgs should learn to live with the Lutherans. (Günter, *Die HabsburgerLiga,* 14 n. 53: Olivares's opinion dated 20 June 1626.) On the suspicions in Paris, see Lutz, *Kardinal Giovanni Francesco Guidi di Bagno,* book II.
5 C.Seco Serrano, *Cartas de Sor María de Jesús de Ágreda y de Felipe IV,* I (Madrid, 1958: Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, CVIII), 28: letter of Philip IV, Zaragoza, 20 July 1645 (thus written over two years after the fall of Olivares); Q.Aldea Vaquero, *España, el Papado y el Imperio durante la Guerra de los Treinta Años. II Instrucciones a los nuncios apostólicos en España (1624–32)* (Comillas, 1958), 32: Urban VIII's instructions to nuncios, 1 May 1632.
6 In this he may well have been correct. See the analysis of the political views of Ferdinand's leading advisers in Bireley, *Religion and Politics,* chapter 1. Certainly Eggenberg went to Spain in 1598–9 and 1605 and collected Spanish objets d'art and books—his library included *Don Quixote* and a complete edition of Lope's plays (extensively annotated by Eggenberg). The prince's splendid castle, built just outside Graz in the early seventeenth century, could almost pass as Spanish.
7 AGS, Estado 2331 f. 126, Olivares in the Council of State, 10 November 1630.
8 However, by insisting on his right to invest the new duke of Mantua, the emperor at least made one gain from the war: he established for all time his rights of suzerainty over the states of northern Italy. Never again would they be challenged. But this development, which smoothed the path to eventual direct rule by Austria between the Alps and the Po, lay far in the future. For the moment, Habsburg humiliation was as visible in Vienna as it was in Madrid. See K.O.von Aretin, 'Die Lehensordnungen in Italien im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert und ihre Auswirkungen auf die europäische Politik', in H.Weber, ed., *Politische Ordnungen und soziale Kräfte im Alten Reich* (Wiesbaden, 1980: Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für europäische Geschichte Mainz. Abteilung Universalgeschichte. Beiheft VIII), 53–84—especially pp. 57–9 and 77.

Chapter IV Total war

1 See the interesting study of Gross, *Empire and Sovereinty,* on the Public Law' debate. See also O.Brunner, 'Souveränitätsproblem und Sozialstruktur in den deutschen Reichsstädten

der frühen Neuzeit', *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial und Wirtschaftsgeschichte,* L (1963), 329–60, especially pp. 347–51. There is a clear parallel here with the 'Ancient Constitution' debate in early Stuart England: in both countries, the language of law dominated the vocabulary of politics.

2 Figures from P.Hohenemser, ed., *Flugschriftensammlung Gustav Freytag* (Frankfurt, 1925), nos 4771–5794. Admirable collections of popular literature about the war may be found in D.Alexander and W.L.Strauss, *The German Single-Leaf Woodcut 1600–1700. A pictorial catalogue* (New York, 1978); E.A. Beller, *Caricatures of the 'Winter King' of Bohemia* (Oxford, 1928); *idem, Propaganda in Germany during the Thirty Years' War* (Princeton, 1940); M. Bohatcová, *Irrgarten des Schicksals: Einblattdrucke vom Anfang des dreissigjährigen Krieges* (Prague, 1966); W.A.Coupe, *The German Illustrated Broadsheet of the Seventeenth Century* (2 vols, Baden-Baden, 1966–7); and J.R.Paas, *The German Political Broadsheet, 1600–1700* (4 vols to date; vol. IV, 1622–9, Wiesbaden, 1994).

3 P.Rassow, *Die geschichtliche Einheit des Abendlandes* (Cologne and Graz, 1960), 306.

IV.i On the edge of the abyss

1 Bireley, *Religion and Politics,* 125: the account was by Kaspar Schoppe (Scioppius), an anti-Jesuit Catholic polemicist. It would seem that the Protestants did not expect any concessions on the Edict of Restitution. And yet the emperor gained surprisingly little from maintaining it: although thirty-seven Imperial cities suffered from strictly illegal attempts to implement the Edict, in only seven was a clear change of political regime effected.

2 On papal diplomacy during the later 1620s, see Lutz, *Kardinal Giovanni Francesco Guidi di Bagno,* book II; Aldea, *España, el Papado y el Imperio;* and *idem,* 'La neutralidad de Urban VIII'. On the French campaigns in Italy, see J. Humbert, *Les Français en Savoie sous Louis XIII* (Paris, 1960).

3 Quoted by O'Connell, 'A cause célèbre in the history of treaty-making', 84.

4 The Catholic Electors to the Bishop of Bamberg, Regensburg, 18 December 1630', in M.C.Lundorp, *Der Römischen Kayserlichen Majestät und Dess Heiligen Römischen Reichs…Acta Publica,* IV (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1668), 103.

5 See Matthias Hoë von Hoënegg, *Homiliae über den 83 Psalm, so zu Leipzig in dem Convent der Evangelischen und Protestierenden Chur-Fürsten und Ständen, den 10. Februarij, Anno 1631 Erkläret, und auff jnständiges anhalten und begehren in Truck gegeben* (n.p., 1631).

6 Bergius's influence in Brandenburg church politics is discussed in Bodo Nischan, 'John Bergius: Irenicism and the beginning of official religious toleration in Brandenburg-Prussia', *Church History,* LI (1982), 389–404; and *idem,* 'Calvinism, the Thirty Years' War, and the beginning of Absolutism in Brandenburg: the political thought of John Bergius', *Central European History,* XV (1982), 203–23. His Leipzig sermons were published under the title *Brüderliche Eynträchtigkeit Auss dem Hundert Drey und Dreyssigsten Psalm Bey der Protestirenden Evangelischen Chur-Fürsten und Stände Zusammenkunfft zu Leipzig Anno 1631…in Drey Predigten erkläret* (Frankfurt-an-der-Oder, 1635).

7 See Johannes Bergius, *Abermaliger Abdruck der Relation der Privat-Conferentz, welche bey währendem Convent der Protestirenden Evangelischen Chur-Fürsten vnd den Ständen zu Leipzig im Jahr 1631. Monats Martii zwischen den anwesenden beyderseits Evangelischen, so wol Lutherischen als Reformirten Theologen gehalten worden* (Berlin, 1644). The protocol is also found in Wolfgang Gericke, *Glaubenszeugnisse und Konfessionspolitik der Brandenburgischen Herrscher bis zur Preussischen Union, 1540 bis 1815* (Bielefeld, 1977), 143–56.

8 ZSM, Rep. 21. 127 p. I, pp. 27–9. Minutes of the Leipzig conference. See also Bodo Nischan, 'Brandenburg's Reformed Räte and the Leipzig Manifesto'.

9 The Leipzig Manifesto is found in Lundorp, *Acta Publica,* IV, pp. 144–6; and J.P.Abelin, *Theatrum Europaeum,* II (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1646), 309–11.

10 See Aldea, *España, el Papado y el Imperio,* 34: Urban VIII's instructions to nuncios going to Spain, 1 May 1632. Maximilian's fears were not unfounded: by the so-called 'Cottington treaty', concluded after the peace of Madrid (which put an end to the Anglo-Spanish conflict in 1630), Spain did make a vague commitment to 'do right' in the Palatinate. See Simon Adams, 'Spain or the Netherlands: the dilemmas of early Stuart Foreign Policy', 100.

11 See Bireley, *Maximilian von Bayern, Adam Contzen,* 168f. On papal promotion of a Franco-Bavarian peace see Aldea, 'Neutralidad', 174f. Some historians have neglected the papacy's role in all this because of the silence of certain sources; however, Bagno's correspondence (now among the Barberini Manuscripts of the Vatican archives) affords ample proof. In fact Bagno devoted more space to the Franco-Bavarian negotiations, in his dispatches to Rome between 1628 and 1631, than to any other item. He tried to keep his involvement secret—in a letter to the Bavarian councillor Jocher he noted, This matter must be kept most secret, because it might seriously affect my dealings with Spain if it were known that I am involved in creating a close union between France and Bavaria'—but the truth emerged when Bagno's Paris apartment was burgled by a Spanish spy (Bireley, *Religion and Politics,* 160).

12 The text of the treaty of Fontainebleau is given by Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik,* 378–9.

IV.ii The intervention of Sweden

1 An English version of the *Kriegsmanifest* is printed in G.Symcox, ed., *War, Diplomacy and Imperialism 1618–1763* (London, 1974), 102–13.

2 Quotations from D.Böttcher, Propaganda und öffentliche Meinung im protestantischen Deutschland, 1628–36', *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte,* XLIV (1952), 181–203, at pp. 191–4(reprinted in Rudolf, *Dreissigjährige Krieg,* 325–67); and Roberts, *Essays in Swedish history,* 84. The exact nature of Sweden's war aims in 1630–1 remains murky, since the available evidence is all open to objection. Thus it might be argued that the Manifesto was moderate in tone because that is the essence of such documents. And Oxenstierna in 1636 might have become more cautious following Sweden's defeat at Nördlingen; or he might have been merely repeating the cautious policies that he (rather than his more impulsive king) had sought to follow in 1630. See further discussion of Sweden's war aims at pp. 140–5 and 163–5 above.

3 The cost to Sweden of the Prussian campaigns, 1626–9, has been estimated at 5 million thalers: Petersen, 'Defence, war and finance', 35.

4 Quoted in K.R.Böhme, 'Das Amt Memel in schwedischer Sequestratur (Nov. 1629-Jul. 1635)', *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung,* XVIII (1969), 655–703, at p. 657. On the tolls see E.Wendt, *Det Svenska Licentväsendet i Preussen, 1627–35* (Uppsala, 1933), 89, 98, 107, 184–202. There is a good discussion of the peace talks in J.K.Fedorowicz, *England's Baltic Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century*. *A study in Anglo-Polish commercial diplomacy* (Cambridge, 1980), 189–206.

5 There has been much exaggeration of the Russian subsidy: over the entire period 1629–33, Sweden only gained 160,000 thalers from this source. See the figures and the discussion of L.Ekholm, 'Rysk spannmål och svenska krigsfinanser, 1629–33', *Scandia,* XL (1974), 57–103, partially reprinted in Ekholm, *Svensk krigfinansiering*.

6 Events were to show that Richelieu had no means of forcing his ally to comply with these restrictive terms. The treaty is published in *Sverges Traktater,* V, 438–40, and discussed in detail in Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus,* II, 466–9. An English translation of the main clauses is provided in Roberts, *Sweden as a Great Powver,* 136–8.

7 Böhme, *art. cit.,* 701; Ekholm, *Svensk krigsfinansiering, passim*. See also the larger, earlier study of K.R.Böhme, *Die schwedische Besetzung des Weichseldeltas 1626–36* (Würzburg, 1963: Beihefte zum Jahrbuch der Albertus-Universität Königsberg, XXII).

8 Newspapers, pamphlets and broadsheets describing the sack, which ranged from exoneration (published in Munich) to accusations of criminal brutality (according to Leipzig) are

described and analysed by W.Lahne, *Magdeburgs Zerstörung in der Zeitgenössischen Publizistik* (Magdeburg, 1931; a tricentennial commemoration). See also N.Henningsen, ed., *Die Zerstörung Magdeburgs 1631. Eine Darstellung der historischen Begebenheiten nach Otto von Guerickes Handschrift und nach urkundlichen Quellen* (Cologne, 1911). Wedgwood gives an excellent English account of the sack: *Thirty Years' War,* 286–91.

9 The story is well told in A.Wang, 'Information und Deutung in illustrierten Flugblättern des Dreissigjährigen Krieges. Zum Gebrauchscharakter einiger Blätter des Themas *Sächsich Confect* aus den Jahren 1631 und 1632', *Euphorion: Zeitschrift für Literaturgeschichte,* LXX (1976), 97–116.

10 There are excellent accounts of the battle in *Sveriges Krig,* IV, and Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus,* II, 535–8. Several of Tilly's banners, which once hung in the Riddarholm Church, are today displayed in the 'State Trophy Collection' of the Army Historical Museum (Stockholm). The tactical innovations of the Swedish army are discussed at pp. 184–6 above.

11 Oluf Hansson's map of 'Mark Brandenburg', which was the best one available to Gustavus in 1631, only covered Germany as far as Frankfurt-on-Oder, Magdeburg and Dessau. (KrA, Krigskadåplatserna 1630–48, 4: Stortformat 2:51.)

12 Stritmatter, *Der Stadt Basel während des dreissigjährigen Krieges,* 66, notes that in 1633 Basel alone contained 5,256 refugees, accompanied by 1,776 cattle. On Sweden's reorganization of Franconia and the Rhineland, see Deinert, *Die Schwedische Epoche;* Müller, *Der schwedische Staat;* and Weber, *Würzburg und Bamberg*. For further details on the Frankfurt convention, see Bireley, *Religion and Politics,* chapter 8 (especially pp. 159 and 167–8).

13 E.Sticht, *Markgraf Christian von Brandenburg-Kulmbach und der dreissigjährige Krieg in Ostfranken 1618–35* (Kulmbach, 1965: see p. 154 for details on the peasants' revolt and its repression).

14 K.Beck, 'Die Neutralitätspolitik Landgraf Georgs II. von Hessen-Darmstadt. Versuch und Möglichkeiten einer Politik aus christlichen Grundsätzen', *Hessisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte,* XXII (1972), 162–228.

15 *The continuation of our forraine avisoes,* no. XX (28 April 1632), 6. War reporting began during the German conflict and the war was itself a major stimulus to the growth of the newspaper.

16 Opinion of a Bavarian war commissar or war councillor, December 1631, quoted by S.Riezler, *Geschichte Bayerns,* V (Munich, 1890), 395–6. Tilly's tomb in a special chapel by the shrine at Altötting (near Bavaria's border with Austria) is a masterpiece of Post-Tridentine Baroque art. His skull gazes grimly out of a window in the stone sarcophagus, while his figure may be observed in the pietà behind the altar: Tilly kneels incongruously in battle dress to the left of the Cross.

17 On Maximilian in exile, see Heinisch, *Salzburg im dreissigjährigen Kriege,* 141ff.; on Bavaria under Swedish occupation, see: G.Rystad, 'Die Schweden in Bayern während des dreissigjährigen Krieges', in Glaser, ed., *Wittelsbach und Bayern, II/1,* 424–35. See also the eyewitness account of devastation in H. Hörger, 'Die Kriegsjahre 1632 bis 1634 im Tagebuch des P.Maurus Friesenegger, nachmaligen Abtes von Andechs (1640–55)', *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte,* XXXIV (1971), 866–76.

18 The conspirators' identities were revealed to an English agent in Brussels, the painter Balthasar Gerbier, and he sold the names to the Spanish government in November 1633: all were arrested. Further details in A.Waddington, *La République des Provinces-Unies, la France et les Pays-Bas espagnols de 1630 à 1650,* I (Paris, 1895), 147–80; P.Janssens, 'L'èchec des tentatives de soulèvement dans les Pays-Bas méridionaux sous Philippe IV (1621–65)', *Revue d'histoire diplomatique,* XCII (1978), 110–29; and Israel, *The Dutch Republic,* 181–90. Pappenheim's assault on the Dutch camp at Maastricht, at the behest of the Elector of Cologne, marked a serious breach in the neutrality observed by the Empire

during much of the Dutch Revolt: see P.J.H.Ubachs, 'Neutraliteit, theorie en praktiek tijdens de Tachtigjarige Oorlog', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis,* XCVI (1983), 165–78.

19 AGS, Estado 3336 f. 138, duke of Feria to Philip IV, 12 April 1631. In fact an army of some 12,000 men did cross from Lombardy to the Low Countries later in the year, but they were recruited in Spain and Naples. The most famous account of the plague of 1631 appears in Alessandro Manzoni's novel *The Betrothed* (*I promessi sposi,* first published in 1825–6). For more recent assessments see Sella, *Crisis and Continuity,* 52; and C.M.Cipolla, *Cristofano and the Plague*. *A study in the history of public health in the age of Galileo* (London, 1973), chapter 1. There is also a useful collection of documents available: *La guerra e la peste nella Milano dei 'Promessi Sposi'. Documenti inediti tratti dagli archivi Spagnoli* (Madrid, 1975: Istituto Italiano di Cultura, Madrid; Collana 'Documenti e Ricerche', IV). Chapter 7 concerns the plague, chapters 3–5 the war.

20 Barberini, papal secretary of state, to Rocci, nuncio in Germany, 27 December 1631, quoted by Repgen, *Die römische Kurie und der Westfälische Friede,* 290, n. 347. This was a fairly threadbare excuse: although the volcanic activity of Vesuvius over the winter of 1631–2 killed thousands and wiped out forty communities, few were papal subjects, and the disaster did not interrupt Pope Urban VIII's lavish spending on his three nephews, which totalled 30 million thalers by the end of his pontificate. On Barberini nepotism, see J. Grisar, 'Päpstliche Finanzen, Nepotismus und Kirchenrecht unter Urban VIII', *Xenia Piana: Miscellanea historiae pontificiae,* VII (Rome, 1943), 205–366; compare the money sent to Germany before 1630 in Albrecht, 'Zur Finanzierung des dreissigjährigen Krieges'.

21 Questenburg, Aulic councillor, to Wallenstein, 23 April 1631, quoted by Suvanto, *Wallenstein und seine Anhänger,* 72.

22 Lukas Behaim, quoted by Ernstberger, 'Die Universität Nürnberg-Altdorf, 10.

23 Goodrick, ed., *The Relation of Sydnam Poyntz,* 73; Elster, *Die PiccolominiRegimenten,* 40.

24 Examples taken from M.E.Seaton, *Literary Relations of England and Scandinavia in the Seventeenth Century* (Oxford, 1935), 79, 83. See also M.A.Breslow, *A Mirror for England: English Puritan views of foreign nations, 1618–1648* (Harvard, 1970: Harvard Historical Studies, LXXXIV), 134–7.

IV.iii Oxenstierna versus Wallenstein

1 AGRB, Secrétairerie d'État et de Guerre, 207 ff. 293–4, Infanta Isabella to Philip IV, 24 October 1633; *ibid.,* ff. 330–2, same to same, 12 November 1633; and AGS, Estado 3341 f. 88, cardinal-infante to the king, 23 February 1634. By the time the last letter was written, Feria was dead and his army decimated. There are some details on his last campaign in K.Beyerle, *Konstanz im dreissigjährigen Kriege. Schicksale bis zur Aufhebung der Belagerung durch die Schweden, 1628–33* (Heidelberg, 1900: Neujahrsblätter der badischen historischen Kommission, N.F. III). On Lorraine during the war, see J.Florange, 'La guerre de trente ans en Lorraine', *Annuaire de la Société d'Histoire et d'Archéologie de Lorraine,* XLVI (1935), 55–123, and Gaber, *La Lorraine meurtrie*. French aggression in this period is discussed more fully in Section IV.iv.

2 See Altmann, *Landgraf Wilhelm V,* part I. The battle of Hessisch-Oldendorf was viewed by Sweden as a major success: see its place of honour on the Triumphal Arch erected by the Regency Council for the coronation of Queen Christina in 1650 (S.Karling, 'L'arc de triomphe de la Reine Christine a Stockholm', in M.von Platen, ed., *Queen Christina of Sweden*. *Documents and Studies* [Stockholm, 1966], 159–86, at pp. 170–1).

3 Details from Roberts, 'Oxenstierna in Germany, 1633–1636', 63–71.

4 See B.F.Porshnev, 'Les rapports de l'Europe occidentale et 1'Europe orientale a 1'époque de la guerre de trente ans', *Rapports du Xle Congrès des Sciences Historiques,* IV (Stockholm, 1960), 136–63.

5 The Gustavsburg is illustrated in Munthe, *Kongliga Fortifikationens Historia,* I, plates 31–2; and described by Müller, *Schwedische Staat,* 145ff.

6 Quoted by M.Roberts, *Sweden as a Great Power 1611–1697* (London, 1968), 146–7. See, in general, R.Nordlund, 'Krig genom ombud. Det svenska krigsfinanserna och Heilbronn förbundet 1633', in Landberg *et al., Det kontinentala krigets ekonomi, 271–451*. Rather like the Protestant Union of 1608–21, the Heilbronn League included too many small states for stability.

7 Quoted in Suvanto, *Wallenstein,* 181.

8 Further details available in Suvanto, *Oxenstierna,* 146–66.

9 Piccolomini to Aldringen, quoted by Mann, *Wallenstein,* 801. On Piccolomini's role in Wallenstein's fall, and for an excellent account of the affair in general, see Barker, *Army, Aristocracy, Monarchy,* 79–97 (part of an extended essay on the Tuscan commander).

10 Suvanto, *Wallenstein,* 158–9, reconstitutes the text of the Göllersdorf agreement with great ingenuity. His argument is reinforced, from other sources, by Lutz, 'Wallenstein, Ferdinand II. und der Wiener Hof'.

11 See the interesting details reproduced from a contemporary pamphlet by A. Hollaender, 'Some English documents on the end of Wallenstein', *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library,* XL (1958), 358–90. Of course, Oxenstierna too was 'a subject become a soveraigne', but few seem to have resented that.

12 How serious was Wallenstein about his 'peace initiative'? Duke Franz-Albrecht of Saxe-Lauenburg, one of the general's closest associates, who was captured three days after his master's death, had no doubt about the matter: 'den praetext der friedens nur vorwendete' he told his captors. And the balance of modern opinion inclines to the view that peace was indeed only a 'pretext'—a bargaining counter that Wallenstein was prepared to exchange for an appanage in the Empire like Bernard of Saxe-Weimar's duchy of Franconia, or like his own duchy of Mecklenburg. On the other hand, it would not have been entirely ridiculous for Wallenstein to dream of becoming king of his native Bohemia. His remote relative, George of Poděbrad, had been elected in 1458; Frederick of the Palatine had been elected in 1619 (and, conveniently, had died in 1632); and, in between, the kingdom had elected rulers from the Jagiellonian and Habsburg dynasties. The young Wallenstein had spent some time in northern Italy, mostly at Padua: he cannot have been unaware of the state-building activities of condottieri such as Francesco Sforza, Sigismondo Malatesta and Cesare Borgia. No doubt in Padua itself he admired Donatello's flattering statue of the city's chief mercenary captain, Gattamellata. In the age of Oliver Cromwell, one cannot ignore the political careers open to successful soldiers. (See the sensitive analysis of F.H.Schubert, 'Wallenstein und der Staat des 17. Jahrhunderts', *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht,* XVI [1965], 597–611; reprinted in Rudolf, *Dreissigjährige Krieg,* 185–207.)

13 Mutio Vitelleschi, Superior-General of the Jesuit Order, to Lamormaini, 1 April 1634, quoted by Bireley, *Religion and Politics,* 203. Wedgwood, *Thirty Years' War,* 346–60, provides a fine set-piece, reconstructing Wallenstein's end through meticulous use of the printed sources. See also the more recent account of C.Kampmann, *Reichsrebellion*.

14 See G.Rystad, *Kriegsnachrichten und Propaganda während des dreissigjährigen Krieges: die Schlacht bei Nördlingen in den gleichzeitigen gedruckten Kriegsberichten* (Lund, 1960). There are illustrations of the battle in Angela and Geoffrey Parker, *European Soldiers 1550–1650* (Cambridge, 1977), 46–55. On the battlefield itself, the traces of the gun emplacements thrown up on the Altbuch the night before the battle are still clearly visible, and there is a small memorial column: the site is, like Lützen, well worth a visit.

15 Quotations from Roberts, 'Oxenstierna in Germany', 86, 98 n. 15.

16 William V quoted by Altmann, *Landgraf Wilhelm V,* 84.

17 See the admirable summary of the terms in *Theologische Realenzyklopädie,* IX (Berlin, 1981), 180 (by K.Repgen). Four of the nine 'Nebenrezesse' have never been published: see Bierther, 'Zur Edition' (page 264 below).

18 Quoted by Repgen, *Römische Kurie,* 337 n. 124, 333 n. 116 and 335–6.

IV.iv France's 'war by diversion'

1 A.Leman, *Urbain VIII et la rivalité de la France et de la maison d'Autriche de 1631 a 1635* (Lille and Paris, 1920), 492.
2 *Acta Pacis Westphalicae,* I, 18–20: Louis XIII to Richelieu, 4 August 1634. The royal views were classified 'top secret': 'âme qui vive ne les a veues', the document states.
3 Leman, *Urbain VIII et la rivalité,* 382.
4 A.J.du Plessis, Cardinal de Richelieu, *Mémoires,* ed. J.F.Michaud and J.J.F. Poujoulat, 2nd ser., VIII (Paris, 1838), 437: 'une longue guerre dans ses entrailles…'.
5 *Acta Pacis Westphalicae,* I, 47 (Feb./March 1637).
6 Richelieu, *Mémoires,* 620: 'parce que Sa Majesté n'ayant point de guerre declarée contre 1'Empereur…'.
7 Montglat gives figures for the relative size of the armies and losses: Montglat, *Mémoires,* ed. J.F.Michaud and J.J.F.Poujoulat, 3rd ser., V (Paris, 1838), 27, 30. For the finance minister's estimates of the total size of the French army: Bonney, *The King's Debts,* 173 n. 3.
8 *Acta Pacis Westphalicae,* I, 47.
9 Richelieu used the term 'Finnish' *(finnois)* but this was a play on the word for 'cunning' *(finaud)*. See Avenel, ed., *Lettres, instructions diplomatiques,* IV, 735.
10 Montglat, *Mémoires,* 41–2.
11 Bonney, *The King's Debts,* 306–7. Conversions based on J.J.McCusker, *Money and Exchange in Europe and America, 1600–1715* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1978).
12 Montglat, *Mémoires,* 38.
13 Avenel, *Lettres…de Richelieu,* V, 965.
14 AMAE, Mémoires et Documents: France, vol. 820 f. 131: Bullion and Bouthillier to Richelieu, 22 February 1636.
15 See, for example, Montglat's comment that the elder Condé, 'quoi-que grand politique, n'entendoit point la guerre…' (Montglat, *Mémoires,* 41).
16 Livet, *L'intendance d'Alsace sous Louis XIV,* 68, 78–9.
17 AMAE, Mémoires et Documents: France, vol. 834 f. llv. Bullion to Richelieu, 1639, following the death of Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, who, in Bullion's view, had 'dans 1'esprit les fantazie[s]'.

Chapter V Countdown to peace

1 KrA, *Historiska planscher, 1648,* 24 folio: 'Amore pacis: geographische Carten von gantz Teutschland', reproduced here as Plate 17. The manuscript original is in Kungliga Bibliotheket, Stockholm, Kartavd. Y50. An inferior version of the map, but with its commentary in full, was republished in J.G. von Meiern, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica,* VI (Hannover, 1736; reprinted Osnabrück, 1969), 'Beylage'. The location of the garrisons is revealing. The Swedish army had nineteen garrisons in Alsace, Franconia and Swabia; twenty-nine in the Bohemian lands; twenty-four in Saxony, Brandenburg and Magdeburg; nineteen in Westphalia and the Palatinate; and no less than twenty-seven in Pomerania. The French were all in the south-west; the Hessians all in the north-west. Only the Swedes were everywhere. Imperial bases in 1648 are shown on the map included in the thesis of Hoyos, 'Ernest von Traun'.

V.i The Swedish dilemma

Note: All dates in the correspondence cited in the notes to this section are in OLD STYLE: for New Style, add ten days.

1 Oxenstierna to the Council of State, 4 February 1633, *A[xel] O[xenstiernas] S[krifter och] B[revvexling],* 1st series, VIII, 162; cf. *ibid.,* XII, 324–5 (Memorandum for Johan Oxenstierna, 28 August 1634).

2 Oxenstierna to Baner, 28 October 1634: *AOSB,* 1st series, XII, 633.

3 Oxenstierna to the Council of State, 7 January 1635: *AOSB,* 1st series, XIII, 27.

4 *Svenska riksrådets protokoll* (Handlingar rörande Skandinaviens Historia, 3rd series), VII, 423, 427 (22 January 1639); and VIII, 315 (14 November 1640), where this dictum is quoted.

5 *Svenska riksrådets protokoll,* IV, 253 (4 December 1634); VI, 185 (25 April 1636).

6 *Ibid.,* VI, 504 (30 July 1636).

7 See the study of the French subsidies paid to Sweden, and how they were employed, by Lorenz: 'Schweden und die französichen Hilfsgelder' (page 268 below).

8 In the debate in the Council of State on 21 November 1640 Oxenstierna told them: 'I may now say, what I have never said here openly before—and what perhaps many think that I do not believe—that there can well come a time when we could retire from the German war and let it go at any price, not retaining a foot of land. I should indeed be prepared to be persuaded easily to that, and had long since advised you to it, if the contempt which some of those out there have for us had not been so great, and if it could have been done with reputation and safety.' And a little later in the same debate: '[Pomerania] is not so important as gaining and retaining the Princes' affection and restoring them to their former condition': *Svenska riksrådets protokoll,* VIII, 330, 333.

9 *Ibid.,* VIII, 571–3 (16 April 1641). It should be noted that Oxenstierna's views reflected the general sense of the meeting.

V.ii The deadlock broken

1 Haan, *Kurfürstentag,* 163–4: 'votum' of George William at the eighteenth session.

2 Springell, *Connoisseur,* 105–10, gives an admirable account of this bizarre episode. The book-trade as a whole was 'down' in 1637: only 408 new works were published in Germany that year, compared with 1,757 titles in 1618 (see R.Engelsing, *Analphabetentum und Lektüre. Zur Sozialgeschichte des Lesens in Deutschland zwischen feudaler und industrieller Gesellschaft* [Stuttgart, 1973], 42).

3 The revolt was led by Martin Aichinger (or Laimbauer), who claimed to be the Messiah and to be proof against bullets. He was captured after the defeat of his peasant army at Frankenburg in May 1636. The banners of his troops survive in the Linz Museum. See F.Wilflingseder, 'Martin Laimbauer und die Unruhen im Machlandviertel, 1632–6', *Mitteilungen des oberösterreichischen Landesarchivs,* VI (1959), 136–208.

4 Sir Thomas Roe, in January 1639, quoted by E.A.Beller, The mission of Sir Thomas Roe to the conference at Hamburg, 1638–40', *English Historical Review,* XLI (1926), 61–77, at p. 74; cannibalism reported in Kuczynski, *Geschichte des Alltags des deutschen Volkes,* I, 87–8, and in Wedgwood, *Thirty Years' War,* 410–12.

5 Details from A.Ernstberger, Plünderung des Leipziger Messgeleites Nürnberger und Augsburger Kaufleute am 26. Januar 1638 bei Neustadt an der Heid', *Jahrbuch für fränkische Landesforschung,* XXII (1962), 101–20. Nuremberg had also suffered severe dislocation and destruction during the siege of 1632: see page 117 above.

6 Weber, *Würzburg und Bamberg im dreissigjährigen Krieg,* 171; Müller, *Der schwedische Staat in Mainz,* 140, 237–8.

7 F.Herrmann, ed., *Aus tiefer Not: hessische Briefe und Berichte aus der Zeit des dreissigjährigen Krieges* (Friedberg, 1916), 115: *Denkschrift* of 19 December 1634. H.Börst *et al.,* 'Die evangelischen Geistlichen in und aus der Grafschaft Nassau-Saarbrücken', *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte der Saargegend,* XXIII–XXIV (1975–6), 39–93, at pp. 39f.

8 See von Hippel, 'Bevölkerung und Wirtschaft'. In fact, the duchy's economy was especially vulnerable, for it had never produced enough foodstuffs to achieve self-sufficiency: instead, fine wine from the vineyards around Stuttgart was exported to buy grain. The war destroyed both the production and the trade. Many of the peasants died; many more took refuge abroad, above all in Switzerland. (See Stritmatter, *Die Stadt Basel,* 75. The 7,561 refugees in Basel in 1638 almost outnumbered the native residents.)

9 Data taken from F.Mager, *Geschichte des Bauerntums und der Bodenkultur im Lande Mecklenburg* (Berlin, 1955), 137–40; W.Zahn, *Die Altmark im dreissigjährigen Krieg* (Halle, 1904: Schriften des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte, XXI/3), 560; F.Schröer, *Das Havelland im dreissigjährigen Krieg. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Mark Brandenburg* (Cologne and Graz, 1966: Mitteldeutsche Forschungen, XXXVII), 118–20, 127–31; and Faden, *Berlin im dreissigjährigen Krieg,* 232.

10 See E.Sparmann, *Dresden während des dreissigjährigen Krieges* (Dresden, 1914), 15–19; and G.Lammert, *Geschichte der Seuchen, Hungers- und Kriegsnoth zur Zeit des dreissigjährigen Krieges* (1890; reprinted Wiesbaden, 1971), 87, 233. Not all the demographic losses were due to the troops, of course: between 1631 and 1634 few parts of Germany escaped the ravages of plague. At Amberg, capital of the Upper Palatinate, for example, eighteen Jesuit Fathers in the newly opened college died of the plague in the year 1634. (See Gegenfurtner, 'Jesuiten in Oberpfalz', 170.)

11 For an indication of the prevailing burden of tax see Weber, *Veit Adam von Gepeckh, Fürstbischof von Freising,* 129–32. One hundred and twenty *Römermonate* were imposed on the Bavarian Circle at the peace of Prague in 1635, 120 at the Electoral Meeting of 1636, 75 at the Circle Assembly of 1638, 120 at the Imperial Diet of 1641:435 *Römermonate* in all, in just six years! Cf. the level of pre-war taxation, noted on page 15 above.

12 P.Antony and H.Christmann, eds, *Johann Valentin Andrea: ein schwäbischer Pfarrer im dreissigjährigen Krieg* (Hildesheim, 1970: Schwäbische Lebensläufe, V), 128.

13 Springell, *Connoisseur,* 113 n. 96. See also the data on pages 186–92 above.

14 See A.Leman, 'Urbain VIII et les origines du Congrès de Cologne de 1636', *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique,* XIX (1923), 370–83; and Beller, The mission of Sir Thomas Roe'. The Anglo-Danish treaty of Hamburg, which was directed primarily against the Dutch, formed part of the campaign conducted (since 1637) by the Danish government to define more precisely and restrictively its territorial rights over the seas around it. It has been suggested that Denmark's policies may have been prompted by the publication of John Selden's *Mare clausum* in 1635–6. (See S.Dalgård, 'Østersø, Vestersø, Nordsø. Dominium maris Baltici et maris septentrionalis 1638', *Historisk Tidsskrift [Dansk],* llth series, V [1956–9], 295–320.1 am grateful to Professor E.L.Petersen for this reference.) Charles I was also hostile to Sweden at this point because the Stockholm government was supplying arms to his Scottish rebels—many of them veterans from Gustavus's army.

15 Further details in R.Leffers, *Die Neutralitätspolitik des Pfalzgrafen Wolfgang Wilhelm als Herzog von Jülich-Berg in der Zeit von 1636–1643* (Neustadt, 1971: Bergische Forschungen, VIII). There was a parallel attempt by Frederick William of Brandenburg, the Elector's heir, to arrange a truce in Cleves in 1637, but it also failed (see Opgenoorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm: der grosse Kurfürst,* chapter 3). In 1639, the Lower Saxon Circle also tried to secure neutrality, with more success (see Magen, 'Die Reichskreise', 451–2). The secret peace talks of Bavaria with France, at Einsiedeln in January 1640, are noted on page 152 above.

16 The Regensburg settlement thus superseded the peace of Prague, which had only suspended the Edict; but it was modified in its turn by the peace of Westphalia, which fixed the 'normative date' at 1624 (far less favourable to the Catholics than 1627).
17 On Brandenburg's neutrality, and its consequences, see Opgenoorth, *op. cit.,* and Schröer, *Das Havelland*. See also Kretzschmar, *Gustavus Adolfs Pläne und Ziele,* for the early stages of Brunswick's alliance with Sweden; and M. Reimann, *Der Goslarer Frieden von 1642* (Hildesheim, 1979: Quellen und Darstellung zur Geschichte Niedersachsens, XC), for the end.
18 The Swedish campaigns of these years, so often overlooked, are admirably described (with the aid of helpful plans) in Tingsten, *Johan Baner och Lennart Torstensson*. I am grateful to Professor Michael Roberts for assistance in assessing the importance of Baner's operations.
19 See K.Schweinesbein, *Die Frankreichpolitik Kurfürst Maximilians I. von Bayern, 1639–1645* (Munich, 1967), chapters 3–4. The papacy was unable to play an active role in this peace initiative, because in 1642 Urban VIII opened hostilities against the duke of Parma. Within two years, Urban squandered some 6 million thalers on 'the war of Castro' and in July 1644, broken in spirit, he died. (See the figures in Grisar, 'Päpstliche Finanzen', 208.)

V.iii The defeat of the Habsburgs

1 AGS, *Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas,* 3a época 949, gives the level of Spanish spending in Germany in 1635–43. 2.3 million thalers were received by the 'Treasury General of Germany' in 1635–40, but only 1.2 million in 1640–3. See also H.Ernst, *Madrid and Vienna*.
2 'It seems to me that we have no choice but to look for a general peace, or at least a settlement in one or two of the wars in which the House of Austria is at present engaged' Oñate to Olivares in 1640, quoted by Stradling, *Europe and the Decline of Spain,* 104.
3 Roberts, *The Swedish Imperial Experience,* 25.
4 L.Stein, 'Religion and patriotism in German peace dramas during the Thirty Years' War', *Central European History,* IV (1971), 131–18. Perhaps the author's link between Lutheran pietism and German patriotism in this period is overdrawn, but the material he presents is both important and unusual.
5 'Vox Caesaris', a phrase used by the Elector of Mainz's councillor in 1646, quoted by Wolff, *Corpus evangelicorum,* 179; Salvius's letter of April 1643 quoted by Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden,* 115. On the Frankfurt 'Deputationstag' in general, see Dickmann, chapters 3 and 5, and R. von Kietzell, 'Der Frankfurter Deputationstag von 1642–1645. Eine Untersuchung der staatsrechtlichen Bedeutung dieser Reichsversammlung', *Nassauische Annalen,* LXXXIII (1972), 99–119.
6 See Böhme, *Bremische-Verdische Staatsfinanzen,* 13–165, and H.Eichberg, *Militär und Technik. Schwedenfestungen des 17. Jahrhunderts in den Herzogtümern Bremen und Verden* (Düsseldorf, 1976: Geschichte und Gesellschaft. Bochumer historische Studien, VII).
7 B.P.von Chemnitz, *Königlichen schwedischer in Teutschland geführten Kriegs vierter Teil* (Stockholm, 1859), 168. Chemnitz, who wrote his account in the 1650s, was a noted anti-Imperialist.
8 On the campaigns of 1643–5 in the south-west, see H.H.Schaufler, *Die Schlacht bei Freiburg-im-Breisgau 1644* (Freiburg, 1979). The battle of Freiburg was described by a Bavarian commander, Johann Werth, as the worst he had ever seen: 'In the twenty-two years I have been involved in the carnage of war,' he claimed, 'there has never been such a bloody encounter.' (Quoted *ibid.,* 7.)
9 The emperor was in Prague, and he left the city on 7 March, the day after the battle: see P.Broucek, *Der schwedische Feldzug nach Niederösterreich 1645/46* (Vienna, 1967: Militärhistorische Schriftenreihe, VII), 11. On the 1645 campaign in general, see also Ruppert, *Kaiserliche Politik,* chapter 3, part II, and Chesler, 'Crown, lords and God', 209–10.

10 Quotation from C.T.Odhner, *Die Politik Schwedens im Westphälischen Friedenscongress und die Gründung der schwedischen Herrschaft in Deutschland* (Gotha, 1877; reprinted Hannover, 1973), 97n. The agreement at Kötzschenbroda was in fact only a truce for six months, but in April 1646, at Eilenburg, it was prolonged to the war's end. Saxony was made to pay contributions to the Swedish army and to allow Swedish garrisons in Leipzig and Torgau; but three of the Saxon regiments in the Imperial army were permitted to remain there, provided they did not fight against Sweden.
11 On the Dutch-Spanish negotiations, see the classic account of J.J.Poelhekke, *De vrede van Münster* (The Hague, 1948). An English survey is conveniently provided by Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World,* 347–74.
12 Details from F.Bosbach, *Die Kosten des Westfälischen Friedenskongresses*. *Eine strukturgeschichtliche Untersuchung* (Münster, 1984: Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der neueren Geschichte, XIII), 14, 16, 33, 57, 110, 168, 196, 211 and 224ff.
13 The delegates' attention to procedural detail has often been ridiculed by historians, but the experience of the abortive peace of Regensburg in 1630 and the treaty of Wismar in 1636 (pages 102–3 and 142–3 above), when an agreement signed by plenipotentiaries was later repudiated by their government, remained fresh in men's minds. No one wanted a repetition at Westphalia. See O'Connell, 'A cause célèbre in the history of treaty-making'.
14 Bosbach, *Kosten,* I, 167–8; Philippe, *Württemberg,* 1.
15 Quoted in Heckel, 'Zur Historiographie des Westfälischen Friedens', 324.

V.iv The making of peace

1 Quoted in Kuczynski, *Geschichte des Alltags des deutschen Volkes,* 117. For the 1646–7 campaign see P.Broucek, *Die Eroberung von Bregenz am 4. Jänner 1647* (Vienna, 1971: Militärhistorische Schriftenreihe, XVIII).
2 Avaux quoted by Philippe, *Württemberg und der Westfälische Friede,* 54; Oxenstierna quoted by G.Schmid, 'Konfessionspolitik und Staatsräson bei den Verhandlungen des Westfälischen Friedenskongresses über die Gravamina Ecclesiastica', *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte,* LIV (1953), 203–23, at page 206.
3 Imperial instructions quoted by Ruppert, *Kaiserliche Politik,* 134.
4 Bosbach, *Kosten,* I, 15–16; Ruppert, *Kaiserliche Politik,* 251.
5 Schmid, 'Konfessionspolitik', 209. This most interesting article is based on documents from the archives of ducal Saxony, whose delegates were among the Protestant hard-liners.
6 The originality of this compromise, enshrined in Article V paragraph 52 of the 'Instrumentum Pacis Osnabrugense', and known as 'Itio in Partes', has not always been appreciated: an age which normally revered the majority principle sanctioned an alternative method for reaching decisions on certain key issues. Admittedly, the principle of parity between two unequal groups had been accepted a century before by the Swiss Confederation; the Holy Roman Empire, however, was so much larger, and therefore the formula of 'Itio in Partes' was correspondingly more difficult to operate. But operate it did. Constitutional lawyers in the eighteenth century saw the arrangement as the masterwork of the peace-makers—'the foremost bulwark of Freedom and Equality, built with so much blood'—because confessional dualism strengthened and protected the political balance established in Germany between emperor and princes. (See C.G.Hoffman, *Gründliche Vorstellung deren in dem Heiliger Römische Reiche…Religions-Beschwerden* [1722], quoted by Heckel, 'Itio in Partes'; see all of Heckel's penetrating analysis at pp. 291–308 of his article entitled 'Itio in Partes'.) For an interesting study of the precedents for 'amicable composition', see K.J.Seidel, 'Zentrale Ständevertretung'. The achievement of the Congress is further considered on pp. 192–5 above.
7 Quoted by Seaton, *Literary relations of England and Scandinavia,* 81. Note also the sentiments of Sir Edward Peyton, *The Divine Catastrophe, or the rise, reign and ruine of the*

house of Stuarts (London, 1652): 'God raised Gustavus Adolphus to turn the scales to the United princes' side; yet, in conclusion, the Swedes have sought more their own interest than God's.'

8 Sten Bielke to the council, 9 February 1647, quoted by Odhner, *Die Politik Schwedens,* 4n.

9 This important aspect of French policy in Germany during the 1640s is played down by Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden*. Most other, less monumental German studies of this phase of the war also tend to belittle the role of Mazarin. See the helpful comments of D.McKay and H.M.Scott, *The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648–1815* (London, 1983), 4–5.

10 Quotations from Odhner, *op. cit.,* 163n; Aldea, *España, el Papado y el Imperio,* 78–80; and Müller, *Der schwedische Staat in Mainz,* 19 n. 66.

11 See Heinisch, *Salzburg im dreissigjährigen Krieg,* 195–6; on the last Imperial campaign of the war see Hoyos, 'Ernst von Traun', part II. On the policy of Cologne at this time see J.F.Foerster, *Kurfürst Ferdinand von Köln. Die Politik seiner Stifter in den Jahren 1634–1650* (Münster, 1976: Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der neueren Geschichte, VI).

12 A.Chéruel, ed., *Lettres du Cardinal de Mazarin,* III (Paris, 1883), 173–81: Mazarin to Servien, 14 August 1648.

13 Chesler, 'Crown, lords and God', 209–10; Evans, *Habsburg Monarchy,* 76. Uncertainty concerning the fate of the New Order in Bohemia continued almost until the end of the war. As late as 1645, Countess Cernin (one of the *arrivistes*) could write: The dice are still on the board, and who knows who will reap the profit from what we possess?' (Quoted by O.Odložilík, 'The nobility of Bohemia, 1620–1740', *East European Quarterly,* VII [1973], 15–30, at p. 19.) See also the discussion in R.J.W.Evans, 'The significance of the White Mountain for the culture of the Czech lands', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research,* XLIV (1971), 34–54, at p. 44 (a most important article).

14 The fighting overseas, particularly in Asia, continued for some time longer, however. Israel, *Dutch Republic,* 336, notes that 'the very last battle of the Eighty Years' War was fought on Ternate on 18 July 1649, more than a year after the ratification of the treaty of Münster, but before official publication of the news in parts of the East'.

15 Odhner, *Die Politik Schwedens,* 238, reports the Swedish plenipotentiaries' complaint, as late as January 1648, that 'the cause of Spain' was 'the emperor's guiding star in the German negotiations'. Ruppert, *Die kaiserliche Politik,* 350–8, describes the emperor's anguish at having to make peace without Spain.

16 Philippe, *Württemberg, passim;* and *Welt im Umbruch. Augsburg zwischen Renaissance und Barock,* I (Augsburg, 1980), 409ff. In 1645 Augsburg, whose population before the war had numbered 33,000, contained only 21,000 people: 14,000 Lutherans, 6,000 Catholics and 1,000 soldiers.

17 See details in Bosbach, *Kosten des Friedenskongresses,* 224ff. The author makes the point that, for some territories, the cost of the conference could equal, and even exceed, the 'satisfaction of the soldiery'. Thus Brandenburg had to find 134,522 thalers for the diplomats and 162,692 for the Swedish army, while the Imperial City of Bremen had to pay 88,413 for the former against only 28,480 for the latter. But for most areas, the proportions were reversed.

18 Heinisch, *Salzburg im dreissigjährigen Krieg,* 196ff. All Archbishop Lodron and his vassals obtained in return for their money was freedom from quartering. The rest of the Empire was equally heavily burdened: see G.Buchstab, 'Die Freie Reichsstadt Köln und die schwedische Armeesatisfaktion', in Repgen, ed., *Forschungen und Quellen,* 149–62.

19 On the Swedish demobilization, see the admirable vintage study of T. Lorentzen, *Die schwedische Armee im Dreissigjährigen Kriege und ihre Abdankung* (Leipzig, 1894), chapters 6 and 7. More recent data is presented in G. Buchstab, *Reichsstädte, Städtekurie und westfälischer Friedenskongress* (Münster, 1976: Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der neueren Geschichte, V), 170–7. On the Imperialists' demobilization, see

part III of Hoyos, 'Ernst von Traun' (which has been printed in *Der dreissigjährige Krieg,* 169–232); and Elster, *Die Piccolomini Regimenter,* 104ff.

20 Quoted in Glaser, ed., *Wittelsbach und Bayern,* II/2, 483. Pages 483–90 of this magnificent catalogue describe and illustrate items made to celebrate the outbreak of peace.

Chapter VI The war in myth, legend and history

VI.i The universal soldier

1 There are, of course, exceptions: most notably, the Krigsarkiv in Stockholm. Furthermore, important military archives may turn up in unlikely places. For example, the detailed records of Wallenstein's life-guards (the foot regiment of Count Julius of Hardegg) are today preserved in the Niederösterreichische Landesarchiv, Vienna, Herrschaft Stetteldorf, Kartons 1–6. See the admirable article based on them: F.Hausmann, 'Das Regiment hochdeutscher Knechte des Grafen Julius von Hardegg, seine Geschichte, Fahnen und Uniform', in *Der dreissigjährige Krieg,* 79–167. See also Dubois, 'Die Teilnahme des Walliser Regiments de Preux'. These are the only modern histories known to me of regiments which fought in the war. The Piccolomini papers, formerly preserved in the castle of Náchod and now in the State Archive, Zámrsk, enabled Otto Elster to prepare in 1903 a short but interesting study of the regiments raised by Ottavio Piccolomini between 1629 and 1650 (see Elster, *Die Piccolomini Regimenter*).

2 On uniforms, see Hausmann, *art. cit.,* 129–35. Reconstituted military costumes of the period are displayed in several museums of Europe, especially in the Thirty Years' War Room' of both the Heeresgeschichtliches Museum in Vienna and the Armémuseum in Stockholm.

3 There is a fine collection of Thirty Years' War colours captured from Imperial and League forces in the Statens Trofé Samlung (a part of the Armémuseum) in Stockholm. The collection includes some 4,000 objects, almost all from the period 1610–1720, of which forty-five, including the Thirty Years' War pennants, are displayed.

4 H.C.Lavater, *Kriegsbüchlein. Das ist grundtliche Anleitung zum Kriegswesen* (Zürich, 1651; 2nd edn, 1667), 63; André, *Michel le Tellier,* 339.

5 Gallas's order and samples are presently on display in a case in the Heeresgeschichtliches Museum in Vienna. Pearl-grey was adopted as the colour of all uniforms in the Austrian army in 1708.

6 Redlich, *Military Enterpriser,* I, 456.

7 Information from J.Lindegren, *Utskrivning och utsugning. Produktion och reproduktion i Bygdeå 1620–1640* (Uppsala, 1980: Studia Historica Upsaliensia, CXVII), 256–7, and from further details kindly supplied to me by Dr Lindegren in January 1980. Denmark also introduced conscription in 1627, but only for defence: see Petersen, 'Defence, war and finance', 33.

8 G.Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567–1659* (Cambridge, 1972), 46–7, on Spanish jail recruiting; *Calendar of State Papers Domestic 1628–9,* 395, 568 on the English parallel.

9 R.Chaboche, 'Les soldats français de la guerre de Trente Ans: une tentative d'approche', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine,* XX (1973), 10–24.

10 H.Jessen, *Der Dreissigjährige Krieg in Augenzeugenberichten* (2nd edn, Munich, 1964), 335.

11 A nine-page 'Sprachbüchlein' of military terms, many of them bizarre and improbable, was included in H.M.Moscherosch, *Wunderliche und warhafftige Gesichte Philanders von Sittewald* (2 vols, Strasbourg, 1640–2), 'sechsters Gesichte: Soldaten Leben'. See also the sources noted in Langer, *The Thirty Years' War,* 100.

12 Monro, *Expedition,* II, 62–3, 75; Dukes, The Leslie family'; H.L.Rubinstein, *Captain Luckless. James, first duke of Hamilton 1600–1649* (Edinburgh, 1973), 26–37; and I.Grimble, *Chief of Mackay* (London, 1965), 81–105.
13 Turner, *Memoirs of his own life and times,* 14. It is notable, for example, that five of Wallenstein's murderers were, like Turner, subjects of Charles I: Lesley, Devereux, Geraldine, Gordon and Butler.
14 Redlich, *Military Enterpriser,* I, 426; K.R.Böhme, *Bremische-Verdische Staatsfinanzen 1645–76* (Uppsala, 1976), 34. The palaces of generals, such as Wrangel (at Skökloster, north of Stockholm) or Wallenstein (in Prague, Mnichovo Hradiště and Jičín), testify even today to the wealth that could be gained through war. The newly rich generals brought with them a style of expenditure that few had seen before in northern Europe: Marshal de la Gardie boasted *circa* 1650 that he had introduced luxury into Sweden single-handed.
15 Grimmelshausen, *Simplicissimus,* book I, chapter XVI, quoted by Redlich, *Military Enterpriser,* I, 370–1.
16 André, *Michel le Tellier,* 64.
17 The 'Selbstschutzsysteme' is described by I.Bog, *Die bäuerliche Wirtschaft im Zeitalter des Dreissigjährigen Krieges. Die Bewegungsvorgänge in der Kriegswirtschaft nach den Quellen des Klosterverwalteramtes Heilsbronn* (Coburg, 1952), 142–54; and G.Benecke, 'Labour relations and peasant society in North-West Germany, c. 1600', *History,* LVIII (1973), 350–9.
18 A display cabinet in the Thirty Years' War Room' of the Heeresgeschichtliches Museum in Vienna contains the short, thick broad-sword of Tilly, c. 1610, next to the long, thin rapier of Ferdinand III, c. 1635. Both are typical of the styles current in their day.
19 Monro, *Expedition,* I, 68–75; M.Pusch, *Der Dreissigjährige Krieg 1618–1648* (Munich, 1978), 112–13.
20 See M.van Crevelt, *Supplying War: logistics from Wallenstein to Patton* (Cambridge, 1977), 34ff., and Kroener, *Les Routes et les Étapes, passim*. Naturally rations due were not always provided. See the complaint of a miserable Imperial soldier at the siege of Münster in 1634, lamenting to his wife that he only received 1lb of bread every four days: Kuczynski, *Geschichte des Alltags des deutschen Volkes,* 100–2.
21 'Streiff'—called after Colonel Johan Streiff von Lauenstein, who sold it to the king in 1631 for 1,000 thalers—was injured at Lützen and died, probably of wounds, a few months later. The beast was promptly flayed and its hide sent to Stockholm, where it was fitted over a wooden frame and set up in the Royal Palace. It is still there, in the Livrustkammaren, bearing the saddle and harness given to Gustavus by his wife at New Year, 1630.
22 Chaboche, 'Les soldats français', notes that only 46 per cent of the Thirty Years' War veterans who later entered the Invalides were, or had been, married.
23 C.A.Campan, ed., *Bergues sur le Soom assiégée* (1622:2nd edn, Brussels, 1867), 247; Redlich, *Military Enterpriser,* I, 521–2.
24 Figures from Fallon, 'Scottish mercenaries'.
25 Monro, *Expedition,* II, 122.
26 AGRB, Secrétairerie d'État et de Guerre, 34, f. 5v: Order of cardinal-infante, 8 July 1634 to pay 50 escudos reward to the peasants who caught nine deserters as they fled through the Valtelline. Example of executions for cowardice are noted on pp. 118 and 136 above.
27 The exception, once again, is the 'Rullor' of the Swedish army, preserved in the Krigsarkiv, Stockholm, which detail desertions and other causes of wastage. But there is, to my knowledge, as yet no systematic study of this source.
28 Sources: *Sveriges Krig,* IV, 124, 387–8, 453; V, 138, 548–9; VI, 423, 483; Fallon, 'Scottish mercenaries', 246ff.; Hausmann, 'Das Regiment', 166; Kroener, 'Truppenstärken', 197. Data is also available on the loss of English troops in Danish service: 5,013 in November 1626, but 2,472 by February 1627. The force was increased to 4,913 men by June, falling to 4,707 in August, 4,412 in September and 3,764 in October. In May 1628 there were only

1,400 English and 230 Scots left. The average monthly loss was thus 4 per cent. See E.A. Beller, 'The military expedition of Sir Charles Morgan to Germany, 1627–9', *English Historical Review,* XLIII (1928), 528–39.

29 Monro, *Expedition,* I, 62, 67, 79–80; II, 35.

30 W.Zahn, *Die Altmark im Dreissigjährigen Krieg,* 16. Tangermünde, which is today one of the most beautifully preserved seventeenth-century towns in central Europe, had to be entirely rebuilt after the war. A general's headquarters on fourteen occasions, and plundered seven times, its 623 occupied houses of pre-war days had been reduced by 1645 to 228 and its birth-rate had been halved. On Darmstadt see Herrmann, ed., *Aus tiefer Not,* 123.

31 On Jesuit chaplains during the Thirty Years' War, see Duhr, *Geschichte der Jesuiten,* 11.2, chapter 6 (based on the campaign journal kept by several chaplains); cf. Parker, *Army of Flanders,* 170–2. On contributions, see *ibid.,* 142–3; and F.Redlich, 'Contributions in the Thirty Years' War', *Economic History Review,* XII (1959–60), 247–54.

32 L.Mulder, ed., *Journaal van Anthonis Duyck, advocaat-fiskaal van den Raad van State 1591–1602* (The Hague and Arnhem, 1862), 636; John Bingham quoted, along with many other works, by W.Hahlweg, *Die Heeresreform der Oranier und die Antike* (Berlin, 1941), 176. This volume should not be confused with Hahlweg's later edition of John of Nassau's *Kriegsbuch,* of similar title: Hahlweg, *Die Heeresreform der Oranier: das 'Kriegsbuch' des Grafen Johann von Nassau-Siegen* (Wiesbaden, 1973: Veröffentlichungen der historischen Kommission für Nassau, XX).

33 On Maurice of Nassau and his cousin, see E.Kist's introduction to Jacques de Gheyn, *The Exercise of Arms* (New York, 1971); on the 'school of war' at Siegen, see L.Plathner, *Graf johann von Nassau und die erste Kriegsschule. Ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis des Kriegswesens um die Wende des 16. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin, 1913). It was certainly an exclusive school: only twenty students had attended when the Academy closed its doors in 1623! Actually Siegen was not quite first: court-based schools of war had been established at Tübingen, Kassel and Sedan in the late sixteenth century. For the diffusion of Dutch techniques see F.Walker, *Niederländische Einflüsse auf das eidgenössische Staatsdenken im späten 16. und frühen 17. Jahrhundert: Neue Aspekte der Zürcher und Berner Geschichte im Zeitalter des werdenden Absolutismus* (Zürich, 1979), chapter 1.

34 von Frauenholz, *Heerwesen,* I, 41; *Sveriges Krig,* VIII, 99–100 (quoting a French pamphlet of 1634).

35 Turner, *Pallas Armata,* 237. The 'double salvo' was certainly used at Breitenfeld in 1631: see *The Swedish Intelligencer,* I (London, 1632), 124. On leather guns, see Parker, *Military Revolution,* 33–5.

VI.ii The war and German society

1 K.Holstein, *Rothenburger Stadtgeschichte* (Rothenburg ob der Tauber, 1969), 96–7.

2 H.Schmidt, 'Der dreissigjährige Krieg', IV (1956), 71–2; VI (1958), 23.

3 H.Woltering, *Die Reichsstadt Rothenburg ob der Tauber und ihre Herrschaft über die Landwehr,* I (Rothenburg, 1965), 32 (map).

4 H.Schmidt, 'Dreissigjähriger Krieg', VI (1958), 15–16, 22; Woltering, *Reichsstadt Rothenburg,* 38.

5 R.Ergang, *The Myth of the All-Destructive Fury of the Thirty Years' War* (Pocono Pines, Pa., 1956).

6 Franz, *Der dreissigjährige Krieg und das deutsche Volk,* provides fundamental data. Franz avoids giving overall population estimates for Germany or the Empire, and most other authors follow suit. But the conservative figures provided by C.McEvedy and R.Jones, *Atlas of World Population History* (London, 1978), 67–72, correctly reflect the most recent trend of thought on the subject.

7 Lammert, *Geschichte der Seuchen,* 233.

8 Friedrichs, *Nördlingen,* 47–9, 306–11.
9 W.Schwemmer, *Die Schulden der Reichsstadt Nürnberg und ihre Übernahme durch den bayerischen Staat* (Nürnberg, 1967), 8.
10 Buchstab, *Reichsstädte, Städtekurie und Westfälischer Friedenskongress,* 210–11; G.Wunder, *Die Burger von Hall: Sozialgeschichte einer Reichsstadt, 1216–1802* (Sigmaringen, 1980), 188–9, 269–70.
11 For some parallel data from north-west Germany, see Benecke, 'The problem of death and destruction in the Thirty Years' War', 239–53. For an important critique of Benecke's approach, see Theibault, The rhetoric of death and destruction'. See also the data on pages 147–9 above.
12 Bog, *Die bäuerliche Wirtschaft,* 126.
13 See Rabb, 'The effects of the Thirty Years' War', 40–51.
14 Haan, 'Prosperität und Dreissigjähriger Krieg', 117.
15 Schmidt, 'Dreissigjähriger Krieg', IV (1956), 72.
16 J.Morhard, *Haller Haus-Chronik* (Schwäbisch Hall, 1962), 136.
17 G.Zillhardt, ed., *Der Dreissigjährige Krieg in zeitgenössischer Darstellung: Hans Heberles 'Zeytregister' (1618–1672)* (Ulm, 1975), *passim*.

VI.iii The war and politics

1 Quoted in M.Walker, *German Home Towns, Community, state and general estate 1648–1871* (Ithaca and London, 1971), 14, 15.
2 J.-J.Rousseau, 'Extrait du projet de paix perpétuelle de Monsieur 1'Abbé de St Pierre' (1761), in *Oeuvres completes de Jean-Jacques Rousseau,* III (Paris, Editions de la Pléiade, 1964), 572.
3 Wedgwood, *Thirty Years' War,* 526.
4 See, for further detail, Vann, *The Swabian Kreis*.
5 Details in Opgenoorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm: der grosse Kurfürst,* chapter 4.
6 Quotation and analysis taken from Livet, *L'intendance d'Alsace,* 123ff.
7 Schmid, 'Konfessionspolitik', 222–3: von Thumshirn, representing Saxe-Altenburg, on 28 November 1648.
8 See J.Vicens Vives, 'La politique européenne du royaume d'Aragon-Catalogne sous Jean II (1458–79)', *Annales du Midi,* LXV (1953), 405–15; and J.Wormald, *Court, Kirk and Community. Scotland 1470–1625* (London, 1981), 100–2.
9 *Documentos inéditos para la historia de España,* II (Madrid, 1943), 140: Gondomar to the king, 28 March 1619.
10 See G.Parker and L.M.Smith, eds, *The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century* (2nd edn, London, 1997), chapters 1, 2 and 11. For detailed evidence about the climate in Germany during the war years see: W.Lenke, *Klimadaten von 1621–1650 nach Beobachtungen des Landgrafen Hermann von Hessen* (Offenbach, 1960: Berichte des deutschen Wetterdienstes, nr. LXIII, vol. 9). The landgrave, although he lacked both barometer and thermometer, left a record of continuous observations, at Kassel and (after 1640) at Fulda, four times every day from 1635 until 1650 (except for one missing year: 1645). His data provide clear evidence of a cooler, wetter climate than today, especially in the 1640s. In 1648 there were 157 days of rain, snow or other precipitation; in 1649 there were 147 days, and in 1650, 179.
11 See G.Benecke, *Society and Politics in Germany 1500–1750* (London, 1974), 234–9, and pp. 190–2 above.
12 P.Skippon, 'An account of a journey through the Low Countries, Germany, Italy and France', in A.Churchill, ed., *A collection of voyages and travels,* VI (London, 1732), 418–84. See also Friedrichs, *Nördlingen,* chapters 2, 4 and 5. Admittedly, the overall standard of living did not regain its pre-war level in most areas until after 1700, but that was largely due to Louis XIV.

13 Bonney, *The King's Debts,* 126–7, 200, 202–5.
14 See Beck, *Der hessische Bruderzwist,* for a succinct, recent account of the later stages of the war from the Hessian point of view. As for the Habsburg lands, war was not without deleterious economic effects, but they were less serious than might have been expected. See, for one area, R.Sandgruber, 'Zur Wirtschaftsentwicklung Niederösterreichs im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert', *Unsere Heimat,* XLV (1974), 210–21.
15 Quoted by L.W.Forster, *The Temper of Seventeenth-Century German Literature* (London, 1952), 9. See the similar eulogies of political theorists and preachers in England quoted by J.N.Figgis, *The Theory of the Divine Right of Kings* (London, 1894), chapters 7, 8 and 9.
16 George's peace policy is sensitively discussed by Frohnweiler, 'Die Friedenspolitik Landgraf Georgs II.', especially pp. 163–70.
17 G.R.Potter and E.Simpson, eds, *Sermons of john Donne,* II (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1955), 250–68. Dr Donne began: 'There is not a more comprehensive, a more embracing word in all Religion, than the first word of this text: NOW.' The preoccupation with Time, and in particular with immediacy, was common to most writers of the day. It is reflected in the popularity of lyric poetry, sonnets and epigrams (all of which aimed at holding fast a momentary emotion, thought or act taken from the stream of Time), and in the epithalamia written to stress the uniqueness of almost every event, however trivial.
18 Details in E.L.Petersen, 'Conspicuous consumption: the Danish nobility of the seventeenth century', *Kwartalnik historij Kultury materialnej,* I (1982), 64–5.

Bibliographical essay

A General works

Several thousand books and articles have been written on the subject of the Thirty Years' War—most of them bearing the same title as this volume. The best available in this category, in alphabetical order, are:

J.Burckhardt, *Der dreissigjährige Krieg* (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1992); H.Langer, *The Thirty Years' War* (Leipzig, 1978; Eng. edn Poole, 1980); S.J.Lee, *The Thirty Years' War* (London, 1991); P.Limm, *The Thirty Years' War* (London, 1984); G.Livet, *La Guerre de Trente Ans* (Paris, 1963); G.Pages, *The Thirty Years' War* (London, 1971); J.V.Polišenský, *The Thirty Years' War* (London, 1971); H.Sacchi, *La Guerre de Trente Ans* (3 vols, Paris, 1991); G.Schmidt, *Der dreissigjährige Krieg* (Munich, 1995); G.Schormann, *Der dreissigjährige Krieg* (Göttingen, 1985); V.L.Tapié, *La Guerre de Trente Ans* (Paris, 1989); and C.V.Wedgwood, *The Thirty Years' War* (London, 1938; frequently reprinted). Some items bear slightly different titles, such as G.Barudio, *Der teutsche Krieg, 1618–1648* (Göttingen, 1985); G.Benecke, *Germany in the Thirty Years' War* (London, 1978); D.Maland, *Europe at War, 1600–1650* (London, 1980); T.K.Rabb, ed., *The Thirty Years' War. Problems of Motive, Extent and Effect* (Lexington, 1964); K.Repgen, ed., *Krieg und Politik, 1618–1648. Europäische Probleme und Perspektiven* (Munich, 1988: Schriften des Historischen Kollegs, Kolloquien VIII); and S.H.Steinberg, *The 'Thirty Years' War' and the Conflict for European Hegemony, 1600–1660* (London, 1967).

All of these works have their strengths but, as noted above in the Preface, none is entirely adequate. Langer's excellent book is really a cultural history of Germany during the war; Pages, Polišensý, Tapié and Wedgwood each deal with one aspect of the conflict at the expense of the rest. Benecke presents an invaluable English translation of many key documents, but not a general history of the war; Steinberg's interpretation is overstated and marred by numerous factual errors; Maland relies exclusively on secondary works and likewise contains numerous errors; Rabb presents the views of twenty-one different authors in less than 100 pages. Of the shorter accounts, Lee (73 pages), Livet (125 pages), Schmidt (115 pages) and Schormann (150 pages) offer terse but clear overviews, while Benecke and Limm offer a useful selection of documents translated into English. Of the longer works, Tapié (450 pages, published posthumously) presents the text of a course of lectures, drawing heavily on German and Czech sources, but marred by many factual errors; Barudio (700 pages) gives a workmanlike narrative based on German and Scandinavian sources; while Sacchi (over 1,500 pages) provides a very detailed account (including an entire volume on the period 1635–48) that rests exclusively on secondary sources. Burkhardt (309 pages), by contrast, views the war from the perspective of state-building, emphasizing the development of territorial governments within the Empire as a result of the war. His main argument is summarized in J.Burckhardt, 'Der dreissigjährige Krieg als moderner Staatsbildungskrieg',

Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, XLV (1994), 487–99. Repgen collected thirteen substantial papers delivered at a conference on the war (held in 1984), which address major domestic and international issues.

None of these more modern surveys thus matches the superb vintage study of Moriz Ritter, *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Gegenreformation und des dreissigjährigen Krieges, 1555–1648* (3 vols, Stuttgart, 1989; reprinted Darmstadt, 1974). Volume I covers 1555–86; volume II deals with 1586–1618 in two parts, divided by the Donauwörth Incident of 1607 and the conflict between Rudolf II and his brother; volume III covers the years 1618–35 in detail. Nowhere else are the international repercussions of each separate event in the Empire so thoroughly and lucidly presented: for the war to 1635, and for developments leading up to the conflict, Ritter remains fundamental and indispensable.

It is not possible to recommend any other general work with the same confidence. J.Gagliardo, *Germany under the Old Regime, 1600–1790* (London, 1991); A.Kohler, *Das Reich im Kampf um die Hegemonie in Europa, 1521–1648* (Munich, 1990); and V.Press, *Kriege und Krisen. Deutschland 1600–1715* (Munich, 1991), all have something to say about the Thirty Years' War, but inevitably they include little detail. Even the solid chapters of the *Cambridge Modern History,* volume IV, first published in 1906, are uneven: although some (such as that on the Valtelline question) are still outstanding, others are definitely out of date. But what can be put in their place? It depends, of course, on the amount of time at the reader's disposal. The *apparatus criticus* that follows is therefore designed to do two things: to indicate and evaluate all the sources on which the text of this book is based; and to draw attention to the score or so most useful works among them (indicated with *). An index of scholars whose works are cited, whether in this bibliography or in the notes, appears on pages 273–80 below.

B Antecedents

According to a leading German historian, writing in 1950, interest in Germany between 1555 and 1618 had declined to such a point that it was close to extinction. This is still true. For English readers who cannot cope with the first two volumes of Ritter's *Deutsche Geschichte* (above), only four brief outlines are available: one by G.D.Ramsay in the *New Cambridge Modern History* (in two parts—vol. III, chap. 10, and vol. IV, chap. 10); the second, by *C.P.Clasen in H.Trevor-Roper, ed., *The Age of Expansion. Europe and the World 1559–1660* (London, 1968), chap. 4; third, in slightly more detail, by Hajo Holborn, *A History of Modern Germany: The Reformation* (London, 1965), chaps 10 and 11; and fourth, M.P.Gutman, The origins of the Thirty Years' War', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History,* XVIII (1988), 749–70 (reprinted in R.I.Rotberg and T.K.Rabb, eds, *The Origins and Prevention of Major Wars* (Cambridge, 1989), 177–98). However, pp. 253–351 of that excellent journal *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung,* X (1983) are devoted to German political developments between 1555 and 1618, with the title 'Möglichkeiten der Reichspolitik zwischen Augsburger Religionsf rieden und Ausbruch des dreissigjährigen Krieges'. The articles by K.Vocelka (on Matthias and Rudolf, 1606–12) and K.Schlaich (on the majority principle in the Diet between 1495 and 1613) are particularly useful. Equally helpful are the challenging essays of *N.M. Sutherland, The

Origins of the Thirty Years' War and the Structure of European Politics', *English Historical Review,* CVII (1992), 587–625, which sees the war as but phase three of a four-phase struggle between France and the Habsburgs spanning more than two centuries (1494–1713); and *S.C.Ogilvie, 'Germany and the Seventeenth-Century Crisis', *The Historical Journal,* XXXV (1992), 417–41.

One of the major gaps in almost every history of the war—including even Ritter—is a consideration of developments in the Austrian lands. Scholars should therefore be particularly grateful for the important study of *R.J.W.Evans, *The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy 1550–1700: An Interpretation* (Oxford, 1979), equipped with a comprehensive bibliography in many languages. Attention should also be paid to the following studies: H.Sturmberger, 'Die Anfänge des Bruderzwistes in Habsburg', *Mitteilungen des Oberösterreichischen Landesarchivs,* V (1957), 143–88, which gives an admirable account of Rudolf s dealings with his brothers; an earlier work by Professor Evans, *Rudolf II and His World. A Study in Intellectual History 1576–1612* (Oxford, 1973); and the volume of essays *Rudolf II and His Court* (Delft, 1982: Leids Kunsthistorisch Jaarboek, I).

Among more recent studies, see the essays collected in R.J.W.Evans and T. V.Thomas, eds, *Crown, Church and Estates. Central European Politics in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (London, 1991). On the Habsburgs' conflicts with their neighbours, see the recent survey of the diplomatic activity of many major (and some minor) European states during the 'long' Turkish war by J.P.Niederkorn, *Die europäische Mächte und der 'Lange Türkenkrieg' Kaiser Rudolfs II. 1593–1606* (Vienna, 1993); and, for the origins of the 'uzkok war', see C.W.Bracewell, *The Uskoks of Senj: Piracy, Banditry and Holy War in the Sixteenth-Century Adriatic* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1992). Two recent studies consider the institutional antagonisms within Bohemia itself that helped precipitate the crisis: J.Bahlcke, *Regionalismus und Staatsintegration im Widerstreit. Die Länder der Böhmischen Krone im ersten Jahrhundert der Habsburgerherrschaft (1526–1619)* (Munich, 1993), in addition to providing an excellent overview of the institutional development of Bohemia in the century before the White Mountain, gives a good account of the implications of the Bohemian model for the political theories of the era; while J.Pánek, 'Das politische System des böhmischen Staates im ersten Jahrhundert der Habsburgischen Herrschaft (1526–1620)', *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung,* XCVII (1989), 53–82, attempts to situate political institutions in the framework of social organization in the Czech-centred Marxist tradition. On the deposition of Rudolf II, see R.Schronbek, 'Die böhmischen Landtagsverhandlungen des Jahres 1611', in F.Seibt, ed., *Die böhmischen Länder zwischen Ost und West. Festschrift für Karl Bosl* (Munich, 1983), 89–102. See also the useful review article of P.S.Fichtner, 'Habsburg State-Building in the Early Modern Era', *Austrian History Yearbook,* XXV (1994), 139–54.

The most important new work relates to Bohemia. See especially J.Janáček, *Rudolf II a jeho doba* (Prague, 1987), and J.Pánek, *Posledni Rožmberkové, velmoži české renesance* (Prague, 1989), on the crisis of the last years of Rudolf's reign; and N.Rejchrtová, *Václav Budovec z Budova* (Prague, 1984), on one of the leaders of the Bohemian Revolt. For Austria, K.MacHardy, *Obedience and Rebellion: The Rise of Absolutism and the Nobility of Early Modern Habsburg Austria* (London, 1994), contains a notable reassessment of the relation between religion and politics.

Far less has been written about Emperor Ferdinand II. The fullest view of his policies remains the contemporary chronicle of one of his privy councillors, first published in the 1640s and given its final form in twelve imposing folio volumes (plus two supplements) by the Elector of Saxony's printer in the 1720s: *Frantz Christoph Khevenhillers Annales Ferdinandeorum*. A companion work by the same author, *Conterfet Kupfferstich* (2 vols, Leipzig, 1721–2), provides illustrated biographical sketches. F.Hurter, *Geschichte Kaiser Ferdinands II. und seiner Eltern* (11 vols, Schaffhausen, 1850–67), is tendentious but remains essential. On a smaller scale, one may consult J.Franzl, *Ferdinand II. Kaiser im Zwiespalt der Zeit* (Graz, 1978); H.Sturmberger, *Kaiser Ferdinand II und das Problem des Absolutismus* (Munich, 1957); and G.Franz, 'Glaube und Recht im politischen Denken Kaiser Ferdinands II.', *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte,* XLIX (1958), 258–69. See also F.Stieve in *Allgemeine deutsche Biographie,* VI (1877), 644r-64; and A.Schindling and W.Ziegler, eds, *Die Kaiser der Neuzeit, 1519–1918* (Munich, 1990), 125–41 (D.Albrecht on Ferdinand II).

For the emperor's skilful manipulation of public opinion, especially in Lutheran Germany, see K.Nolden, *Die Reichspolitik Kaiser Ferdinands II. in der Publizistik bis zum Lübecker Frieden 1629* (Cologne, 1958). There is also much of value on decision-making at the emperor's court in the important study of *R. Bireley, *Religion and Politics in the Age of the Counter-Reformation. Emperor Ferdinand II, William Lamormaini, S.J., and the Formation of lmperial Policy* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1981). On Ferdinand's homeland, see F.M.Dolinar *et al.,* eds, *Katholische Reform und Gegenreformation in Innerösterreich 1564–1628* (Klagenfurt, 1994); A.Novotny and B.Sutter, eds, *Innerösterreich 1564–1619* (Graz, 1967); and W.Schulze, *Landesdefension und Staatsbildung: Studien zum Kriegswesen des innerösterreichischen Territorialstaates (1564–1619)* (Vienna, 1973).

The only problems facing the Empire in these years which have attracted broad surveys, covering the entire period, have been religion, the economy and (perhaps surprisingly) representative institutions. On the general state of Protestantism in Germany at this time, see J.B.Neveux, *Vie spirituelle et vie sociale entre Rhin et Baltique au XVIIe siècle* (Paris, 1967); H.Schilling, *Konfessionskonflikt und Staatsbildung. Eine Fallstudie über das Verhältnis von religiösem und sozialem Wandel in der Frühneuzeit am Beispiel der Grafschaft Lippe* (Gütersloh, 1981: Quellen und Forschungen zur Reformationsgeschichte, XLVIII); B.Vogler, 'La politique scolaire entre Rhin et Moselle, l'example du duché de Deux-Ponts 1555–1619', *Francia,* III (1975), 236–320, and IV (1976), 287–364; and *idem, Le monde germanique et helvétique a I'époque des Réformes, 1517–1618,* II (Paris, 1981). On the Formula of Concord, see the quatercentenary articles edited by L.W.Spitz in *Sixteenth-Century Journal,* VIII no. 4 (1977). More recent works on the subject include R.P. Hsia, *Society and Religion in Münster, 1535–1618* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984); M.Forster, *The Counter-Reformation in the Villages. Religion and Reform in the Bishopric of Speyer* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1992); B.Nischan, *Prince, People and Confession: the Second Reformation in Brandenburg* (Philadelphia, 1994); and H.Schilling, 'Die Konfessionaliserung im Reich. Religiöser und Gesellschaftlicher Wandel in Deutschland zwischen 1555 und 1620', *Historische Zeitschrift,* CCXLVI (1988), 1–45.

On the economy, the best surveys, apart from the article by S.Ogilvie (above), are by H.Kellenbenz in H.Aubin and W.Zorn, eds, *Handbuch der deutschen Wirtschafts- und*

Sozialgeschichte, I (Stuttgart, 1971), 386–494; and from a 'socialist' point of view, by J.Kuczynski, *Geschichte des Alltags des deutschen Volkes. 1:1600–50* (East Berlin, 1981). See also I.Bog, 'Wachstumsprobleme der oberdeutschen Wirtschaft 1540–1618', in F.Lütge, ed., *Wirtschaftliche und soziale Probleme der gewerblichen Entwicklung im 15–16. und 19. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 1968), 44–89; and R.Endres, 'Zur wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Lage in Franken vor dem dreissigjährigen Krieg', *Jahrbuch für fränkische Landesforschung,* XXVIII (1968), 5–52.

Among studies of representative assemblies, the most celebrated (at least among English readers) is F.L.Carsten, *Princes and Parliaments in Germany from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 1959). However, although it contains a mass of fascinating data and a wealth of bold and clear generalizations, Carsten's work has been criticized by German historians as too Anglocentric: the author, it is argued, overstresses the resemblance between German assemblies and the English Parliament. See, for example, P.Herde, 'Deutsche Landstände und englisches Parliament', *Historisches Jahrbuch,* LXXX (1966), 286–97. A very different view of south German representative assemblies, stressing their truly democratic structure (so unlike the English model), is offered by P.Blickle, *Landschaften im alten Reich. Die staatlichen Funktionen des gemeinen Mannes in Oberdeutschland* (Munich, 1973). For further literature on the Imperial Diet, see note 12 on page 217 above. On the Estates of the Austrian lands, two long articles are of crucial importance: on the origins, see M.Mitterauer, 'Ständegliederung und Ländertypen', in E.Bruckmüller *et al.,* eds, *Herrschaftsstruktur und Ständebildung II. Beiträge zur Typologie der österreichischen Länder aus ihren mittelalterlichen Grundlagen* (Munich, 1973), 115–203; on the Protestant schools, founded by the Estates and the symbol of their independence, see G.Heiss, 'Konfession, Politik und Erziehung. Die Landschaftsschulen in der nieder- und innerösterreichischen Ländern vor dem dreissigjährigen Krieg', in G.Klingenstein *et al.,* eds, *Bildung, Politik und Gesellschaft* (Vienna, 1978), 13–63.

The political groups outside the Habsburg lands which took an interest in Bohemian developments before 1618 have also attracted their share of scholarly attention. The archives of both the League and the Union are presently located in the various sections of the Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv in Munich, which contain the pre-war archives of the Rhine Palatinate as well as of the duchy of Bavaria. For the period 1599–1613 most of the contents of these archives, together with much subsidiary documentation from other sources, were printed in the series *Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte des Dreissigjährigen Krieges,* edited by Moriz Ritter *etal.,* vols I–XII (Munich, 1870–1978).

The best study of Palatine policy in English is the brief outline by C.P.Clasen, *The Palatinate in European History 1559–1660* (London, 1963). Far more is available in German: above all, V.Press, *Calvinismus und Territorialstaat: Regierung und Zentralbehörden der Kurpfalz 1559–1619* (Stuttgart, 1970: Kieler historische Studien, VII); *idem,* 'Die Grundlagen der kurpfälzischen Herrschaft in der Oberpfalz 1499–1621', *Verhandlungen des historischen Vereins für Oberpfalz und Regensburg,* CXVII (1977), 31–67; and F.H.Schubert, *Ludwig Camerarius, 1573–1651: Eine Biographie* (Kallmünz, 1955). Anhalt lacks a modern biography, but his connexions with the central European Protestants are briefly outlined in A.A.van Schelven, 'Der Generalstab des politischen Calvinismus in Zentraleuropa zu Beginn des dreissigjährigen Krieges', *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte,* XXXVI (1939), 117–41. There is no recent study of the Union,

but several of its members have been the subject of valuable monographs. See, in particular, H.G.Herold, *Markgraf Joachim-Ernst von Brandenburg-Ansbach als Reichsfürst* (Göttingen, 1973: Schriftenreihe der Historischen Kommission bei der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, X); E.Kossol, *Die Reichspolitik des Pfalzgrafen Philipp Ludwig von Neuburg (1547–1614)* (Göttingen, 1976: Schriftenreihe etc, XIV); A.Gotthard, *Konfession und Staatsräson. Die Aussenpolitik Württembergs unter Herzog Johan Friedrich, 1608–28* (Stuttgart, 1992); and E.L.Sticht, *Markgraf Christian von Brandenburg-Kulmbach und das Oberland der Markgrafschaft im dreissigjährigen Krieg (1618–1635)* (Neuhaus-ander-Eger, 1964).

A number of fine studies of the multitudinous peculiar institutions of the Empire have appeared in recent years. On the institutional structure of small, scattered territorial states, see R.Asch, *Verwaltung und Beamtentum. Die Gräflich Fürstenbergischen Territorien vom Ausgang des Mittelalters bis zum Schwedischen Krieg 1490–1632* (Stuttgart, 1986); and J.A.Vann, *The Making of a State: Württemberg 1593–1793* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984). On Brandenburg, see W.W.Hagen, 'Seventeenth-Century Crisis in Brandenburg: The Thirty Years' War, the Destabilization of Serfdom, and the Rise of Absolutism', *American Historical Review,* XCIV (1989), 302–35; on Electoral Saxony, A.Gotthard,' "Politice seint wir bäpstisch". Kursachsen und der deutschen Protestantismus im frühen 17. Jahrhundert', *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung,* XX (1993), 275–320, is filled with important detail, but ultimately fails to explain why, other than force of habit, Saxony adhered so doggedly to its position of neutrality.

A fine lesson on the labyrinthine political structure of the Empire can be learned from the political manoeuvres of the city of Cologne in relation to the Prince-Bishop, the Hansa, and the Imperial Free Cities described in H.-W. Bergerhausen, *Die Stadt Köln und die Reichsversammlungen im Konfessionellen Zeitalter: Ein Beitrag zur korporativen Reichsständischen Politik 1555–1616* (Cologne, 1990). B.Roeck, *Eine Stadt in Krieg und Frieden. Studien zur Geschichte der Reichsstadt Augsburg zwischen Kalenderstreit und Parität* (2 parts, Göttingen, 1989), and its abridged and popularized complement, *Als wollt die Welt schier brechen: Eine Stadt im Zeitalter des Dreissigjährigen Krieges* (Munich, 1991), provide insights into the confessional and political stance of an important Imperial Free City, as well as its social and economic development. The efforts of the Imperial Counts to organize themselves for a larger political role in the Empire is the subject of two recent books: E.Böhme, *Das fränkische Reichsgrafenkollegium im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert. Untersuchungen zu den Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der korporativen Politik mindermächtigen Reichsstände* (Stuttgart, 1989); and G.Schmidt, *Die Wetterauer Grafenverein: Organisation und Politik einer Reichskorporation zwischen Reformation und Westfälischen Frieden* (Marburg, 1989). K.E.Demandt, 'Das Siegerland im Wettstreit von Glauben, Recht und Politik 1607–1651', *Hessisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte,* XXXII (1982), 175–206, discusses the religious problems faced by the counts of Nassau-Siegen; while W.Dotzauer, *Die Deutschen Reichskreise in der Verfassung des Alten Reiches und ihr Eigenleben (1500–1806)* (Darmstadt, 1989), provides a useful guide to the development of the Imperial Circles.

*H.T.Gräf, *Konfession und Internationales System. Die Aussenpolitik Hessen-Kassels im Konfessionellen Zeitalter* (Darmstadt, 1993), has written perhaps the most useful study of all on the political structure of pre-war Germany, which seeks to explain the interconnexions of confession, dynastic principle, legal custom and reason of state in

shaping the policy of the landgraves of Hesse-Kassel. He deals with both German politics and international ties (revealing, for example, overtures to Sweden as early as the 1570s) in order to demonstrate Hesse's desire to follow a middle course between the militant Calvinism of the Palatinate and the pro-Imperial neutrality of Saxony—frustrated, according to Grä'f, by the rush of events after 1609 that overwhelmed Landgrave Maurice, along with many other German statesmen.

There are two excellent studies of Bavaria and the League: F.Neuer-Landfried, *Die Katholische Liga: Gründung, Neugründung und Organisation eines Sonderbundes, 1608–1620* (Kallmünz, 1968: Münchener historische Studien, Abteilung bayerische Geschichte, IX), and H.Altmann, *Die Reichspolitik Maximilians von Bayern, 1613–1618* (Munich, 1978: Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte des dreissigjährigen Krieges, neue Folge, XII). Other volumes in this series bear the collective title *Die Politik Maximilians I.von Bayern und seiner Verbündeten 1618–1651* and publish all the relevant documents. Volume I (in two parts, published Munich, 1966–70) covers the period 1618–22. Volume II covers 1623–35 in ten parts, not all of them yet available: parts 1–3 (published Leipzig, 1907, 1918 and 1942) and 4–5 (published Munich, 1948 and 1964) take the story to 1630. Part 8 (for 1633–4) appeared in 1981, part 9 (for 1634–5) in 1986. An admirable biography of the League's Director is now available: A.Kraus, *MaximilianI,Bayerns grosser Kurfürst* (Cologne-Graz, 1990). See also A.Kraus, 'Kurfürst Maximilian I von Bayern. Das neue Bild eines grossen Fürsten', *Historisches Jahrbuch,* XCVII/XCVIII (1978), 505–26, which reviews all literature since 1963. Beyond this, on Maximilian before the war, see H.Dollinger's full-length work *Studien zur Finanzreform Maximilians I.Von Bayern in den Jahren 1598–1618. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Frühabsolutismus* (Göttingen, 1968: Schriftenreihe der historischen Kommission bei der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, VIII). Also recommended are H.Dotterweich, *Der junge Maximilian. Jugend und Erziehung des bayerischen Herzogs und späteren Kurfürsten Maximilian I. von 1573 bis 1593* (Munich, 1962: a charming study based on ducal household papers and the young duke's exercise books) and K.Pfister, *Kurfürst Maximilian von Bayern und sein Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1948: insufficiently rigorous but full of interesting anecdotes). Much valuable material appeared in the catalogue of a huge exhibition mounted in 1980 in the Munich *Residenz:* H.Glaser, ed., *Wittelsbach und Bayern. II Um Glauben und Reich: Kurfürst Maximilian I.1.Beiträge zur bayerischen Geschichte und Kunst 1573–1657* and 2. *Katalog der Ausstellung* (Munich and Zürich, 1980). Further studies on the theme of Maximilian and the arts appeared in H.Glaser, ed., *Quellen und Studien zur Kunstpolitik der Wittelsbacher vom 16. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert* (Munich and Zürich, 1980).

For the policy towards events in the Empire pursued by other European powers at this time, see, for England: S.L.Adams, 'The Protestant Cause: Relations with the West European Calvinist Communities as a Political Issue in England, 1585–1630' (Oxford University D. Phil. thesis, 1973), and J.V.Polišenský, *Anglie a Bílá Hora* (Prague, 1949); for France: R.Mousnier, *The Assassination of Henry IV* (English edn, London, 1973), and J.M.Hayden, 'Continuity in the France of Henry IV and Louis XIII. French Foreign Policy, 1598–1615', *Journal of Modern History,* XLV (1973), 1–23; for the United Provinces: J.den Tex, *Oldenbarnevelt* (English edn, 2 vols, Cambridge, 1973), and A.Th.van Deursen, *Honni Soit qui Mal y Pense? De Republiek tussen de Mogendheden (1610–1612)* (Amsterdam, 1965: Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie

van Wetenschappen, Afdeling Letterkunde, N.S., XXVIII/i). For Spain, see: P.Brightwell, 'Spain and Bohemia: The Decision to Intervene, 1619', *European Studies Review,* XII (1982), 117–41; *idem,* 'Spain, Bohemia and Europe, 1619–21', *loc. cit.,* 371–99; M.S.Sánchez, 'A House Divided: Spain, Austria and the Bohemian and Hungarian Successions', *Sixteenth-Century Journal,* XXV (1994), 887–903; and E.Straub, *Pax et Imperium* (page 255 below). Finally, on the complex but crucial Cleve-Jülich succession, see the important and erudite study of A.Anderson, 'The Jülich-Kleve Succession Crisis (1609–1620): A study in international relations' (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Ph.D. thesis, 1992).

C The 1620s

There is an excellent brief survey of the Bohemian revolt by H.Sturmberger, *Aufstand in Böhmen. Der Beginn des dreissigjährigen Krieges* (Munich and Vienna, 1959); but A.Gindely, *Geschichte des dreissigjährigen Krieges* (4 vols, Prague, 1869–80) still remains indispensable for the 'Bohemian phase' of the war. On Ferdinand's reaction to the crisis, apart from the works of Franzl and Bireley (above), much further information is to be found in P.Broucek, 'Feldmarschaĺl Bucquoy als Armeekommandant, 1618 bis 1620', in *Der dreissigjährige Krieg: Beiträge zu seiner Geschichte* (Vienna, 1976: Schriften des Heeresgeschichtlichen Museums, VII), 25–57; and H.Kretschmer, *Sturmpetition und Blockade Wiens im Jahre 1619* (Vienna, 1978: Militärhistorische Schriftenreihe, XXXVIII). Dieter Albrecht has dealt with both papal and Bavarian policy towards the revolt in magisterial manner. See his three studies: 'Zur Finanzierung des dreissigjährigen Krieges', *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte,* XIX (1956), 534–67; *Die deutsche Politik Papst Gregors XV* (Munich, 1956: Schriftenreihe zur bayerischen Landesgeschichte, LIII); and **Die auswärtige Politik Maximilians von Bayern, 1618–1635* (Göttingen, 1962: Schriftenreihe der historischen Kommission bei der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, VI). On papal policy, see also the collection of documents published by Q.Aldea Vaquero, *España, el Papado y el Imperio durante la Guerra de los Treinta Años. II. Instrucciones a los Nuncios Apostólicos en España 1624–32* (Comillas, 1958). See also the recent studies of C.P. Kindleberger, The economic crisis of 1619 to 1623', *Journal of Economic History,* LI (1991), 149–75; F.Gui, *I Gesuiti e la Rivoluzione Boema. Alle Origini della Guerra dei Trent' anni* (Milan, 1989), based on the apologetic literature surrounding the expulsion of the Jesuits from Bohemia by the rebels in 1618; and J.V.Polišenský, *Tragic Triangle: The Netherlands, Spain, and Bohemia, 1617–1621* (Prague, 1991), which restates his earlier conclusions concerning the close affinities between the Dutch and Bohemia at the time of the revolt and features several contemporary commentators who noticed the connexion.

On Spanish policy, see P.Brightwell, 'The Spanish Origins of the Thirty Years' War', *European Studies Review,* IX (1979), 409–31 (and two further articles noted on p. 254 above); and the important study of E.Straub, *Pax et imperium. Spaniens Kampf um seine Friedensordnung in Europa zwischen 1617 und 1635* (Paderborn, 1980: Rechts- und staatswissenschaftliche Veröffentlichungen der Görres-Gesellschaft, Neue Folge XXXI). Note, however, that there are some curious gaps in Straub's list of authorities, and that his entire interpretation has been attacked for neglecting the role of Bavaria and Austria (see

the review by H.Altmann in *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte,* XLV [1982], 723–7). One of the works not cited by Straub is the study of J.Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano, *España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte (1618–1639). La última ofensiva europea de los Austrias madrileños* (Barcelona, 1975), which largely supersedes the relevant chapters of B.Chudoba, *Spain and the Empire 1519–1643* (Chicago, 1952), and considerable parts of R. Ródenas Vilar, *La política europea de España durante la Guerra de Treinta Años, 1624–1630* (Madrid, 1967). Alcalá-Zamora has, however, been criticized (along with the present writer and most others in the field) by *J.I.Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World 1606–1661* (Oxford, 1982), for defective coverage of the war in the Low Countries. Israel, on the other hand, sometimes fails to integrate events in the Low Countries with those in Germany. No one, it seems, is perfect.

There is much of value on the 'Baltic design', in A.E.Sokol, *Das habsburgische Admiralitätswerk des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts* (Vienna, 1976: Biblos-Schriften, LXXXIX); and a useful collection of Spanish documents, together with a long introduction, concerning the negotiations between the two branches of the House of Austria during the period is provided by H.Günter, *Die Habsburger-Liga 1625–1635. Briefe und Akten aus dem General-Archiv zu Simancas* (Berlin, 1908; reprinted 1965). The most recent overview of all this is provided in the balanced and impressively documented article of M.E.H.N.Mout, "'Holendische propositiones". Een Habsburgs plan tot vernietigung van handel, visserij en scheepvaart der Republiek (ca 1625)', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis,* XCV (1982), 345–62.

The definitive work on Spanish politics during this period, *J.H.Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline* (London and New Haven, Conn., 1986), contains brilliant insights on Spain's intervention in Germany; see also Elliott's *Richelieu and Olivares* (Cambridge, 1984) and 'Self-Perception and Decline in Seventeenth-Century Spain', *Past and Present,* LXXIV (1977), 41–61 (reprinted in Elliott, *Spain and its World 1500–1700. Selected Essays* [London and New Haven, Conn., 1989], 241–61. On the court of Spain, where so many crucial decisions were taken, see Jonathan Brown and J.H.Elliott, *A Palace for a King. The Buen Retiro and the Court of Philip IV* (London and New Haven, Conn., 1980). The German policy of the government in Brussels, which did not always see eye-to-eye with Madrid, is examined by J.Kessel, *Spanien und die geistlichen Kurstaaten am Rhein während der Regierungszeit der Infantin Isabella (1621–1633)* (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1979).

Of Ferdinand's principal opponent, the Elector Palatine Frederick V, there is no adequate study—though much may be gleaned from Schubert's *Camerarius* and Press, *Calvinismus und Territorialstaat* (page 252 above). See also J.G.Weiss, 'Die Vorgeschichte des böhmischen Abenteuers Friedrichs V. von der Pfalz', *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins,* N.F. LIII (1940), 383–492; F.H.Schubert, 'Die pfälzische Exilregierung im dreissigjährigen Krieg: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des politischen Protestantismus', *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins,* CII (1954), 575–680; J.Steiner, *Die Pfälzische Kurwürde während des dreissigjährigen Krieges (1618–1648)* (Speyer, 1975: Veröffentlichungen der Pfälzischen Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften in Speyer, LXXVI); and M.E.H.N.Mout, 'Der Winterkönig im Exil: Friedrich von der Pflaz und die niederländischen Generalstaaten, 1621–32', *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung,* XX (1988), 257–72.

The best account of the 1621 and 1622 campaigns in the west is found in H.Wertheim, *Der Tolle Halberstädter: Herzog Christian von Braunschweig im Pfälzischen Krieg, 1621–1622* (Berlin, 1929). For the 1623 campaign, see W.Brünick, *Der Gräf von Mansfeld in Ostfriesland (1621–1624)* (Aurich, 1957: Abhandlungen und Vorträge zur Geschichte Ostfrieslands, XXXIV), which also provides the most convincing portrait of Mansfeld. On the policies of Maximilian of Bavaria in these years see R.Bireley, *Maximilian von Bayern, Adam Contzen, S.J., und die Gegenreformation in Deutschland, 1624–35* (Göttingen, 1975: Schriftenreihe der Historischen Kommission bei der bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, XIII), who stresses the Elector's devoutness; and G.Immler, 'Kurfürst Maximilian I. und die Kirche. Aspekte seiner Finanzpolitik während des Dreissigjährigen Krieges', *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte,* LI (1988), 387–409, who argues that Maximilian was guided more by 'reason of state' and the needs of Bavaria than by religious sentiment. On the occupation of the Rhine Palatinate by Bavarian and Spanish forces, see F.Maier, *Die bayerische Unterpfalz im dreissigjährigen Krieg: Besetzung, Verwaltung, und Rekatholisierung der rechtrheinischen Pfalz durch Bayern 1621 bis 1649* (New York, 1990); A.Egler, *Die Spanier in der Linkrheinischen Pfalz, 1620–32. Invasion, Verwaltung, Rekatholisierung* (Mainz, 1971: Quellen und Abhandlungen zur mittelrheinischen Kirchengeschichte, XIII); and W.Dautermann, *Alzey im dreissigjährigen Krieg. Eine Studie über die Wirkung des dreissigjährigen Krieges in einer pfälzischen Stadt* (Berlin, 1937: Historische Studien, CCCXVIII). Finally, on the Upper Palatinate, see K.-O.Ambronn and A.Fuchs, eds, *Die Oberpfalz wird bayerisch: die Jahre 1621 bis 1628 im Amberg und der Oberpfalz* (Ausstellungskatalog: Amberg, 1978); and J.Staber, 'Die Eroberung der Oberpfalz im Jahre 1621. Nach dem Tagebuch des Johann Christoph von Preysing', *Verhandlungen des historischen Vereins für Oberpfalz und Regensburg,* CIV (1964), 165–221.

For Danish intervention, H.Gamrath and E.Ladewig Petersen, *Gyldendal's danmarkshistorie, II, 2:1559–1648* (Copenhagen, 1980), give a narrative account and a full critical bibliography, including all the literature in Danish, to which readers are referred. The prelude to that intervention—and its relation to the Danish-Swedish context—has been described by L.Tandrup, *Mod triumf eller tragedie. En politisk-diplomatisk studie i forløbet af den dansk-svenske magtkamp fra Kalmarkrigen til Kejserkrigen* (2 vols, Århus, 1979). Cf. the reviews by S.Heiberg and K.J.V.Jespersen in *Fortid og Nutid,* XXVIII (1980), 636–43 and *Historisk Tidsskrift* [Dansk], LXXXI (1981), 242–53, respectively. Tandrup's work largely supersedes T.Christiansen, *Die Stellung König Christians IV. von Dänemark zu den Kriegsereignissen im deutschen Reich und zu den Plänen einer evangelischen Allianz 1618–1625* (Kiel, 1937). The quatercentenary of Christian IV's accession gave rise to a spate of new studies of Denmark's most famous monarch, of which the best were S.Heiberg, *Christian IV. Monarken, mennesket og myten* (Copenhagen, 1988) and S.Ellehøj, ed., *Christian IVs Verden* (Copenhagen, 1988). On these and other works, see the important review articles by O.Ryan and H.Gamrath in, respectively, *Historisk Tidsskrift* [Dansk], LXXXIX (1989), 283–99, and XCI (1991), 133–53. The frosty meeting between the kings of Denmark and Sweden in 1629 (page 71 above) is the subject of K.J.V.Jespersen, 'Kongemødet i Ulfsbäck praestegard februar 1629', *Historie* N.S. XIV (1982), 420–39. The king's military achievements have been reviewed (and largely vindicated) by

J.C.Kirchmeier-Andersen, 'Christian IV som taktiker', *Vaabenhistoriske Aarbøger,* XXXIII (1987), 63–157, and XXXIV (1988), 5–107; and G.Lind, *Hæren og magten i Danmark 1614–62* (Odense, 1994). Finally, in English, an admirable account is provided by *P.D.Lockhart, *Denmark in the Thirty Years' War 1618–1648: King Christian IV and the Decline of the Oldenburg State* (Cranbury, N.J., 1996). On public finance, see E.Ladewig Petersen, 'From Domain State to Tax State', *Scandinavian Economic History Review,* XXIII (1975), 116–48, and *'Defence, War and Finance: Christian IV and the Council of the Realm 1596–1629', *Scandinavian Journal of History,* VII (1982), 277–313.

The role of Transylvania, and, behind it, of the Turks, during the early phases of the Thirty Years' War is often neglected; yet material for study is not lacking. See D.Angyal, 'Gabriel Bethlen', *Revue historique,* LIII (1928), 19–80; J.V. Polišenský, 'Bohemia, the Turk and the Christian Commonwealth, 1462–1620', *Byzantinoslavica,* XIV (1953), 82–108; R.R.Heinisch, 'Habsburg, die Pforte und der Böhmische Aufstand (1618–20)', *Südostforschungen,* XXXIII (1974), 125–65, and XXXIV (1975), 79–124; and H.Valentinitsch, 'Die Steiermark, Ungarn und die Osmanen, 1606–1662', *Zeitschrift des Historischen Vereines für Steiermark,* LXV (1974), 93–128.

For English foreign policy in the 1620s, see S.L.Adams, The Protestant Cause' (page 254 above), and his articles: 'Foreign Policy and the Parliaments of 1621 and 1624', in K.Sharpe, ed., *Faction and Parliament: Essays on Early Stuart History* (Oxford, 1978), 139–71; and 'Spain or the Netherlands? The Dilemmas of Early Stuart Foreign Policy' in H.Tomlinson, ed., *Before the Civil War* (London, 1984), 79–101. More recently, see T.Cogswell, 'Foreign Policy and Parliament: The Case of La Rochelle, 1625–6', *English Historical Review,* XCIX (1984), 241–67; and 'Prelude to Ré: The Anglo-French Struggle over La Rochelle, 1624–7', *History,* LXXI (1986), 1–21. On Britain and the Palatine question, see J.Reeve, 'Quiroga's Paper of 1631: A Missing Link in Anglo-Spanish Diplomacy during the Thirty Years' War', *English Historical Review,* C (1986), 913–26; E.Weiss, *Die Unterstützung Friedrichs V. von der Pfalz durch Jakob I. und Karl I. von England im dreissigjährigen Krieg (1618–32)* (Stuttgart, 1966: Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für geschichtliche Landeskunde in Baden-Württemberg, series B, XXXVII); and R.Zaller,' "Interest of state": James I and the Palatinate', *Albion,* VI (1974), 144–75. James I's attempts to mediate in the Palatinate are discussed in detail in A.W.White, 'Suspension of Arms: Anglo-Spanish Mediation in the Thirty Years' War, 1621–1625' (Tulane University, Ph.D. thesis, 1978). Dutch foreign policy during the Thirty Years' War lacks a modern study, but details of military assistance to the German Protestants can be found in: F.J.G.ten Raa and F.de Bas, *Het Staatsche Leger, 1573–1795. III (1609–1625)* (Breda, 1915); J.V. Polišenský, *Nizozemská politika a Bílá Hora* (Prague, 1958); J.H.Hora Siccama, *Schets van de diplomatieke betrekkingen tusschen Nederland en Brandenburg 1596–1678* (Utrecht, 1867), chaps 1–2; and J.G.Smit and J.Roelevink, eds, *Resolutiën der Staten-Generaal,* nieuwe reeks IV–V (The Hague, 1981–3).

Of the other interventionist states, the policies of France are the best covered. See V.L.Tapié, *La politique de la France et le début de la guerre de trente ans* (Paris, 1934); R.Pithon, 'Les débuts difficiles du Ministère de Richelieu et la crise de la Valtelline (1621–1627)', *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique,* LXXIV (1960), 298–322; and 'La Suisse, théâtre de la Guerre Froide entre la France et l'Espagne pendant la crise de la Valtelline

(1621–1626)', *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte,* XIII (1963), 33–53. There seems to be no entirely satisfactory study of Richelieu's foreign policy: the best consideration of the man in English—W.F.Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State* (Princeton, N.J., 1972)—has little to say on foreign affairs after 1627. Perhaps the most illuminating introduction is part II of J. Wollenberg, *Richelieu: Staatsräson und Kircheninteresse. Zur Legitimation der Politik des Kardinalpremier* (Bielefeld, 1977). Many fine insights into French foreign policy throughout the war are to be found in *R.J.Bonney, *The King's Debts. Politics and Finance in France 1589–1661* (Oxford, 1981). The main series of financial statistics for the French crown has now been published: R.J.Bonney, 'Jean-Roland Malet: Historian of the Finances of the French Monarchy', *French History,* V (1991), 180–233; and M.M. and R.J.Bonney, *Jean-Roland Malet: premier historien des finances de la monarchie française* (Paris, 1993). See also H.Weber, "'Une Bonne Paix": Richelieu's Foreign Policy and the Peace of Christendom,' in J.Bergin and L.W.Brockliss, eds, *Richelieu and his Age* (Oxford, 1992), 45–69; *idem,* 'Chrétienté et équilibre européen dans la politique du Cardinal de Richelieu', *XVIIe siècle,* XLII (1990), 7–16; and R.Mousnier, 'Les crises intérieures françaises de 1610 a 1659 et leur influence sur la politique extérieure française, surtout de 1618 a 1648', in Repgen, *Krieg und Politik,* 169–83.

For some other powers interested in the struggle during the 1620s, see B. Köpeczi *et al.,* eds, *Erdély története,* II (Budapest, 1986; also available in an abridged English translation, London, 1994) on Bethlen Gabor's Transylvania; R. Kleinman, 'Charles Emanuel I of Savoy and the Bohemian election of 1619', *European Studies Review,* V (1975), 3–29; J.Krebs, *Die Politik der evangelischen Union im Jahre 1618* (Breslau, 1890–1); and M.Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus. A History of Sweden 1611–32,* I (London, 1953), chaps 4–5.

Yet the fact remains that the principal victor of the 1620s was not a foreign prince but the emperor, thanks to the crushing military defeats inflicted by Catholic generals on one adversary after another. Tilly, strangely, lacks an adequate biography, though B.Rill, *Tilly: Feldherr für Kaiser und Reich* (Winterthur, 1991), and the relevant (illustrated) section in Glaser, ed., *Wittelsbach und Bayern,* II/I, 377–99, go some way towards bridging the gap. The serious student is therefore forced to rely on the work of Tilly's great apologist, O.Klopp, *Tilly im dreissigjährigen Krieg* (2 vols, Stuttgart, 1861; revised edn, Paderborn, 1891–6). The other central figure in the story, Albrecht von Waldstein, or Wallenstein, has suffered no such neglect: there are perhaps 4,000 works concerning him in various languages. For English readers, the best available biography is Golo Mann, *Wallenstein, His Life Narrated* (London, 1976: the original German edition—Frankfurt, 1971—includes notes and a detailed bibliography). Also useful is H. Diwald, *Wallenstein: eine Biographie* (Munich, 1969), although its outlook is more Germanic than Mann's and it has not attracted the same controversy (see, for example, the 'for and against' review articles of Mann's biography in the journals *Merkur,* XXVI (1972), 282–96, and *Neue Rundschau,* LXXXIII (1972), 343–9). Most non-German historians seem agreed, however, that neither of these modern studies differs greatly from earlier interpretations. Indeed, in many cases, they are less informative than such classic works as A.Gindely, *Waldstein während seines ersten Generalats* (2 vols, Prague, 1886), or the more recent A.Ernstberger, *Wallenstein als Volkswirt im Herzogtum Friedland* (Reichenberg, 1929), and *idem, Hans de Witte, Finanzmann Wallensteins* (Wiesbaden,

1954: Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Beiheft XXXVIII). There is no escape, for the diligent Wallenstein scholar, from the need to consult the massive documentary collections noted on page 228 note 7, and on page 262 below. There is nothing adequate on Eggenberg, but H.von Zwiedineck-Südenhorst, *Hans Ulrich Fürst von Eggenberg* (Vienna, 1880), and W.E.Heydendorff, *Die Fürsten und Freiherren zu Eggenberg und ihre Vorfahren* (Graz, 1965), provide some information.

A good deal of material has been published concerning the internal history of the Habsburg Monarchy after the White Mountain. There is, of course, the invaluable study of Evans, *The Habsburg Monarchy* (page 250 above), after which perhaps the best starting-point is A.Coreth, *Pietas Austriaca. Ursprung und Entwicklung barocker Frömmigkeit in Österreich* (Munich, 1959). For the central institutions of the Monarchy see: T.Fellner and H.Kretschmayr, *Die österreichische Zentralverwaltung,* I (2 vols, Vienna, 1907); L.Gross, *Die Geschichte der deutschen Reichshofkanzlei von 1559 bis 1806* (Vienna, 1933); and H.F.Schwarz, *The Imperial Privy Council in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, Mass., 1943). Political and military events in the separate Habsburg territories must still be approached largely through old-fashioned source and narrative works. For Bohemia, T.B. Bílek, *Dějiny konfiskací v čechách po r. 1618* (2 vols, Prague, 1882–3), gives every detail of changes in landholding; but his figures have been revised by F.L.Snider, The Restructuring of the Bohemian Nobility in the Seventeenth Century' (University of California at Berkeley, Ph.D. thesis, 1972). A.Gindely, *Geschichte der Gegenreformation in Böhmen* (ed. T.Tupetz, Leipzig, 1894), is authoritative but incomplete; E.Denis, *La Bohême depuis la Montagne Blanche* (Paris, 1903), whose Czech translation (by J.Vančura) contains many additions and corrections, is the classic splenetic liberal.

The Bohemian lands have been more recently analysed by J.Válka, *Ceská společnost v 15.-18. století. II. Belohorská doba* (Prague, 1983); a good account of Moravia during the war may be found in F.Matejek, *Morava za třicetiletè války* (Prague, 1992); and, for Hungary, see Zs. P.Pach *et al.,* eds, *Magyarország története*. *III 1526–1686 (2* vols, Budapest, 1986). The new constitution is printed in H. Jireček, ed., *Constitutiones regni Bohemiae anno 1627 reformatae* (Prague, 1988). I.Kollmann, ed., *Acta Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide res gestas Bohemicas illustrantia* (2 vols, Prague, 1923–54), covers the early days of planned Counter-Reformation; J.V.Polišenský, M.Toegel *et al.,* eds, *Documenta Bohemica Bellum Tricennale illustrantia* (7 vols, Prague, 1971–7), contains much hitherto unknown material. For Hungary, the writings of Pázmány are fundamental and they were printed complete in 13 volumes (Budapest, 1894–1905), followed by his correspondence, ed. J.Hanuy (2 vols, Budapest, 1910–11). The latest view of the cardinal-primate is F.Bitskey, *Pázmány Peter* (Budapest, 1986). László Nagy recounts the military events in *Bethlen Gábor a független Magyarországért* (Budapest, 1969) and *Magyar hadsereg és hadmüvészet a harmincéves háborúban* (Budapest, 1972). There is nothing satisfactory on Esterházy. J.Loserth, ed., *Akten und Korrespondenzen zur Geschichte der Gegenreformation in Innerösterreich unter Karl II und Ferdinand II* (2 vols in 3, Vienna, 1898–1907), documents the fate of Styrian Protestants. That of their co-religionists elsewhere in the Empire is covered, from a Catholic perspective, in B.Duhr, *Geschichte der Jesuiten in den Ländern deutscher Zunge:* vols II.l and II.2 (Freiburg, 1913) cover the first half of the seventeenth century.

For the implementation of Habsburg absolutism in Upper Austria, see above all H.Sturmberger, *Adam Graf Herberstorff. Herrschaft und Freiheit im Konfessionellen Zeitalter* (Munich, 1976). Two volumes commemorating the 350th anniversary of the 1626 revolt range far more widely than their titles suggest: *Der oberösterreichische Bauernkrieg 1626: Ausstellung des Landes Oberösterreich im Linzer Schloss und im Schloss zu Scharnstein* (Linz, 1976); and G.Heilingsetzer, *Der oberösterreichische Bauernkrieg 1626* (Vienna, 1976: Militärhistorische Schriftenreihe, vol. XXXII). The impact of Habsburg absolutism on Upper Austrian peasant society is covered by H.Rebel, *Peasant Classes. The Bureaucratization of property and family relations under early Habsburg absolutism, 1511–1636* (Princeton, N.J., 1983), chap. 8. On the revolt and submission of Lower Austria, see the excellent dissertation of R.D.Chesler, 'Crown, Lords and God: The Establishment of Secular Authority and the Pacification of Lower Austria, 1618–48' (Princeton University, Ph.D. thesis, 1979). See also MacHardy, *Obedience and Rebellion*.

Finally, Ferdinand III remains a Cinderella of scholarship. Consult M.Koch, *Geschichte des deutschen Reiches unter der Regierung Ferdinands III* (2 vols, Vienna, 1865–6), for his German policies; F.Stieve in *Allgemeine deutsche Biographie,* VI (1877), 664–72; and K.Repgen in Schindling and Ziegler, *Die Kaiser der Neuzeit,* 142–67.

D 1630–1635

The disastrous war of Mantua, which proved a turning-point in Habsburg fortunes, has received considerable recent attention: R.A.Stradling, *Spain's Struggle for Europe 1598–1668* (London, 1994) includes three substantial articles on the subject (pp. 51–120); and Elliott, *Olivares,* 323–408, provides a masterly overview. There is also a useful collection of Spanish material in *Colecdón de documentos inéditos para la historia de España,* LIV, and in M.Fernández Álvarez, *Don Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba y la guerra de sucesión de Mantua y del Monferrato 1627–9* (Madrid, 1955, with a long introduction). Papal attitudes over Mantua are examined (independently) by Q.Aldea, 'La neutralidad de Urbano VIII en los años decisivos de la Guerra de treinta años (1628–32)', *Hispania Sacra,* XXI (1968), 155–78, and by G.Lutz, *Kardinal Giovanni Francesco Guidi di Bagno. Politik und Religion im Zeitalter Richelieus und Urbans VIII* (Tübingen, 1971: Bibliothek des deutschen historischen Instituts in Rom, XXXIV). For a survey of the economic consequences of the war, see D.Sella, *Crisis and Continuity. The Economy of Spanish Lombardy in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, Mass., 1979).

The events at Regensburg in the summer of 1630 can best be followed through the works written or edited by Dieter Albrecht: *Die ausivärtige Politik Maximilians* (page 255 above); *Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte des dreissigjährigen Krieges, neue Folge: die Politik Maxmilians I von Bayern und seiner Verbündeten 1618–51,* II, part 5 (Munich, 1964), document 170 (315 pages of sources concerning the Electoral Meeting); *Richelieu, Gustav Adolf und das Reich* (Munich and Vienna, 1959); and 'Der Regensburger Kurfürstentag 1630 und die Entlassung Wallensteins', in D.Albrecht, ed., *Regensburg. Stadt der Reichstage* (Regensburg, 1980), 51–71. See also the vintage study of O.Heyne, *Der Kurfürstentag zu Regensburg von 1630* (Berlin, 1866). For a more modern

perspective, see Bireley, *Maximilian von Bayern, Adam Contzen S.J., und die Gegenreformation in Deutschland* and *idem., Religion and Politics in the Age of the Counterreformation,* chap. 6. D.P.O'Connell, 'A cause célèbre in the History of Treaty Making. The Refusal to Ratify the Peace Treaty of Regensburg in 1630', *British Yearbook of International Law,* XLII (1967), 71–90, is an important analysis of a crucial incident in the development of the French struggle with the emperor. On the politics of the Protestant Electors after Regensburg, see B.Nischan, 'Reformed Irenicism and the Leipzig Colloquy of 1631', *Central European History,* IX (1976), 3–26, and 'Brandenburg's Reformed Räte and the Leipzig Manifesto of 1631', *Journal of Religious History, X* (1979), 365–80.

The writings of Michael Roberts form the indispensable starting-point—and, for English readers, often the finishing-point too—for all study of Swedish intervention in the war. First comes his major biography of Sweden's king, the second volume of which deals with the war in Germany: *M.Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus: A History of Sweden 1611–1632* (2 vols, London, 1953–8; one-volume abridgement, *Gustavus Adolphus and the Rise of Sweden,* London, 1973). Further themes are developed in M.Roberts, *Essays in Swedish History* (London, 1967), especially chapter 6 (The Political Objectives of Gustavus Adolphus in Germany, 1630–32'); and many translated documents are printed with a helpful commentary in the same author's *Sweden as a Great Power 1611–1697: Government, Society, Foreign Policy* (London, 1968). Many points are re-examined, and several new ones explored, in Roberts's most recent survey: **The Swedish Imperial Experience 1560–1718* (Cambridge, 1979). See also the sources noted on page 264 below, and in W.Buchholz, 'Der Eintritt Schwedens in den dreissigjährigen Krieg in der schwedischen und deutschen Historiographie des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts', *Historische Zeitschrift,* CCXLV (1987), 291–314; and the interesting survey of polemical literature by S.S.Tschop, *Heilsgeschichte und Deutungsmuster in der Publizistik des dreissigjährigen Krieges: pro- und anti-Schwedische Propaganda in Deutschland 1628 bis 1635* (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1991).

There is very little else on the subject in English, but naturally readers of Swedish have a far greater choice. On the war itself, pride of place must go to the definitive study produced by the Swedish Army's Försvarsstaben: *Sveriges Krig 1611–1632* (8 vols, Stockholm, 1936–9, of which vols 3–6 deal with the war in Germany, 1629–32). With its maps, tables and diagrams, and with a text based on sources drawn from archives all over Europe, it is unlikely that this work will ever be superseded. For a useful illustrated study of Sweden's fortifications, see L.W.Munthe, *Kungliga Fortifikationens Historia,* I (Stockholm, 1902, taking the story to 1641), and II (Stockholm, 1904, covering 1641–76). In recent years, the attention of Swedish military historians has focused on the economy of the Empire at war. See, for example: H.Landberg, L.Ekholm, R.Nordlund and S.A.Nilsson, *Det konintentala krigets ekonomi. Studier i krigsfinansiering under Svensk Stormaktstid* (Stockholm, 1971); S.A.Lundkvist, 'Svensk Krigsfinansiering 1630–5', *Historisk Tidsskrift* [Svensk], LXXXVI (1966), 377–421; L.Ekholm, *Svensk krigsfinansiering* (Uppsala, 1974: Studia historia Upsaliensia, LVI); R.Nordlund, 'Kontribution eller satisfaktion. Pommern och de Svenska krigsfinanserna, 1633', *Historisk Tidsskrift* [Svensk], XCIV (1974), 321–102; and *idem, Krig på avvekling. Sverige och tyska kriget 1633* (Uppsala, 1974).

On the policies of Sweden in the Empire, two vintage studies by Johannes Kretzschmar remain fundamental: 'Die Allianz-Verhandlungen Gustav Adolfs mit Kurbrandenburg in Mai und Juni 1631', *Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte,* XVII (1904), 341–82; and *Gustav Adolfs Pläne und Ziele in Deutschland und die Herzöge zu Braunschweig und Lüneburg* (Hannover and Leipzig, 1904). On Sweden's relations with Hesse, see W.Keim, 'Landgraf Wilhelm V von Hessen-Kassel vom Regierungsantritt 1627 bis zum Abschluss des Bündnisses mit Gustav Adolf 1631', *Hessisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte,* XII (1962), 130–210, and XIII (1963), 141–222. There is nothing similar on the shotgun marriage imposed by Sweden upon Electoral Saxony, although the reasons why John George was persuaded to invade Bohemia in 1631 are discussed in M.Toegel, Příčiny saského vpádu do Čech v roce 1631', *Československý časopis historický,* XXI (1973), 553–81 (with German summary). A German biography of the king gives some attention to these matters: G.Barudio, *Gustav Adolf der Grosse*. *Eine politische Biographie* (Frankfurt, 1982). Swedish policy in Germany after the king's death is splendidly surveyed by *M.Roberts, 'Oxtenstierna in Germany, 1633–1636', *Scandia,* XLVIII (1982), 61–105; while *S.Goetze, *Die Politik des schwedischen Reichskanzlers Axel Oxenstierna gegenüber Kaiser und Reich* (Kiel, 1971), offers a significant advance on the traditional viewpoint exemplified by J.Kretzschmar, *Der Heilbronner Bund 1632–5* (3 vols, Lübeck, 1922), or A.Kuesel, *Der Heilbronner Convent. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des dreissigjährigen Krieges* (Halle, 1878)—although both these older works nevertheless contain much material unavailable elsewhere. Finally, for Sweden's administration of her conquests, see: C.Deinert, *Die schwedische Epoche in Franken von 1631–5* (Würzburg, 1966); and H.D.Müller, *Der schwedische Staat in Mainz 1631–1636. Einnahme, Verwaltung, Absichten, Restitution* (Mainz, 1979: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Stadt Mainz, XXIV). See also the sources noted on page 264 below.

What all these admirable and meticulously detailed works omit is the charisma of the principal actors: neither Gustavus nor Oxenstierna emerges from the printed page as the larger-than-life figure perceived by contemporaries. For the king, at least, this popular appeal may be grasped through the flattering reports of his deeds in every Protestant newspaper and pamphlet of the period 1630–2, and even more in the 'Gustaviana'—the innumerable artefacts fashioned in the likeness of the king. Statuettes, ceremonial tankards, medallions, portraits and even stained-glass windows were all employed as propaganda. There are examples in most of the museums and galleries of Protestant Europe.

The situation concerning Sweden's principal antagonist in these years, Wallenstein, is far less satisfactory. The recent biographies of Mann and Diwald (page 258 above) are inadequate on his second generalship: they certainly do not replace the massive documentary collections and studies produced two and three generations ago. The major ones, in alphabetical order, are as follows: A.Gaedeke, *Wallensteins Verhandlungen mit den Schweden und Sachsen 1631–4. Mit Akten und Urkunden aus dem Königlich Sächsischen Hauptstaatsarchiv zu Dresden* (Frankfurt, 1885); H.Hallwich: *Wallensteins Ende, Ungedruckte Briefe und Akten* (2 vols, Leipzig, 1879); *idem, Fünf Bücher Geschichte Wallensteins* (3 vols, Leipzig, 1910); and *idem, Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte Wallensteins 1630–34* (4 vols, Vienna, 1912: Fontes Rerum Austriacarum, section II, vols LXIII-LXVI); K.G. Helbig, *Der Kaiser Ferdinand und der Herzog von*

Friedland während des Winters 1633–4 (Dresden, 1852); G.Irmer, *Die Verhandlungen Schwedens und seiner Verbündeten mit Wallenstein und dem Kaiser 1631–4* (3 vols, Leipzig, 1888–9); J.Pekař, *Wallenstein 1630–1634. Tragödie einer Verschwörung* (2 vols, Berlin, 1937; original Czech edn, 1895. On Pekař's book, see the informative review by W.Goetz, 'Wallenstein und Kurfürst Maximilian von Bayern', *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte,* XI [1938], 106–20); and Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, *Wallensteins Ende,* (2nd edn, Salzburg, 1952). These vast compilations of documents-and-commentary illuminate, better than any later work, the exceedingly complicated negotiations in which the general was engaged; they therefore explain much of the 'mystery' of Wallenstein and the greater part of the 'Wallenstein problem'. Also recommended are three further studies by H. Hallwich—*Heinrich Matthias Thurn als Zeuge im Prozess Wallensteins* (Leipzig, 1883); *Gestalten am Wallensteins Lager. I. Johann Merode* and *II. Johann Aldringer* (Leipzig, 1884–5)—and a collection of important letters from Moravian archives: P.von Chlumecky, ed., *Die Regesten der Archive im Markgrafthume Mähren. I... Briefen Kaiser Ferdinands des Zweiten, Albrechts von Waldstein, und Romboalds Grafen Collalto* (two parts with separate pagination bound as one volume, Brünn, 1856).

Two major breakthroughs have been made in recent years: one by the Finnish scholar *P.Suvanto: *Wallenstein und seine Anhänger am Wiener Hof zur Zeit des Zweiten Generalats 1631–4* (Helsinki, 1963) and **Die deutsche Politik Oxenstiernas und Wallensteins* (Helsinki, 1979: Studia historica, IX). Some of the more controversial deductions in the first study were supported (albeit amid criticisms), from other documentary sources, by G.Lutz, 'Wallenstein, Ferdinand II. und der Wiener Hof. Bemerkungen zu einem erneuten Beitrag zur alten Wallensteinfrage', *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken,* XLVIII (1968), 207–43. C.Kampmann, *Reichsrebellion und Kaiserliche Acht. Politische Strafjustiz im Dreissigjährigen Krieg und das Verfahren gegen Wallenstein 1634* (Münster, 1992: Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte, XXI), achieved the second 'breakthrough', by showing that Ferdinand proceeded against his general in 1634 according to a legitimate and widely accepted interpretation of Imperial law, without appealing either to a higher moral law or to 'reason of state'. In so doing Kampmann depicts the emperor as a more decisive and astute figure than usually portrayed. Yet more sources on Wallenstein are discussed on page 258 and in note 7 on page 228 above. On his leading lieutenant, the biography of B.Stadler, *Pappenheim und die Zeit des dreissigjährigen Krieges* (Winterthur, 1991), although apologetic towards its subject, rests upon exhaustive archival research.

Two other powers were deeply involved in this phase of the war—Spain and Hesse-Kassel. On the former, see A.van der Essen, *Le Cardinal-Infant et la politique européenne de I'Espagne, 1609–1641,* I (Louvain, 1944); *idem,* 'Le rôle du Cardinal-Infant dans la politique espagnole du XVIIe siècle', *Revista de la Universidad de Madrid,* III (1954), 357–83; and R.A.Stradling, *Europe and the Decline of Spain. A Study of the Spanish System 1580–1720* (London, 1981), chaps 2 and 3. On the links -financial as well as political—between Spain and the emperor at this time, see the excellent study of H.Ernst, *Madrid und Wien, 1632–37. Politik und Finanzen in den Beziehungen zwischen Philipp IV. und Ferdinand II.* (Münster, 1991: Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte, XVIII). On the links between Spain and the

Papacy, see Q.Aldea Vaquero, ed., *España, el Papado y el Imperio durante la guerra de los Treinta Años. I. Instrucciones a los embajadores de España en Roma, 1631–43* (Comillas, 1958). On Spanish diplomacy within the Empire, see Q.Aldea Vaquero, ed., *España y Europa en el siglo XVII. Correspondencia de Saavedra Fajardo. I. 1631–33* (Madrid, 1986). See also the works by Stradling and Elliott noted on page 260 above; J.Brown and J.H.Elliott, *A Palace for a King. The Buen Retiro and the Court of Philip IV* (New Haven, Conn., 1980); and J.Israel, 'Olivares, the Cardinal-Infante and Spain's Strategy in the Low Countries, 1635–1643: The Road to Rocroi', in R.L.Kagan and G.Parker, eds, *Spain, Europe and the Atlantic World. Essays in Honour of john H.Elliott* (Cambridge, 1995), 267–95. The war in Hesse is covered by R.Altmann, *Landgraf Wilhelm V von Hessen-Kassel im Kampf gegen Kaiser und Katholizismus* (Marburg, 1938), and L.van Tongerloo, 'Beziehungen zwischen Hessen-Kassel und den Vereinigten Niederlanden während des dreissigjährigen Krieges', *Hessisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte,* XIV (1964), 199–270.

Hesse-Darmstadt's crucial role in bringing about the peace of Prague between the emperor and most of his Lutheran vassals is subjected to penetrating analysis by K.H.Frohnweiler, 'Die Friedenspolitik Landgraf Georgs II. von Hessen-Darmstadt in den Jahren 1630–5', *Archiv für hessische Geschichte und Altertumskunde,* N.F. XXIX (1964), 1–185. On the negotiations leading up to the peace of Prague, see Bireley, *Religion and Politics,* chap. 11; *K.Repgen, *Die römische Kurie und der westfälische Friede. I.i. Papst, Kaiser und Reich 1521–1644* (Tübingen, 1962), 329–88; and the early sections of *F.Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden* (new edition, Münster, 1992). The text of the peace is discussed at length by K.Bierther, 'Zur Edition von Quellen zum Prager Frieden vom 30. Mai 1635' in K.Repgen, ed., *Forschungen und Quellen zur Geschichte des Dreissigjährigen Krieges* (Münster, 1981: Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte, XII), 1–31. Its military consequences are ably analysed by H.Haan, 'Kaiser Ferdinand II. und das Problem des Reichsabsolutismus. Die Prager Heeresreform von 1635', in H.U.Rudolf, ed., *Der Dreissigjährige Krieg. Perspektiven und Strukturen* (Darmstadt, 1977), 208–64.

E 1635–1641

Both of the major assemblies held during this period to resolve the divisions in Germany have been the subject of meticulous study: H.Haan, *Der Regensburger Kurfürstentag von 1636/1637* (Münster, 1967: Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte, III), and K.Bierther, *Der Regensburger Reichstag von 1640/1641* (Kallmünz, 1971). In connexion with the Electoral Meeting of 1636, there is a fine study of the English embassy led by Thomas, earl of Arundel, which reproduces William Crowne's 'True Relation' and many of Wenceslas Hollar's engravings: F.C.Springell, *Connoisseur and Diplomat: The Earl of Arundel's Embassy to Germany in 1636* (London, 1963).

Oxenstierna's correspondence remains the most important single source for this period and, since 1888, much of it has been printed in two series by the Royal Swedish Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities: *Axel Oxenstiernas skrifter och brevvexling,* 1st series (containing the chancellor's outgoing correspondence to 1636), 15 volumes; and 2nd series (containing incoming correspondence arranged by writers rather than by

date), 12 volumes. Both series are still in the course of publication. The attitude of the Regents and the Council of State to the war is documented in *Svenska riksrådets protokoll (Handlingar rörande Skandinaviens Historia,* 3rd series, III–VIII, Stockholm, 1885–8), which print the Council minutes; and in *Handlingar rörande Skandinaviens Historia,* 1st series, XXIV–XXX and XXXII–XXXVIII (Stockholm, 1842–57), which print letters and instructions from the Regents and the Council to Oxenstierna. Sweden's treaties with foreign powers, and relevant documents connected with them, are printed in Carl Hallendorff, ed., *Sverges Traktater med främmande magter jemte andra hit hörande handlingar, V. 2 (1632–1645)* (Stockholm, 1909). On Franco-Swedish relations, see Erik Falk, *Sverige och Frankrike 1632–4* (Stockholm, 1911); Sverker Arnoldsson, *Svensk-fransk krigs- och fredspolitik i Tyskland 1634–6* (Gothenburg, 1937); Sune Lundgren, *Johan Adler Salvius. Problem kring freden, krigsekonomien och maktkampen* (Lund, 1945); L.Tingsten, *Huvuddragen av Sveriges Politik och Krigföring i Tyskland efter Gustav II Adolfs död till och med sommaren 1635* (Stockholm, 1930); *idem, Fäldmarskalkarna Johan Baner och Lennart Torstensson såsom härförare* (Stockholm, 1932); and B.Steckén, *Johan Baner* (Stockholm, 1939); and S.M.Schröder, 'Hamburg und Schweden im dreissigjähriger Krieg: vom potentiellen Bündnis-partner zum Zentrum der Kriegsfinanzierung', *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte,* LXXVI (1989), 305–31.

The general study of Pages, *The Thirty Years' War,* is specially strong on French matters, and certain important aspects are given fuller treatment in the same author's 'Autour du "grand orage". Richelieu et Marillac. Deux politiques', *Revue Historique,* CLXXIX (1937), 63–97. Although primarily a review of Richelieu's relations with his domestic critics, this study contains fundamental observations on the importance of the acquisition of Pinerolo. See also the two general works on the period by R.J.Bonney: *Political Change in France under Richelieu and Mazarin 1624–1661* (Oxford, 1978), and *The King's Debts* (page 258 above). However, taxes imposed by no means implied taxes paid: for important evidence that French communities could escape much of their direct taxes, see J.B.Collins, *Fiscal Limits of Absolutism: Direct Taxation in Early Seventeenth-Century France* (Berkeley, 1988). On French policy in Alsace, the reader should turn first to G.Livet, *L'intendance d'Alsace sous Louis XIV, 1648–1715* (Strasbourg and Paris, 1956): difficult to read, and centred outside the period, book I nevertheless contains an excellent account of the contradictions of French 'protection'. It is not entirely superseded by two more recent studies: W.H.Stein, *Protection royale. Eine Untersuchung zu den Protektionsverhältnissen im Elsass zur Zeit Richelieus. 1622–1643* (Münster, 1978: Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte, IX); and R.Oberlè, *La République de Mulhouse pendant la guerre de trente ans* (Paris, 1965). Swiss interest in the area is brought out by R.Stritmatter, *Die Stadt Basel während des dreissigjährigen Krieges. Politik, Wirtschaft, Finanzen* (Bern, Frankfurt and Las Vegas, 1977). On Habsburg policy in Alsace, see the thorough survey of W.E. Heydendorff, 'Vorderösterreich im dreissigjährigen Krieg. Der Verlust der Vorlande am Rhein und die Versuche zu deren Rückgewinnung', *Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs,* XII (1959), 74–142 and XIII (1960), 107–94.

French policy on the Lower Rhine has also been extensively studied. See, above all, H.Weber, *Frankreich, Kurtrier, der Rhein und das Reich, 1623–35* (Bonn, 1969), which is conveniently summarized in the same author's article, *'Richelieu et le Rhin', *Revue*

Historique, CCXXXIX (1968), 265–80. The useful article of R.Pillorget, 'Louis XIV and the Electorate of Trier, 1652–76', in R.M.Hatton, ed., *Louis XIV and Europe* (London, 1976), 115–32, also contains comments on the 1640s. For the devastation caused in Burgundy by the war after 1635, see the classic study of G.Roupnel, *La ville et la campagne au 17e siècle. Étude sur les populations du pays dijonnais* (2nd edn, Paris, 1955); for that of Lorraine, see S.Gaber, *La Lorraine meurtrie: les malheurs de la Guerre de Trente Ans* (Nancy, 1979); W.Mohr, *Geschichte des Herzogtums Lothringen. Teil IV: Das Herzogtum Lothringen zwischen Frankreich und Deutschland (14.-17. Jahrhundert)* (Trier, 1986); and P.Braun, 'La Lorraine pendant le gouvernement de La Ferté-Sénctère (1643–1661)', *Mémoires de la Société d'Archéologie lorraine et du Musèe Historique lorrain,* LVI (4th ser., VI) (1906), 109–266. For the policies pursued by the unfortunate duke of Lorraine at this time, see R.Babel, *Zwischen Habsburg und Bourbon. Aussenpolitik und europäische Stellung Herzog Karls IV. von Lothringen und Bar vom Regierungsantritt bis zum Exil (1624–34)* (Sigmaringen, 1989: Beihefte der *Francia,* XVIII).

Several recent works have deepened our understanding of France's intervention in the war and its consequences. Pride of place belongs to the studies of David Parrott: see his articles The Causes of the Franco-Spanish War of 1635–59', in J.M.Black, ed., *The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe* (London, 1987), and 'Richelieu, the *Grands* and the French Army', in Bergin and Brockliss, *Richelieu and his Age,* 135–73; and his fine dissertation, The Administration of the French Army During the Ministry of Cardinal Richelieu' (Oxford University, D. Phil. thesis, 1985), usefully summarized in Parrott, 'French Military Organization in the 1630s: The Failure of Richelieu's Ministry', *Seventeenth-Century French Studies,* IX (1987), 151–67. Important light has also been shed by R.A.Stradling, 'Olivares and the Origins of the Franco-Spanish War' in *idem, Spain's Struggle,* 95–120; Elliott, *Olivares,* 457–95; and H.Weber, 'Zur Legitimation der französichen Kriegserklärung von 1635', *Historisches Jahrbuch,* CVIII (1988), 90–113; and *idem,* 'Vom verdeckten zum offenen Krieg. Richelieus Kriegsgründe und Kriegsziele 1634–35', in Repgen, *Krieg und Politik,* 203–17. These studies make clear that both Philip IV and Louis XIII, along with many of their courtiers, regarded war as inevitable from the summer of 1634, and were only restrained from an earlier declaration by the caution of their chief ministers. See also the various essays in H.Duchhardt and E.Schmitt, eds, *Deutschland und Frankreich in der frühen Neuzeit* (Munich, 1987), especially those of V.Press (on the history of Franco-Bavarian relations); K.Malettke (on French perceptions of the German constitution); and W.H.Stein (on German reactions to France's entry into the war in 1635–6).

F 1642–1650

The outstanding work on the peace that brought the war to an end is Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden. A* useful appreciation of this book, which pays tribute to its definitive nature while making certain criticisms, is provided by M.Heckel, 'Zur Historiographie des Westfälischen Friedens. Die Bedeutung des Werkes von Fritz Dickmann für die deutsche Verfassungs- und Kirchenrechtsgeschichte', *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Kanonistische Abteilung,* LVII (1971), 322–35.

The simultaneous negotiations in Münster concerning peace between Spain and the Dutch Republic are ably analysed by J.J.Poelhekke, *De vrede van Münster* (The Hague, 1948), and Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World,* chap. 6.

The works of Konrad Repgen of Bonn, and of his pupils, are steadily expanding our understanding of the labyrinthine diplomatic activity that took place in the last five years of the war. Particularly useful are Repgen's study of papal policy towards a settlement (even though it ends in 1644)—see pages 263–4 above—and his article 'Über den Zusammenhang von Verhandlungstechnik und Vertragsbegriffen. Die kaiserlichen Elsass-Angebote vom 28. März und 14. April 1646 an Frankreich', in A.Besch, ed., *Die Stadt in der europäischen Geschichte, Festschrift Edith Ennen* (Bonn, 1972), 638–66, reprinted in Repgen, *Historische Klopfsignale für die Gegenwart* (Münster, 1974), 64–96. The works of Repgen's students, published in the series *Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der neueren Geschichte,* are also outstanding. Special mention must be made of *F.Wolff, *Corpus Evangelicorum und Corpus Catholicorum auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongress. Die Einfügung der konfessionellen Ständeverbindungen in die Reichsverfassung* (Münster, 1966: vol. II in the series); W.Becker, *Der Kurfürstenrat. Grundzüge seiner Entwicklung in der Reichsverfassung und seiner Stellung auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongress* (Münster, 1973: vol V); R.Philippe, *Württemberg und der Westfälische Friede* (Münster, 1976: vol. VIII); and *K.Ruppert, *Die kaiserliche Politik auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongress* (1643–8) (Münster, 1979: vol. X). Repgen is also the general editor of the series *Acta Pacis Westphalicae,* in process of publication. There are three series: 'Instructions' (1 volume published, 2 more to come); 'Correspondence' (8 volumes published, 16 more envisaged); and Protocols, Negotiations, Diaries and Varia' (9 volumes published and 6 or more projected).

It might seem to some that this is enough on the subject; but the conference that lasted five years, and involved the representatives of 194 different states, has left more documentary debris than almost any other comparable phenomenon. Historians have accordingly been attracted to the subject like flies. For a useful recent overview, see K.Malletke, 'Diplomatie et Guerre: les Traités de Westphalie, Münster et Osnabrück, 1643–48', XVIIe Siècle, XLVI (1994), 153–70.

The ambiguous relationship of Bavaria with both the emperor and France has attracted considerable study, above all from Andreas Kraus and his student, Gerhard Immler. See Kraus, *'DieActa Pacis Westphalicae*. Rang und geisteswissenschaftliche Bedeutung eines Editionsunternehmens unserer Zeit, untersucht an Hand der Elsassfrage (1640–1646)', *Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Geisteswissenschaften. Vorträge G.,* CCLXIX (Opladen, 1984); *idem,* 'Kurfürst Maximilian I.von Bayern und die französische Satisfaktion (1644–1646). Neue Quellen zu einem alten Problem', in *Land und Reich—Stamm und Nation II* (Munich, 1984: Schriftenreihe zur bayerischen Landesgeschichte, LXXIX), 21–50; and *idem,* 'Frankreich und die Pfalzfrage auf dem westfälischen Friedenskongress', in *Études d'histoire européenne*. *Meìanges offerts a René et Suzanne Pillorget* (Angers, 1990), 97–112. These studies all attempt to exonerate Maximilian from charges of exerting pressure on the emperor to concede Alsace in return for French support for his claim to the Upper Palatinate and the Electoral title. G. Immler, 'Bayerisch-Spanische Beziehungen während des dreissigjährigen Krieges, insbesondere in den Jahren 1643–1645', in Johannes Greipl, Alois Schmid and Walter Ziegler, eds, *Aus Bayerns Geschichte: Forschungen als Festgabe zum 70. Geburtstag von Andreas*

Kraus (St Ottilien, 1992), 311–32, shows that Maximilian was not inherently anti-Spanish, but that their different goals led to a clash of interests that had ruined their relationship by 1645. See also Immler's two solid monographs on Maximilian's devious policies during the 1640s: *Die Bewertung der Friedenspolitik des Kurfürsten Maximilian 1.von Bayern 1639–1648 in der Historiographie* (Kallmünz, 1989: Münchener Historische Studien, Abteiliung Bayerische Geschichte, XIII); and *idem, Kurfürst Maximilian I. und der Westfälische Friedenskongress: die bayerische auswärtige Politik von 1644 bis zum Ulmer Waffenstillstand* (Münster, 1991: Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte, XX).

France's part in the final stages of the war and at Westphalia has suffered from relative neglect. G.Dethan, *Mazarin. Un homme de paix a l'âge baroque 1602–1661* (Paris, 1991) is weak on political events; M.Laurain-Portemer, 'Questions européennes et diplomatie mazarine', *XVIIe siècle,* XLII (1990), 17–56, simply examines the role of Mazarin in three peace treaties: Cherasco, Westphalia, and the Pyrenees. However, Derek Croxton, *Peacemaking in Early Modern Europe: Cardinal Mazarin and the Congress of Westphalia, 1643–1648* (Selinsgrove, PA, 1997) changes all this: Mazarin's aims and achievements are carefully assessed, on the basis of extensive research in French and German archives, and placed within the changing international diplomatic and military context.

Several other lesser players at the Peace Congress have merited separate treatment. On Trier, see K.Abmeier, *Der Trierer Kurfürst Philipp Christoph von Sötern und der Westfälische Friede* (Münster, 1985: Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte, XV). On Poland and the peace, see J.Leszczynski, *Władisław IV a Sl&sk w latach 1644–8* (Wrodaw, 1969); on Brandenburg see E.Opgenoorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm: der grosse Kurfürst von Brandenburg. Eine politische Biographie,* I (Göttingen, 1971), chaps *3–4;* and on the religious settlement brought about at Westphalia, see M.Heckel, 'Itio in partes. Zur Religionsverfassung des Heiligen Römischen Reiches deutscher Nation', *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Kanonistische Abteilung,* LXIV (1978), 180–308. There is a useful English abridgment of the terms of the peace in G.Symcox, ed., *War, Diplomacy and Imperialism, 1618–1763* (London, 1974), 39–62. On the consequences of the treaty, see R.G.Asch, 'Estates and Princes after 1648: The Consequences of the Thirty Years' War', *German History,* VI (1988) 113–32; K. Repgen, 'Der Westfälische Frieden und die Ursprünge des europäischen Gleichgewichts', in *Jahres-und Tagesberichte der Görres-Gesellschaft 1985* (Cologne, 1986), 50–66; and H.Duchhardt, 'Westfälischer Friede und internationales System im Ancien Regime', *Historische Zeitschrift,* CCXLIX (1989), 529–43, who argues that, although many observers hailed the peace of Westphalia as the basis of the European diplomatic system down to 1789, it was in fact a dead letter by 1670 because France's naked aggression changed the system, which was based on law, to one based on force. Finally, for an interesting discussion of precedents for the 'amicable composition' principle, see K.J.Seidel, 'Zentrale Ständevertretung und Religionsfrieden in Deutschland und Frankreich (1555–1614)', in Duchhardt and Schmitt, *Deutschland und Frankreich in der frühen Neuzeit,* pp. 186–220.

Remarkably little has been written about the final campaigns of the war. A few actions have been described; a few commanders have become the subject of a biography; but there is no better general assessment of the fighting itself than Ruppert's study noted

above. J.Bérenger, *Turenne* (Paris, 1987), provides a lively biography of France's leading general in the German war, but contains an alarming number of errors; [Försvarsstabens krigshistoriska avdelning], *Slaget vid Jankow 1645–1945* (Stockholm, 1948), is exhaustive; while K.Scheible, 'Die Schlacht von Alerheim, 3 August 1645', *Rieser Kulturtage,* IV 1982 (1983), 229–72, prints practically (but not quite) every eyewitness account of the battle, not to mention several contemporary prints and an exhaustive analysis. For the French and Bavarians' last campaigns, see Croxton, Peacemaking'; for the Swedes, see [Försvarsstabens krigshistoriska avdelning], *Från Femern och Jankow till Westfaliska Freden. En minnesskrift år 1948* (Stockholm, 1948); K.R.Böhme, 'Geld für die schwedische Armee nach 1640', *Scandia,* XXXIII (1967), 54–95; and G.Lorenz, 'Schweden und die französischen Hilfsgelder von 1638 bis 1649', in K.Repgen, ed., *Forschungen und Quellen zur Geschichte des Dreissigjährigen Krieges* (Münster, 1981: Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte, XII), 98–148. On the demobilization of the Imperial army, see the admirable (largely unpublished) dissertation of P.Hoyos, *Ernst von Traun, Generalkriegskommissär, und die Abdankung der kaiserlichen Armee nach dem 30-jährigen Krieg* (Vienna, 1970). Part III, on the demobilization itself, has been published in *Der dreissigjährige Krieg* (page 271 below), 169–232. For the demobilization process as a whole, see the definitive study of A.Oschmann, *Der Nürnberger Executionstag 1649–50. Das Ende des dreissigjährigen Krieges in Deutschland* (Münster, 1991: Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte, XVII).

G Armies and destruction

The interested student of military history will find rewarding material in the art of the period, particularly in the work of painters such as Vranckx and Snaeyers, and of engravers like Callot, Richter and Franck. A fine selection is reproduced in Langer, *The Thirty Years' War*. See also the list of published volumes of contemporary prints in note 2 on page 230 above. A number of 'wargames' also exist, such as J.Miranda, 'The Thirty Years War', *Strategy and Tactics Magazine,* CLXXIII (1995); Mark McGlaughlin, 'Holy Roman Empire', *The Wargamer Magazine,* XXXIV (1984); and The Thirty Years War: Four Battles [Lützen, Nördlingen, Rocroi and Freiburg]', *SPI,* 1976. Only the first is currently in print (although the last will be re-issued by Decision Games); only the last appears to incorporate any historical research to ensure some verisimilitude. A feature film entitled *The Last Valley,* with screenplay by John Prebble, vividly depicts the everyday life of the armies that fought the war; and a curious book of illustrations—E.Wagner, *European Weapons and Warfare 1618–1648* (London, 1979)—reconstructs military scenes in a lively style.

All these visual sources help our understanding of the period because they convey an immediacy that mere words lack. Nevertheless, some excellent printed works described everyday life during the war, commencing with the literature of the period itself. In Germany, leading writers such as Opitz, Moscherosch and Grimmelshausen covered wartime existence in poems and prose. But to what extent can we take these works of literature at their face value? Hans (or Johann) Jakob Christoph von Grimmelshausen, for example, was born about 1621, and had received, before his capture, a few years of

Lutheran education at the local school. He spent the next five years with the Imperial, the Hessian, and once again the Imperial army. In 1640 he became a regimental clerk and after the war continued to serve his colonel as a secretary until 1660, when he set up as a publican. From then until his death in 1676 he supplemented his income from the sale of drink by writing books about his war experiences. The first, published in 1668, was entitled *The Adventures of Simplicissimus the German,* and it had gone through five editions by 1672. By 1700, there were a further thirty works in print either based on it or on one of its characters, of which two were written by Grimmelshausen himself: *The Vagabond Courage* and *Springinsfeld* (both published in 1670). Between them, Grimmelshausen's books have influenced decisively all historical study of the soldiers who fought the war, and their world.

This is unfortunate, because it has been shown that Grimmelshausen much preferred literary effect to realism. Thus, the vivid account in *Simplicissimus* of the battle of Wittstock in 1636, which the author claims to have seen for himself, is plagiarized—in parts word for word—from the 1629 German edition of Sir Philip Sidney's *Arcadia*. In the early pages of *The Vagabond Courage,* which describe the events of 1620–1, Grimmelshausen repeats verbatim the erroneous account of events contained in another popular contemporary work, Wassenberg's *Teutscher Florus*. No reliance can thus be placed on these descriptions. Perhaps one should not be surprised by this: after all, Grimmelshausen was a novelist and not a historian. But the consequences for historical accuracy are significant. The creative writer is, often, necessarily more concerned with the dynamic than with the static elements of a war: his interest lies in the battles, marches and massacres; he can afford to remain indifferent to the financial, logistical and command structures that underlay them. But Grimmelshausen is not indifferent, he is hostile: commanders and sutlers are portrayed as the real enemy. Even the promiscuous Courage consorts with no one above the rank of captain, and her principal adversaries are the Major and the Colonel. So Grimmelshausen's characters smell unmistakably of the campfire, not of headquarters, as they are shown brawling, gambling or darning socks while they wait for action; and although the events in the war described in *Simplicissimus* may be imaginary, the actors are not. There is nothing to match Grimmelshausen's picture of life in the ranks until the journals written by the British privates of the Peninsular War. See C.Hohoff, ed., *Johann Jacob Christoph von Grimmelshausen in Selbstzeugnissen und Bilddokumenten* (Reinbeck-bei-Hamburg, 1978); H.Geulen,' "Arkadische" Simpliciana. Zu einer Quelle Grimmelshausens und ihrer strukturellen Bedeutung für seinen Roman', *Euphorion: Zeitschrift für Literaturgeschichte,* LXIII (1969), 426–37; and F.van Ingen, 'Krieg und Frieden bei Grimmelshausen', *Études Germaniques,* XLVI (1991), 35–53. The remarkable account of another—anonymous—participant in the war, a common soldier who served in Catholic regiments (except when captured by the Swedes in 1632, after which he served with them for two years), was published by J.Peters, ed., *Ein Söldnerleben im dreissigjährigen Krieg. Eine Quelle zur Sozialgeschichte* (Berlin, 1993). Between 1625 and 1649 the author marched more than 22,000 kilometres! Although few, if any, other combatants could match this odyssey, several left a record of their military careers: see the useful checklist in P.Burschel, 'Krieg als Lebensform. Über ein Tagebuch', *Göttingischen Gelehrten Anzeiger,* CCXLVI (1994), 263–72.

In Britain, too, several contemporaries—most of them participants—wrote about their experiences. Four accounts are of special value: Sydnam Poyntz, 'Relation [1624–36]', ed. A.T.S.Goodrick, in *Camden Society Publications,* 3rd series XIV (1908); Sir James Turner, *Pallas Armata. Military Essayes of the Ancient Graecian, Roman and Modern Art of War* (London, 1683), 157–372; *idem, Memoirs of His Own Life and Times* (Edinburgh, 1829); and R.Monro, *Monro his Expedition with the Worthy Scots Regiment call'd Mackays* (London, 1637). Very little is known about these three authors (though Monro reappeared, thinly disguised, in Daniel Defoe's *Memoirs of a Cavalier* and as Sir Walter Scott's 'Dugald Dalgetty'). Poyntz's career is narrated in Goodrick's edition of his work; the later military efforts of Turner and Monro are assessed and described in D.Stevenson, *Scottish Covenanters and Irish Confederates*. *Scottish-Irish Relations in the Mid-Seventeenth Century* (Belfast, 1981), 80–3 and 312–13. Among the more recent works on the soldiers who fought in the war, Langer, *The Thirty Years' War,* 61–102, forms an excellent starting-point, to be followed by the important and more detailed studies of *F.Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and His Workforce, 13th to 17th Centuries* (2 vols, Wiesbaden, 1964–5: Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Beihefte XLVII-XLVIII), and H.Salm, *Armeefinanzierung im dreissigjährigen Krieg*. *Der Niederrheinisch-Westfälische Reichskreis 1635–1650* (Münster, 1990: Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte, XVI)—who demonstrates that, by the 1640s, the Imperial army depended for two-thirds of its support upon the resources of the areas it occupied, creating serious competition between the military agenda of the emperor (who wanted his troops to serve on campaign) and of the soldiers who fought for him (who wanted to stay close to their only secure supply base).

Reliable general works on warfare during the period include M.S.Anderson, *War and Society in Europe, 1620–1789* (London, 1989); J.R.Hale, *War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450–1620* (London, 1985); G.Parker, *The Military Revolution*. *Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800* (2nd edn, Cambridge, 1996); and F.Tallett, *War and Society in Early-Modern Europe, 1495–1715* (London, 1992). Several important studies focus on particular military aspects of the Thirty Years' War: P.Burschel, *Söldner im Nordwestdeutschland des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts*. *Sozialgeschichtliche Studien* (Göttingen, 1994: Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte, CXIII); D.A.Parrott, 'Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years' War: The "Military Revolution"', *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen,* XXXVIII (1985), 7–25; R.Pillorget, Populations civiles et troupes dans le Saint-Empire au cours de la Guerre de Trente Ans', in V.Barrie-Curien, ed., *Guerre et Pouvoir en Europe au 17e siècle* (Paris, 1991), 151–74; B.Kroener, 'Soldat oder Soldateska? Programmatischer Aufriss einer Sozialgeschichtliche militärischen Unterschichten in der ersten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts', in M.Messerschmidt *et al.,* eds, *Militärgeschichte. Probleme, Thesen, Wege* (Frankfurt, 1982), 100–23; and H.Eichberg, 'Geometrie als barocke Verhaltensnorm. Fortifikation und Exerzitien', *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung,* IV (1977), 17–50. However, none of these entirely replaces the older general study of E.von Frauenholz, Das *Heerwesen in der Zeit des Dreissigjährigen Krieges* (2 vols, Munich, 1938–9—volume III, parts 1–2 of the author's *Entwicklungsgeschichte des deutschen Heerwesens*), or P.Sörensson, 'Das Kriegswesen während der letzten Periode des

Dreissigjährigen Krieges', reprinted in H.U.Rudolf, ed., *Der Dreissigjährige Krieg: Perspektiven und Strukturen* (Darmstadt, 1977: Wege der Forschung, CDLI).

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  entered Benedictine order 1628;
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  governed Netherlands for Philip II 1596–8;
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officer in Swedish army 1613, undertook diplomatic missions;
transferred to Imperial army 1625 (colonel 1627, field marshal 1628);
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lawyer in royal courts from 1617;
entrusted with diplomatic missions from 1627 (ambassador extraordinary in Germany 1637–42 and plenipotentiary at Westphalian peace conference 1643–8);
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ordained 1622, professor (1626) at Glasgow;
envoy of the Scottish church to England 1643–6 and in 1650s;
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entered Swedish army 1615;
colonel 1622;
commandant of Riga, 1625–6;
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in Swedish service 1630–5, as joint-commander after 1632;
transferred to French service in 1635, with his army;
d. 1639:
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rose from poor Calvinist gentry background to become prince of Transylvania in 1613, thanks to Turkish support;
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Bonaparte, Napoleon, b. 1769, Corsica;
general (1795–1815), First Consul (1799–1804) and Emperor (1804–15) of France;
d. 1821:
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Bonney, Richard J. (British historian):
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Bouillon, Henri de la Tour d'Auvergne, viscount of Turenne and duke of, b. 1555;
Calvinist French general who acquired sovereign duchy of Bouillon through marriage, 1591;
conspired against Henry IV (1602) and fled;
returned 1610 and remained Huguenot leader until death (1623) 24, 29, 221n.30
Bracamonte, Don Gaspar de *see* Peñaranda, count of
Brahe, Per, b. 1602, Sweden;
soldier and lawyer by training;
Swedish councillor from 1626;
governor- general of Prussia (1634–7) and Finland (1637–41 and 1648–51);
military commander against Denmark 1643–4 and 1657–9;
d. 1680:
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Brandenburg-Kulmbach, margravate of:
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Brandenstein, Christoph von, b. 1593, Saxony;
officer in Saxon army from 1626;
transferred to Heilbronn League as colonel, 1633;
imprisoned in Saxony, 1637;
d. 1640:
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Brindisi, Laurence of, b. 1559, Brindisi;
became Capuchin 1575 (vicar-general of order 1602–5);
in Prague 1599–1602 and 1606–13;
d. 1619;
canonized:
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Brussels (capital of South Netherlands):
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Buckingham, George Villiers, earl (1617), marquis (1618) and duke (1623) of, b. 1592;
favourite (from 1616) of James I and Charles I;
Master of the Horse (1616), Privy Councillor (1617), and Lord High Admiral (1619) of England;
murdered 1628:
foreign policy of 68, 69, 197
Bucquoy, Charles Bonaventure de Longueval, count of, b. 1571, Arras;
served as officer in Army of Flanders from 1596, rising to be general of artillery (1602);
promoted Imperial commander against Bohemia 1618;
killed 1621 46–55
Bullion, Claude, lord of Bonnelles, b. 1571, Paris;

lawyer in Paris courts from 1595;
served on French government finance committees, in army and on diplomatic missions;
joint minister of finance 1632–40;
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Camerarius, Ludwig, b. 1573, Nuremberg;
entered Palatine council 1598 and from 1603 directed its foreign policy;
followed Frederick V into exile 1620;
in Swedish diplomatic service 1626–41;
d. 1651:
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Joseph, Father
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Carinthia (province of Inner Austria):
religion in 6;
see also Austria, Inner
Carleton, Dudley, b. 1573;
career diplomat from 1598;
English ambassador in Venice (1611–15) and The Hague (1616–28);
created Viscount Dorchester 1628;
chief secretary of state 1628–32;
d. 1632:
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Carniola (province of Inner Austria):
religion in 6;
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Casale, Hyacinth of, b. 1575 to aristocratic Italian family;
studied law;
entered Capuchin order 1600;

in Empire 1607–8, 1613;
nuncio extraordinary in Germany 1621–4;
d. 1627:
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Catherine the Great, b. 1729, a princess of Anhalt;
married tsarevitch 1744;
empress of Russia (1762–96);
d. 1796:
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Cecil, Robert, b. 1563, son of William Cecil, Lord Burghley;
English secretary of state from 1596 and also Lord Treasurer from 1608;
earl of Salisbury (from 1605);
d. 1612:
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Charles I, king of England, Scotland and Ireland, b. 1600;
succeeded father (James VI and I) 1625;
executed 1649:
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Charles IV, duke of Lorraine, b. 1604;
succeeded to duchy 1624 but driven into exile1633;
military commander for Habsburgs 1633–54;
restored to Lorraine 1661–70 but then exiled again;
d. 1675:
and France 130–1, 145;

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Charles V, b. 1500;
ruler of the Netherlands (1506–55), of Spain and Spanish Italy (1516–56) and Holy Roman Emperor (1519–58);
d. 1558 3, 15, 50, 55, 82, 222n.17
Charles IX, duke of Södermanland, b. 1550;
regent (from 1599) and king of Sweden (from 1604);
d. 1611:
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Charles of Austria, b. 1540, youngest son of Emperor Ferdinand I;
archduke of Inner Austria from 1564;
d. 1590:
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Charles Emmanuel I, b. 1562;
duke of Savoy 1580–1630;
d. 1630:
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Charles Gustav, duke of Pfalz-Zweibrücken-Kleeburg, b. 1622;
in Swedish army from 1642;
commander-in-chief from 1648;
later Charles X of Sweden (1654–60);
d. 1660:
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Charles Louis, Elector Palatine, b. 1617, Heidelberg, son of Frederick V;
in exile (mostly at The Hague) from 1621;
restored to Rhine Palatinate only in 1648;
d. 1680:
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Charnacé, Hercule de, b. 1588;
military service 1615–22;
in French diplomatic service 1629–32;
envoy to The Hague 1633–5;
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Christian I, Elector of Saxony, b. 1560, Dresden;
succeeded father (Augustus) as Elector 1586;
d. 1591:
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Christian II, Elector of Saxony, b. 1583, Dresden;
succeeded father (Christian I) as Elector 1591;
personal rule from 1601;
d. 1611:
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Christian IV, king of Denmark and Norway, b. 1577, Frederiksborg;
succeeded father (Frederick II) 1588;
personal rule from 1596;
d. 1648:
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Christian, duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, b. 1599;
Protestant administrator of diocese of Halberstadt from 1616;
in military service of Dutch Republic (1620 and 1622) and Frederick V (1621–2 and 1623–5);
entered Danish service 1625;
d. 1626:
family connexions of 49;
in Thirty Years' War 56, 58, 60–1, 85, 87, 196
Christian, margrave of Brandenburg-Kulmbach, b. 1581, brother of Elector Joachim Frederick of Brandenburg;
margrave from 1603;
military leader of Franconian Circle from 1606;
neutral 1618–31;
fought with Sweden 1631–5;
d. 1655:
and Denmark 114;
and emperor 114;
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Christian, prince of Anhalt-Bernburg, b. 1568, Bernburg;
a Lutheran child prodigy who converted to Calvinism in 1592;
in Saxon service 1586–92 (leading Protestant aid to Henry IV in 1591);
in 1595 became governor of Upper Palatinate under Electors Frederick IV and V;
defeated at White Mountain (1620) and driven into exile;
pardoned (1624), he returned to govern his lands;

d. 1630:
and Bohemian Revolt 46–50, 55;
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Christian William of Brandenburg, b. 1587, younger brother of Elector John Sigismund;
succeeded father as Protestant administrator of the archbishop of Magdeburg 1608;
deposed 1628 and captured 1631;
converted to Catholicism and abandoned public life;
d. 1665:
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Christina, queen of Sweden, b. 1626;
succeeded father (Gustavus Adolphus) 1632;
personal rule from 1644;
abdicated 1654 in favour of cousin Charles Gustav;
d. 1689:
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favourite of Louis XIII;
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Colli, Hippolytus von, b. 1561, Zurich;
chancellor to Christian of Anhalt (1591);
president of Palatine Supreme Court (1593);
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Coloma, Don Carlos, b. 1566;
served in Army of Flanders from 1588 (colonel 1597);
envoy in London 1622–5 and 1629–30;
on Spanish Council of State 1634–7;
d. 1637:
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Condé the elder, Henri de Bourbon, prince of, b. 1588;
conspired against French government 1615;
imprisoned 1616–19;
military commander from 1620;
d. 1646:
leads French armies 136, 236n.15
Condé the younger, Louis de Bourbon, prince of, b. 1621, son of
the preceding;
led French armies to victory at Rocroi, Freiburg and Lens;
principal opponent of Mazarin during the Fronde;
in Spanish service 1653–8;
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Contzen, Adam, SJ, b. 1571, Jülich;
polemical writer and (from 1624) confessor to Maximilian of Bavaria;
d. 1630 107–8, 221n.2
Conway, Sir Edward, b. 1570;
military service in Netherlands 1590–1623;
envoy to Prague 1623–5;
English secretary of state 1625–31;
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Coryat, Thomas, b. 1577, Somerset;
jester and servant of Henry, Prince of Wales (d. 1612);
travelled in Europe on foot (1608), and Asia (1612–17);
d. Surat, 1617:
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Descartes, René, b. 1596;
Jesuit-educated philosopher and scientist;
served in Dutch army;
lived in Holland (1628–49) and Sweden (1649–50);

d. 1650:
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Dietrichstein, Franz von, b. 1570, Madrid, son of Austrian diplomat;
took holy orders 1591;
cardinal bishop of Olomouc (Moravia) from 1599;
governor of Moravia from 1624;
Director of Imperial Privy Council from 1634;
d. 1636 39
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Dohna, Achatius, burggraf von, b. 1581;
servant and agent of Christian of Anhalt;
court official of Frederick of the Palatinate 1606–10;
envoy of Frederick to England 1619–21;
d. 1647 23, 33, 201
Dohna, Christoph, burggraf von, b. 1583;
servant and agent of Christian of Anhalt;
envoy of Frederick V to England 1618;
governor of principality of Orange 1629 to death 1637 23
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English poet and public servant;
ordained 1615, he became a famous court preacher;
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Echter von Mespelbrunn, Julius, b. 1545, Mespelbrunn;
took holy orders 1569 (but not ordained until 1575);
prince bishop of Würzburg from 1573;
d. 1617:
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Eggenberg, Johan Ulrich, prince of, b. 1568, Graz;
brought up a Lutheran but fought in Army of Flanders (*c.* 1597) and visited Spain;
governor of Carinthia 1602;
converted to Catholicism 1605;
governor of Inner Austria from 1615;
Director of Imperial Privy
Council from 1619;
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Electress Palatine from 1613;
queen of Bohemia from 1619;
in exile from 1621;
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Erlach, Hans Ludwig von, b. 1595, Berne;
page of Christian of Anhalt;
served in armies of Frederick V (1618–23) and Sweden (1623–7);
military director of Berne 1627–37;
joined Bernard of Saxe-Weimar 1637 and led Bernardines from 1639 until death, 1650: and Bernardines 137, 168, 176;
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Ernest, count of Mansfeld, b. 1580, Luxemburg;
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military enterpriser for Protestant cause 1622–6;
d. 1626:
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Erskine (or Erskein) Alexander, b. 1598, Greifswald;
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represented army at Westphalian and Nuremberg talks 1647–50;
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b. 1503, Alcalá de Henares, brother of Emperor Charles V;
governor of Austria from 1521;
king of Bohemia and Hungary from 1526;
Holy Roman Emperor from 1558;
d. 1564, government of 4–5, 75–80
Ferdinand II of Austria, b. 1578, Graz;
archduke of Inner Austria 1590 (personal rule from 1595);
king of Bohemia and Hungary from 1617;
ruler of Austria and Holy Roman Emperor from 1619;
d. 1637:
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king of Hungary from 1625 and of Bohemia from 1627;
led Imperial army 1634–5;
elected king of the Romans (1636) and Holy Roman Emperor (1637);
d. 1657:
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chosen to govern Netherlands 1632;
led army via Italy and Germany to Brussels 1633–4;
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coadjutor of dioceses of Cologne (1595), Liège (1601), Hildesheim (1611) and Münster (1612);
succeeded to all in 1612, and added Paderborn 1618;

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succeeded elder brother Francis as duke 1612;
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viceroy of Catalonia 1629–30;
governor of Lombardy 1630–3;
d. 1634:
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served in Army of Flanders;
Spanish commander in Palatinate 1621–3;
in Netherlands 1623–6;
Spanish commander in war of Mantua 1626–30;
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in Imperial army 1620–32;
briefly in Swedish and Saxon service before rejoining Wallenstein (1634);
imprisoned by emperor 1634–5;

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ruler of secularized bishoprics of Bremen (from 1621), Verden (from 1622) and Halberstadt (1624)—all territories lost to Sweden in 1644;
succeeded father in 1648;
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Director of Protestant Union from 1608;
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succeeded 1610 (personal rule from 1614);
married Elizabeth Stuart 1613;
Director of Protestant Union;
accepted election as king of Bohemia 1619;
driven into exile 1621;
led opposition to Habsburgs until d. 1632:
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governed Spanish Netherlands 1592–6;
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served in Spanish and Bavarian armies to 1629;
joined Imperial army as general officer;
joint commander from 1634;
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served in Netherlands wars 1604–9;
in Danish (1614–26) and Imperial (1626–30) armies;
fought for Sweden 1630–5 and 1639–41;
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joined Danish and Swedish armies 1627–34;
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Jesuit-educated;

elected bishop of Freising 1618;
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artist and diplomat;
came to England 1616:
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author, soldier and publican;
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studied law and served States Party;
imprisoned 1619–21;
mostly in France thereafter, from 1635 as Swedish envoy;
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Scottish privy councillor from 1628;
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leader of
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succeeds as king 1589;
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entered service of dukes of Neuburg;
converted to Catholicism and made governor of Neuburg 1616;
served in Bavarian army 1619–23;
governor of Upper Austria for Bavaria and emperor 1623–9;
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Joachim Ernest of Hohenzollern, margrave of Ansbach-Bayreuth, b. 1583, son of Elector John George of Brandenburg and brother of Christian of Brandenburg-Kulmbach;
joined Protestant Union 1608 and commanded its army 1609–21;
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succeeded father as duke 1604;
driven into exile 1621 and d. at Metz 1635:
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succeeded as count 1559;
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succeeded f ather to Siegen division of Nassau 1606;
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senior Palatinate court officer from 1602;
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John II of Zweibrücken;
mostly resident in Sweden;
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John Casimir of the Palatinate, b. 1543, younger son of Elector Frederick III;
administrator of the Palatinate during minority of Frederick IV from 1583 until d. 1592:
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John Ernest, duke of Saxe-Weimar, b. 1594;
military commander for Frederick V (1620–5) and Christian IV (from 1625);
d. 1626:
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succeeded brother Christian II as Elector 1611;
d. 1656:
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John George, margrave of Jägerndorf, b. 1577, son of Elector Joachim Friedrich of Brandenburg;
administrator of Strasbourg diocese 1592;
created margrave 1607;
military commander for Bohemian estates 1618;
joined Bethlen Gabor 1621;
d. 1624:
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John Sigismund of Hohenzollern, Elector of Brandenburg, b. 1572;
regent in Prussia (1594–1608);
succeeded father (Joachim Friedrich) as Elector 1608;
d. 1619:
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Ravensburg and Mark, whom he succeeded in 1592;
d. 1609:

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Joseph, Father (François Leclerc du Tremblay), b. 1577;
entered Capuchin order 1599;
early mentor of Cardinal Richelieu and later his close collaborator, undertaking numerous confidential missions to foreign rulers;
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mathematician and astronomer;
professor at Graz 1593–8;
astronomer at Prague (1600–12) and Linz (1612–26);
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Khevenhüller, Franz Christoph, Count, b. 1588;
Austrian diplomat (especially active in Spain) from 1616 and councillor of Ferdinand II;
biographer of emperor;
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Khlesl, Melchior, b. 1553;
Catholic prelate;
official of the bishop of Passau 1581;
bishop of Vienna 1602;
Cardinal 1615;
d. 1630:
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bishop of Augsburg from 1599;
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served in Imperial army 1620–30;
commander in Swedish army after 1631;
governor of Bremen-Verden 1645–53;
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cleric at Mainz from 1576;
Elector of Mainz (1604–26);
pensioner of France from 1590 and Spain from 1611;
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La Force, Jacques Nompar, duke of, b. 1558;
Huguenot noble (escaped St Bartholomew's massacre) and companion of Henry IV;
led Huguenot rebels against Louis XIII 1619–21;
pardoned, commanded French armies in Italy and Germany 1630–38;
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Laimbauer, Martin, leader of Austrian Peasant Revolt (1635–6);
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Lamormaini, William, SJ, b. 1570, Luxemburg;
entered Jesuit order 1590;
professor and (from 1614) rector of Graz University (1600–21);
rector of Vienna University (from 1623);
confessor to Ferdinand II (1624–37);
d. 1648:
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English prelate;
bishop of London (1628–33);
archbishop of Canterbury (1633–45);
chancellor of Oxford University from 1629;
d. 1645:
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Cardinal (1621);
abandoned church to lead French army 1628;
senior commander from 1635;
d. 1639:
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La Vieuville, Charles, marquis and duke of;
captain of French royal bodyguard from 1616;
French minister of finance 1623–4;
chief minister 1624;
arrested and exiled under Richelieu;
minister of finance again 1651–3;
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joined Jesuits (1594);
professor at Dillingen University 1625–32;
author of *Pacis Compositio* (1629);
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d. 1632:
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bishop of Passau and Strasbourg from 1626;
archbishop of Magdeburg 1629–35;
commander-in-chief of Imperial army 1639–42;

captain-general of South Netherlands 1647–56;
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Lerma, Don Francisco Gómez de Sandoval y Rojas, duke of, b. 1553;
favourite of Philip III of Spain and his chief minister 1598–1618;
became Cardinal 1618 and fell from power;
d. 1625:
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French minister of war 1643–77;
Chancellor of France;
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governor of Bohemia 1621–7;
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canon at Salzburg from 1606 and archbishop from 1619;
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Palatine councillor 1576–1612;
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regent of France 1610–17;

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Matthias of Austria, b. 1557, younger son of Emperor Maximilian II;
archduke;
governor of Upper Austria from 1593;
king of Hungary (from 1608) and Bohemia (from 1611);
Holy Roman Emperor (1612–19);
d. March 1619:
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king of Bohemia (from 1548) and Hungary (from 1563);
Holy Roman Emperor from 1564;
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archduke of Tyrol from 1602;
Grand Master of the German Order;
d. 1618:
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Mazarin, Jules, b. 1602 (Giulio Mazzarini);
Cardinal from 1642;
nuncio at French Court 1634–6 and thereafter adviser and (from 1642) chief minister of French Crown;
exiled during Fronde;
d. 1661:
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served with Scottish troops in Germany 1627–33;
commander of Covenanting forces in Scotland (1637–40), Ulster (1641–4) and again Scotland (1644–7);
d. 1680:
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fought in Imperial army from 1625;
imprisoned by Swedes 1639–42;
on Imperial diplomatic service 1648–57;
commanded Imperial army from 1657;
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travelled in Europe and Near East 1591–8;
d. 1629:
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German author;
member of *Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft* from 1645;

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Nevers, Charles de Gonzague, duke of, b. 1580;
educated by Jesuits;
succeeded as duke 1595;
commanded armies in France (1595–1600), Hungary (1602), and Germany (1621–2);
sundry diplomatic missions for France;
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LA GUERRA DE LOS TREINTA AÑOS

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—Bien, ya que no estás pensando en nada, puedes decirme la fecha en que se firmó la paz de Westfalia.

Antoine no se movió ni respondió. Su padre objetó con voz aguda:

—¿Os dais cuenta? No sabe la fecha de la paz de Westfalia. Debería sentir vergüenza.

Se hizo un pesado silencio en el coche. Para ayudar a su hermano, Lucienne recitó mentalmente una oración que le había recomendado la señorita Hermeline como ayuda para recordar las grandes fechas de la Historia. Frédéric dibujó las cifras en el aire con el dedo y Mme Haudoin intentó captar la mirada de su hijo para reconfortarle con una sonrisa cariñosa. Pero Antoine miraba fijamente a sus botas y se negaba a ver nada...

Finalmente, el pecho de Antoine se agitó con un sollozo... Tragó saliva y musitó con voz quebrada:

—1648.

Marcel Aymé, *The Green Mare,*
Nueva York, 1963, pp. 100-101
(acción situada en el año 1885).

RECONOCIMIENTOS

Este libro es el resultado del trabajo de diez historiadores. En 1977, cuando Andrew Wheatcroft, de Routledge & Kegan Paul, me invitó a escribir un nuevo estudio de la Guerra de los Treinta Años, no tardó en resultar evidente que la cantidad de obras publicadas importantes, así como el número y variedad de los documentos que se conservan, excedían la capacidad de un solo especialista. En consecuencia, invitamos a otros especialistas para que se ocuparan de aquellos aspectos de la guerra en los que mayor era el volumen de material desconocido y que aún no había sido sintetizado —Escandinavia, Brandemburgo y Sajonia, los corolarios de la guerra, etc.— y sus contribuciones constituyen una parte fundamental del texto, ya que narran, analizan y explican en el lugar adecuado los acontecimientos y procesos que en conjunto constituyeron el conflicto. Pero este sistema no tardó en plantear una seria dificultad práctica. Dado que todos los autores escribieron el texto al mismo tiempo, hubo que hacer un importante trabajo de revisión y fue necesario reescribir algunas partes para que los diferentes capítulos encajaran perfectamente unos con otros. Así pues, mi primera y mayor deuda de gratitud es para con los otros autores del texto, que aceptaron de buen grado una mayor interferencia editorial de la que se pide a cualquier especialista y que prestaron una ayuda inapreciable en demasiadas formas como para que sea posible mencionarlas todas.

Otra deuda importante, que reconozco con placer, es la que deriva de la munificencia de la British Academy y la Newberry Library. En 1981 me concedieron una beca de tres meses para trabajar en Chicago y fue allí, en la «segunda ciudad» de América, donde, con el apoyo de varias magníficas bibliotecas y rodeado de muchos cualificados especialistas, redacté casi todos mis capítulos de este libro. Posterior-

mente, Andrew Wheatcroft me ha ofrecido un amable apoyo y útil consejo en todo momento, por lo cual le estoy sumamente agradecido. De igual forma, el profesor Robert Bireley, SJ, Bruce Lenman, el profesor Konrad Repgen, el doctor Hamish Scott, el doctor Lesley M. Smith, el profesor Hugh Trevor-Roper, la desaparecida Frances Yates (que iba a colaborar en la obra) y, sobre todc, el doctor Simon Adams me han ofrecido sugerencias, referencias de trabajos desconocidos (y no tan desconocidos) y ayuda.

Al preparar esta segunda edición, los autores hemos tenido la oportunidad de corregir una serie de errores que se deslizaron en el texto y en las notas. Hemos de manifestar nuestro profundo agradecimiento a los profesores Dieter Albrecht y Konrad Repgen por indicárnoslos. Una serie de nuevos trabajos publicados sobre el tema se mencionan en la página 401.

Sin embargo, uno de los autores no pudo revisar su texto, pues Gerhard Benecke murió en agosto de 1985. Su pérdida ha sido sentida por los especialistas de todo el mundo, no sólo en St. Andrews, donde fue alumno y alumno investigador, y en Canterbury y Vancouver, donde ejerció la docencia, sino por todos los historiadores de la Edad Moderna en general. Como es natural, su ausencia la notan especialmente sus colegas autores de este libro.

PRÓLOGO

Con frecuencia, se afirma que fue Samuel Pufendorf, el eminente jurista e historiador del siglo XVII, quien acuñó la expresión «la Guerra de los Treinta Años» para describir la serie de conflictos que asolaron Europa entre 1618 y 1648. En efecto, esa expresión aparece en su libro *La situación del Imperio germánico*, publicado en 1667, pero lo cierto es que no era una formulación nueva. En mayo de 1648, antes incluso de que terminara el conflicto, uno de los delegados del congreso de paz de Westfalia habló de «La Guerra de los Treinta Años» que había devastado su país; y en 1649 la publicación semanal inglesa *The Moderate Intelligencer* comenzó a publicar una serie de artículos titulados «Epítome de la Guerra de los Treinta Años en Alemania». El número 203, de 8 de febrero de 1649, resumía la «guerra bohemia», 1618-1623; el número 204 seguía con la fase holandesa de la guerra; el número 205 cubría la fase danesa, y así sucesivamente. Tres meses después de la firma de la paz de Westfalia, que puso término a la guerra en octubre de 1648, los lectores ingleses contaban, pues, con un marco moderno para interpretar el conflicto. Al mismo tiempo, se prestó idéntico servicio a los lectores alemanes en un panfleto publicado en alemán con el título «Una breve crónica de la Guerra de los Treinta Años», que no sólo daba las fechas y lugares de las principales acciones militares, sino que ofrecía también un cálculo aproximado de las pérdidas en vidas y propiedades causadas por el conflicto.[1]

1. Véase el detallado estudio de K. Repgen, «Seit wann gibt es den Begriff "Dreissigjähriger Krieg"?», en H. Dollinger *et al.*, eds., *Weltpolitik, Europagedanke, Regionalismus: Festschrift für Heinz Gollwitzer*, Münster, 1982, pp. 59-70. Al parecer, este término fue utilizado por primera vez el 6 de mayo de 1648 por los representantes del obispado de Bamberg en la conferencia de paz de West-

Pero en el siglo XVII, los historiadores no eran tan objetivos como afirman serlo sus descendientes modernos. Todas las publicaciones a las que hemos hecho referencia habían sido escritas por protestantes interesados en hacer hincapié en el hecho de que las diferentes guerras que sacudieron a Europa en los decenios posteriores a 1618 quedaron reducidas a una sola en defensa de la libertad religiosa y constitucional. Trataban de justificar retrospectivamente la rebelión de Bohemia en 1618-1621 contra el emperador Fernando II, sobre la base de su comportamiento posterior. Para muchos observadores contemporáneos, la causa de Bohemia no era justa en absoluto, razón por la cual fueron tantos los príncipes protestantes que se negaron a apoyarla. Sólo después, cuando se incrementó la fuerza imperial y se olvidaron los principios constitucionales, se arrepintieron de su neutralidad y se opusieron a los Habsburgo. Así pues, al reescribir la historia de la guerra intentaban salvar su conciencia. Cuando Gustavo Adolfo, rey de Suecia, afirmó en 1628 que «todas las guerras que tienen lugar en Europa se han unido y se han convertido en una sola guerra», en parte expresaba el deseo de que eso fuera así, ya que contribuía a justificar el traslado de sus ejércitos desde Polonia y Livonia a Alemania.[2]

Sin embargo, la Europa católica veía las cosas de una forma distinta. Uno de los historiadores oficiales de los Habsburgo, Eberhard Wassenberg, publicó un relato de la guerra en 1639, que consideraba cada una de las campañas como un ataque injustificado contra el emperador: su título era: «Comentario sobre las guerras entre Fernando II y III y sus enemigos». El relato de Wassenberg de la «guerra danesa» de 1625-1629 estaba acompañado de descripciones de la «otra guerra austriaca» (es decir, la revuelta campesina de 1626), «la tercera guerra de Transilvania», «la guerra de Holanda», «la guerra de Mantua», etc. Tal vez ésta era una visión extrema, pero incluso los católicos que no sustentaban la visión compartimentada de Wassen-

falia (p. 62). Posteriormente, el profesor Repgen ha descubierto alguna información adicional. Véase «Noch einmal zum Begriff "Dreissigjähriger Krieg"», *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung*, IX (1982), pp. 347-352. *Von dem Dreyssigjährigen Teutschen Krieg Kurtze Chronica* (1650) fue la tercera edición de un panfleto publicado anteriormente con el título de *Von dem Dreissig-Jährigen Deutschen Kriege* (1648) y también con el de *Summarischer Ausszug des dreyssig-Jährigen Deutschen Krigs* (1649). La primera edición también fue traducida al holandés.

2. Citado en *The Cambridge Modern History*, Cambridge, 1906, IV, v.

berg veían una gran diferencia entre las campañas desarrolladas hasta 1629, en las que los enemigos del emperador eran fundamentalmente sus propios súbditos con alguna ayuda extranjera, y la lucha a partir de 1630, en la que el emperador se había enfrentado fundamentalmente con potencias extranjeras cuyos aliados alemanes eran, la mayor parte de las veces, poco numerosos y con escasos recursos. El obispo Gepeckh de Freising (1618-1651), en el corazón de Baviera, distinguía siempre en su correspondencia entre «los conflictos bohemios» del decenio de 1620 (no muy diferentes de la serie de alarmas y escaramuzas que habían perturbado la paz del Imperio desde la paz de Augsburgo de 1555) y «esta guerra» (que comenzó con la invasión sueca en 1630 y le obligó a huir de su capital ocho veces antes de que se firmara la paz en 1648). Para el obispo, la guerra no había durado treinta años sino dieciocho.[3]

Naturalmente, éstas son sólo las opiniones de media docena de individuos. Ahora que todos los archivos públicos del período están abiertos a los historiadores, contamos con las opiniones de miles de personas. Sólo en Checoslovaquia existen 27 depósitos con importantes colecciones documentales que han dejado los participantes en el conflicto; 20 volúmenes acerca del Edicto de Restitución, publicado en 1629, pueden consultarse en los archivos de Sajonia, y así sucesivamente. No hay duda de que se han realizado enormes esfuerzos para publicar algunas de las fuentes más importantes. Existe el proyecto de publicar no menos de 45 volúmenes para recoger toda la correspondencia y las negociaciones generadas por la paz de Westfalia; 13 volúmenes serán necesarios para publicar la correspondencia entre Maximiliano de Baviera y sus aliados entre 1618 y 1635; muchos otros volúmenes harían falta para recoger los documentos pertinentes de la Public Record Office de Londres. Y esto representa tan sólo una parte del material no publicado. En todas partes, la guerra hizo que se multiplicaran los documentos. En el Bremen protestante hubo que duplicar el secretariado del arzobispo-administrador en 1632 para hacer frente a las exigencias de los ejércitos de la zona; y cuando en el decenio de 1650 se reclasificaron los archivos de la diócesis católica de Wurzburgo fueron necesarias dos series: una de «pre-guerra», que se remon-

3. Repgen, «Dreissigjähriger Krieg», p. 63: citas del doctor Isaac Volmar y de la delegación de Salzburgo; y L. Weber, *Veit Adam von Gepeckh, Fürstbischof von Freising, 1618 bis 1651*, Munich, 1972, pp. 88-90.

taba en las profundidades del tiempo; la otra «desde que comenzó la guerra», que tenía casi el mismo volumen.[4]

Tal como en una ocasión predijo lord Acton, vivimos en la «era de la documentación, que tenderá a hacer que la historia sea independiente de los historiadores, a desarrollar la cultura a expensas de la escritura». Ciertamente, los miles de documentos producidos por un continente en guerra constituyen un desafío a la resistencia.[5] Pero incluso la dedicación sobrehumana a la investigación archivística no será suficiente, pues los registros documentales de la Guerra de los Treinta Años están escritos en demasiadas lenguas distintas. La monarquía Habsburgo incluía una cancillería alemana, checa y húngara; la corte de España tenía secretarios para mantener correspondencia en francés, holandés, alemán, latín, italiano, aragonés, portugués y castellano y hay documentos que se refieren a la guerra en cada una de esas lenguas. Es cierto que, por parte protestante, la *lingua franca* tendía a ser un pomposo alemán sazonado con abundantes latinismos, pero también es numerosa la correspondencia y los documentos oficiales redactados en latín, danés, sueco, inglés y holandés. En la lejana corte de Bethlen Gabor, príncipe de Transilvania, los documentos referentes a la guerra se escribían en alemán, húngaro, rumano, latín y (cuando se trataba de la Puerta) en persa.

A pesar de los problemas que esa tarea planteaba, se han hecho una serie de intentos homéricos de ofrecer una síntesis aceptable de ese material. En la Europa occidental, dos de los más celebrados se realizaron en vísperas de la segunda guerra mundial: C. V. Wedgwood (en 1938) consideraba la guerra como un conflicto fundamentalmente alemán en el que influyeron de vez en cuando las potencias septentrionales y occidentales, mientras que G. Pagès (en 1939) parecía obsesionado por la importancia de Francia como árbitro de los destinos de Europa durante toda la guerra, con exclusión de prácticamente

4. K. H. Schleif, *Regierung und Verwaltung des Erzstifts Bremen am Beginn der Neuzeit (1500-1645). Eine Studie zum Wesen der modernen Staatlichkeit*, Hamburgo, 1972, p. 172; H. Jäger, «Der dreissigjährige Krieg und die deutsche Kulturlandschaft», en H. Haushofer y W. A. Boelcke, eds., *Wege und Forschungen der Agrargeschichte: Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Günther Franz*, Frankfurt, 1967, p. 131.

5. Lord Acton, «The Study of History» [conferencia inaugural, 1895], en Acton, *Renaissance to Revolution: the rise of the free state. Lectures on Modern History*, Londres, 1906; reeditado, Nueva York, 1961, p. 9 (con una nota a pie de página donde se hace referencia a las ideas similares de Ranke).

todas las demás consideraciones. En la Europa oriental se han expuesto puntos de vista igualmente restringidos por parte del historiador checo J. V. Polichenski (1971), que argumentaba que en todo momento fueron fundamentales los acontecimientos de su nativa Bohemia, y del ruso B. F. Porshnev (1976), según el cual el clímax de la guerra en 1630-1641, cuando los ejércitos suecos dominaron el Imperio, sólo podía explicarse a la luz de la política rusa respecto a Polonia.[6] Los historiadores alemanes se han mostrado todavía más provincianos: en especial, los autores de Baviera y Brandemburgo tienden a estudiar la guerra en términos casi exclusivamente regionales. No hay ninguna obra que pueda competir con la síntesis en tres volúmenes del alemán Moritz Ritter, *Historia de Alemania durante la época de la Contrarreforma y de la Guerra de los Treinta Años, 1555-1648*, publicada en 1889 y que nunca ha sido traducida. Desde entonces, aunque se han hecho centenares de estudios del conflicto —la mayor parte de ellos titulados (como éste) *La Guerra de los Treinta Años*— el estudioso del tema ha buscado en vano un estudio moderno que no se centre exclusivamente en Alemania, Escandinavia, Inglaterra y Francia, sino que preste también atención a España, Italia, Transilvania, Polonia y los Países Bajos.

6. El doctor Paul Dukes de la Universidad de Aberdeen, que ha publicado un resumen en inglés de uno de los libros de Porshnev [véase *European Studies Review*, IV, 1974, pp. 81-88], ha señalado que, después de centrarse en el estudio de Francia antes de la Fronda, B. F. Porshnev decidió escribir una trilogía que contenía un análisis sincrónico del desarrollo social, económico y de las relaciones internacionales en Europa durante la época de la Guerra de los Treinta Años, que consideraba que había sido el primer conflicto que afectó a todo el continente y, como tal, uno de los acontecimientos fundamentales que separaron la Edad Media de los tiempos modernos. Después de una serie de artículos relacionados con este ambicioso proyecto, en 1970 dio a la luz su último volumen, *France, the English Revolution and European Politics at the Middle of the Seventeenth Century*. La segunda parte, todavía no publicada, pero bosquejada en una nueva serie de artículos, tenía que analizar el cambio en las relaciones entre el oeste y el este de Europa, que ocurrió a mediados del decenio de 1630. La primera parte de la trilogía, *The Thirty Years' War, the Entry of Sweden, and the Moscow State*, apareció en 1976 después de la muerte de su autor. El punto central de la obra era la guerra de Smolensko de 1632-1634, que apenas ha recibido alguna atención en las obras inglesas sobre el conflicto más general. Porshnev argumentaba que, incluso antes del comienzo de la Guerra de los Treinta Años, las interconexiones de Europa eran mayores de lo que se ha pensado recientemente, situando la conclusión del período de tumultos de Muscovy en un contexto más amplio. Agradezco profundamente al Dr. Dukes esta información.

La única excepción en este sentido es el trabajo publicado recientemente por un historiador de la Alemania Oriental. *The Thirty Years' War* (Poole, 1981), de Herbert Langer, es una historia cultural de Alemania durante la guerra basada en datos poco conocidos recopilados en toda la Europa continental, con ilustraciones agradablemente integradas en el texto. Pero no es una historia de la guerra. El libro de Langer nos permite dejar de estudiar en este libro el impacto cultural de la guerra, pero su estudio ha de considerarse como un complemento y no como una alternativa de nuestra obra, que intenta presentar un análisis estructurado del conflicto.

No todos los períodos se estudian aquí con el mismo detalle, porque algunos de ellos —en especial el decenio de 1620— son más complejos que otros.[7] Además, el texto no se centra exclusivamente en Alemania y no abarca tan sólo un período de treinta años: incluimos la guerra de Mantua y las campañas suecas en Polonia porque tuvieron una importancia crucial para el Imperio y el relato se remonta al «Incidente de Donauwörth» de 1607, que aceleró la polarización de Alemania en bandos confesionales hostiles, y se alarga hasta el acuerdo final en 1650, en Nuremberg, sobre la desmovilización de los ejércitos en la Alemania todavía ocupada. Desde Donauwörth a Nuremberg: sobre el terreno, apenas 150 km las separan, pero en la historia se extienden entre ambas poblaciones más de 40 años de guerra y rumores de guerra. En ocasiones, el conflicto parecía tan intenso y parecía implicar a tantos estados que se le ha llamado, con justicia, «la guerra civil europea».[8] Es harto difícil hacer justicia a ese torbellino en el marco de un solo volumen, sin caer en la simplificación o la distorsión.

7. Tradicionalmente, los historiadores han concedido mucha mayor atención a la primera mitad de la guerra: Moritz Ritter dedicó 596 de las 648 páginas de su libro sobre la guerra al período 1618-1635, mientras que Pagès dedicaba 178 páginas de un total de 235, Wedgwood 394 páginas de un total de 515 y Polichenski 200 páginas de un total de 256.

8. Éste es el título de un excelente, aunque breve, estudio sobre la guerra de H. G. Koenigsberger, publicado en H. R. Trevor-Roper, ed., *The Age of Expansion*, Londres, 1968, capítulo 5, y en Koenigsberger, *The Habsburgs and Europe 1516-1660*, Ithaca, Nueva York y Londres, 1971, capítulo 3.

Capítulo I

EUROPA ENTRE LA GUERRA Y LA PAZ, 1607-1618

La *Historia de los viajes de Escarmentado*, cuya acción se sitúa en los años 1615-1620, no es una de las mejores obras de Voltaire. La visión que el autor tiene del siglo XVII como un período de la historia extremadamente violento y perturbado está mejor desarrollada y documentada en su *Ensayo sobre las costumbres*. En la historia de Escarmentado, la ironía del autor, tan poderosa en otros escritos, no tiene apenas fuerza. Sin embargo, este corto relato merece cierta atención por parte de los historiadores. Su héroe y narrador, nacido en Creta y enviado a Roma por sus padres cuando no es más que un adolescente, se embarca en un gran viaje alrededor de Europa en búsqueda de la verdad, pero lo cierto es que sólo encuentra la violencia provocada por la discordia religiosa y política. En París le invitan a cenar y le sirven un trozo de carne procedente del favorito caído de Luis XIII; en Londres observa que «los santos católicos, por el bienestar de la Iglesia» habían intentado recientemente hacer saltar al rey, a la familia real y a todo el Parlamento (el Gunpowder Plot). A continuación, visita La Haya, donde ve cómo un anciano venerable va a ser ejecutado públicamente. Se trata de Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, primer ministro de la República de Holanda durante cuarenta años. Sorprendido, el narrador pregunta a uno de los asistentes al acto si el anciano es culpable de traición. «Mucho peor que eso —le responden—, es un hombre que cree que podemos conseguir la salvación mediante la fe y las buenas obras. Hay que comprender que si llegaran a aceptarse esas opiniones el Estado no perduraría y hacen falta leyes severas para suprimir tan terribles horrores.» Nuestro héroe, que se siente profundamente disgustado, se traslada a Sevilla, donde es conducido a prisión y multa-

do por la Inquisición por escuchar unas palabras inconvenientes en el momento en que cuarenta pecadores son quemados en la hoguera acusados de herejía. Finalmente, el narrador se considera afortunado por haber conseguido escapar hacia la paz y armonía relativas del imperio otomano.

Es curioso que Escarmentado no visitara Alemania. Algunos críticos han apuntado que tal vez Voltaire eliminó el pasaje que se refería (de forma igualmente ofensiva) a ese país, para evitar la reacción de su antiguo patrón Federico de Prusia. No obstante, es posible también que la situación de Alemania en los años 1615-1620 fuera demasiado compleja para poder ser explicada en un corto relato.[1] Sea cual fuere la razón, de ningún modo puede criticarse la decisión de Voltaire de concentrarse en la periferia de Europa, pues las pasiones religiosas y políticas que iban a producir la Guerra de los Treinta Años no se originaron en Alemania sino en los territorios que la rodeaban y, sobre todo, en los estados gobernados por la principal dinastía europea, la de los Habsburgo españoles y austriacos.

I. Los Habsburgo y Europa

Felipe III, que sucedió a su padre como rey de España en 1598, gobernaba un imperio en el que el sol no se ponía nunca. Tenía súbditos en las fortalezas y puertos en torno a las costas de África y el sur de Asia, en las Filipinas, México y Perú, en España y Portugal (unidas desde 1580), en Lombardía, Nápoles y Sicilia. Pero no en los Países Bajos, aunque esos territorios habían constituido una parte importante del imperio de su padre, Felipe II. A su muerte, los Países Bajos del sur pasaron a la hermana de Felipe III, Isabel, y a su marido Alberto, a los que se conoció en todas partes como «los archiduques» (véase cuadro 1). En su Estado satélite, los archiduques eran soberanos en los asuntos internos, mientras que estaban sometidos a España por lo que respecta a la política exterior y de defensa. Esa distinción era importante, porque Felipe III parecía decidido a continuar la guerra

1. F. Deloffre y J. van den Heuvel, eds., *Voltaire: romans et contes*, París, 1979, pp. 136-137. Voltaire escribió la obra en 1753-1754, cuando estaba terminando *Essai sur les Moeurs*. Escribió con cierta incomodidad, «entre deux rois» (pues se había enemistado con los gobernantes de Francia y Prusia) y «le cul à terre», en su exilio en Alsacia.

de su padre contra el vecino de los archiduques en el norte, la República de Holanda.

Nacida como consecuencia de la rebelión de las provincias septentrionales de los Países Bajos contra el gobierno español en el decenio de 1570, la joven república había conseguido sobrevivir a los ataques del mayor imperio de Europa gracias a una combinación de enérgica defensa en el interior e incansable diplomacia en el exterior. Una serie de tratados de amistad con Inglaterra (1585), Francia (1589), el Palatinado (1604) y Brandemburgo (1605) permitieron a los rebeldes hacer acopio de mayor número de hombres y dinero hasta que el gobierno español se vio obligado a aceptar que la victoria en las guerras de los Países Bajos era imposible de alcanzar. A comienzos de 1607, y a pesar de que el año anterior se habían alcanzado algunos éxitos militares, comenzaron las conversaciones de paz. Pero tras dos años de discusiones, los archiduques, España y la República no habían llegado todavía a acuerdo alguno. En cambio, se concluyó una tregua de doce años, firmada en abril de 1609, pero la tregua sólo afectaba a los Países Bajos. Los holandeses no retirarían sus barcos de guerra ni sus mercaderes de la América española ni del Asia portuguesa y la República continuó buscando alianzas con las fuerzas anti-habsburguesas, concertando sendos tratados con los turcos otomanos (1611), Argel (1612), los protestantes alemanes (1613), las ciudades hanseáticas y Suecia (1614), Saboya (1616) y Venecia (1619).

De esta forma, la República de Holanda no sólo consiguió crear una red impresionante de alianzas, sino que se aseguró además el aislamiento diplomático de su enemigo acérrimo. España no encontró ayuda ni siquiera en la otra rama de la familia, los Habsburgo austriacos. A pesar de que entre ambos reinos existían numerosos vínculos matrimoniales —Felipe II había sido simultáneamente primo, tío y cuñado del emperador Rodolfo II, y Felipe III había contraído matrimonio con otra prima Habsburgo—, Austria sólo ofreció ayuda en una ocasión a España en su lucha contra los holandeses.[2] Este hecho fue muy favorable para la República, debido a los enormes recursos

2. Se ha puesto de relieve que de los 57 matrimonios celebrados por miembros de la dinastía entre h. 1450 y h. 1650, 51 esposas procedían de las mismas siete familias, y 24 procedían de sólo tres familias. Felipe IV de España sólo tenía cuatro bisabuelos en lugar de ocho. Tal vez el repetido incesto que se practicaba en la Casa de Habsburgo explica la infertilidad de tantos de sus miembros durante este período. Véase P. S. Fichtner, «Dynastic marriage in sixteenth-



CUADRO 1
La dinastía Habsburgo

de los Habsburgo austriacos. En palabras de un viajero del siglo XVII, sus territorios eran «más extensos de lo que habitualmente se cree».[3] Por el oeste, se extendía la «Austria Exterior», gobernada desde Innsbruck y que comprendía el Tirol, algunos territorios aislados en el curso medio del Rin y parte de Alsacia; en el sudeste, se hallaba la «Austria Interior», como se denominaba a los ducados de Estiria, Carintia y Carniola, con capital en Graz y unos 2 millones de habitantes. Además, estaban los ducados austriacos originales, los ducados «altos», gobernados desde Linz, y los «bajos» desde Viena, menos poblados que la Austria Interior (la población no superaba en conjunto los 600.000 habitantes) pero mucho más prósperos, con muchas ciudades y una poderosa aristocracia cuyos poderes feudales sobre sus vasallos eran envidiados por los nobles de otros países. Eran éstas las llamadas *Erbländer*, las provincias patrimoniales de la Casa de Habsburgo. A ellas se habían añadido, desde 1526, los reinos electivos de Bohemia (que incluía, además de Bohemia, los territorios de Moravia, Silesia y Lusacia, y tenía unos 4 millones de habitantes) y Hungría (o, más bien, la zona noroccidental del reino medieval, pues el resto se hallaba bajo el dominio del sultán turco o de su vasallo cristiano, el príncipe de Transilvania) con aproximadamente un millón de habitantes (véase mapa 1).

El punto de inflexión en el desarrollo de este extenso patrimonio Habsburgo fue la muerte de Fernando I en 1564. Fernando había sido elegido rey de Bohemia y de Hungría en 1526 en gran medida porque los súbditos de esos estados, cuyo rey acababa de morir en el curso de la batalla de Mohács (que constituyó una gran victoria para los turcos sobre las tropas cristianas), esperaban conseguir, a través de él, la protección alemana y austriaca contra el, al parecer, irresistible avance de los turcos hacia el Danubio. Durante su reinado, Fernando supo explotar las necesidades defensivas para fortalecer su autoridad en esos nuevos reinos y en las *Erbländer* (donde gobernaba en calidad de regente de su hermano, el emperador Carlos V, desde 1521). Supo enemistar a las ciudades contra los nobles, a los no católicos aceptables (husitas y, posteriormente, luteranos) contra los no aceptables (ana-

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century Habsburg diplomacy and statecraft: an interdisciplinary approach», *American Historical Review*, LXXXI (1976), pp. 243-265.

3. Edward Brown, *A brief account of some travels in Hungaria, Servia, etc.*, Londres, 1673, *passim* (por ej., pp. 114-115, 123, 133, 140).

baptistas, hermanos bohemios y, finalmente, calvinistas) y a un Estado contra otro (los líderes de la rebelión bohemia de 1547 fueron juzgados por jueces de Moravia y Silesia). Pero esta situación favorable cambió a partir de 1564. En primer lugar, Fernando dividió sus territorios a su muerte: la Austria Interior fue a parar a manos de su hijo menor, Carlos; la Austria Exterior quedó para su segundo hijo, Fernando; sólo la Alta y la Baja Austria, con Bohemia y Hungría, quedaron para el primogénito, el emperador Maximiliano II. Desde entonces no sería posible continuar la política de Fernando de «divide y gobierna».[4]

De cualquier forma, dos acontecimientos habrían minado probablemente esa política: la creación de asambleas representativas en todos los ducados austriacos, dominadas en todos los casos por la aristocracia, a partir de 1564, y el desarrollo del protestantismo, especialmente entre los nobles y caballeros. Hacia 1580, el 90 por 100 de los nobles de la Baja Austria eran protestantes (casi todos ellos luteranos) y la situación era similar en la Alta Austria (pero aquí algunos nobles se hicieron calvinistas). La Iglesia católica se hallaba moribunda en ambos ducados: las parroquias permanecían vacantes de forma casi permanente, las congregaciones estaban abandonadas y los establecimientos sobrevivientes languidecían en una condición nada edificante. En 1563, en la Baja Austria existían 122 monasterios, con un total de sólo 463 monjes y 160 monjas, pero 199 concubinas, 55 esposas y 443 hijos.[5] Nada pudieron hacer para detener la marea protestante. En 1568 y 1571, Maximiliano II concedió a todos los nobles y a sus vasallos (aunque no a las ciudades) de la Baja Austria la posibilidad de practicar el culto protestante a cambio de un fuerte impuesto para financiar la defensa frente a los turcos. En 1578, la Dieta de la Alta Austria, dominada por los protestantes, formó un ejército

4. La política de Fernando ha sido bien analizada por K. J. Dillon, *King and Estates in the Bohemian Lands, 1526-64*, Bruselas, 1976.

5. Las cifras sobre la fuerza de los protestantes proceden de G. Mecenseffy, *Geschichte des Protestantismus in Österreich*, Graz y Colonia, 1956; G. Reingrabner, *Adel und Reformation. Beiträge zur Geschichte des protestantischen Adels im Lande unter der Enns während die 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts*, Viena, 1976: Forschungen zur Landeskunde von Niederösterreich, XXI; e *idem, Protestantismus in Niederösterreich*, XXVII. Respecto de la fuerza y debilidad monásticas, véase Evans, *Making of the Habsburg Monarchy*, p. 4. Hay que señalar, sin embargo, que en 1580 los protestantes sólo tenían 78 pastores en la Baja Austria, Chesler, «Crown, lords and God», p. 63.

de 1.500 hombres para obtener las mismas concesiones para su nuevo gobernante, Rodolfo II, hijo de Maximiliano. En ese mismo año, la Dieta de la Austria Interior consiguió amplias concesiones religiosas de su soberano, el archiduque Carlos, a cambio del voto de los impuestos para financiar una defensa permanente en la frontera húngara. Eran, pues, los vasallos, y no los gobernantes, quienes explotaban la presencia otomana en el extranjero para obtener importantes concesiones en el interior. Como observó amargamente el predicador de la corte al archiduque Carlos: «la amenaza turca es una bendición para los protestantes: si no fuera por ella, podríamos tratar con ellos de una forma muy diferente».[6] Las Dietas victoriosas continuaron obteniendo ventajas, creando escuelas en las ciudades más importantes y una comisión permanente para supervisar los temas religiosos. Los austriacos parecían decididos a crear una Iglesia territorial en la línea de los estados del norte de Alemania como Mecklemburgo o Sajonia.

Pero había una diferencia fundamental entre los estados del norte de Alemania y Austria, pues en ésta el príncipe no era protestante. Todo el proceso de conseguir garantías y construir una *Landeskirche* era, en realidad, artificial. En efecto, perdía toda su fuerza ante un principio fundamental en el gobierno de los estados modernos, según el cual cada soberano secular determinaba por completo el credo de sus súbditos; en consecuencia, sólo podía desembocar en un conflicto. En 1579, los archiduques del Tirol y Estiria celebraron una reunión secreta en Munich con el duque de Baviera en la que se decidió no hacer más concesiones a los credos reformados, sino restablecer el monopolio del catolicismo, «no con ruido y con furia, sino de forma lenta y subrepticia; ... no con palabras sino con hechos».[7] Esto fue más fácil en los remotos ducados Habsburgo, pues la Reforma había penetrado en ellos menos profundamente y no todos los nobles eran protestantes.[8] Este primer empuje de la Contrarreforma se vio inte-

6. Citado por Schulze, *Landesdefension und Staatsbildung*, p. 70, n. 119. Franzl, *Ferdinand II*, p. 17, da una versión ligeramente distinta. Tal vez, el predicador exageraba; de hecho, la imposición permanente del *Türkensteuer* en el siglo XVI permitió a muchos otros príncipes conseguir una cierta independencia económica respecto a sus estados.

7. Citado por Schulze, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

8. Información procedente de A. Posch, «Aus dem kirchlichen Visitationsbericht 1617», en Novotny y Sutter, eds., *Innerösterreich, 1564-1619*, pp. 197-232, en p. 229; y Reingrabner, *Geschichte des Protestantismus*, p. 3. No hubo imprenta

rrumpido por la muerte del archiduque Carlos de Estiria en 1590, y la del archiduque del Tirol poco después, pero todo el mundo comprendió que se trataba tan sólo de una tregua. Cuando el hijo de Carlos, Fernando II, que contaba a la sazón 17 años, regresó a Estiria en 1595, después de ser educado durante cinco años por los jesuitas en la Universidad de Ingolstadt en Baviera, sus consejeros le entregaron un documento que llevaba por título «Una consideración sobre la forma en que puede ser restaurado el catolicismo». En 1598, visitó Italia de incógnito y fue recibido en audiencia por el papa, a quien, sin duda, explicó su plan, ya que en cuanto regresó a Estiria ordenó que salieran de sus territorios todo el clero y los maestros protestantes. En 1599 una «Comisión de Reforma» especial comenzó a clausurar los establecimientos luteranos en el ducado (casi 70 fueron clausurados en el plazo de 9 meses) y a destruir todos los libros prohibidos (sólo en Graz fueron quemados 10.000 volúmenes en una gran hoguera). En 1600, destacados protestantes, junto con sus familias, entre ellos el matemático y maestro de Graz Johannes Kepler, fueron obligados a marcharse. Tal vez unas 2.500 personas fueron exiliadas. Tras este éxito, el archiduque y su Comisión de Reforma dirigieron su atención a Carintia y Carniola. Aunque un obispo temeroso predijo que estallaría una rebelión «a escala holandesa», el archiduque sabía que el miedo a que permitiera la entrada de los turcos (que acababan de capturar Canissa, situada tan sólo a 250 km de Graz) y la renuencia de los luteranos a oponerse a un príncipe legítimo, le daban una ventaja decisiva. Así, Fernando II había proseguido con extraordinario éxito la política de su abuelo de divide y gobierna.[9]

También en la Baja Austria se tomaron algunas medidas similares. En 1578, Rodolfo II, que vivía a la sazón en Viena, ordenó la clausura de todas las instituciones protestantes de la capital, entre ellas una notable escuela dirigida por la propia Dieta. Hubo quejas por parte de los nobles protestantes cuando las iglesias y escuelas tuvieron que trasladarse de Viena hasta la cercana ciudad de Horn, pero no hubo mayores problemas. Tampoco se produjo un movimiento de resistencia por parte de los nobles cuando en el decenio de 1590 el gobierno, a petición del obispo Khlesl de Passau (y posteriormente de Viena) comenzó a imponer magistrados católicos en las ciudades del ducado. En parte, esta pasividad fue consecuencia de la revuelta campesina que paralizó gran parte de la Baja Austria en 1595 y 1596 y que sólo gracias a la intervención imperial pudo ser sofocada: la revuelta antiaristocrática había puesto en evidencia hasta qué punto los terratenientes dependían del apoyo del gobierno. La impotencia de los pastores luteranos para poner coto a las agitaciones había demostrado también que el protestantismo no podía garantizar el orden público y, terminada la rebelión, varios grandes terratenientes —entre ellos Karl von Liechtenstein, cabeza visible de una de las familias más antiguas del ducado— abandonaron la religión reformada y se convirtieron al catolicismo.

En muchos otros lugares ocurrió algo parecido: a partir de la década de 1590, una serie de miembros de las grandes familias de todos los territorios Habsburgo comenzaron a abandonar las Iglesias reformadas en favor del catolicismo. Citemos, entre otros, los nombres de Wallenstein y Slavata en Bohemia, Eggenberg y Trauttmannsdorf en Estiria y muchos otros personajes que más tarde alcanzarían relevancia en la Guerra de los Treinta Años. La punta de lanza de la ofensiva católica estaba constituida por los colegios dirigidos por los jesuitas, de los cuales había cuatro en los territorios habsburgueses en 1561 y alrededor de 50 hacia 1650, con 870 hermanos de la Compañía. Guillermo Lamormaini, jesuita y confesor del emperador Fernando II, no hacía gala de un excesivo celo patriótico cuando más tarde afirmó que «si no hubieran existido escuelas de la Compañía, que se fundaron gracias al prudente designio de los emperadores y archiduques en Viena, Praga, Graz, Olomouc y en otros lugares en Alemania, apenas habría quedado vestigio alguno de la religión católica». En verdad, a partir de 1580 el catolicismo de los territorios Habsburgo llevó el sello de la fe firme, intransigente y legalista de los jesuitas.[10] A medida que la muerte fue haciendo desaparecer a los representantes de la generación anterior, más tolerantes, las posturas religiosas se hicieron cada vez más agresivas. Tal vez, la síntesis manierista-humanística, con su defensa de la vieja unidad de la cristiandad, tenía todavía seguidores, pero muchos de ellos eran individuos de escasa entidad, fugitivos del fanatismo que reinaba en otras partes. Los territorios Habsburgo de

en Innsbruck hasta 1558 y en Graz hasta 1559, lo cual impidió la difusión del protestantismo. En cambio, en 1521 ya se habían impreso en Viena 17 tratados luteranos.

9. Véase Evans, *Making of the Habsburg Monarchy*, p. 45.

10. Citado por Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, pp. 133-134.

la Europa central les habían parecido su único refugio; pero ahora también éstos estaban amenazados.[11]

Estos acontecimientos, aparentes para todo el mundo, deberían haber alarmado a los súbditos protestantes de los Habsburgo, pero no fue así. Los protestantes de Bohemia y Hungría se sentían especialmente seguros, pues ambos reinos poseían sólidas garantías constitucionales contra el absolutismo real —la Bula de Oro (1222) concedía amplios derechos a los súbditos— y ambos reinos tenían una larga tradición de resistencia triunfante a los abusos monárquicos (la rebelión husita de 1418-1436 había puesto fin a todos los intentos de represión del emperador y el papado). Además, en ambos reinos sus gobernantes eran elegidos, y habitualmente se arrancaban concesiones de los candidatos antes de la coronación. Pero la difusión de la Reforma en la Europa central debilitó las defensas de esos vasallos bien protegidos. Es cierto que en las tres Iglesias no católicas más importantes de Bohemia —luteranos, husitas y hermanos bohemios (el ala radical del movimiento husita)— adoptaron un credo común en 1565, la *Confessio Bohemica*, y obligaron a Rodolfo III a garantizarles la tolerancia oficial a cambio de su elección como rey; pero sus promesas fueron tan sólo verbales y tibias. Casi de forma inmediata, Rodolfo rompió el compromiso ordenando la expulsión de los hermanos bohemios (aunque no pudo llevarse a efecto hasta 1602 por falta de recursos). En Hungría, la situación era todavía más incierta, pues los credos más importantes —calvinistas, luteranos y socinianos— no consiguieron ponerse de acuerdo para realizar una declaración común de fe.

La precaria posición del protestantismo en ambos reinos bajo el dominio Habsburgo quedó de manifiesto durante la «larga guerra turca» (1593-1606) entre Rodolfo II y el sultán. Aunque los turcos obtuvieron diversas victorias en los primeros años de la guerra, los vasallos cristianos del sultán en los Balcanes —los príncipes de Transilvania, Valaquia y Moldavia— se rebelaron contra él en 1597 haciendo causa común con el emperador. Los Balcanes podrían haber sido liberados si Rodolfo no hubiera decidido aprovechar la oportunidad para anexionarse Transilvania y explotar la presencia de sus ejércitos en ese territorio y en Hungría para restaurar la supremacía de la Iglesia católica. A partir de 1602, una serie de tribunales especiales complementaron la acción de las tropas, confiscando las tierras de los nobles protestantes (y procesando a varios de ellos por traición), expulsando a los vasallos protestantes y dedicando las iglesias protestantes a la práctica del culto católico. En 1604, el gobierno Habsburgo declaró que las Dietas locales no podrían discutir en adelante asuntos religiosos y ordenó la imposición de medidas rigurosas contra la herejía.

11. Véase Evans, *Rudolf II*, pp. 41-42, y *Habsburg Monarchy*, pp. 39-40, para un análisis más exhaustivo de estos aspectos.

Estas iniciativas eran realmente disparatadas pues, a diferencia de lo que ocurría en Estiria, apenas quedaban católicos en Hungría y Transilvania. En 1606, los agentes papales sólo pudieron encontrar 300 eclesiásticos católicos en Hungría, la mayor parte de ellos en la provincia meridional de Croacia, en la frontera con la Austria Interior; en Transilvania había menos de 30 y ni un solo prelado húngaro había visitado Roma desde 1553.[12] Los católicos apenas controlaban alguna ciudad y prácticamente no existían nobles católicos. Así pues, cuando en 1605 el ejército imperial fue obligado a avanzar hacia el sur para hacer frente a un gran ataque turco, no quedó nadie que pudiera evitar la rebelión de los protestantes de Hungría y Transilvania, conducidos por los calvinistas Esteban Bocskay y Bethlen Gabor. Cuando la Dieta húngara hubo aprobado su revuelta, las fuerzas de Bocskay invadieron Moravia.

Comenzó a parecer evidente que la casa de Habsburgo estaba a punto de perder su dominio sobre los reinos adquiridos en 1526. Sin embargo, el jefe de la familia, Rodolfo, cuya imprudente política había desatado la tormenta, se mostró impertérrito ante el peligro y se recluyó en sí mismo más que nunca. Raras veces abandonaba el Hradschin, el gran palacio situado sobre la «ciudad nueva» de Praga, en el que vivía desde 1581. Los parientes más próximos de Rodolfo, temerosos de que no pudiera superar por más tiempo los peligros que se cernían sobre el Imperio y la dinastía, celebraron una reunión secreta en Linz en abril de 1605 para decidir las medidas a tomar. Pidieron al hermano mayor del emperador, el archiduque Matías, que se hiciera cargo de todos los asuntos y le instaron para que firmara la paz con Bocskay y los turcos; a cambio, le prometieron apoyar su candidatura para suceder a Rodolfo como rey de Bohemia y Hungría.[13] Todo

12. Evans, *Habsburg Monarchy*, p. 18; K. Benda, «Hungary in turmoil, 1580-1620», *European Studies Review*, VIII (1978), pp. 281-304, en p. 295.

13. Para más detalle, véase Sturmberger, «Bruderzwist». Los archiduques se habían reunido ya en 1600, en Schottwein, para discutir la alarmante incompetencia de Rodolfo: véase K. Vocelka, *Die Politische Propaganda Kaiser Rudolfs II*

fue bien en un principio: un ejército leal, rápidamente reclutado y del que formaban parte personajes tan importantes para los acontecimientos futuros como el conde Thurn y el joven Wallenstein, consiguió rechazar a Bocskay y permitió a Matías concluir un alto el fuego en enero de 1606. En el mes de junio, el archiduque reconoció a Bocskay como príncipe de Transilvania por la paz de Viena, le cedió ocho condados de la Hungría real y prometió la libertad religiosa total a los protestantes del reino (aunque también ofreció protección a la Iglesia católica). En noviembre, gracias en parte a los buenos oficios de Bocskay, Matías concluyó también un tratado bastante favorable con los turcos en Zsitva Torok, lo que llevó la paz a la frontera turca durante muchos decenios, gracias a la renovación frecuente del tratado.[14]

Sin embargo, Rodolfo no se mostró satisfecho con la marcha de los acontecimientos. Indeciso e incierto, el emperador aceptó las sugerencias de algunos católicos en el sentido de que los males que devastaban Bohemia, hasta el punto de expulsarle a él mismo de su amado Hradschin, eran un castigo de Dios por la tolerancia otorgada a los protestantes. Aunque firmó la paz de Viena, afirmó que había dado su consentimiento bajo extorsión y luchó para impedir que se realizaran las concesiones. En 1607 hizo pública una «lista de agravios», criticando la administración de su hermano en Austria y Hungría, su dirección de la guerra y sus concesiones tanto a los turcos como a los rebeldes.[15]

Como consecuencia, la Dieta húngara y el archiduque se vieron casi obligados, para su propia defensa, a concluir una embarazosa alianza: la primera podía ofrecer el reconocimiento de Matías como rey a cambio de una sólida garantía de que se mantendría la paz de Viena; por su parte, el segundo podía explotar el deseo de los húngaros de alcanzar una seguridad constitucional para conseguir el reconocimiento de sus pretensiones al trono. El pacto fue sellado en una reunión de la Dieta húngara en Bratislava a comienzos de 1608 y Matías trató, entonces, de conseguir un reconocimiento similar de los otros territorios Habsburgo. No encontró dificultad alguna en sus provincias de la Alta y la Baja Austria, pues una delegación de su Dieta se hallaba ya en Bratislava, encabezada por Jorge Erasmo Tschernembl, un noble calvinista que había recibido parte de su educación en Occidente (y cuya biblioteca de casi 1.900 volúmenes incluía muchas obras protestantes y un tratado manuscrito escrito por él mismo referente a los derechos del súbdito a resistirse a su soberano).[16] En febrero, los líderes austriacos, la Dieta húngara y el archiduque firmaron una alianza para asegurar el cumplimiento del tratado de Viena. Moravia no tardó en unirse a este pacto y en el mes de mayo Matías se dirigió hacia Praga al frente de un pequeño ejército reclutado por los confederados. Sin embargo, Rodolfo siguió negándose a reconocer los nuevos títulos de su hermano. Sólo en junio de 1608 capituló el emperador cuando Matías y su ejército se hallaban a escasos kilómetros de Praga.

Ahora bien, la Dieta había saboreado los dulces frutos del chantaje e incrementó cínicamente sus exigencias. La Dieta de la Alta Austria, encabezada por Tschernembl, exigió de pronto a Matías la libertad religiosa total para las ciudades y para los nobles y la igualdad de trato con los católicos, a cambio de la coronación. Ante la negativa del archiduque, los miembros protestantes de la Dieta concertaron una alianza con sus correligionarios de la Baja Austria, comprometiéndose a movilizar tropas para asegurarse la obtención de estas nuevas concesiones. En marzo de 1609, y dado que Rodolfo se mantenía en una postura intransigente, Matías se vio obligado a aceptar las condi-

(1576-1612), Viena, 1981, pp. 311-316. Se ha dicho que el emperador intentó suicidarse en 1600; desde luego, su comportamiento se hizo más extraño a partir de ese año (véase Evans, *Rudolf II*, p. 63; y, sobre la personalidad de Rodolfo en general, todo el capítulo 2).

14. El tratado fue renovado en cinco ocasiones entre 1615 y 1628. Véase K. Teply, *Die Kaiserliche Grossbotschaft an Sultan Murad IV. 1628. Des Freiherrn Hans Ludwig von Kuefsteins Fahrt zur hohen Pforte*, Viena, s.a. Véase también Heinisch, «Habsburg, die Pforte und der Böhmische Aufstand, 1618-20», *passim*.

15. Vocelka, *Politische Propaganda*, pp. 311-312 y 314, cita y analiza la *Liste von Gravamina*. El original se halla en Viena, Haus-, Hofund Staatsarchiv, *Familienakten*, fasc. 1.

16. Hay una biografía bastante floja, pero muy completa, de este personaje crucial, de H. Sturmberger, *Georg Erasmus Tschernembl: Religion, Libertät und Widerstand. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Gegenreformation und des Landes ob der Enns*, Linz, 1953. Desde entonces no se han publicado muchos trabajos sobre la figura de Tschernembl, pero hay una interesante descripción de su biblioteca en *Der oberösterreichische Bauernkrieg 1626*, pp. 137-143. La lista de sus libros, realizada por los jesuitas de Linz que los consiguieron, incluía 1.897 títulos (248 de ellos duplicados). Había obras de Calvino, Duplessis-Mornay, François Hotman, Lutero, Maquiavelo y Peter Ramus. Su tratado sobre la resistencia fue escrito aproximadamente en 1600. Tschernembl poseía también una edición de 1612 del Atlas de Mercator.

ciones y a confirmar los privilegios religiosos de los austriacos para ser reconocido como archiduque reinante.

Sólo Bohemia, Silesia y Lusacia permanecían todavía bajo el control directo de Rodolfo. Los acontecimientos de 1597-1604 habían puesto de relieve la conveniencia de confirmar sus privilegios religiosos y en enero de 1609 la Dieta del reino se reunió en Praga para conseguirlo. Pero la respuesta de Rodolfo fue una rotunda negativa. En mayo, la Dieta creó un organismo ejecutivo formado por treinta «Directores» y autorizó el reclutamiento de 4.500 soldados, obligando al emperador a firmar, el 9 de julio de 1609, la famosa «Carta de Majestad» que daba fuerza oficial y legal al derecho de todos los bohemios a elegir la fe católica o cualquier otra de las que estaban comprendidas en la Confesión de 1575. Los nobles y las ciudades podían construir escuelas e iglesias protestantes e incluso podían contar con una iglesia o cementerio en los territorios del dominio real, si aún no existían. Se mantenía todavía una ambigüedad, probablemente no percibida por los contemporáneos: no se mencionaban los derechos legales de los protestantes que vivían en los territorios eclesiásticos. Probablemente, la Dieta asumió que serían incluidos en las provisiones para el dominio real, aunque posteriormente el gobierno negaría este extremo. Pero era sólo una cuestión secundaria si se tenían en cuenta las grandes ventajas obtenidas. Rodolfo aceptó incluso la existencia de una comisión permanente de la Dieta, cuyos miembros recibirían el nombre de «defensores», y que se responsabilizaría del cumplimiento de los acuerdos. En 1611, estos hombres se prepararon para actuar cuando Rodolfo permitió inexplicablemente que su primo Leopoldo (hermano de Fernando de Estiria) invadiera Bohemia con unos 7.000 soldados. Si creía que podría amedrentar a la Dieta estaba totalmente equivocado, pues un importante ejército bohemio rechazó a los hombres de Leopoldo en las afueras de Praga y los defensores acudieron a Matías para que se hiciera cargo del gobierno de su reino. Rodolfo, encerrado en su palacio, solo y probablemente loco, fue depuesto; y en el mes de mayo de 1611 Matías fue coronado como rey de Bohemia después de confirmar la Carta de Majestad. Nunca había parecido tan grande el poder de la Dieta en las tierras de los Habsburgo. Y, sin embargo, habría de ser un poder inestable: los defensores sólo esperaban la oportunidad de conseguir nuevas ventajas, mientras, por su parte, Matías (según admitió él mismo) estaba igualmente decidido a revocar lo que había concedido.

No resulta fácil para el historiador situar estos acontecimientos tumultuosos en su auténtica perspectiva. Las ventajas obtenidas por la Dieta a raíz de la rebelión bohemia de 1618 parecen haber estado amenazadas desde el principio; pero no ocurrió otra cosa con la mayor parte de las grandes concesiones políticas de la historia europea, cuando se contemplan tan sólo algunos años después. Incluso la Carta Magna inglesa, que en el siglo XVII era reconocida por todos como la piedra angular de la Constitución, se había visto sometida a violaciones e intentos de revocación durante un siglo después que los barones la obtuvieran del rey Juan en Runnymede, en 1215. Conseguir que la Carta de Majestad de Bohemia fuera de igual forma inmutable y respetable era tan sólo cuestión de tiempo. Pero, como todo el mundo aceptaba, el tiempo se acababa rápidamente.

II. Alemania antes del estallido de la guerra

> Grande es mi temor de que los estados del Imperio, al luchar entre sí en un terrible enfrentamiento, puedan iniciar una conflagración fatal que afecte no sólo a ellos ... sino a todos los países que de una u otra forma están relacionados con Alemania. Sin duda, esto tendrá unas consecuencias sumamente peligrosas, produciendo el colapso total y la inevitable alteración de la situación actual de Alemania. Posiblemente, afectará también a otros estados.[17]

Este pronóstico pesimista que Mauricio, landgrave de Hesse-Kassel, comunicó al gobierno francés en 1615, habría parecido ajustado a la mayor parte de sus contemporáneos. Existía la convicción generalizada, tanto dentro como fuera de los territorios del Sacro Imperio, de que era inminente una nueva guerra europea. Por toda Alemania, los gobiernos habían comenzado a hacer fuertes gastos en materia de defensa. Los viajeros procedentes de la República de Holanda durante el segundo decenio del siglo observaban el contraste entre los Países Ba-

17. Mauricio de Hesse-Kassel a Luis XIII, 23 de marzo de 1615, citado por A. D. Lublinskaya, *Frantsiya v nachale XVII veka*, Leningrado, 1959, p. 186. Lamentablemente, no hay otra edición de esta importante obra. Aunque hace años se hizo una traducción inglesa de esta obra a cargo de Brian Pierce, todavía no ha sido publicada.

jos, donde las tropas raramente se veían, y el Imperio, donde cada potentado parecía jactarse de poseer un ejército privado, ostentoso en su indumentaria y omnipresente. Incluso el landgrave Mauricio, mecenas de intelectuales (muchos de ellos establecidos anteriormente en la corte de Rodolfo II en Praga), músicos (entre ellos el joven Heinrich Schütz) y del teatro, creó en 1600 una nueva milicia de unos 9.000 hombres. Al año siguiente, redactó de su propia mano unas instrucciones de 288 páginas sobre la forma en que debería ser utilizado en caso de urgencia, y a no tardar lo utilizó para invadir y anexionarse Hesse-Marburgo (véase *infra*, p. 46). En 1618 creó una «academia militar» especial para entrenar oficiales para sus regimientos.[18]

Algunos gobernantes intentaron mejorar las defensas por otros procedimientos. Así, aunque el gobierno de la Prusia ducal no consiguió persuadir a la Dieta local de que financiara un ejército, en 1601 se votaron impuestos para erigir nuevas fortificaciones en los puertos de Pillau y Memel y para destinar dos barcos de guerra a patrullar las aguas del Báltico. Los electores de Sajonia crearon un arsenal en Dresde que, además de ser una maravilla arquitectónica, contenía suficientes pertrechos militares para equipar un ejército de 10.000 hombres (cuando menos eso se decía).[19] A partir del año 1600 se aceleró el ritmo en los gastos de defensa. El elector palatino ordenó la construc-

18. Sobre Mauricio y su mundo, véase E. van den Boogaart, ed., *Johan Maurits van Nassau-Siegen, 1604-1679. A humanist prince in Europe and Brazil*, La Haya, 1979, pp. 17-38. Sobre la milicia de Mauricio, véase: G. Thies, *Territorialstaat und Landesverteidigung. Das Landesdefensionswerk in Hessen-Kassel unter Landgraf Moritz, 1592-1627*, Darmstadt, 1973: Quellen und Forschungen zur hessischen Geschichte, XXV.

19. Los detalles proceden de J. Petersohn, «Die Landesdefension in Herzogtum Preussen zu Beginn des 17. Jahrhunderts», *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung*, X (1961), pp. 226-237; G. Oestreich, *Geist und Gestalt des frühmodernen Staates*, Berlín, 1969, notable colección de ensayos, pp. 1-79 y 300-355; y R. Naumann, *Das Kursächsiche Defensionswerk (1613-1709)*, Leipzig, 1917. Había dos arsenales en Dresde, capital de la Sajonia Electoral: uno para el ejército, en el Albertinum, cuyo contenido se ha dispersado; el segundo, en el Johanneum, contenía objetos de gran valor para el elector y sus cortesanos. El inventario del segundo, fechado en 1606 y con 1.500 páginas manuscritas, indica la importancia de la colección incluso en ese momento; en la actualidad incluye unos 10.000 objetos de la primera Edad Moderna: 1.400 pistolas, 1.600 armas largas y 2.200 espadas y dagas, así como armaduras para los caballos y los soldados y todos los arreos. La principal aportación de Juan Jorge I a la colección durante su largo reinado (1611-1656) fue, como no podía ser de otra forma en el caso del principal cazador imperial, una gran colección de equipo de caza.

ción de unas costosas murallas, con bastiones y fosos, en torno a Frankental y Heidelberg y en 1606 creó en Mannheim una ciudad-fortaleza que, con su ciudadela y su conjunto de murallas en forma de estrella, pretendía ser inexpugnable.[20] Entre 1603 y 1618, la ciudad de Hanau, aliada del Palatinado y gobernada por un conde calvinista, se dotó también de una red defensiva totalmente nueva. Las potencias católicas de Renania, que se sentían amenazadas, no tardaron en realizar también sus preparativos defensivos. El elector de Tréveris fortificó Ehrenbreitstein, que dominaba la ciudad de Coblenza en la confluencia del Rin y el Mosela; Felipe Cristóbal von Sötern, obispo de Speyer, construyó la gran fortaleza de Philippsburg en Udenheim, sobre el Rin, al sur del Palatinado (1615-1623). Entre 1598 y 1618, los señores de Alsacia construyeron nuevas murallas en Benfeld, Breisach y Hagenau, mientras que el duque de Baviera añadió nuevas fortificaciones en torno a Munich, Ingolstadt, Rain y algunas ciudades fronterizas, con un coste total de casi un millón de táleros.[21] No hay que subestimar la importancia de estas empresas: se utilizaban millones de ladrillos para construir muros de hasta 13 metros de ancho, 10 de altura y varios kilómetros de longitud. Cuando el poeta, humorista y viajero inglés John Taylor visitó Hamburgo en 1617 se sorprendió al ver el enorme

20. P. Charpentrat, «Les villes, le mécénat princier et l'image de la ville idéale dans l'Allemagne de la fin du XVIe et du XVIIe siècles: l'exemple du Palatinat-Heidelberg et Mannheim», en P. Francastel, ed., *L'urbanisme de Paris et l'Europe 1600-1680*, París, 1969, pp. 267-274 y lám. 146. Véase también K. Wolf, «Von der Einführung der allgemeinen Wehrpflicht in Kurpfalz um 1600», *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins*, LXXXIX (1936-1937), pp. 638-704.

21. En la actualidad, no se conserva ninguna de estas obras maestras de la arquitectura barroca militar: Hanau es prácticamente un barrio de Frankfurt; Ehrenbreitstein, completamente reconstruida en el siglo XIX por el gobierno prusiano, es hoy en día el Monumento Nacional al ejército alemán. Philippsburg, cuyas fortificaciones han sido destruidas, ha sido abandonada incluso por el Rin, que fluye a un kilómetro y medio de distancia hacia el oeste. Todo lo que queda de la gran fortaleza es el nombre de algunas calles, el foso que defendía un bastión, la espada ceremonial utilizada por el obispo Sötern para remover el primer césped de su orgullosa ciudadela (en el museo de la ciudad) y algunas páginas de la novela de Grimmelshausen, *Simplicissimus* (por cuanto el héroe estuvo alojado allí durante algún tiempo en el decenio de 1630). Sólo Breisach, gracias a su extraordinaria situación natural en un saliente rocoso sobre el Rin, conserva la misma apariencia que en el siglo XVII, aunque la mayor parte de las defensas que se pueden contemplar en la actualidad datan del período de la ocupación francesa en los reinados de Luis XIV y Luis XV.

ejército de artesanos que trabajaba en las murallas. «Y cuando vi esas fortificaciones quedé atónito, pues es casi increíble el número de hombres y caballos que trabajaba en ellas cada día; además, la obra en sí es tan impresionante que supera cuanto se pueda contar.»[22] Ciertamente, en el verano de 1617 se vivía en una atmósfera de guerra.

Por otra parte, no hay que exagerar el ambiente de pesimismo y destrucción inminente. El año 1617 contempló el cese de las hostilidades en Francia, Rusia e Italia. El embajador inglés en Turín, doctor Isaac Wake, se vio impulsado a resaltar que se habían cerrado «las puertas de Jano», con la promesa de «días tranquilos y felices no sólo para los habitantes de esta provincia de Italia, sino para la mayor parte de la Cristiandad».[23] Aunque la fortificación y militarización de Alemania fue causa de que la guerra se prolongara durante más tiempo una vez que hubo comenzado, no fue el motivo de su estallido. Cuando Thomas Coryat, otro humorista itinerante inglés, viajó a Venecia en 1608, caminó solo la mayor parte del camino desde Basilea hasta Maguncia y sólo en una ocasión encontró tropas en el camino; tampoco tuvo ningún encuentro desagradable con ladrones o bandoleros. Por contra, en sus escritos alaba con frecuencia el orden, la prosperidad y la paz que reinaban en el valle del alto Rin, donde el pan y las verduras eran tan baratas que se podía consumir una comida alimenticia por un cuarto de penique y comprar el trigo necesario para todo un año por dos libras. Sin embargo, Coryat consideró prudente navegar por el Rin a partir de Maguncia en una barcaza de pasajeros porque los caminos de esa zona tenían fama de estar infestados de proscritos. Fue ésta una sabia decisión, pues otro viajero inglés de este período, Fynes Morison, se vio obligado a viajar disfrazado a través de Westfalia (en una ocasión oculto en un carro que transportaba mercancías) para escapar de los ladrones.[24] Alemania era el país más

22. John Taylor, *Three weekes, three daies and three houres observations and travel from London to Hamburgh*, Londres, 1617, p. 6. Taylor (1580-1653) escribió ésta y muchas otras obras para mofarse de los relatos de viajes, más serios, de Thomas Coryat y de otros autores. No obstante, realizó estos viajes personalmente. Ese mismo año, efectuó un viaje a pie, patrocinado, desde Londres a las Highlands de Escocia (que narra en su *Penniless Pilgrimage*) y en 1619 hizo andando el camino de ida y vuelta hasta Bohemia (véase *An Englishman's love to Bohemia*).

23. Citado por H. G. R. Reade, *Sidelights on the Thirty Years' War*, I, Londres, 1924, p. 183.

24. Thomas Coryat, *Coryat's Crudities, hastily gobled up in five moneths travells... newly digested... and now dispersed to the nourishment of the travelling members of this kingdom*, Londres, 1611, pp. 443-628, cubre «mis observaciones de algunas partes de la Alta Alemania». John Taylor, en su viaje a través del noroeste de Alemania en 1617, advirtió el número de cruces de madera que en los caminos de Westfalia señalaban los lugares donde los viajeros habían sido asesinados por bandoleros (véase *Three weekes*, pp. 36-37). Fynes Morison, *An itinerary*, Londres, 1617, no da tantos detalles sobre lo que vio el viajero, pero en cambio ofrece mucha más información sobre precios, distancias y consejos útiles para los turistas. Los datos que facilita han sido recopilados y confirmados por A. Maczak, *Zhycie codzienne w podrózhach po Europie w XVI i XVII wieku*, Varsovia, 1978, pp. 81-89, y por W. von Hippel, «Bevölkerung und Wirtschaft im Zeitalter des dreissigjährigen Krieges. Das Beispiel Wurttembergs», *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung*, V, 1978, pp. 413-448.

extenso de Europa y no en todas sus partes reinaban las mismas condiciones.

> El viejo y amado Imperio,
> ¿cómo se mantiene unido?

preguntan los bebedores de la taberna en el *Fausto* de Goethe. No es más fácil encontrar hoy la respuesta que a finales del siglo XVIII o a comienzos del siglo XVII. Lo cierto es que Alemania, o «el Sacro Imperio Romano de la nación alemana», si hemos de darle su título de la época, era un territorio con numerosos estados y muchas economías diferentes. Las tierras prósperas del sur —el Palatinado, Alsacia, Baviera, etc.— siempre habían contrastado con los yermos del noroeste, presa habitual de los ejércitos que luchaban en los Países Bajos desgarrados por la guerra. En 1599, toda la infantería española invadió la vecina Westfalia en busca de cuarteles de invierno. Los príncipes locales intentaron organizar su propio ejército para expulsar a los españoles, pero fracasaron totalmente; y, para mayor escarnio, las tropas se amotinaron reclamando su soldada. El coste de ese fracaso fue superior a los 400.000 táleros. Fue ese desastre, más que ninguna otra cosa, lo que originó la creación de ejércitos territoriales separados en los comienzos del siglo XVII, pues para entonces las instituciones supraterritoriales del Imperio habían perdido toda su eficacia.[25]

Los «Círculos» (*Kreise*), responsables desde los albores del siglo XVI de la defensa local, no eran capaces ya de movilizar fuerzas

25. Véase Thies, *Territorialstaat*, pp. 18-19; F. Boersma, «De diplomatieke reis van Daniel van der Meulen en Nicholas Bruyninck naar het Duitse Leger bij Emmerik, Augustus 1599», *Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis van de Nederlanden*, LXXXIV (1969), pp. 24-26.

suficientes para garantizar la seguridad de sus miembros. En este sentido, las tropas que se amotinaron en 1599 fueron reclutadas por el Círculo renano y westfaliano. Los intentos de cooperación entre diversos círculos fueron escasos: las regulaciones de la industria textil, la creación de una moneda común y los controles de cereales acordados en 1564-1572 entre los círculos bávaro, suabo y de Franconia fueron excepcionales y poco duraderos. El principal obstáculo para la cooperación era la extraordinaria fragmentación religiosa y política del sur y oeste de Alemania. Suabia, con una extensión aproximadamente igual a la de la Suiza moderna, tenía 68 señores seculares y 40 señores espirituales y, así mismo, 32 ciudades imperiales libres. Todos ellos estaban representados en la Asamblea del Círculo (*Kreistag*), que se reunía regularmente (64 veces entre 1555 y 1599) y cada uno de ellos era vasallo directo del emperador. Pero su importancia era muy variable, desde el sólido ducado de Württemberg, con una extensión de 9.200 km^2, hasta las tierras de numerosos «caballeros imperiales», que en muchos casos poseían tan sólo una parte de una aldea. Más de la mitad de los miembros del Círculo, y casi exactamente la mitad de su población, eran católicos; el resto eran luteranos o calvinistas. Era ésta la fórmula perfecta para la parálisis y la mayor parte de los círculos del sur y oeste de Alemania se hallaban divididos de igual forma por sus diferencias confesionales y políticas. En el conjunto del Imperio, con una población que hacia 1600 rondaba los 20 millones de habitantes, había alrededor de mil unidades políticas semiautónomas, muchas de ellas muy reducidas. Sin embargo, incluso las más insignificantes defendían tenazmente sus derechos. Los aproximadamente 400 caballeros imperiales estaban organizados en 14 «cantones», cada uno de ellos con un director, un Tesoro y una cancillería; sus asambleas se reunían cuatro o cinco veces al año y a partir de 1590 su autonomía estaba garantizada por una ordenanza imperial especial. En un nivel ligeramente inferior, los 50 o más «condes imperiales» poseían también sus propias organizaciones: tal vez la más importante de éstas, en la región de Wetterau al norte de Frankfurt, estaba dirigida desde 1565 por los condes calvinistas de Nassau (lo que ayuda a explicar su importancia en la política del Imperio). Los condes imperiales tenían garantizados incluso dos escaños en la Dieta imperial.[26]

26. Sobre los Círculos, véase J. A. Vann, *The Swabian Kreis. Institutional growth in the Holy Roman Empire 1648-1715*, Bruselas, 1975; F. Magen, «Die Reichskriese in der Epoche des dreissigjährigen Krieges», *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung*, IX (1982), pp. 409-460; y R. Endres, «Zur Geschichte des fränkischen Reichskreises», *Würzburger Diözesangeschichtsblätter*, XXIX (1968), pp. 168-183. Sobre los caballeros, véase M. J. Le Gates, «The Knights and the problems of political organization in sixteenth-century Germany», *Central European History*, VII (1974), pp. 99-136; y T. J. Glas-Hochstettler, «The Imperial Knights in post-Westphalian Mainz: a case study of corporatism in the Old Reich», *ibid.*, XI (1978), pp. 131-149.

Pero estos potentados menores, aunque insistían en ejercer plenamente sus poderes religiosos, económicos y feudales, tenían un peso específico muy limitado en comparación con los ochos grandes estados del Imperio. A la cabeza se hallaban los electorados de Sajonia, Brandemburgo y Baviera, cada uno de ellos con más de un millón de súbditos; el Palatinado con unos 600.000; y Hesse, Tréveris y Württemberg con 400.000 habitantes cada uno de ellos. Sin embargo, estos grandes estados, algunos de ellos con una extensión y población similares a las de los reinos de Escocia y Suecia, tenían dos grandes desventajas que les impedían alcanzar una situación de predominio en el Imperio. En primer lugar, no todos ellos aceptaban el principio de primogenitura. Hesse, por ejemplo, fue repartido en 1567 entre los cuatro hijos del landgrave Felipe el Magnánimo, protector de Lutero, con la consiguiente pérdida de influencia en los asuntos del Imperio; en segundo lugar, muchos de ellos estaban fragmentados desde el punto de vista geográfico. El Palatinado estaba dividido en cuatro grandes unidades bien diferenciadas: el Alto Palatinado, luterano, que en otro tiempo había formado parte de Baviera, se extendía hasta los límites de Bohemia y aportaba el 40 por 100 de los ingresos del electorado, mientras que el Bajo Palatinado, calvinista, cuyo centro era Heidelberg, se extendía a ambos lados del Rin. Además, otras pequeñas partes del Palatinado, como Zweibrücken y Neoburgo, estaban gobernadas por otras ramas de la dinastía. Dado que los principados más pequeños del Imperio estaban, si cabe, más fragmentados todavía, en ocasiones era difícil para quien viajaba por Alemania saber exactamente dónde estaba. Sólo las fronteras de algunos territorios (como los confines de Lorena, el Palatinado, Hanau y Zweibrücken) estaban señalados por una serie de mojones de delimitación especiales. Más frecuentemente, las fronteras estaban constituidas por puestos aduaneros, tanto en tierra como en los ríos. Por

ejemplo, había 30 estaciones de aduanas en el Elba entre Hamburgo y Praga y 11 en el Rin entre Maguncia y Colonia, cada una de ellas equipada con un pequeño cañón para hundir aquellos barcos que intentaban atravesarlos sin pagar los impuestos.[27]

Por todas estas razones, ningún territorio de Alemania podía hacer frente al poder de los Habsburgo austriacos, que habían monopolizado el título imperial desde 1438. Sin embargo, su base territorial y demográfica era insuficiente para permitir un control absoluto de los destinos de Alemania. A partir de 1601, muchos gobernantes territoriales dejaron de aceptar las decisiones del Tribunal Supremo Imperial (el *Reichskammergericht*) y en 1620 los súbditos de Sajonia, Brandemburgo y Baviera vieron cómo se les prohibía apelar a ese tribunal sin el consentimiento previo de su príncipe. Más grave todavía fue la negativa protagonizada, a partir de 1608, por un grupo importante de príncipes a atender la Dieta imperial. Esta asamblea de todos los gobernantes territoriales de Alemania, o de sus representantes, se había reunido tan sólo seis veces entre 1555 y 1603. Sus miembros, divididos en tres estamentos —electores, príncipes y ciudades— deliberaban por separado las proposiciones que les sometía el emperador, luego deliberaban conjuntamente y, por último, ofrecían una respuesta. En una Dieta de duración prolongada, podía haber más de cien sesiones y unas veinte conferencias conjuntas. El elevado número de participantes semiautónomos producía considerables demoras: aunque había tan sólo siete electores (incluido el propio emperador como rey de Bohemia), unos 150 territorios estaban representados en el estamento de los príncipes y 52 miembros en el de las ciudades. En último extremo, todas las decisiones se basaban en el consenso, y por tanto, en el compromiso. Fue debido a la imposibilidad de alcanzar esos compromisos en determinadas cuestiones clave, sobre todo respecto a la igualdad religiosa para los protestantes

27. H. Hiegel, *Le baillage d'Allemagne de 1600 à 1632. L'administration, la justice, les finances et l'organisation militaire*, Saarguemines, 1961, pp. 148-150: entre 1605 y 1608 se levantaron más de 200 mojones, cada uno de ellos de un metro y medio de altura y con las armas de Lorena; otros mojones se habían erigido en 1602-1604 por orden de Federico del Palatinado. Los derechos de aduana que se cobraban en el Elba en el decenio de 1670 figuran en el mapa de K. Blaschke, «Elbschiffahrt und Elbzölle im 17. Jahrhundert», *Hansische Geschichtsblätter*, LXXXII (1964), pp. 42-54, en p. 48. Sobre los peajes del Rin, véase Coryat, *Coryat's crudities*, pp. 569 ss.

y católicos en el seno de las instituciones imperiales, por lo que en 1608 la Dieta cesó en sus funciones. Sólo se reunió una vez más entre esa fecha y 1640 —en agosto de 1613 en Ratisbona— y muchos protestantes boicotearon incluso esa convocatoria.[28]

La parálisis de las instituciones imperiales fundamentales —los Círculos, el Tribunal Supremo y la Dieta— en esa época fue especialmente desafortunada porque el Imperio se veía enfrentado a una serie de graves problemas. Tal vez el más importante de todos fue la guerra que Rodolfo II tuvo que librar con los turcos entre 1593 y 1606: sin la reunión de la Dieta no podía conseguir los impuestos necesarios para pagar sus ejércitos en Hungría. La dependencia de Rodolfo de las contribuciones alemanas se hace patente cuando contrastamos sus peticiones de *römermonate* (el impuesto básico votado por la Dieta) con las de su tío abuelo, Carlos V (emperador de 1519 a 1558): mientras que Carlos sólo había solicitado 73,5 *römermonate*, Rodolfo solicitó 409 únicamente para luchar contra los turcos. Fue imposible encontrar el dinero y todavía en 1619 los atrasos impagados de esos impuestos de guerra ascendían a casi 4 millones de táleros.[29]

Pero el impago de los impuestos no era consecuencia únicamente de un conflicto institucional: muchas zonas de Alemania sufrían los efectos de una grave recesión económica. El rápido y prolongado crecimiento demográfico que experimentó Alemania (junto con el resto de Europa) durante el siglo XVI provocó numerosas dificultades. Por una parte, se había destinado para el cultivo toda la tierra disponi-

28. Una excelente descripción de la composición de la Dieta en esta época se encontrará en Bierther, *Der Regensburger Reichstag von 1640/1641*, pp. 48-57. Véanse también los estudios, más generales, de H. Weber, «Empereur, Electeurs et Diète de 1500 à 1650», *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, LXXXIX (1975), pp. 281-297; G. Buchda, «Reichsstände und Landstände in Deutschland im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert», *Standen en Landen*, XXXVI (1965), pp. 193-226; y K. O. Freiherr von Aretin, *Heiliges Römisches Reich 1776-1806. Reichsverfassung und Staatssouveränität, I*, Wiesbaden, 1967, pp. 1-110 (que examina las instituciones del Imperio durante los siglos XVII y XVIII).

29. W. Schulze ha puesto de relieve en dos artículos recientes que los problemas financieros de los príncipes alemanes eran más graves de lo que se pensaba anteriormente: «Reichstage und Reichssteuern im späten 16. Jahrhundert», *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung*, II (1975), pp. 43-58; y «Die Erträge der Reichssteuern zwischen 1576 und 1606», *Jahrbuch für die Geschichte Mittel- und Ostdeutschlands*, XXVII (1978), pp. 169-185: Véase también Petersen, «From domain state to tax state».

ble, disminuyendo así las tierras destinadas a la ganadería y a los cultivos industriales; por otra parte, la extraordinaria elevación de los precios de los productos alimenticios durante el decenio de 1590 provocó el hundimiento del mercado de los productos manufacturados, dado que muchos consumidores no tenían dinero para comprar otra cosa que no fuera pan. Después de esta crisis, la recuperación fue extraordinariamente lenta. Muchas ciudades, especialmente en el sudoeste de Alemania, experimentaron una caída en la producción industrial (los empresarios se dedicaron cada vez más a buscar la mano de obra rural, más barata). Muchas otras ciudades arrastraban pesadas deudas, ya fuera por la reducción de los ingresos como consecuencia de la crisis económica o por el incremento de los gastos debido a la construcción de nuevas defensas o nuevos servicios ciudadanos. Por otra parte, prácticamente todas las ciudades —tanto las imperiales como las territoriales— sufrieron una creciente interferencia de los príncipes vecinos en los aspectos sociales, políticos y religiosos.[30] Lo que los estados territoriales buscaban en las ciudades era sobre todo dinero. Muy pocos gobernantes alemanes eran solventes en los años del cambio de siglo. El emperador Matías debía casi 30 millones de táleros en el momento de su acceso al trono en 1612, mientras que el elector de Brandemburgo tenía una deuda de 18 millones, el elector de Sajonia de más de 3 millones y el elector del Palatinado de más de 2 millones. No fue una simple coincidencia el hecho de que durante este período se generalizaran los libros de «economía doméstica», en los que se aconsejaba a los príncipes sobre la mejor manera de ajustar los gastos a sus posibilidades.[31]

Las dificultades económicas fueron causa de que los gobernantes tuvieran conflictos con sus Dietas, cuyo consentimiento (prácticamente en todos los territorios) era necesario para la recaudación de

30. Véanse estimaciones de la población de Alemania antes de la guerra, en el capítulo de H. Kellenbenz en C. H. Wilson y G. Parker, eds., *Introduction to the Sources of European Economic History 1500-1800*, Londres, 1977, especialmente las pp. 191-196. Un brillante análisis de la crisis de preguerra en Alemania, por H. Schilling, se encontrará en P. Clark, ed., *The European Crisis of the 1590s*, Londres, 1984, pp. 135-156. Debo mostrar mi más sincero agradecimiento al profesor Schilling por permitirme examinar su trabajo antes de ser publicado.

31. E. Klein, *Geschichte der öffentlichen Finanzen in Deutschland 1500-1870*, Wiesbaden, 1974, pp. 8-26. Véase también el capítulo de C. P. Clasen en Trevor-Roper, *Age of Expansion*.

impuestos. La composición de estas asambleas representativas difería de un territorio a otro. Algunas de ellas, sobre todo en el sur de Alemania, incluían a la nobleza, el clero, las ciudades y los campesinos; otras sólo estaban formadas por las ciudades y campesinos, y las de los territorios más pequeños tan sólo por los campesinos. Todas ellas tenían derecho a discutir los problemas legislativos, los impuestos y las declaraciones de guerra. Pero en los territorios más amplios, donde vivía la mayor parte de la población, no existía ese funcionamiento «democrático». En 1598, el duque Maximiliano de Baviera escribió estas palabras en una carta dirigida a su padre, que acababa de abdicar en su favor: «creo que los príncipes sólo son valorados por los poderes espirituales y seculares de acuerdo con la "razón de Estado"; y considero que sólo se respeta a quienes tienen muchas tierras o mucho dinero».[32] Durante su largo reinado, Maximiliano actuó en consecuencia, ayudado de forma sorprendente por su Dieta. El *Landschaft* de Baviera se reunió en 33 ocasiones entre 1514 y 1579, seis veces entre esa fecha y 1612 y no volvió a reunirse de nuevo hasta 1669. En la asamblea de 1612, Maximiliano persuadió a los «representantes del pueblo» para que le concedieran un importante subsidio anual durante siete años (ascendía al doble de los ingresos del elector de Sajonia), le otorgaran el poder de declarar la guerra y firmar la paz a su voluntad y le permitieran recaudar todos los impuestos necesarios en caso de guerra. Este tipo de relaciones entre el príncipe y el Parlamento era muy diferente a las que existían en Inglaterra, Francia o las tierras de los Habsburgo.[33]

Sin duda, la razón fundamental de esa cooperación fue la demostrada habilidad económica de Maximiliano. En 1612 había conseguido reducir a la mitad las deudas heredadas de su padre y posteriormente acumuló con todo cuidado un excedente, de forma que incluso en período de guerra podía financiar su ejército sin recurrir a la

32. De Maximiliano al duque Guillermo, 21 de junio de 1598, citado por H. Dollinger, «Kurfürst Maximilian I. von Bayern und Justus Lipsius. Eine Studie zur Staatstheorie eines frühabsolutistischen Fürsten», *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, XLVI (1964), pp. 227-308.

33. Sobre las asambleas representativas de Baviera, véase Carsten, *Princes and Parliaments*, cap. 5; y K. Bosl, *Die Geschichte der Repräsentation in Bayern. Landständische Bewegung, Ländstandische Verfassung, Landesausschuss und altständische Gesellschaft*, Munich, 1974.

asamblea. Creó también un fondo especial (el *aerarium*) para la defensa activa del catolicismo en el Imperio, cuando quiera que surgiera la necesidad. Estas medidas fueron posibles porque Maximiliano y sus predecesores inmediatos habían eliminado el protestantismo de sus dominios. En el decenio de 1550, los protestantes bávaros intentaron obtener promesas de tolerancia por parte del gobierno, amenazando con que, sin tales garantías, no votarían los impuestos. Se produjo una confrontación sobre este tema en 1563, tras la cual los duques no regatearon esfuerzos para expulsar a todos los protestantes de sus dominios. Una vez que lo hubieron conseguido, las asambleas se mostraron mucho más sumisas.

Idénticos acontecimientos tenían lugar en otros territorios católicos bajo los términos de la «paz religiosa de Augsburgo» (1555), que puso fin de manera temporal a la guerra confesional abierta en Alemania. La paz de Augsburgo creó una estructura de seguridades legales a varios niveles para los habitantes del Imperio. En la cima estaba el derecho de cada gobernante secular territorial, desde los electores hasta los caballeros imperiales, para determinar si la religión de sus súbditos había de ser el catolicismo o el luteranismo (los únicos credos permitidos oficialmente, pues el calvinismo y todos los demás estaban prohibidos). Este principio se conocería más tarde como *cuius regio, eius religio*: que la religión de los súbditos debía ser la misma que la del gobernante territorial y que había que permitir que los súbditos que lo desearan emigraran. Las únicas excepciones a esta regla eran las ciudades imperiales libres y los estados eclesiásticos católicos. En las primeras, la paz garantizaba que en donde existieran grupos luteranos y católicos ambos gozarían de la libertad de culto (de hecho, esto sólo afectaba a 8 de las 60 ciudades libres, porque prácticamente todas las demás eran totalmente luteranas o totalmente católicas). La segunda excepción era mucho más importante, pues se refería a los grandes principados eclesiásticos. Por una parte, decretaba que «las tierras eclesiásticas territoriales» (las que se hallaban bajo la autoridad política de un príncipe o una ciudad territorial) en manos protestantes en 1552 permanecerían en esa condición, pero que no se producirían más secularizaciones. Muy diferente era el destino de las «tierras eclesiásticas imperiales» (las que se hallaban bajo un gobernante eclesiástico —un príncipe-obispo o un príncipe-abad— subordinados políticamente tan sólo al emperador), pues si el principio *cuius regio* se aplicaba en ellas, la elección de un obispo o abad protestante produciría la «protestantización» de todo el territorio. En consecuencia, se acordó que si un príncipe-obispo o un príncipe-abad abrazaban la Reforma deberían dimitir, sustituyéndoles un prelado católico. Lógicamente, los protestantes presentes en Augsburgo no aceptaron esta medida, conocida como el *reservatum ecclesiasticum,* y fue incluida en la paz sólo en virtud de la autoridad imperial, pero no por votación de la Dieta.[34] En consecuencia, podía ser rechazada, como ocurrió, de hecho, en 1583 cuando el arzobispo elector de Colonia abrazó el protestantismo: inmediatamente estalló una guerra, que había de durar cinco años, entre quienes le apoyaban (la joven República de Holanda y el Palatinado entre otros) y su sustituto católico, Ernesto de Baviera (apoyado por Felipe II de España y por el hermano de Ernesto, el duque Guillermo, que contrajo deudas por más de 500.000 táleros en su intento —saldado con éxito— de mantener el principio del *reservatum ecclesiasticum*).[35] Ahora bien, lo cierto es que hubo muy pocos intentos de este tipo de desafiar los términos de la paz de Augsburgo.[36] Más numerosos fueron los conflictos entre gobernantes y súbditos en las tierras eclesiásticas imperiales porque, durante las encendidas discusiones que

34. Sobre la paz de Augsburgo, véase H. Tüchle, «The peace of Augsburg: New Order or lull in the fighting?», en H. J. Cohn, ed., *Government in Reformation Europe 1520-1560*, Londres, 1971, pp. 145-165; T. Klein, «Minorities in Central Europe in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries», en A. C. Hepburn, ed., *Minorities in History*, Historical Studies, XII, Londres, 1979, pp. 31-50; Holborn, *A History of Modern Germany*, pp. 243-246 y los caps. 10 y 11; y Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, pp. 25-26. Agradezco a Fr. Bireley las conversaciones que me permitieron superar algunos de mis errores acerca de la paz.

35. Sobre la guerra de Colonia, véase M. Lossen, *Der Kölnische Krieg*, 2 vols., Munich, 1897; G. von Lojewski, *Bayerns Weg nach Köln. Geschichte der bayerischen Bistumspolitik in der zweiten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts*, Bonner Historische Forschungen, XXI, Bonn, 1962, y D. Albrecht, «Das konfessionelle Zeitalter», en M. Spindler, ed., *Handbuch der bayerischen Geschichte*, II, Munich, 1969, pp. 358-361.

36. La mayor parte de las excepciones afectaban a las ciudades libres imperiales, algunas de las cuales defendieron el *ius reformandi* hasta 1593 y protestantizaron su jerarquía eclesiástica: véase K. von Greyers, *The Late City Reformation in Germany. The case of Colmar 1522-1628*, Wiesbaden, 1980, y H. Schilling, «Burgerkämpfe in Aachen zu Beginn des 17. Jahrhunderts. Konflikte im Rahmen der alteuropäischen Stadtgesellschaft oder im Umkreis der frühbürgerlichen Revolution», *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung*, I, 1974, pp. 175-231. Aparte de Colmar (1575) y Aquisgrán (1581), también Essen (1563), Hagenau (1565) y Aalen (1575) implantaron la Reforma después de la paz de Augsburgo.

precedieron a la paz de Augsburgo, los negociadores Habsburgo habían establecido el principio (la *Declaratio Ferdinandei*) de que si las ciudades o caballeros de un príncipe eclesiástico habían practicado el luteranismo durante algún tiempo, deberían poder seguir practicándolo. Pero esa concesión no se incluyó entre las cláusulas de la paz y permaneció secreta durante casi dos decenios. Cuando finalmente se hizo pública, muchos prelados afirmaron que era falsa y provocaron diversos conflictos con sus asambleas.

No obstante, en un principio los gobernantes católicos parecieron no poder o no querer imponer la uniformidad religiosa en sus dominios e impedir la rápida difusión del calvinismo en el Imperio (a este tema haremos referencia más adelante). Fue sólo a partir de 1580, y contando con el apoyo de Austria y Baviera, cuando los príncipes eclesiásticos, especialmente el abad de Fulda y los obispos de Wurzburgo, Bamberg y Eichstätt, hicieron un esfuerzo serio para poner fin al culto protestante en sus territorios, a pesar de la *Declaratio Ferdinandei*. El progreso fue especialmente rápido tras la guerra de Colonia (1583-1588), que puede ser considerada como un hito decisivo en la lucha entre el protestantismo y el catolicismo en Alemania. Esta guerra constituyó el primer intento con éxito para detener la protestantización de un territorio eclesiástico e hizo salir de la prensa un importante tratado en el que se argumentaba que la causa católica se estaba perdiendo en Alemania por dejadez de los gobernantes y que había que salvarla antes de que fuera demasiado tarde: el anónimo *De autonomia,* escrito en 1580 y publicado (a expensas del duque de Baviera) en 1586.[37] El éxodo de luteranos del *Pfaffengasse* (la avenida de los sacerdotes, como se conocían los territorios eclesiásticos a lo largo del Rin y el Main) se convirtió en una auténtica inundación. En su mayor parte, los exiliados buscaron refugio en un lugar lo más próximo posible a sus lugares de procedencia, donde constituyeron una comunidad de exiliados militante e inquieta: se habían marchado contra su voluntad y soñaban constantemente con vengarse de quienes les habían expulsado. Muchos de ellos, como

37. [Andreas Erstenberger], *De Autonomia, das ist, von Freystellung mehrerlay Religion und Glauben* (escrito hacia 1580; impreso en Munich, en 1586). Véase la erudita discusión de esta obra y su significado en M. Heckel, «*Autonomia und Pacis Compositio*: Der Augsburger Religionsfriede in der Deutung der Gegenreformation», *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Kanonistische Abteilung*, XLV (1959), pp. 141-248.

los exiliados luteranos de Wurzburgo, refugiados en la vecina Ansbach en 1588, cantaban el salmo de amargura «junto a las aguas de Babilonia nos sentamos y lloramos» mientras se dirigían a su nueva casa y suspiraban por regresar a su lugar de origen. Sin embargo, esto no había de resultar fácil, pues Julius Echter von Mespelbrunn, obispo de Wurzburgo de 1573 a 1617, convirtió su territorio en el más claro exponente del triunfo de la Contrarreforma. Su capital fue embellecida y enriquecida con una nueva universidad, un palacio magníficamente restaurado y con numerosas iglesias reconstruidas. Se exhortó a los sacerdotes que poseían concubinas a que las abandonaran y se creó un fondo especial para renovar las iglesias católicas recuperadas a los protestantes (más de 300 iglesias en la diócesis fueron reconstruidas según el «estilo Julius»), para mejorar el nivel del clero y para incrementar sus salarios.[38]

El ímpetu de la Contrarreforma parecía irresistible. La ofensiva católica obtenía su fuerza de la Congregatio Germanica (consejo para los asuntos alemanes) creada en Roma en 1568, y de los seminarios, sínodos y escuelas diocesanas de toda Europa. Igualmente, gracias a la presencia de nuncios vigilantes en el tribunal imperial y en Colonia, y al trabajo de las órdenes religiosas, la ortodoxia tridentina se definía cada vez con mayor claridad y se imponía con creciente rigor. Una gran parte del clero católico más activo era preparado en Roma en el Collegium Germanicum, fundado en 1552.[39]

38. Referencias tomadas de Heiss, «Konfession, Politik und Erziehung»; E. Schubert, «Gegenreformation in Franken», *Jahrbuch für fränkische Landesforschung*, XXVIII (1968), pp. 275-307, y J. Meier, «Die katholische Erneuerung des Würzburger Landskapitels Karlstadt im Spiegel der Landskapitelsversammlungen und Pfarreivisitationen, 1579-1624», *Würzburger Diözesangeschichtsblätter*, XXXIII (1971), pp. 51-125. Los esfuerzos del obispo Julius por acabar con el concubinato no se vieron coronados por el éxito de forma inmediata porque, como afirmó ante su capítulo en 1581, «los campesinos acuden espontáneamente ante los sacerdotes jóvenes y les ofrecen a sus hijas junto con una dote» (p. 80). No ha de sorprender que 26 de los 29 sacerdotes a los que afectó la visita episcopal de 1579 tuvieran una concubina, como ocurría con el 50 por 100 de los que fueron visitados en 1588. Esa práctica del concubinato no se erradicó completamente hasta 1619. Véase también la admirable colección de ensayos, F. Merzbacher, ed., *Julius Echter und seine Zeit*, Wurzburgo, 1973.

39. J. Köhler, *Das Ringen und die tridentische Erneuerung im Bistum Breslau: vom Abschluss des Konzils bis zur Schlacht am Weissen Berg, 1564-1620*, Viena y Colonia, 1973, pp. 155-156. Entre 1564 y 1620, 64 jóvenes del «colegio alemán» fueron a la diócesis de Wroclaw (Breslau), en Silesia.

En su mayor parte, los avances de los católicos se produjeron a expensas de la Iglesia luterana, que desde hacía algún tiempo se veía desgarrada por las diferentes teologías surgidas entre aquellos que deseaban mantener las enseñanzas de Lutero en todos sus aspectos (los «gnesio-luteranos») y los «melanchtonianos», así llamados por el principal representante de este grupo, Felipe Melanchthon, que trataban de imponer algunos cambios. Entre 1537 y 1577 se produjeron diez conflictos importantes entre las dos facciones a propósito de cuestiones doctrinales y una constante disputa sobre aspectos pedagógicos y políticos, pero finalmente los gnesio-luteranos consiguieron que sus opiniones fueran incluidas en la llamada «fórmula de concordancia», elaborada entre 1577 y 1580 por una comisión de clérigos luteranos de la corte que actuaban siguiendo las instrucciones de sus gobernantes. Esta fórmula aglutinó a las dos terceras partes del mundo luterano con respecto a las cuestiones doctrinales, pero no dejó otra opción a los melanchtonianos que la de integrarse en la Iglesia calvinista. En consecuencia, las deserciones del luteranismo fueron frecuentes e importantes. Entre quienes abrazaron el calvinismo se hallaban diversos príncipes seculares, como el elector Federico III del Palatinado en 1559-1560, el conde Juan de Nassau en 1578 y el landgrave Mauricio de Hesse-Kassel en 1603. Esta última conversión provocó el estallido de una guerra, por cuanto la extinción de la rama Hesse-Marburgo de la familia al año siguiente fue aprovechada por el nuevo landgrave calvinista: ocupó la sucesión vacante y en especial la famosa Universidad de Marburgo, que se había convertido en un importante seminario para la preparación de los pastores luteranos. Los estudiantes se rebelaron, pero las tropas de Mauricio aplastaron su resistencia. Los luteranos se vieron obligados a emigrar a la academia de Giessen (en el Estado luterano de Hesse-Darmstadt, convertido en una universidad en 1607), desde donde protagonizaron un duro debate con sus expropiadores calvinistas de Marburgo.[40] Sin embargo, el golpe más duro que asestaron los calvinistas a los luteranos fue, tal vez, la conversión de

40. La calvinización del Palatinado ha sido estudiada por O. Chadwick, «The making of a Reforming Prince: Frederick III Elector Palatine», en R. B. Knox, ed., *Reformation, Conformity and Dissent. Essays in honour of Dr. Geoffrey Nuttall*, Londres, 1977, pp. 44-69, y B. Vogler, *Le clergé protestant rhénan au siècle de la Réforme 1555-1619*, Estrasburgo, 1967. Las polémicas entre los luteranos y calvinistas en Hesse y otros lugares han sido analizadas por H. Gross,

otros dos electores protestantes. Cristián I de Sajonia (1586-1591) mantenía estrechas relaciones con el Palatinado y comenzó a designar calvinistas para ocupar los puestos de mayor responsabilidad en sus escuelas y universidades y en la corte. En 1590 ofreció ayuda militar a Enrique IV, el rey calvinista de Francia, para hacer frente a sus enemigos católicos y en 1591 firmó una alianza militar con el gobernante calvinista del Palatinado. En ese mismo año, introdujo una serie de cambios en la Iglesia de Sajonia que la aproximaron más al calvinismo. Sólo la súbita muerte de Cristián, cuando contaba 31 años de edad, salvó la causa luterana en Sajonia. En 1613, un proceso similar pareció amenazar con imponer cambios religiosos sustanciales en Brandemburgo: el nuevo elector, Juan Segismundo, abrazó abiertamente el calvinismo e intentó cambiar el credo oficial de sus territorios según el principio *cuius regio*. Pero hubo revueltas en las calles de Berlín y agitación en la asamblea hasta que se alcanzó un compromiso que toleraba ambas formas del culto protestante. Se publicó una oleada de panfletos —se conocen 200 únicamente para el período 1614-1617— sobre el cambio de religión en Brandemburgo.[41]

No ha de sorprender, por tanto, que el clero luterano odiara a los calvinistas más aún que a los católicos. La voz más estentórea en la campaña calvinista fue la de Matthias Hoë von Hoënegg, de origen austriaco que fue nombrado capellán de la corte del elector de Sajonia en 1602 y capellán en jefe en 1613. Hoë era un individuo belicoso. En el prólogo de su *Prodomus* (1621) escribió: «estoy decidido a luchar por el Señor y doy gracias a mi Dios de que haya enseñado a mis manos a luchar». Incluso los títulos de sus numerosos libros están llenos de agresividad, desde *Un sólido, justo y ortodoxo aborrecimiento de los papistas y calvinistas* (1601) a *Una discusión*

Empire and Sovereignty: a history of the Public Law Literature in the Holy Roman Empire 1559-1804, Chicago, 1975², pp. 105 ss.

41. Sobre el breve pero tempestuoso reinado de Cristián I, padre de Juan Jorge, véase T. Klein, *Der Kampf um die zweite Reformation in Kursachsen, 1586-91*, Colonia y Graz, 1962. Sobre los cambios religiosos en Brandemburgo, cuya importancia se olvida muchas veces, véase E. Faden, *Berlin im dreissigjährigen Krieg*, Berlín, 1927, pp. 136 ss., y O. Hintze, «Calvinism and Raison d'État in early seventeenth-century Brandenburg», en F. Gilbert, ed., *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*, Oxford, 1975, pp. 88-154. Para la «segunda Reforma» en tierras del noroeste de Alemania y para un agudo examen general del fenómeno, véase Schilling, *Konfessionskonflikt und Staatsbildung*.

de peso (muy necesaria en estos tiempos peligrosos) sobre si es mejor, y por qué, estar de acuerdo con los católicos que con los calvinistas (1620). Otras obras comparaban la religión reformada con el Islam en detrimento de aquélla.[42]

Pero no todos los luteranos estaban tan obsesionados con el calvinismo como para olvidarse de su enemigo más antiguo. La mayor parte de los 46 sermones publicados para celebrar el jubileo luterano de 1617 pedían una cruzada inmediata contra Roma, centro de idolatría, sodomía y otros vicios y sede de «la bestia del Apocalipsis». Las tensiones entre los luteranos y los católicos eran especialmente fuertes en las ciudades-estado de Alemania, donde a la división religiosa se añadían enfrentamientos sociales. Entre 1595 y 1618 hubo revueltas en veinte ciudades del Imperio (véase mapa 1). La más grave de ellas fue la de Donauwörth en 1606-1607.[43] Aunque Donauwörth era una de las ocho ciudades imperiales libres donde se toleraba oficialmente el luteranismo y el catolicismo, lo cierto es que hasta 1605 el clero católico apenas había osado celebrar procesiones públicas, no atreviéndose a mostrar sus imágenes cuando peregrinaban en los días de Semana Santa y manteniéndose en las calles secundarias de la ciudad. No les faltaban razones para ello, pues cuando, el día de san Marcos de 1606, el clero intentó celebrar una procesión abiertamente, fueron golpeados y sus reliquias y banderas fueron ridiculizadas y confiscadas. Dos meses después, el padre Lorenzo de Brindisi, importante capuchino (más tarde canonizado), llegó a la ciudad de camino a la corte imperial y sufrió los escarnios de una multitud luterana que cantaba «capuchino, capuchino, canalla, canalla». Recogió las quejas del clero local y prometió pedir al emperador que pusiera término a esa situación.

Encontró Praga asolada por la peste, hasta tal punto que en el mes de septiembre el propio Rodolfo II tuvo que abandonar su capital para escapar a un posible contagio. Lorenzo se apresuró a predicar en un sermón que la causa de la peste eran las concesiones hechas a los protestantes en Donauwörth y en otros lugares. Su sermón fue

42. Véase Neveux, *Vie spirituelle*, pp. 8-12.

43. Sobre las revueltas urbanas, véase C. R. Friedrichs, «Subjects or citizens? Urban conflict in early modern Germany», en M. U. Chrisman y O. Grundler, eds., *Social Groups and Religious Ideas in the Sixteenth Century*, Kalamazoo, 1978: Studies in Medieval Culture, XIII, cap. 6; e *idem*, «German town revolts and the 17th-century crisis», *Renaissance and Modern Studies*, XXVII (1983).

considerado como una grave ofensa y sólo se salvó de un serio disgusto gracias a las urgentes llamadas de Maximiliano de Baviera, que deseaba que Lorenzo exorcizara a la duquesa, al parecer trastornada. El éxito del tratamiento, que exigió varias sesiones, permitió al capuchino obtener la simpatía de Maximiliano hacia la causa de los católicos de Donauwörth, de forma que cuando regresó a Praga en el mes de febrero siguiente, Lorenzo aseguró al emperador que Baviera estaba dispuesta a imponer el acuerdo de Augsburgo en la ciudad. Así pues, Rodolfo aceptó enviar a un comisionado imperial para asegurar que los católicos pudieran celebrar su procesión del día de san Marcos en abril de 1607 y Maximiliano envió también a dos representantes. Pero de nada sirvió: los sacerdotes, el comisionado y los representantes se vieron virtualmente sitiados por una muchedumbre luterana y no pudieron salir del monasterio donde se habían reunido. Los magistrados, todos ellos protestantes, no hicieron nada para impedir los desórdenes.

La autoridad del emperador había sido desafiada abiertamente y en agosto Rodolfo ordenó a la ciudad de Donauwörth que concediera a los católicos la libertad de culto, pues de lo contrario sería declarada rebelde; Maximiliano fue autorizado a utilizar la fuerza si era necesario para asegurar la obediencia. Esas exigencias no fueron atendidas y el duque organizó un ejército y, pese a la movilización de algunos vecinos protestantes, sus fuerzas penetraron en la ciudad el 17 de diciembre de 1607 y restablecieron el culto católico. Esa acción fue abiertamente ilegal, pues Donauwörth pertenecía al Círculo suabo y no al bávaro, y en consecuencia tenía que haber sido el director suabo (el duque luterano de Württemberg) quien asegurara el cumplimiento de la orden imperial. A continuación, se sucedieron nuevas ilegalidades. En junio de 1609, en una decisión que se repetiría posteriormente en 1620 a mayor escala, el emperador entregó a Maximiliano la ciudad como recompensa por los gastos en que había incurrido para hacer cumplir el mandato del emperador. El duque decretó inmediatamente la prohibición del culto protestante según el principio *cuius regio* y expulsó de la ciudad a quienes opusieron resistencia. Comenzó entonces una nueva guerra de panfletos, en esta ocasión entre los refugiados luteranos (en su mayor parte en Württemberg) y los apologetas de Maximiliano.[44]

44. El mejor estudio de las revueltas de Donauwörth es el de A. de Carmig-

Al enterarse de la ocupación de Donauwörth, el duque Felipe Luis de Neoburgo, consciente de lo que había de pasar en el futuro, se lamentó diciendo: «Maximiliano, Maximiliano, no comprendes las consecuencias de lo que estás haciendo».[45] Al igual que otros, no tardó en comprender que la acción de Maximiliano torpedeaba toda posible cooperación entre protestantes y católicos en la Dieta Imperial convocada para reunirse en Ratisbona en enero de 1608. Las circunstancias favorecían ya una confrontación entre el emperador, cuyo principal deseo era obtener dinero para liquidar las deudas en que había incurrido durante la guerra con los turcos, y los protestantes militantes, a cuyo frente se hallaba el elector palatino, que exigía cambios religiosos favorables al protestantismo en general y al calvinismo en particular. La ocupación de Donauwörth, situada apenas a 100 km de Ratisbona, impulsó a una serie de gobernantes luteranos moderados, como el duque de Neoburgo y el elector de Sajonia, a alinearse junto al Palatinado. Pidieron que se incrementara, al menos, la representación protestante en el Tribunal Supremo Imperial. Pero el representante del emperador, el archiduque Fernando, se mostró inflexible: los católicos poseían todavía la mayoría en dos de los tres estamentos de la Dieta (4 contra 3 entre los electores y 33 contra 15 entre los príncipes; sólo las ciudades, cuyo voto, por otra parte, no obligaba, eran predominantemente protestantes). Se rumoreó incluso que el archiduque conspiraba con Maximiliano de Baviera para realizar un golpe de fuerza contra la Dieta, si no conseguía imponer sus criterios. Aunque esa amenaza no llegó a materializarse, en febrero de 1608 los católicos del estamento de los príncipes presentaron una moción en la que solicitaban la restitución de todas las tierras eclesiásticas secularizadas desde 1552. De esta forma, pretendían obligar a los protestantes a otorgar concesiones en otras materias para luego retirar su demanda, pero de hecho hicieron que la posición de éstos fuera insostenible. En abril, la delegación del Palatinado, después de presentar una protesta formal a Fernando, abandonó la Dieta. Inmediatamente hicieron lo mismo los representantes de Brandemburgo, Ansbach, Kulmbach, Baden-Durlach, Hesse-Kassel y Württemberg. Aunque permanecieron los representantes de Sajonia y algunos otros, el 3 de mayo el archiduque Fernando se decidió, no sin renuencia, a disolver la Dieta.

nano, «La part de S. Laurent de Brindes dans le Ban de Donauwörth, 1607», *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, LVIII, 1963, pp. 460-486. Pero véase también F. Stieve, *Der Ursprung des dreissigjährigen Krieges. I. Der Kampf um Donauwörth*, Munich, 1875, y R. Breitling, «Der Streit um Donauwörth 1605/1611. Eine Ergänzung», *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte*, II (1929), pp. 275-298.

45. Citado por Kossol, *Die Reichspolitik des Pfalzgrafen Philipp Ludwig*, p. 167.

Nueve días después, seis importantes príncipes protestantes (los electores palatino, de Neoburgo, Württemberg, Ansbach, Kulmbach y Baden-Durlach) se reunieron en la sala capitular del monasterio secularizado de Auhausen (cerca de Nördlingen) y firmaron una alianza, conocida como la Unión protestante, que habría de durar diez años, y en la que se prometían ayuda mutua en caso de ser atacados. En gran medida, estaban trazadas ya las líneas que habían de dividir a Alemania en el decenio de 1620. La mayor parte de los que desafiaron a Fernando en 1608 habrían de hacerlo nuevamente; quienes dudaron en Ratisbona también actuarían así después y los que apoyaron al archiduque volverían a hacerlo posteriormente. Resulta incomprensible, tanto para los historiadores como para los contemporáneos, que no estallara un conflicto generalizado entre las dos facciones enfrentadas en Alemania durante todo un decenio después del «incidente de Donauwörth», pese a que se produjeron varios enfrentamientos de gravedad. La explicación hay que buscarla en los designios de determinados estados ajenos al Imperio.

III. La Unión, la Liga y la política europea

La creación de la Unión protestante dio comienzo a una nueva fase en la política del Imperio: pese a los esfuerzos constantes de muchos príncipes para conseguir que siguieran funcionando las antiguas instituciones imperiales, las alianzas confesionales eran ahora las fuerzas dominantes. Cuando los dos bandos enfrentados solicitaron ayuda a sus correligionarios del exterior, la tradicional oposición a la implicación de las potencias extranjeras en el Imperio fue perdiendo fuerza gradualmente y la política imperial y el equilibrio internacional de poder se vieron cada vez más imbricados. Sin embargo, la revolución no fue nunca total: mientras algunos príncipes consideraban inevitable una guerra de religión total y otros abrazaron las alianzas confesionales llevados por el curso de los acontecimientos, algunos per-

sonajes fundamentales (tanto en el seno del Imperio como fuera de él) intentaban todavía impedir el desastre. En consecuencia, el decenio transcurrido entre el incidente de Donauwörth y el estallido de la revolución bohemia se caracterizó por una mezcla complicada y confusa de avance hacia el abismo y precavida posición defensiva.

La necesidad de la política confesional era más abiertamente aceptada en el Palatinado renano. La conversión al calvinismo del elector Federico III (1559-1576), y la continuación de su política por su hijo menor, Juan Casimiro (regente, 1583-1592), había convertido a Heidelberg en uno de los centros más importantes de la religión reformada. Un grupo notable de calvinistas independientes y antiguos luteranos melanchtonianos habían sido atraídos a la corte palatina. Sin duda, el más ambicioso y el más notorio de todos ellos era el príncipe Cristián de Anhalt-Bernburg. Anhalt fue nombrado gobernador del Alto Palatinado en 1595 y el alcoholismo y enfermedad del elector Federico IV (1592-1610) no tardaron en permitirle obtener un control prácticamente total de la política exterior del Palatinado. Sus protegidos inmigrantes —como Ludwig Camerarius, los hermanos Christoph y Achatius von Dohna, Vollrad von Plessen e Hippolytus von Colli— adquirieron cada vez mayor notoriedad como agentes de la diplomacia del Palatinado y se hizo más y más difícil distinguir entre la política del Palatinado y la del propio Anhalt.

Estos activistas del Palatinado compartían un rígido enfoque ideológico de la política europea. Desde finales del decenio de 1560, en Heidelberg existía la convicción de que se había establecido una alianza católica internacional encabezada por los Habsburgo y el papado que, conforme fuera adquiriendo fuerza, pondría en marcha una campaña para extirpar la herejía de toda Europa. A los ojos de los dirigentes del Palatinado, un gran conflicto religioso parecía inevitable: para defender la causa protestante, había que combatir el renacimiento católico en todas partes, no sólo en el seno del Imperio sino también mediante la creación de una alianza protestante internacional.[46] Durante las últimas décadas del siglo XVI, el Palatinado había intentado insistentemente establecer alianzas con Inglaterra, los rebeldes holandeses y los hugonotes franceses, pero a finales de siglo sus esfuerzos diplomáticos se habían saldado con el fracaso.

Era con la República de Holanda con la que mantenían relaciones

46. Schubert, *Camerarius*, pp. 46, 52.

más estrechas. En esta última, al lazo confesional se veía fortalecido por conexiones personales y dinásticas y por un interés estratégico común en Renania. En 1593, Federico IV había contraído matrimonio con Luisa-Juliana, hermanastra de Mauricio de Nassau, dirigente de la República de Holanda. Su tío, el conde Juan VI de Nassau-Dillenburg, fue miembro destacado del Consejo Palatino hasta su muerte en 1606. El cuñado de Juan, Juan Alberto, conde de Solms-Brauenfels, se convirtió en chambelán de la corte en 1602. El vínculo dinástico con la casa de Nassau, que situó al Palatinado en la órbita de los principales príncipes calvinistas europeos, se veía completado por el servicio de una serie de oficiales palatinos en el ejército holandés.[47] El interés compartido en Renania había surgido en el curso de la guerra de Colonia y la invasión española de Westfalia (véase p. 35, *supra*); a comienzos del siglo XVII encontró un nuevo centro de atención en la sucesión del católico Juan Guillermo, duque de Cleves-Juliers y Berg, conde de Ravensburgo y Mark, que había muerto sin hijos.

Los territorios se dividieron según la religión (Juliers era abiertamente católico, mientras que en Cleves, Ravensburgo y Mark predominaban los calvinistas y luteranos), pero los dos pretendientes principales, el elector Juan Segismundo de Brandemburgo y Felipe Luis, duque de Pfalz-Neoburgo, eran luteranos. La duquesa, Antoinette de Lorraine, y el Parlamento de Juliers estaban decididos a impedir el acceso de un protestante y habían recibido promesas de apoyo por parte del elector de Colonia y (en el decenio de 1580) de Felipe II de España.[48] Por su parte, los holandeses y los palatinos estaban igualmente decididos a impedir la ocupación española de los ducados. Como consecuencia de las difíciles relaciones entre Neoburgo y el Palatinado, el candidato favorecido por este último y por los holandeses era Brandemburgo. Sin embargo, el elector no podía establecer

47. Van Deursen, *Honni Soit*, pp. 45-46.

48. La disputa sobre la sucesión de Cleves-Juliers derivó del hecho de que sólo las cuatro hermanas de Juan Guillermo habían dejado herederos y no estaba claro si los ducados podían ser heredados indivisos por línea femenina. Brandemburgo estaba casado con la única hija de la hermana mayor; Neoburgo lo estaba con la segunda hermana y afirmaba que su hijo Wolfgang Guillermo tenía más derecho que una hija. En 1593, Neoburgo estaba dispuesto a aceptar una división, pero no así Brandemburgo. Véase Kossol, *Neuburg*, y Hans Schmidt, «Pfalz-Neuburgs Sprung zum Niederrhein. Wolfgang Wilhelm von Pfalz-Neuburg und der Jülich-Klevische Erbfolgetreit», en Glaser, ed., *Um Glauben und Reich*, II/i, pp. 77-89.

una alianza formal porque le ligaba, desde hacía mucho tiempo, un pacto con las familias gobernantes de Sajonia y Hesse (el *Erbverein*), que no permitía los tratados con terceros.[49] Todo lo que fue posible conseguir fue un acuerdo privado entre los tres en abril de 1605, por el cual los holandeses, a cambio de un préstamo de 100.000 táleros por parte de Brandemburgo y el Palatinado, prometieron ocupar Cleves-Juliers en nombre de Juan Segismundo a la muerte del duque.

Las iniciativas diplomáticas de Anhalt no se limitaron de ninguna forma a Alemania, aunque las relaciones del elector palatino con Inglaterra y Francia eran menos satisfactorias. En el momento de su advenimiento al trono en 1603, Jacobo I fue invitado a situarse al frente de una alianza protestante. El monarca inglés rechazó amablemente el ofrecimiento y demostró muy poco interés por los asuntos alemanes.[50] Las relaciones con Enrique IV se habían visto complicadas por su conversión al catolicismo (en 1593) y por la tensión existente entre la corona francesa y los hugonotes. En 1591, Anhalt había dirigido personalmente una expedición militar en ayuda de Enrique —y todavía le debían 1,3 millones de táleros por los gastos de la expedición—, pero el rey miraba ahora con recelo las conexiones internacionales protestantes.[51] El principal objetivo de su política exterior era el de impedir una nueva guerra religiosa en Europa que haría peligrar la paz civil en Francia, tan difícilmente conseguida y todavía frágil. Si bien estaba dispuesto a apoyar a los príncipes alemanes contra el emperador, le gustaba menos el sesgo confesional de la política del Palatinado. Sus sospechas se vieron confirmadas por

49. Como agnado más próximo, Neoburgo podía esperar, según los términos de la Bula de Oro, ser nombrado administrador del Palatinado durante la minoridad de Federico V si, como se esperaba, Federico IV moría en un futuro inmediato. Sin embargo, su ferviente luteranismo le convertía en un candidato inaceptable y, en diciembre de 1602, Federico IV revisó su testamento nombrando heredero al hermano calvinista de Neoburgo, duque Juan de Pfalz-Zweibrücken. Al morir Zweibrücken en 1604, el testamento fue revisado de nuevo en favor del hijo de Federico, Juan II, que finalmente fue nombrado a la muerte de Federico IV en octubre de 1610. Neoburgo experimentó un amargo resentimiento por haber sido excluido del testamento.

50. PRO, S.P. 81/9/6, Jacobo I a Federico IV, 8/18 de junio de 1603 (es decir, 8 de junio según el calendario antiguo, 18 de junio según el calendario nuevo, el gregoriano).

51. ¡Los descendientes de Anhalt reclamaban todavía la devolución de ese dinero en 1818! Véase Bonney, *The King's debts*, p. 273.

la protección que el elector palatino ofreció al duque hugonote de Bouillon, viejo amigo de Anhalt y esposo de otra princesa Nassau, que había huido a Heidelberg en 1602 a raíz de su implicación en una conspiración contra la corona. Cuando regresó a su lugar de origen, Sedan, en 1606, Bouillon fue acompañado por el futuro Federico V, que completó su educación allí. Como respuesta a tan abierto apoyo a un rebelde, Enrique rechazó la invitación de Anhalt para participar en el acuerdo de 1605 a propósito de Cleves-Juliers.

Abortadas sus ambiciosas iniciativas diplomáticas, Anhalt se concentró en la creación de una alianza específicamente alemana. En 1607 concluyó un tratado entre el Palatinado, sus sobrinos los margraves de Ansbach y Kulmbach, y la ciudad de Nuremberg, sin duda para la protección del Alto Palatinado ante un posible ataque de Baviera. La ocupación de Donauwörth seis meses después le ofreció la oportunidad de ampliar su alianza. Anteriormente, los príncipes luteranos se habían sentido tan alarmados por el activismo del Palatinado como por la Contrarreforma, pero el elector Cristián II de Sajonia (1591-1611) se había negado a patrocinar una alianza confesional luterana. En ausencia del liderazgo de Sajonia, el príncipe luterano más activo era el de Pfalz-Neoburgo, cuya incómoda proximidad a Baviera, así como su pretensión de obtener la sucesión de Cleves-Juliers y su enemistad con el Palatinado, le hacían desear ardientemente que se diera un primer paso adelante. Para contrarrestar el acuerdo de 1605 entre el Palatinado, los Países Bajos y Brandemburgo, firmó su propia alianza con el duque de Württemberg y el margrave de Baden-Durlach, para garantizar la defensa mutua y la protección de sus intereses en Cleves-Juliers. Esa alianza iba dirigida tanto contra Heidelberg como contra Munich, pero la ocupación de Donauwörth convenció a Felipe Luis de que Maximiliano era su mayor amenaza. Tras la disolución de la Dieta de Ratisbona en abril de 1608 aceptó la proposición de Ansbach para convertir su alianza en una unión más amplia. El tratado de Neoburgo de 1605 constituyó la base de la alianza Auhausen (véase p. 50, *supra*). Las principales diferencias entre ambos eran la exclusión de cualquier compromiso de apoyar a los pretendientes a la sucesión de Cleves-Juliers y la adición de cláusulas que desalentaban la controversia teológica entre luteranos y calvinistas y que limitaban la duración de la alianza a diez años.

Con todo, el futuro de la Unión Protestante no estaba claro en absoluto. La alianza contenía un compromiso implícito de defensa

mutua contra Baviera, pero no un programa político común. De los ocho miembros fundadores, sólo Ansbach y (con menos firmeza) Württemberg y Baden compartían la convicción del elector palatino respecto a la inevitabilidad de un gran conflicto religioso. Desde Auhausen se había dirigido una invitación general a todos los estados protestantes del Imperio, pero en la primavera de 1609 sólo los condes de Oettingen y las ciudades de Estrasburgo, Ulm y Nuremberg habían solicitado su adhesión. Tampoco tuvo mucho más éxito la maniobra simultánea de Anhalt para ampliar la Unión hasta convertirla en una alianza internacional. La asamblea de la Unión celebrada en Rothenburg en agosto de 1608 rechazó su propuesta de incluir a Enrique IV, demorándose asimismo el envío de invitaciones a Jacobo I, a la República de Holanda y a Cristián IV de Dinamarca.[52] Por consiguiente, Anhalt inició lo que habría de ser una tendencia constante y desastrosa, en último extremo, en la política de la Unión, decidiendo actuar independientemente. En el otoño de 1608, el Consejo del Palatinado decidió intentar la concertación de un matrimonio entre el príncipe Federico y la hija de Jacobo I, Isabel, mientras que Anhalt incitaba a su amigo Tschernembl, líder de los estados protestantes de Austria, a buscar apoyo en la Unión contra su señor Habsburgo, si era necesario.

La tan esperada desaparición de Juan Guillermo de Cleves-Juliers el 25 de marzo de 1609, quince días antes de que la Tregua de los Doce Años interrumpiera temporalmente la guerra entre España y la República de Holanda, constituyó la primera prueba para la alianza. Neoburgo y Brandemburgo enviaron inmediatamente representantes a la sede del ducado en Düsseldorf para reclamar la posesión de los ducados. La duquesa rechazó sus pretensiones, apoyada por el Parlamento de Juliers, y el 2 de abril Rodolfo II le ordenó que actuara como regente hasta que hubiera resuelto la disputa sucesoria. Pero Neoburgo y Brandemburgo (conocidos ahora como los «príncipes pretendientes») habían perdido su confianza en la imparcialidad del emperador a raíz del incidente de Donauwörth y en junio acordaron solicitar el arbitraje de una figura independiente y gobernar conjuntamente mientras tanto. Rodolfo declaró la invalidez de este acuerdo y encargó a su primo, el archiduque Leopoldo, obispo de Estrasburgo y Passau,

52. *Briefe und Akten*, II, pp. 55-56: Protocolo, asamblea de Rothenburg, 7-14 de agosto de 1608.

que ayudara a la duquesa, autorizándole a reclamar ayuda militar de los Países Bajos españoles, si eso era necesario. Leopoldo se puso al frente de la guarnición católica de la fortaleza de Juliers el 23 de julio, pero se encontró bloqueado por las tropas reclutadas por los pretendientes.

Ninguno de los dos bandos deseaba iniciar las hostilidades, pero el hecho de que Leopoldo movilizara refuerzos en la diócesis de Passau y visitara después Bruselas, en el mes de octubre, y la fundación de la Liga católica (véase *infra*) convencieron a los príncipes de la Unión de que sus miedos de que se produjera un segundo incidente Donauwörth estaban justificados. En mayo de 1609, la Unión había acordado que si bien no estaba comprometida a apoyar a los pretendientes, sus miembros les proporcionarían ayuda individualmente si ésta era requerida. En el mes de noviembre, los príncipes más importantes se reunieron y acordaron recomendar en la siguiente asamblea general que la Unión apoyara, como institución, a los príncipes pretendientes enviando un cuerpo expedicionario de 5.000 hombres. El consejero palatino Miguel Loefenius justificó así la intervención:

> Aunque la cuestión de Juliers no afecte a la Unión directamente, sus miembros deben hacer algo inmediatamente para asegurarse de que esos territorios vayan a parar a manos de los príncipes protestantes. Si los territorios estuvieran en poder de esos príncipes, una buena parte de Renania se integraría en la Unión y, por otra parte, se produciría un gran peligro si cayeran en manos de los españoles. Si se dejara indefensos a los príncipes, la reputación de la Unión sufriría un gran daño. Cuando vemos que estados protestantes como Donauwörth, a los que la Unión no está obligada a ayudar, se ven amenazados por prácticas peligrosas, lo cierto es que todos los estados protestantes son miembros de un solo cuerpo sagrado y que la enfermedad de uno de ellos afectará a los otros. En consecuencia, la ayuda a Juliers beneficiará a los habitantes de Donauwörth y a otros en situación similar.[53]

Previamente, durante el otoño, Brandemburgo y Hesse-Kassel habían intentado convencer a Cristián II de Sajonia para que apoyara a los pretendientes. Cuando aquél se negó, denunciaron el *Erbverein* y solicitaron ingresar en la Unión. En diciembre, el propio Anhalt se

53. Citado por Kossol, *Neuburg*, pp. 218-219.

trasladó a París para discutir la intervención francesa con Enrique IV; simultáneamente, se hicieron otras gestiones ante Jacobo I y los Estados Generales de Holanda.

La intervención de la Unión fue confirmada por la asamblea celebrada en Schwäbisch Hall en enero y febrero de 1610, aunque hubo una cierta controversia. Ansbach apoyó de buen grado la intervención afirmando con optimismo que «en el caso de Donauwörth, toda la carga recayó sobre nosotros; pero en la cuestión de Juliers, haremos participar a Francia, los Estados Generales de Holanda, Inglaterra y otras potencias». Pero sólo él y Baden apoyaron la propuesta de Anhalt de que la Unión se comprometiera públicamente a favor de la causa de los príncipes.[54] Hesse-Kassel, Württemberg y Neoburgo, preocupados ante la perspectiva de que pudiera provocarse un conflicto a gran escala, deseaban concluir tan sólo un acuerdo informal para proporcionar ayuda militar. El 4 de febrero, Anhalt reveló la oferta de Enrique IV de enviar tropas para poner sitio a Juliers y de organizar importantes campañas de diversión en los Países Bajos y en el norte de Italia a fin de impedir la intervención española. Como esperaba, esta oferta pacificó temporalmente a quienes temían un conflicto abierto con España y la asamblea aceptó finalmente la propuesta de reclutar 5.000 hombres. Los gastos derivados del reclutamiento serían considerados como un préstamo a Brandemburgo y Neoburgo.

La intervención de Enrique IV hizo que la cuestión de Cleves-Juliers dejara de ser un asunto imperial para convertirse en una crisis internacional. El diplomático inglés sir Ralph Winwood consideró que la decisión del rey era «un misterio más profundo de lo que puede concebir la capacidad humana y un proyecto más extraño de lo que (me parece) puede aceptar fácilmente cualquier hombre».[55] Los motivos que impulsaron la decisión de Enrique IV han sido objeto de numerosas controversias, pero las hipótesis más habituales —la realización de un gran designio o la huida de Charlotte de Montmorency a Bruselas en noviembre de 1909— constituyen una explicación menos convincente que los constantes dilemas de la política exterior francesa. La crisis de Cleves-Juliers amenazaba con provocar la guerra religiosa europea que tanto temía Enrique IV. Con la intervención armada, podría recuperar el control de la Unión antes de que fuera imposible controlar la situación. A este respecto, son reveladoras las condiciones de su oferta de apoyo militar, entre las que se incluía la exigencia de que la Unión interrumpiera sus contactos con los hugonotes. Después de todo, no estalló un conflicto a gran escala. España decidió no poner en peligro la Tregua de los Doce Años interviniendo en Alemania, mientras que el asesinato de Enrique IV el 14 de mayo de 1610 interrumpió las maniobras francesas, más ambiciosas. Las operaciones militares se limitaron a un corto asedio de Juliers por un ejército formado por tropas francesas, holandesas, inglesas y de la Unión; el archiduque Leopoldo se rindió el 1 de septiembre. Sin embargo, el impacto de la crisis fue considerable tanto sobre la Unión como sobre el Imperio en su conjunto.

54. Citado por Herold, *Ansbach*, p. 134.

55. E. Sawyer, ed., *Memorials of Affairs of State during the Reigns of Queen Elizabeth and King James I*, Londres, 1725, III, p. 83: Winwood al conde de Salisbury, 2/12 de noviembre de 1609.

La disposición de la Unión a recurrir a la fuerza en 1609-1610 persuadió finalmente a los más importantes príncipes eclesiásticos (que anteriormente se habían resistido a los llamamientos del obispo de Wurzburgo y del agente papal en Alemania, el *émigré* palatino Caspar Scioppius, para constituir una alianza católica) de que debían tomar medidas para su propia defensa. Durante el siglo XVI, los duques de Baviera habían apoyado varias asociaciones confesionales, pero la última de ellas, la Liga de Landsberg, se había disuelto en 1599 como consecuencia de la situación de Baviera, próxima a la bancarrota, tras la guerra de Colonia. Maximiliano, alertado por la experiencia de su padre, sólo aceptaría una nueva alianza si recibía las garantías de que la carga económica sería compartida por todos. En el tratado de Munich, firmado el 10 de julio de 1609, los miembros de la nueva Liga católica dieron a Maximiliano el control de una caja de guerra centralizada y el mando sobre todas las tropas que pudieran reclutarse. Todos los miembros originales de la Liga —el archiduque Leopoldo, los obispos de Wurzburgo, Augsburgo, Ratisbona y Constanza, el abad de Kempten y el prior de Ellwangen— eran casi vecinos de Baviera; pero en el otoño, el miedo a una guerra en Renania hizo ingresar en la Liga a los obispos de Speyer, Worms y Bamberg y, lo que es más significativo, a los tres electores eclesiásticos. En ese momento, los electores de Colonia y Maguncia cambiaron el subsidio de Francia por el de España.[56]

56. Kessel, *Spanien und die geistlichen Kurstaaten*, pp. 59, 66. Respecto a las razones de los obispos, véase el capítulo de Baumgart en Merzbacher, *Echter*.

Pero la Liga titubeaba respecto a la intervención en la crisis de Cleves-Juliers. Pese a los llamamientos del archiduque Leopoldo para la intervención y los deseos de Maximiliano de apoyarle, la mayoría de los príncipes-obispos consideraban la alianza como una organización defensiva y no deseaban entrar en guerra a menos que se vieran directamente amenazados. Por otra parte, los subsidios que Maximiliano había pedido a Felipe III y al papado no llegaron hasta agosto de 1610. En septiembre, el miedo de que la guerra pudiera extenderse tras la caída de Juliers llevó a la Liga a movilizar un ejército de 19.000 hombres, pero el 24 de octubre, cuando se hizo evidente que la Unión no tenía nuevas ambiciones militares, Maximiliano aceptó una tregua. Por otra parte, la fundación de la Liga provocó un importantísimo incremento de la afiliación a la Unión. Durante la asamblea de enero de 1610 se produjo la incorporación de Brandemburgo, Hesse-Kassel, los hermanos de Cristián de Anhalt, el duque de Pfalz-Zweibrücken y trece ciudades libres del sur y el sudoeste. El contingente urbano, que ahora era superior numéricamente, supuso un importante refuerzo de la posición de los príncipes más prudentes, pues las ciudades eran predominantemente luteranas y habían ingresado en la Unión llevadas fundamentalmente por el miedo a Baviera y a la Liga. En efecto, no les agradaba la política arriesgada de Anhalt y eran plenamente conscientes de su vulnerabilidad a una posible represalia. La constitución aprobada en la asamblea derivada de la nueva composición de la Unión —que les daba tan sólo 8 votos frente a los 12 de los príncipes— no sirvió ciertamente para apaciguar sus temores.[57]

Esos temores no carecían de justificación, pues su aparente éxito en la cuestión de Cleves-Juliers llevó a Anhalt a cometer algunos errores de cálculo importantes. A diferencia de las gestiones realizadas ante Enrique IV, la aproximación de la Unión a Jacobo I y a la República de Holanda obtuvo una respuesta cautelosa. Los holandeses (al igual que España) no deseaban poner en peligro la Tregua de los Doce Años mediante una costosa intervención unilateral, pese al acuerdo de 1605, y no enviaron tropas hasta después de que Enrique IV decretó la movilización.[58] Jacobo I pensó inicialmente en ofrecer sus servicios como mediador; sólo después de conocer la decisión francesa ofreció la inclusión de tropas inglesas en el ejército holandés. Sin embargo, Anhalt había estado en contacto con Winwood y otros diplomáticos ingleses que veían la crisis en los mismos términos que él. El 17 de octubre de 1609 Winwood había escrito al conde de Salisbury que

> Todo este asunto, si se considera superficialmente, puede parecer trivial y ordinario, pero si se examina debidamente con todas las consecuencias que necesariamente seguirán (si puedo expresar libremente mi pobre juicio) fortalecerá o pondrá fin a la grandeza de la Casa de Austria y de la Iglesia de Roma en estos lugares.[59]

Convencidos de la posibilidad de conseguir una alianza internacional protestante, rechazaron las condiciones de Enrique IV en febrero de 1610 y decidieron ofrecer la presidencia de la Unión, junto con una alianza matrimonial con el Palatinado, a Jacobo I.[60]

En la primavera de 1610 se envió una primera misión a Inglaterra que recibió una fría respuesta; no tuvo más éxito la intervención personal de Anhalt en octubre. Lo que llevó a Jacobo a cambiar de opinión y revisar sus conclusiones respecto a la utilidad de la alianza con el Palatinado fueron los acontecimientos que se produjeron en Francia a raíz de la muerte de Enrique IV, y en especial la alianza matrimonial franco-española de marzo de 1611. Durante un breve período, en 1611-1612, consideró seriamente la posibilidad de que estuviera en marcha una conspiración católica internacional y decidió contrarrestarla. La alianza matrimonial anglo-palatina fue concluida por el duque de Bouillon en la primavera de 1611, y en el otoño Jacobo se avino a concluir con la Unión una alianza defensiva por un período de 6 años. Aunque rechazó la presidencia, animó a la Unión a realizar otras alianzas similares con las Provincias Unidas y con Cristián IV de Di-

57. La negativa de los príncipes a que las ciudades tuvieran los mismos derechos de voto que ellos llevó también a las ligas de los condes de Wetterau y Franconia a rechazar la invitación para que se agregaran a la Unión. Véase F. Magen, *Reichsgräfliche Politik in Franken. Zur Reichspolitik der Grafen von Hohenlobe am Vorabend und zu Beginn des dreissigjährigen Krieges*, Forschungen aus Württembergisch Franken, X, Schwäbisch Hall, 1975, pp. 114-115, 119.

58. Van Deursen, *Honni Soit*, p. 60.

59. Sawyer, *Memorials*, III, p. 78: 7/17 de octubre de 1609. Sir Henry Wotton pensaba de la misma forma que Winwood; véase «A few humble remembrances upon the proposition of my employment to some of the German princes on my return» (?june 1609), Historical Manuscripts Comission, *Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Marquess of Salisbury*, XXI, Londres, 1970, pp. 75-77.

60. Estudiado de forma más exhaustiva en Adams, «Protestant Cause», pp. 168-169.

namarca. El tratado entre Inglaterra y la Unión fue firmado en Wesel en abril de 1612, mientras que el que vinculó a los Países Bajos con la Unión se concluyó en La Haya en mayo de 1613.[61]

Estas alianzas internacionales fueron la piedra angular de la futura diplomacia de Anhalt, pero sólo se consiguieron a costa de un incremento de la tensión en el seno de la Unión. La difícil situación de 1610 había aterrorizado a las ciudades y el tratado con Holanda (que temían que pudiera implicarles en una nueva guerra hispano-holandesa) fue ratificado por los príncipes en 1614 a pesar de que expusieron objeciones. También les desagradaba la tendencia de Anhalt y de sus aliados a conducir la diplomacia de la Unión de forma secreta e informal.[62] Sus temores eran compartidos por otros príncipes luteranos menos importantes, especialmente Oettingen, Kulmbach y Neoburgo. En 1613, este último consideraba seriamente su retirada de la Unión. El descontento de Neoburgo se vio reforzado por el rechazo categórico de sus pretensiones de dirigir la regencia del Palatinado a la muerte de Federico IV, el 8 de septiembre de 1610. Las suspicacias con que veía la asociación entre Brandemburgo y el Palatinado, le aproximaron cada vez más a Sajonia, Baviera y el emperador para proteger sus derechos en Cleves-Juliers. Finalmente, en 1613 rompió con la Unión, permaneciendo en la interrumpida Dieta de Ratisbona tras la partida de otros representantes de la Unión. Su hijo Wolfgang Guillermo fue aún más lejos y se convirtió al catolicismo el 19 de julio de 1613, contrayendo matrimonio el año siguiente con la hermana de Maximiliano (véase lámina 3). Según un relato contemporáneo, Felipe Luis «la-

61. Véase *ibid.*, pp. 183-221 *passim*. Sobre el impacto de estos acontecimientos en las Provincias Unidas y especialmente en Mauricio de Nassau, véase Van Deursen, *Honni Soit*, pp. 76, 91-101. Cristián IV permaneció neutral en ese momento, como consecuencia de la falta de dinero que sufría desde la guerra de Kalmar. El profesor E. L. Petersen me ha mencionado amablemente una carta del rey, escrita a comienzos de 1614, en la que se quejaba de que «ich fuhr meine Person [bin] mit gelde itzo nicht versehen ... dan ich mit allerhandt wmkosten ihn vergangendem Kriige seindt gewessen» (RAC, Tyske kancelli, undenlandske afdeling II. Brandenburg A.I.8: cartas a la electora de Brandemburgo, 12 de febrero-18 de abril de 1614). Véase también J. Skovgaard, ed., *Kong Christian den Fjerdes egenhaendige Breve*, VIII, Copenhague (1947), nos 22, 24-25. Al no tener dinero, el rey tuvo que escuchar el cauto «consejo» de su Consejo de Asuntos Exteriores.

62. En 1612, Nuremberg se quejó de que los príncipes trataban los asuntos de la Unión en las bodas, las partidas de caza y las reuniones privadas: véase Herold, *Ansbach*, p. 152.

mentó y repudió la apostasía de su hijo, pero, considerando que se había arrojado en brazos de los papistas para obtener sus derechos y sus pretensiones, lo aceptó todo, como si hubiera obrado bien».[63] La crisis de Cleves-Juliers había convertido también a Cristián II de Sajonia (que fue nombrado árbitro imperial en julio de 1610) y a su hijo Juan Jorge en enemigos declarados de la Unión. La hostilidad de los electores impidió a la Unión contar con el apoyo de los estados clientes de Sajonia del norte y nordeste. Sólo Brandemburgo se aproximó; la conversión de Juan Segismundo al calvinismo en 1613 fue seguida tres años después por el matrimonio de su hijo Jorge Guillermo con Isabel, hermana de Federico V (véase cuadro 2).

Pese a las disensiones cada vez más fuertes en las filas de la Unión, Anhalt esperaba todavía poder utilizarla para explotar las debilidades de la autoridad imperial. Para Anhalt, la larga lucha entre Rodolfo II y su hermano Matías por el control de los territorios Habsburgo era la oportunidad de impedir la elección del otro hermano de Rodolfo, el archiduque Alberto, gobernador de los Países Bajos españoles, como su sucesor —Alberto era una auténtica *bête noire* para Anhalt— y de provocar un interregno imperial, en el que el elector palatino, como príncipe más antiguo del Imperio, desempeñaría el papel fundamental en los asuntos imperiales.[64] Pero Anhalt no estaba seguro de si resultaría más beneficioso ofrecer el apoyo de la Unión al debilitado Rodolfo o al más acomodaticio Matías. Vacilaba entre ambos y la súbita muerte de Rodolfo el 20 de enero de 1612 y el acceso incontestado de Matías le tomaron por sorpresa.

La elección de Matías dio la oportunidad a su nuevo canciller, Melchior Khlesl, obispo de Viena, de intentar detener la tendencia a la confrontación confesional reviviendo la tradicional alianza imperial con Maguncia y Sajonia. Khlesl pretendía la disolución de ambas alianzas religiosas para convertir después a la Liga en un organismo no confesional más amplio, bajo la presidencia imperial, que incluiría a los luteranos y, así lo esperaba, aislaría al Palatinado. Intentó ganarse a determinados miembros descontentos de la Unión como Neoburgo y Kulmbach e incluso ofreció a Ansbach el mando del ejército imperial en Hungría. Sin embargo, la Unión se mantuvo firme. La asamblea de

63. BGSA, Kasten Schwarz 16688, f. 150, «PAD» a William Trumbull, 22 de julio de 1614.

64. Schubert, *Camerarius*, pp. 50-51; Herold, *Ansbach*, pp. 171, 184.

Rothenburg de marzo de 1613 decidió la no disolución mientras siguiera existiendo la Liga y la rectificación de una serie de agravios seculares. Entre ellos se incluía la abolición del *reservatum ecclesiasticum* (véase p. 43, *supra*), la restitución de la independencia de Donauwörth y el reconocimiento de la libertad religiosa de Aquisgrán, donde en 1612, después de varios años de agitación apoyada por la Unión, había sido derrocado un magistrado católico introducido por las tropas españolas en 1598.[65] Los representantes de la Unión abandonaron la Dieta en Ratisbona en agosto de 1613, inmediatamente después de que se iniciara, cuando comprendieron que, si bien podían conseguir algunas reformas judiciales, sus principales exigencias no serían atendidas.

Las propuestas de Khlesl tuvieron un impacto más inmediato en la Liga. El número de afiliados a la Liga había aumentado tras la elección de prelados pro-bávaros en Salzburgo y Eichstätt en 1612, pero al mismo tiempo la presidencia de Maximiliano despertaba cada vez mayor oposición. Los electores eclesiásticos eran perfectamente conscientes de su posición constitucional, especialmente Johann Schweikart von Kronberg de Maguncia, archicanciller imperial, y, bajo su influencia, los otros electores exigieron la descentralización de la Liga en un directorio altoalemán encabezado por Baviera y en un directorio renano dirigido por Maguncia. Maximiliano veía con cierta prevención la descentralización, pero sin duda se oponía con más fuerza a las nuevas peticiones de Maguncia de una mayor participación habsburguesa, condición que había puesto también Felipe III de España para otorgar un subsidio. Maximiliano consideraba que la participación de los Habsburgo convertiría la Liga en un instrumento de la política imperial y la comprometería a apoyar otros intereses más amplios de los Habsburgo.[66] En la asamblea de la Liga celebrada de forma simultánea con la Dieta de Ratisbona en 1613, Khlesl y Maguncia consiguieron convencer a una mayoría de sus miembros para que aceptaran la descentralización y la participación imperial: fue admitido el archiduque Maximiliano, hermano del emperador, creándose para él un tercer directorio, el austriaco. Maximiliano de Baviera se opuso firmemente a esta medida, pues consideraba que la participación de los Habsburgo

65. Para la política de Aquisgrán, véase Schilling, «Burgerkampre in Aachen».

66. Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, p. 34; Altmann, *Reichspolitik*, p. 24.

era un medio para que Khlesl consiguiera su ambición de ampliar la Liga a los luteranos.[67] Para fortalecer su posición, en marzo de 1614 constituyó una alianza privada con sus seguidores: los ricos —y compactos desde el punto de vista geográfico— principados eclesiásticos de Wurzburgo, Bamberg, Eichstätt y Ellwangen.

La descentralización convirtió a la Liga en un instrumento ineficaz. Durante la segunda crisis de Cleves-Juliers de 1614 respondió de forma desorganizada y dubitativa. Además, se produjeron serios enfrentamientos entre los dos Maximilianos acerca de la composición del nuevo directorio austriaco, sobre todo acerca de los ricos obispados de Suabia, que Maximiliano de Baviera deseaba conservar en su propio directorio. Como consecuencia de éste y otros problemas, abandonó la Liga a comienzos de 1616. Su marcha privó a la Liga de la figura que la guiaba y cuando Matías solicitó formalmente la disolución de ambas alianzas, en abril de 1617, Maguncia y el archiduque Maximiliano disolvieron la Liga con la anuencia de sus miembros. El mes siguiente, Maximiliano de Baviera creó, a petición de sus aliados de 1614, un pacto local y privado de protección mutua contra la Unión.[68]

Sin embargo, para entonces la debilidad de la Unión había quedado también de manifiesto al recrudecerse las tensiones sobre la resolución de la crisis de Cleves-Juliers. En mayo de 1614, el deterioro de las relaciones entre Brandemburgo y Neoburgo llevó al coronel Pithan, comandante de la guarnición de Juliers, guarnición conjunta de Neoburgo y Brandemburgo, a solicitar refuerzos holandeses. Wolfgang Guillermo, temeroso de que elementos holandeses y de Brandemburgo organizaran una conspiración, se hizo con el control de Düsseldorf y Pithan expulsó a Neoburgo de Juliers. Los Estados Generales intentaron mediar, pero en el mes de agosto, a petición de Wolfgang Guillermo, 15.000 soldados españoles entraron en los ducados para asegurar el control de Neoburgo sobre las otras ciudades.[69] Como había ocurrido en 1609, los holandeses no deseaban intervenir personalmente, pero en esta ocasión ni Inglaterra ni Francia estaban dispuestas a llevar a cabo una acción militar. Tanto Jacobo I (cada vez más influido por el nuevo embajador español en Londres, don Diego

67. Altmann, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

68. *Ibid.*, pp. 76, 84, 113-114.

69. Respecto a la actuación de Holanda durante la crisis, véase A. Th. van Deursen, *De Val van Wezel*, Kampen, 1967.

Sarmiento de Acuña, futuro conde de Gondomar) como María de Médicis (que no quería poner en peligro el acuerdo matrimonial franco-español) intentaron mediar en el conflicto. Sólo después de que los españoles capturaran el importante paso del Rin en Wesel decidió Holanda la movilización. Sin embargo, ninguno de los dos bandos deseaba la guerra y rápidamente se firmó una tregua en Xanten, tregua que gracias a la intervención de diplomáticos ingleses y franceses se convirtió en un tratado en el mes de noviembre. Hasta tanto se llegaba a una solución definitiva, el gobierno de los ducados quedó dividido: Brandemburgo recibió Cleves y Mark, y Neoburgo, Juliers y Berg. Más difícil resultó concretar la evacuación de los ejércitos español y holandés y, pese a los repetidos intentos de Jacobo I en 1615 y 1616, los holandeses permanecieron en Juliers y los españoles en Wesel.

La segunda crisis de Cleves-Juliers tuvo una serie de ramificaciones. Por lo que respecta a Jacobo I, fue la solución relativamente satisfactoria de un problema potencialmente peligroso, que solventó actuando en concierto con Francia y España. El monarca inglés tendió a verse más como mediador de una crisis que como líder de un bloque confesional. Hubo quienes en Inglaterra, las Provincias Unidas y Alemania consideraron que el precio de la mediación había sido la renuncia de los intereses protestantes. Federico V recordó a Jacobo I que la ocupación de los ducados por parte de España creaba una barrera a la cooperación entre las Provincias Unidas y el Palatinado, cooperación en la que descansaba, en último extremo, la seguridad de la Unión.[70]

En el seno de la alianza, la crisis hizo salir a la superficie el enfrentamiento entre las ciudades y los príncipes. En 1615, las ciudades se negaron de plano a apoyar a Brandemburgo en su lucha por obtener Cleves-Juliers. Se aconsejó al elector que en el futuro intentara conseguir la ayuda militar de Holanda. Sin embargo, sólo dos años después se dejaron sentir plenamente los efectos de la crisis. En abril de 1617, la Unión celebró una importante asamblea en Heilbronn para concretar los términos de la renovación del tratado original, que expiraba al año siguiente. Desde 1610 se había estabilizado la composición de la alianza: sólo se habían incorporado dos ciudades; Neoburgo y una ciudad la habían abandonado y se había firmado un tratado limitado

70. BGSA, Kasten Schwarz 16734, f. 141. Federico a Winwood, 19 de enero de 1615.

con los príncipes del Círculo de la Baja Sajonia, a quienes preocupaba cada vez más la seguridad de sus propiedades eclesiásticas secularizadas. Más importante era el hecho de que muchos de los príncipes, sobre todo los de Brandemburgo, Ansbach, Württemberg y Baden, estaban muy atrasados en el pago de sus contribuciones, por lo cual la alianza dependía económicamente de las aportaciones de las ciudades. Los representantes urbanos, encabezados por Nuremberg, Ulm y Estrasburgo, no dudaron en utilizar su poder financiero para imponer los términos del nuevo tratado. Las ciudades consiguieron que se les reconociera el derecho de veto de cualquier actividad militar de la alianza; la Unión sólo apoyaría las reivindicaciones de los territorios que pertenecían a sus miembros en ese momento y, para impedir expresamente verse implicada en la posible reanudación del conflicto entre España y Holanda, la alianza duraría solamente hasta el 14 de mayo de 1621, y no hasta 1625, como deseaban los príncipes.[71] Así pues, los intereses de Brandemburgo en Cleves-Juliers no fueron tenidos en cuenta y el elector abandonó la alianza poco después.

La pérdida de uno de los dos príncipes más importantes y el poder cada vez mayor de las ciudades fueron causa de que la Unión perdiera gran parte de su fuerza. Pero, para Anhalt, su debilidad se veía contrarrestada por la de la Liga. De cualquier forma, su atención se centró, una vez más, en la amenaza Habsburgo. Durante la invasión de Juliers, el emperador encomendó al comandante español Ambrosio Spínola la misión de restablecer el dominio católico en Aquisgrán, acción que confirmó al elector palatino que ningún emperador Habsburgo dudaría en utilizar tropas españolas en el Imperio y le convenció de que había que encontrar un sucesor para Matías que no perteneciera a la familia Habsburgo.[72] Su convicción se vio reforzada en 1617 cuando descubrió el compromiso de los Habsburgo de apoyar la candidatura del archiduque Fernando de Estiria (véase p. 73, *infra*): Anhalt comentó más tarde que antes habría preferido que se eligiera a un turco o al mismo diablo.[73] Es posible que en determinado momento pensara en la posibilidad de ver coronado a Federico V; Jacobo I

71. Sobre las actividades de las ciudades en la asamblea de Heilbronn, véase J. Müller, «Reichsstädtische Politik in den letzten Zeiten der Union», *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Oesterreichischen Geschichtsforschung*, XXXIII (1912), pp. 484-485.

72. Herold *Ansbach*, pp. 206, 209, 217; Schubert, *Camerarius*, pp. 50-51.

73. Herold, *Ansbach*, p. 229.

afirmó más tarde que en octubre de 1610 le habían presentado un plan para conseguir la elección de Federico.[74] Pero era imposible conseguir la mayoría de votos para Federico en el colegio electoral y, en consecuencia, con la esperanza de dividir a los electores católicos, el Palatinado se decidió a apoyar la candidatura de Maximiliano de Baviera. Entre 1616 y 1618 se desarrollaron largas conversaciones entre Heidelberg y Munich. No obstante, fue imposible convencer a Maximiliano para que se decantara por los protestantes y, por otra parte, tanto Jacobo I como Luis XIII manifestaron su negativa a interferir en la elección de un miembro de la familia Hasburgo.[75]

Fracasadas las negociaciones con Baviera, Anhalt retornó a su estrategia anterior de golpear en el mismo corazón del poder imperial, apoyando a las Dietas protestantes de Austria y Bohemia. Durante el invierno de 1616-1617, Camerarius y Christoph von Dohna fueron enviados a Praga para intensificar los contactos entre Heidelberg y los protestantes bohemios.[76] Al mismo tiempo, Anhalt demostraba cada vez mayor interés en la formación de un frente anti-Habsburgo con Venecia y Saboya en el norte de Italia. Sus agentes se habían mantenido activos en Venecia desde que esta república se enfrentara con el papado en 1605-1608 y, por lo que respecta a Saboya, aunque Carlos Manuel había perdido la confianza de los círculos calvinistas a

74. BL, Adicional MS. 34324, f. 119, Diario de sir Julius Caesar: notas sobre la reunión del consejo privado del 29 de septiembre/9 de octubre de 1620. Véase también NLS, Advocates Library, MS, 33.1.12, art. 35, Zweibrücken a Jacobo I, 19 de marzo de 1612.

75. Sobre la aproximación del Palatinado a Maximiliano, véase Schubert, *Camerarius*, p. 82, y Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, pp. 35-36. El informe privado de Maximiliano sobre este tema está publicado en Altmann, *Reichspolitik*, pp. 480-485. (Pero véase también pp. 199-226, donde Altmann estudia las implicaciones de este documento.) Respecto al intento de Federico de conseguir el apoyo de Jacobo I para este plan y sobre la todavía misteriosa reunión mantenida entre él mismo, Bouillon y el embajador inglés en Francia (sir Thomas Edmondes) en Sedán, en julio de 1617, véase BL, Stowe MS. 176, f. 144, Federico a Edmondes, 21 de agosto de 1617; A. Ballesteros y Beretta, ed., *Correspondencia Oficial de Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, Conde de Gondomar*, Documentos Inéditos para la Historia de España, I, Madrid, 1936, pp. 150-151: Gondomar al archiduque Alberto, 16 de diciembre de 1617; y S. R. Gardiner, ed., *Letters and Documents illustrating the Relations between England and Germany... 1618-1620*, I, Camden Society, XC, Londres, 1865, pp. 27-28: consulta de Gondomar, 19 de enero de 1619.

76. Altmann, *Reichspolitik*, p. 199.

raíz de la «Escalada» (su intento de ocupar Ginebra en 1602), los conflictos entre España y Saboya desde 1613 a 1617 a propósito de Monferrato le hicieron pensar que tal vez estaría dispuesto a incorporarse a una alianza anti-Habsburgo. Además, Jacobo I había instado al Palatinado para que cultivara la amistad de Saboya y, por otra parte, la tentación de cerrar los pasos alpinos a España era difícil de resistir.[77] En 1617, se permitió en un gesto de buena voluntad que un antiguo asociado de Ansbach, Ernesto, conde de Mansfeld, reclutara un regimiento para Carlos Manuel de Saboya en territorios de la Unión.

Por tanto, en 1618, Anhalt estaba poniendo en práctica la misma política de 1609-1610, aunque en esta ocasión lo que estaba en juego no eran dos pequeños —aunque importantes desde el punto de vista estratégico— ducados sino el futuro del Imperio. No obstante, desde su perspectiva, el desafío al Imperio no era una misión imposible. Si los recientes acontecimientos habían puesto de relieve la debilidad de la Unión, también le satisfacía el hundimiento de la Liga en medio de la discordia interna. Y si sus aliados extranjeros, sobre todo Inglaterra y Francia, habían resultado menos confiables de lo esperado, el peligro de actuar aislado había que relativizarlo, teniendo en cuenta que en los Países Bajos se produciría de nuevo un conflicto importante cuando expirara la Tregua de los Doce Años en 1621. Inglaterra, y quizá también Francia, se vería obligada a alinearse en el bando anti-Habsburgo. Lo que Anhalt ignoraba era que sus planes se verían alterados en el tiempo cuando en mayo de 1618 llegara la noticia de que en Praga se habían producido acontecimientos inesperados y dramáticos.

IV. La tormenta se avecina...

Rodolfo II quedó profundamente quebrantado por su destitución en mayo de 1611. En enero de 1612 moría, cuando apenas contaba 60 años. Más tarde durante ese mismo año, su hermano y heredero, Matías, fue elegido emperador, reuniendo bajo su cetro todas las tierras y títulos de Rodolfo. Pero sus credenciales para desempeñar tan

77. BGSA, Kasten Schwarz 16688, f. 171, Jacobo I a Federico, 12/22 de marzo de 1616.

alto cargo no eran buenas. En 1577, pese a la prohibición expresa de su familia, había viajado en secreto desde Viena hasta Bruselas para convertirse en cabeza visible de la rebelión de los holandeses contra Felipe II. Pero en palabras de un estrecho colaborador, su posición le pareció «como un laberinto en el que no cree que sus acciones susciten agradecimiento». No se equivocaba: en 1581 sus propios súbditos le obligaron a dimitir. Entonces, Matías se trasladó a Linz para ejercer el cargo de gobernador de la Alta Austria en nombre de su hermano. Para disgusto de Rodolfo, se rodeó de consejeros calvinistas y en 1586-1587 partió en una gira por el norte de Europa que incluía la visita de la protestante Dinamarca. En 1590 estableció su residencia en Viena, donde bajo la influencia de Melchior Khlesl, obispo de Viena, se fueron apagando gradualmente sus simpatías hacia los reformados. Sin embargo, todavía le faltaba carisma a los ojos de los católicos más recalcitrantes. Su conducta de 1608, cuando enfrentó al emperador con las Dietas locales para conseguir apoyo para su causa, impresionó muy desfavorablemente al archiduque Fernando de Estiria: «todos los católicos lo lamentan profundamente —escribió—, pero los protestantes se sienten felices».[78]

Ciertamente, Fernando estaba interesado en mantener el prestigio imperial, pues se consideraba el siguiente en la línea sucesoria después de Matías (que no tenía heredero), tanto para la corona imperial como para las de Austria, Bohemia y Hungría. Pero no todos pensaban así, ni siquiera todos los miembros de la Casa de Habsburgo. Sus parientes y sus consejeros consideraban que dependía demasiado estrechamente de los jesuitas. El rector de la Universidad de Ingolstadt, adonde Fernando había sido enviado por su madre bávara, afirmó con satisfacción acerca del joven príncipe que «nada de lo que se siembra en este fértil suelo parece perecer» y en 1616, un exasperado Khlesl, que intentaba negociar la sucesión con Fernando, se quejó ante Matías de que «la corte de Graz está gobernada tanto por la opinión de los jesuitas como por la de sus consejeros; están con el archiduque y en torno a él durante todo el día y la noche».[79] Si esta piedad ejemplar

78. Citas de Sturmberger, «Die Anfänge des Bruderzwistes in Habsburg», p. 164; y Franzl, *Ferdinand II*, p. 116.

79. Citado en Novotny y Sutter, *Innerösterreich*, p. 110. Más tarde, cuando los jesuitas podían jactarse de que a su orden pertenecían los confesores de Maximiliano de Baviera (Adam Contzen) y Fernando (Guillermo Lamormaini), el General de la Orden escribía un número de cartas diez veces mayor tanto a Viena como a Munich, tal era la frecuencia con que se aceptaban los consejos de Lamormaini.

irritaba a sus primos, aterrorizaba a los protestantes. Muchos de los que habían sido expulsados de la Austria Interior en 1599-1600 se habían refugiado en Bohemia y se apresuraron a advertir lo que podía suponer el gobierno de Fernando. Antes de que pasara mucho tiempo, la corte de Graz se había puesto en contacto con los católicos asediados de otras provincias Habsburgo, instándoles a mantenerse firmes y aceptando con entusiasmo a los conversos. Por ejemplo, en la Baja Austria el número de nobles católicos se incrementó desde un 10 por 100 del total a un 25 por 100, entre 1580 y 1610, y en este último año —con satisfacción de Fernando— sesenta de ellos crearon una asociación «para la defensa de la fe y la iglesia de Dios Todopoderoso».[80] En el obispado de Olomouc, que cubría gran parte de Moravia, el cardenal Franz von Dietrichstein consiguió elevar el nivel del clero, reformó diversos monasterios y fundó un seminario para fortalecer a la Iglesia católica. Por otra parte, intentó en todo momento incomodar a los protestantes. En su acción antirreformista, contó en todos los aspectos con la colaboración de la corte de Graz.[81] Pero a partir de 1612 el celo religioso de Fernando se vio atemperado por tres dificultades políticas relacionadas entre sí: la sucesión, las hostilidades en el norte de Italia y la amenaza de un nuevo conflicto en los Países Bajos.

En el centro de todos esos problemas estaba España. En cuanto Matías fue nombrado emperador, Felipe III comenzó las conversaciones sobre la sucesión con sus parientes austriacos. En octubre de 1612, el rey dio a conocer su pretensión de aspirar al título imperial en su condición de único nieto varón de Maximiliano II. Se declaró dispuesto a ceder sus derechos en favor de Fernando, pero si recibía a cambio Alsacia, el Tirol y algunas posesiones imperiales en Italia. El precio fue considerado demasiado alto por el archiduque y no se alcanzó acuerdo alguno, pero cuando se reanudaron las conversaciones sobre la sucesión cinco años después, la posición negociadora de Fernando respecto a España era mucho más débil. En 1615, un ejército veneciano con importantes refuerzos holandeses e ingleses había comen-

80. Véase Mecenseffy, *Geschichte des Protestantismus in Oesterreich*, p. 136; y Reingrabner, *Adel und Reformation*, pp. 17-18.

81. Véase J. Köhler, «Franz Kardinal von Dietrichstein, Bischof von Olmütz (1599-1636) und die Prämonstratensen in Mähren», *Archiv für Kirchengeschichte von Böhmen-Mähren-Schlesien*, V (1977), pp. 256-270.

zado la «guerra contra los uscoques», sitiando la ciudad de Gradisca, y Fernando necesitaba desesperadamente la ayuda española.

La guerra contra los uscoques fue uno de los episodios más extraños de comienzos del siglo XVII, pero constituye un ejemplo alarmante de cómo un acontecimiento político secundario, ocurrido en un extremo remoto de Europa, podía amenazar con sumir en la guerra a todo el continente. La defensa de la frontera austriaca con Turquía estaba encomendada parcialmente a los refugiados procedentes de los Balcanes que habían huido a territorio Habsburgo. Se les llamaba «uscoques» (término que en lengua servia significa refugiados). Algunos de ellos se habían instalado en los pequeños puertos del Adriático oriental, especialmente en Zengg (Segna, capturada en 1537) y mantenían a los barcos turcos alejados de la zona. Lamentablemente para Fernando, sus vasallos tampoco permitían la navegación de barcos cristianos. Nadie se veía libre de sus ataques piráticos y los mercaderes venecianos eran frecuentemente uno de sus objetivos. En un principio, la República de Venecia invirtió grandes sumas en escoltas para sus barcos, en torres de vigilancia y en armamento, nombrando desde 1575 un *capitano contra gli uscocchi*, pero el coste de todas esas medidas pronto resultó prohibitivo (120.000 táleros anuales en el decenio de 1590, 200.000 en la década de 1600 y 360.000 en 1615). Además, a los uscoques se les unieron otros elementos, entre ellos corsarios españoles que operaban desde el vecino reino de Nápoles, hasta el punto de que, según un cronista contemporáneo, «parecía como si todos los que navegaban en el mar se hubieran unido en un complot para hundir la flota veneciana».[82]

De forma algo sorprendente, la República de Venecia llegó a la conclusión de que la mejor defensa era el ataque y en diciembre de 1615 sus fuerzas atravesaron el Isonzo para sitiar Gradisca. Al mismo tiempo, una serie de enviados venecianos al extranjero orquestaron una

82. Citas tomadas de A. Tenenti, *Piracy and the Decline of Venice, 1580-1615* (ed. ingl., Londres, 1967), VI, pp. 12, 15. No existe un buen estudio de la guerra contra los uscoques, pero puede obtenerse bastante información en las siguientes obras: P. Geyl, *Christofforo Suriano. Resident van de Serenissime Republiek van Venetië in den Haag, 1616-1623*, La Haya, 1913; S. Gigante, «Venezia e gli Uscocchi», *Fiume: revista semestrale della società di studi fiumani in Fiume*, IX (1931), pp. 3-87; y H. Valentinitsch, «Ferdinand II, die innerösterreichischen Länder, und der Gradiskanerkrieg (1615-18)», en P. Urban y B. Sutter, eds., *Johannes Kepler 1571-1971. Gedenkschrift der Universität Graz*, Graz, 1975, pp. 497-539. Véase también p. 402, *infra*.

gran campaña diplomática para buscar aliados en su lucha contra Fernando. En septiembre de 1616, el conde Juan Ernesto de Nassau-Siegen acordó reclutar 3.000 hombres en la República de Holanda para ayudar a Venecia en su enfrentamiento con el archiduque. Esas tropas llegaron al teatro de operaciones en mayo del año siguiente. Seis meses después llegaron otros 2.000 hombres, junto con un contingente de voluntarios ingleses. Mientras tanto, una flotilla formada por diez barcos de guerra ingleses y doce holandeses navegó por el Adriático para impedir que España enviara ayuda a Fernando desde Nápoles. España tampoco estaba en situación de mandar refuerzos desde Milán, debido al estallido de la «guerra de Mantua».

Mantua era una posesión imperial en la que la herencia había de recaer en un varón. Así, a la muerte del duque Francisco, ocurrida en 1612, que dejó una hija pero ningún hijo, el Estado pasó a manos de su hermano Fernando (véase cuadro 1). Pero Monferrato, gobernado por los duques Gonzaga de Mantua durante generaciones, no conocía las mismas restricciones que Mantua: estaba permitida la sucesión por línea femenina. En consecuencia, fue reclamado por la hija de Francisco, que solicitó ayuda al duque de Saboya (su abuelo).[83] El duque Fernando pidió ayuda a los Habsburgo, pero pese a contar con ella, en el verano de 1615, momento en que los diplomáticos franceses negociaron una tregua, no había conseguido todavía ocupar todo el Monferrato. Pero el año siguiente, el gobierno francés (a cuyo frente estaba temporalmente el obispo de Luçon, futuro cardenal-duque de Richelieu) y los venecianos ofrecieron ayuda a Saboya si invadía de nuevo el Monferrato, operación que mantendría ocupadas a las tropas españolas. El duque reclutó gran número de soldados y su ejército incluyó finalmente a 4.000 protestantes alemanes, reclutados con el

83. Sobre la primera guerra de sucesión de Mantua, véase A. Bombín Pérez, *La cuestión de Monferrato 1613-1617*, Vitoria, 1976. Hay que decir, sin embargo, que los mapas de las comunicaciones imperiales de España que se incluyen al final de su obra son muy incorrectos. Los itinerarios correctos se muestran en el mapa 2 de este libro. Sobre la cultura de los duques Gonzaga, véase el excelente catálogo de la exposición realizada en 1981 en el Victoria and Albert Museum: D. Chambers y J. Martineau, eds., *Splendours of the Gonzaga*, Londres, 1981, especialmente las páginas 203-247. También estuvo a punto de estallar la guerra en Italia en 1610, provocada, una vez más, por el ambicioso y voluble duque de Saboya, Carlos Manuel. Véase al respecto, A. Bombín Pérez, «La política antiespañola de Carlos Manuel I de Saboya, 1607-1610», *Cuadernos de investigación histórica*, II, 1978, pp. 153-173.

consentimiento de los líderes de la Unión por el conde Ernest Mansfeld, y a unos 10.000 voluntarios franceses. Aunque el gobernador de la Lombardía española consiguió hacer frente a este abigarrado ejército hasta que la mediación papal permitió la firma de la paz en octubre de 1617, no pudo ayudar al archiduque Fernando en su lucha con Venecia.

Así pues, el archiduque parecía condenado a una resonante derrota. Con sólo 4.000 hombres en armas, la sitiada Gradisca parecía condenada a menos que el archiduque pudiera encontrar dinero para reclutar nuevas tropas. De hecho, sólo España podía aportar los subsidios que permitirían evitar la rendición, y la cesión de Alsacia y de dos enclaves imperiales en Italia (Finale Liguria y Piombino) no parecía ahora un precio muy elevado a cambio del reconocimiento español de Fernando como heredero de Matías y de la entrega de casi un millón de táleros en efectivo.[84] Así, en marzo de 1617, Fernando y el embajador español ante la corte imperial, conde de Oñate, concluyeron un acuerdo en el que se formalizaron estas condiciones. Contando, pues, con el apoyo español, Fernando se unió al emperador Matías en Viena y ambos se trasladaron a Dresde para entrevistarse con Juan Jorge de Sajonia, «para discutir un asunto importante concerniente al bienestar del Imperio», es decir, la sucesión.[85] El elector se mostró complaciente y el séquito Habsburgo se dirigió primero a Praga y luego a Bratislava, donde Fernando fue aceptado por las Dietas de Bohemia y Hungría como «rey de romanos». Todo parecía marchar bien para el archiduque. Ante la presión militar y diplomática de España, los venecianos concluyeron un acuerdo con Fernando en 1618, gracias al cual muchos de los piratas uscoques fueron ejecutados o exiliados y se instaló una guarnición austriaca en Zengg. La Austria Interior estaba finalmente a salvo.

La guerra contra los uscoques, aunque aparentemente un episodio menor, fue importante porque hizo mucho más real la posibilidad de un conflicto general europeo. En el plano diplomático, cimentó o provocó la formación de alianzas que favorecían la agresión: la fácil

84. Cifras totales tomadas de AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, 2.ª época, 706 y 2059. El tratado propuesto por el conde de Oñate se firmó el 20 de marzo de 1617 y fue ratificado en julio.

85. Franzl, *Ferdinand II*, p. 169. Heinrich Schütz compuso para la ocasión una versión (que se ha perdido) de *Apolo y las nueve musas*. Prácticamente, éste fue su primer trabajo como capellán principal del elector de Sajonia.

cooperación de la Unión protestante con Saboya y Venecia y la aparente disposición de Inglaterra y la República de Holanda a enviar ayuda militar a aliados distantes fortaleció la moral de los protestantes en todas partes, mientras que el impresionante y rápido apoyo que el rey de España prestó a Fernando puso fin a los varios decenios de desconfianza e incomprensión que habían mantenido apartadas a las dos ramas principales de la Casa de Habsburgo. Aunque Alsacia no pasó a poder de los españoles, el tratado negociado por el conde de Oñate creó un marco en el que Viena y Madrid podrían trabajar para asegurar sus intereses conjuntos tanto al norte como al sur de los Alpes. Se planteaba, sin embargo, un problema logístico: ¿cómo pasar de la intención a la acción? ¿Cómo llegarían a Lombardía las tropas de Austria y viceversa? Los pasos montañosos occidentales estaban controlados por el hostil duque de Saboya; los pasos del centro de los Alpes, por los poderosos pero neutrales cantones suizos: Sólo los pasos controlados por las Ligas grisonas protestantes (*Graubünden*), que no formaban parte todavía de la confederación suiza, parecían ofrecer la posibilidad de unir la Lombardía española y el Tirol Habsburgo, permitiendo el acceso (si era necesario) a Alsacia, Lorena y, finalmente, a los Países Bajos (véase mapa 2). Había, además, un punto débil en las Ligas grisonas: el corredor católico de la Valtelina, que comunicaba directamente el lago Como con el Inn. Ya en 1572 y 1607, los católicos de la Valtelina se habían rebelado contra sus dominadores protestantes, mientras que en 1603 el gobierno español había construido un gran reducto a la entrada del valle: el «fuerte Fuentes» (así llamado por su creador, el conde de Fuentes, que gobernó la Lombardía española con mano de hierro desde 1600 a 1610).[86] En 1618 se produjeron nuevas revueltas de los habitantes de la Valtelina contra los protestantes, pero fueron tan salvajemente reprimidas que muchos de los líderes católicos tuvieron que huir a Innsbruck y Milán. Entonces, intentaron convencer a los representantes de las dos ramas de la

86. Existe un bello soneto de Wordsworth sobre el fuerte Fuentes, y una descripción del mismo en los diarios de su esposa (1821-1822). Véase: W. Knight, ed., *The Poetical Works of William Wordsworth*, VI, Londres, 1896, pp. 328-332. Véase también A. Giussani, *Il forte di Fuentes. Episode e documenti di una lotta secolare per il dominio della Valtellina*, Como, 1905. Sobre la crisis de la Valtelina de 1618-1620, véase *The Cambridge Modern History*, IV, cap. 2: «The Valtelline», y A. Rotondò, «Esuli italiani in Valtellina nel '500», *Rivista Storica Italiana*, LXXXVIII (1976), pp. 756-791.

familia Habsburgo de que la restitución de la Valtelina a los católicos sería beneficiosa para ambas. Tuvieron éxito en su misión diplomática y en julio de 1620 las tropas de los Habsburgo bloquearon ambos extremos de la Valtelina, los protestantes fueron aplastados en una nueva rebelión y los españoles se hicieron con el control del valle, creando un corredor militar seguro que iba desde Lombardía hasta Austria y el norte de Europa.

Ese nuevo itinerario era muy necesario. La Tregua de los Doce Años firmada por Felipe III en 1609 no era vista con buenos ojos en España. Aunque la lucha se interrumpió en los Países Bajos, permitiendo la reducción del ejército de Flandes a una fuerza de 15.000 hombres, y aunque la piratería holandesa en el mar del Norte cesó casi por completo, no cedieron los ataques de la República contra las posesiones españolas de ultramar. Bajo la dirección general de la Compañía Holandesa de las Indias Orientales se establecieron fuertes en la costa de Guyana en Sudamérica, en el río Hudson en Norteamérica y en la Costa de Oro en África. En 1615-1616, una flota formada por seis grandes buques de guerra navegó hacia el oeste hasta las Molucas, atacando diversas colonias españolas en América y destruyendo todos los barcos españoles y portugueses que se cruzaron en su camino. Apoyados en tan brutales tácticas, los holandeses no tardaron en exportar doble cantidad de pimienta de Asia —el producto más valioso en el comercio de las especias— que los portugueses. Si estos acontecimientos suscitaron la ira de Madrid, el apoyo de Holanda a los enemigos de España en Europa fue considerado como un ultraje. Ya en diciembre de 1616, el Consejo de Estado había decidido que si las tropas holandesas acudían en ayuda del duque de Saboya, España reanudaría la guerra en los Países Bajos.[87] Aunque esta amenaza no se materializó, en marzo de 1618 los ministros de Felipe III iniciaron un debate interno sobre la conveniencia de renovar la Tregua de los Doce Años, cuando expirara tres años después. Desde el principio, advirtieron que el progreso de Holanda había sido extraordinario y el sentimiento general era que la tregua no debía ser renovada a menos que fuera posible variar sus términos, en especial en lo referente al comercio ultramarino, consiguiendo unas condiciones más favorables para España. En palabras de don Carlos Coloma, general del ejército de Flandes, tantas veces citadas (por su veracidad): «Si en doce años de paz los holandeses han conseguido todo esto, no es difícil imaginar lo que harán si les damos más tiempo ... Si continúa la tregua, nos condenaremos a sufrir todos los males de la paz y todos los peligros de la guerra».[88] Era evidente, pues, que en la primavera de 1621 estallaría un gran conflicto en Europa y la mayor parte de los observadores políticos eran conscientes de ello. Los acontecimientos de Bohemia de 1618 simplemente anticiparon ese conflicto general, relacionando todas las crisis incipientes, pero separadas, que ya habían polarizado la opinión en el Imperio y en el territorio Habsburgo.

87. AGS, Guerra Antigua, 808, sin folio, *consulta* de 26 de diciembre de 1616. De hecho, las tropas holandesas acudieron en ayuda de Venecia, por lo que se evitaron las hostilidades, pero la decisión ilustra la actitud beligerante del gobierno. Véase un espléndido relato de los acontecimientos durante la Tregua en Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, caps. 1 y 2, y Brightwell, «The Spanish system and the Twelve Years' Truce».

En el invierno de 1617-1618, una vez elegido Fernando (sin condiciones) como rey de romanos por las Dietas de Bohemia y Hungría, la corte imperial se desplazó hacia el sur, a Viena, dejando una comisión de diez regentes (siete de ellos católicos extremistas) al frente del gobierno de Praga. Siguiendo instrucciones de Fernando, los regentes decretaron una serie de medidas provocadoras: crearon la figura del censor en la capital para controlar la literatura impresa, prohibieron que se utilizaran los fondos católicos para pagar a los ministros protestantes y se negaron a admitir a individuos no católicos para desempeñar puestos en la administración civil. Lo que era más grave todavía, ordenaron que cesara el culto protestante en dos ciudades —Broumov (Braunau) y Hroby (Klostergrab)— que pertenecían a prelados católicos (los territorios eclesiásticos no estaban incluidos expresamente en la Carta de Majestad). Todas estas medidas incrementaron el riesgo de una confrontación. Polyxena Lobkovic, esposa del canciller de Bohemia, expresó los temores que sentían muchos cuando afirmó que «las cosas estaban llegando rápidamente al punto en que o los papistas acabarían con los protestantes o los protestantes con los papistas».[89]

El papel más importante en la crisis que estaba a punto de estallar correspondió a los miembros de la élite terrateniente de Bohemia: unos 200 nobles y alrededor de 1.000 caballeros. Pero esa élite no estaba unida ni era estable. Se ha calculado que de un total de 69 fa-

88. Citado en *The New Cambridge Modern History*, IV, Cambridge, 1970, p. 280.

89. Citado por Polichenski, *Thirty Years' War*, p. 94.

milias que detentaban tierras en 1557, 37 habían desaparecido completamente en 1615, apareciendo en su lugar una serie de hombres nuevos como el canciller Lobkovic, el cardenal Dietrichstein o el presidente del consejo de regencia de 1617-1618, Vilém Slavata. Se ha atribuido gran importancia a ese «fracaso biológico» de la aristocracia de Bohemia, pero mucho más importante fue el hecho de que las familias sobrevivientes y los nuevos aristócratas adquirieran progresivamente una mayor proporción de las tierras del reino. En 1529, los nobles poseían menos de la mitad de todas las tierras señoriales, mientras que en 1619 eran dueños de casi las tres cuartas partes.

Fue entre estos grandes terratenientes donde la Iglesia católica encontró la mayor parte de sus conversos en los años anteriores a la revuelta y en ellos hallaron también los Habsburgo su más firme apoyo.[90] Los que en 1618 defendían la religión protestante y la libertad constitucional procedían fundamentalmente de la pequeña nobleza y de la alta burguesía y eran plenamente conscientes de su declive político y económico. Comprendían también que el *status* que les adjudicaba la Carta de Majestad era provisional. Tal como afirmó Tschernembl, el líder de la Dieta de la Alta Austria: «lo que el príncipe puede hacer, también lo puede deshacer». Fue para superar esta inferioridad por lo que los líderes bohemios comenzaron a buscar aliados en el extranjero que pudieran prestarles apoyo moral y, si era necesario, político e incluso militar. La lista de los contribuyentes para la construcción de una nueva iglesia protestante en la vieja ciudad de Praga en 1610 —una de las tres que se construirían en la ciudad desde la promulgación de la Carta de Majestad— nos permite conocer dónde trataba de encontrar apoyo la Dieta. Jacobo I de Inglaterra encabezaba la lista con una donación de más de 3.000 táleros; a continuación figuraban los electores de Sajonia, Brandemburgo y el Palatinado, los príncipes de Brunswick, Hesse y Württemberg, y muchos otros. Esa lista es una relación de príncipes protestantes importantes, tanto luteranos como calvinistas.[91] No fue únicamente la religión lo que llevó a los súbditos protestantes de los Habsburgo a ponerse en contacto con sus simpatizantes extranjeros, sino también el interés por

90. Véase J. V. Polichenski y F. Snider, *War and Society in Europe, 1618-1648*, Cambridge, 1978, pp. 202-216.

91. Detalles tomados de R. Schreiber, *Das Spenderbuch für den Bau der protestantischen Salvatorkirche in Prag, 1610-1615*, Salzburgo, 1956.

la educación y la cultura. En 1622, Fernando responsabilizaba a las «subversivas escuelas calvinistas» de la revuelta de Bohemia, porque los nobles del reino «en su juventud se habían empapado del espíritu de rebelión y oposición a la autoridad legítima».[92] Ciertamente, más de 200 estudiantes de Bohemia y Moravia estudiaron en las universidades de Heidelberg, Ginebra y Basilea entre 1574 y 1620, «empapándose» de obras como *La defensa de la libertad contra los tiranos,* de Duplessis Mornay y *Los derechos de los gobernantes sobre sus súbditos,* de Beza. Fue un noble moravo quien en 1605 compró toda la biblioteca de Beza, llevándola a su casa. Fueron aún más los estudiantes bohemios —más de 300 en total— que durante ese mismo período asistieron a las universidades luteranas radicales de Jena (en Sajonia-Weimar) y Altdorf (en las inmediaciones de Nuremberg); una docena de ellos fueron, más tarde, miembros del gobierno rebelde. Los profesores de ambas instituciones expresaron su apoyo a la causa de los rebeldes en 1619-1620 y algunos llegaron incluso a criticar en público la posición pro-Habsburgo de las universidades de Leipzig y Wittenberg en la Sajonia electoral. Un diploma de Jena o Altdorf debía de ser considerado por Fernando como ¡un diploma en estudios revolucionarios! [93]

Sin embargo, los profesores radicales reflejaban simplemente la posición de sus poderosos patronos. Jena criticaba constantemente a Wittenberg porque los duques de Sajonia-Weimar eran enemigos implacables de los Habsburgo y de Sajonia.[94] Altdorf apoyaba la causa de Bohemia porque la mayor parte de sus alumnos procedían del Alto Palatinado, gobernado desde Amberg por Cristián de Anhalt, el más activo defensor de la causa anti-habsburguesa, que difundía sus con-

92. Citado por J. K. Zeman, «Responses to Calvin and Calvinism among the Czech brethren (1540-1605)», *American Society for Reformation Research Occasional Papers*, I (1977), pp. 41-52, en la p. 45.

93. Detalles tomados de J. Polichenski, «Die Universität Jena und der Aufstand der Böhmischen Stände in den Jahren 1618-1620», *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena*, VII (1957-1958), pp. 441-447; y A. Ernstberger, *Die Universität Nürnberg-Altdorf während des dreissigjährigen Krieges in ihrem Bestande bedroht*, Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophische-historische Klasse, Jahrgang 1966, parte II, Munich, 1966.

94. El odio tenía razón de ser. En 1547, la rama Ernestina fue desposeída por Carlos V del título electoral, y de la mayor parte de sus tierras, en beneficio de la rama Albertina de la familia. Los duques de Sajonia-Weimar descendían de la antigua familia electoral y nunca perdonaron a sus primos ni a los Habsburgo.

vicciones tanto por medios culturales como políticos. En 1617, se fundaron (por inspiración de su hermano) dos sociedades literarias de claro signo protestante: la *Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft* (para la defensa de la lengua alemana) en Weimar y la *Ordre de la Palme d'Or* (para los nobles calvinistas) en Amberg. A no tardar, se afiliaron a ambas la mayor parte de los defensores de las aspiraciones de Federico V a la corona de Bohemia, muchos de ellos procedentes del exterior del Imperio.[95]

Naturalmente, los líderes bohemios recibieron una fuerte influencia de Anhalt y de su red de poderosos y cultos amigos. Cuando en 1618 decidieron resistirse al emperador, sin duda esperaban que su causa encontraría una ayuda masiva en el extranjero, tal como había ocurrido en 1616 y 1617 en el caso de Venecia. Pero cometieron un fatal error de cálculo. Aunque visto desde Amberg o Praga, un individuo con gustos y creencias similares podía ser considerado como un aliado político en tiempo de paz, los acontecimientos demostrarían que había una gran distancia entre la intención y la acción cuando se trataba de la guerra. Asimismo, quedó de manifiesto que si el apoyo a un Estado independiente estaba permitido entre las naciones europeas, no sucedía lo mismo cuando se trataba de prestar apoyo a los rebeldes.

95. Véase R. J. W. Evans, «Learned societies in Germany in the seventeenth century», *European Studies Review*, VII (1977), pp. 129-151; y M. Bircher y F. van Ingen, eds., *Sprachgesellschaften, Sozietäten, Dichtergruppen*, Hamburgo, 1978: Wolfenbütteler Arbeiten zur Barockforschung, VII. En esta última obra se observa que, de las 23 sociedades eruditas fundadas en Alemania durante el siglo XVII, 7 se establecieron en 1620 o antes y 13 en 1649 o antes de ese año (p. 54). Irónicamente, había tantos extranjeros afiliados a la *Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft* que la mayoría de sus actividades se realizaron en francés.

Capítulo II

LA GUERRA INDECISA, 1618-1629

Los acontecimientos del decenio de 1620 constituyen el problema de más difícil solución para los historiadores de la Guerra de los Treinta Años. Por una parte, hay que explicar el éxito sin precedentes de las potencias católicas y, por otra, es necesario analizar el tortuoso curso de los protestantes hacia la derrota. Este último es el objetivo más difícil, como consecuencia de la fragmentación de los esfuerzos de los protestantes. Hasta 1621, la lucha tuvo como único foco la cuestión de Bohemia, pero en ese año se reanudó el conflicto entre España y la República de Holanda y los ejércitos protestantes suecos atacaron a la católica Polonia. Aunque el desarrollo de estos nuevos conflictos estaba íntimamente ligado a la evolución de la guerra en Alemania, en conjunto fueron conducidos por separado hasta el final del decenio. Además, Francia intervino por primera vez en 1624: participó en los dos conflictos existentes y comenzó una nueva guerra en el norte de Italia y en los valles alpinos. Pero su participación fue siempre intermitente e impredecible. Y ello por dos razones: en primer lugar, como consecuencia de los desórdenes internos provocados por los nobles disidentes y los protestantes militantes y, en segundo lugar, por las luchas de los diferentes grupos de poder por el control de la situación. Estos dos problemas hicieron casi imposible llevar a cabo una política exterior coherente.

Pero no sólo Francia actuaba de forma incoherente. La mayor parte de los estados que intervenían en la guerra en esa época también tenían dudas respecto a las razones que les impulsaban. Algunos líderes políticos creían que existía una conspiración internacional contra ellos, organizada según principios confesionales y cuyo objetivo era no

sólo acabar con su libertad sino con la religión que profesaban. Sin embargo, otros afirmaban que el único objetivo de la guerra era el beneficio de Federico del Palatinado, primero para conseguirle el título de «rey de Bohemia» y, después, para restituirle su condición de elector. Prácticamente en todas las cortes de Europa existían facciones que aceptaban estas dos motivaciones opuestas. En Francia, los católicos extremistas (conocidos como los *dévôts*) propugnaban la intervención en favor del emperador para detener la marea protestante, mientras que en Inglaterra, los líderes puritanos del Parlamento urgían a un rey renuente a que luchara con todas sus fuerzas por «la causa protestante».[1] Lo mismo ocurría en las demás naciones: en España, en los Países Bajos, en Suecia, en los principados alemanes (incluso en los de los principales antagonistas, Federico y Fernando) se enfrentaban intervencionistas y aislacionistas. Y dado que ambas interpretaciones eran justificables y, de hecho, se verían ocasionalmente justificadas por los acontecimientos, ninguna de las facciones podía monopolizar durante mucho tiempo la política exterior de su gobierno. Ésta es la razón por la que la diplomacia europea del decenio de 1620 (y en menor medida en la década de 1630) se ve ensombrecida por negociaciones interrumpidas y tratados sin ratificar. Y ésta es la razón, también, por la que resulta tan terriblemente complicada la historia del primer decenio de la Guerra de los Treinta Años, analizada en este capítulo fundamentalmente desde el punto de vista de los protestantes.

I. La guerra de Bohemia

Los Defensores nombrados en 1609 para mantener el precario equilibrio religioso en Bohemia convocaron a la Dieta del reino el 5 de marzo de 1618 para discutir la política antiprotestante de los regentes. Existía una especial preocupación sobre la concesión de tierras de la corona (protegidas por la Carta de Majestad) a prelados católicos (que, al parecer, no estaban vinculados por la Carta). Dado que desde 1611 se habían transferido sólo al arzobispo de Praga 132 parroquias

1. La importancia de las facciones en la determinación de la política exterior de los gobiernos en el decenio de 1620 ha sido muy bien estudiada por Simon Adams: véase «The Protestant cause» y «Spain or the Netherlands: the dilemmas of early Stuart foreign policy». He aprendido mucho de la lectura de estos dos trabajos, así como de las frecuentes discusiones con el Dr. Adams, sobre este tema tan complejo.

«reales», el *status* de esas tierras bajo la Carta de Majestad era una cuestión de una cierta importancia. En consecuencia, la asamblea de Praga envió una petición urgente al emperador solicitando un cambio de política. Matías rechazó esas exigencias y ordenó a los delegados que se dispersaran. Aunque lo hicieron, acordaron reunirse de nuevo en el plazo de dos meses para examinar los acontecimientos. El 23 de mayo, después de sólo dos días de debate, la asamblea recibió nuevamente la orden de disolverse de forma inmediata. Dado que la orden, que parecía ser inconstitucional (tales reuniones estaban permitidas por las concesiones reales de 1609 y 1611), procedía del Consejo de Regentes con sede en Hradschin, los furibundos delegados marcharon hacia palacio, entraron en la Cámara del Consejo y (rememorando conscientemente los acontecimientos que dieron comienzo a la revolución husita en 1418) arrojaron por la ventana a dos de los regentes católicos más destacados y a su secretario. A continuación, los delegados nombraron un gobierno provisional formado por 36 directores y autorizaron el reclutamiento de un pequeño ejército, tal como habían hecho en 1611. Los bohemios se rebelaban por tercera vez en diez años.

Las noticias de la «Defenestración de Praga» provocaron una gran conmoción en la mayor parte de las cortes europeas. Todos los diplomáticos adscritos a la corte imperial habían seguido a Matías desde Praga hasta Viena a finales de 1617 y, por tanto, sus despachos del invierno apenas mencionaban el empeoramiento de la crisis de Bohemia. Cuando conocieron la noticia, reaccionaron con un énfasis excesivo. El embajador español, conde de Oñate (que ocupaba el puesto solamente desde hacía un año), consideró al principio que «la gravedad de la ofensa y la facilidad con que han alcanzado su objetivo les impulsará a terminar lo que han comenzado». En sus cartas dirigidas a Madrid —donde las noticias de la defenestración no llegaron hasta el 6 de julio— se respira una atmósfera de pánico. En enero de 1619, Oñate pensaba que sólo el envío de un importante ejército español podía salvar Bohemia: «Parece necesario que Su Majestad considere qué le proporcionará mayor beneficio —reflexionaba—, la pérdida de estas provincias o el envío de un ejército de quince o veinte mil hombres para solucionar la cuestión».[2]

2. AGS, Estado 2503, f. 7, parecer del conde de Oñate del 30 de mayo de 1618; BNM, MS. 18434, s. f., conde de Oñate al rey, 10 de enero de 1619.

Parece improbable que ni siquiera tan desesperados llamamientos hubieran encontrado una respuesta favorable en Madrid si el círculo real no hubiera estado dominado, precisamente en esa época, por la figura formidable de don Baltasar de Zúñiga. Después de realizar un servicio distinguido en el ejército (incluyendo la campaña de la Armada Invencible) y tras un largo período como embajador en Bruselas, París, Roma y Viena, Zúñiga había regresado a Madrid en 1617, donde comenzó a hablar con irrefutable autoridad sobre los asuntos del norte de Europa. Aunque ese breve período de poder aparece en los libros de historia como un simple interludio entre los períodos de dominio de Lerma y Olivares, desde comienzos de 1618 hasta su muerte, en las postrimerías de 1622, Zúñiga utilizó su conocimiento de primera mano del terreno y las personalidades implicadas para justificar su política exterior innovadora y para derrotar la de sus rivales, encabezados por el duque de Lerma. Durante veinte años, el duque había manejado a Felipe III y a su gobierno, pero ahora su influencia estaba en declive. Primero había dejado en manos de su hijo el papel de favorito del rey; ahora, sus decisiones sobre la política exterior española comenzaban a ser cuestionadas. El hombre que había amasado una fortuna personal de 44 millones de táleros (el equivalente de todos los ingresos de Felipe III durante cinco años), que había construido dos palacios y fundado once monasterios, tres cátedras universitarias y dos colegiatas, se veía ahora atacado públicamente de corrupción. Uno de sus principales consejeros fue arrestado por asesinato y malversación de fondos públicos. Para protegerse de este tipo de desgracias, Lerma decidió ingresar en el estamento eclesiástico (asegurándose un cardenalato) en la primavera de 1618 y manifestó ardientes deseos de abandonar sus cargos seculares. Pero antes de ello, intentó llevar a cabo un proyecto que le era muy querido: el envío de una gran expedición naval a Argel.

El reino pirata de Argel había planteado grandes problemas a España durante casi un siglo, pero en los inicios del siglo XVII los ataques de sus piratas contra los barcos españoles y las razias contra los asentamientos costeros alcanzaron una ferocidad sin precedentes. Así, el gobierno de Madrid acordó enviar una gran expedición al norte de África en 1618; pero Zúñiga solicitó que las tropas fueran enviadas a Viena. Desde luego, España no podía afrontar ambas campañas, sobre todo si tenemos en cuenta que estaba enzarzada además en una costosa guerra a propósito de Mantua y los uscoques. En consecuencia,

se hacía inevitable establecer prioridades. En julio de 1618, Lerma y sus aliados intentaron impedir el envío de 200.000 táleros al emperador sobre la base (perfectamente plausible) de que ello le impulsaría a adoptar una actitud más firme que podría desembocar en una guerra prolongada. Pero Lerma fue derrotado y perdió la batalla una vez más en septiembre cuando, a pesar de su fuerte oposición, se enviaron a Viena otros 500.000 táleros. Su derrota definitiva ocurrió en enero de 1619 cuando el rey decidió, no sin renuencia, la necesidad de abandonar la campaña de Argel en favor de la ayuda a Viena:

> Aunque se han hecho muchas diligencias para allar medios con que acudir desta ocasión, de manera que no estorbase la execución de la Jornada de Arjel, está la hazienda de manera que se dificulta mucho, con imposibilidad de poderse acudir a lo uno y lo otro. Y assí por lo que se pudiera aventurar, prendado en todo, y lo que se dilatará el socorro de Bohemia ... parece casso forçosso mirar por aquello.[3]

Así pues, en mayo de 1619 un ejército de 7.000 veteranos del ejército español de Flandes atravesó el Imperio hacia Viena y a finales del reinado de Felipe (en marzo de 1621) unos 40.000 soldados españoles luchaban junto a los Habsburgo austriacos. Hubo también una constante aportación de dinero: 3,4 millones de táleros habían sido enviados en julio de 1619; 6 millones a finales de 1624.[4]

La firme posición de España, que fue plenamente apoyada por los archiduques en Bruselas, indujo a los católicos alemanes a superar sus diferencias y a reactivar la Liga bajo la única dirección de Maximiliano de Baviera. Algunos príncipes católicos se apresuraron a hacer públicas sus simpatías por la Liga. Por ejemplo, el arzobispo de Salzburgo deleitó al archiduque Fernando en julio de 1619, cuando se dirigía a la reunión electoral de Frankfurt, con una parada militar, una representación del *Orfeo* de Peri y, lo que es más importante de todo, un préstamo de 40.000 táleros.[5] Pero la mayor parte de los católicos duda-

3. AGS, Estado 1867, f. 256, nota de Felipe III sobre una consulta del 11 de enero de 1619.

4. Cifras tomadas de Kessel, *Spanien un die geistlichen Kurstaaten*, 53 n., p. 171.

5. Detalles tomados de R. R. Heinisch, *Salzburg im dreissigjährigen Krieg*, Viena, 1968, pp. 10-11. Sin embargo, Salzburgo no llegó a ser nunca miembro pleno de la Liga, con gran disgusto por parte de Maximiliano.

ban todavía en declarar su apoyo a Fernando en su lucha contra los rebeldes bohemios. Deseaban permanecer neutrales y sólo el renovado temor a la existencia de una «internacional protestante» les forzó a adoptar una postura sin ambages.

Las guerras contra los uscoques y contra Mantua, que estaban llegando a su fin en el momento de producirse la defenestración de Praga, habían creado lazos importantes entre varias potencias antihabsburguesas. Las noticias procedentes de Bohemia los mantuvieron vigentes. En cuanto se enteró de las noticias, el duque de Saboya escribió al elector palatino ofreciéndole los servicios del regimiento que Mansfeld había reclutado para él el año anterior, mediante los buenos oficios de la Unión protestante. En agosto de 1618, Federico aceptó agradecido y las tropas saboyanas se trasladaron a Alemania a esperar acontecimientos.[6] Durante un período de tiempo bastante largo, esperaron solas. Los líderes protestantes —Federico, Anhalt y Ansbach— se vieron tan sorprendidos como el que más por los acontecimientos de Bohemia. Aunque habían contemplado la posibilidad de que el elector palatino se convirtiera en rey de Bohemia después de Matías, la preelección de Fernando por la Dieta pareció solucionar el problema de la ocupación del trono de Praga durante al menos otra generación. Ahora, a mediados de junio, la Dieta bohemia escribió a la Unión protestante, solicitando ser admitida como miembro de pleno derecho y pidiendo ayuda militar. Insinuó que la recompensa por una ayuda oportuna sería la elección del líder de la Unión —Federico— como rey, en lugar de Fernando. Por desgracia, esa insinuación se hizo a más de un aspirante al trono —alimentando las esperanzas del duque de Saboya, de Bethlen Gabor de Transilvania, del elector de Sajonia y de Federico del Palatinado— y los Habsburgo, que al parecer interceptaban y descifraban todas las cartas que salían de Praga con destino al extranjero, se apresuraron a hacer pública la duplicidad de los bohemios. Pero durante algún tiempo la indiscreción no tuvo efecto alguno: la rebelión progresó. En el verano de 1618, Lusacia, Silesia y la Alta Austria se unieron a Bohemia; y en el verano de 1619 lo hicieron también Moravia y la Baja Austria. Sólo Hungría permaneció al margen, pero se esperaba que las fuerzas de Bethlen Gabor podrían derrotar a los elementos leales allí. En septiembre de 1618, Mansfeld y el regimiento del duque de Saboya capturaron el bastión de Pilsen. En mayo de 1619, el ejército de los confederados, conducido por Enrique Matías, conde de Thurn (que había desempeñado un papel de primera magnitud en la defenestración), avanzó sobre Viena y la sitió. Al mismo tiempo, Cristián de Anhalt visitó Turín y convenció al duque de Saboya para que incrementara su ayuda económica a la causa, mientras Holanda y Venecia mantenían conversaciones sobre un pacto de defensa mutua contra España. Pero estos éxitos alarmaron a los católicos y hacia junio de 1619 Fernando había conseguido el apoyo necesario como para permitir la invasión de Bohemia.

6. Véase Reade, *Sidelights on the Thirty Years' War*, I, pp. 182-183. No obstante, la ayuda de Saboya tenía un precio. El duque solicitó el apoyo de la Unión en sus pretensiones de ser elegido rey de Bohemia y, si era posible, emperador.

La conclusión de la guerra contra los uscoques permitió que las tropas del archiduque quedaran libres hacia el norte y a lo largo de 1618 diversas unidades avanzaron y establecieron guarniciones en las escasas ciudades que todavía permanecían leales. Pero sólo disponían todavía de 13.000 hombres, un tercio de ellos pagados por los españoles, y el comandante principal de Fernando, el conde Bucquoy, urgió a aquél a que reclutara tropas en el extranjero, en los Países Bajos españoles (donde Bucquoy había hecho sus primeras armas), en Lorena, en Italia y en Croacia. En el verano de 1619, y gracias a la ayuda de los subsidios provenientes de España y el papado, el ejército imperial contaba ya con unos 30.000 hombres, y Toscana, la Lombardía española y los Países Bajos españoles habían prometido enviar refuerzos. El 10 de junio, Bucquoy derrotó a Mansfeld y a su regimiento en Záblatí, en el sur de Bohemia, e interrumpió las comunicaciones entre Praga y el ejército de Thurn en torno a Viena. El asedio terminó casi inmediatamente. Pero casi tan grave para la causa rebelde como estos reveses estratégicos fue la pérdida de su principal valedor extranjero. La cancillería de campo de Mansfeld fue capturada por las tropas imperiales, revelando los detalles de las negociaciones del duque de Saboya con los bohemios, los holandeses, los venecianos y los ingleses. El duque —consciente ya de que no sería elegido rey de Bohemia— se vio en una difícil posición y se apresuró a interrumpir los subsidios (que ya le habían costado casi 40.000 táleros). Pero la rebelión continuó sin él. El 31 de julio de 1619, la Dieta de la corona de Bohemia firmó un pacto mutuo de cien artículos, que creó una unión federal; poco después firmó un tratado especial de alianza con las Dietas de la Alta y la Baja Austria. El 22 de agosto, los confederados derrocaron

solemnemente a Fernando y, pese al apoyo que en algunos lugares encontraron los gobernantes de Transilvania y Sajonia, el día 26 decidieron por una mayoría aplastante ofrecer la corona a Federico del Palatinado.

Fue ésta una elección extraña en muchos sentidos. Aunque una parte de la herencia de Federico —el Alto Palatinado— limitaba con Bohemia, era una zona que raramente visitaba. Además, Federico no era rico ni experimentado. En 1622, un observador hostil, bloqueado por la causa protestante en Frankenthal, cuestionó la conveniencia de elegir «un hombre que nunca había visto una batalla ni un cadáver, ... un príncipe que sabía más sobre jardinería que sobre la guerra».[7] Pero tres años antes eso parecía no tener importancia: Federico era uno de los príncipes mejor relacionados de la Europa protestante (véase cuadro 2). Si algún gobernante podía movilizar el apoyo confesional, ése era él.

De cualquier forma, en agosto y en septiembre de 1619, el joven elector se encontraba ante un dilema y sus consejeros le ofrecieron opiniones contradictorias respecto a la oferta de los bohemios. En conjunto, los consejeros originarios del Palatinado concluyeron que, aunque había varias razones en favor de la aceptación, eran más fuertes los motivos que se oponían a ella, entre otros la probabilidad de que «la aceptación iniciara una guerra religiosa general». Pero los restantes, encabezados por Anhalt y Camerarius, argumentaron que la guerra podría estallar en cualquier caso: parecía inevitable que se produjera una guerra general a la conclusión de la Tregua de los Doce Años en los Países Bajos, mientras que existía evidencia en todas partes de la existencia de una alianza católica militante, cuyo objetivo era la destrucción del protestantismo en toda la Europa central. Si la revuelta bohemia era sofocada, afirmaron Camerarius y sus amigos, el reino perdería la libertad religiosa. Si tal cosa ocurría, ¿durante cuánto tiempo más se sentirían a salvo los protestantes de Alemania? Era ésta una argumentación sólida que compartían muchos observadores extranjeros responsables. Dudley Carleton, embajador inglés en La Haya, afirmó en septiembre de 1619 que «este asunto de Bohemia es como poner en combustión a toda la cristiandad» y subrayó la deducción de los dirigentes holandeses de que «dado que es probable que la revolución del mundo ponga fin a esta era de paz, es mejor comenzar el cambio con ventaja que con desventaja». En efecto, si Bohemia era «descuidada, y en consecuencia, sofocada, los príncipes de la religión contigua sufrirán la carga de un ejército victorioso ... Qué sucederá —añadía con tono pesimista— Dios lo sabe, ya que se verá acosada por los jesuitas y comandada por el nuevo emperador, que se jacta anunciando que extirpará la religión reformada y restablecerá la antigua grandeza de la Iglesia romana».[8]

7. Cita tomada de Toegel, « «Prrichiny saského vpádu do Chech», 560 n., p. 16.

Pero para entonces la causa de los rebeldes bohemios gozaba nuevamente de buena salud. A finales de agosto, Bethlen Gabor, superando su decepción por no haber sido elegido, comenzó la conquista de la Hungría habsburguesa. El 5 de septiembre ocupó Kosiche, la capital de la zona oriental del reino, y fue elegido «protector de Hungría» por la Dieta. Al parecer, la noticia de este éxito decidió a Federico. Aunque, como le confesó a su esposa, se sentía «atormentado por la duda respecto a lo que debía hacer», el 28 de septiembre aceptó la corona bohemia. La oportunidad, afirmó, «es una orden divina que no debo desobedecer. Mi único objetivo es servir a Dios y a su iglesia». Durante un tiempo pareció que el Señor había oído a su siervo. El 13 de octubre, Bethlen derrotó al último ejército Habsburgo en Hungría, comandado por el hermano de Fernando, Leopoldo, y poco después entró en la capital, Bratislava. Desde allí, los transilvanos subieron por el Danubio uniendo sus fuerzas con las de Thurn en noviembre para asediar Viena por segunda vez. No tardaron en llegar diversas ofertas de ayuda. En diciembre llegó a Bratislava un enviado del sultán turco, Osmán II, ofreciendo ayuda militar contra los Habsburgo y, por otra parte, después de largas discusiones sobre la libertad de comercio en el Adriático, los venecianos y la República de Holanda firmaron una alianza de 15 años. Ambas partes se comprometían a pagar a la otra 30.000 táleros al mes en caso de ataque.[9]

Nadie controlaba ya la situación política y muchos estadistas temían por el futuro. El 28 de agosto de 1619, los siete electores imperiales reunidos en Frankfurt decidieron apostar por la seguridad y eli-

8. M. Lee, ed., *Dudley Carleton to John Chamberlain, 1603-1624*, New Brunswick, 1972, pp. 270-271: carta del 18 de septiembre de 1619.

9. Este tratado ha sido estudiado por Geyl, *Christofforo Suriano*, pp. 188-189; y A. van der Essen, «L'alliance défensive hollando-venétienne de 1619 et l'Espagne», en *Miscellanea historica in honorem Leonis van der Essen*, Lovaina, 1947, pp. 819-829.



CUADRO 2.1

Federico V del Palatinado y sus familiares, I



CUADRO 2.2

Federico V del Palatinado y sus familiares, II

gieron unánimemente al archiduque Fernando como próximo emperador. Fue la elección más significativa desde la de Carlos V, ocurrida exactamente un siglo antes, y la primera desde entonces que fue seriamente disputada. Juan Jorge de Sajonia, cuyas fronteras limitaban con Bohemia y el Alto Palatinado, sólo aceptó votar por Fernando cuando, una semana antes de la elección, recibió del gobierno de Bruselas la garantía de que «en caso que el dicho elector fuere molestado de los bohemios, será asistido y socorrido con la gente que su Magestad tiene en Alemania y, si fuere menester con parte deste exercito también».[10]

Algunos observadores experimentados confiaban en que la decisión tomada en Frankfurt pondría fin a la crisis del Imperio. En verdad, en el mes de septiembre el ejército de Flandes retiró las tropas que habían sido movilizadas a lo largo de la frontera alemana durante la elección. Pero la aceptación simultánea de la corona bohemia por parte de Federico recrudeció la tensión. Así, el emperador Fernando se trasladó desde Frankfurt hasta Munich, acompañado por el embajador español, conde de Oñate, y por un alto funcionario del elector de Colonia, para discutir con Maximiliano de Baviera la ayuda que la recientemente reconstituida Liga católica podía prestar a la causa de los Habsburgo. Dado que los católicos alemanes no estaban dispuestos a intervenir excepto si contaban con la ayuda española, la iniciativa correspondía casi por completo al conde de Oñate, que actuó con decisión. Sin esperar a recibir instrucciones de Madrid o Bruselas, el embajador prometió el envío inmediato de 1.000 soldados de caballería de los Países Bajos para unirse a la Liga, el traslado a Austria de importantes refuerzos desde los territorios españoles en Italia y la intervención en Renania de un gran ejército de los Países Bajos. Pero Maximiliano quería todavía más, a cambio de la promesa de comprometer plenamente las fuerzas de la Liga en la lucha contra Bohemia. De esta guisa, el hábil conde de Oñate convenció a Fernando para que ofreciera al duque no sólo una indemnización en efectivo y la garantía de que los Habsburgo no intervendrían en los asuntos de la Liga, sino también la posesión de cualquier parte del Palatinado que conquistara

10. AGS, Estado 2504, f. 110, Pedro de San Juan al conde de Oñate, 21 de agosto de 1619. En un principio, el Palatinado votó por Maximiliano de Baviera, pero los líderes de la Unión pidieron unanimidad en la votación final, por lo cual finalmente el Palatinado también votó por Fernando.

la Liga y la promesa de que la dignidad electoral pasaría de Federico del Palatinado a Baviera. Dado que ambos pertenecían a la familia Wittelsbach, argumentó Oñate, y puesto que Baviera tenía ciertos derechos a los territorios y al título, la transferencia se realizaría con relativa facilidad. Por otra parte, Oñate añadió que probablemente los ejércitos de Maximiliano no hostigarían lo suficiente a la alianza protestante como para reclamar todas esas recompensas. Así pues, el tratado de Munich fue firmado el 8 de octubre de 1619 y el 5 de diciembre los dirigentes de la Liga católica autorizaron el reclutamiento de 25.000 hombres que Maximiliano utilizaría en la forma que creyera más conveniente.

Mucho era lo que Oñate había prometido en nombre de España, en un momento en que los gobiernos de Madrid y Bruselas estaban cada vez más ocupados en la preparación de una nueva guerra con Holanda. Cuando menos, Zúñiga admitió que no sabía si la Tregua de los Doce Años debería ser o no renovada. «Convencernos de que podemos conquistar Holanda es buscar lo imposible, engañarnos a nosotros mismos», se lamentó en abril de 1619 mientras trataba de tomar la decisión adecuada.

> A quienes afirman que todos nuestros males se deben a la Tregua y prevén que su ruptura producirá grandes beneficios, podemos decirles con toda seguridad que ya sea que la rompamos o no siempre estaremos en desventaja. La situación puede llegar a tal punto que cualquier decisión que tomemos sea para peor, no por falta de buen consejo sino porque la situación llegue a ser tan desesperada que no sea posible encontrar remedio alguno.

No era mucho más optimista la posición del máximo responsable de la política española cuando analizaba la situación en Alemania:

> La situación exige [afirmaba] que realicemos los esfuerzos supremos necesarios cuando uno se halla ante el desastre total, intentando conseguir todos los recursos posibles para dar al archiduque lo que necesita y atendiendo todos los demás asuntos en la medida que sea humanamente posible.

Éstas y otras muchas expresiones de desilusión profunda y total en los últimos años del reinado de Felipe III parecen tomadas de una

tragedia de Calderón.[11] Zúñiga veía con toda claridad el dilema en el que se hallaba: a menos que España interviniera masivamente en apoyo de Fernando, los rebeldes saldrían victoriosos, otorgando a los protestantes el control del Imperio y socavando la posición de España en Italia y en los Países Bajos. Pero si España prestaba esa ayuda masiva, podría provocar otro conflicto que se prolongaría durante tanto tiempo como el de los Países Bajos, si es que (como afirmaban algunos) no duraba eternamente.[12]

Pero ya era demasiado tarde para que España se retirara de Alemania. A comienzos de 1620 llegó a Madrid un inquietante despacho de Oñate, sitiado en Viena por segunda vez por los ejércitos transilvano y confederado. El mensaje insistía nuevamente en que, para salvar a los Habsburgo austriacos, había que prestar a Fernando una ayuda sin precedentes. De nuevo, no podía ignorarse la voz inquieta del embajador y los consejeros de Felipe III consideraron que la forma más eficaz de aliviar la presión sobre Viena era realizar una maniobra de diversión atacando el Palatinado renano. Además, esto facilitaría el cumplimiento de los términos del «tratado Oñate» con Fernando, entregando Alsacia a España y, por otra parte, liberaría al ejército de la Liga para que pudiera intervenir en Bohemia sin temor a ser atacado por la retaguardia. Así pues, tras un cierto debate sobre la cuantía de las tropas y el momento adecuado para efectuar la operación, se decidió que en la primavera de 1620 avanzaría desde los Países Bajos hasta el Palatinado un ejército de 20.000 veteranos comandado personalmente por Ambrosio Spínola. Fue éste un paso decisivo para convertir la «vergüenza de Bohemia» en la «Guerra de los Treinta Años».

No deja de ser irónico que, como consecuencia de la lentitud del servicio postal entre Austria y España, la crucial decisión de Felipe III fuera tomada poco después de que se hubiera desvanecido la amenaza que pesaba sobre Viena. El 27 de noviembre de 1619, Bethlen Gabor recibió la noticia de que un gran ejército procedente de Polonia había penetrado en la Alta Hungría interrumpiendo sus comunicaciones con Transilvania. De hecho, el informe exageraba la gravedad de la situación, pero fue suficiente como para poner fin al asedio de Viena. En efecto, Bethlen se apresuró a regresar a Hungría, por lo cual Thurn tuvo que retirarse a Bohemia. Aunque la Dieta húngara eligió al transilvano como «príncipe» en Bratislava, el 15 de enero de 1620, su situación siguió siendo desfavorable. Bethlen había mantenido un gran ejército durante cinco meses, aunque su principado era pobre (tan sólo exportaba ganado, sal y azogue, y una parte importante de su riqueza era entregada cada año al sultán en concepto de tributo). A los ojos de algunos, la campaña del príncipe había sido en todo momento «un torrente sin una fuente» que estaba condenado a secarse si no recibía una urgente ayuda financiera del gobierno rebelde de Praga.[13] Pero los recursos de los confederados estaban tan agotados como los de Bethlen y no pudieron pagar los 400.000 táleros que les pedía. Además, el principal activo del príncipe había sido siempre su alardeado papel de mediador de la ayuda turca a los enemigos de Fernando. Pero los diplomáticos de la Casa de Habsburgo habían convencido al sultán de que retirara su apoyo a la causa confederada, mientras que el estallido de las hostilidades entre los turcos y Polonia en 1619-1621 impidió cualquier campaña otomana en el Danubio. Así pues, cuando una delegación imperial ofreció una tregua de nueve meses que permitía a Bethlen conservar temporalmente sus conquistas húngaras, el príncipe se apresuró a aceptar (20 de enero de 1620).

La neutralización de Transilvania fue simplemente un aspecto de una campaña preparada con todo cuidado para aislar a los rebeldes. No sólo se había convencido al gobierno español para que aportara hombres y dinero al emperador a gran escala (y, a partir de abril de 1620, también a la Liga), sino que también se consiguió ayuda de varios príncipes italianos. El papa comenzó a enviar a Viena un subsidio mensual de 8.000 táleros desde julio de 1618 y, a finales de 1620, habían sido enviados ya 304.000. Durante ese mismo período, el ejército de la Liga recibió 204.000. También Génova realizó una aportación económica y Toscana envió tropas. Ciertamente, Saboya y Venecia seguían siendo hostiles, pero poco podían hacer por sí solas estas dos potencias. A los ojos de los Habsburgo, el único motivo de alarma era la promesa de ayuda holandesa a Bohemia.

11. Citas tomadas de P. Brightwell, «The Spanish system and the Twelve Years' Truce», *English Historical Review*, LXXXIX (1974), p. 289; y AGS, Estado 1867, f. 375, documento del 10 de diciembre de 1619.

12. Straub, *Pax et Imperium*, p. 161, cita la predicción del Consejo de Estado español de que habría una «guerra eterna». Véanse otras predicciones citadas por G. Parker, *Europe in Crisis, 1598-1648*, Londres, 1979, p. 163.

13. Lord Digby, citado por Zaller, «Interest of State», p. 166.

En varias ocasiones a lo largo de 1618, los Estados Generales, órgano de gobierno de la República de Holanda, debatieron la posibilidad de acceder a la petición de ayuda de los confederados, decidiendo finalmente de forma negativa. Su prudencia no carecía de fundamento: durante todo el año, la República se vio paralizada por la lucha entre los Estados de Holanda, a cuyo frente se hallaba Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, y los Estados de las otras provincias, conducidos por Mauricio de Nassau, el capitán general. En los albores de 1619, arrestado Oldenbarnevelt y dispersados sus seguidores, los depurados Estados Generales decidieron contribuir con un subsidio mensual de 25.000 táleros, pero sólo durante tres meses y en tanto en cuanto los bohemios siguieran luchando y la República de Holanda permaneciera en paz. En definitiva, la entrega del subsidio continuó (con gran renuencia y frente a la oposición de algunas de las provincias del interior) hasta diciembre de 1620; pero los Estados Generales se negaron, hasta que ya era demasiado tarde, a enviar tropas a Alemania en ayuda de Federico del Palatinado o para proteger a la Unión. Peor aún, aunque los Estados acordaron que «avanzarán en esa dirección de forma que las tropas españolas de esas provincias bajo la autoridad del archiduque no queden disponibles ni puedan ser utilizadas en Alemania», de hecho no hicieron nada en absoluto. Prácticamente, hasta el último momento fueron engañados por Spínola, que les hizo creer que el destino de su ejército era Praga y no el Palatinado y cuando comprendieron la verdad, la falta de apoyo de Inglaterra y de la Unión protestante impidió una contraofensiva eficaz.[14]

Después de no pocas dudas, Jacobo I manifestó, en el otoño de 1609, su rechazo ante la aventura bohemia de su cuñado. Se negó a apoyar los intentos de recaudar fondos para la causa de Federico, intentó actuar como mediador entre los dos bandos enfrentados y urgió a la Unión a que se mantuviera al margen. Pero la situación de la Unión era ya muy difícil. En una reunión celebrada en junio de 1619, sus miembros decidieron organizar un ejército de 11.000 hombres, pero simplemente para defenderse de la Liga, «para proteger la libertad y la ley» y «para mantener nuestra religión como auténticos patriotas». Pero no fueron más allá, porque «no se puede uno enfrentar a la ligera con la Casa de Austria», especialmente «sin tropas ni dinero de Inglaterra».[15] En una nueva reunión de la Unión celebrada en el mes de noviembre, sólo los margraves de Ansbach y Baden apoyaron la decisión de Federico de aceptar la corona bohemia (aunque otros se mostraron dispuestos a defenderse contra la Liga). Otros príncipes protestantes adoptaron una postura igualmente prudente. Aparte de los duques de Sajonia-Weimar, sólo el elector calvinista de Brandemburgo ofreció su apoyo, y murió en la Navidad de 1619. Su joven sucesor, Jorge Guillermo, que estaba casado con la hermana de Federico, no consiguió convencer a los Estados luteranos para que continuaran la política desafiante de su padre. Dado que la deuda pública de Brandemburgo era una de las mayores de Alemania, si no era posible conseguir nuevos impuestos, la prudencia era la única política posible. No era mucho mejor la situación económica de Juan Jorge de Sajonia, hecho que los príncipes católicos supieron explotar plenamente. En una reunión electoral en Mühlhausen, convocada a comienzos de 1620 para impedir que «el fuego bohemio» se difundiera en Alemania, los electores católicos (entre ellos Fernando) prometieron que no intentarían recuperar por la fuerza las tierras secularizadas de la Iglesia en los Círculos de la Alta y Baja Sajonia hasta que los príncipes que las poseían hubieran sido escuchados ante la ley, siempre que esos príncipes apoyaran lealmente al emperador. Juan Jorge pareció sentirse seguro con la «garantía de Mühlhausen» (20 de marzo de 1620) y a continuación el emperador le ofreció Lusacia si el elector organizaba un ejército y la reconquistaba a los rebeldes. Juan Jorge aceptó inmediatamente esa propuesta.

Fue Francia la que asestó el golpe definitivo a la causa protestante. Luis XIII había sufrido la rebelión de sus súbditos protestantes y, en consecuencia, mostró sus simpatías por la causa de Fernando. En determinado momento se ofreció impetuosamente a encabezar un ejército en ayuda de su primo. Aunque no tardó en desistir de ese proyecto, envió una nutrida misión diplomática a Alemania a cuyo frente se hallaba el duque de Angulema. Éste se dirigió primero a Ulm, donde el ejército de la Liga, comandado por el propio Maximiliano de Baviera, maniobraba para conseguir una posición favorable frente a las tropas de la Unión conducidas por el margrave de Ansbach. El

14. S. R. Gardiner, *Letters and Documents Illustrating the Relations between England and Germany*, II, Camden Society, XCVIII, 7, Londres, 1868; Carleton a Naunton, 13 de septiembre de 1619; Smit y Roelevink, eds., *Resolutiën der Staten-Generaal*, n.r. IV, resoluciones 332, 585, 759, 1548, 1779, 3911, 4119, 4178, 4486 y 4535.

15. Citas tomadas de Magen, *Reichsgräfliche Politik in Franken*, p. 190.

duque de Angulema convenció a los dos comandantes para que firmaran un acuerdo que asegurara la interrupción inmediata de las hostilidades, con la consiguiente retirada de sus fuerzas (el tratado de Ulm, 3 de julio de 1620). Esperaba poder negociar un acuerdo similar entre el emperador y Federico, por lo cual se dirigió a Viena, pero no tuvo éxito en su segunda misión. El alto el fuego acordado en Ulm había otorgado al emperador una ventaja decisiva, que intentó hacer valer: el ejército de la Unión se vio obligado a hacer frente a Spínola, que procedía de los Países Bajos; pero, en cambio, las fuerzas de la Liga se veían libres para prestar ayuda a Fernando en el este. Fue así como el 17 de julio, dos semanas después de la firma del tratado de Ulm, el conde Tilly se dirigió hacia la Alta Austria con un ejército de 30.000 hombres de la Liga (en el que se incluían muchos voluntarios notorios, como el filósofo Descartes). Antes de que transcurrieran quince días, el ducado había sido conquistado y Tilly unió sus fuerzas a las de los imperiales comandados por Bucquoy, que ahora ocupaban la Baja Austria. En el norte, los sajones ocuparon Lusacia apenas sin luchar (sólo se resistió Bautzen; véase lámina 4). Mientras tanto, Spínola avanzaba cómodamente hacia el Palatinado por el oeste. El ejército de la Unión era mucho menos numeroso y sólo se vio incrementado con pequeños contingentes procedentes de Inglaterra y los Países Bajos. No ha de extrañar que fracasaran los esfuerzos del duque de Angulema por conseguir que Fernando aceptara iniciar conversaciones de paz: no había «nada más que obtener de los tratados», le dijeron al duque, pues el emperador estaba «decidido a conseguir la obediencia total de sus súbditos y eso sólo podía conseguirse por medio de la espada».[16] En consecuencia, las tropas conducidas por Tilly y Bucquoy (manteniéndose a la expectativa el duque de Baviera) avanzaron de forma inexorable hacia Bohemia, buscando un enfrentamiento decisivo con el grueso del ejército enemigo, comandado por Anhalt, Mansfeld y Thurn. El 8 de noviembre de 1620, los rebeldes protagonizaron una resistencia desesperada en la Montaña Blanca, en la vecindad inmediata de los muros de Praga. Los católicos tardaron tan sólo una hora en conseguir una victoria total. La revuelta de Bohemia estaba sofocada.

16. Canciller Lobkovic a Angulema, citado por Pagès, *Thirty Years' War*, p. 71.

II. Europa y la guerra del Palatinado

> La pérdida de soldados no fue muy desigual, pero la pérdida de cañones, equipamiento y reputación constituye la victoria de los imperiales que, al parecer, ocupan ahora Bohemia por conquista, habiendo sido suprimidas todas las inmunidades y privilegios. Y si se establece un nuevo estatuto, éste será tan sólo la ley del conquistador, que ha exigido a los protestantes que den razón de cuanto tienen, y que ya lo ha puesto a buen recaudo, de forma que aquéllos han empezado ya a comprender cuál será su situación.[17]

Las profecías de sir Edward Conway sobre las consecuencias de la derrota de los bohemios en la Montaña Blanca se cumplieron al pie de la letra: la ley del conquistador fue impuesta en Bohemia de forma despiadada (véase capítulo III). Pero la campaña de 1620 no sólo sirvió para poner a Bohemia en manos de los vencedores. También Lusacia, Silesia, Moravia y Austria habían sido ocupadas, así como la mitad del Palatinado renano, al tiempo que el Alto Palatinado quedaba indefenso. Sin embargo, todos estos éxitos no sirvieron para poner fin a la guerra. Bien al contrario, no hicieron sino recrudecerla. Si la campaña hubiera terminado en una cierta igualdad militar, habría sido posible alcanzar un compromiso. Pero dada la magnitud de su derrota y el carácter implacable de la autoridad de los Habsburgo, Federico del Palatinado nada tenía que perder si seguía oponiendo resistencia.

En consecuencia, el emperador se vio enfrentado con el problema de erradicar todo apoyo a Federico en el seno del Imperio sin provocar una guerra general europea. En 1619 y 1620, sus éxitos militares habían sido asegurados mediante una cuidadosa campaña diplomática que quebrantó totalmente el modelo de alianzas creado por el Palatinado y que aisló a Federico de sus más poderosos aliados potenciales. Pero no estaba claro si sería posible continuar en el futuro tan brillantes gestiones diplomáticas. Una hábil propaganda podía despertar fácilmente el temor a la ilimitada ambición habsburguesa. Ya había ocurrido con anterioridad —tras la gran victoria de Carlos V sobre

17. Conway, enviado inglés en Praga, citado por Reade, *Sidelights on the Thirty Years' War*, I, p. 388. En Inglaterra muchos no lo creían; otros quedaron muy abatidos. Cf. Mr. Aylesbury a sir Henry Martin, 28 de noviembre de 1620: «Se confirma la noticia de la derrota de Bohemia, pero es demasiado triste para repetirla» (O. Ogle y W. Bliss, eds., *Calendar of the Clarendon State Papers preserved in the Bodleian Library*, I [Oxford, 1872], p. 19).

los protestantes alemanes en Mühlberg en 1547, las fuerzas imperiales perdieron todos los beneficios obtenidos en el plazo de cinco años—y no se consideraba imposible un cambio de fortuna parecido después de la Montaña Blanca.[18]

Sin embargo, en un principio no pareció que hubiera muchas posibilidades de que eso pudiera ocurrir. Federico nunca había tenido muchos aliados activos en Alemania y ahora algunos de ellos abandonaron su causa (Anhalt y Ansbach fueron los primeros en hacerlo, firmando la paz con el emperador en 1621).[19] Sólo un puñado de príncipes, los más importantes de los cuales eran los duques de Sajonia-Weimar y Cristián de Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, administrador del obispado secularizado de Halberstadt, defendían todavía sin reservas la causa del Palatinado. El margrave Jorge de Baden permaneció neutral en 1621, temeroso de que un desafío abierto al emperador pudiera significar su derrocamiento en favor de la rama rival, católica, de la familia, y sólo se decidió a entrar en guerra en 1622 cuando se convenció de que, hiciera lo que hiciera, su derrocamiento sería inevitable tras la derrota de Federico. Parecidas consideraciones disuadieron a los gobernantes calvinistas de Hesse-Kassel y Brandemburgo de movilizar sus ejércitos en apoyo de la causa palatina: el primero temía ser derrocado en favor del gobernante fuertemente imperialista (y luterano) de Hesse-Darmstadt y el segundo tuvo que renunciar a intervenir a raíz de la posición de su Dieta, fuertemente luterana y neutralista. Juan Jorge de Sajonia, fortalecido con la posesión de Lusacia y la garantía de Mühlhausen, hizo cuanto pudo para impedir que todos los restantes gobernantes luteranos apoyaran la causa de Federico.

Esta permanente imposibilidad de conseguir un apoyo importante entre los protestantes alemanes obligó a Federico a depender de los mismos aliados extranjeros que le habían abandonado en 1619-1620. Su tío, Mauricio de Nassau, dedicó una espléndida bienvenida al elector cuando visitó La Haya en abril de 1621 y le permitió que estableciera allí su corte en el exilio. Pero en ese preciso momento expiró la Tregua de los Doce Años y hubo varios tibios intentos de renovarla, que terminaron en fracaso. En consecuencia, los Estados Generales acordaron continuar aportando su subsidio mensual a Federico con la condición de que consiguiera también ayuda de Inglaterra. Los Estados Generales no querían correr riesgo alguno en un momento en que Spínola regresaba victorioso con sus veteranos del Palatinado. En efecto, podían aportar oficiales para el ejército y adelantar dinero para la compra de armas, pero no estaban en condiciones de financiar la causa protestante.[20]

18. Véanse las observaciones de Schubert, *Camerarius*, pp. 96, 194-195. Fernando II recurrió también a los precedentes de la guerra de la Liga de Esmalcalda para justificar la proscripción de Federico en enero de 1621 sin reunir a la Dieta y la transferencia a Baviera del electorado Palatino: Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, p. 49.

19. A la muerte de Ansbach en 1625, Cristián de Dinamarca hizo este terrible comentario: «debería haber muerto hace siete años» (citado por Herold, *Ansbach*, pp. 257-258.)

También Cristián de Dinamarca mantuvo una actitud prudente. Es cierto que en 1618-1619 había permitido que una serie de oficiales de su ejército sirvieran en las tropas de la Dieta bohemia, mientras que otros sirvieron más tarde con Mansfeld, y que en 1620 había prestado dinero a Federico y a sus aliados. Pero los miembros de su gobierno se opusieron a que realizara cualquier otra acción (véase pp. 113-117, *infra*) y además tenía serias dudas sobre el intento de su sobrino de «derrocar reyes y conquistar reinos». En la asamblea del Círculo de la Baja Sajonia reunida en Segeberg en febrero de 1621 afirmó que sólo intervendría si contaba con el apoyo de Inglaterra.[21]

Así pues, Inglaterra se convirtió en el punto de mira de la diplomacia del Palatinado y de todas las fuerzas protestantes. Eran muchos quienes en la corte y en el Parlamento compartían el argumento del Palatinado de que el destino del protestantismo dependía del éxito de la causa de Federico. En junio de 1621, los Comunes hicieron pública una declaración de apoyo a cualquier acción militar necesaria para defender «a quienes profesan auténticamente, en otras tierras, la mis-

20. Ten Raa y de Bas, *Het Staatsche Leger*, III, pp. 227-230, 243-244. ARA, Eerste Afdeling, Staten-Generaal, Lias Duitsland 6065, 1622, s.f., Isabel, reina de Bohemia, a los Estados Generales, 22 de marzo de 1622. Véanse también los comentarios de Schubert, *Camerarius*, pp. 219-222, e Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, pp. 99, 154-157, analizando la política de Mauricio de Nassau.

21. Magen, *Reichsgräfliche Politik*, pp. 228-229; Wertheim, *Braunschweig*, II, p. 210; Schubert, *Camerarius*, p. 146. Sobre la conferencia de Segeberg, véase Christiansen, *Christians IV*, pp. 43-57, y PRO, S.P. 75/5/235-237, 243-244, sir Robert Anstruther a sir George Calvert, 10/20 de marzo, 31 de marzo/10 de abril de 1621. Jacobo I avaló el préstamo de Cristián IV a Federico. En el momento de su muerte en 1625 estaban por pagar tanto el capital como los intereses (18.000 táleros anuales).

ma religión cristiana que la Iglesia de Inglaterra ... pues comparten sus dificultades como miembros del mismo cuerpo».[22] Los Comunes perseguían la creación de una coalición, basada en la alianza de Inglaterra y la República de Holanda, para salvar la causa. Sin embargo, Jacobo I deseaba evitar que la cuestión del Palatinado degenerara en una guerra general de religión y estaba convencido de que la mejor manera de preservar la paz era estableciendo una alianza estrecha con España, alianza cuya base sería el matrimonio de su hijo y heredero, el príncipe Carlos, con María, hermana de Felipe IV. Aunque Jacobo se había comprometido a restituir a Federico en el Palatinado, tras la invasión española del otoño de 1620, esperaba conseguir este objetivo como parte de un acuerdo diplomático más amplio. Así pues, Inglaterra insistía, paradójicamente, en considerar la cuestión del Palatinado como un *affair* puramente alemán, al tiempo que intentaba vincularlo con todo tipo de cuestiones con las que, en realidad, no tenía relación.

A comienzos de 1621, Jacobo I intentó negociar la suspensión general de toda acción armada en el Imperio como un primer paso hacia el deseado acuerdo global, en el que esperaba conseguir la restauración de Federico en el Palatinado a cambio de la renuncia a sus pretensiones en Bohemia. En abril, se firmó en Maguncia un efímero alto el fuego entre los ejércitos que luchaban en el Palatinado, acuerdo que duró hasta julio. Sin embargo, fue imposible convencer a Federico, alentado, al parecer, por Mauricio de Nassau, para que renunciara sin condiciones a sus pretensiones en Bohemia. También los Habsburgo se mostraron inflexibles. La muerte de Felipe III el 31 de marzo y la del archiduque Alberto el 15 de julio de 1621 provocaron un cierto vacío político que durante un breve período dejó la iniciativa en manos de la archiduquesa Isabel, viuda de Alberto, y de su fiel general Ambrosio Spínola. Ambos deseaban completar la conquista del Palatinado lo antes posible y en ese objetivo obtuvieron un apoyo incondicional del emperador y del duque de Baviera. Ciertamente, la guerra se desarrollaba de acuerdo con sus pretensiones. En el contexto del armisticio de Maguncia, la Unión aceptó desmovilizar sus fuerzas a cambio del compromiso de que sus territorios no serían atacados; y en el mes de mayo la propia Unión se disolvió. Esto permitió a Spínola retirar una parte importante de sus ejércitos a los Países Bajos para hacer frente a cualquier ataque holandés, aunque dejando unos 11.000 hombres al mando de don Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba para que continuara la conquista del Palatinado. En el momento en que expiró el armisticio de Maguncia, pusieron sitio a Frankenthal, uno de los tres grandes bastiones (los otros eran Mannheim y Heidelberg) fundamentales para el control del Palatinado.

En esa época, había todavía algunas fuerzas leales al elector en el este, pero no sobrevivieron mucho tiempo. Al acabar el verano de 1621, Tilly avanzó con un ejército de la Liga hacia el Alto Palatinado, ocupándolo sin apenas luchar. Una parte de las tropas de Federico se desplazó hacia el este y se unió a Bethlen Gabor de Transilvania, pero en enero de 1622 el príncipe concluyó la paz con el emperador en Nikolsburg. El resto de las tropas de Federico, comandadas por el conde Mansfeld, se dirigieron a liberar Frankenthal, objetivo que consiguieron alcanzar. Pero Tilly les hostigaba sin cesar y en la primavera de 1622 los católicos tenían una superioridad abrumadora en Renania. Su ventajosa posición se vio consolidada cuando Spínola consiguió la rendición de la guarnición holandesa de Juliers, bloqueando la ruta a través de la cual podían llegar hasta el Palatinado los refuerzos de la República de Holanda o de Inglaterra. Pero esa ayuda no iba a ser enviada. En diciembre de 1621, Jacobo I rechazó la petición del Parlamento de que declarara la guerra a España y en lugar de ello organizó una compleja misión diplomática con el objetivo de reunir a todas las partes implicadas en el conflicto en una conferencia general de paz. Sin embargo, en un principio, Federico rechazó las peticiones de Jacobo para que interrumpiera la lucha so pena de perder el apoyo de Inglaterra.[23] Más aún, permitió que Mansfeld reclutara en Alsacia un ejército de 43.000 hombres constituido fundamentalmente por protestantes suizos y hugonotes franceses. En abril, se unieron a estas fuerzas otros 11.000 hombres reclutados por Jorge de Baden-Durlach. Pero los dos ejércitos no consiguieron actuar conjuntamente y el 6 de mayo Córdoba y Tilly, en una acción conjunta, infligieron gra-

22. PRO, S.P. 14/164/11, obispo Carleton a su hermano, ¿mayo de 1624?; W. Notestein, F. H. Relf y H. Simpson, eds., *The Common Debates for 1621*, V, New Haven, 1935, pp. 203-204. Véase, también, en general, White, «Suspension of arms»; Straub, *Pax et Imperium*, cap. 5, y M. S. Junkelmann, «Feldherr Maximilians: Johan Tserclaes, Graf von Tilly», en Glaser, ed., *Um Glauben und Reich*, II/i, pp. 379-380 (con numerosas notas).

23. PRO, S.P. 81/24/42, Jacobo a Federico, 22 de abril/2 de mayo de 1622.

ves pérdidas al ejército de Baden en Wimpfen, sobre el río Neckar. La situación podía haber cambiado totalmente, por cuanto Federico puso en pie de guerra un tercer ejército reclutado por Cristián de Brunswick en el norte de Alemania. Pero el 20 de junio, el terrible Tilly interceptó esta nueva fuerza en Höchst, en el Main, causando nuevamente gran número de bajas.

Finalmente, Federico se declaró dispuesto a negociar. Prescindió de Brunswick y Mansfeld el 13 de julio y se retiró para esperar el resultado de la conferencia general tan deseada por Inglaterra, que se había reunido en Bruselas.[24] Sin embargo, los católicos, ahora vencedores, habían perdido el interés en la negociación. Tilly, siguiendo instrucciones de Maximiliano, sacó provecho de su posición ventajosa: Heidelberg fue arrasada el 19 de septiembre y Mannheim se rindió el 2 de noviembre. La conferencia de Bruselas se suspendió. Frankenthal se salvó gracias a lo avanzado de la estación, pero en marzo de 1623 Jacobo I ordenó a la guarnición, formada fundamentalmente por tropas inglesas, que entregaran la ciudad a los oficiales de la archiduquesa Isabel, que la conservarían hasta que se reuniera nuevamente la conferencia de paz.

Jacobo I no comprendió que los españoles no tenían intención alguna de entregar sus bastiones en Renania, que constituían un nexo de extraordinario valor entre los Países Bajos y los Alpes. En tanto se prolongara la guerra con Holanda, los problemas logísticos de aprovisionar al ejército de Flandes de hombres, dinero y municiones hacían que fuera imperativo preservar cualquier corredor militar seguro entre Lombardía, España y los Países Bajos (véase mapa 2). Ese mismo tipo de consideraciones hicieron que el gobierno de Madrid se mostrara renuente a ceder el control de la Valtelina, que había sido ocupada por la fuerza en 1620 (véase pp. 75-76, *supra*). Pero las presiones diplomáticas, en esta ocasión de Francia, eran cada vez mayores para forzar la devolución. Desde un principio, Luis XIII había visto cómo los cantones protestantes suizos, Venecia y las Ligas grisonas (los señores de la Valtelina, de cuya protección se había hecho cargo Francia mediante un tratado en 1602) le instaban a que interviniera. Pero el monarca francés no estaba en condiciones de prestar su colaboración. Se había visto obligado a concentrarse en la revuelta de un grupo de

24. Véase PRO, S.P. 81/26/179-180, Federico a Isabel, 14 de agosto de 1622.

católicos extremistas, encabezados por la reina madre (abril-agosto de 1620). Posteriormente, en parte para aplacar a esos disidentes, inició la catolización forzosa del principado de Béarn en los Pirineos (agosto de 1620-octubre de 1622). Cuando recibió la noticia de la invasión de la Valtelina a cargo de las tropas de los Habsburgo, Luis XIII no pudo enviar allí una parte de sus tropas. En consecuencia, las Ligas grisonas decidieron pasar a la acción a finales de 1621, contando con algún apoyo de Berna, Zurich y Venecia. Su iniciativa se saldó con una derrota total y los vencedores ocuparon también parte de los territorios de las Ligas grisonas. Pero el prestigio de Francia estaba ahora en peligro y la «cuestión de la Valtelina» adquirió en París el mismo significado que había tenido para Londres la restitución del Palatinado. En otoño de 1622, tras concluir un acuerdo con los hugonotes, Luis XIII mantuvo una serie de reuniones —a las que se dio gran publicidad— con el duque de Saboya y una embajada veneciana, de las que surgió una triple alianza, conocida como la Liga de Lyon, con el propósito de expulsar a los Habsburgo de los territorios de las Ligas grisonas y de imponer las pretensiones de Saboya sobre Génova y Monferrato (7 de febrero de 1623). Apenas se había firmado el tratado, cuando España se retiró. Su control de los valles se había visto ya quebrantado por una nueva revuelta en el verano de 1622, y en octubre murió el experimentado don Baltasar de Zúñiga. Su sobrino y sucesor como primer ministro, el conde de Olivares, no estaba dispuesto a luchar con Francia por un remoto valle alpino. Así pues, el 14 de febrero de 1623 aceptó que las tropas papales se hicieran cargo de la Valtelina durante un período transicional de cuatro meses para permitir la retirada de las fuerzas españolas.[25]

Para entonces, la atención de Europa se había trasladado de los Alpes al Palatinado. En los tristes días de octubre de 1619, mientras se agitaba ante sus ojos la perspectiva de la derrota, el emperador había prometido grandes recompensas a Maximiliano de Baviera, en es-

25. Respecto a la política de Francia en la cuestión de la Valtelina, véanse los dos artículos de Pithon: «Les Débuts Difficiles du Ministère de Richelieu» y «La Suisse, Théâtre de la Guerre Froide». La postura de España se puede estudiar a través de la correspondencia y las consultas del Consejo de Estado en AGS, Estado K 1492, fols. 20-80. Véase especialmente f. 55 sobre la preocupación por la situación militar en agosto de 1622; fols. 67, 70, 72 y 73 para la decisión de aceptar guarniciones papales, y fols. 76 y 78 para la actitud de Olivares ante la crisis.

pecial la entrega del Alto Palatinado y del título electoral, a cambio de su ayuda militar contra Federico. La oferta había sido hecha de forma precipitada, sobre el supuesto de que Maximiliano no sería capaz de movilizar un ejército lo suficientemente fuerte como para sofocar por sí solo la rebelión. Pero después de la batalla de la Montaña Blanca, la deuda debía ser pagada antes o después. En agosto de 1621, Maximiliano comenzaba ya a sentirse molesto y, como afirmó un enviado inglés a Alemania, con Mansfeld luchando todavía en el oeste y Bethlen en el este «no cabe considerar que éste sea un momento adecuado para que el emperador dé al duque de Baviera una negativa total».[26] Así pues, Fernando prometió realizar la transferencia del título electoral en la siguiente Dieta Imperial, tras conseguir la aprobación de Sajonia y España. Pero uno de los correos que llevaba las noticias de esta decisión fue capturado por Mansfeld. Las cartas no tardaron en llegar a manos del principal consejero de Federico, Ludwig Camerarius, quien consiguió un gran golpe de efecto publicándolas en marzo de 1622, con un comentario cáustico, en un libro conocido por su título en latín, *Cancelleria Hispanica*.[27]

El escándalo popular que produjo la publicidad insospechada de sus planes convenció a Fernando de que la transferencia del título imperial debería ser retrasada y, entre tanto, el papado proveyó una notable fuerza de choque de «viajantes» diplomáticos, todos ellos capuchinos, para convencer al mundo católico, cuando menos, de que esa modificación resultaría beneficiosa. Valeriano Magno fue enviado a París, Alejandro de Hales acudió a Bruselas y Jacinto de Casale se embarcó en una serie de incesantes misiones diplomáticas entre Munich, Viena, Madrid y Renania, recorriendo más de 15.000 km a lo largo del año 1622. La importancia que se atribuía al trabajo de Jacinto se demuestra por el gran número de cartas que el capuchino recibió de la cancillería bávara: 9 entre el 25 de noviembre y el 22 de

26. Digby a Calvert, 12 de agosto de 1621, en *State Papers collected by Edward earl of Clarendon*, I, Oxford, 1767, p. XVII del apéndice.

27. La edición alemana, *Prodromus*, se publicó en Emden el 22 de marzo de 1622; la versión en latín apareció en Amsterdam. Ambas fueron obra del ministro del Palatinado, Ludwig Camerarius. Sus 173 páginas de documentos y comentarios causaron gran sensación, en gran medida porque los gobiernos del siglo XVII muy raras veces publicaban documentos oficiales, y la obra fue reeditada varias veces. Véase Schubert, *Camerarius*, pp. 108-143, y Nolden, *Reichspolitik Kaiser Ferdinands*, pp. 91-97.

diciembre, es decir, más de dos por semana. Finalmente, sus esfuerzos se vieron coronados por el éxito. El padre Jacinto encontró al gobierno español reluctante ante la transferencia del título imperial (pese a que la idea había sido sugerida originalmente por su embajador, el conde de Oñate), pero la muerte de don Baltasar de Zúñiga significó, como se apresuró a señalar un corresponsal bávaro en Madrid, que «aquí nadie entiende los asuntos alemanes».[28] Así, el emperador creyó poder ignorar la oposición española a la elevación de Maximiliano al electorado del Palatinado y en enero de 1623 una asamblea de príncipes escasamente concurrida (una *Deputationstag*) se reunió en Ratisbona para sancionar la transferencia. Ahora bien, ante la constante oposición de Sajonia y Brandemburgo, después de seis semanas de acalorado debate, Fernando se atrevió únicamente a conceder públicamente a Maximiliano la dignidad de elector imperial de forma vitalicia, dejando sin resolver el futuro del Palatinado a largo plazo.[29]

Pero incluso esto era más de lo que la mayor parte de las potencias europeas estaban dispuestas a aceptar. Una vez depuesto, Federico encontró más apoyo del que nunca había tenido hasta entonces. Incluso pudo disponer de un ejército, comandado todavía por Mansfeld y Brunswick. Ambos comandantes, después de haber sido cesados de forma fulminante en el servicio del Palatinado en julio de 1622, habían sido contratados por los holandeses, resultando inmediatamente de gran utilidad, primero al derrotar a las fuerzas españolas de Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba en la batalla de Fleurus (26 de agosto) y a continuación obligando a Spínola y al ejército de Flandes a levantar el sitio de Bergen-op-Zoom (4 de octubre). Estos éxitos convencieron a los Estados Generales de que debían mantener en pie al ejército alia-

28. Citado por Kessel, *Spanien und die geistlichen Kurstaaten*, p. 90.

29. Se afirmó que, en 1329, las ramas palatina y bávara de la familia Wittelsbach habían acordado, en el tratado de Pavía, que el electorado se alternaría entre ambas, aunque, de hecho, ese acuerdo nunca se había puesto en práctica. Pero la defensa de Maximiliano puso de relieve la debilidad subyacente de la argumentación de los católicos, por cuanto la razón por la que no había funcionado el pacto de 1329 era la existencia de un documento posterior mucho más importante, la Bula de Oro de 1356, una de cuyas cláusulas otorgaba definitivamente el electorado Wittelsbach a la rama del Palatinado. Por otra parte, el tratado de Pavía decretó también que el Alto Palatinado se desgajara de Baviera. Véase K. F. Krieger, «Bayerische-Pfälzische Unionsbestrebungen von Hausvertrag von Pavia (1329) bis zur Wittelsbachischen Hausunion vom Jahre 1724», *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung*, IV (1977), pp. 385-413.

do: las tropas de Mansfeld fueron acantonadas en unos cuarteles de invierno al otro lado de la frontera holandesa en Frisia oriental, cuyo gobernante había coqueteado con los Habsburgo. La incómoda presencia de Mansfeld privó a Spínola de una base potencial en el nordeste desde la cual llevar a cabo la invasión de la República de Holanda. Mientras tanto, Federico planeó un nuevo asalto contra el emperador para recuperar sus tierras y sus títulos. Se acordó que Brunswick, con el apoyo de Mansfeld y de los holandeses, se aproximaría a Bohemia por el norte, mientras Bethlen Gabor, ayudado por un grupo de exiliados encabezados por el conde Thurn, atacaría desde el este. Sin embargo, la nueva campaña apenas tuvo ocasión de comenzar. En mayo de 1623, y con todo el Palatinado finalmente bajo el control de los Habsburgo, Tilly condujo su ejército hacia el norte hasta las fronteras de la Baja Sajonia, para impedir el avance de Brunswick hacia Bohemia. El «loco Halberstadter» (como lo llamaban los católicos) decidió, pues, conducir a sus 21.000 hombres, en su mayor parte reclutas mal armados, a la República de Holanda, como había hecho con éxito el año anterior. Sin embargo, en esta ocasión hubo de entrar en batalla en Stadtlohn el 6 de agosto, perdiendo a todo su ejército excepto 6.000 hombres. Tilly deseaba completar su victoria atacando a Mansfeld, pero el clima (junto con la fuerza de las defensas de Mansfeld) frustraron sus intenciones. Menos impenetrables eran, sin embargo, las finanzas de Mansfeld. Durante la mayor parte del año 1623, había sobrevivido gracias a las pequeñas pensiones que le pagaban los miembros de la Liga de Lyon para el caso de que sus tropas fueran requeridas para realizar una campaña en la Valtelina. Pero cuando se agotaron esos fondos, a comienzos de 1624, no tuvo otra alternativa que disolver su ejército. Al igual que había ocurrido en el caso de Brunswick el año anterior, la mayor parte de sus hombres entraron inmediatamente al servicio de Holanda.

Stadtlohn fue la más decisiva de todas las victorias de los católicos. Bethlen Gabor, abandonado por sus aliados, se vio obligado a firmar de nuevo la paz con el emperador; Federico, al recibir la noticia de la derrota de su ejército, olvidó todas sus aficiones militares y confió su causa, sin reservas, a la mediación de Jacobo I. Pero «el Salomón inglés» no estaba ya dispuesto a mediar. Desde hacia seis años trataba de conseguir un matrimonio español para su hijo Carlos y basaba todas sus esperanzas de solución del conflicto del Palatinado en esa alianza con España. Pero en 1623, Jacobo recibió un duro golpe

a sus ambiciones. Se produjo en forma del romántico viaje secreto que el joven príncipe, cansado del interminable preludio diplomático de su matrimonio, hizo a Madrid durante la primavera. Acompañado por el duque de Buckingham (primer ministro de su padre), Carlos llegó a la corte española sin ser anunciado, solicitando que se solucionaran de forma inmediata tanto la firma de su contrato matrimonial como la restitución del Palatinado. De esta forma, el gobierno español se vio obligado a plantear abiertamente sus condiciones: la conversión al catolicismo tanto del príncipe Carlos como del heredero de Federico. Fue éste un duro golpe para los diplomáticos ingleses, puesto que tales condiciones eran inaceptables. En consecuencia, Jacobo decidió, en 1624, aceptar la postura del Parlamento (y de su hijo) y rompió las negociaciones con España, iniciando conversaciones con el gobierno francés para organizar una fuerza expedicionaria conjunta, comandada por el conde Mansfeld, que reconquistaría el Palatinado renano para el elector depuesto.[30]

Sin embargo, Federico y sus consejeros creían que eso no era suficiente. De esta forma, Ludwig Camerarius fue enviado en una misión secreta a Estocolmo para averiguar si el gobierno sueco estaba dispuesto a luchar por la causa del Palatinado en Alemania. Nadie ignoraba que la postura del rey Gustavo Adolfo era favorable: ya en 1618 había comenzado a utilizar al clero sueco para advertir a la población del creciente peligro que corría la causa protestante en la Europa continental. Además, la posición del Palatinado estaba representada en la corte de Gustavo Adolfo por Juan Casimiro, duque de Pfalz-Zweibrücken, hermano del antiguo administrador del Palatinado y casado con una hermana del rey. Pero ese deseo de intervención no era compartido por el resto del consejo sueco, encabezado por Axel Oxenstierna. Para ellos, el principal peligro para Suecia no provenía de Alemania sino de Polonia.[31]

30. Existe un buen estudio de las negociaciones sobre la alianza matrimonial con España en R. Lockyer, *Buckingham. The life and political career of George Villiers, First Duke of Buckingham 1592-1628*, Londres, 1981, cap. 5, y de las consecuencias de su fracaso en el capítulo 6.

31. La campaña de propaganda de Gustavo Adolfo ha sido estudiada por S. Arnoldsson, *Krigspropagand i Sverige före Trettioaariga Kriget*, Gotemburgo, 1941. Agradecemos profundamente al profesor E. L. Petersen la mención de esta obra. Respecto al dominio de Oxenstierna en el consejo sueco, véase N. Aagren, «Rise and decline of an aristocracy: the Swedish social and political elite in the seventeenth century», *Scandinavian Journal of History*, I, 1976, pp. 55-80. De

Segismundo III de Polonia, cuñado del emperador, había accedido al trono de Suecia en 1592. Pocos años después fue derrocado por una conspiración encabezada por su tío, el duque Carlos, quien adoptó el título de rey, que pasó luego a su hijo Gustavo Adolfo. Pero Segismundo, que representaba a la dinastía Vasa más antigua y legítima, nunca abandonó sus pretensiones a la corona sueca y provocó en sus primos, más jóvenes, la intranquilidad que un siglo después provocarían los pretendientes jacobitas al trono de Inglaterra en sus parientes Hanover. Sin embargo, mientras que Jorge I y su hijo esperarían a ser atacados, Gustavo Adolfo llevó la guerra a los territorios del pretendiente. Inmediatamente después de que Suecia firmara la paz con Rusia en 1617, su ejército fue conducido hacia la Livonia polaca. En el otoño de 1618 se concluyó una tregua, que sólo duró dos años. Así pues, a nadie sorprendió el nuevo ataque sueco que se produjo en la primavera de 1621. Sin embargo, la sofisticación de la campaña despertó el interés de la comunidad internacional. El rey cruzó el Báltico para dirigir personalmente el asedio de Riga e intentó varias nuevas técnicas militares: cortinas de fuego móvil, zonas de exclusión total, es decir, las técnicas más modernas de asedio. La ciudad tuvo que rendirse. Al parecer, Gustavo esperaba devolver Riga a cambio de la renuncia de Segismundo al trono de Suecia y, para facilitar las negociaciones, se acordó una tregua de un año en julio de 1622, que se prolongó hasta 1624.[32]

Fue durante ese intervalo cuando Camerarius llegó a Estocolmo (noviembre de 1623) sintiéndose vivamente impresionado por la personalidad del joven Gustavo Adolfo, al que dio el apelativo de «Gedeón» y sobre el que escribió: «no encuentro palabras para alabar las virtudes heroicas de este rey: piedad, prudencia y determinación. No tiene parangón en Europa».[33] Antes de abandonar la embriagadora compañía del rey, Camerarius creía haber sentado las bases de una

los 72 consejeros nombrados entre 1602 y 1647, 54 pertenecían a un grupo relacionado con el canciller y sus más estrechos aliados.

32. Sobre la guerra en Polonia, véase Roberts, *Swedish Imperial Experience*, pp. 33-35, que se basa (así como nuestro relato) en A. Norberg, *Polen i svensk politik 1617-1626*, Estocolmo, 1974, obra que Roberts (p. 33) ha calificado correctamente como tal vez «la contribución más importante, en los últimos cuarenta años, al debate sobre la política exterior del monarca».

33. Camerarius al barón Rusdorf, 24 de diciembre de 1623, citado por Schubert, «Die pfälzische Exilregierung», p. 672.

nueva alianza general de los protestantes bajo la dirección sueca, que restauraría a Federico en Bohemia y convertiría a Gustavo Adolfo en el nuevo emperador del Sacro Imperio.[34] Pero Suecia no podía alcanzar esos objetivos por sí sola, por lo cual los nuevos blancos de los diplomáticos de Federico eran la República de Holanda y Francia. Poco se podía esperar de la primera, pues en el verano de 1624 el ejército de Flandes comenzó el sitio de Breda en el norte de Brabante y durante todo un año los holandeses tuvieron que dedicar todos sus esfuerzos a liberarla. En consecuencia, la corte del Palatinado en el exilio centró cada vez más sus esperanzas en Francia, donde en febrero de 1624 fue nombrado para el cargo de ministro de Asuntos Exteriores el marqués de La Vieuville, declarado enemigo de los Habsburgo. Casi inmediatamente se iniciaron negociaciones entre Inglaterra y Francia, no sólo para concluir una alianza que restaurara a Federico en Bohemia, sino para acordar los esponsales del príncipe Carlos con Enriqueta María, hermana de Luis XIII. Poco después, la corte de París envió embajadores a los príncipes alemanes ofreciéndoles subsidios y promesa de ayuda en caso de que fuese necesario.[35] En el mes de junio, se dio un nuevo impulso a la alianza franco-holandesa, que había perdido fuerza desde la ejecución de Oldenbarnevelt en 1619: por el tratado de Compiègne, los holandeses aceptaron continuar la guerra contra España durante tres años más, a cambio de un préstamo inmediato de 480.000 táleros y la promesa de nuevas cantidades.[36] Finalmente, se revitalizó también la Liga de Lyon, con la adhesión de Venecia y Saboya.

No escapó a los extremistas católicos de la corte de Luis XIII el hecho de que la mayor parte de estos tratados se firmaron con elementos protestantes y ésta fue una de las razones por las que en agosto de 1624 La Vieuville fue sustituido por el cardenal Richelieu. Pero hacía falta algo más que un simple cambio de ministros para superar los dilemas de la política exterior francesa. Si bien el monarca francés

34. Schubert, *Camerarius*, pp. 252-254, 257.

35. Para las negociaciones que desembocaron en la alianza matrimonial con Francia, véase Adams, «Foreign policy», pp. 157-158. La recuperación de la influencia en el Rin y en las regiones situadas más allá por parte de Francia se describe de forma detallada en Kessel, *Spanien und die geistlichen Kurstaaten*, parte III, y Weber, *Frankreich, Kurtrier, passim*.

36. Sobre las complicadas cláusulas del tratado, véase Bonney, *King's Debts*, p. 122.

podía aprovecharse de los problemas y las dificultades que la alianza protestante formada por Camerarius planteaba a los Habsburgo, sin embargo no podía ser un miembro más de esa alianza. Como Richelieu comentó muy enfadado a un confidente: «no podemos contribuir [a la restitución del Palatinado a Federico] por nuestra fe católica, ni negarnos a intervenir sin que nuestros aliados nos reprochen esta actitud».[37] De igual forma, Luis XIII se vio obligado a rechazar los intentos de Maximiliano de Baviera (a quien apoyaba el papado) para situarse bajo la protección francesa e independizarse de los Habsburgo, porque Francia no podía reconocer el nuevo título electoral de Maximiliano. Fue en parte para superar ese terrible dilema por lo que Richelieu decidió concentrar sus esfuerzos en Italia y no en Alemania. En el otoño de 1624, utilizando como pretexto que las tropas papales no habían sido retiradas de la Valtelina tal como se había acordado (véase p. 105, *supra*), tropas francesas y suizas invadieron los territorios de las Ligas grisonas. Obtuvieron un éxito sorprendente y así, en la primavera de 1625, una vez conseguido un firme control sobre los Alpes, Richelieu prometió enviar un ejército para colaborar con el duque de Saboya en el sitio de Génova. Por desgracia, ninguna de estas medidas sirvió de gran ayuda a quienes se oponían a la supremacía de los Habsburgo en Alemania y los políticos del Palatinado comenzaron a sentirse en una situación desesperada. Sin embargo, en tan crítica coyuntura, apareció una nueva potencia para salvarles: el rico y el ambicioso Cristián de Dinamarca.

III. El «intermezzo» danés

Desde la paz de Augsburgo de 1555, Alemania había dado paso a Suecia como principal preocupación de la política exterior danesa. Dinamarca había participado en dos grandes conflictos en 1563-1570 y 1611-1613 para preservar su hegemonía en Escandinavia y el *Dominium maris Baltici*, pero en el segundo decenio del siglo XVII, la expansión sueca parecía amenazar ambos supuestos. A partir de 1590, los gobernantes de ambos países abandonaron el intento de solucionar sus conflictos mediante la negociación o la mediación e incluso en tiempo de paz el gobierno danés destinaba gran cantidad de recursos a la defensa y a la flota. Durante los primeros 25 años de gobierno personal de Cristián IV (desde 1596) se invirtieron aproximadamente un millón de táleros en la fortificación de Copenhague y Malmoe y en las fortalezas situadas a lo largo de la frontera sueca. Las posibilidades de que se produjera un conflicto abierto parecían permanentes e inmediatas.

Sin embargo, desde el punto de vista constitucional, el rey compartía el poder con el Consejo de Estado (*rigsraad*), que en teoría representaba a todos los estamentos, pero que en la práctica estaba constituido exclusivamente por la élite aristocrática. Básicamente, el equilibrio de poder y las posibilidades de limitar la independencia de la monarquía residían en el derecho del Consejo a votar y rechazar impuestos extraordinarios, y en su derecho absoluto de veto sobre la guerra. La esencia del programa político del Consejo, que reflejaba en parte los intereses de los grandes terratenientes, era el mantenimiento de la paz con Suecia y la no intervención en los asuntos continentales europeos.

Ciertamente, al Consejo le preocupaba tanto la expansión de Suecia por el Báltico como las victorias católicas en Alemania a partir de 1619, pero se mostraba renuente a entrar en guerra. Aunque el Consejo votó nuevos impuestos en 1624 para reforzar las guarniciones situadas a lo largo de la frontera con Suecia, también forzó prudentemente a Cristián a que disolviera el pequeño ejército de mercenarios reclutado para salvaguardar la neutralidad danesa frente a los posibles ataques de los alemanes. Dadas las circunstancias, podía convertirse en un peligroso instrumento en manos del monarca. Pero el control aristocrático sobre la política exterior era ya únicamente una ilusión. Tras la muerte de Federico II en 1588, la regencia había conseguido equilibrar una vez más el presupuesto ordinario y las favorables condiciones financieras sentaron las bases de una importante capitalización de la Cámara Real durante los siguientes decenios. En 1608, el excedente presupuestario de Cristián IV era de 250.000 táleros anuales (tras haber hecho frente a todos los gastos); se obtenían otros ingresos de los derechos de aduana cobrados en Elsinore en concepto de

37. D. L. M. Avenel, ed., *Lettres, instructions diplomatiques et papiers d'État du Cardinal de Richelieu*, I, París, 1853, p. 85, Richelieu al Sieur Eschieli [= padre José], ?mayo de 1625. Sobre los dilemas de la política exterior de Richelieu, véanse también los comentarios de Pithon, «Débuts Difficiles», pp. 316-318, y Albrecht, *Auswärtige Politik*, pp. 124, 127, 144.

navegación comercial internacional (200.000 táleros anuales en torno a 1620), pero el ingreso más importante procedía de la indemnización de guerra de un millón de táleros impuesta a Suecia en 1613 y que se pagó en plazos al monarca hasta 1618.[38]

En 1618, Cristián valoraba sus posesiones en un millón de táleros e invertía sus beneficios prudentemente. Entre 1618 y 1624, años de crisis económica internacional, el rey prestó más de 400.000 táleros a terratenientes aristocráticos, lo que le permitió vincularse más estrechamente con el círculo aristocrático desde el punto de vista político. Los ingentes medios económicos de que disponía el monarca dieron al traste con el intento del Consejo aristocrático de controlar su política exterior y sus actividades militares, pues el Consejo sólo podría conservar su poder si Cristián tenía que depender de los impuestos. En 1625, su activo, incluyendo las inversiones en el continente, se aproximaba a 1,5 millones de táleros, lo suficiente como para iniciar una guerra de grandes proporciones. Si exceptuamos las inagotables riquezas de la reina madre (viuda), de las que también podía disponer su hijo, el único que podía hacer gala de una riqueza comparable era, irónicamente, Maximiliano de Baviera, quien en 1618 disponía de alrededor de 4 millones en efectivo. No deja de ser igualmente irónico que las reparaciones de guerra suecas contribuyeran de forma significativa a la formación de esta fortuna real (véase lámina 2).

Cristián se vio implicado en la Guerra de los Treinta Años por dos razones diferentes. En primer lugar, su fuerte posición en el interior le convertía en una figura internacional importante y valiosa. En un principio, este factor actuó en contra suya: Suecia, temerosa de una nueva agresión de los daneses, firmó en 1614 una alianza defensiva con la República de Holanda, cuyos barcos constituían más del 60 por 100 del tráfico total que cruzaba el Sund. Los intereses mercantiles holandeses, hábilmente defendidos por Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, buscaron debilitar el control danés del comercio en el Báltico (claramente demostrado durante la guerra de 1611-1613), fortaleciendo el poder de Suecia. Pero Oldenbarnevelt perdió el poder en 1618, año en el que comenzó también la lucha en el Imperio, y en 1621 expiró la tregua entre Holanda y España. La República de Holanda situó ahora la política por encima del comercio y llevó a cabo un esfuerzo decidido para conseguir que Cristián se uniera a la causa protestante, prestando apoyo tácito a sus ambiciones dinásticas en Alemania. En verdad, el monarca danés no necesitaba de esos estímulos, pues ya se hallaba profundamente implicado.

38. Véase sobre este tema, Petersen, «Defence, war and finance».

En su condición de duque de Holstein, Cristián ejercía una notable influencia en el Círculo de la Baja Sajonia y estaba decidido a ampliarla. Su ambición se centraba muy especialmente en los obispados secularizados de Bremen, Verden y Osnabrück (al sudoeste de Holstein), no sólo porque podría distribuirlos entre sus hijos menores, sino también como medio de establecer un control político y fiscal sobre los estuarios del Weser y del Elba. Además, servirían para contrarrestar la expansión sueca en el Báltico oriental, intensificada desde la paz de Stolbova (1617). En 1616, Cristián consiguió un primer éxito mediante la construcción del puerto de Glückstadt sobre Hamburgo; cinco años más tarde, Hamburgo se vio obligada a reconocer la soberanía de la corona danesa. A continuación, el monarca invirtió una suma no inferior a 135.000 táleros de su fortuna privada «para tratar de conseguir que mi hijo Federico acceda a la sede de Verden». Esto lo consiguió en 1623. El príncipe ya era coadjutor del arzobispado de Bremen.[39]

Parece pues, que hacia 1624 la política exterior danesa había alcanzado todos sus objetivos inmediatos. Se había roto la alianza entre Holanda y Suecia, el monarca ocupaba una fuerte posición en el norte de Alemania y, por otra parte, Dinamarca había evitado, al menos aparentemente, verse arrastrada por el remolino de los acontecimientos europeos. Sin embargo, en los comienzos de 1625 Dinamarca se vio envuelta en una guerra con el emperador y sus aliados, a pesar del rechazo total de las armas y de las hostilidades por parte del Consejo. ¿Cuáles fueron las causas de estos acontecimientos?

La explicación hay que buscarla, ante todo, en la política de los aliados de Federico del Palatinado, decididos a encontrar apoyo, que consiguieron explotar las rivalidades escandinavas y las ambiciones de Cristián en Alemania, hasta el punto de que el monarca danés se vio forzado a unirse a ellos para salvaguardar la estructura de su sistema político en Escandinavia y en el norte de Alemania. En un principio,

39. Sobre el gobierno de Bremen-Verden y sobre las relaciones de Cristián con Hamburgo, respectivamente, véase Schleif, *Regierung und Verwaltung des Erzstifts Bremen am Beginn der Neuzeit*, y H.-D. Loose, *Hamburg und Christian IV. von Dänemark während des dreissigjährigen Krieges*, Hamburgo, 1963, caps. I-III.

Cristián se negó, en una conferencia celebrada en Segeberg (febrero de 1621), a luchar en solitario contra el emperador. Él estaba decidido a luchar, pero no consiguió un número suficiente de aliados poderosos en el extranjero. En consecuencia, sólo contribuyó mediante el préstamo de dinero: 300.000 táleros a petición de Jacobo para apoyar a Federico en 1621-1622; un millón de táleros a otros destacados protestantes alemanes (como el elector de Brandemburgo y sus sobrinos, los duques de Brunswick).[40] Pero la mayor parte de estas transacciones quedaron en secreto: los compromisos económicos y políticos del monarca, que pusieron gravemente en peligro la política de no intervención deseada por el Consejo, sólo salieron claramente a la luz en 1623-1624. En un principio, el Consejo persistió tenazmente en su posición, estableciendo una clara línea de demarcación entre los «compromisos del reino» y los compromisos personales del monarca, pero la situación varió radicalmente en 1624, cuando la República de Holanda, Inglaterra, Brandemburgo y el Palatinado decidieron invitar a Gustavo Adolfo de Suecia a tomar el mando de un ejército aliado en Alemania.

En noviembre de 1623, Gustavo Adolfo acordó con Ludwig Camerarius (véase p. 110, *supra*) que Suecia, con el apoyo de una alianza protestante general, avanzaría por el Vístula para invadir Bohemia, derrocando a Fernando y situando en su lugar a Federico. Sin embargo, el elector de Brandemburgo (cuñado de Gustavo Adolfo) puso de relieve que un desafío directo al emperador encontraría más rechazos que apoyos. Propuso, entonces, que Suecia interviniera en el oeste y reconquistara el Palatinado. Gustavo Adolfo se mostró dispuesto a aceptar este cambio de estrategia, si se ponía a su disposición un ejército de 40.000 hombres (en el que Inglaterra, Suecia y los príncipes alemanes contribuirían con una tercera parte de las tropas) y se le concedían bases en el Círculo de la Baja Sajonia. Pero el monarca sueco se negó a aceptar a Francia como miembro de pleno derecho de su proyectada coalición protestante, a pesar de que Jacobo I ya había aceptado enviar al Palatinado un cuerpo expedicionario conjunto anglo-francés, dirigido por el conde Mansfeld. De igual forma, se negó

40. Christiansen, *Die Stellung König Christians IV*, p. 33; E. Ladewig Petersen, *Christian IV.s pengeudlaan til danske adelige. Kongelig foretagervirksomhed og adelig gaeldsstiftelse 1596-1625* [préstamos de Cristián IV a la nobleza danesa. La empresa real y las deudas de la nobleza, 1596-1625], Copenhague, 1974, pp. 46-58, 102 ss., 116-118, 169-171.

a participar en cualquier campaña en la que no tuviera el mando total de los ejércitos.

Estos acontecimientos alarmaron profundamente a Cristián, pues las relaciones de Dinamarca con Suecia atravesaban por un momento difícil como consecuencia de supuestas o reales violaciones de los suecos del tratado de 1613. En consecuencia, el rey danés temía que si su rival conseguía un gran ejército, tal vez apoyado por la flota holandesa, el Báltico se convertiría en un lago sueco. Fue así como en enero de 1625 Cristián se mostró dispuesto a intervenir, con la condición de que Inglaterra enviara 7.000 hombres a Dinamarca para formar parte del ejército de invasión, y organizara al mismo tiempo una maniobra de diversión en los Países Bajos (si era necesario, conducida por el «odioso y sospechoso» Mansfeld). Jacobo I esperaba todavía conseguir la participación de Suecia y Dinamarca y para solucionar sus diferencias —así como para asegurarse de que podría seguir contando con el apoyo francés— impulsó la reunión de una gran conferencia de los países aliados a celebrar en La Haya en abril de 1625. Pero la muerte de Mauricio de Nassau y de Jacobo I en ese mismo mes provocó el retraso de la conferencia hasta noviembre.[41] Sin embargo, esto no detuvo a Cristián, que continuó adelante, asumiendo el papel de defensor de la fe protestante. A principios de 1625, comenzó las hostilidades en su calidad de duque de Holstein, sin haber conseguido ninguna promesa firme de apoyo político y financiero.

Tradicionalmente, los historiadores daneses han afirmado que la intervención danesa fue producto de la temeridad o el infantilismo del monarca. Pero ni esta explicación ni las recientes valoraciones positivas de la iniciativa real, que sólo habría fracasado por la oposición sistemática del Consejo (basada en intereses económicos egoístas), pueden aceptarse sin reservas. Creemos, más bien, que la extraordinaria libertad económica de que gozaba el monarca le permitió desarrollar una intensa actividad, escapando al control constitucional; y que la combinación de la rivalidad escandinava por alcanzar la hegemonía en el Báltico y de la tortuosa diplomacia de Inglaterra, del elector palatino y de Holanda actuó sobre las convicciones confesionales de

41. Véase BL, MS. Stowe 176, f. 258, Anstruther a sir Thomas Edmondes, 10 de agosto de 1624; PRO, S.P. 84/120/169, Anstruther a sir Dudley Carleton, 3 de noviembre de 1624, y S.P. 75/6/30, extracto de las negociaciones realizadas con Dinamarca y Suecia, enero-febrero de 1625. (Referencias ofrecidas amablemente por el Dr. Simon Adams.)

Cristián y sobre su ambición personal de una forma que fue incapaz de resistir.

En defensa de su decisión de invadir Alemania, hay que decir que la situación militar parecía extraordinariamente clara en la primavera de 1625. Las fuerzas de la Liga católica y el emperador se hallaban en las fronteras del Círculo de la Baja Sajonia; sólo los franceses (la Valtelina), Mansfeld (en los Países Bajos), Bethlen Gabor de Transilvania y Carlos Manuel de Saboya parecían preparados para pasar a la acción. Cristián llegó a la conclusión de que tenía que actuar antes de que fuera demasiado tarde. Pese a la oposición de su Consejo, se aseguró la elección como *kreisoberst* de la Baja Sajonia en abril de 1625, comprometiéndose a defender al Círculo contra la agresión imperial o de la Liga. En junio avanzó al frente de 20.000 mercenarios —cuya paga era satisfecha, por el momento, con la fortuna personal del monarca—, cruzó el Elba y avanzó hacia el sur, hacia Hameln.

Sin embargo, por una extraña coincidencia que a menudo se olvida, Cristián había elegido el peor momento posible para realizar la invasión. Hasta entonces, el principal enemigo de los protestantes había sido el ejército de Tilly, financiado fundamentalmente por la Liga católica y acantonado en Westfalia y Hesse. Pero en la primavera de 1625, por sugerencia de los líderes de la Liga, el emperador decidió poner en pie de guerra su propio ejército, confiando el mando supremo a Wallenstein, un noble checo que había obtenido importantísimos beneficios de la venta de las propiedades confiscadas en Bohemia. Gracias a los recursos obtenidos en sus nuevos dominios, así como de los préstamos concedidos por el banquero de Amberes Hans de Witte y de las contribuciones exigidas por sus propias tropas, Wallenstein contaba ya en el verano con unos 30.000 hombres. Esta fuerza, cuya existencia ignoraban los daneses, avanzó hacia el norte penetrando en Magdeburgo y Halberstadt. Así pues, Cristián, que se hallaba lejos de su patria, tenía que enfrentarse a dos ejércitos en lugar de uno. No tuvo más remedio que organizar la retirada de sus tropas, y si consiguió evitar el desastre fue por la disputa que entablaron Tilly y Wallenstein sobre los límites de su respectiva autoridad.

Cristián necesitaba desesperadamente ayuda, pero no pudo conseguirla de sus aliados. En primer lugar, se produjo la ruptura de la alianza anglo-francesa. A finales de 1624, antes incluso de que se produjera la intervención de Cristián, Richelieu había retirado su apoyo a la expedición de Mansfeld. Cuando el conde llegó a los Países Bajos

con 12.000 soldados ingleses en 1625, no llevó consigo plan alguno de campaña, salvo las órdenes estrictas de Jacobo I de no implicarse en ninguna acción militar fuera del Palatinado. La disputa con Mansfeld coincidió con la revuelta del duque hugonote de Soubise en la región occidental de Francia. Richelieu solicitó ayuda naval a Inglaterra y a las Provincias Unidas a cambio de continuar apoyando la causa anti-Habsburgo, pero la cooperación en la represión de los protestantes causó una gran reacción pública en ambos países. Atrapado por los dilemas de la política confesional, Richelieu cambió de actitud y abandonó la guerra: se negó a hacer frente a sus compromisos de ayuda al duque de Saboya, que había invadido Génova (aliada de España y vínculo fundamental en sus comunicaciones imperiales), y aceptó abandonar la Valtelina a España, conservando tan sólo vagos derechos de tránsito para las tropas francesas (paz de Monzón, 5 de mayo de 1626). Unos meses después, el gobierno francés rechazó formalmente participar en la alianza antihabsburguesa y, lo que era aún peor, en marzo de 1627 concluyó una alianza con España para luchar contra Inglaterra (véase pp. 158-159, *infra*). Carlos I respondió apoyando a Soubise, el jefe hugonote, y en el mes de julio envió una expedición dirigida por el duque de Buckingham para fomentar la rebelión en La Rochelle. Durante más de un año, el asedio a esta ciudad centró la atención europea: Inglaterra apoyaba a los hugonotes; España (brevemente) y los holandeses (más brevemente todavía) apoyaron a Luis XIII y a Richelieu, quien dirigió las operaciones personalmente. Hasta que no se produjo la rendición de La Rochelle el 28 de octubre de 1628, Francia se vio imposibilitada a intervenir fuera de su territorio.

En el verano de 1625 Gustavo Adolfo abandonó también la coalición e inició su propia campaña contra el monarca de Polonia, ocupando primero el resto de Livonia, para atacar después la Prusia polaca. Ante la decisión de Gustavo Adolfo, Brandemburgo volvió a adoptar una postura de neutralidad. Más grave todavía fue el hecho de que el nuevo rey de Inglaterra, Carlos I, redujera la ayuda a sus aliados. Aunque en abril, inmediatamente después de acceder al trono, aceptó proporcionar a Cristián IV un subsidio mensual en lugar de un contingente de soldados ingleses, la disolución del Parlamento en 1625 debilitó gravemente su posición financiera. La mayor parte del dinero disponible fue utilizado para equipar la flota que se envió para atacar Cádiz en el mes de noviembre, operación que terminó en

un fracaso total. Las 90 naves holandesas e inglesas, que transportaban a unos 9.000 hombres, no consiguieron capturar el tesoro de la flota americana, no fueron capaces de destruir ningún barco español importante y tampoco ocuparon ninguna ciudad enemiga. El regreso a Inglaterra de la fracasada expedición en el mes de noviembre, con la pérdida de 30 buques y numerosos hombres, no sirvió ciertamente para incrementar el entusiasmo en el país por otra aventura en el exterior.

Así, en el otoño de 1625 fueron sólo algunos representantes de la Gran Alianza —Inglaterra, Dinamarca y las Provincias Unidas— los que enviaron delegados a La Haya a discutir la siguiente campaña contra los Habsburgo. En un primer momento, la delegación inglesa, encabezada por el duque de Buckingham, concentró sus esfuerzos en el intento de conseguir que una parte de la carga económica recayera en sus aliados.[42] Pero en octubre, Jacob Ulfeld, el principal negociador danés, afirmó rotundamente que la aparición del ejército de Wallenstein había cambiado por completo la naturaleza del problema, pues si el teatro de la guerra se trasladaba al norte de Alemania, los daneses podrían verse obligados a firmar una paz por separado con el emperador. El 9 de diciembre de 1625 se alcanzó un compromiso: la Convención de La Haya. Inglaterra y la República de Holanda prometieron a Dinamarca el pago de 144.000 táleros mensuales cada una, mientras que el ejército de Mansfeld se integraría en las fuerzas de Cristián.[43] Los firmantes de la Convención manifestaron, asimismo, su esperanza de que Bethlen Gabor —que hasta el momento no había entrado en contacto con Cristián IV— atacara de nuevo al emperador y Francia prometió que si lo hacía pagaría al príncipe un subsidio.

Aunque la coordinación y preparación de las operaciones transcontinentales eran un asunto difícil en el siglo XVII, los aliados decidieron lanzar una ambiciosa campaña en 1626. Mansfeld avanzaría por el Elba hacia Silesia, asolaría las posesiones de los Habsburgo y se uniría con Bethlen Gabor; sus dos ejércitos unidos atraerían a las fuerzas de

42. BL, MS. Harley 1584, fols. 29-30, instrucciones a Buckingham respecto a Dinamarca, 17/27 de octubre de 1625. Finalmente, el duque consiguió convencer a los aliados para que integraran las diezmadas fuerzas de Mansfeld en el ejército danés. (Mi agradecimiento, una vez más, al Dr. Adams.)

43. El texto de la «Convención de La Haya» se encontrará en L. Laursen, ed., *Danmark-Norges Traktater 1523-1750* (Tratados de Dinamarca y Noruega, 1523-1750), III, Copenhague, 1916, núm. 38; cf. la introducción, pp. 620-637.

Wallenstein y las derrotarían. La victoria imperial en el puente de Dessau, en abril de 1626, retrasó la marcha de Mansfeld, pero en junio reanudó su campaña y, según las informaciones que llegaron al cuartel general de Cristián, consiguió que Wallenstein fuera en su persecución. En julio, el monarca danés acogió con satisfacción la noticia de que había estallado una revuelta campesina generalizada en la Alta Austria (véase p. 141, *infra*), que exigió la intervención de unidades regulares de los ejércitos imperial y bávaro antes de que pudiera ser sofocada. Así pues, Cristián partió de Wolfenbüttel en agosto, confiado de que sólo el ejército de Tilly —comparable al suyo en calidad y fuerza— se interponía entre él y Viena. Sus fuerzas constituirían uno de los brazos de un gigantesco movimiento de tenaza hacia los territorios de los Habsburgo; Mansfeld y Bethlen constituirían el otro. Pero Cristián se hallaba en inferioridad de condiciones respecto al número de hombres y cuadros de mando. En efecto, Wallenstein había dejado una fuerza considerable en la Baja Sajonia y Tilly contaba con las ventajas de su reciente experiencia militar. Cuando el 16 de agosto de 1626, y tras varios días de constantes escaramuzas en medio de la lluvia, Cristián se enfrentó a Tilly en el campo de batalla de Lutter-am-Barenberg, en el diario del monarca figuraba una lacónica anotación: «hemos luchado con el enemigo, siendo derrotados. Ese mismo día me dirigí a Wolfenbüttel». Sin duda, este comentario habría parecido un tanto eufemístico a los soldados de su ejército, que se retiraban caóticamente bajo una presión constante del enemigo y abandonados por su comandante.[44]

La verdad de los hechos que ocurrieron en Lutter se ve oscurecida por la plétora de panfletos producidos inmediatamente después de la batalla por la cancillería de campo de Tilly, en los que se afirmaba la inevitabilidad de la derrota de los herejes que se oponían al emperador legítimo y a su leal ejército. Por contraste, la propaganda protestante explicaba la derrota, al parecer —por razones política internas—, como consecuencia de la defección de la caballería en un momento crucial y de las emboscadas realizadas tras las líneas del ejército de Cristián. Pero todo parece indicar que la victoria de Tilly fue debida no tanto a la superioridad de sus tropas como a los errores

44. Sobre esta batalla, véase la interesante reconstrucción de K. J. V. Jespersen, «Slaget ved Lutter am Barenberg, 1626», *Krigshistorisk tidsskrift*, IX, 1973, pp. 80-89.

tácticos del monarca. No obstante, lo que queda fuera de toda duda es la importancia de la batalla de Lutter: la frágil unidad del Círculo de la Baja Sajonia se rompió por completo y desaparecieron todos los obstáculos que pudieran existir para la invasión de Dinamarca por parte de las fuerzas católicas. Si la campaña decisiva se retrasó hasta 1627, fue tan sólo para permitir que Wallenstein y el nuevo ejército imperial cobraran también su parte de los despojos.

Mansfeld no tuvo más éxito que Cristián. Cuando se enteró de la derrota del monarca danés el 3 de septiembre de 1626 se hallaba en Silesia y Wallenstein le perseguía muy de cerca. Ante la imposibilidad de escapar hacia el norte, decidió unir sus fuerzas inmediatamente con las de Bethlen Gabor. Esa operación la llevó a cabo en el plazo de una semana. Poco después, llegaron algunos contingentes enviados por el gobierno otomano y el 30 de septiembre tan extraños aliados se dispusieron a hacer frente a las tropas imperiales. Pero finalmente no se produjo la batalla, porque Wallenstein (cuyas tropas habían sufrido severas privaciones en su rápida marcha hacia Hungría) no contaba con suficientes hombres y Bethlen Gabor (que apenas acababa de llegar) no tenía armas. Era la última oportunidad que se le presentaba al transilvano para obtener una gran victoria. Pocas semanas después, recibió la noticia de que los turcos habían sufrido una derrota total en el Próximo Oriente: el ejército otomano no consiguió reconquistar Bagdad, tomada por los persas en 1624, a pesar de que sometió a esa ciudad a un asedio que duró casi un año. Bethlen comprendió inmediatamente la importancia de ese revés para sus propios planes. «Veo que debo hacer la paz», fue su comentario. Ante la imposibilidad de conseguir ayuda desde el oeste a raíz de la batalla de Lutter y privado de apoyo desde el este tras lo sucedido en Bagdad, no podía enfrentarse en solitario a los ejércitos de los Habsburgo. La paz de Bratislava fue firmada a comienzos de 1627 y Wallenstein avanzó hacia el noroeste, penetrando en Mecklemburgo, Pomerania y, finalmente, Jutlandia.

El emperador hizo pagar un altísimo precio por la paz. Los duques de Mecklemburgo, que habían apoyado a Cristián, fueron desposeídos automáticamente de sus títulos y Wallenstein recibió el ducado confiscado. A Cristián se le exigió que cediera toda Jutlandia, que pagara gravosas reparaciones de guerra y que renunciara para siempre a sus territorios en el Imperio. Estas exigencias eran excesivas. Cristián se inclinaba a rechazarlas, pero sus aliados no podían permitirle que lo

hiciera. Inglaterra y Holanda, que contemplaban una paz por separado entre Dinamarca y el emperador como el preludio del hundimiento de su causa, enviaron nuevos (aunque limitados) contingentes de hombres y dinero. Gustavo Adolfo concluyó una alianza defensiva con su antiguo enemigo e incluso mantuvo con él una difícil entrevista personal en su frontera común en febrero de 1629, al parecer con la intención de atemorizar al enemigo. Pero en ese momento era indudable que la posición imperial, que parecía tan sólida a finales de 1627, había comenzado a debilitarse. Los esfuerzos de Wallenstein para crear una flota imperial en el Báltico, con ayuda española, fracasaron ante la falta de apoyo de Polonia y de los puertos hanseáticos. Su proyecto de excavar un canal entre el Báltico y el mar del Norte, que habría permitido a los barcos evitar el pago del peaje en el Sund, no pasó de ser un simple sueño. Lo que es más importante, el ejército imperial no consiguió ocupar las islas danesas, requisito necesario para una total rendición y, asimismo, fracasó en su intento de conquistar el puerto de Stralsund, donde existía una flota perfectamente preparada, a pesar de que lo sometió a un asedio prolongado (véase p. 151, *infra*).

Mientras Wallenstein trataba sin éxito de conseguir sus objetivos, el coste de su ejército comenzó a ser intolerable para los estados alemanes. Indudablemente, el Imperio necesitaba la paz en no menor medida que Dinamarca y en consecuencia se iniciaron intensas negociaciones en Lübeck. En esta ocasión, no se habló en absoluto de reparaciones de guerra ni de cesiones de territorios. Por el tratado de paz, concluido en mayo de 1629, Cristián recuperó todos los territorios que había perdido y vio confirmado su derecho a cobrar peaje en el río Elba. A cambio, el monarca prometió no volver a interferir en los asuntos internos del Imperio, compromiso puramente personal que no afectaba a los parámetros políticos en los que podía actuar —y actuó— en beneficio de sus sucesores.

Así terminó el *intermezzo* danés. No es fácil calcular cuál fue su coste exacto. Cristián IV, que no intentó que sus ejércitos se mantuvieran con los recursos de los territorios en los que luchaba, como ocurrió con los ejércitos de Wallenstein o Tilly, gastó, por tanto, una cantidad mayor de su fortuna personal y del tesoro del reino: 2,6 millones de táleros costaron los dos años de guerra continental. La mayor parte de ese dinero se recaudó en Dinamarca, pues los subsidios del extranjero sólo comenzaron a llegar en la primavera de 1625 y se satisfacieron parcialmente y con gran renuencia (sólo se llegaron a pagar

547.000 táleros del subsidio procedente de Inglaterra). Esta cifra no incluye el dinero que pagó el propio Cristián o las potencias occidentales a determinados aliados como Mansfeld. En 1628, el Consejo restableció su tutela financiera sobre el monarca: los impuestos para la guerra se votaban tan sólo a condición de que fueran administrados por una comisión especial elegida por el Consejo. Esto ocurrió con los aproximadamente 700.000 táleros que recaudaron para pagar los retrasos (o la licencia) de las unidades en Dinamarca. Una vez satisfechas todas las facturas, el gobierno se encontró con una deuda considerable tanto en Dinamarca como en el extranjero, lo cual induce a pensar que la aventura alemana de Cristián pudo haber costado a sus reinos entre 6 y 8 millones de táleros.[45]

Fue éste un duro golpe, pero no hay que exagerar las consecuencias a largo plazo. Es cierto que Jutlandia (y en especial sus bosques) había sido devastada y que su población tuvo que pagar 2 millones de táleros al ejército imperial de ocupación en tan sólo cuatro meses. Así pues, la guerra dejó tras de sí una gran pobreza y una fuerte intranquilidad social, cuyo blanco eran sobre todo los nobles que se habían protegido huyendo a las islas. Las malas cosechas, las enfermedades epidémicas y la dureza de los impuestos no hicieron sino empeorar una situación difícil. Pero la crisis de posguerra no duró mucho tiempo. La continuación de la guerra en Alemania creó un mercado importante para los productos agrícolas daneses, gracias al cual se enriquecieron los comerciantes y los grandes cultivadores, hasta que la política antisueca de Cristián provocó el ataque relámpago de Lennart Torstensson contra Dinamarca en 1643 (véase p. 251, *infra*).

Si la guerra no causó graves daños a Dinamarca a largo plazo, ¿cuáles fueron sus consecuencias sobre el monarca? Esta vez, la valoración ha de ser más negativa. En el plano internacional, las derrotas de Cristián le desacreditaron, mientras que la intervención victoriosa de Suecia a partir de 1630 (con el apoyo de Francia, Rusia y Holanda) aseguró a este país el *dominium maris Baltici* y le permitió aislar a Dinamarca, que era precisamente lo que Cristián había intentado evitar. La guerra había demostrado por primera vez la vulnerabilidad de la frontera meridional de Dinamarca. No pasaría mucho tiempo antes de que otros explotaran esta debilidad. Desde el punto de vista interno, el monarca y el Consejo reconocieron la necesidad de realizar mayores gastos en defensa, «pues ... el peligro se aproxima cada vez más a nuestras fronteras», pero no estaban de acuerdo sobre quién debía dirigir la política exterior y a quién debía corresponder el control de los impuestos.[46] En 1629, Cristián obligó al Consejo a aprobar impuestos por valor de un millón de táleros, «para recuperar los gastos que había hecho en beneficio del reino durante la guerra», con la amenaza de que, de lo contrario, no ratificaría la paz de Lübeck. Al parecer, el monarca intentó, mediante esta maniobra, recuperar la independencia financiera de que había gozado antes de la guerra, pero fracasó como consecuencia de la obstrucción sistemática del Consejo. En 1637 sus «diez toneles de oro» —como eran llamados por los contemporáneos— habían desaparecido y la necesidad de crear un ejército permanente por primera vez permitió a la Asamblea, resistiéndose al crecimiento explosivo de los impuestos, insistir con éxito en que debería supervisar la recaudación de impuestos para objetivos militares mediante una comisión de nobles elegidos.[47] En 1645, tras una segunda y desgraciada guerra, los comisionados consiguieron también el control del gasto militar. Fueron estos acontecimientos —junto con la depresión económica en que se vio sumido el país a partir de 1640—, más que las consecuencias inmediatas del *intermezzo* danés, los que iniciaron el período de decadencia del país.

¿Qué había conseguido, pues, el *intermezzo* danés? Cristián se vio desacreditado y derrotado; Carlos I, cuyas tropas, sin alimentos, se rindieron en abril de 1628, se retiró de la guerra; Mansfeld y Bethlen Gabor, aunque no habían sido derrotados, se habían visto obligados a abandonar la lucha y ambos habían muerto ya en 1629. En ese momento, la causa protestante tenía muy mala salud, pero cuando menos había sobrevivido. También se había transformado. Quienes identificaban la causa del Palatinado con la causa protestante vieron cómo su idea era reivindicada. Los líderes europeos, ya fueran protestantes

45. Petersen, «Defence, war and finance», basado en un estudio de los libros mayores de guerra reales, en *Rigsarkivet*, Copenhague.

46. S. Heiberg, «De ti toender guld: Rigsraad kongemagt og statsfinanser i 1630'erne» [Los diez toneles de oro; el Consejo de Estado, la monarquía y las finanzas públicas en el decenio de 1630], *Historisk tidsskrift* [*Dansk*], LXXVI (1976), pp. 39 ss.

47. *Ibid.*, pp. 49-57; sobre las consecuencias sociales y económicas del período de posguerra, véase E. Ladewig Petersen, *Fra rangssamfund til standssamfund, 1550-1700: Dansk socialhistorie*, III, Copenhague, 1980, pp. 317-413. Véanse también pp. 400-403, *infra*.

o católicos, estaban convencidos ahora de que los conflictos del decenio de 1620 habían sido causados por algo más que la ambición y la obstinación de Federico V. Sin embargo, este cambio de opinión no se debió únicamente a la propaganda de los exiliados del Palatinado o de sus aliados. Fue consecuencia, en mucha mayor medida, de las acciones y afirmaciones de los Habsburgo victoriosos y de sus aliados, que pusieron claramente de relieve que estaban decididos a explotar al máximo sus éxitos. Después de una centuria de permanecer a la defensiva, los católicos de Alemania tenían muchas deudas que saldar.

Capítulo III

LOS HABSBURGO, VICTORIOSOS

Desde que triunfara la Reforma, los grandes estados católicos de Europa no habían desarrollado una acción conjunta eficaz para extirpar la herejía. Carlos V había encontrado la oposición sistemática de Francia y ocasional por parte del papado; Felipe II se había visto enfrentado casi con tanta frecuencia a los católicos como a los protestantes. Sin embargo, a partir de 1619, Fernando contó durante un tiempo con el apoyo activo de España, Francia, Polonia, los católicos alemanes y los principales estados de Italia en su lucha con los rebeldes y los herejes. Es cierto que estos aliados retiraron su apoyo gradualmente —Polonia y Francia en 1621; el papado y la mayor parte de los estados italianos en 1623—, pero el eje Viena-Bruselas-Madrid, contando con el único apoyo de la Liga católica alemana, continuó derrotando a sus enemigos protestantes. Finalmente, organizaron grandes operaciones conjuntas tanto en los Países Bajos como en Italia, aunque muchos de los consejeros de Fernando mantenían profundas reservas respecto a la conveniencia de prestar tal ayuda abierta a España.

Aunque al escribir la historia de la Guerra de los Treinta Años los acontecimientos del decenio de 1620 se suelen analizar desde el punto de vista de los protestantes derrotados, lo cierto es que ésa es una visión distorsionada y errónea. En efecto, no tiene en cuenta los esfuerzos de los vencedores por convertir su triunfo temporal en un logro permanente, primero en las tierras reconquistadas a los rebeldes y luego en el conjunto del Imperio. En consecuencia, tampoco explica cómo esas acciones desarrolladas a lo largo de todo un decenio, provocaron finalmente el aislamiento de los Habsburgo que permitiría

después su derrota total. Parece, pues, fundamental volver a analizar el primer decenio de la guerra desde el punto de vista católico, aunque eso signifique examinar de nuevo algunos acontecimientos, como los cruciales asedios de La Rochelle y Stralsund en 1628. Ciertamente, un mismo acontecimiento puede tener un significado completamente distinto cuando se examina a través de los ojos de los católicos y no desde el punto de vista protestante.

I. La visión imperial

El año 1620 constituye un punto de inflexión en la historia centroeuropea. Sin embargo, ello no fue consecuencia de la breve y confusa batalla de la Montaña Blanca ni tampoco de la vergonzosa retirada de Federico del Palatinado. Antes bien, hay que hacer hincapié en el hecho de que el emperador Fernando II tomó una serie de decisiones personales a raíz de su victoria, que alteraron notablemente la naturaleza de la soberanía de los Habsburgo en sus propios territorios y que favorecieron la probabilidad de una guerra prolongada en Alemania.

En Bohemia, sus lugartenientes pusieron en marcha un programa que combinaba la persecución con la reorganización. Aunque realizado en ocasiones de forma caótica, este proyecto tenía una indudable coherencia interna. Primero, subyugó a los participantes activos en la rebelión y, luego, expulsó a los más peligrosos enemigos ideológicos, los ministros calvinistas, a los que a no tardar siguieron los luteranos. A continuación, atacó a las ciudades protestantes y finalmente, en 1627-1628, toda la nobleza se vio obligada a elegir entre la conversión o el exilio. Entre tanto, una serie de consejeros imperiales de confianza elaboraron una constitución revisada para Bohemia y Moravia para consagrar y perpetuar los nuevos poderes reales: el gobierno hereditario de la dinastía Habsburgo, que veía incrementados sus derechos legislativos y judiciales; la abolición de la tolerancia religiosa; la decisión de que los funcionarios fueran responsables ante el soberano y no ante la Dieta; la concesión a la realeza, con exclusividad, de la prerrogativa de conceder el *status* de nobleza y, por tanto, de introducir extranjeros en la administración; la igualdad de la lengua alemana, lengua de la corte, con el checo, predominante entre la población. Y aunque fue Bohemia, como foco principal de la rebelión, la que recibió el trato más severo, se tomaron medidas en todos los territorios de los

Habsburgo para proscribir a los protestantes e imponer la adhesión a la nueva política. En la Alta Austria, la ocupación bávara, combinada con la Contrarreforma imperial, desencadenó en 1626 las revueltas campesinas más violentas de la Guerra de los Treinta Años.

El personaje inspirador de esta política siempre ha desconcertado a los historiadores. Ello no es sorprendente, pues sus propios contemporáneos emitían juicios muy diversos sobre el emperador Fernando. Unos destacaban su talante amistoso y sus maneras afables (en verdad era sociable y capaz de cautivar incluso a quienes no aprobaban sus acciones), mientras que para otros resultaba duro e inflexible. Unos destacaban su fuerte personalidad, mientras que otros hacían hincapié en el papel (positivo o negativo, según el punto de vista del que hablaba) de sus confidentes. Pero en algo se mostraban todos de acuerdo: las convicciones católicas del emperador constituían una auténtica pasión devoradora. Acudía a misa a cualquier hora del día y de la noche; veneraba a la Virgen y a las reliquias de los santos; mostraba siempre la disposición más favorable hacia el clero y las instituciones de la Iglesia, en especial los monasterios; participaba en peregrinaciones y realizaba penitencia y su vida privada era un modelo de piedad y virtud familiar. Esta devoción no era sólo del conocimiento común, sino que fue difundida públicamente, en especial en las postrimerías de la vida de Fernando en una celebrada homilía de su confesor jesuita Lamormaini. Hay que decir, en verdad, que la fe ascética se halla en la raíz de la actividad política del emperador. No fue meramente casual que tras la batalla de la Montaña Blanca restituyese al clero en el lugar preeminente de la jerarquía constitucional de Bohemia. Si bien pensaba que la herejía causaría siempre la insubordinación en sus dominios, la determinación de extirparla era previa a cualquier otra consideración.

Para comprender el drama que se desarrolló en el decenio de 1620 debemos considerar de nuevo los orígenes políticos de Fernando. En efecto, unos años antes, este señor de la guerra internacional, el rey-emperador unido por vínculos matrimoniales con España y Polonia, Baviera, Mantua y Toscana, era todavía un simple archiduque que gobernaba la provincia de Estiria siguiendo las directrices de la Casa de Habsburgo. Sin ningún género de dudas, esa experiencia influyó decisivamente en el emperador. Por otra parte, la capital de la Austria Interior, Graz, siguió ocupando un lugar de privilegio en su corazón: supervisó personalmente la construcción de un mausoleo en esa ciu-

dad, donde fueron enterrados sus restos en 1637. Durante su juventud, había sido testigo de la dura lucha de sus padres, en especial su enérgica madre bávara, contra los prepotentes líderes de la Dieta protestante estiria. Había observado cómo, en tales circunstancias, la consolidación de la monarquía podía correr pareja con la consolidación del catolicismo, dividiendo a la mal cohesionada oposición formada por nobles, burgueses y predicadores, persuadiendo a los más débiles con toda clase de argumentos de tipo espiritual y material y contando, sobre todo, con la recién fundada universidad jesuita. Al llegar a la mayoría de edad y fortalecido por la visita que realizó al santuario de Loreto y por el encuentro que mantuvo con el papa, Fernando se dedicó a perfeccionar los métodos de la Contrarreforma política. Entre 1599 y 1602, sus agentes, laicos y eclesiásticos, recorrieron aldeas y ciudades forzando la adhesión a la Iglesia católica. Los ciudadanos tenían que jurar la fe católica, presentar pruebas de absolución y abandonar todo tipo de libros y enseñanzas sectarias. Los que no se mostraron dispuestos a transigir fueron obligados a acompañar a sus ministros protestantes camino del exilio.

El emperador consiguió imponer con éxito sus medidas. Desde entonces, la provincia meridional de Austria permaneció obediente a la voluntad de los Habsburgo; la nobleza, aunque todavía predominantemente luterana, se vio aislada y permaneció tranquila. Ni los importantes acontecimientos de 1608-1609, ni la insurrección subsiguiente, la indujeron a manifestar ningún tipo de deslealtad. Por su parte, Fernando, convencido de estar realizando una misión al servicio de la Madre Iglesia, pasó a la acción e intrigó con la facción extremista hispano-bávara en las cortes de sus primos imperiales, Rodolfo y Matías. Al acceder al trono se trasladó a Viena, ansioso por imponer el mismo código de severa disciplina en un territorio más amplio. No deja de ser significativo el hecho de que muchos de sus colaboradores más estrechos alcanzaran también en Graz la madurez política: el canciller Werdenberg, el confesor Lamormaini y, sobre todo, el sagaz y dúctil primer ministro, Eggenberg. En el lapso de unos pocos años repitió el modelo ya conocido: el envío de agentes imperiales, la imposición de confesiones y juramentos, la política educativa dominada por los jesuitas, la imposición de la censura, las presiones para asegurarse el conformismo y la combinación de halagos a las clases altas y represión implacable contra los disidentes. Ahora, también los últimos herejes de Estiria, por noble que fuera su cuna, tuvieron que elegir.

Centenares de ellos obedecieron a su conciencia y emigraron a Alemania.

A este sistema se le ha dado con frecuencia el nombre de «absolutismo confesional». Esta expresión puede ser útil, pero debemos definirla en términos negativos, mostrando lo que *no* era. En primer lugar, no se trataba de un ideal político abstracto. Sin duda, las ideas de Fernando eran totalmente legalistas, una especie de conservadurismo radical, basado en el principio de que los estados protestantes de la Europa central nunca habían tenido derechos constitucionales, de los cuales, por tanto, podían ser desposeídos a voluntad de su soberano. Pero en vano buscaríamos entre las miles de páginas compiladas por el fiel diplomático y cronista del emperador, conde Khevenhüller, la afirmación teórica de ese principio, de la misma forma que en 1619 Viena no encontró quien pudiera refutar adecuadamente la razonada *Apología* de los rebeldes bohemios. La mente del emperador estaba vacía de principios filosóficos, más allá de algunas ideas de las grandes figuras jesuitas, adquiridas en el curso de su impecable educación ortodoxa en la universidad bávara de Ingolstadt. Era su decisión, unida a un evidente sentido práctico, la que le permitía salir triunfador.

En segundo lugar, absolutismo confesional no equivalía a teocracia. Por mucho que confiara en la intervención divina, el emperador mantenía un estrecho control sobre sus colaboradores eclesiásticos. En este sentido, eran muy exageradas las historias que hacían circular sus enemigos respecto a que estaba dominado por los jesuitas. Lo cierto es que cuando Fernando depositó en ellos algún poder lo hizo lúcidamente y con perfecto conocimiento de lo que hacía. Durante toda su vida fue consciente de la imposibilidad de separar la Iglesia y la política cuando estaban en juego asuntos tales como la soberanía sobre los territorios eclesiásticos. Sus primos bávaros gobernaban en toda una serie de sedes alemanas, mientras que sus hermanos más jóvenes, Leopoldo y Carlos, alcanzaron el obispado a temprana edad. La causa inmediata de la revuelta en Bohemia fue precisamente esa interpenetración de las esferas clerical y laica: si los protestantes podían (desde la Carta de Majestad) construir iglesias en territorios pertenecientes a la corona, ¿tenían también derecho a construir en las propiedades monásticas? Fernando, si bien apoyaba totalmente la idea de que las posesiones católicas eran inviolables a este respecto, no tenía duda, sin embargo, sobre el corolario práctico (por muy inconsecuente que fuera en teoría): que un soberano *católico* podía interferir en ellas. Cuando

Melchior Khlesl, consejero durante mucho tiempo de Matías y máxima figura de la Contrarreforma austriaca hasta esa época, intentó negociar un acuerdo con los insurgentes, Fernando le hizo detener y le retuvo por la fuerza en una remota abadía. Tampoco le importó enfrentarse con la propia Roma (a donde se retiró finalmente Khlesl muy enojado). El enfrentamiento entre el emperador y el papa Urbano VIII fue un factor internacional de primer orden en los decenios de 1620 y 1630. El Edicto de Restitución tenía perfecto sentido, al menos para Viena, como expresión de la voluntad soberana del emperador, aunque provocó tantos inconvenientes a los católicos como a los protestantes.

Finalmente, el absolutismo confesional no implicaba una centralización fuerte del gobierno ni una visión clara de un «imperio Habsburgo». En efecto, el decenio de 1620 asistió a la creación de un nuevo organismo administrativo, la cancillería de la corte. Pero ese título no implicaba (en ese momento) la aparición de una nueva entidad política —el objetivo era limitar la autoridad del archicanciller de Alemania, el elector católico de Maguncia— y, todavía menos, una nueva política radical. En el Tirol y Alsacia, Fernando permitió que su hermano Leopoldo (liberado ahora de sus votos eclesiásticos) gobernara con poderes casi totales; y a la muerte de Leopoldo, ocurrida en 1632, fue su viuda, una princesa italiana, la que se hizo cargo del poder. Incluso en Bohemia, una vez estabilizada la situación, las antiguas instituciones de gobierno permanecieron en la práctica casi sin cambios. En todas partes sobrevivieron, e incluso prosperaron, Dietas locales, a condición de que aceptaran el catolicismo y permanecieran leales al emperador.

Pese a todas las expulsiones y a la creación de nuevos títulos nobiliarios durante el decenio de 1620, lo cierto es que el sistema de gobierno de los Habsburgo no creó una nueva élite social. Pocos aventureros militares o favoritos de la corte consiguieron alcanzar una posición sólida, en tanto que los nuevos títulos fueron a parar fundamentalmente a familias que ya eran poderosas en el seno de la monarquía. La política de los Habsburgo siguió siendo ejecutada fundamentalmente por notables locales (un poco más oligárquicos que antes), que la adaptaron a las circunstancias regionales. Es muy posible que al recordar las peligrosas confederaciones protestantes de los años anteriores a 1620, Fernando pensara que un gobierno eficaz y centralizado de territorios tan variados podía provocar fácilmente una oposición internacional igualmente poderosa. Además, en los territorios

habsburgueses faltaban otros dos elementos fundamentales en un auténtico sistema de absolutismo real. No existía una red bien desarrollada de financieros o empresarios. De hecho, el emperador había hecho todo lo posible por desquiciar la vida comercial al destruir a la burguesía protestante (aunque mostró una actitud ligeramente favorable hacia los judíos). Al final de su reinado, Fernando nombró incluso a dos abades como presidentes de su Tesoro: el Estado de la Contrarreforma estaba concebido todavía como un gigantesco latifundio monástico. Al mismo tiempo, el ejército no ejercía una influencia pública decisiva. Por su parte, Fernando no poseía mejores credenciales como soldado que sus predecesores imperiales inmediatos. El caso de Wallenstein pone en evidencia la ausencia de canales establecidos de control militar, así como el hecho de que las tropas imperiales (como las de otros países) tendían a ganar batallas a pesar del intento de imponerles una autoridad religiosa o moral y no gracias a él.

Así, la revivida monarquía Habsburgo experimentó muy escasos cambios estructurales. En la década de 1630, el nuevo impulso ideológico del poder civil, junto con sus triunfos en el exterior, tendieron a ocultar los todavía débiles fundamentos del edificio. Pero la monarquía tenía un talón de Aquiles muy evidente: Hungría. En Hungría, la amenaza turca había desaparecido momentáneamente, siendo sustituida por una revuelta nacional contra Austria de carácter protestante. Los príncipes de Transilvania, Bethlen Gabor y Jorge Rákóczi, calvinistas que gozaban de buenos contactos entre los otomanos, no encontraron muchas dificultades para conseguir la adhesión de la clase gobernante en la mayor parte del territorio controlado por los Habsburgo, a pesar de la elección de Fernando como rey en 1618, tan sólo unas semanas antes de la Defenestración de Praga. La Contrarreforma húngara, que había contribuido notablemente a precipitar la rebelión, consiguió sofocarla durante el decenio de 1620, gracias a la firme dirección del infatigable político Nicolás Esterházy y del brillante polemista arzobispo Pázmány. Pero la situación siguió siendo delicada. Ni siquiera se podía confiar siempre en la Iglesia católica y Esterházy y Pázmány divergían en cuestiones de principio. Al no existir grandes reservas de lealtad, la obediencia al régimen de Fernando estaba condicionada todavía a su buen comportamiento. Sin embargo, habría sido posible pacificar Hungría (los planes estaban ya hechos para llevarlos a la práctica más adelante) si los Habsburgo hubieran podido retirarse de Alemania. Pero esa antítesis era totalmente irreal para Fernando II.

Su más firme acto de fe, fe en su propia vocación divina, implicaba mantener inalterable en toda su grandeza el patrimonio de los emperadores cristianos. Ante el esplendor del legado de Carlomagno, las espinas de la corona de san Esteban parecían una simple molestia de carácter provincial.

Cualquier relato de la reconstrucción de la Austria católica debe centrarse en la figura de Fernando II. ¿Pero qué decir de su brillante hijo, Fernando III, a quien la posteridad ha olvidado de forma tan persistente? El joven Fernando se educó en la guerra: nació en el año en que Matías se rebeló contra Rodolfo, fue coronado rey de Hungría durante una pausa en las campañas contra Bethlen Gabor; rey de Bohemia en el año de la nueva constitución, más tarde sería el primer Habsburgo austriaco durante muchas generaciones en dirigir personalmente, en Nördlingen, una gran victoria militar. Tras su accesión al trono en 1637 tuvo que dedicarse a la labor de gobernar, pese a sus inclinaciones intelectuales y artísticas (por ejemplo, fue quien inauguró la tradición familiar en el terreno de la actividad musical). Ahora bien, Fernando III fue todavía menos innovador que su padre por lo que respecta a la tarea de gobierno. Los cambios fueron titubeantes y ligeros. Con su trayectoria nada espectacular, el nuevo emperador confirmó simplemente un cambio gradual hacia una monarquía más danubiana, ortodoxa y con centro en Viena, autosuficiente como conjunto e interdependiente en sus diversas partes.

Ciertamente, merecía la pena todavía luchar por Alemania. Pero ahora, el objetivo más importante pasó a ser el de asegurarse el éxito de la Contrarreforma consiguiendo la retirada de los suecos, con sus designios en la Europa central y su constante apoyo a los emigrados protestantes. Fernando se conformó finalmente con muy pocas exigencias en el exterior, para asegurarse mayor libertad de acción en el interior. En 1648, los Habsburgo se encontraron con un Estado a medio consolidar frente a Alemania, por un lado, donde su esfera de influencia se vio limitada, y Bohemia y Hungría, por otro, donde se vio consecuentemente ampliada. Pero si la Casa de Austria carecía todavía de lo substancial al gobierno absoluto, al menos ahora podía perseguir lo accidental sin estorbos.

II. La práctica del absolutismo, I: 1621-1626

La primera consecuencia de la victoria de Fernando II sobre los rebeldes que se dejó sentir sobre el pueblo común fue el hundimiento de la moneda. Al igual que la revuelta, comenzó también en Bohemia. Ya bajo el gobierno de la Dieta del reino, la moneda había sido devaluada. Sin embargo, el alcance de la operación fue modesto en comparación con lo que ocurrió durante el régimen siguiente, encabezado por el colaborador de Fernando, Karl von Liechtenstein: durante el año 1621, la moneda se devaluó en un 25 por 100. Pero también esta devaluación fue modesta si la comparamos con la que se produjo en 1622. El 18 de enero de ese año se firmó un contrato entre el Tesoro imperial y un consorcio de quince destacados súbditos de Fernando que aceptaron arrendar todas las cecas de Bohemia, Moravia y la Baja Austria y controlar su moneda durante un año. El consorcio, cuya composición era hasta tal punto secreta que incluso en la actualidad sólo es posible identificar a cinco de sus miembros con cierta seguridad, se las arregló para destruir por completo la economía bohemia durante el breve período que ostentó su dirección. El mercado se vio inundado con 34 millones de táleros de monedas del consorcio, su valor nominal aumentó en un 25 por 100 mientras que su contenido de plata se redujo drásticamente. Se produjo una devaluación de aproximadamente el 90 por 100, que hizo casi imposible cambiar la moneda del consorcio (llamada «moneda larga») fuera del territorio habsburgués. Mientras que en 1618 un tálero imperial costaba 90 kreuzers bohemios, en 1623 la tasa de cambio comercial era de 675 kreuzers. No terminaban ahí los problemas, pues algunos miembros del consorcio formaban parte también del «Tribunal de Confiscaciones», creado a finales del decenio de 1620 para determinar la culpabilidad de los acusados de apoyar la rebelión. Más de 1.500 terratenientes fueron juzgados y casi la mitad de ellos condenados a perder todas o una parte de sus propiedades. El tribunal confiscaba siempre toda la propiedad de los sospechosos de estar implicados en la rebelión y aunque finalmente se decretara que la pena consistía en la pérdida de tan sólo una parte de la propiedad —la mitad o una cuarta parte—, el territorio restante no se devolvía sino que se estimaba su valor, que era satisfecho en «monedas largas». Esto significó la ruina incluso para los nobles cuyas propiedades fueron sólo parcialmente confiscadas (tal vez 600 en conjunto) y la pérdida de prácticamente todas las tierras

de las ciudades. En el momento en que se decretó la disolución del Consorcio y el Tribunal, en el otoño de 1623, el poder de las ciudades y de la nobleza en Bohemia estaba totalmente quebrantado, y la economía del reino estaba en situación tan caótica por la ausencia de una moneda fuerte que los estudiantes no podían acudir a las escuelas y universidades, los que recibían un salario en moneda y los pensionistas se convirtieron en indigentes y los artesanos y comerciantes sólo podían comerciar con sus productos («no venderemos una buena carne por una mala moneda», protestaban los carniceros). Pavel Stránský escribió en su libro *República de Bohemia*, publicado en 1633:

> Fue entonces cuando por primera vez aprendimos por experiencia ... que ni la peste, ni la guerra ni las incursiones hostiles desde el exterior en nuestro territorio, ni el pillaje ni el fuego, podían hacer tanto daño a la buena gente como los cambios frecuentes en el valor de la moneda.[1]

La confusión monetaria provocada por estos acontecimientos no quedó limitada a Bohemia. En todas partes, unos gobernantes ansiosos de incrementar sus beneficios acuñando nuevas monedas imitaron las «monedas largas» del Consorcio. Entre 1621 y 1623 se produjo el hundimiento general de las monedas del Imperio. En algunos lugares, ni siquiera el gobierno podía hacer frente a la situación. Así, por ejemplo, los encargados del Tesoro de la ciudad de Nördlingen, en Suabia, no podían calcular los ingresos y gastos municipales totales. El valor de la moneda cambiaba tan rápidamente que a partir de 1621 se limitaban a registrar las partidas individuales intentando mantener en las arcas el mayor número posible de monedas de plata.[2] En varias zonas,

1. El estudio más actual de este tema es el de A. Klima, «Inflation in Bohemia in the early stage of the seventeenth century», en M. Flinn, ed., *Seventh International Economic History Conference*, Edimburgo, 1978, pp. 374-386. Las cifras sobre la composición de la nobleza bohemia proceden de Polichenski y Snider, *War and Society in Europe 1618-1648*, pp. 202-216, y de F. Snider, «The restructuring of the Bohemian nobility in the seventeenth century». Naturalmente, había excepciones a este negro panorama, como las tierras de Wallenstein (*Terra felix*, como se conocía su dominio). Así, las exportaciones de grano de Bohemia a Sajonia, que en 1597-1621 eran de 1.800 toneladas anuales de promedio, eran todavía de 1.300 toneladas entre 1629 y 1643. (Véase V. Sadova, «Eksport czeskiego zboza do Niemiech... w okresie przed Biala Gora», *Roczniki dziejów spolecznych i Gospodarczych*, XXII, 1960, pp. 37-47.)

2. Friedrichs, *Nördlingen*, p. 27, n. 45.

en especial en Sajonia, hubo revueltas contra las autoridades públicas que se mostraban incapaces de mantener una moneda estable y por toda Alemania se compusieron canciones y poemas populares que preservaron el recuerdo del *kipper- und wipperzeit* (la 'era de vaivén'), cuando, durante más de dos años, el Imperio hubo de mantener forzosamente el patrón cobre.[3]

Pero la población de amplias zonas del Imperio no tan sólo veía amenazada su posición económica, sino que se vio sometida, además, a otro tipo de presión: la recatolización. Esta operación se realizó a un ritmo más lento que el cambio de valor de la moneda, pero sus efectos fueron más duraderos. Por ejemplo, en el Alto Palatinado, conquistado por las tropas de Maximiliano de Baviera en 1621, el catolicismo no se practicaba desde 1540, de forma que los primeros sacerdotes que quisieron volver a celebrar la misa —dos jesuitas del ejército bávaro— tuvieron dificultades para encontrar los útiles necesarios, como un cáliz. La recatolización prosiguió lentamente hasta 1625, en gran medida porque la administración permaneció en manos de los funcionarios de Federico V, muchos de ellos calvinistas. Pero finalmente éstos fueron depurados y establecieron en Amberg, la capital territorial, iglesias católicas, una escuela y una misión jesuita. Luego, en 1626, fueron expulsados los ministros calvinistas; en 1628 incluso a los luteranos les dieron seis meses de plazo para que se convirtieran o se exiliaran y el clero católico estableció la obligatoriedad de la enseñanza del catecismo para todos. Al año siguiente, las autoridades bávaras diseñaron un plan para la creación de una jerarquía permanente, que fue llevado a la práctica de forma inmediata. La congregación católica de Amberg incrementó el número de sus miembros

3. Existe un buen estudio, aunque algo anticuado, sobre el trasfondo de las fluctuaciones monetarias de comienzos del decenio de 1620: W. A. Shaw, «The monetary movements of 1600-21 in Holland and Germany», *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, nueva serie, IX (1895), pp. 189-213. Véase también Friedrichs, *Nördlingen*, pp. 27-28, y F. Redlich, «Die deutsche Inflation des frühen 17. Jahrhunderts in der zeitgenössischen Literatur: die Kipper und Wipper», en H. Kellenbenz, ed., *Forschungen zur internationalen Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, VI, Colonia y Viena, 1972. Es de destacar el hecho de que de los aproximadamente cuarenta textos que se publicaron condenando la inflación, todos ellos escritos por luteranos, trece eran tratados populares, once habían sido escritos por eclesiásticos, mientras que dieciséis habían sido elaborados por juristas, que condenaban la acuñación de moneda devaluada desde el punto de vista del derecho constitucional.

de 1.000 en 1625 a 5.000 en 1629 y (tras algunas pérdidas en el decenio de 1630) a 10.000 e incluso más en 1645.[4]

El progreso en los territorios de los Habsburgo del otro lado de la frontera también fue lento. Aunque los católicos, que gozaban del total apoyo de Fernando, consiguieron clausurar las iglesias de sus enemigos protestantes, durante algún tiempo parecieron incapaces de sustituirlas. En el decenio de 1640, aproximadamente la mitad de las parroquias de Bohemia estaban vacantes y fue necesario recurrir a sacerdotes polacos, cuya lengua no era siempre comprensible para sus congregaciones checas. En Moravia, en 1635, sólo había 257 eclesiásticos residentes (en su mayor parte clero regular) para servir las 636 parroquias, mientras que en Hungría fue necesario soslayar los requisitos habituales para la ordenación en vistas a conseguir un número adecuado de sacerdotes.[5] Como veremos, en la Alta Austria el gobierno hubo de importar sacerdotes italianos para incrementar el reducido número de clérigos locales.

Lo mismo ocurría más hacia el oeste. En Renania, la recatolización fue conducida por Felipe Cristóbal von Sötern, obispo de Speyer, antiguo defensor de la Liga que había sido conducido al exilio en 1621 por los ejércitos que defendían el Palatinado renano de Federico V. Al margen de otro tipo de inconveniente, calculó que la guerra del Palatinado había causado a sus dominios pérdidas por valor de 8 millones de táleros. Decidió entonces vengarse y su nombramiento como elector de Tréveris en 1623 incrementó su poder para conseguirlo. El principal objetivo de Sötern y de los otros prelados era reclamar todos los territorios eclesiásticos del Palatinado renano que habían sido secularizados; el segundo era acabar con el culto protestante y sustituirlo por el catolicismo. En un principio todo sucedió según sus deseos: en febrero de 1623 el gobernador bávaro de los territorios palatinos al este del Rin ordenó la expulsión de todos los predicadores calvinistas; dos años después, el gobernador español de los territorios mucho más extensos de la orilla derecha del Rin actuó de la

4. W. Gegenfurtner, «Jesuiten in der Oberpfalz. Ihr Wirkung und ihr Beiträg zur Rekatholisierung in den oberpfälzischen Landen, 1621-50», *Beiträge zur Geschichte Bistums Regensburg*, XI (1977), pp. 71-220, en p. 170. Véase también P. Schertl, «Die Amberger Jesuiten im ersten Dezennium ihres Wirkens (1621-1632)», *Verhandlungen des historischen Vereins für Oberpfalz und Regensburg*, CII (1962), pp. 101-194, y CIII (1963), pp. 257-350.

5. Los detalles proceden de Evans, *Habsburg Monarchy*, pp. 123 y 425-426.

misma forma. Al mismo tiempo, los funcionarios del elector de Maguncia prepararon un programa para la recatolización del condado calvinista de Nassau. Su aplicación se inició en el otoño de 1626 y el ritmo de la restitución se aceleró al año siguiente cuando las fuerzas de Tilly fueron acantonadas en la región.[6] Pero, como había ocurrido en los territorios de los Habsburgo, una cosa era destruir y otra muy diferente reconstruir. Una vez más, no se pudo contar con un número suficiente de sacerdotes para las parroquias reconquistadas. A finales de 1630, apenas el 20 por 100 de las comunidades del Palatinado tenían un sacerdote católico y las congregaciones eran en todas partes muy reducidas. Tampoco se realizó con gran entusiasmo la restitución de los territorios eclesiásticos, ya que los 5.000 soldados españoles acantonados en la zona conservaban a menudo las antiguas propiedades de la Iglesia para su propio sustento.[7] Tal vez lo mejor en este aspecto era actuar de forma gradual. Cuando menos, esa recatolización moderada en el Palatinado no provocó oposición popular. En cambio, en la Alta Austria se produjo una revuelta de grandes proporciones.

En 1620, la Dieta de la Alta Austria, encabezada por Tschernembl, había apoyado abiertamente la causa de Federico del Palatinado. Maximiliano de Baviera sofocó la insurrección en el plazo de algunas semanas, dejando una guarnición de 5.000 hombres, cuya soldada intentó pagar por medio de los impuestos recaudados localmente. En 1621, Fernando aceptó que los bávaros continuaran ocupando la Alta Austria y el Alto Palatinado como garantía hasta que hubieran sido satisfechos los considerables gastos de guerra de Maximiliano.[8] Maximi-

6. Véase F. Menk, «Restitution vor dem Restitutionsedikt. Kurtrier, Nassau und das Reich, 1626-29», *Jahrbuch für westdeutsche Landesgeschichte*, V (1979), pp. 103-130 (artículo muy importante).

7. Véase Egler, *Spanier in der linksrhenischen Pfalz*, p. 134 y mapa de la p. 149; y Kessel, *Spanien und die geistlichen Kurstaaten*, pp. 269 ss.

8. Sobre las finanzas de la Liga, poniendo de relieve que sólo Baviera pagaba las contribuciones en el plazo convenido y en su totalidad, véase F. Stieve, «Das "Contobuch" der deutschen Liga», *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 1.ª serie, X (1893), pp. 97-106. El ejército de Tilly tenía un coste de unos 5 millones de táleros anuales y entre 1619-1627 Baviera pagó tres veces más que todos los demás miembros de la Liga juntos. Por ejemplo, los obispos de Wurzburgo tal vez eran poderosos guerreros en el Señor, pero de los 1,4 millones de táleros que debían a la Liga católica en concepto de las contribuciones, de 1620 a 1631, pagaron menos de 500.000. (Véase R. Weber, *Würzburg und Bamberg im dreissigjährigen Krieg: die Regierungszeit des Bischofs Franz von Hatzfeldt, 1631-42*, Wurzburgo, 1979.)

liano fue autorizado a recaudar impuestos en cada uno de los territorios ocupados en concepto de intereses por la deuda, impuestos que le reportaban 240.000 táleros anuales. El acuerdo funcionó satisfactoriamente en el Palatinado, cuyo príncipe fue declarado proscrito; pero en la Alta Austria, las fuerzas de ocupación bávaras debían actuar no sólo en nombre de Maximiliano sino también de Fernando, en su calidad de archiduque. Se produjo un importante conflicto de intereses entre los dos señores. Austria suponía para Maximiliano una importante fuente de ingresos con los que pagar a su ejército. En consecuencia, deseaba mantener la paz y la prosperidad en el ducado a cualquier precio, para garantizar que los impuestos fueran satisfechos sin demora y en su totalidad. Por su parte, a Fernando no le interesaba el dinero sino la lealtad: pretendía depurar el ducado de traidores y herejes y como príncipe territorial se sentía autorizado a hacerlo bajo la cláusula *cuius regio* de la paz de Augsburgo. No sin renuencia, las autoridades bávaras de ocupación, encabezadas por el bienintencionado Adam von Herberstorff, ordenaron en octubre de 1624 la expulsión de todos los pastores y maestros protestantes y permitieron que los acreedores católicos obligaran a los protestantes a vender sus propiedades. En octubre de 1625, el gobierno creó una Comisión de Reforma encargada de la recuperación de todos los territorios y bienes eclesiásticos secularizados y se decretó que en la Semana Santa de 1626 los residentes en el ducado debían asistir a los servicios del culto católico o abandonar el territorio. Sólo la aristocracia recibió un trato de privilegio, pues se le concedieron hasta cincuenta años para llevar a cabo su conversión.

El catalizador final de la revuelta fue la actuación de la Congregación para la Propagación de la Fe, fundada en Roma por Gregorio XV con el propósito expreso de sacar el máximo beneficio para la Iglesia católica de las victorias de Fernando y de sus aliados más allá de los Alpes. En 1625, la Congregación autorizó el envío de numerosos misioneros italianos al Imperio para realizar la obra de recatolización, en parte porque no existía un número suficiente de sacerdotes de lengua alemana, en parte porque el latín de los italianos era excelente y en parte (en palabras de la propia Congregación) «porque los italianos no son tan adictos al vino y a la bebida» como los nativos. Pero estas virtudes eran menos evidentes para los feligreses austriacos, que ofrecieron una cierta resistencia a los sacerdotes extranjeros instalados en antiguas parroquias protestantes. Presionado por el emperador Fernando, el gobernador Herberstorff decidió realizar una acción ejemplificadora en una zona: así, el 15 de mayo de 1626 convocó al castillo de Frankenfeld a diversos hombres de varias parroquias y les reprendió duramente por su comportamiento desordenado e irrespetuoso hacia los nuevos sacerdotes. Herberstorff acusó a los nuevos funcionarios locales de ser responsables del problema y ordenó la ejecución inmediata de 17 de ellos, elegidos por sorteo.[9]

Este comportamiento terriblemente arbitrario, aunque le había sido impuesto a Herberstorff por el emperador, provocó que un grupo de oficiales protestantes, encabezados por Esteban Fadinger (un modesto agricultor y ayudante del magistrado local), organizaran una revuelta general que consiguió la expulsión de los señores bávaros y austriacos. A diferencia de las anteriores rebeliones campesinas, que eran antiseñoriales, en esta ocasión el objetivo de los rebeldes era Linz, la capital del gobierno. Fadinger encontró apoyo tanto entre los católicos como entre los protestantes, pues todos ellos habían sufrido el incremento de los impuestos (que se habían multiplicado por catorce) necesario para pagar a las fuerzas bávaras de ocupación, así como el hundimiento de la moneda entre 1621 y 1623. En mayo de 1626, un pequeño ejército conducido por Herberstorff fue derrotado por los rebeldes, que sitiaron la ciudad de Linz. Pero Fadinger resultó muerto en el mes de julio, levantándose el asedio a la capital. Los campesinos tampoco consiguieron ayuda en el exterior, aunque entraron en contacto con Scultetus, un predicador de la corte del Palatinado, que actuó como embajador de Cristián IV, que en ese momento estaba también alzado en armas contra el emperador. El levantamiento adquirió pronto la forma de una guerra de guerrillas más que de una revuelta campesina. Sin embargo, fue necesaria la participación de un ejército de 12.000 hombres y una serie de batallas campales antes de que fuera posible controlar la situación (véase mapa 2). Los únicos éxitos que obtuvieron los rebeldes fueron la finalización de la ocupación bávara y la marcha de los sacerdotes italianos. En mayo de 1628, después de largas negociaciones en las que el conde Max von Trauttmannsdorf realizó su primera misión diplomática para el emperador, el Alto Palatinado fue vendido a Maximiliano por diez millones de táleros, que

9. *Der oberösterreichische Bauernkrieg*, pp. 8-11; H. Tüchle, ed., *Acta SC de Propaganda Fide, Germanian Spectantia. Die Protokolle der Propagandakongregation zu deutschen Angelegenheiten 1622-1649*, Paderborn, 1962, p. 488.

era la cantidad exacta en que se había cifrado la deuda de Fernando con Baviera y la Liga. A cambio de ello, la Alta Austria se reintegró al control de los Habsburgo. Al mismo tiempo, el papado dio su autorización para que los impopulares italianos fueran sustituidos por 300 miembros del clero regular en la Alta Austria para prestar servicios en las antiguas parroquias protestantes (pues no había todavía suficientes sacerdotes católicos).[10]

Sin embargo, ninguna de estas medidas disuadió al emperador y a sus aliados de seguir con su cruzada contra los herejes. «Dios está de nuestra parte, no de la suya», era el lema victorioso del padre Jacinto de Casale (que tanto había contribuido para que se produjera la transferencia del Electorado) en la primavera de 1624.[11] Sin que él lo supiera, en la misma época el emperador Fernando hizo en Viena un voto solemne ante su confesor en el sentido de que «haría todo cuanto le sugirieran las circunstancias» por el bien de la religión católica. El confesor, Guillermo Lamormaini, no tenía dudas sobre las implicaciones de esta declaración: «grandes hazañas pueden ser realizadas por este emperador», informó triunfalmente al Vaticano. «Tal vez, incluso toda Alemania [puede] ser reintegrada a la vieja fe, con tal de que ... [el papa y el emperador conjuntamente] se planteen ese objetivo con energía y perseverancia.»[12] Los acontecimientos demostrarían cuán profundamente conocía Lamormaini al emperador.

III. La práctica del absolutismo, II: 1626-1629

Parece extraño que los triunfos de los Habsburgo y de sus aliados católicos durante los cinco años siguientes a la Montaña Blanca provocaran tan pocas protestas por parte de los luteranos. Ciertamente, había algunos críticos del imperialismo, pero apenas tenían fuerza.[13] Más

10. Tüchle, *Acta*, p. 181 (resolución del 4 de febrero de 1628).

11. El padre Jacinto al Dr. Jocher en mayo de 1624, citado por W. Goetz, «Pater Hyazinth», *Historische Zeitschrift*, CIX (1912), pp. 101-128, en la p. 122.

12. Lamormaini, citado por Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, p. 21.

13. Véase Gross, *Empire and Sovereignty, passim*, y el útil artículo de H. Dreitzel, «Das deutsche Staatsdenken in der frühen Neuzeit», *Neue politische Literatur*, XVI (1971), pp. 17-42. Sin embargo, el estudio más valioso es la tesis de Nolden, *Die Reichspolitik Kaiser Ferdinands II.*

influyente fue el elector de Sajonia, quien en 1626 intentó convencer a sus vecinos del Círculo de la Baja Sajonia de que se equivocaban al oponerse al emperador. En una larga argumentación, Juan Jorge acusaba a su correligionario, el rey Cristián IV de Dinamarca, de agresión exterior, y a sus compatriotas alemanes, Cristián de Brunswick y los duques de Sajonia-Weimar, que se habían unido a los daneses, de traición. Argumentaba que Fernando estaba sosteniendo una guerra justa contra los rebeldes y no una guerra religiosa de conquista; que el miedo a que los Habsburgo españoles establecieran su dominio sobre Alemania era exagerado; que la teoría de la conspiración de una reconversión jesuita de los luteranos quedaba desmentida por la actuación moderada de Fernando (¡esto ocurría en 1626!) y que el lema de Lutero de «obedecer a los poderes que existen» se aplicaba todavía al emperador Fernando, pues no había dado motivo alguno para la resistencia. Según Juan Jorge, la actuación del emperador en Bohemia y Austria se enmarcaba en el principio *cuius regius*. Y, por si todo esto no era suficiente, el elector afirmaba que incluso Tilly era un general patriota, que defendía a los alemanes leales de los daneses y de los mercenarios de Mansfeld, a quienes pagaban los holandeses, y que el ejército de la Liga debía, por tanto, ser apoyado por todos los luteranos en una campaña concertada para conseguir la paz, la justicia y la obediencia en el Imperio.[14]

El argumento del elector de Sajonia era un alegato conservador por la paz y la unidad, proclamando la lealtad a Fernando como emperador correctamente elegido. Su debilidad residía en la convicción de que Fernando pensaba de la misma forma. Hay que decir, sin embargo, que es la declaración más confiada que poseemos del pacifismo, el quietismo, el legalismo y la xenofobia de los luteranos alemanes, antes de que la política torpe y militarista del emperador obligara incluso al elector de Sajonia a considerar la posibilidad de la rebelión. Pero incluso en esta larga declaración política de 1626, Juan Jorge guardaba un ominoso silencio sobre los dos nuevos ejércitos Habsbur-

14. Onno Klopp, «Das Restitutions-Edikt im nordwestlichen Deutschland», *Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte*, I (1862), pp. 75-132, especialmente pp. 86-90, que es todavía el mejor estudio sobre el tema. La paciencia de Juan Jorge terminó cuando el emperador obligó a los canónigos protestantes de Magdeburgo a aceptar como administrador a su hijo adolescente Leopoldo Guillermo, a pesar de que ya habían declarado su apoyo a Augusto, hijo de Juan Jorge. (Véase Ritter, *Deutscher Geschichte*, II, pp. 422-423.)

go —uno español, el otro imperial— que habían comenzado a actuar en el Imperio.

Los miembros de la Liga católica se alarmaron en el invierno de 1624-1625 ante el rumor persistente de que Cristián de Dinamarca se preparaba para invadir Alemania. Temían por las fuerzas de la Liga, vulnerables en su acantonamiento en el noroeste de Alemania. «Tilly no puede alcanzar el triunfo por sí solo —fue la advertencia que se hizo a Maximiliano—. Los daneses poseen grandes ventajas: actuarán primero y no abrumarán.»[15] El nuevo elector analizó la situación con el emperador. Todo lo que deseaba era conseguir algunos refuerzos, pero la cuestión no era tan simple para Fernando. En primer lugar, corrían rumores también de que Bethlen Gabor de Transilvania había comenzado a movilizarse para lanzar un nuevo ataque contra el corazón del territorio de los Habsburgo. España, que en otro tiempo había ofrecido ayuda, no podía ahora enviar tropas; más aún, de los 16 regimientos imperiales que existían en ese momento, seis se hallaban en los Países Bajos ayudando a Spínola en su asedio de Breda y uno se hallaba en la Lombardía española. No quedaban hombres suficientes para defender Viena, y mucho menos todavía para reforzar al ejército de Tilly. Así pues, el 7 de abril de 1625, Fernando firmó una declaración en la que nombraba a Alberto de Wallenstein (duque de Friedland en Bohemia desde 1623) «jefe de todas nuestras tropas que sirven en este momento, ya sea en el Sacro Imperio Romano o en los Países Bajos», ordenándole organizar «un ejército ya sea a partir de las unidades existentes o de regimientos de nueva creación, de forma que en conjunto haya 24.000 hombres». En septiembre de 1625, «la armada Friedlandsche» avanzó hacia el norte desde Bohemia, dejando una reducida fuerza para defender Viena, hacia las fronteras de la Baja Sajonia, para situarse a la derecha del ejército de Tilly.

A la izquierda de Tilly se hallaban los destacamentos del ejército de Flandes. Tras la triunfal captura de Breda en junio de 1625, unos 11.000 hombres fueron enviados desde los Países Bajos del sur, estableciéndose guarniciones a lo largo del Rin, en Ems y Lippe, para llevar a cabo un bloqueo económico por tierra y por mar contra la República de Holanda. Permanecieron en esas posiciones hasta 1629. Al mismo tiempo, se creó en Sevilla un nuevo organismo —el Almirantazgo— para impedir la llegada de productos holandeses a España y

15. Citado de Mann, *Wallenstein* [ed. alemana], p. 369.

(en menor medida) para asegurarse de que las mercancías españolas no fueran enviadas a la República. Estas medidas no fueron bien recibidas en Alemania. Los puertos hanseáticos protestaron fuertemente por el minucioso examen a que eran sometidos sus barcos por parte de los funcionarios del Almirantazgo y el bloqueo fluvial fue denunciado por los gobernantes territoriales de Renania, cuyos súbditos se veían privados de fructíferos contactos comerciales al tiempo que se les exigía albergar y aplacar a las mal pagadas tropas españolas. Los obispados de Münster, Osnabrück, Paderborn y Minden, del elector de Colonia, sufrían directamente los efectos de esta guerra económica y el elector se quejaba amargamente de que «los españoles no respetan la constitución imperial; ... siempre afirman que su supuesta "necesidad" o "comodidad" debe prevalecer».[16]

En 1627, los españoles infligieron una nueva ofensa cuando impusieron una sentencia del Tribunal de la Cámara Imperial referente a la división de Hesse. En 1604, al extinguirse la casa de Marburgo, Mauricio de Hesse-Kassel se había hecho con toda la herencia (véase p. 46, *supra*), pero ahora, como consecuencia del decreto imperial, fue

16. Kessel, *Spanien und die geistlichen Kurstaaten*, p. 197 n. Sobre el sistema del «Almirantazgo» y el bloqueo, véase Alcalá Zamora, *España, Flandes y el mar del Norte*, 2.ª parte, e Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, pp. 204-223. El elector de Colonia y sus colegas prelados sospechaban que lo que España deseaba era establecer una base de poder en el Imperio desde la cual subvertir las libertades alemanas. Mandaron enviados a Bruselas y dirigieron un aluvión de críticas a las cortes de Viena y Madrid en un intento de convencer a España para que retirara sus tropas. Pero estos dirigentes espirituales no estaban en situación de protestar demasiado ruidosamente. Si volvían alguna vez los ejércitos de Federico V o sus aliados, como había ocurrido en 1622 y 1623, uno de los objetivos principales sería el rico corredor de territorios eclesiásticos de la zona del Rin y del Main. Incluso cuando pedían la evacuación del Palatinado, se sintieron obligados a pedir garantías de que las tropas serían enviadas de nuevo desde los Países Bajos para defenderles en caso de que se produjera un ataque protestante. Pese a que deseaban profundamente permanecer neutrales en la lucha entre los Habsburgo y sus enemigos, los prelados de Renania se vieron cogidos en la red de España en tanto en cuanto Francia no tuviera capacidad para intervenir con eficacia en el extranjero. Todo lo más que podían hacer era negarse a ayudar a España en sus campañas contra los holandeses, con la esperanza de que la guerra en Holanda impidiera a los Habsburgo explotar su ventajosa posición. Como escribió el exasperado elector de Colonia en junio de 1626: «Los Países Bajos *deben* permanecer divididos y cada una de las zonas debe controlar un territorio tan reducido como la otra». (Kessel, *op. cit.*, p. 190 n.)

obligado a entregar la mayor parte de su territorio a su primo Jorge de Hesse-Darmstadt y, además, a pagar más de un millón de táleros en concepto de daños y perjuicios por haber conservado Marburgo indebidamente.[17] No obstante, el ultraje que este ejercicio del poder imperial causó en Alemania fue superado por el derrocamiento de los duques de Mecklemburgo, también en esta ocasión por decisión del Tribunal Supremo Imperial, sobre la base de que habían apoyado a Cristián de Dinamarca. En esta ocasión, las propiedades confiscadas fueron entregadas, no a un pariente, sino a Wallenstein. En principio (febrero de 1627) se le entregaron únicamente como garantía del dinero que debía el emperador a su general, pero al año siguiente Wallenstein fue reconocido como duque y comenzó a residir allí, en el gran palacio de Güstrow, con una corte formada por más de 1.000 personas.[18]

No será posible nunca alcanzar un acuerdo sobre la personalidad y el papel de Wallenstein, pero su supuesta traición y asesinato en 1634 han acaparado por completo la atención de la historiografía, haciendo palidecer su importancia como militar innovador y leal a los Habsburgo durante su primera etapa como general imperial en 1625-1630. Fueron éstos los años cruciales de su vida, cuando ejerció una influencia significativa en los acontecimientos. Pero incluso durante esos años, Wallenstein no tomó decisiones políticas de consideración, sino que se limitó a ejecutar las decisiones de su señor. Por ejemplo, en los temas religiosos adoptó la misma actitud calculadora y pragmática de cualquier ejecutivo moderno que dirige una compañía multinacional.[19] Cuando sus enemigos prodaneses, Cristián de Brunswick

17. Para una información más exhaustiva, véase K. Beck, *Der hessische Bruderzwist zwischen Hessen-Kassel und Hessen-Darmstadt in den Verhandlungen zum westfälischen Frieden von 1644 bis 1648*, Frankfurt, 1978; Thies, *Territorialstaat, passim*; y Keim, «Landgraf Wilhelm V von Hessen-Kassel». Mauricio de Nassau abdicó en 1627, en un vano intento de frustrar la orden de secuestro. Hay gran número de objetos de su pertenencia expuestos en la Landgräfliche Kunstkammer conservada en el Museo municipal de Kassel.

18. El palacio ducal de Güstrow, ampliado por Wallenstein, todavía está en pie. Además de las cornamentas de innumerables ciervos gigantes, lujosamente expuestas y con útiles comentarios sobre la matanza escritos por los duques que les dispararon, el palacio contiene una gran colección de armas de caza e incluso un comedor decorado con ciervos en bajorrelieve con cornamentas auténticas. Era una fantasía barroca que habría envidiado incluso el Nimrod alemán, Juan Jorge de Sajonia.

19. El mejor estudio sigue siendo el de Gindely, *Waldstein während seines ersten Generalats*, donde se pone de relieve cómo la actuación de Wallenstein polarizó a las diferentes facciones católicas y luteranas de Alemania en reacción a sus métodos militares brutales y destructivos. Es útil también volver a analizar la polémica de los años 1880 entre Hallwich y Gindely sobre las motivaciones y métodos económicos de Wallenstein, polémica que parece aún totalmente viva, a pesar de todo el trabajo biográfico y de archivo sobre Wallenstein realizado en la última década por Golo Mann, H. Diwald, J. Kollmann, P. Suvanto, J. Polichenski y otros. Compárese Anton Gindely, *Zur Beurtheilung des kaiserlichen Generals im dreissigjährigen Krieg, Albrechts von Waldstein*, Praga, 1887, con la obra del mismo autor, *Zweite Antwort an Dr. Hallwich*, Viena, 1887. Pese al intento de M. Ritter, «Das Kontributionssystem Wallensteins», *Historische Zeitschrift*, LV, 1903, pp. 193-249, para demostrar que Wallenstein mantenía una buena disciplina militar, lo cierto es que el coste de su ejército era demasiado elevado como para poder soportarlo durante largo tiempo. Por el momento, el último estudio es el de F. H. Schubert, «Wallenstein und der Staat des 17. Jahrhunderts», *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, XVI, 1965, pp. 597-611 [reeditado en Rudolf, ed., *Der dreissigjährige Krieg*, pp. 185-207], que le ve como un financiero y un mercantilista militar, demasiado impaciente como para poder influir fácilmente en la política exterior imperial, con su enmarañado confesionalismo y burocracia.

y Juan Ernesto de Sajonia-Weimar, intentaron conseguir el apoyo de la luterana Magdeburgo en 1626 afirmando que el ejército imperial que intentaba ocupar la ciudad estaba dando el primer paso en una guerra religiosa de agresión para recatolizar toda Alemania, Wallenstein pidió al emperador [20]

> Que tenga la bondad de asegurar a la ciudad de Magdeburgo que ésta no es de ninguna forma una guerra de religión; sino que en cuanto que ciudad leal y devota, sus privilegios de paz religiosa y secular no se verán menoscabados en absoluto, antes bien serán protegidos y defendidos de cualquier peligro que vaya en contra de ellos.

Pero los temores de Magdeburgo eran fundados. Tres años después, la ciudad sufría las atenciones de Franz Wilhelm von Wartenburg, obispo de Osnabrück, que actuaba como agente imperial especial, quien intentó infiltrar el capítulo de la catedral, tradicionalmente luterana, confiscando diez prebendas clave para facilitar la elección de un

20. Hans Schulz, ed., *Der dreissigjährige Krieg*, I, Leipzig, 1917, documento 21: Wallenstein a Fernando, 6 de julio de 1626. Una petición similar anterior aparece en una carta de Wallenstein a Fernando, escrita desde Stötterlingeburg, 25 de octubre de 1625, en J. Kollmann, ed., *Documenta Bohemica Bellum Tricennale illustrantia, IV, 1625-30*, Praga, 1974, documento 88.

obispo católico por primera vez a lo largo de casi un siglo. Después de llegar hasta ese punto, el proyecto en julio de 1630 consistía en aplicar la *autonomía*, es decir, el derecho constitucional de un gobernante católico a imponer la uniformidad religiosa sobre sus súbditos territoriales.[21] No era éste un caso aislado. Los acontecimientos de Magdeburgo formaban parte de un plan desarrollado por todo el Imperio para recuperar los territorios eclesiásticos para la causa católica de una vez por todas (véase lámina 5).

La operación fue planeada en Mühlhausen en el otoño de 1627, cuando los electores (o sus representantes) se reunieron para discutir las implicaciones de la derrota de Dinamarca. El enviado del emperador a la reunión recibió instrucciones para que afirmara que, tras nueve años de guerra, había llegado el momento de reconsiderar la situación religiosa de Alemania y, en especial, la restitución de los territorios eclesiásticos arrebatados ilegalmente a los católicos. Según Fernando, ésa era «la gran ganancia y objetivo de la guerra» que perseguía y aseguró al partido católico de Mühlhausen —que solicitaba una acción de algún tipo— que «así como hasta ahora nunca hemos pensado en dejar pasar ninguna oportunidad de asegurarnos la restitución de los territorios eclesiásticos, tampoco intentamos ahora, o en el futuro, cargar ante la posteridad con la responsabilidad de haber descuidado o dejado de explotar incluso la más mínima oportunidad».[22]

Pero durante varios meses no se tomó ninguna medida concreta y en septiembre de 1628 cinco prelados del sur de Alemania enviaron una carta conjunta emplazando al emperador a que mantuviera su promesa. Al mes siguiente se envió al Consejo Privado Imperial y a los electores de Maguncia y Baviera un redactado preliminar del documento conocido como el Edicto de Restitución, para que aportaran sus comentarios. Fernando afirmaba en el preámbulo que no hacía otra

21. Sobre el obispo Franz Wilhelm, véase Klopp, «Das Restitutionsedikt» (nota 14, *supra*); asimismo, T. Tupetz, *Der Streit um die Geistlichen Güter und das Restitutionsedikt 1629*, Viena, 1883. J. H. Gebauer, *Kurbrandenburg und das Restitutionsedikt von 1629*, Halle, 1899, pone de relieve hasta qué punto podían ser torpes en su actuación política los católicos extremistas. Véase especialmente H. Günter, *Das Restitutionsedikt von 1629 und die katholische Restauration Altwirtembergs*, Stuttgart, 1901.

22. Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, p. 54, donde cita las instrucciones de Fernando a su representante (Stralendorf) en Mühlhausen, 4 de octubre de 1627. Sin duda, el emperador sufría presiones acerca de esta cuestión.

cosa que restablecer el *statu quo* de 1555, inmediatamente después de la paz de Augsburgo, y que el edicto no pretendía, pues, sino asegurar el cumplimiento de las leyes del Imperio. Las primeras secciones del proyecto de edicto parecían confirmar esto: todos los territorios eclesiásticos ocupados desde 1552 (la «fecha normativa» en la paz de Augsburgo) deberían ser devueltos. Pero el edicto afirmaba también que los príncipes eclesiásticos tenían el mismo derecho a imponer la conformidad religiosa a sus súbditos en cuanto que gobernantes seculares. Esto suponía ir mucho más allá de la solución acordada en 1555, pues invalidaba la *Declaratio Ferdinandei* (véase p. 42, *supra*). Pero ni siquiera esto fue suficiente para los prelados católicos, que solicitaron que se incluyera en el edicto una nueva prohibición del calvinismo, y que sus términos se aplicaran también a las ciudades imperiales libres. Después de cinco meses de discusiones, el emperador y sus consejeros decidieron finalmente incluir la orden de disolución de todas las sectas protestantes a excepción del luteranismo, pero dejando a las ciudades al margen. El resto del documento apenas sufrió alteraciones.

Quinientas copias del edicto fueron impresas secretamente en Viena y distribuidas a los directores de los Círculos imperiales y a los príncipes más importantes, con instrucciones para que publicaran otras copias simultáneamente el 28 de marzo de 1629. El documento parecía extraordinariamente sencillo —una simple hoja de papel con cuatro columnas impresas en letra pequeña y la firma del emperador—, pero las apariencias eran engañosas. En una versión impresa en Wurzburgo, una pluma contemporánea añade en la página que lleva el título las palabras *Radix omnium malorum*: la raíz de todos los males.[23] Durante todo un año, el edicto y su ejecución se convirtió en la cuestión fundamental de la política alemana. Los obispados y arzobispados de la Baja Sajonia y de Westfalia se vieron afectados de forma inmediata, así como unos 500 monasterios, conventos y otras propiedades

23. El edicto ha sido publicado en M. C. Lundorp, ed., *Acta publica*, III, Frankfurt, 1668, pp. 1.048-1.054. Se conservan todavía más de 100 ejemplares de las diferentes ediciones, número realmente elevado. Sobre los detalles de cómo fue publicado, véase H. Urban, «Druck und Drucke des Restitutionsedikts von 1629», *Archiv für Geschichte des Buchwesens*, XIV (1974), cols. 609-654; el *Radix omnium malorum* está reproducido en la col. 635. Se puede encontrar más información sobre la preparación e importancia del edicto en Bireley, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-59 y 74-94.

eclesiásticas secularizadas por un sinnúmero de gobernantes protestantes desde 1552. El duque de Württemberg se vio privado de los territorios de 14 grandes monasterios y 36 conventos; los duques de Brunswick, por su parte, hubieron de atender demandas ligeramente menos desorbitadas (véase mapa 2 y láminas 6-7).

Aunque por el momento los territorios eclesiásticos de Brandemburgo y la Sajonia electoral parecían a salvo, ya que habían sido secularizados mucho antes de 1552, había razones para temer la publicación de otro edicto que pudiera poner en peligro un día su inmunidad. En primer lugar, algunas de las antiguas propiedades de la Iglesia reclamadas en otras zonas habían pasado a manos luteranas antes de 1552: así, de las 45 ciudades imperiales afectadas por las exigencias de los comisionados entre 1627 y 1631, sólo 8 habían roto claramente la moratoria posterior a 1552 sobre nuevas protestantizaciones (de hecho una de ellas —la ciudad imperial de Lindau— era protestante desde 1528). En segundo lugar, a la aparición del edicto siguió inmediatamente la publicación de un influyente tratado que parecía revelar con detalle la filosofía que subyacía en el decreto del emperador Fernando: el *Pacis Compositio* de Pablo Laymann. El autor —un jesuita— argumentaba que «todo lo que no haya sido explícitamente concedido, debe ser considerado prohibido» y que, en consecuencia, los protestantes deberían restituir todas las propiedades, a menos que pudieran ostentar un título válido. Como no podía ser de otro modo, este panfleto provocó una gran conmoción. Cuando Gustavo Adolfo llegó a Alemania al año siguiente, anunció su intención de ejecutar a tres hombres, cuyos nombres comenzaban por L (uno de ellos era Laymann).[24] La tercera razón de inquietud en Brandemburgo y Sajonia era de tipo más práctico: la importancia de los ejércitos católicos reunidos en la proximidad de sus fronteras y su papel a la hora de imponer la restitución de los territorios eclesiásticos. Tilly y sus tropas de la Liga ayudaron a los agentes imperiales en las diócesis de Osnabrück,

24. «Quicquid concessum non reperitur, prohibitum censeri debet»: véase *Pacis compositio inter principes et ordines catholicos atque Augustanae confessionis adhaerentes*, Dillingen, 1629, Lib. VI, cap. 37, párraf. 4-7. Sobre Laymann y el «Libro Dillingen», patrocinado por el obispo Knöringen de Augsburgo y distribuido con la anuencia del Consejo Privado Imperial, véase Heckel, «Autonomia und Pacis Compositio» y R. Bireley, «The origins of the "Pacis Compositio" (1629): a text of Paul Laymann S.J.», *Archivum historicum societatis Iesu*, XLII (1973), pp. 106-127.

Bremen, Verden y Hildesheim, así como en una serie de ciudades clave como Augsburgo. Si las fuerzas de Wallenstein no actuaron de la misma forma sólo se debió a que estaban ocupadas en operaciones de importancia contra los daneses y contra el puerto hanseático de Stralsund, uno de los lugares designados para recibir una guarnición imperial en el tratado de sumisión firmado con Wallenstein en 1627 por el duque Boguslav de Pomerania.

Stralsund, una ciudad de unos 15.000 habitantes, había mantenido malas relaciones con los duques de Pomerania durante algún tiempo. En 1612, un ejército ducal había ocupado la ciudad para imponer un control más efectivo, pero estallaron revueltas contra la nueva situación casi inmediatamente y las querellas entre los duques y los magistrados continuaron durante algunos años. En 1627, ante el temor de la proximidad de Wallenstein, los magistrados de la ciudad utilizaron un equipo de ingenieros suecos para construir una nueva cadena de poderosas fortificaciones y se amplió la milicia de la ciudad, que llegó a tener casi 5.000 hombres. La ciudad se negó a aceptar la orden ducal de admitir a los imperialistas. Este desafío fue bien recibido por Cristián IV, que sin embargo apenas poseía tropas para enviar allí, viéndose obligado a firmar un acuerdo con Suecia en el que ambas potencias se comprometían a defender Stralsund si era atacada. Nada más comenzar el asedio (mayo de 1628) llegaron siete compañías de veteranos escoceses al servicio de los daneses, a los que se unieron 600 suecos el mes siguiente. Estas tropas extranjeras consiguieron rechazar, actuando conjuntamente, los ataques de las tropas imperialistas de los días 27-29 de junio, llegando posteriormente nuevos refuerzos escoceses, suecos, daneses y alemanes. El asedio fue levantado el 24 de julio.[25]

La defensa con éxito de Stralsund no creó una situación de guerra entre el emperador y Suecia, cuyo rey estaba todavía luchando en Polonia, aunque sus consejeros recomendaron a Fernando en 1629 que enviara a los polacos una importante ayuda militar (véase p. 181, *infra*). El fracaso de las tropas imperiales tampoco afectó gravemente su situación militar general (Dinamarca todavía estaba perdiendo la guerra). Sin embargo, fue un duro golpe desde el punto de vista polí-

25. Hay una espléndida descripción del asedio en *Monro his expedition*, 1.ª parte, pp. 62-80 («Trailesound = Stralsund). Un estudio moderno, más general, sobre la ciudad y su historia es el de H. Langer, *Stralsund 1600-1630: eine Hansestadt in der Krise und im europäischen Konflikt*, Weimar, 1970.

tico. Ya en septiembre de 1628, Wallenstein advirtió a Fernando desde su campamento de Breitemburgo, en Holstein, que su presencia era tan impopular que sólo podría continuar actuando si poseía un número de soldados lo suficientemente importante como para obligar a los habitantes nativos a pagar un tributo todas las semanas. El consejo que dio Wallenstein al emperador era el de reclutar y armar más y más hombres y ocupar todas las zonas del Imperio que fuera posible. Sólo de esa forma, argumentó, se verían obligados los príncipes territoriales, como los de Sajonia y Baviera, a permanecer leales y a abandonar todo proyecto de solicitar ayuda de tropas extranjeras, así como de ofrecer ayuda a los exiliados del Palatinado.[26] Pero era de todo punto imposible seguir reclutando tropas indefinidamente, pues eran ya demasiados los soldados en armas que el Imperio tenía que sustentar. Las listas del ejército del propio Wallenstein ponen de relieve la gravedad del problema que había creado (véase cuadro 3). Y, además, el Imperio tenía que pagar también las fuerzas de España y de la Liga católica en el noroeste.

CUADRO 3

Listas del ejército de Wallenstein, 1625-1630[27]

Año	Infantería	% del total	Caballería	Total	% incremento sobre el año anterior	% de tropas alemanas
1625	45.300	(73)	16.600	61.900	—	61
1626	86.100	(77)	25.000	111.100	79	72
1627	83.100	(74)	29.600	112.700	1	79
1628	102.900	(79)	27.300	130.200	16	74
1629	111.000	(86)	17.900	128.900	—1	80
1630	129.900	(86)	21.000	150.900	17	87

26. Schulz, *Der dreissigjährige Krieg*, documento 33.

27. Kollmann, ed., *Documenta Bohemica*, IV, pp. 414-446. Aunque las cifras representan únicamente fuerza sobre el papel, indican la magnitud del problema. Por supuesto, el coste era ingente. El arzobispado de Magdeburgo calculó que en septiembre de 1627 los gastos en concepto de contribuciones ascendían a 687.000 táleros; el ducado de Pomerania afirmaba haber pagado 1,7 millones hasta julio de 1628, y así sucesivamente.

El primer ataque político concertado contra Wallenstein y su sistema se produjo en la misma reunión electoral de Mühlhausen, en noviembre de 1627, en la que se planeó el Edicto de Restitución. Los electores católicos criticaron tanto la cuantía de los impuestos recaudados por el general del emperador Fernando como la forma en que eran distribuidos: «Sus impuestos de guerra garantizan unos salarios exorbitantes a los oficiales de los regimientos y a los del Estado Mayor», afirmaban, asegurando que el teniente-general Arnim obtenía 3.000 florines al mes. También censuraban a Wallenstein la práctica de vender nombramientos «hasta para cuatro regimientos a la vez a quien quiera que ofreciera sus servicios, aunque se tratara de criminales, extranjeros y de personas que desconocían por completo la administración militar», así como la falta de disciplina de las compañías a sus órdenes. Mencionaban el reciente motín de los regimientos del duque de Sajonia-Lauemburgo en el Wetterau. Pero, por supuesto, sus mayores agravios eran la destrucción y despoblación que provocaba el ejército y su incapacidad para controlar a las fuerzas imperiales estacionadas en sus propios dominios. «Los gobernantes territoriales —se lamentaban— están a merced de los coroneles y capitanes, que son unos indeseables carroñeros de la guerra y criminales que transgreden las leyes del Imperio».[28]

Los electores exigieron a Fernando que pusiera fin a los reclutamientos y que redujera la fuerza del ejército de Wallenstein (especialmente en Renania, donde tanto las tropas de los Habsburgo como las de los miembros de la Liga eran numerosas). Pidieron también que organizara un nuevo sistema de mando que gozara de la confianza de los gobernantes territoriales en el Imperio y que, para salvaguardar a «las pobres viudas y huérfanos», el ejército imperial fuera desposeído del derecho de recaudar sus propios impuestos por el llamado «sistema de contribuciones», que debía quedar bajo el control del sistema económico civil. El emperador debería prohibir a Wallenstein reclutar nuevas tropas sin la aprobación de los agentes imperiales, así como

28. Véase Klopp, *op. cit.*, pp. 815, 853. *El Kurfürstentag* de Mühlhausen, ciudad libre de Turingia, fue utilizado por el elector Juan Jorge para su autopropaganda. Encargó al compositor de su corte, Heinrich Schütz, que escribiera la obra *Da pacem* para esa ocasión. Incluía un motete para dos coros, uno de los cuales cantaba en el exterior del lugar de reunión y el otro en el interior, entonando la oración en latín por la paz. Véase R. Petzoldt, *Heinrich Schütz and his times in pictures*, Kassel y Londres, 1972.

recaudar nuevos impuestos de guerra sin el consentimiento, la administración y la supervisión de los gobernantes territoriales que albergaban a sus ejércitos.

El emperador estaba dispuesto a ignorar las quejas mientras durara el fragor de la batalla. Pero en diciembre de 1629, una vez que Dinamarca había sido derrotada, el nuevo elector de Maguncia, Anselmo Casimiro von Wambold, organizó una reunión de la Liga católica en Mergentheim y por primera vez insistió abiertamente en la dimisión de Wallenstein:

> Dado que el duque de Friedland [Wallenstein] ha contrariado y ofendido gravemente a todos los gobernantes territoriales del Imperio; y aunque la situación actual le ha llevado a comportarse con mayor cautela, no ha abandonado sus planes de retener Mecklemburgo en virtud de su mando imperial.

Según el elector, mientras Wallenstein permaneciera al frente del ejército imperial y en posesión de Mecklemburgo, nunca reinaría la paz en el Imperio.[29] En marzo de 1630, actuando en su calidad de archicanciller del Imperio, Wambold convocó a los siete electores para celebrar una reunión en Ratisbona el día 3 de junio, en la que el problema quedaría resuelto.

En esta ocasión, Fernando se vio obligado a escuchar las quejas de sus aliados alemanes, pues no le quedaban muchos más aliados. Urbano VIII, que había sido elegido papa en agosto de 1623, no manifestaba las mismas simpatías hacia los Habsburgo que habían demostrado sus predecesores. Interrumpió el envío de subsidios al emperador y a la Liga y decidió concentrarse en lo que consideraba que eran los intereses de los estados pontificios en Italia, para lo cual creía necesaria la neutralización de la influencia Habsburgo en la península. También Segismundo de Polonia, que en otro tiempo había apoyado al emperador, hacía ahora oídos sordos a sus peticiones de ayuda. En el verano de 1629, con su reino totalmente exhausto, Segismundo firmó una tregua de seis años con Suecia, que dejó a Gustavo Adolfo las manos libres para intervenir en el Imperio si lo deseaba (ya contaba con una cabeza de puente en Stralsund). También Francia, sofocada finalmente la rebelión hugonote, podía ofrecer ayuda nuevamente a los enemigos del emperador, y de hecho ya lo estaba haciendo en

29. *Die Politik Maximilians I. von Bayern, 4.ii., 1628-Juni 1629*, p. 348.

Italia. Lo que era todavía peor, España se vio obligada en ese momento a retirar su ayuda a la causa de Fernando debido a los serios reveses sufridos en los Países Bajos. En 1628, un ejército holandés capturó todo el tesoro de la flota que navegaba desde el Caribe hasta España, proveyendo así al mismo tiempo a la República con los recursos necesarios para lanzar un gran ataque contra los Países Bajos españoles y privando a Felipe IV de los medios económicos necesarios para organizar una resistencia eficaz. A comienzos de 1629, confiado en el éxito y contando con un ejército sin precedentes de 128.000 hombres, el comandante en jefe del ejército holandés, Federico Enrique (hermano de Mauricio), puso sitio a la importante ciudad de 's Hertongenbosch. Los Habsburgo respondieron enviando dos columnas —una de ellas formada por 10.000 soldados imperiales y la otra por soldados del ejército de Flandes— que penetraron en territorio holandés. En agosto ocuparon Amersfoort, a tan sólo 40 km de Amsterdam. Por desgracia para los Habsburgo, en ese mismo mes los holandeses arrasaron Wesel y en septiembre forzaron la rendición de 's Hertogenbosch, obligando así a que los ejércitos de los Habsburgo, totalmente aislados, se retiraran desordenadamente de Amersfoort. Pero esto no fue todo. Durante el invierno de 1629-1630, los holandeses expulsaron prácticamente a todas las guarniciones españolas del noroeste de Alemania. El bloqueo fluvial quedó totalmente roto y en julio de 1630 España entregó los bastiones que aún le quedaban a las fuerzas de la Liga de Tilly.[30]

Lo cierto era que la carga de defender la causa católica en Alemania recaía ahora casi por completo sobre Tilly, dado que el ejército de Flandes era demasiado débil como para defender ninguna plaza fuera de los límites de los territorios patrimoniales de Felipe IV y las tropas de Fernando II estaban demasiado ocupadas en otros lugares. La razón fundamental que explica estos dos hechos es muy simple: en el curso del año 1629 las dos ramas de la Casa de los Habsburgo se vieron fatalmente envueltas en una gran guerra con Francia en Italia debido a la infatigable diplomacia del conde-duque de Olivares.

30. Véase el excelente relato de estas campañas en Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, pp. 162-181.

IV. España y la guerra

«Dios es español y está de parte de la nación estos días.» Sin duda, hubo momentos a lo largo de 1625, ese *annus mirabilis* para las armas españolas, cuando incluso los enemigos de España podrían haber aceptado renuentemente que el conde-duque de Olivares no estaba totalmente equivocado en su confiada declaración sobre la afiliación nacional de la divinidad.[31] En el curso de ese año, Breda se rindió al ejército de Flandes comandado por el extraordinario Spínola; la República de Génova, aliada y cliente de España, fue rescatada del ataque de las fuerzas conjuntas de Francia y Saboya; una expedición naval conjunta hispano-portuguesa expulsó a los holandeses de Bahía en Brasil y, finalmente, una fuerza expedicionaria inglesa fue humillantemente derrotada cuando intentó atacar Cádiz. Si añadimos a todo ello las victorias de los Habsburgo en la Europa central, ciertamente parecía que si Dios no era español al menos tenía una gran predilección por la Casa de Austria.

Sin embargo, para Olivares, enfrascado en los mapas de Europa en su salón de mapas en Madrid, las victorias de 1625, aunque extraordinariamente alentadoras, suponían poco más que un respiro. España necesitaba la paz, la necesitaba para restaurar las exhaustas finanzas de la corona y la quebrantada economía de Castilla y para emprender las importantes reformas que le parecían esenciales para la supervivencia de su país. Pero la paz era muy difícil de conseguir. El rey de Francia, aunque preocupado temporalmente por el problema de los hugonotes, constituía una amenaza permanente para esa *pax austriaca* que Madrid consideraba indispensable para la supervivencia del catolicismo y el mantenimiento de la estabilidad en extensas zonas de Europa. El ataque contra Cádiz en noviembre de 1625 (véanse pp. 119-120, *supra*) había iniciado un estado de guerra entre Inglaterra y España. La situación de Italia era precaria: Venecia estaba constantemente implicada en maquinaciones anti-habsburguesas, Carlos Manuel de Saboya cambiaba constantemente de opinión y el papa Urbano VIII no era persona en la que se pudiera confiar. Pero, sobre todo, era el problema de Holanda el que parecía de más difícil solución. El problema no radicaba únicamente en el hecho de que la guerra de los Países Bajos impusiera una

31. Olivares al conde de Gondomar, citado en Brown y Elliot, *A Palace for a King*, p. 190.

sangría constante y casi intolerable sobre los recursos españoles, tanto en hombres como en dinero, con ser éste un problema muy grave. Además, la mano de los holandeses aparecía detrás de cualquier coalición anti-habsburguesa, las actividades de la Compañía Holandesa de las Indias Orientales y la de las Indias Occidentales ponían en peligro las posesiones ultramarinas de la Corona de Castilla y Portugal y, finalmente, la vida económica de la Península Ibérica se veía gravemente socavada por los éxitos de las actividades comerciales y empresariales holandesas.

Olivares no se hacía ilusiones respecto a la posibilidad de recuperar la adhesión de las Provincias Unidas de los Países Bajos. Esa posibilidad había dejado ya de existir hacía mucho tiempo. Pero creía, y no sin justificación, que los términos en los que se había negociado la tregua de 1609 habían resultado desastrosos para la monarquía española y esperaba que fuera posible forzar a los holandeses, mediante una presión militar y económica, a negociar una paz nueva y más duradera en unos términos aceptables para España. Pero para conseguir esto, España necesitaba ayuda, ayuda que sólo podía proceder del Imperio.

El principio fundamental de la política exterior del conde-duque era que «estas dos casas [las ramas austriaca y española de los Habsburgo] no se han de dividir por nada».[32] La ruptura de las negociaciones para concertar un compromiso matrimonial con la monarquía inglesa le permitió fortalecer los lazos existentes entre las dos casas pactando un matrimonio entre la hermana de Felipe IV, la infanta María, y Fernando, rey de Hungría, hijo del emperador. Pero Olivares creía también que era necesario un acuerdo más formal que garantizara a ambas partes la ayuda mutua en caso de peligro. Fue en 1625 cuando el Consejo de Estado discutió por primera vez en Madrid la posibilidad de establecer una alianza formal entre España, el emperador y los príncipes del Imperio, tanto católicos como protestantes, ya que se consideraba fundamental separar a los luteranos de los calvinistas.[33] Durante los años siguientes, Olivares persiguió con tenacidad la realización de este plan de establecer una alianza militar defensiva-ofensiva

32. AGS, Estado 2331, f. 126, Olivares en el Consejo de Estado, 10 de noviembre de 1630.

33. Una Junta del Consejo de Estado, que se reunió el 2 de junio de 1625, recomendó que la alianza propuesta no se basara en la afinidad religiosa, punto de vista que también sustentaba Olivares, por cuanto consideraba que la participación de Sajonia era indispensable (AGS, Estado 2327, fols. 371 y 372).

entre Madrid y Viena que, a sus ojos, era la única forma eficaz de garantizar una estabilidad permanente en la Europa central y de solucionar el problema de los Países Bajos. Si conseguía implicar al emperador en la guerra de España con Holanda, tal vez convenciendo a Fernando de que la paz definitiva de Alemania dependía de la pacificación de los Países Bajos, todavía sería posible reducir a esos vasallos rebeldes.

Las victorias de los Habsburgo en Alemania presentaron lo que parecía ser una oportunidad ideal para una acción concertada de España y el Imperio. Desde 1625, Olivares había negociado con el emperador y con Maximiliano de Baviera la posibilidad de realizar un gran «designio báltico». El objetivo de ese proyecto era conseguir para España una base naval en el norte. Ese puerto actuaría a modo de sede de una nueva compañía comercial que intentaría arrancar de manos de los holandeses el control del lucrativo comercio entre el Báltico y el Mediterráneo, comercio que, como Olivares juzgaba certeramente, era el fundamento de su prosperidad económica y de su resistencia militar. Una de las formas de realizar ese ambicioso proyecto sería conseguir que los ejércitos del emperador y de la Liga católica expulsaran a los holandeses del territorio de Frisia oriental, adyacente a la república, donde existían buenos puertos. Pero Maximiliano de Baviera, que sospechaba de las ambiciones españolas, no mostró entusiasmo alguno ante la idea de implicar a la Liga en esa iniciativa y Madrid se vio obligada a buscar soluciones alternativas.

El espectacular ascenso de Wallenstein dio a Olivares otra oportunidad. Los contactos del conde-duque con Wallenstein en 1627 encontraron una acogida favorable: al parecer, estaba dispuesto a proporcionar ayuda contra Holanda. Existían dos formas, no excluyentes entre sí, de concretar esa ayuda. Podía utilizar su ejército para ocupar uno de los puertos del Báltico y podía ordenar a sus fuerzas que penetraran en Frisia oriental invadiendo las provincias holandesas al otro lado del Ems, que además satisfarían sus ambiciones territoriales. Si se conseguía que al mismo tiempo el ejército de Flandes presionara a los holandeses desde el sur, la República se vería, sin duda, obligada a acceder a un acuerdo que garantizara a España una paz honorable.

Las perspectivas mejoraron para España en junio de 1627 con el comienzo de las hostilidades entre Francia e Inglaterra. Olivares, esperando capitalizar las dificultades de Richelieu, cambió bruscamente de política y ofreció al gobierno de París un acercamiento franco-español. El embajador español en París recibió instrucciones para conseguir el apoyo de Luis XIII en la formalización de una alianza contra todos los enemigos comunes: los protestantes franceses, los ingleses y, si fuera posible, los holandeses. Como muestra de buena voluntad, la flota española del Atlántico se trasladó desde Cádiz al golfo de Morbihan para ayudar al monarca francés en el asedio de La Rochelle, cuya población hugonote se había rebelado contra su rey confiando en las promesas de ayuda de los ingleses. Sin embargo, la alianza franco-española, aunque ardientemente deseada por el papado, no fue nunca fácil. Había quienes se oponían a ella en Madrid —donde uno de los consejeros de Felipe advirtió que «no havria ninguna teología que obligue a Vuestra Magestad a que en todas partes contra todos los herejes emplee sus armas» y, por otra parte, en París también se veían con recelo las intenciones españolas.[34]

La situación se deterioró de forma dramática en 1628. El emperador aprobó el «gran designio» en el Báltico, pero casi inmediatamente el ejército de Wallenstein se vio obligado a levantar el asedio del puerto de Stralsund, con lo cual se hundieron las esperanzas de conseguir un éxito inmediato. Pero no acabaron ahí los males, pues casi de forma inmediata una aventura mal calculada en la que Olivares se había embarcado en Italia dificultó, y luego desbarató totalmente, sus planes para terminar la guerra con Holanda, transformando de forma sustancial el panorama internacional.

El reavivamiento del conflicto (véase p. 73, *supra*) sobre la sucesión de Mantua y Monferrato, a la muerte del duque Vicente II en diciembre de 1627, provocó una serie de peligros en Italia que Olivares no pudo evitar, así como tentaciones a las que le fue imposible resistirse. Si la sucesión del duque Vicente recaía sobre el francés duque de Nevers, el pretendiente más fuerte, los franceses se hallarían en una posición que les permitiría burlar Milán, la base sobre la cual dominaba España el norte de Italia. Milán era, asimismo, el punto de partida de ese sistema estratégico vital de corredores militares que dis-

34. Straub, *Pax et Imperium*, p. 285 n., opinión de diciembre de 1627. El gobierno español, todavía en junio de 1626, intentó evitar declarar la guerra a Dinamarca, «por ser muchos los enemigos forzosos con que nos allamos, y no parezer justo buscar otros voluntarios». Olivares creía que los Habsburgo debían aprender a convivir con los luteranos. (Günter, *Die Habsburger-Liga*, p. 14, n. 53: opinión de Olivares fechada el 20 de junio de 1626.) Sobre las suspicacias en París, véase Lutz, *Kardinal Giovanni Francesco Guidi di Bagno*, libro II.

curría a través de la Valtelina (véase mapa 2) hasta la Europa central, o por el Rin hasta los Países Bajos. Lamentablemente para España, el duque de Nevers, advertido de la inminente muerte del duque de Mantua, llegó a esa plaza a mediados de enero de 1628, haciéndose de forma inmediata con el control del gobierno. Al instante despachó un enviado a Viena para convencer al emperador (cuya nueva esposa, hermana del duque fallecido, apoyaba la causa del francés) de su derecho a la sucesión.

Alarmado por estos peligros y sometido a duras críticas en el interior por sus supuestos fallos de gobierno, Olivares autorizó a don Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, comandante del ejército de Milán, a poner sitio a la fortaleza de Casale en Monferrato. La ocupación de este bastión casi inexpugnable constituiría un golpe brillante que restituiría la reputación de los ejércitos españoles y consolidaría la posición de España en la llanura lombarda. Pero el ejército de don Gonzalo, mal aprovisionado pese a los esfuerzos del conde-duque por enviar dinero, se vio atrapado en el exterior de los muros de Casale y lo que en un principio se había contemplado como un triunfo relámpago se convirtió en una pesadilla interminable. Fue ésta la acción política por la que posteriormente se lamentó Felipe IV: «si en algo he errado, y dado causa para menos agrado de nuestro Señor —admitió a un confidente en 1645—, ha sido en esto». Por su parte, el papa Urbano VIII se lamentaba en 1632 del hecho de que la guerra de Mantua hubiera provocado la derrota de la causa católica «pues todo el mundo sabe que antes de la guerra los Habsburgo, los franceses y todos los demás príncipes católicos concordaban en los asuntos de política exterior y que ... el progreso de la religión católica se desarrollaba de forma muy favorable en Alemania, en Francia y en todas partes».[35]

El largo asedio de Casale impuso nuevas y fuertes exigencias a las finanzas de la corona española e hizo necesario transferir los escasos recursos del ejército de Flandes a las fuerzas de Italia. A su vez, esta decisión tuvo desastrosas consecuencias sobre la guerra en los

35. C. Seco Serrano, *Cartas de Sor María de Jesús de Agreda y de Felipe IV*, I, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, CVIII, Madrid, 1958, p. 28: carta de Felipe IV, Zaragoza, 20 de julio de 1645 (escrita, por tanto, más de dos años después de la caída de Olivares); Q. Aldea Vaquero, *España, el Papado y el Imperio durante la Guerra de los Treinta Años. II Instrucciones a los nuncios apostólicos en España (1624-32)*, Comillas, 1958, p. 32: instrucciones de Urbano VIII a los nuncios, 1 de mayo de 1632.

Países Bajos en el momento en que se celebraban negociaciones de paz. Como ya hemos señalado, los holandeses, reforzados por el río de plata española capturada a la flota que transportaba el tesoro desde América en 1628, se vieron, en 1629, en situación de pasar a la ofensiva contra el ejército de Flandes, debilitado por la partida de Spínola, que se había trasladado a Madrid para discutir los términos de un acuerdo de paz con la República. Por tanto, Madrid se vio una vez más enfrentada en 1629 con un dilema secular: ¿Flandes o Italia? Después de intensos debates, el Consejo de Estado, por influencia de Spínola y contra los deseos del conde-duque, autorizó a la archiduquesa Isabel para que firmara un acuerdo con los holandeses en Bruselas, para poder dar así prioridad a la guerra en Italia. Las consecuencias de esta decisión fueron exactamente las que temía Olivares. La República, consciente de la nueva debilidad de España en el norte, perdió el interés por alcanzar un acuerdo inmediato de paz, mientras que las provincias leales de los Países Bajos del Sur, terriblemente cansadas de la guerra y desmoralizadas por la serie constante de derrotas, se situaron al borde de la rebelión.

Sin embargo, éste no fue sino uno de los muchos problemas que abrumaron a Olivares durante esos críticos años de la guerra de Mantua transcurridos entre 1628 y 1631. La situación económica de Castilla se deterioraba sin cesar. El año 1627 había sido particularmente malo: los precios se elevaron notablemente bajo la presión combinada de las pobres cosechas y los efectos de la acuñación por parte del gobierno de cantidades excesivas de la devaluada moneda de cobre (vellón) durante los primeros años del reinado, en un intento por hacer frente a las necesidades financieras. Las fuerzas productivas de Castilla se veían aplastadas por un injusto sistema impositivo; el aumento de los precios amenazaba con provocar inquietud en las ciudades y el programa de reformas en el que con tantas esperanzas se había embarcado Olivares en 1621 se había visto prácticamente interrumpido, paralizado por la resistencia de las Cortes y de la oligarquía urbana y por la propia maquinaria gubernamental. El régimen era totalmente impopular y todos sus intentos contradictorios de hacer frente a los problemas de la inflación sólo sirvieron para aumentar su impopularidad y agravar la situación. La participación de España en una guerra en Italia, muy costosa y aparentemente desastrosa, dio los argumentos necesarios a los enemigos de Olivares. Todo tipo de manifiestos y escritos satíricos circularon por Madrid a lo largo de 1628 instando a

Felipe IV a librarse de su favorito para pasar a actuar como un auténtico rey.

Felipe no pareció dispuesto a aceptar de forma inmediata el consejo de los enemigos del conde-duque, pero hubo síntomas de tensión entre el rey y su ministro en la primavera y el verano de 1629, cuando el rey pareció inclinarse a aceptar la opinión de la mayoría de su Consejo de Estado e incluso llegó a comentar la posibilidad de conducir personalmente un ejército a Italia. Al conceder prioridad a Italia y aprobar la idea de un acuerdo con los holandeses, el Consejo de Estado había aceptado los argumentos de Spínola en pro de una paz en el norte. Pero una cuestión fundamental era el comportamiento de los franceses. Olivares había contado siempre con la posibilidad de que don Gonzalo de Córdoba capturara Casale antes de que Luis XIII derrotara a los hugonotes de La Rochelle, pero una vez más su cálculo fue erróneo. La Rochelle se rindió en octubre de 1628; en enero de 1629 Olivares advirtió al nuncio papal, con extraña presciencia, que si un ejército francés atravesaba los Alpes, Francia y España se verían envueltas en una guerra que duraría treinta años. Un mes más tarde, ignorando la advertencia, Luis XIII condujo a su ejército a través de las cumbres nevadas del paso del Mont Cenis y don Gonzalo, apremiado por la aproximación de los franceses, se vio obligado a levantar el largo y frustrado sitio de Casale.

Tal como había previsto el conde-duque, la decisión de Luis XIII de seguir el consejo de Richelieu y conducir un ejército a través de los Alpes situó a Francia y España en la vía del enfrentamiento. Ninguna de las dos potencias estaba preparada para una guerra a gran escala y el enfrentamiento de Mantua fue, por tanto, limitado. Pero desde la primavera de 1629, las exigencias de una política exterior firme habían adquirido prioridad, tanto en París como en Madrid, sobre cualquier consideración de reforma interna. Tanto Richelieu como Olivares intentaron movilizar sus recursos en hombres y dinero con un ojo puesto en el inminente conflicto. Ambos se apresuraron a firmar la paz con Inglaterra —Francia en abril de 1629 y España en noviembre de 1630— y comenzaron a cortejar asiduamente a sus aliados potenciales mientras se enzarzaban en un complicado juego de ajedrez político para conseguir el control de esa zona estratégica del tablero que se extendía desde el norte de Italia hasta la frontera de los Países Bajos.

En su búsqueda de aliados, Olivares pidió nuevamente ayuda a Viena, esta vez con cierto éxito. Pero el precio del éxito resultó ser

muy elevado. La presencia de los franceses en Italia constituía para Fernando una preocupación mayor que el curso de la guerra de los Países Bajos y en el verano de 1629 revocó el permiso que había dado a Wallenstein para que desplegara parte de su ejército contra los holandeses en Frisia. Ordenó, a continuación, que sus tropas se trasladaran a Italia. Esta aparición de las tropas imperiales al otro lado de los Alpes restableció el equilibrio en Mantua (con un terrible coste para ese desgraciado ducado), pero dio al traste también con una oportunidad probablemente irrepetible para ver hechos realidad los proyectos de Olivares de organizar una gran operación combinada hispano-imperial contra Holanda. Y en cuanto a Italia, la presencia de unos 50.000 soldados imperiales no permitió a los Habsburgo alcanzar el claro triunfo que esperaba Olivares.

Las relaciones entre Madrid y Viena se deterioraron peligrosamente a propósito de la cuestión de Mantua, que puso de relieve una vez más que las dos cortes no tenían puntos de vista y prioridades similares. Olivares desconfiaba profundamente de la influencia que ejercían sobre Fernando su esposa Gonzaga y su confesor, Lamormaini, y pensaba que, de entre los consejeros imperiales, sólo Eggenberg era un auténtico amigo de España.[36] El conde-duque consideraba la paz de Ratisbona de 1630 (véase p. 169, *infra*) como una traición imperial de los intereses españoles —«la más desautorizada paz que hemos sufrido jamás»— y no se lamentó cuando fue rechazada por Francia.[37] Pero tampoco él podía conseguir nada mejor. Cuando la cuestión de Mantua quedó definitivamente resuelta por los acuerdos de paz de Cherasco en la primavera de 1631, el duque de Nevers detentaba todavía la sucesión; los franceses consiguieron conservar la fortaleza de Pinerolo como base militar en la sección italiana de los Alpes y los españoles no consiguieron ocupar Casale.[38]

36. Es muy posible que tuviera razón en este punto. Véase el análisis de las opiniones políticas de los principales consejeros de Fernando, en Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, cap. 1. Ciertamente, Eggenberg fue a España en 1598-1599 y recolectó allí objetos de arte y libros (en su biblioteca había una edición de *Don Quijote* y una edición completa de las obras de Lope de Vega, con numerosas anotaciones de Eggenberg). El extraordinario castillo del príncipe, construido en las afueras de Graz a comienzos del siglo XVII, era prácticamente igual que los castillos españoles.

37. AGS, Estado 2331, f. 126, Olivares en el Consejo de Estado, 10 de noviembre de 1630.

38. Sin embargo, al insistir en su derecho a investir al nuevo duque de

Inevitablemente, los acontecimientos de la última fase de la guerra de Mantua se vieron oscurecidos por el avance, aparentemente irresistible, de los suecos. Olivares, dirigiendo ansiosamente su mirada a Europa en 1631-1632, detectó una gran conspiración internacional contra la Casa de Austria, una conspiración en la que quienes profesaban lealtad a la causa católica, Francia, Baviera y el propio pontífice, harían que grandes zonas de la cristiandad fueran arrastradas por la marea de la herejía. Era a España, como auténtica campeona de la fe, a quien correspondía detener esa marea de la mejor forma posible. Pero el conflicto de gigantes que desencadenó la intervención de Olivares en Mantua demostraría de manera irrefutable que, después de todo, Dios no era español, sino francés.

Mantua, el emperador obtuvo al menos un beneficio de la guerra: estableció para siempre sus derechos de soberanía sobre los estados del norte de Italia. Pero ese aspecto, que abrió el camino al gobierno directo de Austria entre los Alpes y el Po, tendría importancia en un futuro lejano. Por el momento, la humillación de los Habsburgo era tan intensa en Viena como en Madrid. Véase K. O. von Aretin, «Die Lehensordnungen in Italien im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert und ihre Auswirkungen auf die europäische Politik», en H. Weber, ed., *Politische Ordnungen und soziale Kräfte im Alten Reich*, Wiesbaden, 1980: Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für europäische Geschichte Mainz. Abteilung Universalgeschichte. Beiheft VIII, pp. 53-84, especialmente pp. 57-59 y 77.

Capítulo IV

LA GUERRA TOTAL

Aunque fue emperador durante 18 años, Fernando II nunca convocó la Dieta Imperial. Antes bien, decidió gobernar el Imperio mediante decretos publicados por su propia autoridad o después de consultar con los príncipes electores y con otros gobernantes de su confianza. Esta fórmula podría haber resultado aceptable si el emperador no hubiera tomado decisiones políticas. Pero no ocurrió así. El derrocamiento de gobernantes como el elector palatino o los duques de Mecklemburgo, la transferencia electoral, el mantenimiento del ejército de Wallenstein y el Edicto de Restitución, eran temas que habrían suscitado el debate y la oposición en cualquier circunstancia. Pero dado que la Dieta no se reunió entre 1613 y 1640, la legalidad de éstas (y de otras) medidas tomadas por el gobierno imperial se convirtió en tema de controversia en la corte de todos los gobernantes: los consejeros políticos y los académicos hicieron circular innumerables panfletos, conocidos como *Denkschriften*, que justificaban o criticaban una decisión determinada sobre la base del «Derecho Público» del Imperio («Público» porque implicaba relaciones entre estados).

La audiencia de estas publicaciones fue muy amplia. El derecho era, después de la teología, la disciplina intelectual más apreciada en Alemania y era estudiado por casi la mitad de los 8.000 jóvenes que ingresaban en las universidades del Imperio cada año a comienzos del siglo XVII.[1] Además, los argumentos de los *Denkschriften* y de otros

1. Véase el interesante estudio de Gross, *Empire and Sovereignty*, sobre el debate del «Derecho Público». Véase también O. Brunner, «Souveränitätsproblem

panfletos se filtraban a otras clases de la sociedad por medio de octavillas y cuadernillos ilustrados, que se imprimieron a millares durante la guerra. En efecto, esto sirvió para crear una «opinión pública» informada que ejerció una considerable influencia en determinados temas. Por tomar el ejemplo más claro, en el apoyo que se prestó a la rebelión bohemia influyeron en gran medida las opiniones expresadas en la literatura popular. De las 1.000 octavillas que se conservan de la guerra en la colección Gustav Freytag en Frankfurt, casi 400 fueron publicadas entre 1618 y 1621. Sólo hubo otro período similar de intensa actividad literaria durante la guerra, entre 1629 y 1633, cuando sus principales protagonistas intentaron conseguir el apoyo de los que aún no estaban comprometidos; 229 ejemplares de la colección Freytag proceden de estos años.[2]

Dado que todos los textos a los que hemos hecho referencia fueron publicados en Alemania y para la edificación del pueblo del Imperio, nos sentimos tentados a afirmar que, pese a las apariencias que puedan indicar lo contrario, la Guerra de los Treinta Años fue un asunto exclusivamente alemán. Se ha dicho incluso que «la "Guerra de los Treinta Años" debería ser llamada "la Guerra religiosa alemana"».[3] Pero este punto de vista es totalmente erróneo. El último período en el que los líderes políticos de Alemania tuvieron libertad para determinar su propio destino fue el período interlunar entre julio de 1630 y marzo de 1631, los meses que separaron la Reunión electoral de Ratisbona del Coloquio protestante en Leipzig. En ambas

und Sozialstruktur in den deutschen Reichsstädten der frühen Neuzeit», *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, L, 1963, pp. 329-360, especialmente pp. 347-351. Existe un claro paralelismo aquí con el debate de la «Constitución Antigua» en los comienzos de la Inglaterra de los Estuardo: en ambos países, el lenguaje del derecho dominaba la política.

2. Cifras tomadas de P. Hohenemser, ed., *Flugschrifttensammlung Gustav Freytag*, Frankfurt, 1925, n.os 4.771-5.794. Pueden encontrarse admirables colecciones de literatura popular sobre la guerra en D. Alexander y W. L. Strauss, *The German Single-Leaf Woodcut 1600-1700. A pictorial catalogue*, Nueva York, 1978; E. A. Beller, *Caricatures of the «Winter King» of Bohemia*, Oxford, 1928; *idem, Propaganda in Germany during the Thirty Years' War*, Princeton, 1940; M. Bohatcová, *Irrgarten des Schicksals: Einblattdrucke vom Anfang des dreissigjährigen Krieges*, Praga, 1966; y W. A. Coupe, *The German Illustrated Broadsheet of the Seventeenth Century*, 2 vols., Baden-Baden, 1966-1967.

3. P. Rassow, *Die geschichtliche Einheit des Abendlandes*, Colonia y Graz, 1960, p. 360.

asambleas, y en otras reuniones de menor escala celebradas entre ambas, se intentó conseguir un realineamiento de fuerzas en el seno del Imperio que pudiera preservar la paz —pues, en tanto en cuanto los príncipes alemanes permanecieran neutrales, existía una posibilidad de conseguirlo—. Pero en la primavera de 1631, el matrimonio forzoso de Suecia con Brandemburgo y el tratado franco-bávaro de Fontainebleau rompieron la unidad y situaron a los gobernantes de Europa al borde del abismo. La guerra general europea era ya inevitable.

I. Al borde del abismo

Tanto el emperador como sus aliados de la Liga acogieron con satisfacción la Reunión electoral (*Kurfürstentag*) de Ratisbona del verano de 1630, pues ofrecía la oportunidad de resolver las diferencias que habían surgido recientemente entre ellos. Su importancia a los ojos de todos los participantes viene demostrada por la lista de los que asistieron personalmente: el emperador, todos los electores católicos, el nuncio papal y diversos representantes diplomáticos de Francia, España, Venecia, Toscana e Inglaterra. Los electores de Sajonia y Brandemburgo se negaron a asistir personalmente en razón a su oposición al Edicto de Restitución, pero enviaron delegados. En conjunto, el número de asistentes se acercaba a los 2.000 entre participantes y observadores.

Fernando necesitaba conseguir la aprobación de los electores para ayudar financiera y militarmente a España en la guerra contra la República de Holanda. También necesitaba su apoyo frente a la amenaza de la agresión francesa y sueca y, de forma más inmediata, para la elección de su hijo primogénito como rey de romanos, o heredero de la corona imperial. En cuanto a los electores, su principal preocupación era conseguir la destitución de Wallenstein, que solicitaron formalmente el 16 de julio, después de sólo una semana de deliberación. A la consecución de su objetivo contribuyó la postura impasible del protagonista, que pasó el verano en Memmingen, no lejos de Ratisbona. Wallenstein se sentía cansado y deprimido ante la profunda crisis económica en que se encontraba. En efecto, el coste de su ejército era tan superior a la suma que recibía del emperador que simplemente no podía permanecer como comandante en jefe. Parece que casi sintió alivio cuando el 13 de agosto el emperador escuchó las esten-

tóreas voces que reclamaban su destitución. El general se retiró a sus propiedades de Bohemia y su principal financiero, Hans de Witte, se suicidó. Al conde Tilly, todavía general del ejército de la Liga, se le encargó la tarea de reducir el ejército imperial en un 75 por 100, fusionando con las suyas las unidades sobrevivientes. Pero a Tilly se le negaron incluso los medios económicos para mantener tan reducidas fuerzas, que exigían unos 5 millones de táleros anuales: el pago debía proceder de las asambleas de los Círculos, y los gobiernos territoriales representados en ellas siempre estaban atrasados en el pago de sus contribuciones. Los problemas del ejército se vieron agravados cuando el grueso de sus fuerzas se concentró en el asedio de Magdeburgo, ciudad que desafiaba abiertamente al emperador desde agosto de 1630. Los recursos locales se consumieron rápidamente y ante la imposibilidad de recurrir al sistema de contribuciones de Wallenstein el desasosiego se apoderó de las tropas.

La reforma militar en profundidad no fue la única concesión arrancada al emperador en Ratisbona. En efecto, la asamblea electoral se convirtió en un tribunal de investigación de la política exterior e interior de Fernando. Su veredicto fue realmente feroz y hubo que abandonar varias innovaciones del decenio de 1620: el Tribunal Supremo Imperial con sede en Speyer dejó de ser controlado desde Viena para quedar de nuevo bajo la supervisión general de los príncipes territoriales y al emperador se le hizo prometer que en el futuro «no se declarará ninguna guerra sino aquellas que aconsejen los electores». Fernando no obtuvo prácticamente nada a cambio de estas concesiones: no se eligió un rey de romanos ni se concedió el apoyo de la Liga para los ejércitos de los Habsburgo en los Países Bajos. Su única victoria consistió en mantener el Edicto de Restitución en su forma original, aunque algunos aliados católicos (encabezados por Baviera) aconsejaron que se introdujera alguna modificación. Según el relato de una entrevista mantenida entre Maximiliano (que se mostraba a favor de hacer algunas concesiones de poca monta a los protestantes) y el confesor del emperador, Lamormaini (quien sustentaba la opinión opuesta), la salvación del Imperio se hacía depender del cumplimiento estricto del Edicto:

> [Lamormaini] cerró los ojos y contestó ... el Edicto debe ser respetado, no importa cuáles puedan ser los males que se deriven posteriormente de él. Poco importa que debido a ello el emperador pierda no sólo Austria sino todos sus reinos ... con tal de que salve su alma, lo cual no podrá conseguir sin el cumplimiento del Edicto.[4]

De hecho, la reunión electoral de Ratisbona no sirvió para resolver los problemas que enfrentaban al Imperio y al emperador en 1630, sino, antes bien, para agravarlos. Al sacrificar a Wallenstein, Fernando perdió al único hombre cuya capacidad y poder podían haberle permitido consolidar las ventajas conseguidas recientemente y unificar a una débil y dividida Alemania bajo una fuerte monarquía Habsburgo. Al mantener el Edicto de Restitución, el emperador y los príncipes de la Liga se enajenaron aún más a los electores del norte de Alemania, exacerbando la división existente entre protestantes y católicos. De hecho, los acontecimientos de Ratisbona produjeron un vacío de poder. Nadie controlaba ahora el Imperio.

Fue precisamente en ese momento de debilidad y crisis cuando Francia y Suecia se vieron sumidas en el conflicto, cada una de forma diferente. En el verano de 1630 llegó ante el emperador una delegación francesa para buscar una solución a numerosos problemas: el control de la Valtelina (todavía en disputa pese a la paz de Monzón de 1626); la soberanía de los tres obispados de Lorena (ocupados por Francia en 1552 y reclamados todavía por el Imperio), y los derechos del duque de Nevers en Mantua y Monferrato. Las conversaciones se prolongaron durante los meses de julio y agosto, aprovechando los diplomáticos franceses el tiempo libre de que disponían para fomentar la oposición al emperador (por ejemplo, impulsando a los electores a rechazar el reconocimiento del hijo de Fernando como heredero). Pero entonces llegó una noticia sensacional a Ratisbona: el 18 de julio las tropas imperiales habían capturado la ciudad de Mantua y, con ella, al duque de Nevers. Los negociadores franceses pensaron entonces que era imprescindible hallar una rápida solución a la guerra del norte de Italia, antes de que la situación se deteriorara aún más. Inmediata-

4. Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, p. 125: este relato se debe a la pluma de Kaspar Schoppe (Scioppius), polemista católico antijesuita. Parece que los protestantes no esperaban ninguna concesión sobre el Edicto de Restitución. Sin embargo, lo cierto es que el emperador consiguió muy pocos beneficios al mantenerlo: aunque 37 ciudades imperiales sufrieron como consecuencia del intento, totalmente ilegal, de imponer el edicto, sólo en 7 de ellas se produjo un cambio sustancial del régimen político.

mente, solicitaron a París la autorización para concluir un acuerdo, autorización que no llegó. Finalmente, y no sin considerables recelos, el 13 de octubre firmaron un tratado que no sólo estipulaba la evacuación conjunta del norte de Italia por las tropas francesas e imperiales, sino que además comprometía a Luis XIII a negar apoyo a cualquiera que se opusiera al emperador.

No es difícil imaginar el impacto que causaron estas concesiones en la corte francesa. Desde la captura de La Rochelle en octubre de 1628 el rey había apostado fuerte en Mantua. Para permitir la rápida liberación del ducado, el gobierno francés había hecho amplias concesiones a los derrotados hugonotes (la «Gracia de Alais», junio de 1629); se había tragado su orgullo y había firmado una paz con Inglaterra que no produjo beneficios directos (el tratado de Susa, abril de 1629) y había renovado su costosa alianza con la República de Holanda (junio de 1630). En todos estos compromisos con grupos protestantes, Francia había contado con el apoyo activo de Urbano VIII, porque el objetivo de todos ellos era liberar a Italia del «yugo español», extremo éste deseado ardientemente por el papa.[5] Pero ahora, la iniciativa no autorizada de los enviados a Ratisbona había dado al traste con todo ello y se exigía a Luis que negara el apoyo a los enemigos de los Habsburgo. El prestigio y la credibilidad del monarca se vieron gravemente comprometidos y el rey reaccionó de forma furibunda. El alcance de su ira se aprecia en una carta que escribió a sus embajadores una semana después:

> Este tratado no es sólo contrario a vuestros poderes, a las órdenes contenidas en las instrucciones que llevasteis con vosotros y a las que os he enviado desde entonces en diversas ocasiones, sino que incluso contiene varias cláusulas en las que nunca he pensado y que resultan tan perjudiciales que no puedo escuchar su lectura sin sentir una gran insatisfacción.[6]

5. Sobre la diplomacia papal en los últimos años del decenio de 1620, véase Lutz, *Kardinal Giovanni Francesco Guidi di Bagno*, libro II; Aldea, *España, el Papado y el Imperio*, e *idem*, «La neutralidad de Urbano VIII». Sobre las campañas de Francia en Italia, véase J. Humbert, *Les Français en Savoie sous Louis XIII*, París, 1960.

6. Citado por O'Connell, «A cause célèbre in the history of treaty-making», p. 84.

Lo cierto es que el rey se negó a ratificar la paz de Ratisbona y unas semanas después, dado que la autoridad de Richelieu parecía haberse visto comprometida por este episodio, se organizó una operación importante para intentar apartarle del poder. La *Journée de Dupes* (11 de noviembre de 1630), organizada por la facción católica extremista de la corte, estuvo a punto de triunfar. Mantua siguió, por el momento, en manos de los Habsburgo.

Sin embargo, lo cierto es que la diplomacia francesa difícilmente podía haber cosechado más éxitos a largo plazo: su aceptación y posterior rechazo de los términos de Ratisbona causó mucho más daño a la causa imperial que si su negativa se hubiera manifestado desde un principio. Fernando II, fortalecido temporalmente por la aparente retirada de la lucha de Luis XIII, no sólo se negó a moderar las condiciones del Edicto sino que decidió que podía atacar al pequeño ejército sueco, que el rey Gustavo Adolfo había conducido a Pomerania el 6 de julio de 1630, sin intentar en ningún momento que sus medidas encontraran mejor aceptación entre los protestantes alemanes. Fue éste un terrible error de cálculo pues, cuando los imperiales comprendieron que sus tropas no podían ser retiradas de Italia, ya era imposible desalojar a los suecos de Pomerania.

Los más inmediatamente afectados por la invasión sueca fueron los estados protestantes del norte de Alemania. Fundamental para el futuro curso de la guerra era la forma en que sus gobernantes, en especial los dos electores, pudieran reaccionar. Juan Jorge de Sajonia y Jorge Guillermo de Brandemburgo, el primero luterano y el segundo calvinista, no habían mantenido relaciones cordiales en el pasado. En su calidad de «clarissimo príncipe luterano» del Imperio, Juan Jorge se veía a sí mismo como «protector de la cuna de la Reforma» y, al igual que la mayor parte de sus correligionarios, desconfiaba de los calvinistas más que de los católicos. Sus opiniones políticas conservadoras le habían llevado a apoyar generalmente al emperador. La situación del elector de Brandemburgo era más difícil. Aunque tras la caída de Federico del Palatinado, Juan Guillermo era líder de los calvinistas alemanes, en la misma medida en que Juan Jorge lo era de los luteranos, en realidad su posición era mucho más débil. El elector habría deseado mantener la postura de neutralidad armada en el decenio de 1620, pero las poderosas asambleas representativas luteranas de Brandemburgo, temerosas de que pudiera verse arrastrado en el conflicto, se negaron a conceder a su gobernante reformado el apoyo necesario

para esa política. Luego, en 1626, cuando tanto las tropas danesas como las imperiales cruzaban el electorado impunemente, se hizo necesario elegir entre ambos bandos. Aunque la mayor parte de los consejeros de Guillermo eran calvinistas como él, su principal consejero, el conde Adam de Schwarzenberg, era católico y se apoyó en los deseos de las asambleas luteranas de mantener la seguridad y una buena posición económica para inducir a su elector a establecer una alianza con el emperador (el tratado de Königsberg de mayo de 1627). Pero la alianza imperial no resultó satisfactoria: los brandemburgueses no tardaron en quejarse del duro trato a que les sometían las tropas imperiales que penetraron en el país en persecución de los daneses.

Los dos electores protestantes se reunieron durante una semana en abril de 1630 en Annaberg, en Sajonia, para discutir los últimos acontecimientos políticos y las circunstancias de la próxima reunión electoral en Ratisbona. Reafirmaron la decisión anterior de no asistir a la reunión personalmente y acordaron otorgar a sus delegaciones las mismas instrucciones. Los consejeros reformados de Juan Guillermo se habrían visto más satisfechos si los electores hubieran adoptado una posición más clara contra el emperador (contemplaron incluso la posibilidad de una alianza protestante defensiva), pero los sajones no estaban preparados todavía para una aventura conjunta de ese tipo. Sin embargo, a comienzos de septiembre, cuando los dos electores y sus consejeros se reunieron de nuevo, en esta ocasión en el castillo de Zabeltitz (Sajonia), la actitud de los sajones había variado sustancialmente. Juan Jorge se manifestó muy alterado por la invasión sueca y por los acontecimientos de Ratisbona, en especial por la actitud intransigente de los católicos respecto al Edicto de Restitución, y esto otorgó a los brandemburgueses la oportunidad de plantear de nuevo sus propuestas, encontrando esta vez una respuesta más favorable. Los consejeros privados de Jorge Guillermo, que defendían ya una actitud más decidida frente al emperador, aconsejaron ahora una estrategia similar respecto al rey sueco. Ciertamente, hay que considerar que su actitud hacia los suecos era una consecuencia directa de su política imperial: en ambos casos, se trataba de preservar la integridad y la constitución del Imperio en general y los derechos de los estados protestantes en particular; ambas políticas pretendían crear una tercera fuerza neutral entre el rey y el emperador para impedir que la guerra siguiera extendiéndose. Fueron las propuestas de Brandemburgo las que se impusieron en Zabeltitz y Juan Jorge anunció que convocaría una

reunión de todos los príncipes protestantes alemanes en Leipzig en un futuro próximo para discutir sus agravios y tomar las medidas adecuadas.

Sin embargo, las decisiones de Juan Jorge fueron efímeras. Como luterano y firme defensor de la constitución imperial, continuó oponiéndose a una confrontación directa con el emperador. No ha de sorprender, por tanto, que las presiones conjugadas de los electores católicos y de sus correligionarios luteranos (en especial su cuñado, el archiconservador landgrave Jorge II de Hesse-Darmstadt) no tardara en convencer a Juan Jorge de que las conversaciones bilaterales con el emperador serían mucho más fructíferas que cualquier esfuerzo multilateral con otros gobernantes protestantes. Posteriormente, en el mes de noviembre, los católicos, alarmados por el rechazo francés de la paz de Ratisbona, anunciaron súbitamente la posibilidad de hacer concesiones en el Edicto de Restitución y propusieron la celebración de un encuentro con los protestantes a comienzos de 1631, en Frankfurt, para discutir la ejecución del edicto imperial. «Creímos —explicaron más tarde los electores católicos— que si negábamos cualquier gesto de buena voluntad por nuestra parte habríamos puesto en peligro el Sacro Imperio Romano, en especial la ... fe católica.»[7] En otras palabras, el encuentro de Frankfurt había sido planeado deliberadamente para impedir la unión de los protestantes (véase lámina 8).

Si el encuentro de los protestantes en Leipzig se llevó a cabo finalmente ello se debió a la actitud de los consejeros calvinistas de Brandemburgo, que continuaron insistiendo ante el elector de Sajonia en la necesidad de que los gobernantes protestantes celebraran un encuentro, aunque sólo fuera para diseñar una estrategia evangélica conjunta en Frankfurt. Juan Jorge, pese a las objeciones de algunos de sus consejeros, se dejó convencer finalmente y en enero de 1631 se enviaron comunicaciones a 160 estados informándoles de que la tan esperada conferencia comenzaría por fin el 6 de febrero. La respuesta fue abrumadora: asistieron todos los grandes príncipes protestantes, con excepción de Jorge de Hesse-Darmstadt, y varias ciudades imperiales enviaron también representantes.

Pero el principal problema seguía siendo la actitud de Juan Jorge:

7. «The Catholic Electors to the Bishop of Bamberg, Regensburg, 18 December 1630», en M. C. Lundorp, *Der Römischen Kayserlichen Majestät und Des Heiligen Römischen Reichs... Acta Publica*, IV, Frankfurt del Main, 1668, p. 103.

¿Insistiría en que la conferencia de Leipzig debía ser un encuentro preparatorio de las próximas conversaciones de Frankfurt, o apoyaría también la toma de medidas defensivas? Cinco días antes del comienzo de la conferencia, Fernando II había enviado una carta amenazadora al elector prohibiendo que se armaran los príncipes protestantes. Pero otros le urgían a considerar la posibilidad de adoptar medidas defensivas conjuntas, entre ellos el influyente predicador sajón de la corte Matthias Hoë von Hoënegg, que en los años anteriores se había distinguido por sus furibundas diatribas anticalvinistas (véase p. 00, *supra*). Sin embargo, el Edicto de Restitución había hecho variar su actitud. Sólo unas semanas antes de la conferencia de Leipzig, Hoë había dicho a Juan Jorge que si el edicto no era revocado, el elector estaría obligado, en su calidad de luterano, a luchar contra el emperador. De igual forma, en un sermón que pronunció el primer día de la convención, Hoë instó a los gobernantes reunidos a unirse y a defenderse contra el gobierno arbitrario de Fernando y sus aliados.[8]

Los pastores calvinistas de la corte de Berlín acogieron de buen grado las opiniones de Hoë. Durante años habían defendido, sin éxito, una mayor cooperación con los luteranos y su actitud más militante encontraba apoyo ideológico en el irenismo reformado cuyo principal portavoz en los años 1620 y 1630 fue Juan Pedro Bergius, homólogo de Hoë en Berlín. Los estudios de Bergius en Heidelberg, Estrasburgo y Cambridge y sus visitas a Francia y Holanda le habían puesto en contacto con el protestantismo internacional. En su condición de teólogo moderado, estaba convencido de que la mayor parte de los desacuerdos entre los luteranos y los calvinistas podían ser superados, ya que las dos Iglesias protestantes concordaban en los «artículos fundamentales» de la fe cristiana. Sus opiniones reflejaban la posición confesional oficial de la Iglesia calvinista de Brandemburgo y del elector y sus consejeros. Al igual que Hoë, instó a los príncipes reunidos en Leipzig a que se unieran y se defendieran.[9]

8. Véase Matthias Hoë von-Hoënegg, *Homiliae über den 83 Psalm, so zu Leipzig in dem Convent der Evangelischen und Protestierenden Chur-Fürsten und Ständen, den 10. Februarij, Anno 1631 Erkläret, und auff jnständiges anhalten und begehren in Truck gegeben*, s. l., 1631.

9. La influencia de Bergius en la política eclesiástica de Brandemburgo ha sido estudiada por Bodo Nischan, «John Bergius: Irenecism and the beginning of official religious toleration in Brandenburg-Prussia», *Church History*, LI (1982), pp. 389-404, e *idem*, «Calvinism, the Thirty Years' War, and the beginning of Absolutism in Brandenburg: the political thought of John Bergius», *Central European History*, XV (1982), pp. 203-223. Sus sermones de Leipzig fueron publicados con el título de *Brüderliche Eynträchtigkeit Auss dem Hundert Drey und Dreyssigsten Psalm Bey der Protestirenden Evangelischen Church-Fürsten und Stände Zusammenkunfft zu Leipzig Anno 1631... in Drey Predigten erkläret*, Frankfurt-an-de-Oder, 1635.

Mientras los políticos se reunían, los teólogos mantenían su propio coloquio. Hoë y dos de sus colegas luteranos de Sajonia se reunieron con Bergius de Brandemburgo y con otros dos calvinistas de Hesse-Kassel. Partiendo de la Confesión de Augsburgo como base para sus deliberaciones, estos seis hombres hicieron gala de una armonía sin precedentes. Ciertamente, quedaron sin resolver los grandes temas que dividían a luteranos y calvinistas —las doctrinas de la Santa Cena y de la Predestinación—, pero ambas partes acordaron analizar esas diferencias en otras reuniones posteriores. Asimismo prometieron «manifestarse mutuamente amor cristiano en el futuro». El coloquio religioso fue importante porque ayudó a crear una atmósfera de buena voluntad y aportó, así, una valiosa base ideológica para la cooperación política y militar que los príncipes buscaban en su reunión de Leipzig.[10]

Sin embargo, la sorprendente armonía que se manifestó en el frente ideológico no prevaleció por completo en las deliberaciones políticas. Inicialmente, Juan Jorge y sus más tímidos consejeros seculares se mostraron decididos a no hablar sino de la próxima reunión de Frankfurt. Pero, sin duda, los representantes de Brandemburgo expresaban una preocupación común cuando el 15 de marzo plantearon la cuestión de la resistencia militar.[11] Sugirieron que era posible organizar una alianza defensiva protestante sin violar la constitución imperial. Esa alianza no iría dirigida contra nadie en particular, pero salvaguardaría los derechos de los príncipes contra quien pudiera ponerlos en peligro, ya fuera el emperador Fernando o el rey de Suecia. La

10. Véase Johannes Bergius, *Abermaliger Abdruck der Relation der Privat-Conferentz, welche bey währendem Convent der Protestirenden Evangelischen Church-Fürsten vnd Ständen zu Leipzig im Jahr 1631. Monats Martii zwischen den anwesenden beyderseits Evangelischen, so wol Lutherischen als Reformirten Theologen gehalten worden*, Berlín, 1644. El protocolo puede encontrarse también en Wolfgang Gericke, *Glaubenszeugnisse und Konfessionspolitik der Brandenburgischen Herrscher bis zur Preussischen Union, 1540 bis 1815*, Bielefeld, 1977, pp. 143-156.

11. ZSM, Rep. 21. 127 p. I, pp. 27-29. Actas de la Conferencia de Leipzig. Véase también Bodo Nischan, «Brandenburg's Reformed Räte and the Leipzig Manifesto».

respuesta fue tan alentadora que los representantes de Brandemburgo decidieron redactar una propuesta formal para la creación de una alianza defensiva. Ésta fue la base del Manifiesto de Leipzig, la resolución final elaborada por los príncipes el 12 de abril de 1631 que creaba una asociación defensiva, la *Leipziger Bund*, con un ejército de 40.000 hombres que sería utilizado únicamente con objetivos defensivos. Su reclutamiento y financiación quedarían a cargo de los Círculos imperiales, cuyos esfuerzos defensivos serían coordinados por un comité presidido por Juan Jorge de Sajonia. El objetivo de esta asociación armada quedó claramente expresado: sería el de proteger y «mantener las leyes básicas, la constitución imperial y las libertades alemanas de los estados protestantes».[12]

El Manifiesto de Leipzig fue un intento de proteger los intereses religiosos y políticos de los gobernantes protestantes. Fue una clara advertencia a Fernando II y sus aliados de que resistirían la opresión militar y cualquier nuevo intento de recatolización. Asimismo, sirvió para que Gustavo Adolfo comprendiera que los electores de Brandemburgo y Sajonia, así como la mayor parte de los demás estados luteranos, no estaban dispuestos a convertirse en aliados suyos. En resumen, el Manifiesto intentaba defender la constitución del Sacro Imperio Romano creando una tercera fuerza neutral entre los ejércitos imperiales de la Liga y los extranjeros, cuya agresión amenazaba convertir la guerra en la Europa central en un gran conflicto internacional.

También Maximiliano de Baviera se sintió profundamente perturbado por los acontecimientos del verano de 1630. A primera vista, su ansiedad puede parecer un tanto injustificada, pues ningún otro príncipe alemán se benefició tanto como él de la destitución de Wallenstein. Tilly, general de la Liga, comandaba ahora también el ejército imperial y el camino parecía haber quedado despejado para que Maximiliano recuperara el dominio militar sobre Fernando, que había poseído antes de 1625. Pero a Maximiliano no le interesaba tan sólo salvaguardar sus derechos e intereses como príncipe alemán y católico romano, sino también la protección del título electoral y de los territorios que había adquirido recientemente. Para ello, necesitaba un período de paz. Las crecientes divisiones en el seno del Imperio y la

12. El Manifiesto de Leipzig se encontrará en Lundorp, *Acta Publica*, IV, pp. 144-146; y J. P. Abelin, *Theatrum Europaeum, II*, Frankfurt del Main, 1646, pp. 309-311.

extensión del conflicto en 1630 amenazaban sus logros, urgiéndole a buscar nuevos procedimientos para salvaguardar sus derechos e intereses. Las dificultades de Maximiliano se veían incrementadas por su apoyo al Edicto de Restitución (que le impedía hacer causa común con cualquiera de los príncipes protestantes) y, más todavía, por la proximidad geográfica de Francia y la creciente hostilidad de este país frente a los Habsburgo.

Franceses y bávaros ya habían entablado negociaciones para una posible alianza a mediados de 1620. En un esfuerzo por debilitar el poder de los Habsburgo, Richelieu había intentado persuadir a Maximiliano para organizar y encabezar un grupo de príncipes, mixto desde el punto de vista confesional, pero el príncipe bávaro, ansioso por conservar su independencia política, dirigía su mirada a Francia únicamente para proteger su título electoral y sus territorios. El gobierno francés no podía aceptar este juego, por lo cual las negociaciones quedaron rotas en 1627 (véase p. 112, *supra*). Sin embargo, la amenaza del régimen absolutista en el Imperio, personificado fundamentalmente en el ejército de Wallenstein, hizo que Maximiliano se mostrara de nuevo más receptivo al llamamiento de los franceses. La llegada de Hercule de Charnacé, agente de Richelieu, a Munich, el 16 de marzo de 1629 señaló el comienzo de otra ronda de negociaciones.

Durante un tiempo pareció que una vez más las conversaciones quedarían abortadas y Charnacé se marchó. Sin embargo, en octubre de 1630, el padre José afirmó en Ratisbona que Baviera estaba dispuesta a discutir seriamente la alianza. Varias razones explican este cambio de actitud. La primera es el miedo de Maximiliano ante el hecho de que España había prometido secretamente a Carlos I de Inglaterra que el Palatinado y el título electoral serían finalmente restituidos a Federico.[13] La segunda era la profunda crisis política en el Imperio: el temor a Wallenstein y la oposición a implicarse en Mantua fueron sustituidos por el temor a Gustavo Adolfo. Aunque la amplitud de la implicación de Suecia en la guerra no fue evidente de forma

13. Véase Aldea, *España, el Papado y el Imperio*, p. 34: instrucciones de Urbano VIII a los nuncios que iban a España, 1 de mayo de 1632. Los temores de Maximiliano no carecían de fundamento: por el llamado «tratado de Cottington», concluido tras la paz de Madrid (que puso fin al conflicto anglo-español en 1631), España aceptó un vago compromiso de «actuar correctamente» en el Palatinado. Véase Simon Adams, «Spain or the Netherlands: the dilemmas of early Stuart Foreign Policy», p. 100.

inmediata, la presencia de Gustavo en suelo alemán, que se percibía como una seria amenaza a la constitución imperial y a los intereses de Baviera, impulsaron inexorablemente a Maximiliano en la dirección de una alianza con Francia. El acuerdo con Francia era deseable en el otoño de 1630 debido a la actitud todavía incierta de Suecia y de los príncipes protestantes y se hizo urgente para Maximiliano después del tratado de Bärwalde (enero de 1631), que selló la alianza de Francia y Suecia en la causa de la «restitución de las asambleas suprimidas del Imperio».

Sin embargo, como ocurría con los electores protestantes, la religión también influía en el pensamiento político de Maximiliano. Su confidente y confesor, el jesuita Adam Contzen, insistía en la necesidad de un tratado con Francia desde la primavera de 1629 con la esperanza de que esa alianza fortaleciera la causa católica en el Imperio. Soñaba con la existencia de un frente católico europeo (un proyecto totalmente irreal en tanto se mantuviera la rivalidad entre los Habsburgo y los Borbones), pero los argumentos profranceses de Contzen —apoyados totalmente por los diplomáticos papales— influyeron en Maximiliano y en sus consejeros, especialmente cuando se hizo evidente que el rey de Suecia estaba dispuesto a utilizar el poderío militar para quebrantar la posición de los católicos en el Imperio.[14]

El gran obstáculo en las conversaciones franco-bávaras era la negativa de Richelieu a comprometerse en dos puntos que Maximiliano consideraba fundamentales para la protección de sus derechos y de la constitución imperial. Baviera deseaba que Francia aceptara el derecho hereditario de su familia al título electoral que había adquirido, pero

14. Véase Bireley, *Maximilian von Bayern, Adam Contzen*, pp. 168 s. Sobre el impulso dado por el papado a una paz franco-bávara, véase Aldea, «Neutralidad», pp. 174 ss. Algunos historiadores han pasado por alto el papel desempeñado por el papado en este tema, debido al silencio de algunas fuentes; sin embargo, la correspondencia de Bagno (que se halla ahora en los Manuscritos Barberini de los archivos del Vaticano) aporta numerosas pruebas al respecto. Lo cierto es que en sus despachos a Roma de 1628 a 1631, Bagno dedicó a las negociaciones franco-bávaras más espacio que a ningún otro tema. Intentó mantener en secreto su participación —en una carta al consejero bávaro Jocher afirmaba: «Este asunto ha de quedar en un total secreto, porque mis relaciones con España se verían muy afectadas si se supiera que estoy implicado en la consecución de una unión estrecha entre Francia y Baviera»—, pero la verdad se descubrió cuando un espía español registró el apartamento de Bagno en París (Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, p. 160).

Richelieu sólo estaba dispuesto a reconocer el derecho personal de Maximiliano, negándose a garantizar el de sus descendientes. Además, el elector deseaba incluir una cláusula especial en el tratado que reconociera sus obligaciones constitucionales para con el Imperio y el emperador. Richelieu, decidido a conseguir el apoyo bávaro contra los Habsburgo, se negó. Finalmente, Richelieu cedió, para asegurarse un aliado alternativo a los suecos y para apaciguar a sus críticos católicos. De esta forma, Maximiliano consiguió las garantías y el reconocimiento que buscaba. El tratado de Fontainebleau se firmó en mayo de 1631. Habría de durar ocho años y se mantendría en un secreto total. Ambas partes acordaron la no agresión y no ayudar a los enemigos de la otra. Sin embargo, los príncipes de la Liga no fueron incluidos en el tratado, y esta fue una omisión que habría de tener graves consecuencias al año siguiente.[15]

El tratado de Fontainebleau puede ser considerado como la contrapartida católica del Manifiesto protestante de Leipzig, hecho público tan sólo unas semanas después. Ambos fueron una respuesta directa al fracaso de la reunión electoral de Ratisbona en el restablecimiento del orden. Ambos intentaban proteger la constitución del Imperio y los derechos y libertades de los príncipes. Los dos buscaban la creación de una tercera fuerza neutral que se situara entre el emperador y sus enemigos extranjeros para impedir la ampliación del conflicto. Pero ambos esfuerzos —y ésta fue la gran tragedia de Alemania— fracasaron finalmente porque en ningún caso pudieron detener a los suecos, que tenían su propia idea sobre lo que deseaba el Imperio y que contaban con la fuerza necesaria para aplastar a todos aquellos cuya opinión fuera diferente de la suya.

II. 1630-1632: LA INTERVENCIÓN DE SUECIA

Un panfleto inglés anónimo de 1630, titulado *The Civil Wars of Germany*, ofrecía a los lectores una útil guía de la guerra y de sus comandantes. Contenía 21 retratos de los jefes militares de cada bando, junto con un sucinto *curriculum vitae*, y la guerra estaba dividida en «167 episodios» numerados, cada uno de ellos vívidamente narra-

15. Albrecht reproduce el texto del tratado de Fontainebleau en *Auswärtige Politik*, pp. 378-379.

do y lleno de hechos. Ahora bien, es significativo el hecho de que sólo 32 de los episodios seleccionados se situaban durante los doce primeros años de la guerra. Para los espectadores ingleses, como para la mayor parte de los alemanes, la guerra no comenzaba realmente sino con el «episodio 33», con la llegada al Imperio del rey Gustavo Adolfo de Suecia y su ejército, en julio de 1630 (véase lámina 9).

El rey no llegó a Peenemünde con la intención expresa de sumergir a Europa aún más profundamente en la guerra. Su *Declaración* de junio de 1630, que tuvo una circulación mayor que ningún otro panfleto de la época (23 ediciones en cinco idiomas) estaba redactado en términos modestos. Comenzaba, inocentemente, con una lista de agravios personales menores: «Su Majestad de Suecia ha sufrido muchos ultrajes e injurias sin poder recibir ninguna satisfacción por ellas, tales como que sus cartas [dirigidas a otros príncipes] hayan sido interceptadas, abiertas y falsamente descifradas e interpretadas», o haber visto cómo se le negaba el permiso para participar en la paz de Lübeck o para enviar una embajada al emperador. A continuación, se denunciaba la ayuda que Wallenstein había prestado al rey de Polonia en 1629 («[el emperador] ha hecho que ejércitos enteros marchen a Prusia contra Su Majestad y el reino de Suecia»). Seguidamente, Gustavo se quejaba del «designio báltico» de los Habsburgo que, afirmaba, iba dirigido contra la supremacía marítima de que gozaba Suecia en ese momento. Sólo al final, y con cierta reticencia, el manifiesto mencionaba la opresión de las libertades alemanas por el emperador como motivo para la invasión. En ningún caso se hacía referencia a lo que Suecia esperaba conseguir mediante su intervención, ni al deseo de salvar la causa protestante de la extinción a manos de las tropas imperiales.[16] Todavía en agosto de 1630 el rey protestaba que su campaña «no estaba de ninguna forma dirigida contra Su Majestad Imperial ... sino únicamente como defensa contra los perturbadores de la paz pública, tanto eclesiásticos como seculares». Ciertamente, el objetivo de esta actitud constitucionalista era atraerse a la opinión pública alemana —el rey conocía bien lo importante que era entablar una guerra que los contemporáneos consideraban «justa»—, pero Gustavo Adolfo probablemente creía que su manifiesto era una expresión real de su misión. En 1636, cuatro años después de la muerte del rey, su

16. Hay una versión inglesa del *Kriegsmanifest* en G. Symcox, ed., *War, Diplomacy and Imperialism 1618-1763*, Londres, 1974, pp. 102-113.

más estrecho colaborador, el canciller Axel Oxenstierna, negaba todavía que la invasión de 1630 hubiera sido fundamentalmente una cruzada protestante. Era, recordó al Consejo de Estado (al que no tenía por qué mentir), «no tanto una cuestión de religión, sino más bien de salvaguardar el *status publicus* [la situación política general], en el que también está comprendida la religión».[17]

Ciertamente, el *status publicus* del norte de Europa en el verano de 1630 era motivo de preocupación para los dirigentes suecos. Tres años antes, tras la derrota de Cristián IV y sus aliados, los ejércitos de Tilly y Wallenstein habían avanzado hacia el norte, hasta el Báltico. La península de Jutlandia fue totalmente ocupada, los duques de Mecklemburgo fueron depuestos y Wallenstein se instaló en su lugar. Por su parte, el duque de Pomerania fue obligado a admitir guarniciones imperiales en sus territorios. Aunque Stralsund resistió el asedio de los imperiales, en septiembre de 1628 una nueva ofensiva de Cristián IV, reforzada por los escoceses de Stralsund, fue totalmente derrotada en Wolgast. Esto dejó totalmente libres las manos de Wallenstein para ayudar con 12.000 de sus hombres al cuñado del emperador, Segismundo de Polonia, que trataba de rechazar una invasión sueca desde 1625 (véase p. 119, *supra*). En un principio, se impusieron las fuerzas de Gustavo Adolfo: Dorpat fue ocupada casi inmediatamente y toda Livonia cayó ante los suecos; en 1626, varios puertos de Prusia fueron ocupados. Pero en ese punto se detuvo el avance sueco. Si bien la nobleza que controlaba el Estado polaco no estaba dispuesta a luchar por Livonia, una adquisición reciente que se consideraba que sólo producía beneficios a la corona, Prusia formaba parte de la comunidad por la que estaban decididos a luchar hasta el final. Así pues, Gustavo Adolfo y sus hombres tuvieron que permanecer a orillas del

17. Citas tomadas de D. Böttcher, «Propaganda und öffentliche Meinung im protestantischen Deutschland, 1628-36», *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte*, XLIV (1952), pp. 181-203, en pp. 191-194 (reeditado en Rudolf, *Dreissigjährige Krieg*, pp. 325-367); y Roberts, *Essays in Swedish History*, p. 84. Persiste la incertidumbre sobre los objetivos de guerra de Suecia en 1630-1631, pues los documentos de que disponemos son poco confiables. Así, podría argumentarse que el tono del Manifiesto es moderado porque tal es la esencia de estos documentos. Y en 1636, es posible que Oxenstierna actuara con mayor cautela como consecuencia de la derrota de Nördlingen, o bien que pusiera en práctica de nuevo la política de prudencia que (él más que su impulsivo rey) había propugnado en 1630. Véase un análisis más completo de los objetivos de guerra de Suecia en pp. 225-233 y 261-265, *infra*.

Báltico, agotando las tierras que controlaban y el tesoro sueco.[18] No eran un enemigo de peso para el ejército polaco-imperial que avanzaba por el Vístula en el verano de 1629. El 27 de junio, los suecos sufrieron una severa derrota en la batalla de Honigfelde (o Stuhm) de la que Gustavo tuvo la fortuna de salir con vida.

Fue también afortunado para él el hecho de que poco después de esta derrota un enviado francés llegara al campamento sueco. Hercule de Charnacé, enviado especial de Richelieu, tras haber fracasado en su intento de persuadir a Maximiliano de Baviera para que rompiera con el emperador y de convencer a Cristián IV de Dinamarca para que siguiera luchando, recibió instrucciones de apartar a Gustavo Adolfo del conflicto polaco como medida preliminar para la intervención sueca en Alemania. En esta ocasión, el diplomático francés tuvo éxito. En Altmark, entre dos campamentos hostiles, los diplomáticos franceses (ayudados por sir Thomas Roe, representante de Carlos I) convencieron a los dos primos Vasa para que el 25-26 de septiembre firmaran una tregua de seis años, que confirmaba el control sueco de Livonia pero que decretaba la restitución de todas las otras conquistas a excepción de algunos puertos de Prusia. Suecia aceptó estas duras condiciones a cambio de la concesión, mientras durara la tregua, de los derechos de aduana de los barcos que atracaran en los puertos de Polonia y Prusia. Ésta era una fuente extraordinariamente lucrativa de ingresos, pues la mayor parte de los 1.500 barcos que entraban en el Báltico anualmente en esa época se dirigían a los puertos de Danzig, Königsberg y Elbing. De hecho, los derechos de aduana reportaban una suma equivalente a la tercera parte de los ingresos totales de Suecia. Cuando la concesión expiró en 1635, Oxenstierna exclamó solemnemente ante su hermano: «te aseguro que Suecia no es ahora más de la mitad del reino que era el año pasado».[19]

Pero eso era cosa del futuro. En el otoño de 1629, firmada la paz

18. Se ha calculado que el coste de las campañas de Prusia en 1626-1629 supuso a Suecia un desembolso de 5 millones de táleros: Petersen, *Defence, war and finance*, p. 35.

19. Citado en K. R. Böhme, «Das Amt Memel in schwedischer Sequestratur (Nov. 1629-Jul. 1635)», *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung*, XVIII, 1969, pp. 655-703, en p. 657. Sobre los peajes, véase E. Wendt, *Det Svenska Licentväsendet i Preussen, 1627-35*, Upsala, 1933, pp. 89, 98, 107, 184-202. Hay un buen estudio de las conversaciones de paz en J. K. Fedorowicz, *England's Baltic Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century. A study in Anglo-Polish commercial diplomacy*, Cambridge, 1980, pp. 189-206.

con Polonia y con una nueva fuente de ingresos y la promesa del apoyo francés, Gustavo Adolfo estaba preparado para intervenir en Alemania. Estaba, en muchos sentidos, bien preparado para hacerlo. Comandaba un ejército disciplinado y experimentado; gobernaba sobre un país bien organizado y leal; poseía importantes reservas de material de guerra, en especial cobre y hierro. En dos ocasiones distintas, la Dieta sueca había declarado su apoyo a una campaña en Alemania, aceptando que la organización de las operaciones quedara totalmente a discreción del rey. Como hemos visto, Gustavo eligió como principal *casus belli* la intervención imperial en Polonia, pero no tuvo tiempo de encontrar aliados previamente. Cuando penetró en Alemania en julio de 1630, el único aliado de Suecia en el Imperio era la ciudad de Stralsund. Durante los meses siguientes, la situación apenas mejoró: sólo los desposeídos (los duques de Mecklemburgo y Sajonia-Weimar), los que esperaban obtener alguna cosa (uno de los pretendientes a Brunswick-Lüneberg) o los que se sentían directamente amenazados u ocupados por las tropas imperiales (Hesse-Kassel y el obispado secularizado de Magdeburgo) declararon su apoyo a Gustavo. Entre las potencias extranjeras, sólo Rusia ofreció ayuda práctica, ayuda que en realidad se limitó a la licencia para exportar, libres de impuestos, grandes cantidades de trigo de Narva a Amsterdam, para que pudiera ser vendido con buenos beneficios que financiaran el esfuerzo de guerra sueco. En el curso del año 1630, el tesoro sueco sólo ingresó 78.000 táleros procedentes de esta fuente de ingresos.[20]

Este conjunto descoordinado de aliados no podía erigirse en un enemigo peligroso para los ejércitos católicos victoriosos y en un principio la causa de Gustavo Adolfo no progresó de forma importante. Sus diplomáticos no consiguieron asegurarse un acuerdo con los principales estados del norte de Alemania ni una firme promesa de ayuda financiera de Francia y, sin esos apoyos vitales, a sus tropas les fue imposible avanzar desde la cabeza de puente que habían establecido en el Báltico. La razón de la neutralidad de los luteranos alemanes no era un secreto: los príncipes no se cansaban de afirmar a todo el mundo que deseaban evitar una traición abierta y que preferían utilizar

20. Se ha exagerado mucho el subsidio ruso: durante todo el período 1629-1633, Suecia sólo ingresó 160.000 táleros por ese concepto. Véanse las cifras y el estudio de L. Ekholm, «Rysk spannmaal och svenska krigsfinanser, 1629-33», *Scandia*, XL, 1974, pp. 57-103, reeditado parcialmente en Ekholm, *Svensk krigsfinansiering*.

la amenaza sueca para arrancar concesiones a Viena sin tener que romper con el emperador. Sus esperanzas estaban depositadas en las discusiones de Leipzig y Frankfurt y no en los inquietos ejércitos de Pomerania y Mecklemburgo. Sin embargo, la razón de la reticencia francesa era menos evidente para quienes esperaban ansiosamente a orillas del mar Báltico. Al igual que Suecia, Francia se había visto envuelta en una guerra a gran escala durante varios años y sus dirigentes comprendían que la paz y la desmovilización sólo podían reportar ventajas. Si el emperador hubiera hecho concesiones —ya fuera sobre los obispados de Lorena, sobre la Valtelina o sobre Francia— en el verano de 1630, Richelieu tal vez habría abandonado a Suecia, pero tras la ocupación de Mantua por las tropas imperiales la alianza con Gustavo Adolfo parecía inevitable. El gran desafío a que se vio sometido el poder personal de Richelieu en el otoño de 1630 (véase p. 171, *supra*) retrasó el acuerdo inmediato, pero el 23 de enero de 1631 se firmó el tratado de Bärwalde, por el cual Francia se comprometió a proporcionar a Suecia 400.000 táleros anuales durante cinco años para apoyar la lucha de ese país por las libertades alemanas y la libertad de comercio en el Báltico. Se acordó que el culto católico sería permitido en las zonas conquistadas donde ya existía y que los territorios de los miembros de la Liga católica serían considerados neutrales, a menos que protagonizaran la agresión.[21]

El subsidio francés no era importante —muy inferior al producto de los derechos de los puertos prusianos—, pero su concesión se produjo en un momento crítico para la economía de guerra de Suecia. El tesoro de Gustavo tenía que sustentar ahora a 50.000 hombres en Alemania y Livonia y otros 20.000 en Suecia y Finlandia y el coste era exorbitante: 2,3 millones de táleros del tesoro real se gastaron en 1630 —cifra muy superior a los ingresos de todo el año—, pero esa cantidad sólo sirvió para satisfacer menos de la mitad de las necesidades de las tropas. Cuando el monarca sueco inició la guerra esperaba que la mayor parte de las necesidades del ejército serían satisfechas por los territorios ocupados, pero hasta agosto de 1631 no eran lo

21. Los acontecimientos demostrarían que Richelieu no contaba con los medios necesarios para obligar a su aliado a cumplir estos términos restrictivos. El tratado está publicado en *Sverges Traktater*, V, pp. 438-440, y ha sido estudiado en profundidad por Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II, pp. 466-469. Hay una traducción inglesa de las cláusulas más importantes en Roberts, *Sweden as a Great Power*, pp. 136-138.

bastante extensos como para poder soportar la gran concentración de tropas (en la segunda mitad de 1630 suministraron tan sólo 35.000 táleros al mes y en la primera mitad de 1631 tan sólo 75.000). Tampoco las provincias del Báltico, agotadas ya por los sucesivos ejércitos de ocupación, podían soportar la carga durante mucho tiempo. Incluso una zona hasta entonces no ocupada, el condado de Memel, que fue cedido temporalmente a Suecia en 1629, fue devastada en el plazo de un año por las 17 compañías de caballería asentadas en ella. Mientras que antes de la ocupación había 154 caballos, 236 bueyes, 103 vacas, 190 cerdos y 810 ovejas, en 1631 quedaban tan sólo 26 bueyes y 1 vaca; los restantes animales habían desaparecido, sacrificados o tomados por los soldados. Incluso las autoridades suecas describieron la zona como «devastada». Difícilmente podía haber llegado en un momento más oportuno el oro de Richelieu.[22]

Pero si los subsidios franceses aliviaron los problemas inmediatos de dinero, no sirvieron para conseguir aliados. En el oeste, las fuerzas de Tilly sitiaban Magdeburgo y ocupaban Hesse-Kassel; el ejército de Gustavo Adolfo estaba todavía a unos 240 km de distancia, en Stettin, y sus 30.000 hombres se hallaban rodeados por las fuerzas imperiales, más numerosas. En el este, los príncipes protestantes reunidos en Leipzig no mostraron interés en concertar una alianza con Gustavo Adolfo. Sin duda, Suecia se vería obligada a emprender un «difícil cortejo».

Así pues, en abril de 1631, avanzó hacia el sur penetrando en Brandemburgo, tomando y saqueando las ciudades de Küstrin y Frankfurt del Oder (defendidas por guarniciones imperiales). Pero era demasiado tarde para salvar al único aliado de Gustavo que había tomado las armas, Magdeburgo, que fue capturada por las tropas imperiales el 20 de mayo. Toda la ciudad fue saqueada por la enfurecida soldadesca que había sufrido terribles privaciones en las trincheras durante el asedio. Una gran parte de la población fue masacrada y fueron más aún los que perecieron en el fuego que se declaró poco después de la ocupación. Sólo unos pocos, como el inventor Otto von Guericke, consiguieron salvarse. No hay nada especial en la brutalidad ejercida en Magdeburgo —el saqueo de una ciudad que se resistía era

22. Böhme, *art. cit.*, p. 701; Ekholm, *Svensk krigsfinansiering, passim*. Véase también el estudio de K. R. Böhme, anterior y más completo, *Die schwedische Besetzung des Weichseldeltas 1626-36*, Beihefte zum Jahrbuch der Albertus-Universität Königsberg, XXII, Wurzburgo, 1963.

práctica habitual durante la guerra—, pero el alcance de la matanza fue inhabitual. Una cosa era el incendio o la destrucción de una aldea y otra muy distinta la aniquilación de una ciudad de 20.000 habitantes que, además, era una de las capitales del protestantismo. No menos de 20 periódicos, 205 panfletos y 41 octavillas ilustradas describiendo los horrores del acontecimiento fueron impresos y circularon por toda Europa, de forma que observadores de Londres, París, Amsterdam, Estocolmo, Roma, Madrid, así como de las cortes principescas de Alemania, conocieron cómo trataba el emperador a sus súbditos protestantes. Sin duda alguna, el episodio de Magdeburgo (al que se dio gran publicidad), ciudad situada junto a la frontera de Brandemburgo y administrada por el tío del elector (el margrave Cristián Guillermo), ayudó a convencer al renuente Jorge Guillermo para unir su suerte a la de Gustavo Adolfo (21 de junio de 1631).[23]

El pacto con Brandemburgo fue muy oportuno para Suecia. La paz de Cherasco (ratificada por Fernando el 19 de junio) liberó finalmente al importante ejército imperial del norte de Italia para que pudiera luchar en el Imperio, impulsando a Tilly a avanzar hacia el nordeste desde Magdeburgo, para enfrentarse a Gustavo Adolfo. La clave de la situación militar era ahora Sajonia, situada entre los suecos y los imperiales, pues ambos bandos tenían que atravesar las ricas tierras del Electorado, hasta entonces ajeno a la guerra, para atacar al otro. En agosto, Tilly solicitó permiso para que su ejército, falto de aprovisionamiento, pudiera cruzar la frontera, pero Juan Jorge se lo negó (véase lámina 12). Afirmó: «Ya veo que ahora han de ser consumidos los pasteles sajones, que durante tanto tiempo no han sido tocados; pero tal vez descubras que en su interior hay duras nueces que pueden romper tus dientes».[24] Cuando el 4 de septiembre Tilly

23. Los periódicos, panfletos y octavillas que describen el saqueo y que iban desde la exoneración (los publicados en Munich) hasta la acusación de brutalidad criminal (según Leipzig) han sido analizados por W. Lahne, *Magdeburgs Zerstörung in der Zeitgenössischen Publizistik*, Magdeburgo, 1931; conmemoración tricentenaria. Véase también N. Henningsen, ed., *Die Zerstörung Magdeburgs 1631. Eine Darstellung der historischen Begebenheiten nach Otto von Guerickes Handschrift und nach urkundlichen Quellen*, Colonia, 1911. Wedgwood ha realizado, en inglés, un excelente estudio del saqueo: *Thirty Years' War*, pp. 228-291.

24. Un buen estudio es el de A. Wang, «Information und Deutung in illustrierten Flugblättern des Dreissigjährigen Krieges. Zum Gebrauchscharakter einiger Blätter des Themas *Sächsich Confect* aus den Jähren 1631 und 1632», *Euphorion: Zeitschrift für Literaturgeschichte*, LXX, 1976, pp. 97-116.

condujo su ejército para consumir los «pasteles sajones», Juan Jorge se apresuró a unir sus fuerzas con las de los suecos, incorporando su ejército «Leipziger Bund», formado por 18.000 reclutas sin instrucción, al de los 23.000 veteranos de Gustavo Adolfo. Una semana después se firmó una alianza entre los dos gobernantes y decidieron dar la batalla a Tilly en Breitenfeld, ligeramente al norte de Leipzig. Los aliados disfrutaban de una clara superioridad numérica sobre los imperiales, que sólo contaban con 31.000 soldados, entre los que se incluían 7.000 hombres agotados que acababan de llegar de Mantua (5.000 más estaban de camino, pero se hallaban todavía a más de 300 kilómetros hacia el sur). Así pues, los protestantes tenían un 30 por 100 más de hombres y poseían una aplastante superioridad en artillería: mientras que Tilly contaba con 27 piezas normales de artillería, los suecos tenían 51, apoyadas por una batería de cuatro cañones del 3, móviles (y muy efectivos), adscritos a cada regimiento. Los suecos poseían también mayor flexibilidad: aunque en la batalla del 17 de septiembre la infantería sajona cedió cuando cargaron las tropas imperiales, las formaciones suecas, de seis hileras de profundidad (mientras que las formaciones imperiales eran de treinta hileras), taparon los huecos rápidamente. Apenas hicieron falta dos horas para que los cañonazos, las continuas salvas de los mosquetes y las tácticas superiores de Gustavo Adolfo pusieran en fuga a las tropas de Tilly. Unos 7.600 soldados imperiales quedaron muertos en el campo de batalla, la mayor parte de ellos por efecto de las armas suecas; otros 9.000 fueron capturados o desertaron y muchos más se batieron en retirada. Las dos terceras partes del ejército imperial, que hasta entonces nunca había sido derrotado, se perdieron, junto con su artillería y 120 estandartes de los regimientos y compañías.[25]

Breitenfeld fue la primera gran victoria protestante en el campo de batalla desde el comienzo de la guerra. Pero, ¿cómo sería explotada esta victoria? Gustavo Adolfo había intentado mantener el Báltico libre para Suecia expulsando a los imperiales de su orilla meridional y lo había conseguido brillantemente. Pero el monarca no había hecho

25. Hay dos excelentes descripciones de la batalla, en *Sveriges Krig*, IV, y en Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II, pp. 535-538. Algunos de los estandartes de Tilly, que en otro tiempo colgaban en la iglesia de Riddarholm, están expuestos actualmente en la «Colección de Trofeos del Estado» del Museo Histórico del Ejército en Estocolmo. Las innovaciones tácticas del ejército sueco se analizan en las pp. 297-299, *infra*.

planes para una victoria a tal escala; de hecho, no poseía ni siquiera mapas detallados de los territorios situados al sur de Brandemburgo y al oeste de Magdeburgo.[26] Por tanto, se puede perdonar a Gustavo Adolfo que no eliminara a su principal enemigo, Tilly (que se retiró más allá del Saale y el Weser), dirigiéndose en cambio con sus agotados veteranos hacia el sudoeste, hacia una zona confortable en los territorios católicos situados a lo largo del Main, mientras que sus aliados de Sajonia avanzaban hacia el sudeste a través de Silesia, penetrando en Bohemia. Federico V y los duques de Sajonia-Weimar acompañaron a Gustavo Adolfo para invernar en Maguncia, mientras que la mayor parte de los exiliados bohemios avanzaban con los sajones y penetraban en Praga de nuevo el 15 de noviembre de 1631.

Esta estrategia aseguró, cuando menos, la destrucción de la «tercera fuerza», ya fuera encabezada por la Sajonia protestante o la Baviera católica. La Convención de Frankfurt se reunió finalmente el 4 de agosto, pero sólo asistieron a ella trece estados católicos (diez de ellos eclesiásticos) y algunos protestantes (liderados por Sajonia). La delegación de Brandemburgo no acudió hasta septiembre y apenas se había discutido ningún tema cuando el 14 de octubre los participantes católicos huyeron, para no caer en manos de los suecos que se aproximaban. El elector de Maguncia, que había reforzado, en vano, las guarniciones de su Estado, huyó a Colonia, seguido de cerca por el obispo de Wurzburgo, quien, también en vano, había creado una milicia de 1.700 hombres. Sus súbditos huyeron al primer lugar que les ofreció refugio, a Westfalia, a la Lorena francesa, y a los cantones suizos.[27]

Sin embargo, y no deja de resultar extraño, el estandarte sueco siguió suscitando pocos apoyos, excepto entre aquellos que poco tenían que perder. Así, los primeros —y durante algún tiempo los únicos— potentados que declararon su apoyo a Gustavo Adolfo en Franconia fueron los caballeros imperiales, señores de minúsculos estados. Otros gobernantes más importantes sintieron menos entusiasmo ante la gran victoria del monarca, pues la llegada del ejército sueco iba seguida invariablemente de la petición a los príncipes de que abandonaran la neutralidad y declararan la guerra al emperador. Por ejemplo, el destacado luterano margrave Cristián de Brandemburgo-Kulmbach, había conseguido mantenerse neutral durante las primeras fases de la guerra. Aunque era una figura destacada de la Unión protestante (véase p. 51, *supra*), rechazó las peticiones de ayuda del elector del Palatinado y, aunque súbdito leal del emperador, se negó también a apoyar a los ejércitos imperiales en su avance hacia el norte contra Dinamarca. Asistió al Coloquio de Leipzig (una de las muchas veces que acudió a Sajonia para celebrar conversaciones políticas) y posteriormente reclutó una milicia de 1.200 hombres para proteger su frontera. Pero todo fue en vano. Un mes después de la batalla de Breitenfeld recibió una carta de Gustavo Adolfo en la que le preguntaba si era amigo o enemigo. El avance del ejército sueco no le dejaba elección y el 31 de octubre el margrave Cristián tuvo una audiencia con el monarca, juró que era su aliado contra el emperador y prometió proporcionar cuarteles y contribuciones para el ejército. De esta forma, los súbditos del margrave se vieron sometidos a duras condiciones como consecuencia de la actuación de las tropas, los capitanes de los cuarteles y los recaudadores de impuestos. Cuando los campesinos intentaron expulsar a los intrusos, en noviembre de 1632, fueron masacrados. Un cronista que visitó el lugar donde se produjo la resistencia de los últimos campesinos se sintió abrumado al encontrar los viñedos y los campos teñidos del rojo de la sangre, con los cadáveres dispersos en extrañas posiciones en un radio de 4 kilómetros. Mientras tanto, el margrave se encerró en el único castillo que podía defender, el castillo de Plassenburg, y esperó a que pasara la tormenta. Éstas fueron las consecuencias de la victoria de Suecia en Breitenfeld, para aquellos que hasta entonces habían permanecido «neutrales».[28]

Los príncipes protestantes se vieron enfrentados a la misma dramática elección en todos los lugares del Imperio. Jorge de Hesse-Darmstadt conoció especiales dificultades porque su derecho a la he-

26. El mapa de «Mark Brandenburg» de Oluf Hansson, que era el mejor con que contaba Gustavo Adolfo en 1631, sólo cubría Alemania hasta Frankfurt del Oder, Magdeburgo y Dessau. (KrA, Krigskaadeplatserna 1630-48, 4; escala 2:51.)

27. Stritmatter, *Der Stadt Basel während des dreissigjährigen Krieges*, p. 66, señala que sólo en Basilea había 5.256 refugiados en 1633, con 1.776 vacas. Sobre la reorganización de Franconia y Renania a cargo de Suecia, véase Deinert, *Die Schwedische Epoche*; Müller, *Der schwedische Staat*, y Weber, *Würzburg und Bamberg*. Para más información sobre la convención de Frankfurt, Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, cap. 8 (especialmente pp. 159 y 167-168).

28. E. Sticht, *Markgraf Christian von Brandenburg-Kulmbach und der dreissigjährige Krieg in Ostfranken 1618-35*, Kulmbach, 1965; véase la p. 154 para más detalles sobre la rebelión campesina y su represión.

rencia de Marburgo descansaba únicamente en la buena voluntad imperial. A comienzos de 1632, obligado a decidir entre los luteranos suecos, que llamaban a su puerta, y el emperador católico en la lejana Viena, el landgrave Jorge reunió a sus consejeros y teólogos de la corte para que contestaran a este dramático interrogante: «si Su Gracia se ve obligado a elegir entre uno de los dos bandos en conflicto en el Imperio, ... ¿a cuál de ellos debe unirse?». Aunque pueda parecer increíble, los teólogos se inclinaron hacia el bando imperial antes que hacia una alianza que incluía a calvinistas y —peor aún— a Guillermo de Hesse-Kassel. Pero en último extremo, el Edicto de Restitución y el ejemplo del suegro del landgrave, Juan Jorge de Sajonia, inclinaron la balanza y Jorge se decantó también por Suecia.[29]

Gracias a los recursos obtenidos de estos nuevos, aunque renuentes, aliados, las tropas de Gustavo Adolfo se vieron finalmente bien aprovisionadas. La eficacia del sistema de aprovisionamiento sueco queda reflejada en un informe de su campamento de comienzos de abril de 1632, reproducido por un semanario inglés. El informe comenzaba constatando la abundancia de ganado: un caballo por una libra, un buey por la mitad de esa cifra y gansos y aves prácticamente por nada. Sin duda, las tropas encontraron comida abundante y barata por toda Franconia, donde el ejército se hallaba acuartelado. Esta situación era consecuencia de una extorsión a gran escala. Sólo el vino escaseaba, afirmaba el autor del informe, especulando que los católicos habrían «alegrado su desmayado corazón con él ... antes de su triste partida».[30]

De hecho, con o sin la ayuda del vino, el ejército católico se apresuraba a reagruparse al otro lado del Weser. Las guarniciones del oeste, dirigidas por el conde Pappenheim, atacaron el sistema de comunicaciones sueco; y el cuerpo principal del ejército, comandado por Tilly, se trasladó en noviembre a la segura Baviera y comenzó a reclutar soldados de refuerzo para la nueva campaña. En teoría, según los términos del tratado de Bärwalde, Gustavo Adolfo estaba obligado a considerar neutrales todos los territorios aliados de Francia, pero, al

29. K. Beck, «Die Neutralitätspolitik Landgraf Georgs II. von Hessen-Darmstadt. Versuch und Möglichkeiten einer Politik aus christlichen Grundsätzen», *Hessisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte*, XXII (1972), pp. 162-228.

30. *The continuation of our forraine avisoes*, n.° XX (28 de abril de 1632), p. 6. Los reportajes de guerra comenzaron durante el conflicto alemán y la guerra fue un factor importante en el crecimiento de la publicación.

parecer, Tilly había perdido su vigor. Según un consejero bávaro del cuartel general, el comandante en jefe, que contaba 73 años, se mostraba «perplejo y deprimido, sin capacidad de decisión; no sabe cuidar de sí mismo, rechaza una propuesta tras otra, no decide nada, sólo ve grandes dificultades y peligros, pero no tiene idea de cómo superarlos». En marzo, Tilly perdió imprudentemente la protección que le ofrecía el tratado de Bärwalde al expulsar de Bamberg a un destacamento sueco. Tres semanas después, Gustavo Adolfo avanzaba hacia el sur con 37.000 hombres contra los 22.000 que formaban el ejército de Tilly. Avanzó de forma inexorable y cruzó el río Lech en Rain, ante los mismos ojos del ejército bávaro: bajo una intensa cortina de fuego de 72 cañones, se construyó un puente a través del cual pasaron los hombres de Gustavo. En la matanza que siguió, Tilly cayó mortalmente herido.[31]

Muerto Tilly y vencido su ejército, nada podía detener el pillaje del amado ducado de Maximiliano: muchas ciudades, situadas incluso a 60 o 70 km de distancia, se apresuraron a rendirse a los vencedores; muchas más fueron saqueadas y sólo algunas consiguieron escapar al pillaje. «Vuestra Gracia no reconocería la pobre Baviera —escribió Maximiliano a su hermano Fernando de Colonia—; tanta crueldad no se ha conocido hasta ahora en una guerra.» Gustavo Adolfo y Federico V realizaron una entrada triunfal en Munich el 17 de mayo, pasaron revista a sus tropas victoriosas, jugaron al tenis juntos en las pistas ducales, contemplaron la colección artística del duque y saquearon la ciudad con tanta saña como los bávaros habían saqueado Heidelberg diez años antes. Capturaron, además, cien piezas de artillería, muchas de las cuales habían pertenecido anteriormente a Federico y sus aliados. Habrían de pasar tres años hasta que Maximiliano pudiera regresar a su capital (véase lámina 13).[32]

31. Opinión de un comisario de guerra o consejero de guerra bávaro, diciembre de 1631, citado por S. Riezler, *Geschichte Bayerns*, V, Munich, 1890, pp. 395-396. La tumba de Tilly, situada en una capilla especial junto al altar en Altötting (cerca de la frontera de Baviera con Austria), es una obra maestra del arte barroco postridentino. Su calavera mira hacia afuera con severidad por una ventana abierta en el sarcófago de piedra, mientras que su figura se puede observar en la pietà detrás del altar: Tilly se arrodilla absurdamente con indumentaria de guerra a la izquierda de la cruz.

32. Sobre el exilio de Maximiliano, véase Heinisch, *Salzburg im dreissigjährigen Kriege*, pp. 141 ss.; para Baviera bajo la ocupación sueca, véase G. Rystad, «Die Schweden in Bayern während des dreissigjährigen Krieges», en Glaser,

La causa católica parecía perdida. El ejército de la Liga se hallaba quebrantado y su principal bastión, Baviera, reducido a cenizas. Por un momento, pareció que España salvaría una vez más la situación, pues sus fuerzas recuperaron Speyer y algunas otras plazas poco importantes a lo largo del curso del Rin en la primavera de 1632. Sin embargo, en ese momento Felipe IV perdió el control de los Países Bajos del Sur. En junio, el ejército holandés capturó, en rápida sucesión, Venlo, Roermond, Straelen y Sittard, obligando a los españoles a enviar a ese escenario un ejército que se hallaba en el Palatinado para impedir el ataque sueco. Pero no fue suficiente para evitar que los holandeses sitiaran la gran fortaleza de Maastricht, centro de todas las comunicaciones entre Bruselas y los católicos de Westfalia. En ese momento, un pequeño grupo de nobles holandeses, encabezados por el conde Enrique van den Bergh, se apresuraron a unirse al ejército holandés en Limburgo, e hicieron un llamamiento a sus compatriotas para que se sacudieran «el yugo español». Nadie se movió, a excepción de los holandeses, que culminaron con éxito el asedio de Maastricht el 23 de agosto, a pesar del desesperado ataque que lanzó un ejército imperial dirigido por Pappenheim contra las fortificaciones de asedio menos de una semana antes. Un tanto perturbados por estos acontecimientos, un segundo grupo de conspiradores, que (desconociendo la existencia del primer grupo) habían intentado llamar en su ayuda a los franceses, decidieron finalmente no actuar.[33] Así, los españoles consiguieron mantener el control de los Países Bajos del Sur

ed., *Wittelsbach und Bayern, II/1*, pp. 424-435. Véase también la descripción de los testigos de la devastación, en H. Hörger, «Die Kriegsjahre 1632 bis 1634 im Tagebuch des P. Maurus Friesenegger, nachmaligen Abtes von Andechs (1640-1655)», *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte*, XXXIV, 1971, pp. 866-876.

33. Un agente inglés en Bruselas, el pintor Balthazar Gerbier, conoció la identidad de los conspiradores y vendió la información al gobierno español en noviembre de 1633, siendo todos detenidos. Véase más información en A. Waddington, *La République des Provinces-Unies, la France et les Pays-Bas espagnols de 1630 à 1650*, I, París, 1895, pp. 147-180; P. Janssens, «L'échec des tentatives de soulèvement dans les Pays Bas méridionaux sous Philippe IV (1621-65)», *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, XCII, 1978, pp. 110-129; e Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, pp. 181-190. El ataque de Pappenheim contra el campamento holandés en Maastricht, por orden del elector de Colonia, supuso una grave ruptura de la neutralidad que había mantenido el Imperio durante gran parte de la revuelta de Holanda: véase P. J. H. Ubachs, «Neutraliteit, theorie en praktiek tijdens de Tachtigjarige Oorlog», *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis*, XCVI, 1983, pp. 165-178.

casi de forma milagrosa, pero habría de transcurrir algún tiempo antes de que Bruselas pudiera acudir de nuevo en ayuda de Viena.

Tampoco Italia estaba en condiciones de ofrecer ayuda al emperador en 1632. El final de la guerra de Mantua coincidió con una epidemia de peste que devastó la mitad norte de la península con ferocidad sin precedentes. En abril de 1631, el gobernador español de Milán se quejaba de que «la peste ha dejado [a esta provincia] tan disminuida de gente que no se podrán hazer reclutas», y la situación permaneció así durante algún tiempo.[34] También el papado alegó hallarse en dificultades cuando el emperador solicitó su apoyo. Aunque el envío de subsidios a los católicos alemanes se reanudó en diciembre de 1631, no superaron los 5.000 táleros mensuales. Durante todo el cuatrienio 1631-1634, sólo fueron enviados 550.000 táleros e incluso esa suma se remitió con la condición de que «si se firma la paz con los protestantes ... Su Santidad retirará su ayuda, sobre todo porque desde la erupción del monte Vesubio la recaudación de diezmos presenta una gran dificultad».[35] En verdad, la causa imperial se hallaba en una situación desesperada. Tal como escribió un cortesano vienés

34. AGS, Estado 3336, f. 138, el duque de Feria a Felipe IV, 12 de abril de 1631. De hecho, un ejército de unos 12.000 hombres se trasladó desde Lombardía a los Países Bajos unos meses después, pero fue reclutado en España y Nápoles. El relato más famoso de la peste de 1631 es el que aparece en la novela de Alessandro Manzoni, *The Betrothed* (*I promessi sposi*, publicado en 1825-1826). Para descripciones más recientes, véase Sella, *Crisis and Continuity*, p. 52; y C. M. Cipolla, *Cristofano and the Plague. A study in the history of public health in the age of Galileo*, Londres, 1973, cap. 1. Existe también una valiosa colección de documentos: *La guerra e la peste nella Milano dei «Promessi Sposi». Documenti inediti tratti dagli archivi Spagnoli*, Madrid, 1975: Istituto Italiano di Cultura, Madrid; Collana «Documenti e Ricerche», IV. El capítulo 7 se refiere a la peste y los capítulos 3-5 a la guerra.

35. Barberini, secretario de Estado papal, a Rocci, nuncio en Alemania, 27 de diciembre de 1631, citado por Repgen, *Die römische Kurie und der Westfälische Friede*, p. 290, n. 347. Era ésta una débil excusa. Aunque la erupción volcánica del Vesubio durante el invierno de 1631-1632 produjo varios millares de víctimas mortales y sepultó cuarenta núcleos de población, muy pocos de ellos eran súbditos papales y el desastre no interrumpió los ingentes dispendios que el papa Urbano VIII dedicaba a sus tres sobrinos, gastos que al final de su pontificado ascendían a 30 millones de táleros. Sobre el nepotismo de Barberini, véase J. Grisar, «Päpstliche Finanzen, Nepotismus und Kirchenrecht unter Urban VIII», *Xenia Piana: Miscellanea historiae pontificiae*, VII, Roma, 1943, pp. 205-366; compárese el dinero enviado a Alemania antes de 1630, en Albrecht, «Zur Finanzierung des dreissigjährigen Krieges».

en abril de 1631, inmediatamente después de que los suecos ocuparan Frankfurt del Oder: «gritamos "ayuda, ayuda", pero nadie responde».[36]

Conforme la triunfal marea sueca se aproximaba a Munich y Viena, incluso Maximiliano tuvo que reconocer que la salvación sólo podía proceder de la creación de un nuevo ejército imperial y que sólo Wallenstein era capaz de reclutarlo, mantenerlo y dirigirlo. Así pues, en abril de 1632, tras tres meses de reclutar nuevas tropas, el general recibió de nuevo plenos poderes. Sus tácticas durante la nueva campaña fueron extraordinariamente cautelosas. Era consciente de que, eliminados todos los aliados de Fernando y con una nueva revuelta campesina en Austria (fomentada por los exiliados al servicio de Suecia), la causa imperial no sobreviviría a una nueva derrota. Por ende, en julio se instaló en una posición fuertemente fortificada en torno a un castillo medieval, llamado el Alte Veste, en las afueras de Nuremberg, ciudad asediada por los suecos. Gustavo Adolfo y sus hombres quedaron estancados allí durante dos meses en una confrontación estéril, mientras los lugartenientes de Wallenstein expulsaban a los sajones de Bohemia y Silesia. Los suecos lanzaron varios ingentes ataques, sin éxito, contra el Alte Veste, pero el asedio continuó durante el mes de octubre hasta que la zona en torno a Nuremberg quedó totalmente devastada («durante tres meses estuvimos sitiados por nuestros enemigos; durante cuatro meses, fuimos desgastados por nuestros amigos», fue el juicio de un patricio de Nuremberg llamado Lucas Behaim en el año 1632).[37] Finalmente, Gustavo Adolfo regresó con su ejército, agotado y descorazonado, hacia el noroeste, mientras Wallenstein avanzaba por el nordeste y asolaba las tierras del principal aliado de Suecia, el elector de Sajonia. Leipzig cayó el 1 de noviembre.

Pero Wallenstein cometió entonces el mayor error de su carrera profesional. Después de mantener a su ejército durante dos semanas en los puestos de batalla, al parecer decidió que la campaña había terminado y el 14 de noviembre ordenó a su ejército que se dispersara hacia los cuarteles de invierno. Ese mismo día recibió informes de que los suecos avanzaban contra su cuartel general en Lützen. Rápidamente reunió a todas las unidades. Pero el día 17, cuando la batalla ya

36. Questenburg, consejero áulico, a Wallenstein, 23 de abril de 1631, citado por Suvanto, *Wallenstein und seine Anhänger*, p. 72.

37. Lukas Behaim, citado por Ernstberger, «Die Universität Nürnberg-Altdorf», p. 10.

había comenzado, sólo disponía de 19.000 hombres, exactamente el mismo número que los suecos, después de todas las pérdidas que habían sufrido durante el verano. Como era habitual cuando ambos bandos estaban igualados, la batalla fue prolongada y las pérdidas numerosas. Sin embargo, al atardecer, ambos bandos permanecían en sus puestos. Según el capitán inglés Sydnam Poyntz, que se hallaba en el ejército de Wallenstein, al llegar la noche «apenas acabábamos de tumbarnos en el suelo para descansar y dormir, cuando llegó una orden del general a todos los coroneles y sargentos mayores para que comunicaran por escrito cuál era la fuerza de todos los regimientos». Las respuestas fueron desalentadoras. Poyntz sólo tenía tres oficiales de un total de doce y las bajas en otras unidades eran también muy altas, por lo cual Wallenstein consideró prudente retirarse del campo de batalla, abandonando el bagaje y la artillería al enemigo, liberando las plazas ocupadas en Sajonia y retirándose a Bohemia. Dejó también tras de sí unos 6.000 muertos, entre los que se contaba su lugarteniente general, Pappenheim. Pero llevó consigo la convicción de que la victoria se le había escapado como consecuencia de la traición o deserción de una parte de sus tropas luteranas, reclutadas apresuradamente. Después de la batalla hizo ejecutar a diecisiete soldados (entre los que se incluían doce oficiales) acusándolos de cobardía, concedió una deshonrosa licencia a otros siete oficiales y puso precio a la cabeza de otros cuarenta. Estas decisiones contribuyeron no poco a alejar al ejército de su voluble comandante y, por tanto, facilitaron más tarde su eliminación.[38]

También en el bando protestante hubo represalias —el comandante de la ciudadela de Leipzig fue ejecutado por haberse rendido precipitadamente—, pero Gustavo Adolfo no participó en los procesos. Había muerto en el campo de batalla el 17 de noviembre después de haber recibido tres disparos, uno en el brazo, otro en la espalda y el tercero en la cabeza. Durante algunas semanas, nadie creyó la noticia de su muerte. El propio Wallenstein no se convenció de su veracidad hasta el 30 de noviembre; en Inglaterra se apostaron, durante el mes de diciembre, 200 libras en la corte a que Gustavo Adolfo estaba todavía vivo. La intervención de Suecia había arrebatado de tal forma la imaginación popular que incluso Federico del Palatinado, que murió

38. Goodrick, ed., *The Relation of Sydnam Poyntz*, p. 73; Elster, *Die Piccolomini-Regimenten*, p. 40.

también en el otoño de 1632, fue recordado posteriormente en Inglaterra como «el príncipe por el que cayó Gustavo Adolfo» y cuando, ese mismo año, el nieto de Axel Oxenstierna y el sobrino de Gustav Horn recibieron un título nobiliario de la Universidad de Oxford, la alabanza del vicecanciller comparó a sus ilustres parientes con «dos truenos de la guerra ... [que] para terror de la Casa de Austria, han destacado como luchadores por su patria, por la religión y por la libertad de toda Alemania»[39] (véanse láminas 14 y 15).

Si la batalla de Lützen fue tan importante, fue porque, pese a terminar en tablas, puso fin a la breve oleada de triunfos protestantes. Otra victoria sueca como la de Breitenfeld o Rain habría destruido la causa imperial sin esperanzas de recuperación. Ahora, ambos bandos se hallaban en una situación similar, y cada uno de los combatientes buscaba desesperadamente apoyos en el exterior que pudieran desequilibrar la balanza. Las esperanzas de Suecia se depositaban cada vez más firmemente en Francia, mientras que las del emperador se fijaban cada vez más en España.

III. 1633-1635: Oxenstierna frente a Wallenstein

La campaña sueca de 1631-1632 había resultado desastrosa para España y los católicos alemanes. Las tropas de Felipe IV fueron expulsadas del Palatinado y las de sus aliados tuvieron que abandonar Alsacia: el «camino español» había quedado bloqueado. Al principio, el conde-duque de Olivares esperaba que la comunicación entre Lombardía y los Países Bajos pudiera ser restablecida por el ejército de Flandes, pero la crisis de 1632 en los Países Bajos del Sur (véase p. 192, *supra*) lo impidió. Así, en el verano de 1633 una fuerza compuesta por unos 20.000 hombres al mando del duque de Feria, gobernador de la Lombardía española, avanzó a través de la Valtelina hasta el sur de Alemania y comenzó a restablecer la influencia de los Habsburgo: Constanza y Breisach fueron liberadas y Bregenz y Rheinfelden nuevamente ocupadas. El camino a través de Alsacia era de nuevo seguro. Pero no duró lo suficiente: pues cuando el duque de Feria no había terminado aún su operación, los franceses invadieron el ducado de Lorena, ocupando Nancy y las demás plazas importantes y exiliaron al duque. El gobierno español, desesperado, autorizó al duque de Feria a actuar desde Breisach para reconquistar Nancy, sancionando así, de hecho, una nueva guerra con Francia. Pero la estación propicia para la campaña había terminado y el duque se retiró a la aparente seguridad de las estribaciones alpinas, donde él y la mayor parte de su ejército murieron en el curso del invierno como consecuencia de la peste.[40]

Ahora bien, la guerra del sudoeste de Alemania era un acontecimiento secundario en 1633: estaba protagonizada por ejércitos reducidos que luchaban con independencia de los principales protagonistas, que se hallaban más hacia el este. Lo mismo cabe decir de las operaciones del noroeste, donde Guillermo de Hesse-Kassel había unido su ejército privado a una fuerza sueca a cuyo frente se hallaba el duque Jorge de Brunswick-Luneburgo. Actuando conjuntamente, ocuparon los territorios eclesiásticos de Paderborn y Fulda, capturaron varias ciudades pequeñas en el Weser y derrotaron a un ejército imperial en Hessisch-Oldendorf.[41] Pero también esto era secundario y si estas operaciones parecían importantes era tan sólo porque los ejércitos principales apenas luchaban. El problema central era el vacío creado por la muerte de Gustavo Adolfo en Lützen. Su heredera, la reina Cristina, contaba tan sólo seis años de edad y la dirección de la polí-

39. Ejemplos tomados de M. E. Seaton, *Literary Relations of England and Scandinavia in the Seventeenth Century*, Oxford, 1935, pp. 79, 83. Véase también M. A. Breslow, *A Mirror for England: English Puritan views of foreign nations, 1618-1648*, Harvard Historical Studies, LXXXIV, Harvard, 1970, pp. 134-137.

40. AGRB, Secretaría de Estado y de Guerra, 207, fols. 293-294, infanta Isabel a Felipe IV, 24 de octubre de 1633; *ibid.*, fols. 330-332, *idem*, 12 de noviembre de 1633, y AGS, Estado 3341, f. 88, el cardenal-infante al rey, 23 de febrero de 1634. Cuando se escribió esta última carta, el duque de Feria había muerto y su ejército estaba diezmado. Hay algunos detalles de su última campaña, en K. Beyerle, *Konstanz im dreissigjährigen Kriege. Schicksale bis zur Aufhebung der Belagerung durch die Schweden, 1628-33*, Heidelberg, 1900: Neujahrsblätter der badischen historischen Komission, N.F. III. Respecto a Lorena durante la guerra, véase J. Florange, «La guerre de trente ans en Lorraine», *Annuaire de la Société d'Histoire et d'Archéologie de Lorraine*, XLVI (1935), pp. 55-123, y Gaber, *La Lorraine meurtrie*. La política agresiva de Francia en este período se estudia más detalladamente en el capítulo IV, parte IV.

41. Véase Altmann, *Landgraf Wilhelm V*, 1.ª parte. La batalla de Hessisch-Oldendorf fue considerada por Suecia como un gran éxito: cf. su lugar de honor en el Arco de Triunfo erigido por el consejo de regencia para la coronación de la reina Cristina en 1650 (S. Karling, «L'arc de triomphe de la Reine Christine à Stockholm», en M. von Platen, ed., *Queen Christina of Sweden. Documents and Studies*, Estocolmo, 1966, pp. 159-186, en pp. 170-171.

tica exterior sueca recayó, en consecuencia, en manos del principal colaborador del monarca, Axel Oxenstierna. Este hombre notable, de cincuenta años de edad, gozaba del mayor prestigio en toda Europa. Trataba a los príncipes de igual a igual y hablaba libremente en presencia de los reyes; era responsable de las operaciones del aprovisionamiento de unos 100.000 hombres y de la pesada maquinaria administrativa que se había creado en Alemania a raíz de las conquistas suecas. Y por si todo ello fuera poco, como canciller de Suecia y cabeza visible del Consejo de Regencia se veía obligado a tomar innumerables decisiones sobre cuestiones domésticas (a menudo de menor cuantía, como la selección y el envío del vino del Rin a la corte de Estocolmo, los adornos que debían colocarse en el catafalco de Gustavo Adolfo o la política correcta a seguir por la Casa de la Moneda). El cúmulo de información que aparece en su amplia correspondencia sobre una increíble variedad de asuntos públicos referentes a Suecia y a sus vecinos resultaba abrumador. Pero sus habilidades, por grandes que pudieran ser, no eran suficientes para hacer frente a los desafíos a los que se veía enfrentado desde 1633. Ciertamente, cabe dudar que hubiera existido facultad humana capaz de superarlos.[42]

En un principio, la situación no parecía tan difícil. El estallido de la guerra entre Polonia y Rusia en 1632, la «guerra de Smolensko», ofreció un respiro en ese frente, que podía haber permitido la solución permanente de la cuestión alemana de forma favorable a Suecia.[43] En los albores de 1633, Oxenstierna dirigió un largo informe al Consejo de Regencia de Estocolmo respecto a la política a seguir, ahora que el rey estaba muerto. De un total de 36 cláusulas, sólo seis se referían a Alemania, pero en ellas se marcaba una línea de acción muy definida. El canciller abogaba por un doble conjunto de medidas: en primer lugar, había que hacer permanente la presencia sueca en Pomerania y Prusia para asegurar el Báltico contra Polonia y el emperador, pero manteniendo tan sólo algunas bases más al sur; en segundo lugar, se debía organizar una confederación de los príncipes amigos en Alemania central que pudiera amortiguar una posible agresión imperial. En consecuencia, propuso disolver el principal ejército y trasladar la mayor parte de las unidades nacionales suecas hacia el norte, a Pomerania. Pero no se retirarían todas las unidades y no se abandonarían todas las conquistas meridionales. En especial, Oxenstierna no tenía intención de entregar Maguncia, que había sido el cuartel general de Gustavo Adolfo en el invierno de 1631-1632. Se dio al Electorado (estratégicamente situado) un gobierno autónomo, constituido en su mayor parte por los caballeros imperiales que habían sido los primeros en apoyar a Suecia y se produjo una importante redistribución de las tierras católicas a los protestantes leales. A continuación, se elaboró un programa de reconstrucción económica, se acuñó una nueva moneda y se instauró una jerarquía luterana. Pero el eje de la «Maguncia sueca» era un gran campamento fortificado, el «Gustavsburg», en el punto de unión del Main y el Rin, con cabezas de puentes en ambos ríos y con espacio suficiente para albergar 17.000 hombres si era necesario. La fortaleza, contigua a las reconstruidas murallas de Maguncia, debía garantizar el control de la zona y servir como refugio en caso necesario. Era, pues, un baluarte militar para reforzar el poder sueco en el occidente de Alemania. Era el pivote del complicado equilibrio de poder que Suecia intentó crear, «atomizando» Alemania en una miríada de unidades independientes escasamente organizadas pero recelosas unas de otras. Desde Maguncia, Oxenstierna podía asegurarse de que nadie consiguiera el control del oeste de Alemania.[44]

¿Pero cómo conseguir satisfacer la soldada de las guarniciones de estas bases suecas, alejadas de la patria? ¿Y cómo pagar a las restantes tropas al servicio de Suecia, que agrupaban a más de 100.000 soldados? Oxenstierna estaba decidido a conseguir que el coste para Suecia no volviera a aproximarse a los niveles de 1630-1631, cuando los gastos de la guerra de Alemania fueron diez veces superiores a los ingresos del país. Durante algún tiempo, al menos, pudo contar con los derechos de aduana de Prusia, Pomerania y Mecklemburgo y con los subsidios procedentes de Francia y Holanda, que le permitieron reducir todavía más la presión a corto plazo sobre Suecia. Pero los derechos de aduana expiraron en 1635 y, desde 1632, los subsidios llegaban tarde cuando llegaban. Otros expedientes a los que se había recurrido durante los primeros años de la guerra —indemnizaciones pagadas por ciudades que querían librarse del pillaje (100.000 táleros

42. Véase Roberts, «Oxenstierna in Germany, 1633-1636», pp. 63-71.

43. Véase B. F. Porshnev, «Les rapports de l'Europe occidentale et l'Europe orientale à l'époque de la guerre de trente ans», *Rapports du XI^e Congrès des Sciences Historiques*, IV, Estocolmo, 1960, pp. 136-163.

44. El Gustavsburg está reproducido en Munthe, *Kongliga Fortifikationens Historia*, I, láms. 31-32, y su descripción puede encontrarse en Müller, *Schwedische Staat*, pp. 145 ss.

en Nuremberg, por ejemplo) y sumas entregadas por príncipes a los que las armas suecas habían restituido sus territorios (60.000 táleros procedentes del elector palatino; 220.000 de Baden-Durlach)—, no pudieron seguir utilizándose después de Lützen. Sin embargo, el ejército no podía ser sostenido únicamente con los recursos procedentes de Suecia y Pomerania. Gustavo Adolfo había impuesto a sus soldados un juramento de lealtad a la corona sueca a cambio del compromiso de pagar sus soldadas; en consecuencia, Oxenstierna decidió cargar sobre otros hombros tanto la lealtad como las obligaciones financieras.

Ya en octubre de 1632, el rey había encargado a su canciller que reuniera en Ulm a los Círculos de Franconia, Suabia y Renania para discutir la formación de una liga defensiva, en alianza con Suecia. La reunión se celebró en el mes de enero siguiente. Los asistentes discutieron la manera de crear esa asociación, de formar un ejército y de financiarlo. En marzo, después de que los Círculos hubieran discutido por separado los diferentes asuntos, la asamblea volvió a reunirse en Heilbronn (un lugar más seguro que Ulm) y el 23 de abril de 1633 constituyeron la liga auspiciada por Suecia. Acordaron luchar y no cejar en la lucha hasta haber conseguido tres objetivos: en primer lugar, «hasta que las libertades de Alemania y el respeto por los principios y la constitución del Sacro Imperio Romano estén de nuevo firmemente asentados»; en segundo lugar, hasta que «se haya producido la restitución de las propiedades protestantes, y una cierta y justa paz, tanto en asuntos espirituales como temporales ... haya sido obtenida y concluida»; y en tercer lugar «hasta que la corona de Suecia haya recibido adecuada satisfacción». Además, el logro de estos objetivos se confiaba firmemente al canciller Oxenstierna: en respeto (así lo afirmaban los aliados) de sus «excepcionales cualidades otorgadas por Dios», se convirtió en el director único de la Liga Heilbronn.[45]

Pero la organización política de la nueva alianza era mejor que su base financiera. La Liga acordó mantener un ejército de 56 ½ regimientos de infantería y 216 compañías de caballería, con un coste anual de casi 10 millones de táleros. Para cubrir ese presupuesto, se

45. Citado por M. Roberts, *Sweden as a Great Power 1611-1697*, Londres, 1968, pp. 146-147. Véase en general, R. Nordlund, «Krig genom ombud. Det svenska krigsfinanserna och Heilbronn förbundet 1633», en Landberg *et al.*, *Det kontinentala krigets ekonomi*, pp. 271-451. Como había ocurrido en el caso de la Unión protestante de 1608-1621, la Liga Heilbronn incluía demasiados estados pequeños para poder gozar de estabilidad.

ingresaron en el tesoro de la Liga los subsidios procedentes de Francia y Holanda. Pero aparte de ese compromiso —y en ello radicaba su gran debilidad— los aliados acordaron también pagar los atrasos de las unidades que ya estaban en servicio. Eran unas cantidades tan ingentes (en algunos casos se remontaban hasta 1627) que resultó imposible ponerse de acuerdo sobre una cifra total. Además, apenas acababa de firmarse el tratado cuando el ejército del sur de Alemania se amotinó. En esa contingencia, Oxenstierna concedió a los comandantes locales el derecho de recaudar contribuciones directamente bajo la supervisión general de un empresario militar, el coronel Brandenstein. Así, en Franconia se concedió a Bernardo de Sajonia-Weimar los obispados de Wurzburgo y Bamberg para satisfacer los retrasos de sus tropas: en la práctica, esto equivalía a una licencia para el pillaje. Además, se permitió a los comandantes que compraran tierras bajo control sueco a un precio nominal y a los oficiales del ejército suabo de Gustav Horn se les dieron recompensas en dinero para el tesoro sueco. Estas medidas permitieron resolver la crisis a corto plazo, aunque cuando se consiguió sofocar el motín en el mes de agosto se había consumido una buena parte de la estación propicia para las campañas. Ahora bien, esas medidas crearon un grave problema a largo plazo a la Liga Heilbronn, que se vio privada de muchas zonas cuyos impuestos eran necesarios para el pago corriente de las tropas. El problema se hizo cada vez más grave, pues, al dedicar cada vez más zonas al pago de los atrasos, había menos posibilidades de satisfacer las deudas corrientes. Antes de que pasara mucho tiempo, las tropas comenzaron a asegurarse directamente el pago de sus soldadas, con la inevitable brutalidad y devastación. A finales de 1633 era claro que las cargas del ejército superaban las posibilidades de la Liga. Si quería sobrevivir tendría que ampliarse.

Durante algún tiempo, Oxenstierna depositó sus esperanzas en Brandemburgo, cuyo elector era tío de la reina Cristina y cuyos consejeros calvinistas favorecían todavía una política de agresión activa contra el Imperio. Pero Jorge Guillermo seguía bajo la influencia del conde Schwarzenberg, católico y pro-imperial, y además sentía un agravio personal contra Suecia que excluía cualquier otro razonamiento. En 1529, el Parlamento de Pomerania, vecino de Brandemburgo por el norte, había reconocido al entonces elector y a sus herederos como eventuales sucesores del ducado si se extinguía la dinastía gobernante. Ahora, esa situación parecía próxima: el duque Boguslav XIV (que

murió en 1637) era el último de la dinastía. Pero en 1630, el duque había sido obligado a firmar un tratado que concedía a Suecia el control total del ducado mientras durara la guerra. ¿Qué ocurriría, pues, si Boguslav moría antes de que se firmara la paz? Suecia afirmó que no podía entregar Pomerania, y la evacuación de sus unidades nacionales desde la Alemania central hasta los territorios del ducado, tras la victoria de Lützen, confirmó los temores de Jorge Guillermo: Suecia intentaba anexionarse Pomerania a pesar de los derechos de Brandemburgo. El elector envió a su hijo y heredero, Federico Guillermo, a la corte de Boguslav, en Stettin, en 1633-1634, pero sin resultado, pues los suecos se mostraron inflexibles.

Jorge Guillermo estaba convencido de que la reconciliación con el emperador era la única forma de conseguir la paz y de liberar, así, sus propiedades de la ocupación extranjera. En enero de 1633 envió una misión diplomática a Dresde para persuadir a Juan Jorge para que se le uniera en una iniciativa de paz. Pero en la capital de Sajonia pululaba ya gran número de diplomáticos y dignatarios extranjeros, todos ellos intentando conseguir el apoyo del elector. Oxenstierna fue el primero en llegar y pasó las Navidades de 1632 tratando de convencer a su anfitrión para que participara en una nueva invasión del territorio de los Habsburgo. Poco después, el landgrave Jorge de Hesse-Darmstadt invitó a Juan Jorge para que se le uniera en unas conversaciones formales con una delegación imperial sobre los términos de un posible acuerdo de paz. Las condiciones de los Habsburgo resultaron demasiado duras y Juan Jorge (al igual que Brandemburgo) se unió con Suecia para una nueva campaña. Ahora bien, puso un alto precio a su participación. Sobre todo, se aseguró de que la principal ofensiva protestante se desencadenara en el este, hacia Silesia, y fuera comandada por oficiales elegidos por él mismo.

La tensión entre Suecia y sus aliados alemanes no podía ser mantenida en secreto durante mucho tiempo. Como Wallenstein observó sagazmente: «Creo que Suecia quiere la paz, que quiere hacer regresar a sus soldados a casa y dejar que los dos electores [Brandemburgo y Sajonia] encuentren por sí solos la salida del laberinto».[46] En consecuencia, el general del ejército imperial centró sus esfuerzos en ahondar en esas diferencias. Primero intentó seducir a los exiliados checos de la corte de Sajonia llevándoles a creer que él —también era checo—

46. Citado en Suvanto, *Wallenstein*, p. 181.

podría conseguirles un acuerdo favorable con el emperador. Fue para eludir esa amenaza y para controlar a los exiliados por lo que Oxenstierna se vio obligado a tomar la desagradable decisión de aceptar al candidato de Juan Jorge, el conde Thurn —el torpe general de la confederación bohemia un decenio antes—, como comandante sueco en Silesia. Pero en junio de 1633, Wallenstein consiguió dividir a las unidades sajonas y suecas en Silesia cuando acordó un alto el fuego de un mes para permitir que se desarrollaran negociaciones de paz con Arnim, en otro tiempo subordinado suyo y ahora comandante de Sajonia. Las conversaciones no llegaron a buen puerto y, para alivio del canciller, las hostilidades se reanudaron en julio. En agosto, Arnim aceptó una nueva tregua para permitir nuevas negociaciones y cuando recomenzaron las hostilidades, el 27 de septiembre, Wallenstein lanzó de pronto un ataque masivo contra las fuerzas suecas de Thurn en Steinau, cercándolas y obligando a 8.000 hombres a rendirse en el plazo de una semana. El propio Thurn fue hecho prisionero y aceptó rendir todas las ciudades de Silesia que controlaban sus compañeros de exilio a cambio de su libertad. Estos golpes fueron de extraordinaria dureza y Wallenstein concluyó su éxito renovando sus ofertas de paz a Sajonia y Brandemburgo. Oxenstierna tuvo que visitar personalmente a Jorge Guillermo a comienzos de 1634 para asegurarse de que rechazaba la oferta del general imperial.[47] Pero el 25 de febrero, el canciller se vio libre inesperadamente de nuevas dificultades cuando su principal enemigo fue asesinado.

Aunque poco después del asesinato se organizó una comisión imperial que investigó en profundidad los últimos días de Wallenstein, y aunque se han publicado miles de poemas, piezas dramáticas, panfletos y libros sobre este tema, todavía está oscuro el complejo proceso que desembocó en la muerte del general. Pero ésta fue la intención de los conspiradores, uno de los cuales explicó a un amigo íntimo: «Para decirlo brevemente, el disimulo es el alfa y el omega de este asunto».[48] Sin embargo, podemos apuntar algunas razones que explican el asesinato. En primer lugar, el emperador se sentía profundamente descontento por el hecho de haber financiado durante todo el año 1633 un

47. Más información en Suvanto, *Oxenstierna*, pp. 146-166.

48. Piccolomini a Aldringen, citado por Mann, *Wallenstein*, p. 1.071. Sobre el papel que jugó Piccolomini en la caída de Wallenstein y para un excelente estudio de la cuestión en general, véase Barker, *Army, Aristocracy, Monarchy*, pp. 79-97 (parte de un amplio estudio sobre el general toscano).

ingente ejército que había alcanzado pocos éxitos militares: Baviera estaba todavía parcialmente ocupada por protestantes; Heidelberg y Ratisbona se habían perdido y Silesia no fue liberada hasta octubre. Además, Wallenstein insistió una vez más en acuartelar sus tropas en las provincias Habsburgo en el invierno de 1633-1634, provocando un grave riesgo de revueltas campesinas contra las exacciones de los soldados. Hay que tener en cuenta, por otra parte, la posición de España. Los gobiernos de Madrid y Viena habían decidido que en 1634 un gran ejército se trasladaría desde Lombardía hasta los territorios del Imperio, comandado personalmente por el hermano de Felipe IV, el cardenal-infante Fernando, para unirse al ejército imperial y limpiar de fuerzas enemigas todo el sur de Alemania. De acuerdo con las condiciones que figuraban en el nombramiento de Wallenstein, el cardenal-infante y sus hombres tenían que ponerse a las órdenes del comandante en jefe, pero el gobierno español afirmó que esto era inaceptable. No obstante, probablemente ninguno de estos argumentos indujo al emperador a contemplar la posibilidad del asesinato. Más perjudicial para el crédito de Wallenstein a los ojos de su señor fue su actitud independiente en los contactos diplomáticos con Sajonia y Brandemburgo. Sin embargo, al parecer tenía plena autoridad para comportarse de esa forma. En abril de 1632, después de que asumiera el control de los ejércitos de Fernando, se otorgaron a Wallenstein poderes inhabitualmente amplios. En una reunión secreta celebrada en Göllersdorf, a medio camino entre su cuartel general y Viena, se acordó que el comandante en jefe podría acuartelar sus tropas donde deseara, incluso en los territorios hereditarios de los Habsburgo; que controlaría todas las tropas católicas que luchaban por la causa imperial (quedando incluidas así todas las unidades enviadas desde España) y que ejercería la autoridad *in absolutissima forma*. Como se ha perdido el texto original (si en realidad llegó a existir) del acuerdo de diez puntos de Göllersdorf, es imposible decir qué significaba exactamente esa cláusula. De hecho, Wallenstein se comportaba como si le hubiera sido conferido el poder de negociar un alto el fuego e incluso la paz con sus enemigos y se mantuvo en contacto permanente con Dresde, creyendo que Sajonia (con toda seguridad) y Suecia (posiblemente) deseaban poner fin a la guerra. Pero en el curso de estos contactos apenas mantuvo informada a la corte de Viena.[49]

49. Suvanto, *Wallenstein*, pp. 158-159, ha reconstruido con gran ingenio el texto del acuerdo de Göllersdorf. Su argumentación se ha visto corroborada, a partir de otras fuentes, por Lutz, «Wallenstein, Ferdinand II. und der Wiener Hof».

Wallenstein siempre había tenido enemigos en la corte imperial y, aunque en 1631 no pudieron impedir que se le confiara de nuevo el mando, durante este segundo mandato mantuvieron una actitud de crítica permanente, tanto respecto a los hábitos personales del general como respecto a su actuación pública. En ambas facetas parecía comportarse de forma más extravagante que antes. Por ejemplo, Wallenstein no podía soportar el ruido y cuando llegaba a una ciudad mandaba —así se decía— que se diera muerte a todos los perros y gatos; prohibía que los soldados llevaran botas y espuelas en su presencia y castigaba de forma severa y arbitraria a quienes hablaban en voz alta o gritaban. Su comportamiento con los hombres que le rodeaban iba desde una generosidad exagerada hasta una terrible crueldad (las penas eran ejecutadas de forma inmediata por su verdugo personal). En la expresión de sus opiniones políticas se movía entre las predicciones más eclécticas y las más brutales amenazas. Como afirmaba un panfleto escrito después de su muerte, era «un súbdito convertido en soberano». Había sido «promovido a la posición suprema, de la que nadie había gozado hasta entonces» y, sin duda, la experiencia del poder supremo le había llevado a sobrepasarse en su conducta.[50] Desde luego, sus enemigos no encontraban dificultad para hallar, entre sus expresiones jactanciosas o descuidadas y sus actuaciones extravagantes, amplios motivos para cuestionar su lealtad al emperador. Wallenstein había criticado siempre (y en ocasiones había desbaratado) los esfuerzos de Viena para apoyar las ambiciones españolas de los Países Bajos y siempre había hecho gala de una notable falta de entusiasmo por el Edicto de Restitución. Además, con frecuencia se había mostrado favorable a un acuerdo negociable entre el emperador y, cuando menos, los luteranos. Ahora conducía su propia ofensiva diplomática para alcanzar ese objetivo, negándose a realizar las acciones militares ordenadas desde Viena porque podrían comprometer sus iniciativas de paz. Por si esto no fuera suficiente para difundir la alarma

50. Véanse los interesantes detalles reproducidos de un panfleto contemporáneo por A. Hollaender, «Some English documents on the end of Wallenstein», *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, XL (1958), pp. 358-390. Por supuesto, también Oxenstierna era «un súbdito convertido en soberano», pero no parece que eso importara a muchos.

en la corte imperial, en enero de 1634 Wallenstein hizo jurar a sus coroneles que situarían la lealtad hacia él por encima de ninguna otra. No es difícil comprender que el emperador y su entorno consideraran que esto era abierta traición y actuaran en consonancia.[51]

Fueran cuales fueren las razones que decidieron finalmente a Fernando a librarse de su todopoderoso vasallo, no fue difícil conseguirlo. A finales de 1633 nadie confiaba en él: ni Suecia, cuyas tropas había capturado con engaño en Steinau; ni Sajonia ni Brandemburgo, que no tenían seguridad de que sus promesas contaran con el apoyo del emperador; ni Baviera, cuyos territorios había dejado desprotegidos, ni los exiliados bohemios, que habían comprendido que Wallenstein no pensaba restituirles las tierras que él (y sus colegas) habían ocupado. En febrero de 1634, el emperador firmó una orden secreta para que el general fuera conducido a Viena para ser interrogado. Comprendiendo que tal vez no sería posible llevarle vivo, autorizó a que le dieran muerte si era necesario. Pese a todo, el riesgo de fracaso parecía alto y Fernando pidió a su confesor que asegurara las plegarias de los jesuitas de todo el mundo para que la misión se saldara con un resultado positivo. La Orden prestó la máxima atención a esta

51. ¿Hasta qué punto era auténtica esa iniciativa de paz de Wallenstein? El duque Franz-Albrecht de Sajonia-Lauenburg, uno de los colaboradores más estrechos del general, que fue hecho prisionero tres días después de la muerte de su jefe, no tenía dudas al respecto: «den praetext der friedens nur vorwendete», dijo a quienes le apresaron. Y los historiadores recientes se inclinan a pensar que la paz era simplemente un «pretexto», un producto que Wallenstein estaba dispuesto a intercambiar por una posesión en el Imperio, como el ducado de Franconia de Bernardo de Sajonia-Weimar, o como su propio ducado de Mecklemburgo. Por otra parte, no habría sido totalmente ridículo que Wallenstein soñara en convertirse en rey de su Bohemia natal. Un pariente lejano suyo, Jorge de Podehbrad, había sido elegido en 1458; Federico del Palatinado había sido elegido en 1619 (y había muerto, convenientemente, en 1632), y en el ínterin, el reino había elegido reyes en las familias Jagellón y Habsburgo. En su juventud, Wallenstein había pasado algún tiempo en el norte de Italia, sobre todo en Padua, y, sin duda, debía de estar al corriente de las actividades de *condottieri* (capitanes de soldados aventureros) como Francesco Sforza, Sigismondo Malatesta y Cesare Borgia. Sin duda, en Padua admiró la estatua de Donatello del más importante capitán mercenario, Gattamellata. En la época de Oliver Cromwell no se puede ignorar que a los soldados que tenían éxito se les presentaba la posibilidad de labrarse una carrera política. (Véase el estudio de F. H. Schubert, «Wallenstein und der Staat des 17. Jahrhunderts», *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, XVI, 1965, pp. 597-611; recogido en Rudolf, *Dreissigjährige Krieg*, pp. 185-207.)

petición y su superior general decidió dedicar «otras mil misas semanales para la seguridad del emperador y la felicidad del Imperio» y más tarde afirmó (con satisfacción) que en ese preciso momento «el brazo del Altísimo realizó actos maravillosos». «Cuanto más lo pienso —se jactaba— veo con más claridad que el Dios misericordioso se sintió conmovido por nuestras plegarias.»[52] Naturalmente, se refería al brutal asesinato de Wallenstein y su escolta cuando se dirigían hacia Sajonia después de recibir la orden del emperador, en la noche del 25 de febrero de 1634. De hecho, tal vez fue milagroso que no hubiera prácticamente tumultos entre las tropas imperiales después del asesinato del general. El mando supremo fue asumido por el hijo del emperador, Fernando, rey de Hungría, ayudado por un triunvirato de oficiales veteranos: Piccolomini, Gallas y (en nombre de las fuerzas de la Liga católica) Aldringen.

De cualquier forma, el asesinato de Wallenstein ofreció a Suecia la posibilidad de superar algunas de las divisiones que se habían suscitado en el seno de la Liga Heilbronn. Oxenstierna convocó una reunión de los estados protestantes en Frankfurt con la esperanza de ampliar la Liga para incluir en ella a Sajonia, Brandemburgo y los restantes territorios del nordeste de Alemania y para determinar con exactitud cuáles serían los territorios alemanes que Suecia conservaría después de la guerra. La convención se desarrolló en términos satisfactorios hasta que en abril de 1634 Jorge Guillermo tomó una decisión crucial y afirmó que no se uniría a la Liga si Suecia no renunciaba a sus pretensiones sobre Pomerania. En junio, los miembros del Círculo de la Baja Sajonia se decidieron a respaldar su postura. A continuación, el elector de Sajonia, pretendiendo estar por encima de tan prosaicas cuestiones, intentó conseguir apoyo para las conversaciones de paz iniciadas por los oficiales imperiales en Leitmeritz con Jorge de Hesse-Darmstadt.

Así, la causa protestante se vio paralizada incluso antes de que recomenzaran las hostilidades en julio, existiendo de nuevo dos escenarios de operaciones diferentes: los sajones, dirigidos por Arnim, trataban de penetrar en Silesia, mientras que los suecos y sus aliados de la Liga Heilbronn, bajo el mando conjunto de Gustav Horn y Ber-

52. Mutio Vitelleschi, prepósito general de los jesuitas, a Lamormaini, 1 de abril de 1634, citado por Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, p. 203. Wedgwood, *Thirty Years' War*, pp. 346-360, reconstruye el fin de Wallenstein a partir del análisis meticuloso de los documentos escritos.

nardo de Sajonia-Weimar, intentaban conquistar el sudeste de Alemania. En un principio, el desarrollo de la campaña fue satisfactorio: Arnim invadió Bohemia y pronto llegó una vez más ante los muros de Praga, mientras que las fuerzas de la Liga Heilbronn asaltaban Landshut, en Baviera, episodio en el que murió Johann von Aldringen, comandante en jefe de Maximiliano. Pero estos éxitos se vieron contrarrestados por la reconquista de Ratisbona y Donauwörth por las tropas imperiales comandadas por Fernando de Hungría, que restableció de esta forma el contacto entre Baviera y los territorios de los Habsburgo. Arnim consideró prudente retirarse de las puertas de Praga, porque su posición le parecía excesivamente arriesgada. A continuación, Fernando sitió la ciudad protestante de Nördlingen y esperó la llegada de su primo, el cardenal-infante Fernando, que encabezaba un ejército de 15.000 hombres procedentes de España y de las posesiones españolas en Italia. Llegaron el 2 de septiembre, inmediatamente antes que las tropas de Bernardo y Horn. Los dos primos comprendieron que una confrontación podía favorecerles y prepararon un campamento fuertemente fortificado en las colinas que se extendían al sur de la ciudad. Su confianza estaba justificada. Cuando los dos ejércitos se enfrentaron el 6 de septiembre, los Habsburgo contaban con 33.000 hombres y los protestantes solamente con 25.000. Al anochecer, después de «la mayor victoria de nuestros tiempos» (expresión que utilizó con júbilo Olivares), unos 12.000 protestantes yacían muertos en el campo de batalla y 4.000 más, entre ellos Gustav Horn, habían sido hechos prisioneros. Nördlingen cayó inmediatamente y los restos del ejército derrotado, bajo el mando de Bernardo de Sajonia-Weimar, se retiraron a Alsacia mientras Suecia retiraba renuentemente todas sus guarniciones al sur del Main.[53]

La moral de Oxenstierna comenzó finalmente a flaquear. En noviembre de 1634 escribió a Johan Baner, el único general sueco capaz que quedaba en Alemania: «No seguiré luchando, sino que me dejaré llevar adonde me conduzca la marea ... Somos odiados, envidiados y

53. Véase G. Rystad, *Kriegsnachrichten und Propaganda während des dreissigjährigen Krieges: die Schlacht bei Nördlingen in den gleichzeitigen gedruckten Kriegsberichten*, Lund, 1960. Hay ilustraciones de la batalla, en Angela y Geoffrey Parker, *European Soldiers 1550-1650*, Cambridge, 1977, pp. 46-55. En el campo de batalla, son visibles todavía los emplazamientos de los cañones preparados en el Altbuch la noche antes de la batalla, y hay una pequeña columna conmemorativa. Como ocurre con Lützen, el lugar bien merece una visita.

ANTES DE LA INTERVENCIÓN DE LOS SUECOS

1. *La revuelta Fettmilch en Frankfurt (1612-1616).* La revuelta de los ciudadanos de Frankfurt que comenzó en 1612, durante la celebración de la elección de Matías como emperador, fue antipatricia y antisemita a un tiempo. Al principio, los ciudadanos, dirigidos por el carismático panadero Vincent Fettmilch, exigían un consejo más democrático y la expulsión de la importante población judía de la ciudad (que en opinión de muchos obtenía ventajas de la protección que le dispensaba el consejo). En 1614, y dado que los consejeros no variaron su actitud, los ciudadanos les depusieron y atacaron el ghetto judío (como se ve en esta ilustración). Todos los judíos fueron expulsados de la ciudad. Pero estos nuevos desórdenes obligaron al emperador a intervenir y, finalmente, Fettmilch fue apresado por sus conciudadanos y su movimiento sofocado. En 1616 fue ejecutado y los patricios se hicieron de nuevo con el poder. Los desórdenes de Frankfurt constituyen un ejemplo extremo de la tensión que existía entre los consejos de las ciudades y los ciudadanos, tensión que desembocó en enfrentamientos violentos en una serie de ciudades alemanas en los años anteriores a la guerra (*véase mapa 1*). (Tomado de J. L. Gottfried, *Historische Chronica*, Frankfurt, 1633, p. 1.142. Cortesía del Historisches Museum, Frankfurt del Main.)


December,
Chriſtmaanet.
Totales de los ingresos y gastos anuales, así como de las reservas, registradas en este libro:
Ingresos 1.143.954
Gastos 179.784
Reservas 974.170
Esta reserva incluye algunos miles de daler, que han sido enviados a Holstein.

2. *Las finanzas de Cristián de Dinamarca (1618).* El diario hológrafo de Cristián IV correspondiente al día de Nochevieja de 1618, donde se resumen sus disponibilidades de capital (en *daler* daneses). La traducción del texto es la siguiente:

> Totales de los ingresos y gastos anuales, así como de las reservas, registradas en este libro:
>
> | | |
> |---|---|
> | Ingresos . . . . . | 1.143.954 |
> | Gastos . . . . . | 179.784 |
> | Reservas . . . . . | 974.170 |
>
> Esta reserva incluye algunos miles de *daler*, que han sido enviados a Holstein.

Esta posición financiera extraordinariamente saneada —de la que el diario del rey es el único registro— contribuye a explicar por qué el rey de Dinamarca sería tan asiduamente cortejado por los seguidores de Federico del Palatinado. (Procedente de Rigsarkivet, Kongehusets arkiv: Cristián IV. Copenhague.)



3. *La boda de Neoburgo (12 de noviembre de 1614).* Si en 1613 la «boda del año» protestante fue la de Federico del Palatinado con Isabel Estuardo en Londres, el equivalente católico fue, sin duda, la que se celebró entre Wolfgang Guillermo, heredero del ducado de Pfalz-Neoburgo, y Ana Magdalena, hermana de Maximiliano de Baviera, en Munich. Esta ilustración, una de un conjunto de doce (realizadas por Wilhelm Peter Zimmermann de Augsburgo) conmemorando las festividades, muestra a la pareja de recién casados que abandona la iglesia con el acompañamiento de una salva de mosquetes. Esta boda fortaleció la adhesión de Wolfgang Guillermo a la causa católica —no había abandonado la fe luterana sino en el mes de julio anterior— y fue también una garantía del apoyo de los bávaros a las pretensiones de Neoburgo a la sucesión de Cleves-Juliers. (Procedente de Staatliche Graphische Sammlung 94.451. Munich.)

4 (arriba). *La rendición de Bautzen a Juan Jorge de Sajonia (1620).* Aunque el apoyo de Baviera a la causa de los Habsburgo en 1620 es un hecho mucho mejor conocido, también fue importante la campaña de Sajonia para ayudar a Fernando II. Sin embargo, apenas hubo derramamiento de sangre. Mientras que Maximiliano tenía que luchar para avanzar por la Alta Austria y Bohemia hacia Praga, Juan Jorge ocupó Silesia y Lusacia sin apenas esfuerzo. Sólo la capital de Lusacia, Bautzen, ofreció una resistencia seria que (como muestra este grabado) tampoco duró mucho tiempo. Los defensores no tardaron en verse obligados a rendirse formalmente al vigoroso elector. (Tomado de J. P. Abelinus, *Theatrum europaeum*, I, Frankfurt, 1639, pp. 421-422.)

5. *El general Tilly visita a los jesuitas en la tejeduría (1632).* Era Tilly, más que Wallenstein, quien simbolizaba, para los propagandistas protestantes, la amenaza imperial y católica y se convirtió en el blanco de innumerables ilustraciones y octavillas satíricas, sobre todo desde el momento en que su estrella comenzó a declinar tras la batalla de Breitenfeld. Por ejemplo, este furibundo pasquín muestra al anciano general rodeado de jesuitas y monjes en una decrépita tejeduría. Incapaces ya de hacer girar sus ruedas, se ven en la necesidad de tejer el lino como lo hacían las viejas aldeanas. (Tomado de Herzog-August-Bibliothek, *Sammlung Ilustrierte Einblattdrucke* JH 170. Wolfenbüttel.)



6. *El Edicto de Restitución (1629).* Pocas veces ha resultado tan polémico un trozo de papel como el Edicto religioso promulgado por Fernando II el 6 de marzo de 1629. Contenía tan sólo cuatro columnas de texto, pero sería la causa de que fracasaran todos sus ambiciosos planes. Esta copia, firmada por el propio Fernando II, fue enviada antes de su publicación a Maximiliano de Baviera en su calidad de director de un Círculo imperial, con órdenes para que la reprodujera y hubiera alcanzado una amplia distribución en su jurisdicción el día de su publicación oficial, el 28 de marzo. (Procedente de Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, *Kasten Schwartz* 60, fol. 106. Munich.)

Der Röm. Käys. auch zu
Hungarn vnd Böheimb Kön. Mayst.
FERDINANDI II.
Außspruch/Decision/vnd Käys. Edict/
Radix omnium Vber malorum.
Etliche Puncten den Religion Frieden/sonderlich
die Restitution der Geistlichen Gütter betreffendt.
Auß dem Original mit fleiß nachgedruckt.
Gedruckt in der Fürstl. Hauptstatt Wirtzburg/
bey Stephan Fleischmann.
Anno M. DC. XXIX.

7. *El Edicto: «raíz de todos los males».* Esta edición del Edicto fue reeditada en forma de panfleto a partir de la copia enviada al obispo de Wurzburgo. Era una de las treinta y cinco versiones conocidas y contiene el juicio de un contemporáneo anónimo (pero sin duda católico) escrito de su puño y letra: *Radix omnium malorum.* (Procedente de Stadtbibliothek, Hist. 494, 4.°. Nuremberg.)

Lutherisch: vnd Calvinisch jüngst gehaltener Rathschluß.

Darinnen ein jedweder sein Mainung fürbringt/ wie dargegen dero eygnen wahren bekandtnuß nach/ Ihr Intent wider Kay. May. zu rugg gehet/

vnd Klagen wie es etlichen vbel ergangen ist.



8. *El Coloquio de Leipzig (1631): un complot protestante.* Para los católicos, la reunión de los estados protestantes del Imperio en la primavera de 1631 fue el presagio de una conspiración internacional en la que estaban implicadas Inglaterra, Francia, Suecia y Holanda, así como los luteranos y calvinistas alemanes. Aparece un «espíritu turbulento» (*unruhiger Geist*) —de hecho, el propio diablo— como secretario de la conferencia y se le acusa de fomentar la oposición a la autoridad legítima del emperador (a la derecha) y la verdadera iglesia (a la izquierda). Éste es uno de los tres panfletos conocidos hostiles a Gustavo Adolfo de Suecia. Las octavillas católicas fueron raras a partir de 1629: no importa cuál fuera su suerte en el campo de batalla, los protestantes conservaban una aplastante superioridad en la guerra de propaganda. (Procedente de Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Einblattdrucke V, 8.ª, n.° 37, Munich.)

Schwedischer Zug

Darauß:

Guter Anfang zu der instehenden Göttlichen Hülffe/

vnd Exempel der rechten Buß.



9. *El avance de los suecos (1630-1632).* El rico contenido alegórico de esta octavilla de 1632 es típico de ese período. El victorioso rey de Suecia aparece avanzando hacia el Sacro Imperio Romano en un carro tirado por animales que simbolizan la magnanimidad, la rapidez, energía y glorioso pasado del conductor. Estas bestias son guiadas por la mano de Dios. Un grupo de príncipes protestantes desposeídos de sus bienes ayuda a empujar el carro, mientras se incita a la iniciativa de paz imperial («Pacem») al tiempo que la «Religión» (G) señala acusadoramente a la verdadera iglesia, atada y amordazada («R»). (Procedente de la British Library, Call n.° 1.750, b. 29/47.)

10. *El asedio de Smolensko (1632).* Suecia había estado en guerra con Polonia durante todo el decenio de 1620 y a Gustavo Adolfo le preocupaba que, a pesar de la tregua de seis años firmada en Altmark (1629), su primo Segismundo pudiera lanzar un nuevo ataque intentando recuperar una parte de sus pérdidas mientras Suecia se hallaba totalmente ocupada en la guerra de Alemania. Fue para hacer frente a esta amenaza por lo que Gustavo Adolfo incitó a los rusos a declarar la guerra a Polonia, debilitada por la muerte de Segismundo en la primavera de 1632. El ejército ruso, contando con la ayuda de voluntarios ingleses y escoceses, sitió Smolensko y mantuvo el asedio durante el invierno de 1632-1633 con las más modernas técnicas militares (que se muestran en esta ilustración de Hondius). Sin embargo, el asedio fracasó, debido en parte a los enfrentamientos entre los mercenarios británicos, y la paz se firmó a principios de 1634. Polonia quedó libre entonces para luchar para que los suecos abandonaran el mar Báltico cuando expirara la tregua de Altmark al año siguiente. (Cortesía del Dr. Paul Dukes.)

11. *El Hércules sueco (1631).* Otra alegoría, mucho más evidente, sobre el sorprendente rey de Suecia, cuya encarnación de la causa protestante fue un rasgo característico de prácticamente toda la propaganda de la época. (Procedente de Herzog-August-Bibliothek, *Sammlung Illustrierte Einblattdrucke:* «Der Schwedische Hercules». Wolfenbüttel.)

12. *«Los pasteles sajones» (1631).* Se decía que en una reunión celebrada entre el elector de Sajonia y representantes del general Tilly, el primero había advertido a los imperiales que si intentaban devorar el hasta entonces intacto «confite» de Sajonia, encontrarían que contenía duras nueces para romper (véase p. 186). Este episodio dio lugar a una larga serie de octavillas. En ésta, vemos a Tilly intentando coger los gustosos platos, que tienen las leyendas «regio» y «religio», mientras Juan Jorge le aparta con el bastón de la «clara conciencia» y Gustavo Adolfo blande el cáliz de la justicia. El sajón está asentado sobre sólidos bloques en los que se lee «justa causa» y «segura esperanza», mientras que Tilly se tambalea precariamente sobre unas bolas con las leyendas «malicia» y «falsedad». (Procedente de la British Library, Call n.° 1.750, b. 29/32.)

13. *El avance sueco continúa.* Algunas octavillas tenían una estrecha relación con las cambiantes noticias diarias. Aquí vemos a Gustavo Adolfo que obliga al papa, símbolo de la causa católica, a vomitar ciudades y fortalezas tomadas a los protestantes durante el decenio de 1620. La secuencia, que parece casi una tira cómica, incluye los lugares ocupados o liberados por los suecos en su avance desde Stralsund en el Báltico hasta Kreuznach en Renania. Se ha dejado espacio para insertar las victorias subsiguientes en las ediciones posteriores de la ilustración. (Procedente de la British Library, Call n.° 1.750, b. 29/67*.)

14. *Gustav Adolphiana.* Después de la gran victoria de Breitenfeld se desarrolló una auténtica «industria Gustavo Adolfo». Algunos objetos se fabricaban de forma individual, pero otros se producían en masa: relieves de marfil, estatuas de plata, anillos de oro, colgantes y medallones con la efigie del rey sueco. Este vaso ceremonial ofrece una oportunidad más de recordar al héroe sueco. (Procedente de Victoria and Albert Museum, n.° 1.885A-1898. Londres.)

15. *Gustavus redivivus (1633).* La muerte del monarca no interrumpió inmediatamente la impresión masiva de octavillas asociadas con sus logros en Alemania. Esta ilustración de 1633 presenta de forma melodramática la apoteosis del rey: sostenido por las «tres coronas» (emblema nacional sueco), Gustavo Adolfo surge indestructible de entre las olas. El título dice: «El sueco sigue con vida». (Procedente de Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Einblattdrucke V, 3.ª, n.° 89. Munich.)



Raisons pour faire la guerre

1

On ne doit point douter que le dessein des Espagnols ne soit d'attaquer la France avec toutes les forces qu'ils le pourront, soit ouvertement, soit en faisant des croupes et de l'argent à la Reyne Mere et à mon frere, ou à quelques mal-intentionnés du Roy[aume] s'ils en trouvent (ce que je ne crois pas présentement). Nous devons envoyer par les despesches presser à Calais la consommation de leur mauvaise volonté contre cet Etat. Il par le traité qu'ils veulent faire avec Angleterre contre nous, s'il pourroit [illegible] mieux les attaquer présentement que l'année qui



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nous attaquent.

2

Secondement il n'y a pas raison de croire qu'ils ne fassent pour les raisons que dessus. Les peuples et grandes du pays bas sont très mal contents de leur domination en particulier et en général.

3

Ils n'auront pas moyens [illegible] pour s'assurer de tous costés qu'ils en ont présentement.

4

Jamais ne furent si foibles ni d'hommes ni d'argent.

Nous ne devons point craindre de commencer dans le Royaume. Les Huguenots estant bas, n'y a de dimension en Italie, en cette

16 *a* y *b*. ***Luis XIII se prepara para la guerra (1634).*** El 4 de agosto de 1634 el rey de Francia escribió un memorándum de alto secreto («ningún ser vivo lo ha visto» según el documento) a su primer ministro cardenal Richelieu, sobre la política más acertada respecto a los Habsburgo. En ese momento, la postura de Luis XIII era eminentemente defensiva. Afirmaba que Francia no podía permitirse el lujo de quedar aislada si Holanda firmaba una nueva tregua con España o si los suecos y sus aliados de la Liga Heilbronn firmaban la paz con el emperador. En cambio, una declaración de guerra contra España impediría la tregua de Holanda y daría nuevos ánimos a los protestantes alemanes. La implicación subyacente es que la preocupación fundamental no era la guerra en Alemania, sino la guerra contra España. Tras la batalla de Nördlingen, justo un mes después, ese punto de vista tuvo que variar sustancialmente. (Procedente de Archive du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Correspondance politique: Allemagne*, vol. 23, fols. 338-340. París.)

DESTRUCCIÓN Y RECONSTRUCCIÓN

17. *Amore Pacis (1648).* Esta enorme octavilla incorporaba un mapa preparado por orden del general intendente Cornelis van den Büsch y contenía los detalles de las principales batallas de Suecia en la guerra (1630-1648), la situación de las diferentes guarniciones de Suecia y de sus aliados al término de la guerra y otras informaciones militares útiles. Sirvió tanto para dar difusión a los éxitos de Suecia como para localizar sus dispersas guarniciones para la evacuación. (Procedente de Krigsarkivet, *Hist. Plan.* 1648: fol. 24. Estocolmo.)

Groß Europiſch Kriegs Balet getantzet durch die Könige vnd Potentaten Fürſten vnd Reſpublicken
auff dem Saal der betrübten Chriſtenheit.

18. *El ballet de la gran guerra europea (1647-1648).* Esta sencilla sátira de las, al parecer, interminables delegaciones diplomáticas en Westfalia muestra a los diferentes gobernantes europeos tratando de moverse al unísono, mientras los ángeles arrojan ante ellos ramas de olivo y manzanas de la discordia. A la derecha, contemplados por el sultán turco y el príncipe de Transilvania, el infante Luis XIV da la mano a Juan IV de Portugal, el príncipe de Orange y el general Torstensson (interesante elección para representar a Suecia). Danzan ante el ataúd de Federico del Palatinado, mientras Gustavo Adolfo yace muerto en el suelo. El emperador y sus aliados son contemplados por un grupo de príncipes italianos, mientras Sajonia y los cantones suizos, en primer plano, intentan obtener ventajas. (Procedente de Bayerische Staatsbibliothek. Munich.)

19. *La batalla de Jankov (1645).* Uno de los extraordinarios grabados del grabador y librero de Frankfurt Matthaeus Merian (1593-1650), publicado en el libro *Theatrum europaeum* como una especie de historia contemporánea, impresa a medida que avanzaba la guerra. Que se apreciaba la importancia de Jankov lo demuestra el hecho de que se incluyeron en la obra cuatro ilustraciones diferentes de la batalla, por dos de la de Breitenfeld y tres de la de Lützen. (Procedente de M. Merian, *Theatrum europaeum*, V, Frankfurt, 1647, pp. 716-717.)



20 y 21. *Nuremberg: el fin de la guerra (1650).* Aunque la paz de Westfalia puso fin a la guerra en octubre de 1648, pasaron casi dos años más antes de que se encontrase una fórmula aceptada por todos para la desmovilización de los ejércitos. El papel más importante correspondió al príncipe Carlos Gustavo de Pfalz-Zweibrücken, comandante en jefe del ejército sueco y supuesto heredero del trono sueco (al que accedió en 1654 con el nombre de Carlos X). Aquí (arriba) aparece sentado a la izquierda del comandante imperial Ottavio Piccolomini, al final de la mesa (a la izquierda en primer plano) esperando el banquete con el que se celebraba el acuerdo final, mientras que en el exterior tenían lugar unos espectaculares fuegos artificiales (página de la derecha). Finalmente, había llegado la paz a Alemania. (Procedente de M. Merian, *Theatri europaei oder historischer Beschreitung... sechster und letzter Teil*, Frankfurt, 1652, pp. 939 y 1.076.)



22 *a* y *b*. *Esquemas contemporáneos de la batalla de Lützen (1632).* La derrota de los católicos en Breitenfeld se produjo porque el orden de batalla del ejército sueco —con líneas menos nutridas y más largas, más artillería y mayor número de mosqueteros— se mostró superior al orden tradicional. En consecuencia, los ejércitos imperiales derrotados, dirigidos por Wallenstein, adoptaron la técnica sueca. En Lützen, ambos bandos estaban desplegados más o menos de la misma forma y la batalla terminó en tablas. Por un afortunado azar, han sobrevivido dos esquemas contemporáneos de las líneas de batalla en Lützen: uno (arriba) del bando protestante (aunque es anónimo, el *munitionslager* se menciona como *vom Feind*, «del enemigo»); el otro (*abajo*) realizado tal vez por el propio Wallenstein y que le fue entregado a Pappenheim (se encontró en poder del conde muerto, manchado con su sangre, después de la batalla). Se aprecia que el flanco derecho de Wallenstein ocupaba la aldea de Lützen y los molinos de viento, mientras que la posición de Gustavo Adolfo (*König* en el mapa de arriba en la parte inferior derecha) se hallaba en el flanco opuesto, razón por la cual su monumento funerario se halla situado en la actualidad a unos tres kilómetros de la aldea. La masiva artillería sueca, que provocó tan graves pérdidas entre las tropas imperiales, aparece en el centro de su formación (*Samptstücke*) en el «esquema protestante». (Esquema de arriba procedente de Krigsarkivet, *Sveriges Krig*, 3:86. Estocolmo; esquema de abajo, de Heeresgeschichtiches Museum, Kat. Erben/John 1903, nr 75/3. Viena.)



In Bauier men not left to bury the dead, but
Rattes. and mice. devoured there carcasses.
Haue pittey vpon me, haue pittey vpon me, o yee my
frends for the hand of the Lord hath touched me.
GERMANY

Priests slaine at the Altare
Croats eate Children
Noses & eares Cut of to make hatbandes
Snailes and froges eagerly eaten
Eatinge dead mens guts and Interalls
A diuines wife saw 6 of her Children ley starued before her eyes. Corne 2 pounds 15 shilling a bushell.

23 *a*, *b* y *c*. *Las lamentaciones de Alemania*. Un folleto inglés sobre la guerra publicado en 1638, con el título *The lamentations of Germany*, incluye cartas de algunos ministros protestantes en el Palatinado a sus colegas exiliados en Londres. Pero el texto principal era un largo informe sobre «la miserable situación de Alemania», elaborado por el refugiado G. R. Weckerlin, con títulos como «De las torturas y tormentos», «De las violaciones y raptos», «Del derramamiento de sangre y las matanzas». He aquí algunas de las menos terroríficas ilustraciones que acompañaban su terrible relato de la inhumanidad del hombre para con el hombre. (Procedente de *The lamentations of Germany*, Londres, 1638, láminas de las pp. a2, 26, 61.)



24 *a* y *b*. *En la corte de Cristián IV*. Un extracto del diario del consejero de Cristián, Esge Brock, durante la visita del monarca a Noruega en 1604. Las cruces que aparecen al final de cada anotación registran el grado de intoxicación al final de cada velada. La anotación del 20 de julio, en la página de abajo a la derecha dice así: «Su Majestad y nosotros fuimos huéspedes del alcalde y del consejo (de Bergen) en el ayuntamiento. Luego, esa misma noche, entramos en la ciudad y fuimos a la casa de Jørgen Friis y Mogens Gøye. ¡Libera nos domine! Las cuatro cruces y la jaculatoria parecen indicar una noche de excesos sin parangón que dejó con resaca incluso a un bebedor de tanto aguante como Brock. La corte real marca la tónica de gran consumo de alcohol, que fue habitual en la Europa protestante. (Procedente de Rigsarkivet, Privatarkiver n.° 5.212: Esge Brock C: Dagbøger 1604-1622. Copenhague.)

acosados». En Suecia, el Consejo de Regencia criticaba abiertamente su política, lo que llevó a Oxenstierna a lamentarse ante su hermano: «Estas actuaciones me hacen sentirme cansado de la vida».[54] En el exterior, la situación diplomática empeoraba rápidamente, y no sólo como consecuencia de la derrota de Nördlingen. Aunque en 1633, para satisfacción de Suecia, los turcos y los rusos habían atacado Polonia, al año siguiente Polonia y Rusia firmaron la paz cuando los turcos concentraron una vez más sus fuerzas contra Persia. Suecia corría el serio peligro de que cuando expirara la tregua de Altmark, tan favorable para sus intereses, en 1635, no fuera renovada, o cuando menos, no fuera renovada en los mismos términos ventajosos. También la posición de Suecia en el Imperio era crítica. Los miembros de la Liga Heilbronn, en la que se centraba ahora por completo la atención de los imperiales, enviaron una misión diplomática a París en noviembre de 1634 sin conocimiento de Oxenstierna. Allí se mostraron dispuestos a hacer amplias concesiones a cambio de la declaración de guerra contra España y el emperador (véanse los detalles de esta misión en las pp. 217-218). Al mes siguiente, Oxenstierna se retiró de la Liga, a cuyo seno no habría de regresar. Incluso el aliado más antiguo de Suecia, Guillermo de Hesse-Kassel, estaba convencido ahora de que sólo la Francia católica podía salvar la causa protestante. En noviembre de 1634 escribió:

> La Casa de Austria quiere subyugar toda Alemania, extirpando la libertad y la religión reformada. Por eso, en esta situación extrema debemos dirigir nuestra mirada hacia Francia.

El landgrave pretendía incluso elegir como emperador al rey de Francia porque consideraba que sólo así se podían garantizar las «libertades alemanas».[55]

Pero mucho más grave que estas defecciones de la causa fue la pérdida de Sajonia. Tan sólo diez semanas después de la batalla de Nördlingen, las negociaciones de Hesse-Darmstadt y Sajonia con las tropas imperiales (que se trasladaron de Leitmeritz a Pirna durante el verano) desembocaron en un acuerdo. Los «Preliminares de Pirna»

54. Citas tomadas de Roberts, «Oxenstierna in Germany», pp. 86, 98, nota 15.

55. Guillermo V citado por Altmann, *Landgraf Wilhelm V*, p. 84.

ofrecían grandes ventajas a ambos bandos: a Sajonia se le reconocían plenos derechos sobre Lusacia (cedida en 1620 como garantía por la ayuda del elector a Fernando durante la revuelta bohemia) y sobre el territorio de Magdeburgo; se constituiría un solo ejército formado por tropas sajonas, bávaras e imperiales para luchar contra todas las fuerzas extranjeras en el Imperio y se aceptaba la transferencia definitiva del Electorado palatino a Baviera. Sobre todo, se fijó el mes de noviembre de 1627 como «fecha normativa» para la restitución de los territorios eclesiásticos y el ejercicio de las religiones permitidas, compromiso crucial que permitía a los católicos retener sus conquistas en el sur y en el sudoeste pero que ofrecía total seguridad a los territorios secularizados de los príncipes del norte (el Edicto de Restitución quedaba suspendido «durante 40 años»).[56]

Sin embargo, los nuevos éxitos militares sobre el ejército imperial durante el invierno de 1634-1635 debilitaron la posición negociadora de Sajonia. Más tarde, un autor de panfletos protestante afirmaba haber advertido 371 cambios negativos para su religión entre el texto de los «Preliminares de Pirna» y el del acuerdo final, firmado en Praga en mayo de 1635. Juan Jorge aceptó finalmente que se suspendieran los indultos prometidos a la familia del Palatinado, a Hesse-Kassel y a varios otros, así como la imposición del Edicto en muchas otras zonas. Habría habido otras concesiones si las tropas francesas no hubieran invadido el Imperio en el invierno de 1634-1635 para defender Heidelberg de las fuerzas del emperador. Aunque no hubo una declaración de guerra, todo el mundo comprendió en la corte imperial que era necesario firmar la paz con Sajonia antes de que se materializaran nuevos apoyos a la causa protestante. Incluso el nuncio papal en Alemania, que se oponía tajantemente a cualquier acuerdo que supusiera la suspensión del Edicto de Restitución, observó que «si los franceses intervienen en Alemania, el emperador se verá obligado a concluir la paz con Sajonia en los términos que pueda». Así pues, parecía conveniente firmar la paz antes en condiciones más ventajosas. El pragmático primado de Hungría, cardenal Pázmány, se declaró dispuesto a aceptar cualquier acuerdo con Sajonia «en tanto en cuanto la religión

56. Véase el admirable resumen de las condiciones del acuerdo en *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*, IX, Berlín, 1981, p. 180 (por K. Repgen). Cuatro de los nueve «Nebenrezesse» no han sido publicados: véase Bierther, «Zur Edition» (p. 393, *infra*).

católica sea preservada en las provincias patrimoniales sin permitir ningún otro credo».[57]

En febrero de 1635, Fernando presentó sus propuestas de paz a un equipo de 24 teólogos, en el que figuraba su leal confesor. Lamormaini, fiel a la filosofía providencialista que siempre había propugnado en los asuntos que concernían al emperador, argumentó que la gran victoria de Nördlingen era otro signo que demostraba la buena disposición de Dios y pidió que se rechazara cualquier acuerdo de paz con los protestantes. Pero en esta ocasión sólo seis miembros del equipo votaron con él. Los demás veían Nördlingen como una vía de escape y el emperador estaba de acuerdo con la mayoría. Más tarde en ese mismo mes se concluyó un alto el fuego no sólo con Sajonia sino también con Brandemburgo, resentido todavía contra Suecia a propósito de Pomerania. La paz de Praga se hizo pública, entre el general regocijo, el 30 de mayo de 1635. El ejército de Sajonia, que ocupaba todavía algunas partes de Silesia, se integró en las fuerzas imperiales (al igual que las tropas de Baviera, con gran disgusto de Maximiliano) y la mayor parte de los Estados luteranos se apresuraron a firmar la paz con el emperador en los mismos términos que los dos electores protestantes. El coronel Brandenstein, cuya distribución de tierras católicas a los ejércitos protestantes había causado tantas desgracias, fue hecho prisionero y murió como deudor, en 1640, en una cárcel de Sajonia. Quienes, como Guillermo de Hesse-Kassel, rechazaron la reconciliación y aceptaron las grandilocuentes promesas (luego incumplidas) de Francia y de Holanda, fueron atacados y destruidos sin piedad por los nuevos y más numerosos ejércitos imperiales. El landgrave calvinista fue expulsado de su territorio por una fuerza comandada por su rival luterano Jorge de Hesse-Darmstadt. Murió arruinado en el exilio. Más tarde ese mismo año, fue sitiado el gran campamento fortificado situado en las afueras de Maguncia, el Gustavsburg, y en enero de 1636 se rindió la guarnición de 5.000 hombres. Sólo Hanau defendía ahora la causa protestante en Renania y en 1637 también cayó a pesar de las formidables defensas con que contaba y de su desesperada resistencia. Los suecos ya habían abandonado Bremen y Verden, en el noroeste, a su antiguo enemigo Cristián IV de Dinamarca.

La paz de Praga constituyó un hito importante en la Guerra de

57. Citado por Repgen, *Römische Kurie*, pp. 337 n. 124, 333 n. 116 y 335-336.

los Treinta Años. Por una parte, limitó la importancia del aspecto religioso de la guerra. En adelante, los protestantes no se vieron enfrentados a los católicos en bloques casi monolíticos y los católicos ultramontanos no monopolizaron la política imperial. En este sentido, el rechazo de las opiniones tan explícita y tenazmente expresadas por Lamormaini fue de importancia crucial. La política imperial se hallaba ahora en manos de hombres pragmáticos, como Trauttmannsdorf (director del Consejo Privado Imperial desde 1637) que comprendía que era necesario hacer sacrificios si se quería recuperar las conquistas del decenio de 1620. Sin embargo, la firma de la paz con los luteranos alemanes no fue únicamente un triunfo de los pragmáticos, sino que constituyó también la reivindicación de la política de Olivares que, durante un decenio, había instado al emperador a llegar a un acuerdo con sus enemigos internos para destruir a los enemigos del exterior y desplegar sus recursos contra Holanda y, si era necesario, contra Francia. Pero el júbilo español ante la paz de Praga fue efímero. La destrucción del ejército sueco en Nördlingen, a la que siguió rápidamente la defección de muchos de sus aliados, parecía cuestionar la capacidad de Oxenstierna para orquestar con éxito la oposición a las fuerzas imperiales, sobre todo si éstas podían seguir contando con la ayuda de España. En consecuencia, el monarca de Francia declaró la guerra a Felipe IV el mismo mes en que se firmó la paz de Praga.

IV. La «guerra de diversión» de Francia

La declaración de guerra de Francia contra España el mes de mayo de 1635 se produjo tras el apresamiento del elector de Tréveris, aliado francés, por una columna de soldados españoles el 26 de marzo. El Consejo de Estado de Luis XIII, en su análisis del acontecimiento, concluyó que «el rey no puede evitar tomar las armas para vengar la afrenta que ha recibido como consecuencia del arresto de un príncipe que se halla bajo su protección».[58] Los españoles argumentaron que ese episodio del elector de Tréveris era simplemente un pretexto y que Francia estaba decidida de cualquier forma a hacer la guerra a España. En cierto sentido tenían razón: un informe secreto de Luis XIII al cardenal Richelieu, con fecha de 4 de agosto de 1634,

58. A. Leman, *Urbain VIII et la rivalité de la France et de la maison d'Autriche de 1631 à 1635*, Lille y París, 1920, p. 492.

analizaba en profundidad la eventualidad de «una enérgica guerra abierta contra España para asegurar una paz general positiva».[59] Sin embargo, Luis XIII estaba convencido de que los españoles pretendían invadir Francia cuando les resultara conveniente, y también él tenía razón. El Consejo de Estado español había discutido el 13 de abril de 1634 la posibilidad de declarar la guerra a Francia y aunque se desestimó, un mes más tarde el gobierno de España firmó una alianza con Gaston de Orleans, pretendiente al trono de Francia, que se hallaba exiliado en los Países Bajos españoles.[60] En tan tensa situación, había poderosas razones que justificaban un ataque francés que permitiera situar el campo de batalla en los territorios de los Habsburgo en lugar de tener que entablar una guerra defensiva «en las entrañas de Francia».[61] (Véase lámina 16.)

Así pues, ambos bandos estaban más o menos preparados para el comienzo de las hostilidades. Entre 1630 y 1635, el gobierno francés había establecido acuerdos con una serie de aliados que, casi con toda seguridad, provocarían en algún momento un conflicto internacional. La más célebre de estas alianzas es la que se estableció con la República de Holanda (desde junio de 1624 existía un acuerdo para la concesión de un subsidio, acuerdo que fue renovado en junio de 1630, mientras que la cuantía del subsidio se incrementó en abril de 1634) y con Suecia (después de enero de 1631; se interrumpió temporalmente con la muerte de Gustavo Adolfo, en razón de que era un acuerdo entre dos monarcas y quedaba derogada por la muerte de uno de ellos, pero fue renovada en abril de 1633). El objetivo de estas alianzas era luchar contra los Habsburgo de forma indirecta y evitar una intervención directa de Francia en la Guerra de los Treinta Años, pues ésa era una cuestión duramente controvertida en la política interna. En la *Journée de Dupes*, los enemigos de Richelieu estuvieron a punto de derrocarle y las críticas a su política exterior —en especial a la intervención en la guerra de Mantua— ocupaban un lugar preeminente entre sus agravios. La amenaza que planteaba la conspiración interna

59. *Acta Pacis Westphalicae*, I, pp. 18-20: Luis XIII a Richelieu, 4 de agosto de 1634. Las opiniones del rey eran calificadas como «alto secreto»: «âme qui vive ne les a veues», dice el documento. [«Ninguna alma viviente las ha visto».]

60. Leman, *Urbain VIII et la rivalité*, p. 382.

61. A. J. du Plessis, Cardenal de Richelieu, *Mémoires*, ed. J. F. Michaud y J. J. F. Poujoulat, 2.ª serie, VIII, París, 1838, p. 437: «une longue guerre dans ses entrailles ...» [«Una larga guerra en sus entrañas ...».]

fue un elemento que influyó decisivamente para retrasar la intervención francesa en el conflicto alemán.

Entre las restantes consideraciones estratégicas hay que citar la vulnerabilidad de la frontera francesa a una posible invasión y la proximidad de dos estados clientes de los Habsburgo (Saboya y Lorena) cuyos duques habían dado asilo y habían ayudado de otras formas a los opositores aristocráticos del gobierno francés. Luis XIII y Richelieu decidieron asestar el primer golpe contra Carlos Manuel de Saboya, que en 1628 cometió el terrible error de intentar la partición de Monferrato con España a expensas del candidato francés, duque de Nevers. Con la connivencia del papado, el ejército francés invadió Saboya por dos veces en 1629-1630 y retuvo primero la fortaleza de Susa y, después, la más importante de Pinerolo. Víctor Amadeo I, que sucedió a su padre como duque en 1630, aceptó la transferencia permanente de Pinerolo a Francia (en contra de las cláusulas de la paz de Cherasco, que estipulaban que Francia y España abandonarían todas sus conquistas) y en 1635 Saboya fue uno de los pocos estados que ingresó en la liga de inspiración francesa contra el poder de los Habsburgo en Italia.

La disputa con Carlos IV de Lorena fue más compleja. En parte, era un enfrentamiento por cuestiones de jurisdicción: el ducado de Bar era considerado como un feudo de la corona francesa en el que el duque Carlos no había prestado homenaje (no lo hizo hasta 1641); asimismo, el monarca francés afirmaba que otros territorios habían sido «usurpados» a su soberanía. Por su parte, el emperador sustentaba que el ducado de Lorena era pura y simplemente un feudo del Imperio. Estas disputas no habrían alcanzado gran importancia si el duque Carlos no hubiera dado asilo a Gaston de Orleans en dos ocasiones en sus territorios durante los años 1629-1632 y no le hubiera concedido la mano de Margarita de Lorena, hermana del duque, sin contar con la autorización de Luis XIII. Además, en febrero de 1630 el duque había permitido que las tropas imperiales ocuparan las dos fortalezas de Vic y Moyenvic, que dominaban el camino desde Estrasburgo hasta Nancy. En diciembre de 1631, Luis XIII dio un ultimátum para la retirada de esas tropas imperiales, que fue ignorado y, en consecuencia, durante los dos años siguientes se produjeron tres invasiones de las tropas francesas. En cada ocasión, el duque se rindió, aceptó no ayudar a los Habsburgo y concedió garantías territoriales, pero por tres veces se retractó de su promesa. Finalmente, en 1634 desapareció

cualquier vestigio de resistencia al ejército de ocupación de Luis XIII, se instaló una administración francesa y el duque tuvo que partir para el exilio, convirtiéndose en un general Habsburgo. Su exilio se prolongaría durante 28 años, con una breve interrupción en 1641.

De esta forma, el monarca francés fortaleció sus fronteras en Saboya y Lorena neutralizando, o expulsando, a un vecino en quien no podía confiar. Sin embargo, a partir de diciembre de 1631, Francia amplió su ofensiva: Luis XIII protegería a todos los príncipes católicos que necesitaran su ayuda, ya fuera contra las tropas españolas o suecas. De los tres electorados eclesiásticos de Renania, sólo Tréveris aceptó su oferta, pero ese territorio era de la mayor importancia estratégica. Los puntos clave eran las grandes fortalezas de Coblenza y Ehrenbreitstein, junto con Philippsburg, que pertenecía al elector en su condición de obispo de Speyer. En abril de 1632, Gustavo Adolfo reconoció la neutralidad del Electorado y aceptó que los bastiones clave fueran ocupados por los franceses (los dos primeros lo fueron en mayo y junio de 1632, mientras que Philippsburg no conoció la presencia de los franceses hasta agosto de 1634 y su reconquista por las tropas de los Habsburgo en enero de 1635 fue uno de los factores que precipitó la intervención francesa en la guerra). Ahora bien, Tréveris fue tan sólo un ensayo en el sistema de protección francés: una vez terminada la guerra, recuperaría su *status* anterior en el seno del Imperio. El mismo principio presidió los subsiguientes tratados de protección con los príncipes protestantes de Alsacia en 1633-1636. Pero la complejidad de las jurisdicciones territoriales rivales en Alsacia, los intereses encontrados de Francia, los cantones suizos y los Habsburgo y el vacío de poder derivado de la lejanía de la autoridad archiducal facilitaron la imposición gradual del control de Francia, tanto político como militar. Hasta la batalla de Nördlingen, Francia deseaba disponer en Alsacia simplemente de la autoridad suficiente para garantizarse el acceso al Rin; pero después de ese episodio necesitaba urgentemente poder mantener a los Habsburgo más allá de la orilla oriental del río. En consecuencia, Richelieu forzó más enérgicamente la protección de Francia sobre los estados de Alsacia entre 1634 y 1636 y tomó las medidas necesarias para consolidar los derechos que había adquirido, hasta imponer un dominio total.

El momento preciso en que se produjo la declaración de guerra entre Francia y España estuvo determinado por consideraciones tácticas: la brillante campaña del cardenal-infante, que indujo a España a man-

tener la paz en 1634, fue causa de que Francia la rompiera en 1635. La derrota y dispersión del ejército sueco en Nördlingen y el hundimiento de la Liga Heilbronn exigían una intervención decisiva de Francia para impedir la capitulación de los suecos. Pero al principio, Francia intentó que su intervención fuera limitada e indirecta. Francia entablaría una poderosa «guerra de diversión», pero limitaría al máximo su compromiso en Alemania. El principio que animaba esta estrategia era la convicción de que el rey de España, y no el emperador, constituía la amenaza más grave para la seguridad europea. El gobierno francés consideraba que si se debilitaba decisivamente el poder de Felipe IV el emperador no podría seguir haciendo la guerra «según los caprichos y el deseo de los españoles».[62] Naturalmente, los franceses estaban comprometidos a mantener «la libertad y la paz en Alemania», justa satisfacción para todas las partes interesadas en una Dieta Imperial libre (en la que los franceses participarían plenamente) y a firmar una alianza interconfesional contra el intento de establecer una monarquía Habsburgo en Alemania. Por otra parte, Richelieu no había perdido de vista el objetivo de apartar a Maximiliano de Baviera de la alianza Habsburgo a cambio de permitirle conservar el título electoral. Pero la declaración de guerra de Francia iba dirigida contra España y no contra el emperador. Cuando los franceses lucharon en Alemania en 1635 lo hicieron bajo la autoridad nominal (*sous le nom*) de Suecia y se mantuvo un control estricto de las acciones de las tropas francesas en el Imperio.[63]

Desde la muerte de Gustavo Adolfo, Richelieu había pensado siempre que el mando general de Alemania debía recaer en la persona de Bernardo de Sajonia-Weimar como general más experimentado con un ejército mercenario a su disposición. Sin embargo, en su condición de luterano, con sus ambiciones territoriales y dinásticas, no se le podía confiar el mando de las tropas francesas. En consecuencia, las fuerzas francesas de Lorena y Alemania en 1635 tenían sus propios comandantes (el duque de La Force y el cardenal de La Valette respectivamente, con el vizconde de Turena como segundo comandante), su propio sistema de abastecimiento y unas finanzas independientes controladas por intendentes del ejército francés. De esta forma, si el duque Bernardo protagonizaba un súbito cambio de bando, ello supondría un duro golpe, pero no el desastre total, para el esfuerzo de guerra francés. Se han hecho diversos cálculos sobre la importancia de las fuerzas francesas en todos los frentes durante los años 1634-1636. La estimación más modesta es la de 9.500 soldados de caballería y 115.000 de infantería, pero es difícil saber con seguridad si tan siquiera esas fuerzas fueron realmente movilizadas, pues no se han conservado las listas de las revistas. Dado que se enviaron a la campaña de 1635 en los Países Bajos 6.000 soldados de caballería y 20.000 de infantería y que se mandaron otras fuerzas a Saboya y la Valtelina, la conclusión es que los ejércitos franceses que operaban en Lorena y Alemania eran relativamente reducidos. En 1635 hubo que reclutar 12.000 hombres para defender Lorena de la amenaza de una ofensiva imperial y se esperaba reclutar 15.000 soldados de caballería y 35.000 infantes para liberar Corbie en 1636. La mayor parte de las fuerzas francesas luchaban fuera de Alemania en los comienzos de la guerra y las pérdidas fueron catastróficas en algunos frentes: en la campaña de los Países Bajos de 1635, el ejército francés quedó reducido de 26.000 a 8.000 hombres.[64]

Como consecuencia de los importantes compromisos que mantenían en diversos frentes, los franceses se comportaron con cautela en Alemania. De hecho, la declaración de guerra contra el emperador se retrasó hasta que el pacto franco-sueco fue renovado en Wismar en marzo de 1636. Todo esto no agradó en absoluto a los suecos. Francia estaba comprometida todavía a mantener la alianza sueca, a asegurarse de que Suecia conseguía Pomerania para «mantener un estrecha vigilancia sobre ... la Casa de Austria» e incluso a apoyar la posición de Suecia una vez conseguida la paz, si ello era necesario,[65] pero no estaba dispuesta a dejar a Suecia libertad total para conducir una guerra en la que la intervención francesa en hombres y dinero era verdaderamente ingente. Es cierto que Feuquières, el embajador francés extraordinario en Alemania, se ofreció a incrementar notablemente la ayuda francesa en un momento determinado, pero incluso los enviados de

62. *Acta Pacis Westphalicae*, I, 47 (febrero/marzo de 1637).

63. Richelieu, *Mémoires*, p. 620: «parce que Sa Majesté n'ayant point de guerre declarée contra l'Empereur ...». [«Porque Su Majestad, no habiendo declarado guerra alguna contra el Emperador ...».]

64. Montglat da cifras de la importancia de las fuerzas del ejército y de las pérdidas: Montglat, *Mémoires*, ed. J. F. Michaud y J. J. F. Poujoulat, 3.ª ser., V, París, 1838, pp. 27, 30. Sobre las estimaciones del ministro de Finanzas del número total de soldados del ejército francés, véase Bonney, *The King's Debts*, p. 173 n. 3.

65. *Acta Pacis Westphalicae*, I, p. 47.

la Liga Heilbronn a París, en noviembre de 1634, vieron que lo que se les ofrecía no era ni mucho menos la declaración de guerra de Francia contra el emperador. A cambio de la garantía de ayuda durante veinte años en caso de ataque después de la paz, Suecia tenía que renunciar a la dirección de la guerra y al subsidio francés. No puede sorprender que Oxenstierna se negara a ratificar el acuerdo y Feuquières recibió la orden de suprimir el apoyo francés hasta que lo hiciera. Tampoco el enviado especial de Suecia, Hugo Grocio, consiguió concesiones de los franceses, ante lo cual el propio Oxenstierna se vio obligado a visitar a Luis XIII y a su ministro en la primavera de 1635. Richelieu encontró al canciller sueco «un tanto godo y muy astuto»[66] y el resultado de la entrevista fue el tratado de Compiègne de 28 de abril, por el que ambos bandos se comprometían a ayudar a los protestantes en Alemania por medio de las armas, sin concluir una paz por separado o un armisticio. Pero nada se especificó sobre la importancia del ejército francés ni la cuantía del subsidio y así siguieron las cosas hasta el tratado de Wismar de marzo de 1636. Además, Richelieu intentó atraer al servicio de Francia a antiguos comandantes suecos, y en el verano de 1635 se había hecho ya con los servicios de Bernardo de Sajonia-Weimar. El 27 de octubre se firmó un acuerdo formal en virtud del cual Bernardo recibiría 1,6 millones de táleros anuales (aproximadamente cuatro veces más que el subsidio francés a Suecia) a cambio de mantener un ejército de 18.000 hombres en el campo de batalla. A partir de ese momento, las operaciones militares en el sur de Alemania estuvieron firmemente controladas por Francia.

La relativa facilidad con la que Bernardo abandonó a los Vasa para ofrecer su lealtad a los Borbones (en la primavera de 1636 se hallaba en París para recibir órdenes) pone de relieve la fortaleza y la debilidad de la posición de Francia. La debilidad radicaba en la falta de comandantes experimentados y de tropas bregadas en el campo de batalla. Montglat, un oficial de segundo rango que sirvió en la mayor parte de las campañas y cuyas memorias constituyen un buen relato de la guerra, afirma que en 1636 cualquier francés que hubiera servido en los Países Bajos era escuchado como si fuera un oráculo. Los franceses, concluía, habían olvidado las artes de la guerra en un largo período de paz.[67] Sus comentarios pueden parecer sorprendentes si pensamos en las guerras civiles francesas del decenio de 1620, en la intervención en la Valtelina en 1624-1626, en la participación en la guerra de Mantua en 1628-1631 y en la ocupación de Lorena en 1632-1634, pero en todos estos casos las campañas habían sido de corta duración y muy pocas veces se habían saldado con un éxito total. Los franceses hubieron de esperar hasta 1643 para conseguir su primera gran victoria contra los españoles en una confrontación directa (en Rocroi).

66. Richelieu utilizaba el término «finlandés» (*finnois*), pero era un juego de palabras con «astuto» (*finaud*). Véase Avenel, ed., *Lettres, instructions diplomatiques*, IV, p. 735.

Sin embargo, la gran fortaleza de la posición francesa derivaba, al menos en parte, del papel relativamente pasivo que había jugado en el conflicto alemán entre 1618 y 1635. Cuando Francia se involucró en el conflicto tenía todas sus energías intactas y la capacidad de financiar la guerra en varios frentes al mismo tiempo. De hecho, una de las razones por las que Richelieu había retrasado la intervención en la Guerra de los Treinta Años lo máximo posible era precisamente (aparte de la necesidad de hacer frente a las críticas dirigidas a su política y a la rebelión aristocrática en el interior) la de mejorar la posición financiera de la monarquía francesa y su capacidad para mantener una guerra larga. Así, en 1635, cuando la causa de los suecos y los protestantes en Alemania pasaba por sus peores momentos, se produjo el aflujo de grandes cantidades de dinero que ni el emperador ni el rey de España podían aportar (véase cuadro 4). Con la tasa de cambio existente, los gastos de guerra franceses en todos los frentes (incluido el Mediterráneo) en 1635 equivalían a 16,5 millones de táleros. El gasto medio de los años 1636-1639 se situó escasamente por debajo de los 13 millones anuales, para aumentar hasta poco menos de 16 millones en los años 1640-1645.[68] Ciertamente, era ésta una poderosa «guerra de diversión». No hay que pensar que el éxito militar acompaña necesariamente al aflujo de dinero, pero en una larga guerra de desgaste, como lo fue la guerra de Alemania, era importante contar con nuevas aportaciones económicas en las últimas fases del conflicto. Sin duda, fue un factor nuevo que influyó en el equilibrio de poder.

De hecho, los franceses no obtuvieron prácticamente éxito alguno en las dos primeras campañas. En 1635 Francia esperaba que si ases-

67. Montglat, *Mémoires*, pp. 41-42.

68. Bonney, *The King's Debts*, pp. 306-307. La conversión de la moneda se basa en J. J. McCusker, *Money and Exchange in Europe and America, 1600-1715*, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1978.

CUADRO 4

Gastos militares de Francia, 1618-1648

Año	Gastos militares en millones de táleros	Acontecimiento de política interna	Guerra exterior
1618	3,2		
1619	4,5	Revuelta	
1620	5,2	de la reina madre	
1621	7,5	Revuelta	
1622	9,0	de los hugonotes	
1623	4,8		
1624	4,6		
1625	6,9	2.ª revuelta	Guerra
1626	4,9	de los hugonotes	de la Valtelina
1627	5,7	3.ª revuelta	Invasión inglesa
1628	7,8	de los	Guerra de Sucesión
1629	7,4	hugonotes	de Mantua
1630	9,2		
1631	6,0	Revuelta de Gastón	
1632	7,4	de Orleans	Ocupación
1633	6,7		de Lorena
1634	9,9		
1635	16,5		Declaración de guerra a España
1636	13,5		Invasiones de Francia
1637	11,0		por los Habsburgo
1638	12,8		Breisach
1639	12,8	Revuelta campesina (Normandía)	
1640	12,5		
1641	13,4	Revuelta del conde de Soissons	Ayuda francesa a los catalanes
1642	13,0	Conspiración de Cinq-Mars	
1643	19,4	Intriga de los *Importants*	Rocroi; Tuttlingen
1644	19,0		Friburgo
1645	18,0		Allerheim
1646	15,4		
1647	15,8		
1648	13,0	Comienzo de la Fronda	Zusmarshausen Lens

FUENTE: R. J. Bonney, *The King's Debts. Finance and Politics in France, 1589-1661*, Oxford, 1981, apéndice 2, cuadro 2.

taba un súbito golpe contra la posición española en los Países Bajos, en Italia, y en la Valtelina, debilitaría decisivamente la posición de Felipe IV e impulsaría la rebelión de sus pocos leales súbditos, en especial en los Países Bajos españoles (como había estado a punto de ocurrir en 1632). Sin embargo, no se produjo un levantamiento similar al que había ocurrido en tierras de Borgoña en 1477. Cuando finalmente estalló la rebelión, en 1640, lo hizo inesperadamente en la Península Ibérica. La campaña franco-holandesa de 1635 constituyó un fracaso total —no se consiguió ninguno de los objetivos, y por supuesto, tampoco la división de los Países Bajos españoles— y terminó con recriminaciones mutuas por parte de los aliados. El ejército español de Flandes consiguió reconquistar varias ciudades y rechazar a los invasores franceses (que tuvieron que ser evacuados por mar por los holandeses). En 1636, cuando el ejército de Flandes invadió Francia, el ejército holandés no hizo nada para hostigarlo. Tampoco se consiguieron éxitos de relieve en Italia, hasta que los franceses consiguieron liberar Turín en 1639 y desplazar la guerra hasta las fronteras de Lombardía. La ocupación francesa de la Valtelina, dirigida por Rohan (el antiguo líder hugonote) comenzó con buenos augurios hasta que, en 1637, la falta de pago de los subsidios provocó un levantamiento general en los valles contra todas las fuerzas extranjeras. Bernardo de Sajonia-Weimar y el cardenal de La Valette encabezaron una invasión francesa coordinada en el sur de Alemania en septiembre de 1635, pero el comandante imperial Gallas consiguió cortar casi por completo las líneas de comunicación cerca de Frankfurt del Main y los invasores tuvieron que realizar una dura marcha de tres días hasta verse nuevamente a salvo en Lorena.

No ha de sorprender que Richelieu no pudiera disimular su disgusto ante la falta de éxito de la primera campaña francesa. Al parecer, se mostró «atónito» ante el fracaso militar, a pesar de los «muchos millones» dedicados al esfuerzo de guerra.[69] En febrero de 1636 acusó a los ministros de Finanzas de retrasos injustificados en las transferencias de los fondos: «Digo esto ... sin [pretender entablar] una disputa pero con gran resentimiento y disgusto: ... las cosas no funcionan como lo requiere el servicio al monarca y el bienestar del Estado ...».[70] Los ministros replicaron que no podían hacer más y que

69. Montglat, *Mémoires*, p. 38.
70. Avenel, *Lettres... de Richelieu*, V, p. 965.

temían una bancarrota general que obligaría a Francia a retirarse de la guerra en términos desventajosos e implicaría el fin de la «guerra de diversión».[71] El rey se vio obligado a elegir entre sus ministros, por cuanto el intendente de finanzas Bullion acusó del fracaso a Abel Servien, que había sido ministro de la Guerra durante casi seis años. En definitiva, Servien se vio obligado a dimitir en marzo de 1636. Su sustituto, que permaneció en el cargo hasta abril de 1643, fue François Sublet des Noyers. Este hombre contaba ya con una valiosa experiencia financiera y militar (como intendente del ejército había contribuido a planear una nueva línea de defensa en el norte de Francia), que resultaría de enorme importancia en la crisis de 1636.

La segunda campaña de Francia comenzó de forma muy diferente. Bernardo de Sajonia-Weimar trató de avanzar hacia Alsacia, donde los franceses tenían ya protectorados, y Condé sitió Dôle en el Franco Condado. A finales del otoño, la lucha se había convertido en huida: en los últimos días de octubre, Condé se vio obligado a retirarse para impedir que Dijon fuese capturado por una fuerza comandada por Gallas y el avance de las tropas imperiales se vio detenido tanto por la resistencia francesa como por la victoria sueca en Wittstock y el desbordamiento del río Saona. También en el norte de Francia, el avance de los ejércitos de los Habsburgo fue espectacular, en parte como resultado de la precipitada capitulación de tres fortalezas cuyos comandantes fueron condenados a muerte por cobardía (Le Bec de La Capelle, Saint Léger de Le Câtelet y Soyecourt de Corbie). Esta fuerza invasora, formada por unidades españolas e imperiales, avanzó desde los Países Bajos del Sur y el 15 de agosto alcanzó Corbie, ciudad situada en el río Somme, a unos 80 km de París. Corbie no fue reconquistada hasta el 9 de noviembre (véase mapa 3). Si la planeada invasión del Languedoc desde España se hubiera producido en ese momento, en lugar de ser retrasada hasta 1637, el reino de Francia se habría visto abocado a una rendición deshonrosa. Pero los Habsburgo perdieron la gran oportunidad que se presentó para su causa en 1636. En comparación con el *année de Corbie,* las invasiones subsiguientes de Francia fueron asuntos de poca monta.

Pero durante los tres años siguientes, el resultado de la guerra estuvo indeciso. En el caso de Francia se combinaba una estrategia muy

71. AMAE, Mémoires et Documents: France, vol. 820, f. 131: Bullion y Bouthillier a Richelieu, 22 de febrero de 1636.

ambiciosa con la falta de generales adecuados y una máquina militar sin la necesaria preparación.[72] Los grandes generales franceses —Harcourt, Condé, Turena— eran todavía simples soldados o bien no contaban con los recursos necesarios para destacar. Uno de los escasos éxitos que conoció el ejército francés durante los primeros cuatro años de la guerra fue la ocupación de Breisach por Bernardo de Sajonia-Weimar en diciembre de 1638, pero incluso esa victoria habría sido un beneficio ilusorio para Francia si el vencedor no hubiera muerto en el mes de julio siguiente sin dejar un heredero, pues Francia se había comprometido a permitir que Bernardo estableciera su propia dinastía en las zonas de Alsacia que conquistara con la ayuda del dinero de Luis XIII. Al morir sin heredero, Francia se encontró con todos los beneficios y pocos de los peligros de esa política.[73] El sucesor de Bernardo, Erlach, era también luterano y los franceses temían que pudiera volver a una alianza con los suecos,[74] pero su lealtad nunca flaqueó porque los franceses pagaron los subsidios regularmente y, en cualquier caso, no se le concedieron los derechos dinásticos que se habían reconocido a Bernardo.

Aunque las grandes victorias francesas en la guerra contra los Habsburgo no se produjeron hasta después de la revuelta de los catalanes en mayo de 1640, los años de la «guerra de diversión» no habían sido totalmente infructuosos. Ciertamente, Francia no consiguió imponer su solución en la guerra por las libertades alemanas; eso habría exigido la resurrección del poder militar sueco y la renuncia de la paz de Praga por los príncipes protestantes alemanes. Sin embargo, aportó un importante apoyo práctico a la causa protestante (aunque a un terrible coste en impuestos en el interior y en destrucción de vidas y propiedades en el exterior) mediante la creación de «vías de penetración» en Alemania, como Ehrenbreitstein, Philippsburg y, sobre todo, Breisach. La importancia real de la «guerra de diversión» fue que impidió que se produjera otro Nördlingen: una solución militar Habsburgo para la Guerra de los Treinta Años.

72. Véase, por ejemplo, el comentario de Montglat de que el viejo Condé, «quoique grand politique, n'entendoit point la guerre...» (Montglat, *Mémoires*, p. 41). [«Si bien era un gran político, no entendía la guerra...»]

73. Livet, *L'intendance d'Alsace sous Louis XIV*, pp. 68, 78-79.

74. AMAE, Mémoires et Documents: France, vol. 834, fol. 11v. Bullion a Richelieu, 1639, tras la muerte de Bernardo de Sajonia-Weimar, quien, según Bullion, tenía «dans l'esprit les fantazie[s]» [«en el espíritu las fantasías»].

Capítulo V

EL CAMINO HACIA LA PAZ

Hubo tres fases críticas en el proceso por el cual la revuelta de Bohemia se transformó en un gran conflicto europeo. La primera fue la participación de Federico del Palatinado y España en 1619; la segunda, la invasión sueca de Pomerania en 1630 y la tercera fue, paradójicamente, la paz de Praga. Puesto que la paz de mayo de 1635 sirvió para reconciliar al emperador con muchos de sus enemigos, la oposición a los Habsburgo fue protagonizada a partir de aquel momento casi exclusivamente por los extranjeros. Como pone de relieve el cuadro 5, no se trata de que hubiera más países extranjeros implicados en la guerra. De hecho, su número disminuyó. Fue más bien la actitud de los intervencionistas la que varió. Eran pocos los que fuera del Imperio hablaban ahora sinceramente de la «causa protestante» y tampoco eran muy numerosos los que sentían un entusiasmo auténtico por las «libertades alemanas». Para los estadistas que ahora dominaban la guerra, Alemania era fundamentalmente un teatro de operaciones. Poco les importaba los costes y las consecuencias que su política pudiera tener para el Imperio; lo fundamental era su beneficio y su prestigio.

Es natural considerar a Richelieu y (a partir de 1643) a Mazarino como ejemplos típicos de la nueva *realpolitik*, pero a ese respecto fueron menos influyentes que Oxenstierna. Francia luchaba en varios frentes, dividiendo su fuerza casi a partes iguales entre Italia, España, los Países Bajos y el Imperio; su inferioridad frente a Suecia era manifiesta. Esa inferioridad se manifestaba con toda claridad en la importancia de los ejércitos que se oponían al emperador: Oxenstierna controlaba prácticamente dos veces más hombres que Mazarino. Incluso

en 1648, en los momentos finales de la guerra, había en el Imperio 127 guarniciones suecas, 52 francesas y 43 de Hesse, que representaban, junto con los ejércitos para la lucha en campo abierto, un total de 915 compañías suecas, 432 francesas y 224 de Hesse.[1] Suecia llevaba la iniciativa en las últimas etapas de la guerra, de la misma forma que ésta había correspondido al emperador en el decenio de 1620. A raíz de la paz de Praga, si no antes, sus objetivos y sus exigencias eran fundamentales tanto para la marcha de la guerra como para la firma de la paz. En consecuencia, para poder comprender el desarrollo de la segunda mitad de la guerra es fundamental conocer los debates sobre política exterior que se desarrollaron con cierta acritud durante casi diez años en el seno del Consejo de Regencia de Suecia.

I. El dilema sueco

Con la muerte de Gustavo Adolfo, el carácter de la implicación de Suecia en la guerra alemana se transformó de forma inmediata. Sin más dilación, se abandonaron los planes que contemplaba el monarca para alterar la constitución del Imperio. Ya antes de su muerte, los miembros del Consejo en Estocolmo afirmaron que Suecia había conseguido sus objetivos de guerra y que nada justificaba la continuación de la misma. Esa opinión no era compartida por Oxenstierna. Ciertamente, coincidía con sus colegas en la creencia de que Suecia debía dejar de luchar, pero no siempre estaba de acuerdo con ellos respecto a la forma de alcanzar ese objetivo. Aceptando que la meta que debía alcanzarse era la paz quedaban todavía dos importantes interrogantes por despejar: ¿Paz por qué medios? ¿Paz en qué términos? Oxens-

1. KrA, *Historiska planscher, 1648*, 24 folio: «Amore pacis: geographische Carten von gantz Teutschland», que reproducimos en la lám. 17. El manuscrito original se halla en la Kungliga Bibliotheket, Estocolmo, Kartavd. Y50. Una versión inferior del mapa, pero con todo el comentario, fue reeditada en J. G. von Meiern, *Acta pacis westphalicae publica*, VI, Hannover, 1736; reimpresa en Osnabrück, 1969, «Beylage». La localización de las guarniciones resulta muy ilustrativa. El ejército sueco tenía 19 guarniciones en Alsacia, Franconia y Suabia; 29 en territorio bohemio; 24 en Sajonia, Brandemburgo y Magdeburgo; 19 en Westfalia y el Palatinado y no menos de 27 en Pomerania. Las guarniciones francesas estaban todas en el sudoeste; las de Hesse en el noroeste. Sólo los suecos se extendían por todas partes. Las bases imperiales en 1648 aparecen en el mapa incluido en la tesis de Hoyos, «Ernest von Traun».



CUADRO 5
Estados implicados en la Guerra de los Treinta Años

tierna tuvo claro en todo momento que si era posible debía negociar desde una posición de fuerza y aunque las circunstancias le obligaran a infringir ese principio, se apartó de él sólo provisionalmente y con gran renuencia. Por tanto, Suecia debía continuar luchando como camino más seguro hacia la paz pero tenía que alterar sus procedimientos de lucha. Ya a comienzos de 1633 Oxenstierna empezó a completar la retirada de todas las unidades exclusivamente suecas desde Alemania central hacia la costa y estableció el principio de que en adelante la lucha debía ser responsabilidad de los príncipes alemanes. En consecuencia, Suecia «prestaría su nombre» a la guerra, pero en la medida de lo posible no haría nada más. Las hostilidades deberían ser conducidas a través de un elemento intermedio.[2] El principal objetivo para Suecia debería ser ahora el de asegurar su integridad frente a los posibles ataques de sus vecinos: ataques de Dinamarca, pero sobre todo de Polonia. «La guerra polaca —escribió Oxenstierna poco después— es *nuestra* guerra; si se gana o se pierde, será nuestra ganancia o nuestra pérdida. No sé qué es esta guerra alemana, sólo sé que aquí derramamos nuestra sangre por la reputación y que nada salvo gratitud podemos esperar.»[3] En consecuencia, continuaba, «debemos dejar esta cuestión alemana a los alemanes, que serán los únicos que recibirán de ella algún beneficio (si es que existe alguno) y, por tanto, no debemos invertir más hombres y dinero aquí, sino intentar apartarnos por todos los medios».[4]

Esta estimación era calurosamente compartida por los colegas de Oxenstierna en Suecia. Pero, por otra parte, todos estaban de acuerdo en que si debía concluirse la paz, en ella tendrían que estar presentes tres elementos: en primer lugar, la «recompensa y deuda de gratitud» que consideraban que les debían los estados protestantes a los que habían liberado y que concretaban en importantes concesiones territoriales en Alemania; en segundo lugar, la seguridad contra la invasión,

2. [*Nota:* todas las fechas que figuran en la correspondencia que se cita desde la nota 2 a la nota 10, en este capítulo, corresponden al calendario juliano. Para el calendario gregoriano, hay que añadir 10 días.] Oxenstierna al Consejo de Estado, 4 de febrero de 1633, *A[xel] O[xenstiernas] S[krifter och] B[revvexling]*, 1.ª serie, VII, p. 162; cf. *ibid.*, XII, pp. 324-325 (memorándum para Johan Oxenstierna, 28 de agosto de 1634).

3. Oxenstierna a Baner, 28 de octubre de 1634; *AOSB*, 1.ª serie, XII, p. 633.

4. Oxenstierna al Consejo de Estado, 7 de enero de 1635: *AOSB*, 1.ª serie, XIII, p. 27.

que significaba el dominio sueco en los puertos del Báltico; y, finalmente, un concepto más amplio de seguridad que implicaba la destrucción de las pretensiones de los Habsburgo a conseguir una soberanía real en Alemania. Gustavo Adolfo había expresado esta idea al decir: «Estaremos seguros mientras un elector pueda ser un elector en su tierra y un duque sea duque y tenga sus libertades».[5] En consecuencia, había que devolver a Alemania la libertad de que gozaba en 1618, no sólo —ni siquiera fundamentalmente— por bien de la causa protestante, sino en beneficio de Suecia. Pero en este proyecto se olvidaba que en la Alemania de 1618 no había lugar para una recompensa territorial para Suecia.

La Liga Heilbronn (véase mapa 3) parecía cubrir la mayor parte de estos objetivos: se había comprometido a luchar por las libertades alemanas y no dejaría de hacerlo hasta que Suecia no hubiera tenido su compensación. Estaba firmemente controlada por Oxenstierna y representaba la derrota del proyecto de Richelieu de promocionar a Juan Jorge como sucesor de Gustavo Adolfo; y, en teoría, permitía seguir en la lucha indirectamente, a través de un intermediario. Pero para que la Liga pudiera conseguir todo lo que Oxenstierna esperaba de ella, era fundamental ampliarla; los cuatro Círculos de la Alta Alemania eran demasiado débiles, desde el punto de vista militar y financiero, pero sobre todo desde el punto de vista político, para poder hacer frente a la responsabilidad que había previsto para ellos. Esto explica que en la Convención de Frankfurt de 1634 (véase p. 207, *supra*) intentara convencer a los Círculos de la Alta y Baja Sajonia para que se adhirieran a la Liga. En esa tesitura se produjo un choque total entre la necesidad de seguridad y el deseo de obtener compensaciones. En efecto, la negativa de Suecia a olvidar sus aspiraciones sobre Pomerania significó que Jorge Guillermo de Brandemburgo se negara a unirse a la Liga y en esa negativa arrastró a los dos Círculos sajones. Desde ese momento, la Liga Heilbronn estaba condenada. Antes de que terminara la reunión de Frankfurt, la efectividad militar de la Liga recibió un golpe terrible en Nördlingen; antes de que finalizara el año, los Preliminares de Pirna iniciaron el camino de su desintegración. Oxenstierna no conseguiría impedirlo.

5. *Svenska riksraadets protokoll* (Handlingar rörande Skandinaviens Historia, 3.ª serie), VII, pp. 423, 427 (22 de enero de 1639), y VIII, p. 315 (14 de noviembre de 1640), donde se cita esta sentencia.

Se hizo entonces necesario encontrar un sustituto a la Liga Heilbronn. La Alemania central parecía perdida; la tregua de Suecia con Polonia expiraría al año siguiente y el gobierno de Estocolmo, temiendo que se renovara la guerra en ese frente, reclamaba la paz a cualquier precio. Oxenstierna veía con claridad que en el futuro inmediato sólo Francia podía sustituir a la Liga Heilbronn. El paso siguiente a dar era, por tanto, implicar a Richelieu en Alemania y, evitando aceptar compromisos, utilizar a Francia como en otra ocasión lo había hecho con la Liga. Después de la paz de Praga, la posición de Suecia parecía tremendamente difícil: a finales de 1635, prácticamente todos sus antiguos aliados la habían aceptado y sus recursos militares en Alemania se limitaban al reducido ejército de Baner en Pomerania. Suecia se veía enfrentada ahora con el resurgimiento del patriotismo alemán bajo la dirección del emperador, con un deseo universal de paz y con un odio intenso hacia los extranjeros: situación mucho más amenazadora que la de 1629. No puede extrañar que los regentes estuvieran dispuestos a pagar lo que Oxenstierna condenó duramente como un precio desastroso por la renovación de la tregua con Polonia en Stuhmsdorf (20 de septiembre de 1635). La gran mayoría de las «fuerzas suecas» en Alemania (y sus oficiales) eran alemanas, y se veían amenazadas con la proscripción si se resistían a las órdenes del emperador de aceptar su liderazgo. ¿Quién podría pagarles todos los atrasos que se les debían? En agosto de 1635, sus oficiales amotinados mantuvieron a Oxenstierna prisionero en su campamento cerca de Magdeburgo, como rehén y garantía en las negociaciones con Juan Jorge de Sajonia. Antes de que pudiera escapar, le obligaron a prometer que si en el acuerdo de paz no obtenían dinero suficiente para pagar sus atrasos podrían acudir a Suecia para conseguirlo. Era una terrible perspectiva, una promesa imposible de cumplir. Desde ese momento, la «satisfacción de la soldadesca» se convirtió en un elemento esencial para Suecia en cualquier acuerdo de paz.

En Suecia, el gobierno era ahora abiertamente derrotista. Ya en 1634, bajo la impresión de la derrota de Nördlingen, un destacado miembro del Consejo había exclamado, «¿de qué nos sirve conseguir muchas tierras y gastar todo nuestro dinero en ello?». Un año después, otro de los miembros del Consejo afirmó que la idea de las recompensas territoriales había sido un error desde el comienzo; y en abril de 1636 incluso el hermano de Oxenstierna afirmó: «Es intolerable seguir luchando en una guerra en la que no tenemos inte-

rés».[6] Ante esta actitud, Oxenstierna se decidió en el otoño de 1635 a explorar la posibilidad de paz por intermedio de Sajonia. En el proceso se vio sometido a intolerables humillaciones y rechazos: Juan Jorge exigió la inmediata evacuación de Alemania por parte de Suecia y su adhesión a la paz de Praga (lo que significaba sacrificar a su último aliado, Guillermo de Hesse-Kassel) y sólo en ese caso estaría dispuesto o ofrecer una cantidad en metálico muy reducida, sin compensaciones territoriales; además, los negociadores de Sajonia afirmaron que era imposible garantizar que el emperador ratificaría el acuerdo de paz que pudieran concluir. Esos términos significaban el fracaso de Suecia en el intento de buscar seguridad, el fin de sus esperanzas de obtener recompensas económicas, la imposibilidad de poseer una base naval en el Báltico y de dar satisfacción al ejército.

La única posibilidad de salvar algo del desastre parecía ser una alianza con Francia, pero ello impediría a Suecia firmar una paz por separado si la situación militar mejoraba lo suficiente como para permitir abandonar la guerra en condiciones aceptables. Fue este dilema el que siguió afrontando Oxenstierna hasta su decisión final en 1641. Por el momento, intentó seguir ambos caminos. Por una parte, en marzo de 1636 firmó el tratado de Wismar, que le aseguró —previa ratificación— la alianza con Francia. Por otra parte, tomó buen cuidado en no ratificarlo y a su regreso a Suecia en el mes de julio consiguió, gracias a su fuerte personalidad, fortalecer la moral de sus colegas y hacerles apoyar su política dilatoria. No sacrificarían —afirmaban— la libertad de acción de Suecia por «un puñado de dinero» y, tal vez, comprendían que, en el año de Corbie, Francia necesitaba a Suecia casi tanto como Suecia necesitaba de Francia. Por ello, mantendrían abierta la opción de la alianza con Francia. Si era posible, se beneficiarían del dinero francés, pero al mismo tiempo intentarían una vez más conseguir la paz negociada en Alemania. Desde hacía mucho tiempo habían abandonado el gran designio de conseguir ventajas territoriales que contemplaban en 1633 y algunos creían que si no planteaban exigencias de ningún tipo, que si renunciaban incluso a Pomerania y se limitaban a dar satisfacción al ejército, las posibilidades de paz serían bastante elevadas. Sin embargo, no había que abandonar por completo la idea de la seguridad, aunque ahora adoptaba una nueva forma, la petición de indulto para los príncipes y las ciudades excluidos de la paz de Praga. En la medida de lo posible, Suecia tenía que mantener con vida en Alemania un partido comprometido con la defensa de las «libertades alemanas». Pero en julio de 1636, la situación militar era tan difícil que hubo incluso que sacrificar ese principio. Tal como señaló Per Brahe en el Consejo, «el indulto es honroso; la compensación es útil, pero la satisfacción del ejército es fundamental».[7] Sin embargo, si podían llevar a la práctica incluso una parte de este programa, la alianza con Francia parecía, sin duda, una opción secundaria.

6. *Svenska riksraadets protokoll*, IV, p. 253 (4 de diciembre de 1634); VI, p. 185 (25 de abril de 1636).

Pero el factor que dificultaba esta política era la duda de si en caso de continuar la lucha hasta conseguir una paz negociada se podría lograr que las ganancias de la guerra financiaran su continuidad, como había ocurrido en los días felices posteriores a la batalla de Breitenfeld. Esto sería difícil si Suecia se veía encerrada en una base angosta y exhausta en Pomerania y Mecklemburgo. Para que las negociaciones pudieran ser positivas habría que entablar una guerra ofensiva; los suecos tenían que apartarse de su base y obtener nuevos territorios en los que poder encontrar aprovisionamiento y reclutamiento. La cuestión era si eso se podía conseguir sin el dinero de Francia y, por tanto, sin su alianza. La gran victoria de Baner en Wittstock en octubre de 1636 y su enérgica ofensiva en los primeros meses de 1637 (véase p. 235, *infra*) parecieron demostrar que era factible. La decisión de luchar y negociar y, entretanto, manejar a Francia —la decisión en la que Oxenstierna comprometió a los miembros del Consejo de Regencia en agosto de 1636— parecía haber sido la más correcta. Pero los acontecimientos ocurridos en la segunda mitad de 1637 no tardaron en demostrar lo contrario. La ofensiva de Baner fue seguida de su brillante pero desastrosa retirada de Torgau y al finalizar el año los ejércitos suecos estaban luchando en la costa, aferrándose con enormes dificultades a sus últimas posesiones de Pomerania. No quedaba más que una solución. Se reanudaron las conversaciones con Francia y en marzo de 1638 el tratado de Wismar fue definitivamente ratificado por el de Hamburgo, que comprometía a ambas partes a no firmar una paz por separado durante los tres años siguientes y que proveyó a los suecos los subsidios que tanto necesitaban.[8] La opción que Oxens-

7. *Ibid.*, VI, p. 504 (30 de julio de 1636).
8. Véase el nuevo estudio de Lorenz sobre los subsidios franceses a Suecia

tierna habría preferido era imposible, al menos por el momento. Fue una derrota diplomática. Pero los subsidios de Francia transformaron inmediatamente la situación militar, aunque no antes de que Oxenstierna, quebrantando el principio en el que había basado la conducción de la guerra desde 1633, enviara 14.000 hombres desde Suecia en ayuda de Baner. Se produjo una revitalización del ejército y Baner pudo organizar campañas tan brillantes que por primera vez desde 1632 fue posible soñar en terminar la guerra con la conquista de Viena.

En esta situación más favorable, a los suecos se les presentó la tentación de vulnerar los términos de la alianza con Francia. La idea fue contemplada por el Consejo más de una vez y obtuvo un cierto consenso a raíz de la indignación que produjo entre los suecos la «seducción» por parte de Francia del ejército de Weimar (que había sido reclutado por Gustavo Adolfo y que estaba vinculado a Suecia por un juramento) tras la muerte de Bernardo en 1639. Finalmente, se abandonó la idea, pero algunos siguieron preguntándose si con una situación militar relativamente favorable sería conveniente renovar la alianza con Francia a su término, en 1641. Lo que puso fin a todas esas especulaciones (al menos en el caso de Oxenstierna) fue el estallido de otro grave motín, que paralizó los ejércitos suecos inmediatamente después de la muerte de Baner, en mayo de 1641. El motivo del amotinamiento fue, una vez más, la cuestión de los atrasos en los pagos. En esta tesitura, el dinero francés parecía totalmente fundamental para que el nuevo comandante, Lennart Torstensson, pudiera conseguir que el ejército fuera de nuevo una fuerza eficaz. De esta forma, cuando se renovó la alianza en 1641, Suecia se comprometió, a cambio de recibir mayores subsidios, a luchar junto a Francia, no durante un período limitado, sino hasta el fin de la guerra.

El intento de conseguir autonomía de acción había fracasado. En 1641, Oxenstierna había tomado su opción definitiva y los resultados demostrarían que había actuado correctamente. Pero en esta ocasión había tomado, además, otra opción: las compensaciones territoriales quedaron relegadas a un segundo plano entre los objetivos de guerra de Suecia. Desde luego, era importante mantener una cierta presencia en el Báltico, pero si Suecia podía conservar algunas bases navales, la

y sobre la forma en que eran utilizados: «Schweden und die französischen Hilfsgelder» (pp. 396-397, *infra*).

adquisición de territorios en Alemania tenía menos importancia. Lo esencial eran la amnistía y la reconstrucción. Oxenstierna estaba dispuesto a olvidarse de Pomerania si se podía conseguir que la situación de Alemania volviera a ser la misma de 1618.[9] En abril de 1641, el canciller sueco definió como objetivos principales el de impedir la esclavización del Imperio y el de conseguir dar satisfacción al ejército: «estos puntos son *reales*, pero nuestra compensación no hay que considerarla así».[10] El objetivo esencial de la guerra ya no era la ampliación de los territorios suecos sino la destrucción de la paz de Praga. En Westfalia, la consecución de lo esencial posibilitó también la obtención de lo deseable y Suecia consiguió unas condiciones que nunca habría alcanzado con la estrategia propugnada por Oxenstierna durante los años 1635-1638: la destrucción de la paz de Praga, el restablecimiento de la «libertad» alemana, una amplia reconstrucción y amnistía y propiedades en el Imperio. Era la seguridad plena para Suecia. Pero la paz de Westfalia significó también, como «compensación», ganancias territoriales importantes desde el punto de vista estratégico y económico, una considerable indemnización económica, la satisfacción del ejército firmemente asentada sobre los hombros de los alemanes; y además (aunque este punto había dejado de ser preocupación importante hacía mucho tiempo), el reforzamiento de la causa protestante. Y todo ello sin que Suecia se hubiera visto obligada a convertirse (como Oxenstierna había temido siempre) en instrumento de los astutos franceses.

9. En el debate que tuvo lugar en el Consejo de Estado el 21 de noviembre de 1640, Oxenstierna les dijo: «Ahora puedo decir lo que no he dicho nunca aquí claramente —y lo que, tal vez, muchos piensan que no creo—, que es posible que llegue el día en que podamos retirarnos de la guerra de Alemania y no retengamos ni un centímetro de tierra. Ciertamente, estoy dispuesto a dejarme convencer fácilmente para hacerlo y hace mucho que os hubiera aconsejado hacerlo si el desprecio que algunos muestran hacia nosotros no fuera tan grande y si hubiera sido posible hacerlo guardando nuestra reputación y seguridad». Y un poco más tarde, en el mismo debate, afirmó: «[Pomerania] no es tan importante como conseguir y conservar el afecto de los príncipes y como restituirles su situación anterior»: *Svenska riksraadets protokoll*, VIII, pp. 330, 333.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 571-573 (16 de abril de 1641). Hay que indicar que las opiniones de Oxenstierna reflejaban el sentir general de la reunión.

II. 1635-1642: LA SUPERACIÓN DEL «IMPASSE»

En la época de la paz de Praga, Fernando II tenía ya cincuenta y siete años. Desde su llegada al poder en 1596 había tenido que enfrentar la oposición procedente de diversos frentes, que había superado con gran facilidad. Durante su mandato como emperador había depuesto a un elector y a varios duques, margraves y condes, había restaurado el poder imperial hasta devolverle un nivel no conocido desde el reinado de Carlos V. Pero no había podido convencer a los electores para que reconocieran a su hijo Fernando, el vencedor de Nördlingen, como rey de romanos. Ahora, la situación parecía mejor: Fernando era elector de Bohemia; Sajonia y Brandemburgo, reconciliadas con el emperador por la paz de Praga, ardían en deseos de agradarle y el elector antihabsburgués de Tréveris, Philip von Sötern, languidecía en prisión (donde permanecería hasta 1645) por situarse abiertamente bajo la protección de Francia. Eso dejaba únicamente a los hermanos Wittelsbach, electores de Baviera y Colonia, y al refugiado elector de Maguncia, Anselmo Casimiro von Wambold, que estaba exiliado en Colonia desde 1631. Fernando confiaba en poder conseguir que estos hombres reconocieran el derecho de su hijo a la sucesión y convocó una reunión del colegio electoral en Ratisbona en septiembre de 1636.

Pero el poder de los electores era formidable. En ausencia de las Dietas, podían (según la cáustica expresión de David Chytraeus, abogado constitucional protestante) «adornarse con el plumaje de un águila» y usurpar determinadas funciones de la Dieta y del emperador. Aunque en 1636 el joven Fernando era el único candidato serio (los intentos de Francia de promocionar primero a Ladislao de Polonia y luego a Maximiliano de Baviera terminaron en fracaso), los electores consiguieron posponer su reconocimiento hasta diciembre mientras intentaban forzar al emperador a firmar la paz con sus enemigos. Consiguieron algunos éxitos en el frente interno: Fernando aceptó, no sin renuencia, perdonar a cualquier príncipe que reconociera su autoridad y prometió también celebrar una conferencia de paz internacional para responder a las peticiones de las potencias extranjeras implicadas en la guerra, pero fue imposible hacer más progresos en este terreno, debido a las exageradas exigencias de los electores. Maximiliano de Baviera exigió a Francia que evacuara Lorena y restableciera en el poder a su primo Carlos IV; Jorge Guillermo de Brandemburgo, obsesionado todavía por la cuestión de Pomerania, insistió en que Suecia «no debe

conservar un solo centímetro de territorio en suelo imperial y todavía menos cualquier ciudad o fortaleza».[11] En último extremo, los electores tuvieron que conformarse con las promesas del emperador de que las negociaciones comenzarían en breve. Pero Fernando murió el 15 de febrero de 1637 y no se celebraron conversaciones formales con las potencias extranjeras.

Por tanto, la guerra continuó. Mientras los franceses intentaron, sin éxito, conquistar los Países Bajos del Sur y Renania (pp. 219-222, *supra*), el ejército sueco al mando de Johan Baner se preparó para enfrentarse a las fuerzas del emperador, fusionadas en una unión poco feliz con las de Baviera, Sajonia y Brandemburgo desde la paz de Praga. En el otoño de 1635, Baner se enfrentó en diversas ocasiones con los sajones, como preparación para una gran ofensiva a lo largo del Elba y el Saale hasta Naumburgo en la primavera de 1636. Tal como había planeado, esa acción provocó un ataque de las tropas imperiales a las que Baner infligió una derrota total en Wittstock el 4 de octubre de 1636. Los suecos capturaron provisiones, equipos y más de cien cañones de sus enemigos. Esta victoria significó la eliminación de Brandemburgo: desde ese momento, el elector Juan Guillermo se refugió en Königsberg, en la Prusia oriental, uno de los pocos lugares que todavía controlaba, mientras los suecos ampliaban su dominio hasta el Elba.

Baner contemplaba ahora tres objetivos: mantener a sus enemigos alejados de las nuevas posesiones suecas en el Báltico, prestar apoyo (en caso necesario) a sus aliados Jorge de Brunswick-Luneburgo y a Guillermo de Hesse-Kassel y atemorizar —o derrotar— al elector de Sajonia. Pero no consiguió hacer triunfar su estrategia y en enero de 1637 tuvo que levantar el asedio de Leipzig, retirándose a Torgau, en el Elba. En el mes de junio tuvo que abandonar también esa plaza y los ejércitos sajones e imperiales le obligaron a retirarse a Pomerania. Allí, falto de dinero y municiones, el ejército sueco permaneció confinado durante más de un año. Las únicas operaciones de la campaña de 1638 que tuvieron resonancia internacional fueron las protagonizadas por Bernando de Sajonia-Weimar, con su victoria de Rheinfelden y su ocupación de Breisach.

Sin embargo, en el plano local, la actividad bélica era incesante.

11. Haan, *Kurfürstentag*, pp. 163-164: «votum» de Jorge Guillermo en la sesión decimoctava.

Grandes ejércitos morían de hambre y los más reducidos eran derrotados, pero nada podía impedir el merodeo de los comandantes de las guarniciones y de los filibusteros. El relato de William Crowne y los grabados de Wenceslas Hollar, que acompañaron al embajador de Carlos I en la reunión electoral de Ratisbona en 1636, proyectan una imagen aterradora de la Alemania desgarrada por la guerra. Aunque, de hecho, sólo atravesaron una zona de guerra (en Ehrenbreitstein en el Rin, donde se interrumpió momentáneamente el asedio para permitir el paso de las barcazas del embajador), la devastación era terrible en todas partes. La desolación era total en el territorio que se extiende entre Maguncia y Frankfurt y los habitantes de Maguncia estaban tan debilitados por el hambre que no podían siquiera arrastrarse para recibir las limosnas que distribuían los viajeros. En Nuremberg, el embajador (Thomas Howard, conde Arundel) compró la fabulosa biblioteca Pirckheimer, con manuscritos ilustrados por Durero y otros grandes maestros, por 350 táleros porque su dueño necesitaba dinero «por la dureza de los tiempos y la dificultad para conseguir alimentos».[12] Más allá de Nuremberg y hasta el Danubio, la destrucción era también total: la expedición inglesa pasó por una aldea que había sido saqueada dieciocho veces en dos años e incluso dos veces en un mismo día. En otros lugares no quedaba ni siquiera quien pudiera contar lo ocurrido y el grupo de viajeros tuvo que acampar en medio de las ruinas abandonadas y sustentarse con las provisiones que llevaban consigo, que lavaban con agua de lluvia. En otros lugares, su aproximación, con 18 carros tirados por caballos y una escolta de caballería, fue confundida con un ataque del enemigo, provocando el pánico y haciendo que se tomaran inmediatas medidas defensivas. Finalmente, en Linz, capital de la Alta Austria, contemplaron la ejecución de Martin Laimbauer, cabecilla de uno de los múltiples levantamientos campesinos contra los Habsburgo, que había conocido una importante difusión en la región en los meses anteriores.[13]

12. Springell, *Connoisseur*, pp. 105-110, hace un admirable relato de este episodio extraño. En 1637, la industria del libro en su conjunto estaba deprimida. Ese año sólo se publicaron en Alemania 408 obras nuevas, frente a los 1.757 títulos de 1618 (véase R. Engelsing, *Analphabetentum und Lektüre, Zur Sozialgeschichte des Lesens in Deutschland zwischen feudaler und industrieller Gesellschaft*, Stuttgart, 1973, p. 42).

13. La revuelta fue encabezada por Martin Aichinger (o Laimbauer), que afirmaba ser el Mesías y ser inmune a las balas. Fue hecho prisionero después de que su ejército de campesinos fuera derrotado en Frankemburgo en mayo de 1636. Los estandartes de sus tropas se conservan en el Museo Linz. Véase F. Wilflingseder, «Martin Laimbauer und die Unruhen im Machlandviertel, 1632-6», *Mitteilungen des oberösterreichischen Landesarchivs*, VI (1959), pp. 136-208.

Afortunadamente para los ingleses, eran sólo espectadores. Otros tuvieron menos fortuna. «Unos hombres cazan a otros como si fueran bestias, en los bosques y en el camino», escribió un observador e incluso hay casos bien documentados de canibalismo en Renania, en 1635.[14] Nadie estaba libre de ser atacado. En enero de 1638, una columna de comerciantes de Nuremberg con siete carromatos regresaba de la feria de Leipzig cuando sufrió una emboscada a manos de un grupo de soldados de caballería. Los soldados pidieron 1.000 táleros en efectivo y el jefe del convoy ofreció sólo 300. En ese momento, las tropas atacaron y destrozaron los carromatos. Mataron a varios comerciantes y se llevaron consigo unos ochenta caballos que cargaron con el botín, destruyendo lo demás. Las pérdidas se estimaron en 100.000 táleros, pero fue imposible determinar la identidad de los atacantes, aunque muchos sospechaban que se trataba del ejército bávaro. Era el séptimo convoy que perdían los comerciantes de Nuremberg en menos de dos años y la ciudad envió una misión diplomática a los principales bandos combatientes y a las demás ciudades libres del Imperio pidiendo mayor protección para el comercio.[15] Por supuesto, estas gestiones fueron infructuosas.

El caso de Nuremberg es un caso típico. En el período transcurrido entre las batallas de Breitenfeld y Nördlingen, los territorios de la Alemania central sufrieron una terrible devastación cuando las tropas suecas pusieron en evidencia hasta qué punto estaban dispuestas a conseguir que la guerra se autofinanciase. Entre 1631 y 1636, el obispado de Wurzburgo sufrió pérdidas estimadas en más de 1 millón de táleros. Durante ese mismo período, la ciudad de Maguncia, ocupada

14. Sir Thomas Roe, en enero de 1639, citado por E. A. Beller, «The mission of Sir Thomas Roe to the conference at Hamburg, 1638-40», *English Historical Review*, XLI (1926), pp. 61-77, en p. 74; el canibalismo es mencionado por Kuczynski, *Geschichte des Altags des deutschen Volkes*, I, pp. 87-88, y por Wedgwood, *Thirty Years' War*, pp. 410-412.

15. Detalles tomados de A. Ernstberger, «Plünderung des Leipziger Messegeleites Nürnberger und Augsburger Kaufleute am 26. Januar 1638 bei Neustadt an der Heid», *Jahrbuch für fränkische Landesforschung*, XXII (1962), pp. 101-120. Nuremberg había sufrido también una terrible destrucción durante el asedio de 1632: véase p. 194, *supra*.

por los suecos, perdió aproximadamente una cuarta parte de sus edificios, el 40 por 100 de la población y el 60 por 100 de su riqueza. La biblioteca del elector fue totalmente desmantelada y la mayor parte de sus libros fueron a parar a Västeraas, en Suecia, mientras que algunos de los manuscritos terminaron (gracias a la intervención del arzobispo Laud, canciller de la Universidad de Oxford) en la Bodleian Library.[16] Después de la batalla de Nördlingen, fueron los protestantes los que más sufrieron. En los tres meses que siguieron a la gran victoria de los Habsburgo se perdieron, según los ministros de Jorge de Hesse-Darmstadt (que se hallaban entonces en Dresde), 30.000 caballos, 100.000 vacas y 600.000 ovejas y las pérdidas que sufrió el territorio se aproximaron a los 10 millones de táleros. En 1635, también los condes de la vecina Nassau abandonaron sus tierras refugiándose en Metz, lo que los cronistas bautizaron posteriormente como «el año de la gran destrucción en la tierra».[17] El ducado de Württemberg, ocupado por tropas imperiales y bávaras entre 1634 y 1638, sufrió unos daños estimados en 34 millones de táleros y su población disminuyó en más de un 75 por 100 (de 450.000 habitantes en 1620 a menos de 100.000 en 1639).[18] En verdad, Suabia fue devastada con saña especial durante el decenio de 1630, pero la situación no era mejor más hacia el norte. En Mecklemburgo, un catastro parcial del ducado realizado en 1639-1640, puso de relieve que sólo existían 360 granjas cultivadas, cuando antes de la guerra había casi 3.000. En Brandemburgo, Werben (que fue por un tiempo el cuartel general de Gustavo Adolfo) pasó de 267 casas habitadas a 105 durante el mismo período,

16. Weber: *Würzburg und Bamberg im dreissigjährigen Krieg*, p. 171; Müller, *Der schwedische Staat in Mainz*, pp. 140, 237-238.

17. F. Herrmann, ed., *Aus tiefer Not: hessische Briefe und Berichte aus der Zeit des dreissigjährigen Krieges*, Friedberg, 1916, p. 115: *Denkschrift* del 19 de diciembre de 1634. H. Börst *et al.*, «Die evangelischen Geistlichen in und aus der Grafschaft Nassau-Saarbrücken», *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte der Saargegend*, XXIII-XXIV (1975-1976), pp. 39-93, en pp. 39 ss.

18. Véase von Hippel, «Bevölkerung und Wirtschaft». Lo cierto es que la economía del ducado era especialmente vulnerable, pues nunca había producido la cantidad de alimentos necesaria para conseguir la autosuficiencia: así, se exportaba el estupendo vino que se obtenía en los viñedos en torno a Stuttgart, para comprar trigo a cambio. La guerra terminó con la producción y con el intercambio. Muchos de los campesinos murieron y otros muchos se refugiaron en el extranjero, sobre todo en Suecia. (Véase Stritmatter, *Die Stadt Basel*, p. 75. Los 7.561 refugiados que había en Basilea en 1638 constituían un número casi mayor que el de los residentes nativos.)

mientras que la capital del elector, Berlín, con una población de 12.000 personas en 1618, sólo contaba con 7.500 veinte años después, y el declive demográfico de varias zonas rurales —ya fuera por efecto de la guerra, la peste o el hambre— excedió el 40 por 100.[19] En la capital del elector de Sajonia, Dresde, que nunca fue ocupada, la tasa de entierros y bautismos varió de 100/121 en el decenio anterior a 1630 a 100/39 en la década siguiente. Sólo la inmigración consiguió mantener la población de la ciudad.[20] Y a estas desgracias hay que añadir los elevados impuestos que cobraban todos los gobiernos para hacer frente a los gastos de defensa: apenas bastaban para garantizar la seguridad, pero desde luego, siempre eran suficientes para provocar dificultades.[21]

Todos estos informes de miseria y crueldad, aunque puedan parecer generalizados e impersonales, de hecho afectaban a innumerables individuos, cuyo sufrimiento personal no era menor por el hecho de que fuera compartido. La autobiografía de Johann Valentin Andreä, escritor de tratados utópicos y rosacrucianos en su juventud y supervisor de las iglesias luteranas en Calw (Suabia) en el decenio de 1630, nos recuerda la agonía que vivieron incluso los supervivientes. En 1639 escribió con gran abatimiento que de sus 1.046 correspon-

19. Datos tomados de F. Mager, *Geschichte des Bauerntums und der Bodenkultur im Lande Mecklenburg*, Berlín, 1955, pp. 137-140; W. Zahn, *Die Altmark im dreissigjährigen Krieg*, Schriften des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte, XXI/3, Halle, 1904, pp. 58-60; F. Schröer, *Das Havelland im dreissigjährigen Krieg. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Mark Brandenburg*, Mitteldeutsche Forschungen, XXXVII, Colonia y Graz, 1966, pp. 118-120, 127-131, y Faden, *Berlin im dreissigjährigen Krieg*, p. 232.

20. Véase E. Sparmann, *Dresden während des dreissigjährigen Krieges*, Dresde, 1914, pp. 15-19; y G. Lammert, *Geschichte der Seuchen, Hungers- und Kriegsnoth zur Zeit des dreissigjährigen Krieges*, 1890 (reeditado en Wiesbaden, 1971), pp. 87, 233. No todo el descenso demográfico es imputable a la acción de las tropas. Entre 1631 y 1634, pocas zonas de Alemania escaparon a los azotes de la peste. Por ejemplo, en Amberg, capital del Alto Palatinado, dieciocho jesuitas murieron aquejados de la peste en 1634, en el colegio que se había inaugurado recientemente. (Véase Gegenfurtner, «Jesuiten in Oberpfalz», p. 170.)

21. Se encontrará información sobre la importancia de la carga fiscal, en Weber, *Veit Adam von Gepeckh, Fürstbischof von Freising*, pp. 129-132. En la paz de Praga de 1635 se decretó que el Círculo bávaro habría de pagar 120 *Römermonate*, otros 120 en la reunión electoral de 1636, 75 en la Asamblea del Círculo de 1638 y 120 en la Dieta Imperial de 1641. En total, pues, 435 *Römermonate*, ¡únicamente en seis años! Cf. la cuantía de los impuestos antes de la guerra, que se menciona en la p. 39, *supra*.

sales de 1630 sólo quedaban 338. «En los últimos cinco años [es decir, desde Nördlingen], 518 de ellos han muerto debido a numerosas desgracias.» Entre ellos se contaban 38 amigos, cinco de ellos íntimos, 20 parientes y 41 colegas clérigos. «Tengo que llorar por ellos —continuaba— porque me veo aquí tan impotente y solo. Me he quedado para el resto de mi vida con apenas 15 personas vivas con las que puedo afirmar que tengo una mínima amistad.»[22]

El doctor William Harvey, que acompañó la embajada de Arundel a Ratisbona en 1636, comentó las peligrosas implicaciones del cansancio y la desesperación extremas causadas por la guerra. «Esta guerra de Alemania —escribió a un colega— amenaza con derivar en anarquía y confusión», y seguía comentando «la necesidad que tienen aquí de hacer la paz a cualquier precio, cuando no hay más medios para hacer la guerra y escasean los medios de subsistencia».[23] Poco tiempo después, el papa Urbano VIII dio los primeros pasos para la organización de conversaciones de paz con el objeto de poner fin a la guerra. Un legado papal llegó a Colonia en octubre de 1636 e invitó a todas las potencias interesadas a que enviaran representantes a un congreso de paz general. Pero nadie acudió: ni Francia ni España confiaban en la imparcialidad del papa y los protestantes rechazaron por completo la mediación papal, convocando una conferencia en Hamburgo. Este encuentro de paz surgió de un acuerdo entre Francia e Inglaterra firmado en marzo de 1637, por el cual Carlos I prometió a Francia que le permitiría reclutar tropas en Inglaterra y que le prestaría 30 barcos de guerra para realizar una nueva campaña contra el emperador. A cambio, Luis XIII se comprometió a no concluir ningún acuerdo de paz en el que no se contemplara la restitución de sus tierras y títulos a la familia del Palatinado y a aceptar una conferencia de paz en Hamburgo o en La Haya donde Suecia, Dinamarca, Holanda y Francia prepararían los términos del acuerdo que luego presentarían al emperador. Aunque Francia finalmente se negó a ratificar el tratado, envió delegados a Hamburgo, donde los diplomáticos suecos celebraban ya conversaciones con los representantes imperiales. Francia se apresuró a poner fin a esas negociaciones (mediante el

22. P. Antony y H. Christmann, eds., *Johann Valentin Andreä: ein schwäbischer Pfarrer im dreissigjährigen Krieg*, Schwäbische Lebensläufe, V, Hildesheim, 1970, p. 128.

23. Springell, *Connoisseur*, p. 113 n. 96.

tratado de concesión de subsidios al que hemos hecho referencia en la página 231, *supra*) y, en último término, el protocolo de Hamburgo fue firmado tan sólo por Dinamarca e Inglaterra —estados que hacía tiempo que ya no estaban implicados activamente en la guerra— en abril de 1639.[24]

Sin embargo, los príncipes territoriales alemanes estaban obligados a considerar más seriamente la perspectiva de «anarquía y confusión» si no se hallaba una fórmula para alcanzar la paz. Al ver que se desvanecían temporalmente las posibilidades de un acuerdo general, varios príncipes intentaron conseguir una solución local, por separado. Wolfgang Guillermo, duque de Neoburgo y Juliers, preocupado por la situación de intranquilidad en que se debatía su ducado en Renania, provocada por la presencia de importantes fuerzas imperiales en los inviernos de 1635-1636 y 1636-1637, propuso en una asamblea del Círculo de la Baja Renania que se declarara la neutralidad de toda la región. En 1639 inició negociaciones directas con los jefes locales del ejército —tanto imperiales como protestantes— con ese fin, solicitando incluso a la República de Holanda que garantizara su neutralidad. Pero esa iniciativa de paz, al igual que muchas otras, quedó finalmente en nada: el ducado de Juliers, con sus pasos del Rin, presentaba ventajas estratégicas que los ejércitos rivales no podían desdeñar.[25]

24. Véase A. Leman, «Urbain VIII et les origines du Congrès de Cologne de 1636», *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, XIX (1923), pp. 370-383; y Beller, «The mission of Sir Thomas Roe». El tratado anglo-danés de Hamburgo, dirigido fundamentalmente contra Holanda, se inscribía en la campaña que había iniciado en 1637 el gobierno danés para definir de forma más precisa y restrictiva sus derechos territoriales sobre sus costas. Se ha dicho que la política de Dinamarca tal vez se vio estimulada por la publicación de *Mare clausum* de John Selden, en 1635-1636. (Véase S. Delgaard, «Oestersoe, Vestersoe, Nordsoe. Dominium maris Baltici et maris septentrionalis 1638», *Historisk Tidsskrift* [*Dansk*], serie 11, V [1956-1959], pp. 295-320. He de agradecer esta referencia al profesor E. L. Petersen.) Carlos I se mostraba también hostil frente a Suecia en ese momento porque el gobierno de Estocolmo estaba suministrando armas a los escoceses que se habían rebelado contra él, muchos de ellos veteranos del ejército de Gustavo Adolfo.

25. Más información en R. Leffers, *Die Neutralitätspolitik des Pfalzgrafen Wolfgang Wilhelm als Herzog von Jülich-Berg in der Zeit von 1636-1643*, Bergische Forschungen, VIII, Neustadt, 1971. Hubo un intento paralelo por parte de Federico Guillermo de Brandemburgo, heredero del elector, por conseguir una tregua en Cleves en 1637, pero también fracasó (véase Opgenoorth, *Friedrich*

Todos estos acontecimientos —las victorias de sus enemigos, la destrucción y desmoralización generalizadas de Alemania y los intentos de conseguir una paz por separado— eran síntomas que el nuevo emperador, Fernando III, no podía ignorar. En consecuencia, en febrero de 1640 convocó una nueva reunión electoral en Nuremberg. Ésta no llegó a celebrarse y entonces propuso que la Dieta imperial se reuniera de nuevo, por primera vez desde 1613, a fin de allanar el camino para una paz general. La ceremonia de apertura se celebró en Ratisbona en septiembre de 1640 y durante más de un año los tres colegios de la asamblea analizaron con intensidad las diferencias que mantenían a su país en guerra. Los electores celebraron 185 sesiones formales y los príncipes 153; hubo además 26 reuniones conjuntas. Naturalmente, los príncipes territoriales no asistieron personalmente durante todo el año. Algunos no hicieron ni siquiera acto de presencia, por lo cual hubo innumerables demoras mientras circulaba la correspondencia entre las cortes de los príncipes y sus delegaciones en Ratisbona. Las cartas desde Munich tardaban dos o tres días, las cartas desde Maguncia y Viena entre cinco y ocho días y las de Königsberg (donde residía ahora el elector de Brandemburgo) tardaban tres semanas en verano y cinco en invierno. Algunos príncipes ni siquiera enviaron delegaciones: Fernando excluyó a los administradores protestantes de las diócesis afectadas por el Edicto de Restitución y a los príncipes que estaban en armas contra el emperador. En verdad, uno de los problemas más acuciantes que debía resolver la Dieta era la readmisión de esos príncipes. Al final, solamente Brunswick, la familia del Palatinado y Hesse-Kassel se negaron a interrumpir la lucha y a aceptar la autoridad imperial. Sin embargo, si este problema era difícil, mucho más lo era el de los territorios eclesiásticos secularizados. El emperador cedió una vez más. A pesar de las protestas papales, presentadas formalmente ante la Dieta por el nuncio en abril de 1641, el emperador abandonó el Edicto de Restitución: el poder secular conservaría las propiedades eclesiásticas que poseía el 1 de enero de 1627. Aunque el papado continuó condenando cualquier acuerdo futuro —incluso la paz definitiva— que incluyera la

Wilhelm: der grosse Kurfürst, cap. 3). En 1639, el Círculo de la Baja Sajonia intentó también conseguir la neutralidad, con más éxito (véase Magen, «Die Reichskreise», pp. 451-452). En pp. 245-246, *infra*, se hace mención de las conversaciones secretas de paz entre Baviera y Francia.

derogación del Edicto de Restitución, de hecho esta cuestión se saldó para siempre en Ratisbona.[26]

Fernando no tenía más remedio que hacer estas importantes concesiones porque estaba perdiendo la guerra. En los últimos meses de 1638, y después de estar durante todo un año a la defensiva en Pomerania tras la retirada de Torgau, Baner —contando con refuerzos suecos y dinero francés— consiguió una vez más hacer retroceder a las tropas imperiales hasta Silesia. Al año siguiente, mientras Bernardo de Sajonia-Weimar conquistaba Alsacia y atacaba el Franco Condado español, Baner derrotó a los sajones en Chemnitz (abril de 1639) y amenazó Praga. Los suecos se vieron obligados a retirarse de Bohemia en junio, pero al año siguiente organizaron la primera operación conjunta con sus aliados franceses. En Sajonia se unieron a Baner las tropas comandadas anteriormente por Bernardo de Sajonia-Weimar (que había muerto en julio de 1639) y contingentes que aportaron Brunswick y Hesse-Kassel (este último dirigido ahora por la viuda de Guillermo V, Amalia, condesa de Hanau). Esa fuerza conjunta de 40.000 hombres realizó algunas operaciones, no muy brillantes, en el Weser, pero en enero de 1641, mientras estaba reunida la Dieta, apareció ante Ratisbona y asedió brevemente la ciudad. Era un contundente recordatorio de la necesidad de llegar a un acuerdo de paz. Poco después, hubo otro más: cuando Brandemburgo firmó una paz por separado con Suecia.

Desde la paz de Praga, como consecuencia de la cual Jorge Guillermo había abandonado la alianza sueca para entrar en la órbita imperial, Brandemburgo se había convertido en un campo de batalla. Tras la derrota de Wittstock al año siguiente, sus territorios se hallaban casi por completo bajo el control de los suecos: Cleves y Mark fueron completamente ocupados y en Brandemburgo los enfrentamientos eran constantes. Sólo Prusia permanecía libre, aunque tenía que pagar un tributo a Suecia. El ejército del elector contaba apenas con 6.000 hombres, todos ellos distribuidos en guarniciones. A la muerte de Jorge Guillermo, ocurrida en diciembre de 1640, después de más de un año de inactividad casi total (que los contemporáneos llamaron eufemísticamente «melancolía»), su hijo Federico Guillermo,

26. Así pues, el acuerdo de Ratisbona sustituyó a la paz de Praga, que sólo había suspendido temporalmente la aplicación del Edicto. A su vez, aquél fue modificado por la paz de Westfalia, que fijó la «fecha normativa» en 1624 (mucho menos favorable para los católicos que la de 1627).

que a la sazón contaba tan sólo 21 años, se apresuró a proponer al Parlamento (o lo que quedaba de él) de Brandemburgo una paz por separado con Suecia. Tras la muerte del principal consejero de su padre, el pro-imperial conde Schwarzenberg, en marzo de 1641, envió delegados a Estocolmo para concertar un alto el fuego. Éste entró en vigor en julio, casi exactamente diez años después de que Gustavo Adolfo penetrara en Brandemburgo con su ejército. El «gran elector» no estaba dispuesto a contemplar la destrucción de sus propiedades patrimoniales por los suecos simplemente porque se había aliado con un emperador que no podía ofrecerle protección.

A no tardar, también abandonaron la lucha armada los vecinos de Brandemburgo en el oeste, los duques de Brunswick, los varios miembros de la familia güelfa que dominaban conjuntamente las tierras que se extienden entre el curso medio del Elba y el Weser. En el pasado habían sido intermitentes aliados de uno y otro bando. El duque Jorge de Brunswick-Luneburgo había apoyado a Fernando II hasta 1630, cuando los agentes imperiales exigieron la devolución del obispado secularizado de Hildesheim. El duque Jorge y sus primos se negaron a aceptar las pretensiones de los imperiales, firmaron una alianza con Suecia y movilizaron un ejército que se enfrentó con éxito a las tropas imperiales. En 1635, el duque Jorge se enemistó con Oxenstierna y aceptó finalmente la paz de Praga, pero ante la insistencia del emperador para que devolviera Hildesheim, Jorge firmó una nueva alianza con Hesse-Kassel y Suecia. Su muerte se produjo en abril de 1641 cuando conducía sus fuerzas hacia el sur para luchar nuevamente contra las tropas imperiales. Sus primos no hicieron gala de la misma capacidad diplomática y militar y durante el verano las tropas imperiales asolaron amplias zonas de Brunswick. Luego, en el invierno, apareció de nuevo el ejército sueco y se produjeron duros enfrentamientos en los ducados. Fueron estos acontecimientos los que indujeron a los duques güelfos a firmar un acuerdo preliminar con el emperador en enero de 1642 (la paz de Goslar), que implicó la devolución de las tierras secularizadas de Hildesheim, entregadas un año después al obispo, el elector Fernando de Colonia. A cambio, se mantuvo una actitud tolerante hacia los protestantes (incluso en Hildesheim, donde se reservaron seis iglesias para el culto luterano) y desde entonces Brunswick fue considerado como territorio neutral.[27]

27. Sobre la neutralidad de Brandemburgo y sus consecuencias, véase Opgenoorth, *op. cit.*, y Schröer, *Das Havelland*. Véase también Kretzschmar, *Gustavus Adolfs Pläne und Ziele*, sobre las primeras fases de la alianza de Brunswick con Suecia, y M. Reimann, *Der Goslarer Frieden von 1642*, Quellen und Darstellung zur Geschichte Niedersachsens, XC, Hildesheim, 1979, sobre el final de la alianza.

A raíz de estos acontecimientos, la paz se instaló en amplias zonas del nordeste y noroeste de Alemania, pero la lucha continuó en las demás regiones del país. La muerte de Baner en mayo de 1641, a la que siguió el motín de algunas unidades de su ejército que reclamaban su soldada, permitió un breve respiro a las tropas imperiales. Pero el 30 de junio los representantes de Oxenstierna en Hamburgo consiguieron una alianza definitiva con Francia, que había de durar hasta la paz de Westfalia, y Lennart Torstensson, uno de los más brillantes generales suecos, fue enviado a Alemania para ganar la guerra. En la primavera de 1642 el nuevo comandante en jefe invadió Sajonia derrotando a las fuerzas de Juan Jorge una vez más (en Schweidnitz) y avanzó a través de Silesia hacia Moravia. En junio ocupó la capital, Olomouc, y amenazó Viena antes de retirar su principal ejército a Sajonia, donde sitió Leipzig. Allí, el 2 de noviembre, el ejército imperial (bajo el mando personal del hermano del emperador, archiduque Leopoldo Guillermo) desafió a los suecos a entablar batalla. Torstensson se retiró un poco hacia el norte, a Breitenfeld, y allí consiguió una victoria casi tan completa como la que había obtenido Gustavo Adolfo en el mismo lugar once años antes. El ejército imperial perdió 5.000 hombres en el campo de batalla, mientras que otros 5.000 fueron hechos prisioneros; el archiduque perdió además su tesoro y la cancillería y el convoy de abastecimientos, así como 46 cañones. Leipzig cayó un mes después y tuvo que pagar una indemnización de 400.000 táleros. Esta ciudad permanecería en poder de los suecos hasta 1650.[28]

Esta serie de desastres sembraron el pánico entre los aliados católicos del emperador en Alemania occidental, en especial en Baviera. En enero de 1640, antes incluso de que se celebrara la reunión electoral de Nuremberg, hubo conversaciones secretas con representantes franceses en Einsiedeln, en las que Maximiliano se ofreció a firmar una paz por separado con Francia con tres condiciones: el recono-

28. Las campañas suecas de estos años, con tanta frecuencia olvidadas, están admirablemente narradas (con la ayuda de útiles planos) en Tingsten, *Johan Baner och Lennart Torstensson*. He de agradecer al profesor Michael Roberts su ayuda a la hora de estimar la importancia de las operaciones de Baner.

cimiento del título electoral para él y sus descendientes; la retirada de Francia de Alsacia y la ruptura de la alianza de Francia con la protestante Suecia. Estas grandes exigencias fueron acremente rechazadas por Richelieu, que ya había decidido renovar el tratado con Suecia. Pero el éxito del ejército aliado comandado por Baner y la solución de tan gran número de cuestiones en Ratisbona indujeron a Maximiliano a intentar un camino diferente. En esta ocasión trató de conseguir el apoyo del papa y de los otros electores católicos para convencer a Francia de que aceptara los compromisos alcanzados en Ratisbona y concluyera la paz, aunque Suecia los rechazara. En abril y mayo de 1642 celebró conversaciones con los electores de Maguncia y Colonia para preparar una plataforma común de cara a las pretendidas negociaciones, tras lo cual envió una misión diplomática a París.[29] Después de casi veinticinco años de guerra, el emperador se había visto abandonado por la casi totalidad de sus aliados alemanes. Finalmente, se había superado el *impasse* en la lucha, *impasse* que se mantenía desde Lützen. Ahora sólo faltaba inducir a los Habsburgo a aceptar lo inevitable.

III. 1643-1647: LA DERROTA DE LOS HABSBURGO

Fernando III se vio impulsado a responder positivamente a los llamamientos que se le hacían para que firmara la paz ante el súbito, y al parecer total, hundimiento del poder español. Desde la batalla de Nördlingen, Felipe IV había prestado una ayuda masiva a su cuñado. Mantenía guarniciones en el Palatinado; aportaba un subsidio de unos 500.000 táleros anuales; y manteniendo ejércitos en Lombardía, los Países Bajos y Cataluña, bloqueaba en gran medida la fuerza militar de Francia.[30] Su hermano, el cardenal-infante, que gobernó los Países Bajos españoles hasta su muerte en 1641, consiguió incluso amenazar París (véase p. 222, *supra*). Sin embargo, Francia no era el único enemigo de España. El cardenal-infante mantenía todavía ocupada a la mayor parte de su ejército en el conflicto con la República de Holanda (que en 1637 reconquistó Breda, ocupada por Spínola doce años antes) y el propio Felipe dedicaba importantes recursos a la defensa de las posesiones ultramarinas de España y Portugal (sobre todo en Sudamérica, donde Holanda ocupaba la provincia del norte de Brasil, Pernambuco, desde 1630). En octubre de 1639, una gran flota de guerra que transportaba tropas y provisiones desde España a los Países Bajos fue interceptada por los holandeses en el canal de la Mancha y resultó casi totalmente destruida (la batalla de los Downs); otra flota, enviada para recuperar Brasil, conoció el mismo destino en Recife tres meses después.

Por si esto fuera poco, 1640 contempló derrotas aún más severas de los españoles. En el mes de mayo se rebeló la provincia de Cataluña e inmediatamente solicitó la ayuda de Francia. En diciembre, estalló la revuelta en Portugal, que consiguió el apoyo inmediato de Francia y Holanda. Felipe IV se vio obligado, no sin renuencia, a apartar su atención del norte de Europa para centrarse en los problemas de la Península. Algunos de sus consejeros —entre ellos el belicoso conde de Oñate— instaron al monarca a que abandonara sus compromisos exteriores, pero sin resultado.[31] España sufrió pérdidas en todos los frentes: Arras y la mayor parte de Artois en 1640; Salces y Perpiñán en 1642. El conde-duque de Olivares, que había sobrevivido a muchas derrotas, no pudo soportar ahora la campaña que se lanzó contra él. En enero de 1643 dimitió. Pero el cambio de ministro no hizo variar la política exterior de España: no se contempló la necesidad de iniciar conversaciones de paz. En el mes de mayo, el ejército de Flandes fue totalmente derrotado en Rocroi. Aunque la batalla fue tal vez menos importante de lo que se ha hecho ver algunas veces —pues no tuvo una consecuencia inmediata sobre el control de España en Flandes—, acabó con cualquier posibilidad de organizar una nueva invasión de Francia desde los Países Bajos. Con Tréveris,

29. Véase K. Schwinesbein, *Die Frankreichpolitik Kurfürst Maximilians I. von Bayern, 1639-1645*, Munich, 1967, caps. 3-4. El papa no pudo desempeñar un papel activo en esta iniciativa de paz porque Urbano VIII inició las hostilidades contra el duque de Parma en 1642. Dos años después, Urbano VIII despilfarró unos 6 millones de táleros en «la guerra de Castro», y en julio de 1644 moría en medio de una gran depresión. (Véanse las cifras en Grisar, «Päpstliche Finanzen», p. 208.)

30. AGS, *Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas*, 3.ª época, 949, nos permite conocer los gastos españoles en Alemania en 1635-1643. El «Tesoro General de Alemania» recibió 3,5 millones de florines de 60 kreuzers en 1635-1640, pero sólo 1,8 millones en 1640-1643. En esa época, un tálero valía 90 kreuzers.

31. «Creo que no tenemos elección, sino intentar una paz general, o al menos un acuerdo en una o dos de las guerras en las que está embarcada en este momento la Casa de Austria.» Oñate a Olivares en 1640, citado por Stradling, *Europe and the Decline of Spain*, p. 104.

Alsacia y Lorena en manos de los franceses y con los holandeses dominando Limburgo, el canal de la Mancha y el mar del Norte, el gobierno de Felipe IV estaba totalmente imposibilitado para enviar refuerzos a los Países Bajos. El «camino español» estaba bloqueado; en consecuencia, los Países Bajos españoles no pudieron resistir el progreso de los ejércitos francés y holandés. Así, Gravelinas se perdió en 1644, Hulst en 1645 y Dunkerque en 1646.

Pero Francia tenía también graves dificultades para mantener su esfuerzo de guerra. Entre 1636 y 1643 estallaron una serie de graves revueltas populares, que afectaron tanto a las zonas rurales como a las ciudades y fue necesario hacer regresar del frente algunos destacamentos del ejército regular para sofocarlas. También había oposición por parte de la burocracia real, que se negaba a recaudar los impuestos o que se embolsaba los ingresos, y hubo varios complots aristocráticos contra el primer ministro, el cardenal Richelieu. En 1641 una conspiración, encabezada por el primo del monarca (conde de Soissons) y que abogaba por la paz y por el abandono de los compromisos en el exterior, suscitó grandes apoyos. Sólo la muerte accidental de Soissons salvó al gobierno. Al año siguiente se produjo una nueva maquinación encabezada por el favorito del monarca, el marqués de Cinq-Mars, que había prometido a España que firmaría la paz en cuanto cayera Richelieu. Pero Richelieu murió tres meses después de la ejecución de Cinq-Mars y, aunque en un principio no hubo cambio de política, en mayo de 1643 —inmediatamente después de la victoria de Rocroi— la muerte se llevó también a Luis XIII. El poder quedó en manos de la regente, la española Ana de Austria, hermana de Felipe IV y del cardenal-infante y cuñada de Fernando III. Naturalmente, se oponía con menos fuerza que el monarca fallecido a firmar la paz con sus parientes Habsburgo, pero en los asuntos de política exterior aceptaba los consejos del ministro que sucedió a Richelieu, el cardenal Mazarino. Aunque había nacido súbdito de Felipe IV y una parte de su educación se había desarrollado en España, su preparación en la carrera diplomática con Urbano VIII y con Richelieu le habían llevado a convertirse en un genuino enemigo del poder de los Habsburgo. Su objetivo fundamental era debilitar, y si era posible dividir, a las ramas austriaca y española de la familia, objetivo que finalmente consiguió. Pero en 1643, recién llegado al poder, Mazarino se sentía inclinado a actuar con prudencia. No podía ignorar el riesgo de prolongar una costosa guerra que podría provocar una revolución derrocando la monarquía, como parecía haber ocurrido al otro lado del canal, en los estados gobernados por Carlos I y su reina francesa, Enriqueta María. La guerra civil inglesa, que estalló en agosto de 1642, fue una dura advertencia que impulsó a los príncipes a actuar con prudencia.

También en Suecia el gobierno era consciente de la intensa hostilidad que sentía la población contra la guerra y su corolario inevitable, los impuestos y el reclutamiento. «El hombre común desea verse muerto» —observó el lúgubre hermano de Oxenstierna, cuyos largos y pesimistas informes de estado eran una de las muchas cruces que el canciller tenía que soportar—. «Podemos decir que hemos conquistado nuestros territorios a otros y para ese fin hemos arruinado los nuestros. Mientras las ramas se expanden —continuaba— el árbol se hunde en sus raíces.»[32] Y realmente estaba a punto de hundirse, pues las pérdidas militares de Suecia se estaban haciendo insoportables: aldeas enteras quedaban despobladas de hombres jóvenes, pues la orden de reclutamiento (como se señala en la página 277, *infra*) suponía prácticamente una sentencia de muerte.

Si en Suecia la censura limitaba la expresión pública de descontento, no ocurría lo mismo en el Imperio. Por toda Alemania empezaron a proliferar tratados de paz y los llamamientos al cese de las hostilidades se realizaban por diversos medios: oraciones, panfletos, octavillas ilustradas, música, medallas y obras de teatro. Éstas eran las más influyentes, porque las mejores «obras de paz» eran escritas por hombres que compartían la visión «pietista» que había comenzado a rejuvenecer el luteranismo. El fervor emocional y la limpieza moral del lenguaje en obras como *La victoria de la paz* (*Friedens Sieg*, de Justus Schöttel, hijo de un pastor) o *El espejo de la paz* (*Frieden Spiegel*, de Johan Rist, un pastor de Hamburgo) eran extraordinariamente poderosos. Además, alcanzaron una gran audiencia. Schöttel era un canciller de los duques de Brunswick y la primera representación de *Friedens Sieg* fue protagonizada por los hijos del duque, con Federico Guillermo de Brandemburgo como espectador.[33]

32. Roberts, *The Swedish Imperial Experience*, p. 25.

33. L. Stein, «Religion and patriotism in German peace dramas during the Thirty Years' War», *Central European History*, IV (1971), pp. 131-148. Tal vez es exagerado el vínculo que establece el autor entre el pietismo luterano y el patriotismo alemán en este período, pero el material que presenta es importante e inusual.

Así pues, a principios de 1643, la paz estaba indudablemente en el aire que respiraban tanto los participantes no alemanes como los alemanes de la guerra y no pasó mucho tiempo antes de que se celebraran dos conferencias de paz. En Frankfurt, se reunieron en enero de 1643 representantes de muchos príncipes alemanes, incluidos la mayor parte de los electores, para resolver las cuestiones puramente alemanas y para determinar la mejor forma de negociar con las potencias extranjeras. Mientras tanto, plenipotenciarios de estas últimas convergían hacia Münster y Osnabrück, las ciudades especificadas para las negociaciones en el tratado franco-sueco de 1641, que se convirtieron en una especie de «zona desmilitarizada». Francia, España y otros estados católicos sentaron sus reales en Münster, mientras que Suecia y sus aliados negociaron en Osnabrück, a 45 km de distancia.

La intención de Fernando III era mantener ambas asambleas por separado, pues esperaba que sus aliados podrían entablar negociaciones con las potencias extranjeras en nombre de todo el Imperio. Los gobernantes católicos parecían de acuerdo con este principio —«vox caesaris est vox catholicorum» como afirmó uno de ellos—, pero no podemos decir lo mismo de los protestantes. En primer lugar, en los primeros días de la conferencia de Frankfurt, su número era mucho más reducido: dos por cuatro católicos en el colegio electoral y cuatro frente a diez en el colegio de los príncipes. En segundo lugar, varios destacados protestantes eran todavía proscritos y, por tanto, no podían asistir a las conversaciones de Frankfurt. La oposición a la política dual de paz de Fernando estaba encabezada por Federico Guillermo de Brandemburgo desde dentro de la asamblea y por Amalia de Hesse-Kassel desde fuera de ella. Pero probablemente no habrían conseguido su propósito sin la ayuda de Francia y Suecia. La opinión de estas dos potencias fue claramente expresada por el plenipotenciario sueco, Johan Adler Salvius, en una carta dirigida a los príncipes protestantes en abril de 1643. «Durante treinta años —afirmaba (incorrectamente)— no se ha reunido ninguna Dieta Imperial, y entre tanto el emperador ha conseguido usurparlo todo por derecho de soberanía. Éste es el camino que conduce al absolutismo y a la servidumbre de los territorios. Las coronas [de Suecia y Francia] buscan, en la medida de lo posible, impedir esto, pues su seguridad descansa en la libertad de los territorios alemanes.»[34] Gradualmente, las delegaciones protestantes se trasladaron a Osnabrück. Pero el emperador se mantenía firme, negándose a reconocer los derechos de sus vasallos a votar en las reuniones del congreso. Sólo el 29 de agosto de 1645, fecha clave en el proceso de paz, fue concedido el *ius belli ac pacis* a todos los gobernantes territoriales independientes. Las deliberaciones en la conferencia de Westfalia recibieron entonces el *status* de una Dieta, de forma que sus resoluciones tendrían fuerza de ley imperial. Al mismo tiempo, se clausuró la conferencia de Frankfurt.

34. «Vox Caesaris», frase utilizada por el consejero del elector de Maguncia en 1646, citado por Wolff, *Corpus evangelicorum*, 179; carta de Salvius de abril de 1643 citada por Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden*, p. 115. Sobre la «Deputationstag» de Frankfurt en general, véase Dickmann, caps. 3 y 5, y R. von Kietzell, «Der Frankfurter Deputationstag von 1642-1645. Eine Untersuchung der staatsrechtlichen Bedeutung dieser Reichsversammlung», *Nassauische Annalen*, LXXXIII (1972), pp. 99-119.

De hecho, el emperador había podido prolongar las conversaciones de Frankfurt durante tanto tiempo debido a un breve golpe de buena fortuna militar: en 1643 Suecia entró inesperadamente en guerra con Dinamarca. Varias razones explican este acontecimiento sorprendente. Cristián IV, contrariado en su deseo de alcanzar gloria en el exterior ya fuera por su avanzada edad o por las derrotas anteriores, no cejaba en perjudicar lo más posible a su vecino del norte desde hacía mucho tiempo: dio cobijo a los enemigos políticos del gobierno de Estocolmo, deseosos de venganza; bloqueó al aliado de Suecia, el puerto de Hamburgo, y hostigó e incluso apresó barcos suecos en el Báltico. Cuando se conoció la noticia de que Cristián negociaba secretamente una alianza con el emperador, Suecia se decidió a golpear primero. Sus mejores generales, Torstensson y Königsmarck, recibieron instrucciones de avanzar desde las fronteras de Bohemia (donde operaban desde la victoria de Breitenfeld en noviembre de 1642) hacia Dinamarca, Königsmarck ocupó los obispados secularizados de Verden y Bremen, que se habían mantenido neutrales desde que Suecia los devolvió a los daneses después de la batalla de Nördlingen. Ahora fueron rápidamente ocupados, instalándose un gobierno provisional encabezado por Königsmarck, que abrió el camino a la anexión de Suecia tras la paz de Westfalia. Entre tanto, Torstensson ocupó Holstein y en 1644 comenzó la conquista de la península de Jutlandia con la misma facilidad con que Tilly y Wallenstein lo habían conseguido 16 años antes.[35] En octubre, una gran batalla naval en

35. Véase Böhme, *Bremische-Verdische Staatsfinanzen*, pp. 13-165, y H. Eich-

Femmern, en la que las fuerzas de Cristián fueron derrotadas, abrió las islas a la amenaza de la invasión sueca; las conversaciones de paz se iniciaron el mes siguiente. Una conferencia formal, que comenzó en febrero de 1645, terminó el 23 de agosto en la paz de Brömsebro, favorable a Suecia.

No era éste el final que el emperador había previsto. En cuanto Suecia manifestó su intención de invadir Dinamarca, Fernando se apresuró a prometer ayuda a Cristián IV y envió a su ejército, comandado por el conde Gallas, para perseguir a Torstensson en Holstein. Sin embargo, los suecos habían previsto esta maniobra concluyendo una alianza con Jorge Rákóczy, sucesor de Bethlen Gabor en Transilvania: el príncipe, con la aprobación del sultán otomano y con subsidios recibidos de Francia, prometió invadir los territorios húngaros de los Habsburgo. Así lo hizo en febrero de 1644, comprometiendo seriamente a Fernando III, que se vio obligado a hacer regresar al ejército que había enviado a Dinamarca. Pero Torstensson consiguió hábilmente obligar a los imperiales a retirarse por zonas tan terriblemente devastadas que la mayor parte de ellos murieron de hambre. Según el (ciertamente hostil) cronista Chemnitz, de 18.000 hombres que comenzaron la retirada, apenas 1.000 llegaron a Bohemia. Así pues, «sería difícil encontrar un ejemplo similar de un ejército destrozado en tan corto período de tiempo sin luchar en una gran batalla».[36] Gallas, que también había conducido la desastrosa retirada de Borgoña en 1636, fue destituido.

Pero hacía falta algo más que el cambio de un general para detener a los suecos. A comienzos de 1645, con Dinamarca apartada ya definitivamente de la guerra, el Alto Mando sueco decidió organizar una operación que produjera el hundimiento inmediato de la resistencia de los Habsburgo. Para ello nada mejor que una invasión en toda regla de Bohemia en conjunción con las tropas de Transilvania, porque conseguiría «herir al emperador en el mismo corazón». Además, el ejército francés del Rin invadiría Baviera, y de esta forma Fernando III no podría recibir ayuda desde allí. Pero no era fácil

berg, *Militär und Technik. Schwedenfestungen des 17. Jahrhunderts in den Herzogtümern Bremen und Verden*, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, Bochumer historische Studien, VII, Düsseldorf, 1976.

36. B. P. von Chemnitz, *Königlichen schwedischer in Teutschland geführten Kriegs vierter Teil*, Estocolmo, 1859, p. 168. Chemnitz, que escribió su narración en el decenio de 1650, fue un destacado anti-imperialista.

llevar a cabo una acción de esas características. Los franceses no se habían mostrado fuertes en Renania desde la muerte de Bernardo de Sajonia-Weimar. La necesidad de enviar apoyo a Cataluña y Portugal y de continuar la guerra en las fronteras de los Países Bajos, reducía el aflujo de hombres y dinero al ejército de Alemania comandado por el vizconde de Turena. En un primer momento, Baviera desdeñó la oportunidad que le ofrecía esta situación, pues Maximiliano esperaba todavía firmar una paz por separado con Francia (véase p. 245, *supra*). Pero cuando se rompieron las negociaciones, el ejército bávaro, al mando de Franz von Mercy, realizó un perfecto ataque contra Tuttlingen (noviembre de 1643) que obligó a Turena a retirarse hacia el Rin, abandonando todo el bagaje de su ejército. La retirada, realizada durante el invierno, provocó la pérdida de casi dos tercios del ejército de Turena formado por 16.000 hombres (los «bernardinos» o «brigada alemana», constituida por los regimientos comandados anteriormente por Bernardo de Sajonia-Weimar, sufrieron pérdidas especialmente fuertes). Aunque se enviaron refuerzos a Alsacia en 1644, los franceses no pudieron salir del valle del Rin. En agosto de 1644, Mercy volvió a infligir una grave derrota a Turena en Friburgo (en esta ocasión, la «brigada alemana» quedó prácticamente aniquilada: sólo sobrevivieron tres oficiales y cincuenta hombres de un total de tres regimientos). La batalla de Mergentheim, en mayo de 1645, confirmó la superioridad de Baviera sobre las fuerzas francesas en la región.[37] Pero la llegada de refuerzos suecos permitió a Turena pasar al contraataque y en la batalla de Allerheim, el 3 de agosto, Mercy fue derrotado y muerto y su ejército destruido por la acción combinada de las tropas de Suecia, Francia y Hesse.

El ejército sueco que luchó en Allerheim ya había conseguido una gran victoria cinco meses antes. El *Hauptarmee* [el grueso del ejército] sueco había comenzado su avance desde Sajonia hacia Bohemia antes de la primavera. Torstensson comandaba una fuerza de sólo 15.000 hombres y las tropas imperiales —a pesar del avance del ejército de Transilvania remontando el Danubio— disponían del mis-

37. Sobre las campañas de 1643-1645 en el sudoeste, véase H. H. Schaufler, *Die Schlacht bei Freiburg-im-Breisgau 1644*, Friburgo, 1979. La batalla de Friburgo fue calificada por un general bávaro, Johann Werth, como la peor que había visto nunca: «En los 22 años en los que me he visto implicado en la matanza de la guerra —afirmó—, nunca ha habido un enfrentamiento tan sangriento». (Citado *ibid.*, p. 7.)

mo número de hombres. Pero los suecos contaban con una abrumadora superioridad en artillería: 60 cañones frente a sólo 26. Después de algunas escaramuzas, ambos bandos se enfrentaron en una larga batalla campal en Jankov, al sudeste de Praga, el 6 de marzo. El resultado fue definitivo: los imperiales perdieron su artillería, la mitad de sus hombres, su cancillería de campo e incluso sus generales (véase lámina 19). El emperador y su familia se apresuraron a huir a Graz.[38] No fue ésta una precaución innecesaria, pues a finales de mes los hombres de Torstensson habían ocupado Krems, donde establecieron una cabeza de puente en el Danubio (y restablecieron el culto luterano). Las fuerzas de Suecia y Transilvania se prepararon a continuación para asediar Viena y los pocos luteranos que quedaban en la ciudad mostraron su regocijo y esperaron su liberación. Pero ésta no llegó, porque el emperador fue salvado por los turcos.

En la primavera de 1645, el sultán otomano decidió entrar en guerra con la República de Venecia por la posesión de Creta. Comenzó la campaña en junio y muy pronto concentró todos sus recursos militares en esa operación. De esta forma, fue imposible seguir prestando ayuda a Rákóczy. El príncipe, abandonado y en dificultades financieras, aceptó las iniciativas de paz de los Habsburgo y —a pesar de que firmó una nueva alianza con Francia en abril— el 16 de diciembre de 1645 concluyó el tratado de Viena con Fernando. La tolerancia religiosa fue restablecida y garantizada en Hungría y Rákóczy consiguió amplios territorios. Sin duda, Transilvania, un Estado que carecía prácticamente de recursos para sostener las hostilidades durante un tiempo prolongado, había salido excepcionalmente bien parada de la Guerra de los Treinta Años.

Pero la defección de Transilvania no alteró la importancia crítica de la campaña de 1645. Ésa fue la razón por la que se luchó de forma tan encarnizada. La batalla de Jankov, por ejemplo, se prolongó más que ningún otro enfrentamiento en la guerra precisamente porque todo el mundo reconocía su importancia decisiva: el emperador arriesgaba todos sus recursos económicos y militares, el prestigio de su dinastía y su propia reputación como comandante de gran capacidad. La derrota, en la que perdió todo esto, hizo casi inevitable que el acuerdo final de paz fuera desfavorable para los Habsburgo. Después de Jankov y Allerheim, los católicos no contaban ya con un ejército capaz de enfrentarse a los suecos y a sus aliados, y todo el mundo lo sabía. El 6 de septiembre, Juan Jorge de Sajonia firmó, no sin renuencia, un alto el fuego con Suecia en Kötzschenbroda y abandonó la guerra. Mientras tanto, en Westfalia, Oxenstierna afirmaba que «el enemigo comienza a hablar con un tono más educado y agradable» y los representantes imperiales en la conferencia de paz se aprestaron a realizar importantes concesiones.[39] En agosto de 1645 se acordó que todos los príncipes y ciudades con representación en la Dieta Imperial gozarían de una presencia efectiva en las conferencias de paz. En septiembre, el emperador aceptó a regañadientes no buscar ventaja alguna en el tratado de paz para los católicos que vivían en territorios protestantes del Imperio. Poco después, decretó un indulto para todos sus vasallos rebeldes, para permitirles asistir personalmente a la conferencia y exponer sus opiniones, y el 29 de noviembre de 1645 el colaborador más estrecho del emperador y principal negociador, conde von Trauttmannsdorf, llegó a Münster con instrucciones de hacer las concesiones necesarias para asegurar la paz.

Fue en ese momento en que comenzaban las conversaciones serias para poner fin a la guerra alemana cuando llegaron a Münster los representantes de la República de Holanda para solucionar sus diferencias con España. Ya en enero de 1642, el capitán general de la República, Federico Enrique, príncipe de Orange, había instado a los Estados Generales a que nombraran plenipotenciarios y formularan sus condiciones, pero hasta octubre de 1645 no se llegó a una decisión sobre los delegados y sus instrucciones. La misión holandesa partió hacia la conferencia de paz en enero de 1646.[40] Su presencia completó

38. El emperador estaba en Praga y salió de la ciudad el 7 de marzo, el día después de la batalla: véase P. Broucek, *Der schwedische Feldzug nach Niederösterreich 1645/46*, Militärhistorische Schriftenreihe, VII, Viena, 1967, p. 11. Sobre la campaña de 1645 en general, véase también Ruppert, *Kaiserliche Politik*, cap. 3, parte II, y Chesler, «Crown, lords and God», pp. 209-210.

39. Cita tomada de C. T. Odhner, *Die Politik Schwedens im Westphälischen Friedenscongress und die Gründung der schwedischen Herrschaft in Deutschland*, Gotha, 1877 (reeditado en Hannover, 1973), 97 n. En realidad, el acuerdo de Kötzschenbroda fue tan sólo una tregua de seis meses, pero en abril de 1646 se acordó en Eilenburg prolongarla hasta el final de la guerra. Sajonia tenía que pagar contribuciones al ejército sueco y permitir que se instalaran guarniciones suecas en Leipzig y Torgau, pero se autorizó a que tres regimientos sajones que formaban parte del ejército imperial permanecieran en él, con tal de que no lucharan contra Suecia.

40. Sobre las negociaciones hispano-holandesas, véase el clásico estudio de

el rompecabezas político y complicó la labor de conseguir una paz para Alemania. Tal vez fuera cierto, como había dicho Gustavo Adolfo en una ocasión, que «todas las guerras que se libran en Europa se han fusionado y se han convertido en una sola guerra», pero las alianzas que unían a los diversos combatientes no podían ocultar importantes divergencias de intereses. Incluso el mismo Estado (el caso más notable es el de Francia) podía defender dos políticas diferentes en la conferencia: una para Alemania y otra para los Países Bajos. En ocasiones, los delegados recibían instrucciones diferentes e incluso contradictorias; a veces, los diferentes miembros de la misma delegación actuaban de forma distinta. La primera conferencia de los tiempos modernos era un mundo en sí misma. (Véase lámina 18.)

En las negociaciones participaron 176 plenipotenciarios (casi la mitad de ellos abogados de profesión) que actuaban en nombre de 194 gobernantes europeos, de mayor o menor importancia. No todos los estados representados en el congreso enviaron sus propias delegaciones —sólo lo hicieron 109—, pero de cualquier forma varios millares de diplomáticos pululaban por las calles de Münster y Osnabrück entre 1643 y 1648. El número de miembros de las diferentes misiones diplomáticas variaba desde los 200 hombres, mujeres y niños de la delegación francesa hasta los enviados aislados de los principados alemanes más pequeños.

La vida en la conferencia era una curiosa mezcla de escasez y abundancia. Por una parte, en cuanto al alojamiento, con frecuencia dos personas tenían que compartir una cama (así, en la misión bávara, los 29 miembros que la componían tenían que distribuirse en sólo 18 camas); por otra parte, la comida y la bebida eran abundantes (al parecer, cada bávaro consumía entre dos y tres litros de vino diarios, por lo cual tal vez estaban demasiado ofuscados como para discutir por la cama).[41] Pero, sobrios o borrachos, la principal actividad de los delegados era comunicarse y negociar y el consumo de tinta de los diplomáticos fue realmente extraordinario. Se creó una compleja red postal para permitir el intercambio regular de prolijos *denkschriften* (memorándums) y cartas interminables entre los delegados y sus representados, para que nada se concluyera sin el acuerdo total y manifiesto de cada gobierno.[42] Naturalmente, esto provocó graves retrasos en las negociaciones, pues cada carta tardaba entre 10 y 12 días en llegar desde Münster a París o Viena y entre 23 y 30 días en llegar a Madrid. Una carta de Osnabrück a Estocolmo tardaba 20 días o más (antes de la paz de Brömsebro con Dinamarca, bastante más) y, naturalmente, la respuesta tardaba el mismo tiempo. Pero estos retrasos no provocaron una reducción de la correspondencia. Tomemos como ejemplo la correspondencia de los delegados del duque de Württemberg en Osnabrück y su señor en Stuttgart: desde 1644 hasta 1649, en teoría se escribían tan sólo una vez a la semana, por lo general el viernes, pero al final de las negociaciones se habían escrito más de 400 cartas por cada parte.[43]

Con tantos participantes y tantos intereses conflictivos es difícil descubrir —y mucho más resumir— los rasgos sobresalientes. Sin embargo, se puede afirmar que las negociaciones se desarrollaron en tres fases. La primera, en la que se discutieron asuntos fundamentalmente de procedimiento, comenzó con la reunión de Frankfurt en enero de 1643 y duró, con numerosas interrupciones, hasta noviembre de 1645, cuando llegó a Münster el conde Trauttmannsdorf. La segunda fase se desarrolló desde ese momento hasta la nueva partida del conde, en junio de 1647: fue un período de intensas negociaciones durante el cual se superaron prácticamente todas las diferencias importantes entre los protagonistas tanto de la guerra de Holanda como de la guerra de Alemania. Durante la fase final, que duró hasta la firma de los tratados de paz en 1648, Francia intentó sin éxito retrasar el final de las hostilidades, tanto en los Países Bajos como en Alemania, hasta haber derrotado por completo a España. Durante los cinco años, el ritmo de

J. J. Poelhekke, *De vrede van Munster*, La Haya, 1948. Israel ha escrito un estudio en inglés, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, pp. 347-374.

41. Los detalles están tomados de F. Bosbach, *Die Kosten des Westfälischen Friedenskongresses. Eine strukturgeschichtliche Untersuchung*, Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der neueren Geschichte, XIII, Münster, 1984, pp. 14, 16, 33, 57, 110, 168, 196, 211 y 224 ss. He de manifestar mi más profundo agradecimiento al Dr. Bosbach por permitirme leer y citar su interesantísimo estudio antes de que sea publicado.

42. Con frecuencia, los historiadores han ridiculizado la atención prestada por los delegados a los detalles de procedimiento, pero la experiencia de la abortada paz de Ratisbona en 1630 y del tratado de Wismar de 1638 (véanse pp. 170 y 228, *supra*), cuando un acuerdo firmado por plenipotenciarios fue rechazado más tarde por su gobierno, permanecía fresco en las mentes de muchos. Nadie quería que ocurriera lo mismo en Westfalia. Véase O'Connell, «A cause célèbre in the history of treaty-making».

43. Bosbach, *Kosten*, I, p. 196; Philippe, *Württemberg*, p. 1.

las negociaciones, así como el carácter de las concesiones, se vio constantemente alterado por las fortunas de la guerra. En las cínicas palabras del prior Adami de Murrhart, uno de los representantes de los católicos duros de la conferencia: «durante el invierno negociamos y durante el verano luchamos».[44] El camino hacia la paz era estrecho y tortuoso.

IV. 1647-1650: LA FIRMA DE LA PAZ

> Dicen que la terrible guerra ha terminado. Pero todavía no hay señales de paz. Por todas partes existe envidia, odio y codicia: esto es lo que la guerra nos ha enseñado ... Vivimos como animales, comiendo cortezas y hierbas. Nadie podría haber imaginado que nos iba a ocurrir algo así. Muchos dicen que no existe Dios ...

Esta lúgubre anotación en una biblia familiar, en la aldea de Gerstetten, en Suabia, fue escrita el 17 de enero de 1647, tras la aparición de un nuevo grupo de refugiados perseguidos de cerca por las tropas predatorias. «Pero creemos todavía que Dios no nos ha abandonado —continuaba el texto—. Debemos permanecer juntos y ayudarnos unos a otros.»[45] Ahora bien, quedaban todavía doce meses de lucha por delante, antes de que se alcanzara la paz, y durante ese período Suabia (al igual que Baviera, Austria y muchas otras partes del Imperio) fue saqueada una vez más. De hecho, la lucha continuó en la mayor parte de Alemania hasta el momento en que se secó la tinta de las últimas firmas sobre los tratados de paz el 24 de octubre de 1648. Aunque para entonces habían muerto o caído en desgracia la mayor parte de los personajes intransigentes en el conflicto —Richelieu y Olivares, Fernando II y Gustavo Adolfo, Bernardo de Sajonia-Weimar y Guillermo de Hesse-Kassel—, sus sucesores estaban igualmente decididos a obtener el máximo provecho de la prolongada y pródiga inversión de sangre y dinero. Por ello negociaron con tanta dureza como habían luchado.

44. Citado en Heckel, «Zur Historiographie des Westfälischen Friedens», p. 324.

45. Citado en Kuczynski, *Geschichte des Alltags des deutschen Volkes*, p. 117. Sobre la campaña de 1646-1647, véase P. Broucek, *Die Eroberung von Bregenz am 4. Jänner 1647*, Militärhistorische Schriftenreihe, XVIII, Viena, 1971.

Aunque la mayor parte de los temas se discutieron en la conferencia de paz de forma simultánea, existía el acuerdo, al menos entre los diplomáticos franceses y suecos, de resolver primero los problemas específicamente alemanes. Como escribió el conde d'Avaux desde Münster en abril de 1644:

> Parece que ... el honor y el beneficio de Francia serán mejor preservados planteando primero sobre la mesa las cuestiones referentes a la paz y a las libertades públicas del Imperio ... porque si éstos [los estados alemanes] no desean todavía realmente la paz sería perjudicial y dañino para nosotros que las conversaciones se interrumpieran a propósito de nuestras exigencias particulares.

Mientras tanto, por parte sueca, en diciembre del mismo año, el astuto Oxenstierna escribió a su hijo (que era uno de los principales negociadores en Osnabrück): «En la medida en que "la restitución de los asuntos del Imperio a su situación original" es nuestro pretexto para desear cambios a nuestro favor ... debemos justificar todas nuestras acciones a la luz de ese mismo principio».[46]

Muchos de los parámetros de la «libertad alemana» ya se habían establecido en la paz de Praga y las decisiones de la Dieta de Ratisbona, pero los puntos más destacados fueron inevitablemente los más espinosos: la tolerancia oficial del calvinismo, la restitución de las tierras eclesiásticas secularizadas, la reposición del elector palatino y la amnistía general. Como ya hemos dicho, el último punto fue concedido después de la batalla de Jankov. El tercero, aunque objeto de prolongadas discusiones, estaba contemplado ya en las instrucciones secretas del emperador a Trauttmannsdorf en octubre de 1645: «en caso de extrema necesidad cuando no exista otro camino», se crearía un octavo electorado para que Baviera y el Palatinado pudieran tener cabida en el colegio electoral.[47] Pero estos asuntos podían ser decididos por el emperador por sí solo. Eran los otros dos temas —el de la tolerancia y la reposición— los que suscitaban realmente las diferencias,

46. D'Avaux citado por Philippe, *Württemberg und der Westfälische Friede*, p. 54; Oxenstierna citado por G. Schmid, «Konfessionspolitik und Staatsräson bei den Verhandlungen des Westfälischen Friedenskongresses über die Gravamina Ecclesiastica», *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte*, LIV (1953), pp. 203-223, en la página 206.

47. Instrucciones imperiales citadas por Ruppert, *Die kaiserliche Politik*, p. 134.

pues planteaban las cuestiones fundamentales de quién era competente para decidir sobre temas religiosos y si los gobernantes territoriales tenían derecho a ignorar los decretos imperiales. El partido católico había argumentado muchas veces que la paz de Augsburgo de 1555 era una medida temporal, de urgencia, pero todo el mundo se daba cuenta de que el nuevo equilibrio que se estableciera en la conferencia de paz sobre los credos religiosos sería permanente. Ésa es la razón por la que las discusiones fueron tan duras.

El enfrentamiento alcanzó su punto álgido a partir de agosto de 1645 cuando tuvo lugar la primera reunión de todas las delegaciones en el congreso. Justo un mes después, los príncipes católicos del Imperio mantuvieron su primera discusión por separado en Münster y poco después los protestantes comenzaron a celebrar sus propias reuniones en Osnabrück. Aunque el número de miembros de ambos bandos era muy similar (había 72 miembros del *Corpus catholicorum* frente a 73 del *Corpus evangelicorum*), los católicos parecían inicialmente en ventaja. En primer lugar, los representantes imperiales estaban claramente de su lado; en segundo lugar, había mayor coherencia entre los católicos porque varios de sus miembros tenían más de un voto. El elector de Colonia encabezaba la lista con 15 votos, que decidía su principal consejero —y primo— el obispo Wartenburg de Osnabrück (que también tenía 5 votos por delegación); el prior Adami de Murrhart representaba a varias abadías de Suabia y a 41 prelados suabos. Lo mismo ocurría con las ciudades imperiales: el representante de Augsburgo, Johann Leuchselring, estaba autorizado a emitir el voto de otras 15 ciudades.[48] Sin embargo, esta apariencia de fuerzas era ilusoria. Aunque el emperador estaba de parte de los católicos, no todos los católicos estaban al lado del emperador. Había un poderoso grupo de anti-imperialistas, encabezado por el elector de Tréveris (resentido todavía de sus diez años de cautiverio en manos del emperador), dispuesto a hacer concesiones a los franceses y, si era necesario, a los protestantes, para conseguir la paz. Frente a ellos se alzaban, en el bando católico, un grupo de 15 extremistas encabezados por Wartenburg, Adami y Leuchselring —a quienes se conocía como «los triunviros»—, apoyados por España. Estos hombres estaban decididos a no hacer concesiones importantes en cuestiones religiosas. Y por si esta división no fuera suficiente para minar la causa católica, también

48. Bosbach, *Kosten*, I, p. 14; Ruppert, *Kaiserliche Politik*, p. 251.

había diferencias entre los príncipes que detentaban un solo voto. Así, Maximiliano de Baviera y el duque de Neoburgo aspiraban ambos a obtener el Alto Palatinado, el primero como recompensa por sus gastos de guerra y el segundo porque era el pariente católico más próximo de la proscrita familia palatina. Los bloques de votos controlados por los principales asistentes, lejos de constituir una fuerza, hacían que la desunión resultara paralizante. A finales de 1646 era ya imposible para el *Corpus catholicorum* elaborar declaraciones comunes para el congreso; y, a comienzos de 1648, los exremistas abandonaron Münster, protestando contra la actitud de «palomas» de sus colegas y para deliberar por separado.

A simple vista, el *Corpus evangelicorum* no parecía más unido que el de los católicos. En primer lugar, no contaban con un líder comparable a Maximiliano de Baviera: ni el joven elector palatino (Carlos Luis, hijo de Federico V), ni el viejo elector de Sajonia (todavía Juan Jorge) daban la talla; y Federico Guillermo de Brandemburgo, el personaje más destacado en las filas protestantes, ya había firmado su propio acuerdo de paz. Tal vez el miembro más activo del bando protestante era una de las escasas mujeres presentes en el congreso, Amalia de Hesse-Kassel, viuda de Guillermo V y regente de su joven hijo. Ella y un grupo de príncipes menores, entre los que se contaban los duques de Sajonia-Weimar, y los príncipes calvinistas de Renania, deseaban obtener garantías para el protestantismo en zonas predominantemente católicas y exigían la revocación total del Edicto de Restitución. Frente a ellos, se situaban los estados luteranos más importantes, que deseaban la paz casi a cualquier precio. Además, como en el caso de los católicos, se producían también disputas territoriales entre sus miembros: el eterno enfrentamiento entre los landgraves de Hesse por Marburgo, entre Brandemburgo y Brunswick a propósito de Halberstadt y entre Brandemburgo y Suecia sobre la posesión de Pomerania. Pero en último extremo, el *Corpus evangelicorum* poseyó la coherencia y voluntad de obviar esas «vanidades» (término que se utilizó en una importante resolución de marzo de 1646) para votar como un solo bloque siempre que se planteaban cuestiones confesionales de importancia.[49] De esta forma, los protestantes consiguieron

49. Schmid, «Konfessionspolitik», p. 209. Este interesantísimo artículo se basa en documentos procedentes de la Sajonia ducal, cuyos delegados pertenecían al ala dura del bando protestante.

mantenerse hasta que la fragmentación del *Corpus catholicorum* les permitió conseguir la victoria. El 24 de marzo de 1648 se alcanzó un acuerdo final sobre todos los temas religiosos, que era muy favorable para los protestantes. La «fecha normativa» para todas las cuestiones religiosas se fijó en el 1 de enero de 1624. La tolerancia para el culto privado de las minorías religiosas se concedería para los que existían en la «fecha normativa»; los territorios eclesiásticos en manos seculares en la «fecha normativa» permanecerían bajo control protestante. Así, el principio *cuius regio* y la *Declaratio Ferdinandei* de 1555 quedaron finalmente descartados y el *reservatum ecclesiasticum* se aplicó solamente a las propiedades que estaban bajo control de los católicos a comienzos de 1624. A mayor abundamiento, cualquier variación en esta situación se decidiría por «consenso amistoso» en la Dieta entre católicos y protestantes y no por simple voto mayoritario.[50]

Solucionadas así las «cuestiones referentes a la paz y a las libertades públicas del Imperio», tal como deseaban los franceses y los suecos (véase p. 259, *supra*), el congreso tenía ahora que estudiar las exigencias de las potencias extranjeras. Hasta cierto punto, éstas variaban según los avatares de la guerra, que confundían a algunos observadores. Como observó en 1638 el severo presbiteriano de Glasgow, Robert Baillie: «No veo cuál pueda ser para los suecos el objetivo en Alemania, sino el de derramar sangre protestante».[51] Sin embargo, sus

50. No siempre se ha apreciado la originalidad de este compromiso, incluido en el Artículo V, párrafo 52 del «Instrumentum Pacis Osnabruguense» y conocido como «Itio in Partes». En efecto, en una época en la que se practicaba el principio de mayoría, se sancionó un método alternativo para tomar decisiones sobre determinados aspectos fundamentales. Es cierto que el principio de paridad entre dos grupos desiguales había sido aceptado un siglo antes por la Confederación Suiza, pero el Sacro Imperio Romano era mucho más extenso y, en consecuencia, era mucho más difícil aplicar la fórmula «Itio in Partes». Sin embargo, se puso en práctica. Los juristas constitucionalistas del siglo XVIII consideraron que ésa había sido la obra maestra de los artífices de la paz —«el baluarte fundamental de la libertad y la igualdad, construido con tanta sangre»— porque el dualismo confesional fortalecía y protegía el equilibrio político establecido en Alemania entre el emperador y los príncipes. (Véase C. G. Hoffman, *Gründliche Vorstellung deren in dem Heiliger Romische Reiche ... Religions-Beschwerden* [1722], citado por Heckel, «Itio in Partes»; véase el agudo análisis de Heckel en pp. 291-308 de su artículo titulado «Itio in Partes».) Los logros del Congreso son analizados más extensamente en las pp. 309-313, *infra*.

51. Citado por Seaton, *Literary relations of England and Scandinavia*, p. 81. Considérense también los sentimientos de sir Edward Peyton, *The Divine Catastrophe, or the rise, reign and ruine of the house of Stuarts*, Londres, 1652: «Dios hizo surgir a Gustavo Adolfo para inclinar la balanza del lado de los príncipes unidos; sin embargo, en conclusión, los suecos han buscado más su propio interés que el de Dios».

52. Sten Bielke al consejo, 9 de febrero de 1647, citado por Odhner, *Die Politik Schwedens*, p. 4 n.

objetivos estaban bastante claros: todavía luchaban por conseguir «satisfacción» (en forma de algunos territorios del norte de Alemania), «seguridad» (en forma de una garantía de que ningún poder del Imperio plantearía nuevamente una amenaza a los intereses suecos) y una indemnización. La única diferencia radicaba en la cuantía de esas exigencias. El gobierno sueco no se conformaba ya solamente con Pomerania, sino que pedía, además, algunos territorios de Mecklemburgo y los obispados secularizados de Bremen y Verden. Abandonada ya la Liga Heilbronn, los suecos aspiraban ahora a «atomizar» el Imperio para crear un equilibrio de poder permanente entre los diferentes credos y príncipes. En lugar de una modesta indemnización en efectivo a la que se podía renunciar a cambio de Pomerania, el enviado de las tropas suecas, coronel Erskine, exigió en el verano de 1647 30 millones de táleros.

Naturalmente, estas peticiones encontraron una encendida oposición en el congreso de paz, aunque Suecia las planteó amparada por una abrumadora fuerza militar. La cuestión de Pomerania fue especialmente espinosa. Para el gobierno de Estocolmo era imperativo mantener sus adquisiciones en el Báltico, particularmente Stralsund y Wismar, porque, como señaló un consejero real en febrero de 1647: «Estos dos puertos constituyen no sólo la puerta de entrada a Alemania, sino también los lugares donde pueden ser preparadas las flotas reales y, en consecuencia, de donde puede proceder el peligro para la corona de Suecia».[52] Pero Suecia no tenía derecho a Pomerania: Federico Guillermo de Brandemburgo era, sin duda, el sucesor legítimo del último duque nativo, que murió en 1637 (véanse pp. 201-202, *supra*). Cuando en 1643, en el curso de la guerra que enfrentó a Suecia con Dinamarca, el elector se abstuvo de prestar ayuda a Cristián IV, lo hizo con la esperanza de conseguir la buena disposición de los suecos y algunas concesiones. Al año siguiente fue recompensado con la evacuación sueca de Frankfurt del Oder, pero los suecos no se retiraron de Pomerania. En consecuencia, Federico Guillermo comenzó una ofensiva diplomática para convencer a las cortes de Europa de la necesidad

de que se le restituyera Pomerania. En 1646 se trasladó a Cleves para estar más cerca de las conversaciones de paz y fue su constante ofensiva diplomática en la conferencia lo que elevó a Brandemburgo desde su habitual oscuridad a la posición de potencia de primer orden. Consiguió, sobre todo, el apoyo del cardenal Mazarino, que temía que Suecia pudiera ocupar en el norte de Alemania una posición tan dominante como la que había gozado el emperador en 1627-1629. En consecuencia, Francia inició la política —que mantendría durante largo tiempo— de fortalecer el poder de Brandemburgo como contrapeso de Suecia.[53] Finalmente, en febrero de 1647, y alarmada por el apoyo exterior de que gozaba Brandemburgo, Suecia decidió dividir Pomerania, conservando tan sólo la parte occidental, con sus puertos estratégicos, y cediendo el resto a Federico Guillermo (que vio además reconocidos sus derechos sobre los obispados secularizados de Halberstadt y Magdeburgo y sobre los ducados de Mark y Cleves). Poco después se concluyó un acuerdo con Dinamarca, por el cual Bremen y Verden pasaban a poder de Suecia.

Conseguida, pues, de forma tan importante la «satisfacción», la «seguridad» era menos importante. Era también más difícil. Los negociadores imperiales, encabezados por el conde Trauttmannsdorf en 1645-1647 y por el doctor Isaac Volmar desde esa fecha, intentaron enfrentar a Francia con Suecia y movilizar un patriotismo residual alemán contra ambas potencias. Así, aunque Suecia presionó para que se concediera tolerancia religiosa a los protestantes que vivían en las provincias de los Habsburgo, los plenipotenciarios imperiales se aliaron con Francia para impedirlo. Asimismo, conspiraron para impedir que Francia y Suecia alcanzaran un papel preponderante en el Imperio. Tal como informó el conde Salvius con exasperación a finales de 1646: «Muchos empiezan a considerar que el poder de Suecia es peligroso para el "equilibrio de poder" [*Gleichgewicht*]. Su primera norma política es que la seguridad de todos depende del equilibrio de los individuos. Cuando uno comienza a ser poderoso ... los otros se sitúan, mediante uniones o alianzas, en la balanza opuesta para mantener el

53. Este importante aspecto de la política francesa en Alemania durante los años 1640 ha sido minusvalorado por Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden*. La mayor parte de los otros estudios alemanes —menos extensos— de esta fase de la guerra tienden también a limitar el papel de Mazarino. Véanse los útiles comentarios de D. McKay y H. M. Scott, *The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648-1815*, Londres, 1983, pp. 4-5.

equilibrio». Pero esa idea no era nueva. Ya en 1632 la curia papal había advertido a sus diplomáticos en el extranjero que «el interés de la Iglesia de Roma» se preservaba mejor con un equilibrio de poder que con la victoria de un Estado concreto. Y ese mismo principio había sido invocado muchas veces por Suecia: en 1633 el canciller Oxenstierna le dijo a un dignatario extranjero que la principal razón de la intervención sueca en Alemania era «preservar el *aequilibrium* en toda Europa».[54] Ahora se veía obligado a actuar de acuerdo con sus propias normas. Era el principio de un nuevo orden en Europa —de un equilibrio internacional de poder con centro en Alemania— y Suecia se vería obligada a respetarlo.

Las exigencias territoriales de Francia eran más modestas. Mazarino intentaba que se reconocieran las conquistas que había hecho en Renania —una serie de cabezas de puente en la orilla oriental del río y la jurisdicción sobre la mayor parte de Alsacia— y la legalización del control de Francia sobre los tres obispados de Lorena adquiridos en 1552. Los consejeros del emperador se mostraron muy renuentes a aceptar siquiera esas peticiones, ya que Alsacia era una de las provincias patrimoniales más antiguas de la familia Habsburgo (hecho que el plenipotenciario de Fernando en Münster, Isaac Volmar, que había sido anteriormente canciller de Alsacia, recordaba constantemente al emperador). Pero en septiembre de 1646 Alsacia fue abandonada a cambio de un pago en efectivo de 1,2 millones de táleros y se concluyó una paz preliminar entre Francia y el emperador.

Sin embargo, la guerra continuó durante dos años más después de este acuerdo. ¿Por qué? Una de las razones era la política de Maximiliano de Baviera. En 1646, el Alto Mando sueco decidió concentrar sus esfuerzos contra Baviera en lugar de Austria durante la siguiente campaña. En los primeros meses del año, el principal cuerpo de ejército se retiró hacia el oeste y, en agosto, se abandonaron Krems y los demás bastiones suecos en la Baja Austria. Pero los Habsburgo no pudieron contraatacar. Aunque consiguieron reunir un ejército de 40.000 hombres, que marchó hasta Hesse-Kassel, en ningún modo podían plantear problemas al «Hauptarmee» de 34.000 veteranos, comandado conjuntamente por Turena y Karl Gustav Wrangel. Aunque no hubo una batalla campal, el ejército de los Habsburgo fue rechaza-

54. Citas de Odhner, *op. cit.*, 163 n.; Aldea, *España, el Papado y el Imperio*, pp. 78-80; y Müller, *Der schwedische Staat in Mainz*, p. 19, n. 66.

do hacia Bohemia, mientras que Baviera y Renania eran saqueadas sistemáticamente durante el invierno de 1646-1647. No puede sorprender que el 14 de marzo de 1647 los desesperados electores de Baviera y Colonia, junto con alguno de sus aliados, firmaran un alto el fuego en Ulm con los representantes de Francia, Suecia y Hesse-Kassel. Maguncia hizo lo mismo en mayo. Se acordó que las tropas anti-imperialistas ocuparían tres ciudades estratégicas en el electorado de Maximiliano y que los electores católicos no seguirían luchando al lado del emperador, sino que discutirían los términos para una paz por separado. Mientras tanto, Wrangel regresó con sus fuerzas a Austria, invadiendo esta vez el Vorarlberg, conquistando Bregenz y saqueando el territorio circundante.

En ese momento, eran muchos (como los campesinos cuyos comentarios citábamos al comienzo de esta acción) los que creían que la guerra había terminado. Y ello podía haber sido cierto, a no ser por la decisión de Mazarino de plantear nuevas exigencias. Sus negociadores en Münster trataron de conseguir para Luis XIV el *status* de príncipe del Imperio (con representación en la Dieta), una indemnización de guerra y una solución de la cuestión del Palatinado que era inaceptable para Baviera. Maximiliano concluyó que «la corona francesa no desea conseguir una paz que restaure la libertad, sino más bien oprimir a Alemania con una nueva forma de imperialismo» y en septiembre de 1647 renovó su antigua alianza con el emperador. Fue ésta una decisión temeraria, pues desde que perdiera sus mejores hombres en Allerheim (véanse pp. 253-254, *supra*), el ejército de Maximiliano no era enemigo para los franceses. Rápidamente se enviaron refuerzos imperiales (reunidos gracias a los esfuerzos de Ernest von Traun, el hábil intendente general de Fernando III) a Baviera, pero no sirvieron de nada. El 17 de mayo de 1648, el último ejército que había de luchar por el emperador en la guerra fue derrotado en la batalla de Zusmarshausen. Maximiliano huyó hacia Salzburgo.[55] Sin duda, Mazarino pretendía explotar esta victoria, también, para conseguir nuevas ventajas, pero se lo impidió el estallido de una grave rebelión en Francia ese

55. Véase Heinisch, *Salzburg im dreissigjährigen Krieg*, pp. 195-196; sobre la última campaña imperial de la guerra, véase Hoyos, «Ernst von Traun», parte II. Para la política de Colonia en esta época, véase J. F. Foerster, *Kurfürst Ferdinand von Köln. Die Politik seiner Stifter in den Jahren 1634-1650*, Münster, 1976: *Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der neuren Geschichte*, VI.

mismo mes. En principio, la revuelta (conocida como la Fronda) se limitó a París, donde los funcionarios se declararon en huelga, pero el ejemplo de la desobediencia cundió rápidamente en las provincias, privando al gobierno de todos los ingresos por impuestos. A mediados de agosto, el cardenal estaba convencido de «nuestra necesidad de firmar la paz a la primera oportunidad» y dio instrucciones a sus delegados en Münster de que alcanzaran un acuerdo lo más rápidamente posible, pues «es casi un milagro que, a pesar de tantos obstáculos, consigamos que avancen todos nuestros asuntos, e incluso que prosperen, pero la prudencia dicta que no situemos toda nuestra confianza en la continuación de este milagro durante mucho tiempo».[56]

También Suecia estaba ansiosa por alcanzar un acuerdo. En el verano de 1648 quedaba realmente tan sólo una cuestión importante sin resolver —la cuantía de la indemnización que debería cobrar el ejército sueco— y en junio de 1648, después de prolongadas discusiones, la delegación sueca acordó aceptar como indemnización definitiva 5 millones de táleros (1,8 millones en efectivo, 1,2 millones como asignaciones y los 2 millones restantes en el plazo de dos años). Este acuerdo abrió la vía hacia «una paz preliminar» entre Suecia y el emperador, similar al acuerdo de 1646 con Francia, y fue firmada en Osnabrück el 6 de agosto. Sin embargo, la lucha continuó y una vez más los suecos invadieron Bohemia, sitiando Praga. Los luteranos residentes en la zona se agolparon para escuchar a los capellanes del ejército y los suecos hicieron un esfuerzo final para asegurar la tolerancia para su correligionarios en Bohemia. Sin embargo, no consiguieron su objetivo al no obtener apoyo de Francia en este punto: aunque los protestantes de Silesia obtuvieron garantías para su fe en la paz de Westfalia, Fernando III se mantuvo firme sobre la situación en los demás lugares. No se restituirían las propiedades confiscadas y no habría tolerancia para los no católicos.[57] Pero el emperador no pudo

56. A. Chéruel, ed., *Lettres du Cardinal de Mazarin*, III, París, 1883, pp. 173-181; Mazarino a Servien, 14 de agosto de 1648.

57. Chesler, «Crown, lords and God», pp. 209-210; Evans, *Habsburg Monarchy*, p. 76. La incertidumbre respecto al destino del nuevo orden en Bohemia se mantuvo al menos hasta el final de la guerra. Todavía en 1645, la condesa Cernin (una de las *arrivistes*) escribió: «La suerte no está echada todavía, y ¿quién sabe quién se beneficiará de lo que poseemos?». (Citado por O. Odlozhilik, «The nobility of Bohemia, 1620-1740», *East European Quarterly*, VII (1973), pp. 15-30, en p. 19.) Véase también el estudio de R. J. W. Evans, «The significance of the White Mountain for the culture of the Czech lands», *Bulletin of*

resistir la presión de Francia en otra cuestión: pese al estallido de la Fronda, Mazarino estaba totalmente decidido a seguir luchando hasta que los Habsburgo austriacos acordaran retirar su apoyo a España.

Era indudable que Felipe IV necesitaba más que nunca la ayuda imperial. En Cataluña y Portugal no se había podido sofocar la rebelión, como consecuencia del apoyo francés. Por otra parte, en 1647 estalló una gran rebelión en la ciudad de Nápoles que consiguió el respaldo de una parte importante de la aristocracia y la promesa de ayuda francesa; poco después, hubo también levantamientos en ciudades de Sicilia y de Andalucía, y toda España se vio afectada por una virulenta epidemia de peste. Algunos miembros del Consejo Real eran partidarios de una paz inmediata con Francia, pero eran más numerosos los que preferían llegar a un acuerdo con Holanda. Esta tendencia estaba encabezada por don Gaspar de Bracamonte, conde de Peñaranda, principal plenipotenciario de Felipe IV en Münster. En cuanto llegó a esa ciudad la delegación holandesa, en enero de 1646, Peñaranda comenzó a ofrecer concesiones. Inmediatamente puso de manifiesto el deseo de España de reconocer la soberanía y la independencia de Holanda. Luego, en el mes de mayo, aceptó el cierre permanente del río Scheldt al tráfico, excepto bajo licencia holandesa, la cesión de extensos territorios en el norte de Brabante (el Meierij de 's Hertogenbosch) y la imposición de derechos aduaneros por Holanda en los puertos de Flandes. El único punto importante sobre el cual no se había llegado todavía a un acuerdo era el comercio ultramarino. Los delegados holandeses, presionados por la Compañía de las Indias Orientales y por la Compañía de las Indias Occidentales deseaban conseguir libertad total de comercio en cualquier parte del mundo ibérico. España no podía conceder esto y las negociaciones se interrumpieron durante algún tiempo. Pero en diciembre de 1646, Felipe IV admitió reconocer todas las conquistas holandesas en territorios de la corona de Portugal, a cambio del compromiso de que los barcos de la República se mantuvieran apartados de la América española. En enero de 1647 se alcanzó un acuerdo provisional entre los negociadores que fue ratificado, pese a los esfuerzos de Mazarino por impedirlo, en enero de 1648. La «revuelta holandesa» había terminado por fin.[58]

the Institute of Historical Research, XLIV (1971), pp. 34-54, en p. 44 (artículo de suma importancia).

58. Sin embargo, la lucha continuó en ultramar, sobre todo en Asia, durante algún tiempo. Israel, *Dutch Republic*, p. 336, señala que «la última **batalla** de la Guerra de los Ochenta Años se libró en Ternate el 18 de julio de **1649**, más de un año después de la ratificación del tratado de Münster, pero antes de la publicación oficial de la noticia en determinadas zonas de Oriente».

59. Odhner, *Die Politik Schwedens*, p. 238, menciona la queja de los plenipotenciarios suecos, en enero de 1648, de que «la causa de España» era «el principio que guiaba al emperador en sus negociaciones en Alemania». Ruppert, *Die kaiserliche Politik*, pp. 350-358, menciona la angustia que embargaba al emperador por tener que firmar la paz sin España.

España tenía ahora las manos libres para dirigir el ejército de Flandes únicamente contra Francia y en los primeros meses de 1648 consiguió algunas pequeñas ventajas. Pero Mazarino aprovechó la derrota de Baviera en Zusmarshausen para trasladar al frente septentrional un gran destacamento de tropas del sur de Alemania. Con su ayuda, los franceses infligieron una aplastante derrota en Lens al ejército español, bajo el mando personal del hermano del emperador, Leopoldo Guillermo, que perdió todo su bajage junto con 8.000 hombres y 30 cañones. Fue éste un momento terrible para Fernando III. Por una parte, deseaba ardientemente ayudar a su hermano y, por otra, no podía dejar de considerar la precaria situación de Bohemia. Ya el 26 de julio la «ciudad nueva», suburbio de Praga donde se hallaba ubicado el palacio Hradschin, había sido capturada por los suecos. El emperador corría el riesgo de perder todo el reino, si no se apresuraba a firmar la paz. A finales de septiembre, bajo la incesante presión militar de sus enemigos y la desesperada urgencia diplomática de sus amigos, Fernando se hundió: simplemente no podía seguir luchando por España.[59] Los lazos entre España y Austria, que tanto habían desestabilizado la política europea desde el acceso al trono de Carlos V, se vieron fatalmente debilitados. Ya que no había otro obstáculo para la paz, los últimos acuerdos para poner fin a la guerra —128 cláusulas que incluían todas las decisiones tomadas en los acuerdos preliminares— fueron definitivamente firmados en Münster el 24 de octubre de 1648.

La atención se centró ahora en el cumplimiento de las numerosas provisiones del tratado, comenzando con las cuestiones eclesiásticas. En Württemberg, donde 30 conventos habían sido recatolizados en 1630 en cumplimiento del Edicto de Restitución, y nuevamente después de la batalla de Nördlingen, los protestantes pudieron regresar en el invierno de 1648-1649. En abril de 1649, las ciudades imperia-

les a las que se había ordenado admitir la igualdad de credos religiosos obedecieron la cláusula del tratado: incluso Augsburgo, cuyo representante (Leuchselring) había sido un destacado extremista católico en Münster, se vio obligado a admitir 14 pastores que se apresuraron a organizar una jerarquía eclesiástica protestante junto a la católica.[60] Simultáneamente, se restituyeron los territorios a quienes los habían perdido por aliarse con Suecia o Francia (pero no por declararse en rebeldía). Se decretó la amnistía general y el elector palatino recuperó un puesto en el colegio electoral. Poco después, los diplomáticos prepararon sus equipajes, intercambiando presentes de despedida (los relicarios fueron el regalo favorito entre los plenipotenciarios católicos) y escribiendo sus últimas cartas. El coste total de sus cinco años de actividad fue de aproximadamente 3,2 millones de táleros: 500.000 en el caso de Francia, y otro tanto en el de España, unos 250.000 en el caso del emperador, Suecia y Holanda, una media de 60.000 por cada elector, etc. Esas sumas eran importantes y en parte fueron sufragadas por los diferentes territorios soberanos del Imperio. Pero en la mayoría de los casos, eso no era nada comparado con el coste de la desmovilización.[61]

Muchos de los delegados de Westfalia no tardaron en reunirse de nuevo en Nuremberg, donde se inauguró una nueva conferencia para supervisar los pagos a los diferentes ejércitos que habían luchado en la guerra. En primer lugar, se resolvió el problema de las formaciones más pequeñas. Por ejemplo, a finales de 1648 se entregaron tres meses de soldada a las tropas reclutadas por príncipes católicos (las llamadas unidades *mediatarmee,* como el ejército de Westfalia del elector Fernando de Colonia), mientras que los miembros del Círculo bávaro se hicieron responsables del pago de los atrasos al ejército de Baviera (por ejemplo, al arzobispado de Salzburgo se le requirió el pago de

60. Philippe, *Württemberg, passim;* y *Welt im Umbruch. Augsburg zwischen Renaissance und Barock*, I, Augsburgo, 1980, pp. 409 ss. En 1645, la población de Augsburgo, que antes de la guerra era de 33.000 habitantes, era de sólo 21.000: 14.000 luteranos, 6.000 católicos y 1.000 soldados.

61. Véanse detalles en Bosbach, *Kosten*, pp. 224 ss. El autor señala que, en algunos territorios, el coste de la conferencia igualaba, e incluso superaba, el de la «satisfacción de la soldadesca». Así, Brandemburgo tuvo que encontrar 134.522 táleros para los diplomáticos y 162.692 para el ejército sueco, mientras que la ciudad imperial de Bremen tuvo que pagar 88.413 para los primeros y sólo 28.480 para el segundo. Pero en la mayor parte de las zonas, las proporciones eran las contrarias.

240.000 táleros).[62] Luego, en enero de 1649, todas las guarniciones imperiales se retiraron de Baviera. Pero las dificultades fueron mayores en el caso de los ejércitos más importantes. En agosto de 1649, cuando se ordenó la salida de Lindau de los 500 soldados imperiales, estalló un motín que se prolongó durante dos meses. También en el ejército francés reinaba el desasosiego. El estallido de la Fronda interrumpió el aflujo de dinero a las tropas de Alsacia y ni siquiera el experimentado Erlach pudo impedir los desmanes de sus hombres.

Sólo a los suecos que ocupaban la zona más extensa de Alemania y que habían recibido el primer plazo de los 5 millones de táleros de indemnización parecieron no afectarles los retrasos en la desmovilización. Pero sus fuerzas todavía cobraban la soldada —casi un millón de táleros al mes— y en consecuencia se acumularon nuevos atrasos mientras esperaban en sus guarniciones. En el otoño de 1649, los comandantes suecos amenazaron con reiniciar las hostilidades si no se acordaba un programa adecuado de desmovilización. Pero el 26 de junio de 1650, en medio de fuegos artificiales y el regocijo general, los delegados suecos (dirigidos por el príncipe Carlos Gustavo) y los imperiales (encabezados por el infatigable Ernest von Traun, uno de los héroes anónimos de la guerra) firmaron un acuerdo para la retirada gradual, en días señalados, de todas las tropas de las zonas de Alemania que no habían sido cedidas a Francia, a Suecia o al emperador (véanse láminas 20 y 21).

La operación se prolongó durante mucho tiempo. El congreso de Nuremberg no se clausuró hasta julio de 1651; una guarnición española permaneció en Frankenthal, en el Palatinado, hasta 1653 (cuando el emperador ofreció a Felipe IV la ciudad imperial de Besançon como compensación) y las últimas tropas suecas no se retiraron al Báltico hasta 1654. Por otra parte, en la desmovilización se vulneraron algunos acuerdos de la paz de Westfalia, especialmente por parte del emperador. Aunque sus tropas se retiraron prontamente de Alsacia (cedida a Francia), de la Alta y Baja Lusacia (concedidas a Sajonia) y de dos ducados de Silesia (ofrecidos a la corona polaca como garantía por las deudas contraídas por Fernando III), se enviaron algunos regi-

62. Heinisch, *Salzburg im dreissigjährigen Krieg*, pp. 169 ss. Todo lo que el arzobispo Lodron y sus vasallos consiguieron a cambio de su dinero fue que las tropas no se alojaran allí. Las cargas fueron igualmente elevadas en el resto del Imperio: véase G. Buchstab, «Die Freie Reichsstadt Köln und die schwedische Armeesatisfaktion», en Repgen, ed., *Forschungen und Quellen*, pp. 149-162.

mientos —contraviniendo claramente las cláusulas III y IV del acuerdo de Westfalia— a luchar a favor de España en los Países Bajos del Sur y en el norte de Italia. Sin embargo, la mayor parte del ejército imperial, unos 25.000 hombres, permanecieron al servicio de Fernando. Algunos ingresaron en guarniciones de las provincias patrimoniales, pero la mayoría fueron trasladados a la frontera con Hungría, que había sido peligrosamente descuidada durante los últimos años de la guerra. Según observaba el gobierno, los veteranos formaban «el núcleo de un buen ejército permanente» comandado por generales experimentados como Ottavio Piccolomini (que había luchado en la guerra desde 1618) y Raimondo Montecuccoli (comandante desde la batalla de Lützen) y posteriormente demostraron su valía ante los franceses, los polacos, los turcos y cualquier otro enemigo de su príncipe. Los regimientos conservados en 1648, algunos de ellos con una historia colectiva de treinta años, continuaron luchando por los Habsburgo hasta el hundimiento final del ejército austro-húngaro en 1918.[63] Al igual que «la Madre Coraje» de Grimmelshausen, muchos de los que habían luchado en la guerra no conocían otra vida y no deseaban abandonar el ejército. Para ellos, los acuerdos de Westfalia y Nuremberg fueron tan sólo la transición de un capítulo a otro, y no el final de la historia. Pero para el resto de la humanidad, señalaron el final de la guerra. Tal como escribió el poeta de Nuremberg, Johann Vogel:

> Algo en lo que nunca creíste
> ha ocurrido. ¿Qué?
> ¿Pasará el camello por el ojo de la aguja
> ahora que la paz ha regresado a Alemania?[64]

63. Sobre la desmovilización sueca, véase el admirable estudio de T. Lorentzen, *Die schwedische Armee im Dreissigjährigen Kriege und ihre Abdankung*, Leipzig, 1894, caps. 6, 7. Datos más recientes aparecen en G. Buchstab, *Reichsstädte, Städtekurie und westfälischer Friedenskongress*, Münster, 1976: *Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der neueren Geschichte*, V, pp. 170-177. Sobre la desmovilización de las fuerzas imperialistas, véase la parte III de Hoyos, «Ernst von Traun» (que ha sido publicada en *Der dreissigjährige Krieg*, pp. 169-232); y Elster, *Die Piccolomini Regimenter*, pp. 104 ss.

64. Citado en Glaser, ed., *Wittelsbach und Bayern*, II/2, p. 483. En las páginas 483-490 de este magnífico catálogo se describen e ilustran objetos fabricados para celebrar el comienzo de la paz.

Capítulo VI

LA GUERRA EN EL MITO, LA LEYENDA Y LA HISTORIA

El poeta escocés del siglo XV, Gavin Douglas, concluía su traducción de la *Eneida* con un audible suspiro de alivio: «Aquí termina la larga, tremenda obra». Pero, por desgracia, la historia, a diferencia de la literatura, no tiene un término obvio. El significado de la Guerra de los Treinta Años ha sido motivo de enfrentamiento para historiadores y políticos desde que concluyera y la polémica ha sido especialmente virulenta en torno a tres aspectos: uno militar, otro económico y el tercero, político. Respecto al primero, se han escrito, inevitablemente, las tradicionales historias militares, con un punto de vista nacionalista, que exaltan a los líderes heroicos y a las tropas infatigables de cada ejército. Pero, frente a éstas, algunos autores (comenzando por determinados testigos presenciales como Grimmelshausen y Moscherosch) han presentado a los soldados que lucharon en la guerra como los guerreros más brutales y carentes de principios que se hayan visto nunca en Europa, dirigidos por oficiales tan ineficaces como corruptos. De igual forma, el impacto social y económico de la guerra ha sido evaluado en formas radicalmente distintas. Algunos han afirmado que la guerra hundió una economía próspera y causó una devastación inigualable, mientras que otros afirman que los treinta años de conflicto no tuvieron consecuencias económicas negativas. Finalmente, tampoco hay mucha coincidencia a la hora de evaluar los objetivos políticos y los logros de los estadistas implicados en la guerra. La mayor parte de los analistas no alemanes otorgan poderes casi divinos de presciencia y prudencia a políticos como Oxenstierna y Richelieu, pero desdeñan a sus aliados alemanes por incompetentes, egoístas y hom-

bres sin principios. Por lo general, los investigadores alemanes presentan la imagen opuesta. Es lamentable que después de trescientos años de discusión no sea posible ofrecer todavía un veredicto definitivo sobre cualquiera de estos tres aspectos fundamentales. Sin embargo, los historiadores han de trabajar ahora con una documentación más completa que nunca. Ello justifica, por tanto, que examinemos de nuevo cada una de esas controversias.

I. El soldado universal

En el momento en que se firmó la paz de Westfalia, las fuerzas de los enemigos de Fernando III en el Imperio —Francia, Hesse-Kassel y, sobre todo, Suecia— sumaban posiblemente unos 140.000 hombres. Las de los imperialistas y los escasos aliados que todavía tenían eran considerablemente menores, aunque formaban aún un ejército importante: tal vez unos 70.000 en conjunto. En la actualidad, estas concentraciones de hombres en armas en Europa nos parecen insignificantes, pero en el siglo XVII no tenían precedentes.

¿Quiénes eran estos hombres que ganaban su sustento dando muerte a otros? Los testimonios con los que contamos al respecto son exiguos, asistemáticos e insuficientemente estudiados como para permitir generalizaciones.[1] En primer lugar, no sabemos cuál era el aspecto de los soldados, pues incluso la indumentaria de las tropas que lucharon en la Guerra de los Treinta Años ha sido objeto de debate. A juzgar por las representaciones artísticas del período y por la indumentaria militar conservada en algunos museos, parece que (al menos en las primeras fases de la guerra) los soldados vestían a menudo la ropa que querían.[2] Pero en algunos momentos se intentó estandarizar la vestimenta y crear «uniformes». Así, cuando el duque de Neoburgo creó una milicia en 1605, todos los hombres tenían que estar equipados con «una ropa militar similar». Los guardias de la ciudad de Nuremberg, reclutados en 1619, vestían todos de la misma forma y los dos nuevos regimientos del duque de Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel de ese mismo año vestían de azul. Poco después, tanto Mansfeld como Gustavo Adolfo comandaron regimientos que se conocían por sus colores («los rojos» o «los azules»), pero, al parecer, esto se refería tan sólo a los estandartes del regimiento en el que luchaban. Los colores de los estandartes militares de la Guerra de los Treinta Años, en su mayor parte piezas de 2 m² (con una terminación en punta para la caballería), suscitaban la mayor devoción, por cuanto eran el único símbolo colectivo común que poseía la compañía o el regimiento. En los relatos contemporáneos se evaluaba la victoria o la derrota según el número de banderas que se ganaban o se perdían. Ciertamente, en muchas acciones de guerra, ésa era la única medida tangible del éxito o el fracaso.[3]

En su *Compendio de la Guerra*, publicado en 1651, Hans Conrad Lavater de Zurich aconsejaba a los futuros soldados que llevaran ropas *juiciosas*: zapatos fuertes, pantalones y calcetines, dos camisas gruesas (o más; Gustavo Adolfo llevaba tres en la batalla de Lützen), un abrigo de piel que se protegía de la lluvia con una capa y un amplio sombrero de fieltro. Lavater advertía que las prendas debían ser amplias para que dieran más calor, pero no debían tener pelo y pocas costuras (para impedir que anidaran los parásitos). Pero en el momento en que escribía Lavater había ya mucha menos oportunidad para las soluciones individuales. En 1647, el secretario de Estado francés

1. Naturalmente, hay excepciones, siendo la más notable la del Krigsarkiv en Estocolmo. Además, es posible que aparezcan importantes archivos militares en los lugares más insospechados. Por ejemplo, los detallados archivos de la guardia de corps de Wallenstein (el regimiento de infantería del conde Julius de Hardegg) se conservan en el Niederösterreichische Landesarchiv, Viena, Herrschaft Stetteldorf, Kartons 1-6. Véase el excelente artículo basado en ellos: F. Hausmann, «Das Regiment hochdeutscher Knechte des Grafen Julius von Hardegg, seine Geschichte, Fahnen und Uniform», en *Der dreissigjährige Krieg*, pp. 79-167. Es ésta la única historia que conozco de un regimiento que luchó en la guerra. Los documentos Piccolomini, que antes estaban en el castillo de Náchod y ahora en el Archivo del Estado de Zámrsk, permitió a Otto Elster preparar en 1903 un breve pero interesante estudio de los regimientos reclutados por Ottavio Piccolomini entre 1629 y 1650 (véase Elster, *Die Piccolomini Regimenter*). Sería interesante utilizar estos archivos de forma más sistemática.

2. Sobre los uniformes, véase Hausmann, *art. cit.*, pp. 129-135. En varios museos de Europa, especialmente en la «Sala de la Guerra de los Treinta Años» del Heeresgeschichtliches Museum en Viena y del Armémuseum de Estocolmo, se exhiben trajes militares reconstruidos de ese período.

3. Existe una estupenda colección de estandartes de la Guerra de los Treinta Años capturados a las tropas imperiales y de la Liga en el Statens Trofé Samlung (una parte del Armémuseum) de Estocolmo. La colección consta de unos 4.000 objetos, prácticamente todos ellos del período 1610-1720, entre los cuales se exhiben 45 estandartes de la Guerra de los Treinta Años.

para la Guerra, Michel Le Tellier, ordenó que se fabricara la ropa para el ejército en tres medidas —la mitad «normal», una cuarta parte «grande» y otra cuarta parte «pequeña»—, pero no dijo nada sobre la calidad o el color.[4] Sin embargo, el ejército imperial había comenzado a utilizar ya los uniformes de color gris perla que fueron adoptados universalmente en el siglo XVIII. Así, en 1645, cuando el conde Gallas encargó a los sastres austriacos que le suministraran 600 uniformes para su regimiento, acompañó el pedido de una muestra del material y el color, gris pálido, que deseaba. También envió muestras de los cuernos para la pólvora y de las cartucheras que debían producir *en masse* los fabricantes locales.[5] La colección de armas y armaduras del siglo XVII que se conserva en el Arsenal de Graz permite concluir que esos artefactos se fabricaban realmente en masa: miles de armas con sus arreos, con un alto grado de uniformización pese a haber sido fabricadas en diferentes talleres, aparecen listas para ser utilizadas de forma inmediata. Ocho mil hombres podían ser equipados en un solo día. En Suecia se creó una fábrica en Vira para fabricar espadas para todo el ejército sueco según un diseño único.

Pero alcanzar un mayor grado de estandarización era algo que quedaba fuera del alcance de la mayor parte de los estados europeos de la época. En primer lugar, no todas las tropas que formaban parte de un ejército pertenecían al mismo señor. En el decenio de 1640, el ejército imperial estaba formado por unidades sajonas, bávaras, españolas y de Westfalia, así como por regimientos austriacos. En segundo lugar, incluso en la misma formación se incluían hombres reclutados en momentos y lugares diferentes. En 1644, un regimiento bávaro del que se han conservado documentos detallados, contaba entre sus filas a hombres de no menos de 16 nacionalidades, siendo los más numerosos los alemanes (534 soldados) y los italianos (217), con grupos más reducidos de [illegible]os, croat[illegible], húngaros, [illegible]gos, dálmatas, loreneses, [illegible]eses, che[illegible], escoceses e irlandeses. También había catorce turcos.[6] Incluso aunque todos estos hombres recibieran el mismo uniforme al unirse al regimiento, las ropas no tardaban en gastarse, siendo sustituidas por otras que los soldados robaban a la población civil, arrancaban a los muertos o compraban en las contadas ocasiones en que nadaban en la abundancia. Al carecer de un uniforme, las tropas de un mismo bando se veían obligadas, por tanto, a adoptar signos distintivos. Por lo general, los soldados de Gustavo Adolfo llevaban una cinta azul con el borde amarillo en torno a sus sombreros y cuando unieron sus fuerzas con las de los sajones, que tenían marcas distintivas diferentes, inmediatamente antes de la batalla de Breitenfeld en 1631, ambos ejércitos decidieron colocar una marca en el sombrero (con frecuencia, una ramita con hojas o un helecho que cogían mientras avanzaban). De igual forma, los soldados de los ejércitos de los Habsburgo —tanto españoles como austriacos —podían ser reconocidos en todas partes por sus distintivos rojos (por lo general, una pluma o una cinta). En mayo de 1632, Wallenstein ordenó que no llevaran distintivos de otro color. Así pues, aunque las ropas de un tono determinado pudieran predominar durante un período en un regimiento concreto, no pasaba mucho tiempo antes de que los soldados se convirtieran en los veteranos raídos y cubiertos de polvo o en los arlequines ataviados con ropas multicolores que aparecen retratados por los artistas militares del período.

Cabe preguntarse cómo es posible que algún hombre se enrolara libremente en el ejército. Lo cierto es que muchos soldados lo eran contra su voluntad. Por ejemplo, las tropas de Suecia y Finlandia se formaban mediante una forma de reclutamiento conocida como *Indelningsverk*, que obligaba a cada comunidad a aportar un determinado número de soldados. La mayor parte de ellos eran campesinos. En los voluminosos (pero apenas estudiados) registros de los ejércitos suecos y finlandeses de Gustavo Adolfo y su hija, la palabra *bönde* (campesino) es la que aparece más veces en las relaciones de alistamiento. Procedían de aldeas como Bygdeaa en el norte de Suecia, que aportó 230 jóvenes para el servicio en Polonia y Alemania entre 1621 y 1639 y vio cómo morían 215 de ellos, mientras otros cinco regresaban tullidos. Así pues, el alistamiento suponía prácticamente una sentencia de muerte y causó un profundo impacto demográfico. El número de varones adultos de la parroquia de Bygdeaa decreció constantemente —de 468 en 1621 a 288 en 1639— y la edad de los alistados disminuyó cada vez más, reclutándose progresivamente a mayor número de adolescentes, que nunca regresaban. También el impacto social fue importante: en un principio, prácticamente sólo se reclutaba a los desocu-

4. H. C. Lavater, *Kriegsbüchlein. Das ist grundtliche Anleitung zum Kriegswesen*, Zurich, 1651, 2.ª ed., 1667, p. 63; André, *Michel le Tellier*, p. 339.

5. El pedido y las muestras de Gallas se exhiben actualmente en una vitrina del Heeresgeschichtliches Museum de Viena. El color gris perla se adoptó para todos los uniformes del ejército austriaco en 1708.

6. Redlich, *Military Enterpriser*, I, p. 456.

pados, pero al cabo de un tiempo les tocó el turno a los hijos jóvenes de familias más prósperas y, finalmente, también los hijos únicos de los campesinos ricos fueron llamados para morir en Alemania. En algunos lugares pequeños, a finales del decenio de 1630 todos los varones adultos disponibles que figuraban en las listas de reclutamiento, estaban ya en el frente o se hallaban demasiado tullidos para ser llamados a filas. Las pérdidas totales del ejército sueco entre 1621 y 1632 han sido estimadas en 50.000 a 55.000 hombres, pero el número de bajas probablemente se duplicó entre 1633 y el fin de la guerra. Sin duda, la guerra estaba causando en Suecia y en Finlandia una despoblación sin precedentes y, en último extremo, imposible de soportar.[7]

Otros países, renuentes a introducir el sistema de reclutamiento, recurrieron al expediente de condenar a los criminales a prestar el servicio militar o conmutaron las penas de prisión por el servicio en el ejército, ya que pocas veces había voluntarios suficientes. Los ejércitos españoles recibían regularmente el aporte de prisioneros liberados. Igualmente, de los aproximadamente 25.000 escoceces que defendieron la causa protestante en Alemania durante la guerra, muchos eran «hombres sin señor», es decir, desempleados; otros eran delincuentes locales a quienes los magistrados permitían que fueran secuestrados y bastantes de ellos eran proscritos: en 1629, el coronel sir James Spens recibió en su unidad a 47 criminales convictos (entre ellos una mujer) procedentes de las cárceles de Londres.[8]

Sin embargo, la mayor parte de los hombres que lucharon en la Guerra de los Treinta Años —incluso en el ejército sueco— eran voluntarios. Normalmente, gran número de ellos procedían de tres grandes zonas: las montañas, las ciudades y la propia zona de guerra. Los territorios subalpinos de Alemania, Austria y los cantones suizos siempre habían sido zonas con un reclutamiento importante y esa situación no parece haber variado durante todo el siglo XVII. La importancia de

7. Información procedente de J. Lindegren, *Utskrivning och utsugning. Produktion och reproduktion i Bygdeaa 1620-1640*, Upsala, 1980: *Studia Historica Upsaliensia*, CXVII, pp. 256-257, y de otros datos que me proporcionó amablemente el Dr. Lindegren en enero de 1980. También Dinamarca introdujo el reclutamiento en 1627, pero sólo para la defensa: véase Petersen, «Defence, war and finance», p. 33.

8. G. Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567-1659*, Cambridge, 1972, pp. 46-57, sobre el reclutamiento en las prisiones por parte del ejército español; *Calendar of State Papers Domestic 1628-9*, pp. 395, 568, sobre el mismo caso en Inglaterra.

las otras dos zonas —las ciudades y la zona de guerra— se refleja en un estudio pionero de unos 1.500 veteranos reclutados por el ejército francés antes de 1648 y que sobrevivieron para ingresar en los Inválidos de París en los decenios de 1670 y 1680: de los nacidos en Francia, aproximadamente la mitad procedía de las ciudades (en las que vivía tan sólo el 15 por 100 de la población francesa), mientras que la otra mitad provenía de las aldeas del norte y nordeste, próximas a los principales escenarios de la guerra. La edad media de esos hombres en el momento del alistamiento era de 24 años y casi una cuarta parte de ellos se alistaban antes de cumplir los 20.[9]

¿Por qué se decidían a luchar? De entre las razones que impulsaban a muchos voluntarios, la primera era el infortunio de algún tipo. El reclutamiento era siempre más fácil en los años de precios elevados o cuando se producían conflictos políticos o religiosos. Así, en abril de 1633, el ejército de Wallenstein se vio incrementado con numerosos reclutas protestantes procedentes de Austria, a quienes les había impulsado a alistarse la campaña de recatolización desarrollada por el emperador Fernando.[10] Incluso cuando la recesión económica o la persecución religiosa no constituían amenazas directas, el pago de una cantidad en metálico en el momento del alistamiento, la ropa nueva y la promesa de la soldada y el pillaje parecían una alternativa atractiva a la existencia civil, en la que muchas veces era difícil conseguir trabajo y salario, mientras que el riesgo de sufrir pillaje o de caer en la miseria como consecuencia de los impuestos era elevado. Aunque la paga de los soldados no era alta, ¡con frecuencia era más *seguro* integrarse en el ejército en esa Alemania desgarrada por la guerra!

Pero no debemos pensar que los soldados de la Guerra de los Treinta Años eran unos cobardes deterministas económicos. Muchos hombres expusieron con cierto detalle las razones que les habían inducido a alistarse y raramente mencionaban el infortunio. En cambio, resaltaban la emoción y el peligro de las acciones militares, la oportunidad de alcanzar la gloria y el atractivo de pertenecer a un grupo exclusivo (que incluso creaba su propio vocabulario).[11] Sir James Tur-

9. R. Chaboche, «Les soldats français de la guerre de Trente Ans: une tentative d'approche», *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, XX, 1973, pp. 10-24.

10. H. Jessen, *Der Dreissigjährige Krieg in Augenzeugenberichten*, Munich, 1964², p. 335.

11. Un «Sprachbüchlein» (opúsculo filológico) de nueve páginas, de términos

ner, un escocés que luchó en los ejércitos de Suecia y Dinamarca, escribió que «mi espíritu se vio asaltado por un deseo irrefrenable de convertirme, si no en actor, al menos en espectador de estas guerras». Otros voluntarios, a los que tal vez no movía la curiosidad, se sentían motivados por lazos de amistad o camaradería con sus oficiales. Muchos de los soldados escoceses que llevó consigo el marqués de Hamilton para servir en el ejército de Gustavo Adolfo en 1631 se llamaban de la misma manera que su coronel; varios miembros de la familia Leslie de Aberdeenshire luchaban juntos, y así sucesivamente. En otros casos, era la condición de arrendatarios lo que impulsaba a los hombres a alistarse cuando su señor hacía un llamamiento. Otro escocés al servicio de Suecia, Robert Monro, que escribió la primera historia de un regimiento en lengua inglesa, menciona una serie más completa de motivaciones: admitía como razones el deseo de viajar y de vivir la aventura, así como de vivir una experiencia militar a las órdenes de un jefe ilustre, pero hacía hincapié, sobre todo, en el interés de defender la fe protestante y los derechos y el honor de Isabel Estuardo, hermana de su rey y esposa del «rey de invierno» de Bohemia. En más de un pasaje de *Monro his expedition with the worthy scots regiment called Mackays*, el autor expresa su convicción de que la «causa de Bohemia» era el motivo principal que le impulsaba a luchar y que la fuerte motivación religiosa explicaba por qué «tan pocos de nuestra nación se ven impulsados a servir a estos potentados católicos».[12]

Este alarde de fe era un tanto exagerado. De hecho, hubo escoceses (e ingleses) que lucharon en los ejércitos católicos, especialmente al servicio de Francia; hubo también algunos que, como el capitán Sidnam Poyntz (otro oficial que nos ha dejado un interesante relato de su experiencia), cambiaron de bando más de una vez. Incluso sir James Turner confesó después que «había tragado, sin masticar, en Alemania, una máxima muy peligrosa, que los militares siguen muchas

militares, muchos de ellos extraños e improbables, fue incluido en H. M. Moscherosch, *Wunderliche und warhafftige Gesichte Philanders von Sittewald*, 2 vols., Estrasburgo, 1640-1642, «sechsters Gesichte: Soldaten Leben». Véanse también las fuentes indicadas en Langer, *The Thirty Years' War*, p. 100.

12. Monro, *Expedition*, II, pp. 62-63, 75; Dukes, «The Leslie family»; H. L. Rubinstein, *Captain Luckless, James, first duke of Hamilton 1600-1649*, Edimburgo, 1973, pp. 26-37, y I. Grimble, *Chief of Mackay*, Londres, 1965, pp. 81-105.

veces allí, que era que mientras sirvamos a nuestro señor honestamente no importa a qué señor sirvamos».[13] Este comportamiento era especialmente habitual en las tropas luteranas, porque sus líderes políticos, como Juan Jorge de Sajonia, resaltaron durante la mayor parte de la guerra que se debía mantener la lealtad al emperador católico. Los comandantes hacían su propia elección entre las lealtades políticas y religiosas enfrentadas. El general Hans Georg von Arnim, que cambió de bando con mayor frecuencia que otros durante la guerra, lo hizo por su propia conciencia y no por obtener algún beneficio. Probablemente, el número de los que luchaban indiferentemente por cualquier señor no fue mayor que en otras guerras.

La firmeza de convicciones que mostraron oficiales de alta graduación como Turner, Monro y Arnim fue de la mayor importancia durante la Guerra de los Treinta Años por la forma en que se organizaban sus ejércitos. Desde el principio, la debilidad económica de los diversos gobiernos implicados en la guerra era tan grande que no podían reclutar tropas utilizando sus recursos habituales. Fue así como apareció una clase de «empresarios militares», que adelantaban el dinero a los oficiales en nombre del gobierno. Aproximadamente un centenar de este tipo de empresarios actuaron durante la mayor parte de la guerra, número que aumentó hasta 300 en los años de más intensa actividad, entre 1631 y 1634. Durante todo el conflicto, hubo unos 1.500 empresarios militares, que financiaban la movilización de un regimiento o más para uno de los combatientes. Hubo también varios intentos con éxito de formar ejércitos completos por este procedimiento, con un «contratante general» que reclutaba cuerpos de numerosos regimientos para un príncipe empobrecido. Aunque Wallenstein, que organizó en dos ocasiones todo un ejército imperial (en 1625 y 1631-1632), es el ejemplo más destacado de esta forma extrema de delegación militar, hubo otros: el conde Mansfeld, al servicio de Federico V, el marqués de Hamilton al servicio de Suecia y el duque de Sajonia-Weimar al servicio de Francia.

Este sistema de crear ejércitos provocó diversos conflictos de lealtades entre los oficiales jóvenes y la tropa, ya que eran los empresarios, más que los príncipes, los que constituían la principal fuente de

13. Turner, *Memoirs of his own life and times*, p. 14. Es de destacar, por ejemplo, que cinco de los asesinos de Wallenstein eran, al igual que Turner, súbditos de Carlos I: Lesley, Devereux, Geraldine, Gordon y Butler.

dinero y beneficio. La elección entre seguir a un general (o a un coronel) que les alimentaba y les pagaba y a un soberano que no hacía ninguna de las dos cosas, no era fácil. En conjunto, sorprende que hubiera tan pocos casos de traición y que ningún empresario militar organizara una fuerza por su cuenta y riesgo para ofrecerla luego a cambio de un pago en efectivo (como había ocurrido tantas veces durante la Guerra de los Cien Años). Pero algunos navegaban a favor del viento. El ejército que en 1635 formó Bernardo de Sajonia-Weimar para Francia estuvo a punto de cambiar de bando a comienzos de 1639, e incluso después de la muerte de quien lo había creado, a finales de año, los «Bernardinos» o «brigada alemana» (como se conocían esos regimientos) continuaron luchando hasta la paz definitiva como una unidad semiautónoma en el seno del ejército francés, bajo el mando de su oficial superior, el suizo Hans Ludwig von Erlach.

Diferente fue el comportamiento de Wallenstein durante su primer generalato, publicando órdenes de reclutamiento en su propio nombre. Sus motivos eran puramente económicos: dado que el Tesoro imperial no podía pagar los salarios ni financiar el equipamiento, el comandante en jefe se vio obligado a encontrar hombres que pudieran hacerlo, y les encargó esa tarea. Así, los coroneles y generales dieron crédito al gobierno. El propio Wallenstein avanzó más de 6 millones de táleros al emperador entre 1621 y 1628 y sus coroneles prestaron sumas menores a los nuevos oficiales de los regimientos que habían reclutado. Eso exigió la movilización de recursos importantes y no ha de sorprender que algunos empresarios militares se enriquecieran: Bernardo de Sajonia-Weimar, cuya herencia como hijo menor era de escasa entidad, en 1637 calculaba su fortuna personal en 450.000 táleros (aproximadamente una tercera parte en efectivo, otro tanto en letras de cambio y el resto en un banco parisiense); el comandante imperial Henrik Holck, que había llegado como un hombre pobre, regresó a su Dinamarca nativa en 1627 con el dinero suficiente para pagar en efectivo los 50.000 táleros que costaba una propiedad en Funen; el general sueco Königsmarck, que sirvió primero como paje y como soldado raso, murió en 1663 con una fortuna de casi 2 millones de táleros (183.000 en efectivo, 1,14 millones en letras de crédito y 406.000 en tierras).[14]

14. Redlich, *Military Enterpriser*, I, pp. 420-426; K. R. Böhme, *Bremische-Verdische Staatsfinanzen 1645-1676*, Upsala, 1976, p. 34. Los palacios de determinados generales, como Wrangel (en Skökloster, al norte de Estocolmo) o Wallenstein (en Praga, Mnichovo Hradichteh y Jichín), son testimonio, todavía hoy, de la riqueza que se podía conseguir por medio de la guerra. Los generales enriquecidos llevaban un ritmo de vida que raras veces se había conocido en el norte de Europa: Marshal de la Gardie se jactaba hacia 1650 de haber introducido el lujo en Suecia.

Pero, naturalmente, el crédito de esos hombres tampoco era inagotable. No podían seguir pagando a sus hombres por tiempo indefinido. De hecho, lo cierto es que no podían pagar a sus soldados grandes cantidades; e incluso los soldados de Wallenstein aceptaron un salario ligeramente superior al que cobraba el peón de una granja. En resumen, los comandantes del ejército tuvieron que poner en práctica un complicado sistema para obtener dinero, basándose en el modelo de los ejércitos holandés y español que luchaban en los Países Bajos. El ingrediente fundamental era una aportación regular (aunque insuficiente) en efectivo, procedente del Tesoro del Estado. En una famosa carta de enero de 1626, que escribió al comienzo de su primer generalato, Wallenstein informaba al ministro de Finanzas imperial que necesitaba «un par de millones de táleros cada año para sostener esta guerra». El dinero era necesario para conservar el crédito de los empresarios militares, incluyendo al propio general, que habían avanzado grandes sumas a los hombres que se hallaban bajo su mando; no se pagaba directamente a las tropas. Este sistema fue duramente criticado en una novela sobre la guerra: *Las aventuras de Simplicissimus el alemán*. El autor, Hans Jakob Christoph von Grimmelshausen, elaboró una complicada metáfora en la que comparaba la jerarquía del ejército en los días de cobro con una banda de pájaros en un árbol.[15] Los que ocupaban las ramas más altas, afirmaba,

> se sentían sumamente felices cuando un pájaro-comisario volaba sobre sus cabezas y vaciaba sobre el árbol una cesta llena de oro ... pues cogían cuanto podían dejando que cayera muy poco, o nada, en las ramas inferiores, de forma que de cuantos allí se hallaban eran más los que morían de hambre que a consecuencia de los ataques del enemigo.

En realidad, la imagen de Grimmelshausen era un tanto exagera-

15. Grimmelshausen, *Simplicissimus*, libro I, cap. XVI, citado por Redlich, *Military Enterpriser*, I, pp. 370-371.

da, porque los pájaros que ocupaban las ramas inferiores —el soldado raso del ejército— recibían importantes ayudas por otros procedimientos. El más importante era el de disponer de alojamiento gratuito: durante mucho tiempo, los soldados vivían en alojamientos más o menos confortables, con una cama, servicio y, tal vez, comida a cargo del dueño de la casa. Los soldados eran afortunados al poder disponer de todo eso porque las tropas no podían sobrevivir en los cuarteles o en un campamento militar, donde tenían que conseguirlo todo por sí mismos. Como escribió en 1642 Michel le Tellier, inspector del ejército francés en Italia: «Dos meses de paga y alojamiento entre los campesinos [en Francia] valen mucho más [para las tropas] que tres meses de paga y un cuartel en Turín».[16] Pero al cabo de un tiempo los recursos locales siempre resultaban insuficientes y era necesario completarlos. Ésa era la razón por la que se introdujeron contribuciones: impuestos que se recaudaban directamente a cada comunidad en las proximidades del ejército, que se pagaban en efectivo o con productos necesarios para las tropas (alimentos, vestido, municiones y transporte). La mecánica exacta de esa transferencia de bienes y servicios se decidía entre los encargados de la administración del regimiento y la compañía y los magistrados locales. En las zonas muy frecuentadas por las tropas, como Franconia, existía un «sistema de alerta» entre las comunidades a lo largo del itinerario previsto del ejército y de esta forma se preparaban por adelantado las provisiones necesarias para los soldados.[17] Cuando las gestiones de los administradores militares y civiles no bastaban para conseguir las vituallas necesarias, a veces se invitaba a intervenir a empresarios de otras zonas no afectadas por la guerra. Algunos generales compraban grandes cantidades de vacas en Suiza o tejidos en Inglaterra; Wallenstein organizó la entrega regular de pan, cerveza, ropas y otros productos necesarios para su ejército en sus grandes propiedades de Bohemia. Como más tarde observaría Le Tellier, «asegurar el sustento del soldado supone asegurar la victoria para el rey». Al finalizar la guerra, la mayor parte de los administradores militares calculaban pagar en especie las dos terceras partes de la paga de sus soldados.

16. André, *Michel le Tellier*, p. 64.

17. El «Selbstschutzsysteme» (sistema autodefensivo) es descrito por I. Bog, *Die bäuerliche Wirtschaft im Zeitalter des Dreissigjährigen Krieges. Die Bewegungsvorgänge in der Kriegswirtschaft nach den Quellen des Klosterverwalteramtes Heilsbronn*, Coburgo, 1952, pp. 142-154, y G. Benecke, «Labour relations and peasant society in North-West Germany, c. 1600», *History*, LVIII (1973), pp. 350-359.

Asimismo, los administradores tenían que organizar el abastecimiento de las pesadas armas que utilizaban los ejércitos a mediados del siglo XVII. La mitad de la infantería necesitaba lanzas de 4 m, cascos y armadura; el resto utilizaba mosquetes con sus soportes de horquilla, sus recipientes para la pólvora y la mecha lenta, y todos los soldados, incluida la caballería, necesitaban pistolas y espadas.[18] Aunque no era necesario que las armas fueran las mismas para todos (de hecho, cada soldado tenía que formar las balas utilizando su propia provisión de plomo), no hay que subestimar la importancia de la tarea de equipar a un ejército de 30.000 hombres. En el asedio de Stralsund en 1628 se dispararon unas 760 balas de cañón (algunas de ellas de 50 kg de peso) contra el Frankentor solamente el día del primer asalto; en el asedio de Kronach (en Franconia) en mayo y junio de 1632 se hicieron 1.260 disparos contra las murallas.[19] Por otra parte, para alimentar a semejante multitud de soldados no bastaban cinco panes y dos peces. La entrega diaria de 1 kg de pan, medio de carne y 2 litros de cerveza (que era la ración que se entregaba a cada soldado, tanto soldado raso como oficial) exigía la fabricación de 300 quintales de pan, el sacrificio de 225 bueyes (o el equivalente) y la elaboración de 60.000 litros de cerveza cada día.[20] Aparte estaban los caballos: la caballería, la artillería, los oficiales y los carros que transportaban el bagaje los utilizaban, con lo que un ejército importante requería unas 20.000 bestias, que consumían 900 quintales de forraje o 160 ha de pasto cada día. Además, los caballos debían ser sustituidos con frecuencia. En la primera batalla de Breitenfeld, 4.000 de los 9.000 caballos resultaron muertos; en la batalla de Lützen, el general Piccolomini

18. En la «Sala de la Guerra de los Treinta Años» del Heeresgeschichtliches Museum de Viena se halla, en una vitrina, la espada, corta y gruesa, de Tilly, *c.* 1610, junto con el estoque largo y delgado de Fernando III, *c.* 1635. Ambas armas ejemplifican el estilo que imperaba en la época en que fueron construidas.

19. Monro, *Expedition*, I, pp. 68-75; M. Pusch, *Der Dreissigjährige Krieg 1618-1648*, Munich, 1978, pp. 112-113.

20. Véase M. van Crevelt, *Supplying War: logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*, Cambridge, 1977, pp. 34 ss., y Kroener, *Les Routes et les Étapes, passim.* Naturalmente, no siempre se entregaban las raciones que estaban previstas. Véanse las quejas de un pobre soldado imperial en el sitio de Münster en 1634, que se lamentaba a su esposa por no haber recibido más que 400 g de pan cada cuatro días: Kuczynski, *Geschichte des Altags des deutschen Volkes*, pp. 100-102.

tuvo que cambiar siete veces de caballo porque habían muerto como consecuencia de los disparos. El gran caballo de Gustavo Adolfo, «Streiff», condujo a la muerte a su dueño en Lützen y murió poco después por las heridas recibidas.[21] Organizar el aprovisionamiento de cantidades tan ingentes de equipo militar planteaba graves problemas logísticos.

Además, ningún ejército moderno estaba formado únicamente por los combatientes y sus caballos. Muchos soldados se veían acompañados por sus esposas o amantes y eran más todavía los que tenían sirvientes o lacayos.[22] Cuando el ejército español de Flandes regresó a los Países Bajos en 1622, tras la conquista del Palatinado, avanzó directamente hacia Bergen-op-Zoom, ciudad sitiada, donde tres pastores calvinistas registraron virtuosamente que «nunca se ha visto tan larga cola en un cuerpo tan pequeño: ... un ejército tan reducido con tantos carros, caballos para transportar el equipaje, jacas, lacayos, mujeres, niños y una chusma mucho más numerosa que el propio ejército». Es muy posible que esa descripción fuera cierta, pues aunque los archivos del ejército de Flandes indican que en las guerras de los Países Bajos el séquito rara vez estaba formado por más del 50 por 100 del total de las tropas, en 1646 dos regimientos bávaros constaban de 480 soldados de infantería, acompañados de 74 sirvientes, 314 mujeres y niños, 3 vivanderos y 160 caballos, y 481 soldados de caballería con 236 sirvientes, 9 vivanderos, 102 mujeres y niños y 912 caballos.[23]

Lo cierto es que este incremento de los componentes del ejército situaba los problemas de la logística militar por encima de los recursos de los gobiernos europeos. Todavía era posible mantener —mediante las aportaciones directas, el crédito, las contribuciones y la intervención de los empresarios militares— un abastecimiento adecuado

21. «Streiff» —así llamado por el coronel Johan Streiff von Lauenstein, que lo vendió al rey en 1631 por 1.000 táleros— resultó herido en Lützen y murió unos meses después, probablemente como consecuencia de las heridas. El animal fue rápidamente despellejado y su piel se envió a Estocolmo, donde se colocó en un marco de madera, situándola luego en el Palacio Real, donde se conserva todavía, en el Livrustkammaren, con la silla y el arnés que su esposa le regaló a Gustavo Adolfo el día de Año Nuevo de 1630.

22. Chaboche, «Les soldats français», pone de relieve que sólo el 46 por 100 de los veteranos de la Guerra de los Treinta Años que más tarde entraron en los Inválidos estaban —o habían estado— casados.

23. C. A. Campan, ed., *Bergues sur le Soom assiégée*, 1622; Bruselas, 1867², p. 247; Redlich, *Military Enterpriser*, I, pp. 521-522.

a los ejércitos reducidos o acuartelados. Así, los 2.000 soldados ingleses y escoceses que pasaron el invierno de 1627-1628 defendiendo el nuevo bastión de Glückstadt de Cristián IV recibieron (y firmaron recibos según los cuales les habían sido entregados) 313.000 kg de pan, 33.000 kg de queso y 36 toneles de mantequilla, 8 toneles de carne de cordero y 7 de buey, 8 toneles de arenques y 9.000 kg de bacon, 37 toneles de sal y 1.674 toneles de cerveza (en su mayor parte, una bebida muy suave conocida como «brebaje del regimiento»). Era ésta una dieta aceptable.[24] Pero muchas veces, el sistema normal de abastecimiento no servía cuando el ejército entraba en batalla o se desplazaba. Era tanto lo que tenían que transportar, que los ejércitos necesitaban imperativamente acceder con facilidad a los ríos navegables, pues sólo los barcos y barcazas podían asegurar el aprovisionamiento de guerra en el siglo XVII. Ninguna localidad podía proporcionar el número suficiente de carros y caballos (aunque un carro grande de cuatro ruedas podía transportar hasta 7 t). Por tanto, cuando las tropas se apartaban del sistema fluvial alemán se encontraban con serias dificultades. Por ejemplo, la noche anterior a la primera batalla de Breitenfeld, los soldados suecos durmieron en el campo en orden de batalla; luego lucharon durante siete u ocho horas, en los últimos momentos en medio de una tormenta de polvo; sin embargo, incluso después de la victoria no recibieron comida ni bebida hasta que llegaron al campamento abandonado de las tropas imperiales, en Leipzig, al día siguiente.

Otras veces, las tropas avanzaban más deprisa que los convoyes de abastecimiento, recorriendo en ocasiones hasta 40 km en un día (en una ocasión, en 1631, para realizar un ataque por sorpresa contra Ochsenfurt, al norte de Wurzburgo, los soldados estuvieron andando toda la noche y recorrieron 32 km en 7 horas). Era en esos casos en que las tropas iban más deprisa que el convoy de abastecimiento, cuando el saqueo, el pillaje y el botín se convertían en un problema importante. Naturalmente, el fuerte siempre sentía la tentación de explotar al débil. Había un dicho durante la guerra según el cual «cada soldado necesita tres campesinos: uno para que le deje su alojamiento, otro para que le dé a su mujer y el tercero para que ocupe su lugar en el infierno». Por lo general, los que iniciaban la conquista del botín en un regimiento eran los mosqueteros, que tenían más movilidad y

24. Cifras tomadas de Fallon, «Scottish mercenaries».

estaban peor pagados que los lanceros. En ocasiones provocaban graves desórdenes. Así, según el coronel Monro, cuando el ejército sueco entró en Baviera en abril de 1632:

> los campesinos que avanzaban se comportaron cruelmente con nuestros soldados (*que salieron para saquear*), cortándoles las narices y orejas, las manos y los pies, arrancándoles los ojos, con muchas otras crueldades que practicaron; siendo justamente respondidos por los soldados, quemando muchas aldeas al avanzar, dejando también muertos a los campesinos, donde fueron hallados.[25]

Pero la mayor parte de las veces, los soldados de Gustavo Adolfo que oprimían a la población civil eran severamente castigados (se les azotaba, se les castigaba con turnos más prolongados de centinela o se les humillaba públicamente). Al menos cinco hombres del regimiento de Monro fueron ejecutados por el pelotón de fusilamiento y varios más fueron condenados a muerte por el juez militar por maltratar a la población civil. En efecto, el ejército no se podía exponer a perder el apoyo de quienes les proporcionaban soldados, guías e información sobre el enemigo, así como comida y alojamiento.

Normalmente, las otras faltas que eran castigadas con la ejecución eran la cobardía, el motín y la deserción. Diecisiete oficiales y soldados fueron decapitados en 1632 por orden de Wallenstein por supuesta cobardía durante la batalla de Lützen (la sentencia fue ejecutada en la misma plaza de Praga donde habían conocido la muerte los líderes bohemios rebeldes once años antes, coincidencia que hizo aún mayor el deshonor de los soldados). Aquellos comandantes que rendían las plazas que les habían sido confiadas antes de que sus superiores lo consideraran necesario también podían ser ejecutados *pour encourager les autres*. Otro tanto ocurría con los desertores (como sucedió en 1634 a algunos soldados del ejército del cardenal-infante, a quienes se les sorprendió cuando regresaban a Lombardía para no tener que luchar en las guerras de Alemania).[26]

25. Monro, *Expedition*, II, p. 122.

26. AGRB, Secretaría de Estado y de Guerra, 34, f. 5v; orden del cardenal-infante, 8 de julio de 1634, de que se pagaran 50 escudos como recompensa a los campesinos que habían hecho prisioneros a nueve desertores que huían por el valle de la Valtelina. En las páginas 195 y 222, *supra*, se citan casos de ejecución por cobardía.

Los motines eran mucho menos habituales, aunque entre los soldados alemanes existía la costumbre de que, cuando no cobraban su soldada o no eran bien tratados, elegían representantes para negociar con sus señores e interrumpían el servicio hasta que se daba satisfacción a sus agravios. En 1633, el ejército sueco —que según el cálculo exacto de Monro había recorrido 4.800 km desde su desembarco en Peenemünde tres años antes— se negó a seguir luchando hasta que se hubieran satisfecho los atrasos. En 1635, repitieron el plante, en esta ocasión secuestrando al canciller Oxenstierna durante varias semanas para negociar desde una posición de fuerza. En 1638, el ejército francés se negó a atravesar el Rin y penetrar en Alemania hasta que hubiera recibido el salario. Pero ésas fueron ocasiones excepcionales. La reacción habitual de las tropas cuando la soldada era insuficiente o las condiciones adversas, era la deserción.

Lamentablemente, los archivos militares de la mayor parte de los ejércitos no registran los índices de deserción.[27] Sin embargo, la comparación del número total de los que abandonaban el ejército en los regimientos franceses que luchaban en el país con los de un regimiento alemán (la guardia de Wallenstein: las tropas del conde Julius de Hardegg de la Alta Austria) y con los de las unidades extranjeras más selectas, pone en evidencia que ese fenómeno era algo más frecuente entre las tropas reclutadas localmente (véase cuadro 6). Esa diferencia se explica casi con toda seguridad por las deserciones, pues las pérdidas de soldados extranjeros por las heridas o por la muerte ocurrida en el servicio activo eran muy elevadas. Por ejemplo, el regimiento escocés de Mackay, que defendía una sección crucial de las murallas de Stralsund durante el asedio de 1628, permaneció de servicio bajo el fuego enemigo durante seis semanas sin interrupción. Les llevaban la comida a los puestos de combate y «no nos molestábamos en abandonar nuestros puestos para el ocio normal ni tampoco para dormir». Incluso el coronel nunca «se quitaba las ropas, excepto cuando tenía que cambiarse de uniforme». Como consecuencia de una situación de riesgo tan prolongada, de los 900 hombres que componían el regimiento, 500 murieron y 300 (entre ellos, Monro) resultaron heridos.

27. Una vez más, la excepción es el «Rullor» del ejército sueco, que se conserva en el Krigsarkiv, en Estocolmo, que menciona las deserciones y otras causas que producían la baja en el ejército. Sin embargo, por lo que yo sé, no se ha estudiado esta fuente hasta la fecha de forma sistemática.

CUADRO 6

Porcentaje de abandono del ejército en regimientos seleccionados [28]

Fecha	4 regimientos ingleses		4 regimientos escoceses				Total		3 regimientos suecos		Regim. alemán guardias Hardegg		10 reg. franceses de infantería	
	Núm.	Pérdidas mensual. %	Hamilton & Meldrum	Hepburn	Spens	Mackay		Pérdidas mensual. %	Núm.	Pérdidas mensual. %	Núm.	Pérdidas mensual. %	Núm.	Pérdidas mensual. %
1627 Jun.	4.913	6				2.000		13						
Oct.	3.764	8				900								
1628 Abr.	1.882	13												
May.	1.630													
1629 Agos.			2.219											
1630 Ene.							1.900	7						
Jun.			600			1.000								
1631 Mar.				1.402	830	638		2						
May.				837	608				2.577	9	c.1.400	6		
Sept.				829			1.300		1.212		866			
1632 Mar.				1.248		518		3		4				
Oct.					416				828		1.156	11		
Dic.				936	350	300					654			
1634 Feb.							200						5.571	20
Jun.													4.470	
Oct.											1.101	9		
1635 Jun.											796			
Jul.											600	4		
Oct.														
1636 Ene.														
Agos.														

28. Fuentes: *Sveriges Krig*, IV, pp. 124, 387-388, 453; V, pp. 138, 548-549; VI, pp. 423, 483; Fallon, «Scottish mercenaries», pp. 246 ss.; Hausmann, «Das Regiment», p. 166; Kroener, «Truppenstärken», p. 197. Existen también datos sobre las bajas entre las tropas inglesas al servicio de Dinamarca: 5.013 en noviembre de 1626, pero 2.472 para febrero de 1627. La fuerza se incrementó hasta los 4.913 hombres en junio, descendiendo a 4.707 en agosto, 4.412 en septiembre y 3.764 en octubre. En mayo de 1628 había tan sólo 1.400 ingleses y 230 escoceses. Por tanto, las bajas mensuales eran de un 4 por 100. Véase E. A. Beller, «The military expedition of Sir Charles Morgan to Germany, 1627-9», *English Historical Review*, XLIII, 1928, pp. 528-539.

Sin embargo, los escoceses se consideraban afortunados, pues si Stralsund hubiera sido tomada por asalto todos habrían perecido, como ocurrió con las guarniciones de Magdeburgo y de Frankfurt del Oder en 1631, cuyos soldados fueron masacrados en sus puestos de combate después de la derrota. Tras el saqueo de Frankfurt, donde los defensores imperiales perdieron 3.000 hombres y el ejército sueco 800, pasaron seis días antes de que hubieran sido enterrados todos los muertos y «al final, eran arrojados en montones en el interior de grandes pozos, más de 100 en cada tumba».[29]

Por supuesto, había muchas otras causas que provocaban bajas y que nada tenían que ver con la lucha. En el cuartel general de Cristián IV, en Tangermünde, en el Elba, en 1625, «el hedor del campamento le hacía a uno levantar la nariz» (en palabras de un cronista) y al cabo de poco tiempo, las enfermedades habían reducido notablemente las fuerzas danesas. Los soldados imperiales acantonados en Hesse-Darmstadt en el invierno de 1634-1635, después de la victoria de Nördlingen, se vieron obligados a dormir entre 10 y 20 en cada casa. No había pasado mucho tiempo antes de que las enfermedades producidas por el hacinamiento se cobraran su precio.[30] En la brigada escocesa que sirvió en Alemania entre 1626 y 1633, el 10 por 100 de los soldados eran baja por enfermedad en cualquier momento y de vez en cuando las epidemias incrementaban dramáticamente ese porcentaje. Por ejemplo, los escoceses que defendían el curso infe ior del Oder en 1631 perdieron 200 hombres cada semana como consecuencia de la peste y el número de bajas que provocaban el tifus y las otras enfermedades habituales en los ejércitos de los primeros tiempos de la Edad Moderna eran aún mayores.

De cualquier forma, la muerte en el curso de la batalla era siempre la causa que provocaba el mayor número de bajas, al menos entre las unidades extranjeras. Las bajas durante la batalla siempre eran muy elevadas, no importa cuánto tiempo duraba el enfrentamiento, y

29. Monro, *Expedition*, I, pp. 62, 67, 79-80; II, p. 35.

30. W. Zahn, *Die Altmark im Dreissigjährigen Krieg*, p. 16. Tangermünde, que es una de las ciudades del siglo XVII mejor conservadas de Europa central, tuvo que ser totalmente reconstruida después de la guerra. Cuartel general del ejército catorce veces, y saqueada en siete ocasiones, las 623 casas que estaban habitadas antes de la guerra habían quedado reducidas a 228 en 1645 y la tasa de nacimientos en la ciudad se había reducido en un 50 por 100. A propósito de Darmstadt, véase Herrmann, ed., *Aus tiefer Not*, p. 123.

las tropas extranjeras se hallaban siempre en primera línea. Cuando las fuerzas de ambos bandos estaban equilibradas —como ocurrió en Lützen en 1632, en Rocroi en 1643, en Friburgo en 1644 y en Jankov en 1645—, la masacre era realmente terrible. Cuando no existía equilibrio de fuerzas, a la derrota del ejército más reducido seguía la persecución y, tal vez, una matanza aún mayor: muchos soldados fugitivos y, en ocasiones, unidades enteras, resultaban muertos a sangre fría a manos de sus enemigos o de los campesinos locales. Incluso cuando los soldados derrotados conseguían mantenerse unidos, su retirada podía convertirse en una catástrofe. La retirada de Gallas de Borgoña (1636) y Holstein (1642), la de Baner en Torgau (1637) y la de Turena después de la batalla de Tuttlingen (1643), a las que hemos hecho referencia anteriormente, fueron desastres importantes en función del número de soldados que quedaron muertos en las márgenes de los caminos.

Sin embargo, la mortandad se veía reducida algunas veces por la práctica del rescate de prisioneros de guerra. Después de la batalla de Jankov (1645), los vencedores ofrecieron entregar a todos los generales imperiales a cambio del pago de un rescate de 120.000 táleros. En el caso de otras derrotas menos catastróficas, los rescates se acordaban según una tarifa conocida: 25.000 táleros por un general, 100 por un coronel, y así sucesivamente según la graduación. En ocasiones, los prisioneros simplemente se intercambiaban, tal como ocurrió con el general sueco Torstensson, que fue intercambiado por el conde Harrach (el tesorero imperial). Era raro que un oficial rechazara la oportunidad de ser liberado, pero a veces ocurría. Así, Gustav Horn, cuñado de Oxenstierna, pasó ocho años en prisión tras haber sido apresado en Nördlingen en 1634 (aunque Maximiliano de Baviera consideró en determinado momento cambiar a Horn por todos los tesoros robados en Munich durante la ocupación sueca; sin embargo, el gobierno de Estocolmo no mostró interés por el trueque). Pero, por lo general, los soldados rasos, sobre todo los reclutados en Alemania, no eran rescatados ni intercambiados; o bien eran liberados después de jurar que no lucharían contra el vencedor durante un período determinado o se les instaba a enrolarse en el ejército que les había apresado, solución ésta que en las últimas fases de la guerra se vio favorecida por la presencia en todos los ejércitos de algunos hombres que habían luchado en los dos bandos y que, en consecuencia, podían conocer a los prisioneros y ayudarles a vencer los escrúpulos a la hora de cambiar

sus lealtades. En 1631, incluso los italianos capturados por Gustavo Adolfo en su campaña de Renania fueron acogidos en el ejército sueco (aunque desertaron en cuanto llegaron a las estribaciones de los Alpes en el verano siguiente).

Sin embargo, hay que decir que los soldados que eran hechos prisioneros podían considerarse afortunados. Pocos comandantes parecen haber tenido mucho tiempo para dedicar a los heridos, excepto en ocasiones excepcionales, como en el punto culminante de un ataque sueco en el Alte Veste en 1632, cuando Wallenstein se paseó por entre los defensores lanzando puñados de monedas sobre los heridos para animar a todos los demás. Raras veces se organizaban cuidados médicos para los enfermos, hospitales militares y pensiones para los heridos, a no ser en el caso de las fuerzas expedicionarias suecas y españolas, e incluso en éstas los servicios que se ofrecían eran muy inferiores a los que mantenía, por ejemplo, el ejército español en los Países Bajos, con su hospital militar de 330 camas en Mechelen y su hogar para pensionistas del ejército en Hall. Los ejércitos de la Guerra de los Treinta Años sólo podían compararse a los de Flandes por lo que respecta al servicio de capellanes. Las tropas de la Liga eran atendidas normalmente por capellanes jesuitas, mientras que toda una jerarquía de pastores luteranos acompañaba al ejército sueco invasor de 1630. Pero por lo que hace a la administración militar y a pesar de que las hostilidades fueron casi permanentes, los ejércitos de la Guerra de los Treinta Años introdujeron muy pocas innovaciones. Incluso el célebre sistema de contribuciones de Wallenstein seguía muy de cerca el modelo del ejército español, introducido por Spínola en el Palatinado en 1620, pero que había sido ideado en el decenio de 1570.[31]

Fue en la táctica y en la estrategia donde realmente se produjeron cambios importantes. No en vano, Napoleón Bonaparte, confinado en Egipto en 1798-1799, pidió a su gobierno que le hiciera llegar historias de la Guerra de los Treinta Años para leer. El punto de partida de la nueva táctica de guerra fue la reforma militar introducida por Mauricio de Nassau en el ejército holandés durante los años 1590. Inspirándose en las tácticas del ejército de Roma, descritas por Elio y

31. Sobre los capellanes jesuitas durante la Guerra de los Treinta Años, véase Duhr, *Geschichte der Jesuiten*, II, 2, cap. 6 (basado en los diarios de campaña de varios capellanes); cf. Parker, *Army of Flanders*, pp. 170-172. Sobre las contribuciones, véase *ibid.*, pp. 142-143, y F. Redlich, «Contributions in the Thirty Years' War», *Economic History Review*, XII (1959-1960), pp. 247-254.

León VI, Mauricio de Nassau ideó nuevas formas de desplegar a sus tropas durante la batalla. En lugar de falanges de lanceros, de 40 y 50 hileras de profundidad, habituales en las batallas del siglo XVI, sus formaciones tenían tan sólo 10 hileras; eran más reducidas y en ellas era más importante el poder de las armas de fuego que las cargas de los lanceros. Al menos la mitad de los soldados del ejército de Nassau eran mosqueteros. Estos cambios parecen simples, pero exigieron transformaciones importantes en la organización militar. En primer lugar, al reducir la profundidad de la formación había que ampliar su extensión, exponiendo así a un mayor número de hombres en el combate cuerpo a cuerpo. En segundo lugar, dado que la línea era menos nutrida había que exigir más disciplina y coordinación a cada uno de los soldados. Por ejemplo, en 1594, el ejército holandés perfeccionó la técnica de la «salva», que implicaba que cada una de las hileras disparara sus mosquetes simultáneamente contra el enemigo, retirándose los soldados a continuación para recargar sus armas, mientras las otras nueve hileras disparaban sucesivamente, creando de esta forma una continua cortina de fuego. Pero para realizar esa maniobra frente al enemigo se exigía una gran fortaleza, una coordinación perfecta y una gran familiaridad con todas las acciones que había que realizar. En consecuencia, Mauricio de Nassau introdujo en sus unidades los ejercicios que se practicaban en el ejército de Roma. El diario de uno de sus consejeros políticos, que estuvo presente en un asedio en 1595, registra cómo las tropas realizaban constantes ejercicios, rehaciendo las formaciones sin cesar y utilizando una y otra vez sus armas. Según una edición inglesa de la *Táctica* de Elio, publicada en 1616:

> La práctica de los preceptos de Elio permaneció en la oscuridad enterrada en las ruinas del tiempo hasta que fue revivida y sacada de nuevo a la luz no hace mucho tiempo en las Provincias Unidas de los Países Bajos, países que hoy en día son la escuela de la guerra, donde los espíritus más marciales de Europa realizan el aprendizaje de su servicio en las armas.[32]

32. L. Mulder, ed., *Journaal van Anthonis Duyck, advocaat-fiskaal van den Raad van State 1591-1602*, La Haya y Arnhem, 1862, p. 636; John Bingham, citado junto con muchas otras obras por W. Hahlweg, *Die Heeresreform der Oranier und die Antike*, Berlín, 1941, p. 176. No hay que confundir ese libro con la edición posterior, a cargo de Hahlweg, de la obra de Juan de Nassau, *Kriegsbuch*, de título similar: Hahlweg, *Die Heeresreform der Oranier: das*

No fue este tratado el primero que llamaba la atención sobre los nuevos métodos de lucha desarrollados en la República de Holanda. La insistencia de Mauricio de Nassau en la precisión y la armonía en la batalla reflejaban la preocupación general de la época por las formas geométricas, ya fuera en la construcción, en el arte de la monta del caballo, en la danza, en la pintura, en la esgrima o en la lucha. Ya en 1603, un tratado militar francés dedicaba todo un capítulo a «los ejercicios utilizados en el ejército de Holanda» y en 1607 se publicó en La Haya el primer manual ilustrado de ejercicios de la Europa occidental, compuesto por el primo de Mauricio de Nassau, Juan, y que llevaba por título *El ejercicio de las armas,* con la firma de Jacob de Gheyn, un conocido grabador. Muchas otras obras imitaron la técnica de De Gheyn de reproducir una serie numerada de dibujos para ilustrar las diferentes maniobras necesarias para manejar las armas y para organizar las tropas durante la batalla. Durante el año 1616, el conde Juan inauguró una academia militar en su capital, Siegen, de donde habían de salir oficiales para las tropas calvinistas. El primer director de la *Schola Militaris,* Johann Jacob von Wallhausen, publicó varios manuales de guerra según el modelo holandés, que era la base de todas las enseñanzas de Siegen (donde el entrenamiento duraba seis meses y la escuela proveía armas y armaduras, mapas y maquetas para la instrucción). Al mismo tiempo, otros autores publicaron una serie de obras explicando las ventajas de las fortificaciones de tipo holandés, que (no podía ser de otra forma) combinaban la máxima eficacia con el mínimo coste.[33]

El nuevo arte de la guerra no se difundió únicamente a través de

«Kriegsbuch» des Grafen Johann von Nassau-Siegen, Veröffentlichungen der historischen Kommission für Nassau, XX, Wiesbaden, 1973.

33. Sobre Mauricio de Nassau y su primo, véase la introducción de E. Kist al libro de Jacques de Gheyn, *The Exercise of Arms,* Nueva York, 1971; sobre la «escuela de guerra» en Siegen, véase L. Plathner, *Graf Johann von Nassau und die erste Kriegsschule. Ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis des Kriegswesens um die Wende des 16. Jahrhunderts*, Berlín, 1913. Ciertamente, era una escuela exclusiva: ¡sólo habían acudido a ella veinte alumnos cuando la Academia cerró sus puertas en 1623! De hecho, la escuela de Siegen no fue la primera. A finales del siglo XVI se habían establecido escuelas de guerra de la corte en Tubinga, Kassel y Sedán. Sobre la difusión de las técnicas holandesas, véase F. Walker, *Niederländische Einflüsse auf das eidgenössische Staatsdenken im späten 16. und frühen 17. Jahrhundert: Neue Aspekte der Zürcher und Berner Geschichte im Zeitalter des werdenden Absolutismus*, Zurich, 1979, cap. 1.

la imprenta. En efecto, Mauricio de Nassau recibió el encargo de enviar instructores militares a estados extranjeros. Brandemburgo solicitó y obtuvo dos en 1610; otros fueron al Palatinado, Baden, Württemberg, Hesse, Brunswick, Sajonia y Holstein. Incluso los tradicionales suizos, que habían sido los primeros en demostrar la importancia de la lanza en sus luchas contra Borgoña en el siglo XV, se vieron obligados a tomar en cuenta las nuevas tácticas. En 1628, la milicia de Berna fue reorganizada según el modelo holandés, con compañías más reducidas y mayor potencia de fuego, por Hans Ludwig von Erlach, futuro comandante de los «Bernardinos». Sin embargo, el discípulo más influyente de Mauricio de Nassau fue, sin duda, Gustavo Adolfo de Suecia. El propio Juan de Nassau se trasladó a Suecia en 1601-1602 y dio algunos consejos a los suecos para perfeccionar su ejército, pero fue dos decenios después cuando la influencia holandesa se dejó sentir en toda su importancia. Mientras realizaba una visita a Alemania en 1620, Gustavo Adolfo contempló muchas formas diferentes de organización y fortificación militar y leyó los libros más importantes sobre el tema. Llevó incluso más allá las reformas de Mauricio de Nassau, reduciendo la profundidad de la formación de diez a seis hileras e incrementando su poder de fuego al añadir cuatro piezas de artillería ligera por cada regimiento (los prototipos, que resultaron un fracaso y que alcanzaron más fama que las piezas que realmente se usaron luego, eran cañones de 3 construidos de metal ligero reforzado con madera y cuero). Gustavo Adolfo introdujo también una nueva unidad táctica, la brigada, formada por cuatro escuadrones (o dos regimientos) en formación en forma de flecha, con el cuarto escuadrón en reserva y apoyada por nueve o más cañones. Cada soldado recibía un riguroso entrenamiento a cargo de numerosos oficiales. Se intentaba mantener ocupadas a las tropas en todo momento, ya fuera excavando trincheras, reconociendo el terreno o realizando ejercicios. El monarca instruía personalmente a las tropas en la nueva disciplina: explicaba personalmente a los nuevos reclutas cómo disparar un mosquete de pie, arrodillado y tumbado. Las unidades reclutadas en el extranjero contemplaban las exhibiciones del «orden de disciplina sueco» a cargo de los veteranos y luego se les obligaba a practicar hasta que lo ejecutaban a la perfección.[34] Estos ejercicios incluían la doble salva, con

34. Von Frauenholz, *Heerwesen*, I, p. 41; *Sveriges Krig*, VIII, pp. 99-100 (citando un panfleto francés de 1634).

los mosqueteros situados en tres hileras, la primera arrodillada, la segunda cuerpo a tierra y la tercera en pie para «introducir tanto plomo en la barriga de tus enemigos de una vez [como sea posible] ... y de esa forma les haces más daño ... pues un estallido de fuego largo y continuado es más terrible y dañino para los mortales que diez interrumpidos» (según sir James Turner, que vio practicar la temible salva).[35]

La diferencia más importante entre la «revolución militar» de los suecos y de los holandeses no reside en las innovaciones, sino en la aplicación y en su alcance. Mauricio de Nassau raramente se vio obligado a participar en una batalla (y cuando lo hizo su ejército apenas sumaba 10.000 hombres), porque el terreno en el que actuaba estaba dominado por una red de ciudades fortificadas en las que las batallas carecían de importancia, pues una vez terminadas aún había que ocupar las ciudades. Pero Gustavo Adolfo luchaba en zonas que durante setenta años no habían conocido la guerra, y ni siquiera la amenaza de guerra, y en algunos casos (como Baviera) durante más tiempo. Eso hacía que hubiera menos ciudades bien defendidas —aunque, cuando existían, tenían que ser sitiadas al «estilo holandés»— y el control de muchas regiones dependía de la capacidad de ganar las batallas. La publicidad más favorable que podía haber recibido el sistema holandés fue la victoria de Gustavo Adolfo en Breitenfeld. Fue el clásico enfrentamiento entre el orden tradicional, utilizado desde las guerras de Italia, y el nuevo sistema: los hombres de Tilly, en una formación de 30 hileras de profundidad y 50 de anchura, se enfrentaron al ejército sueco de 6 hileras de mosqueteros y 5 de lanceros, con un número de cañones dos veces mayor. La superioridad de la potencia de fuego de estos últimos era abrumadora. La artillería sueca podía lanzar una bala de cañón de 9 kg a unos 1.700 m de distancia cada 6 minutos; los mosqueteros de Gustavo Adolfo —que formaban algo más de la mitad de todo el ejército— podían disparar salvas repetidas de balas de plomo, cada una de 20 mm de diámetro, con bastante precisión hasta una distancia de 50 m (y con un 50 por 100 de precisión hasta una distancia de 75 m). Los tiradores apostados, armados con «escopetas largas», podían disparar con precisión a mayor distancia (aunque

35. Turner, *Pallas Armata*, p. 237. Ciertamente, la «doble salva» se utilizó en Breitenfeld en 1631: véase *The Swedish Intelligencer*, I, Londres, 1632, p. 124.

en ningún caso se aproximaban a los 400 m de los rifles modernos). Y estas máquinas de la muerte eran manejadas por concentraciones de hombres cada vez más numerosas. Durante el decenio 1625-1635, cuando la guerra alcanzó su punto álgido, luchaban en el Imperio más de un cuarto de millón de soldados (más de los que habían luchado nunca hasta entonces); durante los treinta años que duró el conflicto, más de un millón de hombres estuvieron alistados en los ejércitos. De entre este ingente número de soldados, sin precedentes, pueden encontrarse argumentos que respalden cualquier teoría sobre la naturaleza real del soldado de los primeros tiempos de la Edad Moderna y sobre el impacto de la guerra en la que luchó.

II. La guerra y la sociedad alemana

El 11 de agosto de 1650, cuando ya habían partido los últimos soldados suecos, tuvo lugar en la ciudad de Rothenburg ob der Tauber la celebración de la paz y un acto de acción de gracias. Acompañados por músicos, los niños de las escuelas de Rothenburg, muchos de ellos portando coronas y ramos de flores, se reunieron en la gran plaza de la ciudad. Diecinueve años antes, sus padres y abuelos se habían arrodillado en la misma plaza, implorando al temido general Tilly que permitiera que su ciudad no sufriera el mismo destino que Magdeburgo. Así ocurrió. Sin embargo, durante dos decenios Rothenburg había sido centro de actividad militar; los muchachos que se reunieron aquella mañana de 1650 no habían conocido hasta entonces sino la guerra. Pero ahora había llegado la paz y los niños marcharon solemnemente desde la plaza del mercado hasta la gran iglesia parroquial, donde cantaron himnos de acción de gracias ante los adultos congregados y escucharon un encendido sermón del pastor Johann Dümmler antes de dispersarse.[36]

Escenas similares se desarrollaron en las ciudades y aldeas de toda Alemania. La propia Rothenburg era el centro de una región de unos 400 km² en el sudoeste de Franconia, y en todas las iglesias de las aldeas de ese territorio se escucharon parecidos sermones de acción de gracias. Pero eso no ocurrió en todas partes; por ejemplo, en Linden.

36. K. Holstein, *Rothenburger Stadtgeschichte*, Rothenburg ob der Tauber, 1969, pp. 96-97.

Linden era un pequeño pueblo situado en una zona de bosques en el nordeste de la ciudad. En 1618, contaba con un total de nueve hogares de campesinos sometidos a impuesto, además de otros cuatro campesinos sin tierras. Al igual que otros súbditos de Rothenburg, los habitantes de Linden habían sufrido frecuentes exacciones económicas desde el comienzo de la guerra, en especial desde que los ejércitos imperial y sueco comenzaran a luchar por el control de la región en los primeros años del decenio de 1630. Pero los horrores de la guerra se dejaron sentir realmente en Linden a comienzos de 1634, cuando la zona estaba ocupada por los suecos. En una tarde de enero, veinte soldados suecos irrumpieron en la aldea pidiendo comida y vino, derribando puertas y registrando las casas en busca de objetos de valor. Dos de ellos entraron en la casa de Georg Rösch, violaron a su mujer y la persiguieron mientras ella corría gritando por toda la aldea. Pero los habitantes de Linden convocaron a los de las comunidades vecinas y desde el interior de los bosques los campesinos convergieron en Linden, donde hicieron prisioneros a los soldados, les arrebataron el botín y escaparon con algunos de sus caballos. Al día siguiente, los soldados se dirigieron a Rothenburg para quejarse del robo cometido por los aldeanos y cuando el alguacil de Rothenburg llegó a Linden detuvo a cuatro campesinos. Pero pronto tuvo una visión más exacta de la situación, especialmente cuando la mujer de Rösch identificó a uno de los violadores, un soldado del este de Finlandia. El alguacil se trasladó de aldea en aldea, recuperando los caballos, las sillas y la indumentaria de los soldados, pero lo acontecido llegó también a oídos del comandante sueco, general Horn, que dirigió una dura reprimenda a los oficiales responsables y les recordó que los soldados no debían molestar a los campesinos.[37]

En 1641, no quedaban en Linden campesinos que pudieran ser molestados, pues la aldea estaba totalmente deshabitada y así permaneció durante el resto de la guerra. Pero Linden no se convirtió en una aldea fantasma permanente. En los decenios subsiguientes a la firma de la paz, los habitantes regresaron y en 1690 la aldea contaba con once explotaciones campesinas, es decir, había recuperado su aspecto de antes de la guerra.[38]

37. Schmidt, «Der dreissigjährige Krieg», IV, 1956, pp. 71-72; VI, 1958, p. 23.

38. H. Woltering, *Die Reichsstadt Rothenburg ob der Tauber und ihre Herrschaft über die Landwehr*, I, Rothenburg, 1965, p. 32 (mapa).

¿Hasta qué punto es característico el caso de Linden? En 1641, los funcionarios de Rothenburg recorrieron casa por casa las aldeas que se hallaban bajo su jurisdicción y su informe ofreció una imagen deprimente de las condiciones que reinaban en la región. Según ese estudio, el territorio de Rothenburg, que comprendía unas cien aldeas, poseía 1.503 hogares de campesinos imponibles en 1618, pero en 1641 quedaban solamente 447, es decir, había desaparecido el 70 por 100. Unos 25 núcleos de población —en su mayor parte pequeños, como Linden— estaban totalmente deshabitados en 1641 y antes de que finalizara la guerra hubo que añadir algunos más a esa lista. Pero otras comunidades corrieron mejor suerte: Oberstetten, una aldea importante con 75 hogares, había perdido 5 de ellos en 1641. Situada al oeste de la principal ruta de paso, se vio escasamente afectada por el tumulto de la actividad militar. En 1700, los funcionarios de Rothenburg censaron un total de 1.558 hogares campesinos imponibles, ligero aumento, por tanto, respecto a las cifras de antes de la guerra.[39]

Los alemanes del siglo XVII mantenían escrupulosamente sus registros y la Guerra de los Treinta Años no varió sus hábitos de conservar una meticulosa documentación. En algunos lugares, se destruyeron los archivos por negligencia o por causa de la guerra, pero se han conservado documentos suficientes que aportan gran número de datos sobre las condiciones que reinaban en la Europa central durante la guerra. Se podrían contar episodios como el de Linden en cualquier parte de Alemania: en todas partes, los archivos describen la frecuente brutalidad de los soldados, la resistencia esporádica de los campesinos, la cauta sumisión de los habitantes de las ciudades y los esfuerzos desesperados de los funcionarios civiles y militares para mantener un nivel mínimo de justicia e impedir el hundimiento total de la ley y la disciplina. La información sobre el impacto económico y demográfico de la guerra es también abundante en los registros de los impuestos, los archivos de las parroquias y en otros documentos que los funcionarios y clérigos alemanes mantenían con tanta meticulosidad. Los historiadores pueden localizar centenares de aldeas despobladas y ciudades venidas a menos, junto con muchas otras que sobrevivieron a la guerra casi intactas.

No obstante, pese a la abundancia de datos de carácter local ha

39. Schmidt, «Dreissigjähriger Krieg», VI, 1958, pp. 15-16, 22-24; Woltering, *Reichsstadt Rothenburg*, p. 38.

resultado casi imposible ponerse de acuerdo sobre el impacto general de la Guerra de los Treinta Años en Alemania y en los territorios circundantes. Sin embargo, no es que no se haya intentado, pues durante más de un siglo los historiadores han debatido las consecuencias económicas, sociales y demográficas de la guerra. Los debates fueron estimulados a mediados del siglo XIX por dos obras literarias. Una de ellas fue el *Simplicissimus*, de Hans Jakob Christoph von Grimmelshausen. Aunque fue escrita en los años 1660, esta novela picaresca quedó en el olvido hasta el siglo XIX, cuando su tenebrosa descripción de la vida durante la Guerra de los Treinta Años comenzó a llamar la atención. La otra obra influyente fue *Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit* (Escenas del pasado alemán) de Gustav Freytag, en cuyo tercer volumen, publicado originalmente en 1859, aparecían detalladas descripciones, muy documentadas, con generalizaciones sobre la devastación económica y moral causada por la guerra. El impacto de estas dos obras se vio reforzado por los escritos de algunos historiadores poco cuidadosos, cuyas afirmaciones dieron fuerza a lo que se ha calificado como el «mito de la furia destructiva de la Guerra de los Treinta Años».[40]

Sin embargo, otros historiadores han dedicado todo su esfuerzo a superar este mito, utilizando estudios de investigación de carácter local realizados con gran meticulosidad para demostrar que muchas veces se ha exagerado el nivel de muerte y destrucción atribuidos a la guerra. Toda la documentación de que se dispone es local o regional, pues durante el siglo XVII no se realizaron censos y estudios económicos sobre el conjunto del territorio alemán. Pero la acumulación gradual de datos locales ha permitido, al menos, adelantar hipótesis más razonables sobre el impacto de la guerra que las que era posible ofrecer hace cien años.

Esto es especialmente cierto respecto a las consecuencias demográficas del conflicto. En la actualidad, ya no se aceptan los cálculos que afirman que la guerra acabó con las dos terceras partes de la población de Alemania. Las estimaciones más recientes son mucho más prudentes y parecen indicar que la población del Sacro Imperio se habría reducido entre un 15 y un 20 por 100, de unos 20 millones antes de la guerra a unos 16 o 17 al finalizar ésta. Por otra parte, las

40. R. Ergang, *The Myth of the All-Destructive Fury of the Thirty Years' War*, Pocono Pines, Pa., 1956.

pérdidas de población no siempre fueron permanentes. Los decenios de posguerra contemplaron un considerable incremento demográfico y algunos expertos consideran que la población se había recuperado hacia 1700.[41]

Además, la situación varió enormemente de unas regiones a otras. La zona del noroeste de Alemania, donde la lucha fue escasa después de los primeros años de la guerra, apenas experimentó pérdidas de población, mientras que Mecklemburgo, Pomerania y Württemberg, en las que se centró especialmente la actividad bélica, perdieron más de la mitad de sus habitantes. La sangría demográfica siempre fue más importante en las aldeas que en las ciudades, cuyas murallas las protegían de la destrucción total (el saqueo de Magdeburgo de 1631 causó una enorme impresión, en parte, porque constituía una excepción a esa regla general). Además, en muchos casos, lo que parece haber sido una pérdida de población fue, en realidad, una transferencia demográfica. Por ejemplo, mientras las zonas rurales se despoblaban, en las ciudades vecinas pululaban los refugiados en busca de protección. Así, en 1637, cuando el hambre y las enfermedades se difundieron por la campiña sajona, más de 4.200 personas buscaron refugio en Leipzig, lo que provocó un incremento temporal de la población de la ciudad de más de un 30 por 100.[42]

No obstante, es indudable que la Europa central conoció un importante declive demográfico durante una generación. No siempre es posible determinar las causas de esa disminución de la población, pero hay un hecho seguro: las muertes producidas por las acciones militares fueron un factor secundario en ese proceso. La escasez de alimentos y los brotes de enfermedades epidémicas relacionados con la guerra fueron agentes letales mucho más importantes. Los episodios de mortalidad más espectaculares fueron consecuencia de la peste bubónica, que apareció durante la guerra en muchas zonas de la Europa central. La ciudad de Nördlingen, en el norte de Suabia, ilustra vívidamente el impacto letal de la peste. Entre 1619 y 1633, se produjeron en esa ciudad una media de 304 defunciones anuales, pero en 1634, año de

41. Franz, *Der dreissigjährige Krieg und das deutsche Volk*, proporciona datos fundamentales. Franz no da estimaciones de la población de Alemania ni del Imperio, y lo mismo hace la mayor parte de los autores. Pero las cifras conservadoras de C. McEvedy y R. Jones, *Atlas of World Population History*, Londres, 1978, pp. 67-72, reflejan la tendencia más reciente sobre este tema.

42. Lammert, *Geschichte der Seuchen*, p. 233.

peste, la tasa de mortalidad de sextuplicó: murieron 1.549 de sus habitantes, junto con 300 refugiados que se hallaban entonces en la ciudad.[43] Sin embargo, sería inexacto afirmar que todas las muertes producidas por la peste fueron consecuencia de la guerra. Muchas enfermedades epidémicas eran difundidas por los soldados o civiles infectados, pero no era ése el caso de la peste. En efecto, la peste bubónica es una enfermedad de las ratas, que se transmite a los seres humanos a través de las moscas, y el ciclo de infección entre las ratas se ve influido por factores ecológicos que poco tienen que ver con los acontecimientos de la sociedad humana. Hoy en día, los demógrafos rechazan la vieja idea de que las ratas y las moscas infectadas por la enfermedad viajaban en el bagaje de los ejércitos. Además, las epidemias de peste tenían una corta duración y, con frecuencia, eran seguidas por un período de uno o dos años de rápida recuperación demográfica. De hecho, las pérdidas de población a largo plazo asociadas con la guerra fueron consecuencia de enfermedades menos espectaculares pero más persistentes propagadas por contagio humano: el tifus, la gripe, la disentería y otras enfermedades, que año tras año afectaban a comunidades cuyos habitantes estaban ya debilitados por la malnutrición provocada por la guerra y por los esfuerzos a que se veían sometidos (véase lámina 23).

Si es difícil determinar el impacto demográfico de la Guerra de los Treinta Años, lo es más todavía establecer las consecuencias económicas del conflicto. No carecemos de documentación de carácter local, pero muchas veces la información es difícil de interpretar. Utilizar los ingresos procedentes de los censos locales, los recibos de los derechos aduaneros y los registros de impuestos para determinar tendencias nacionales de producción o niveles generales de actividad económica constituye, en el mejor de los casos, un ejercicio de azar.

Sin embargo, cuando se establecen comparaciones entre 1615 y 1650, prácticamente todas las regiones de Alemania muestran un declive significativo en la actividad económica. Hay algunas excepciones, sobre todo las ciudades portuarias como Hamburgo y Bremen, donde hubo durante la guerra un intenso comercio marítimo. Pero la mayor parte de las ciudades y territorios experimentaron una reducción sustancial en la producción de bienes agrícolas y productos manufacturados y en el volumen comercial. Además, muchas familias, instituciones y gobiernos, otrora prósperos, se endeudaron fuertemente entre 1620 y 1650.

43. Friedrichs, *Nördlingen*, pp. 47-49, 306-311.

El endeudamiento fue un problema especialmente grave en el caso de los gobiernos municipales de Alemania. Antes de la guerra, muchas ciudades tenían importantes excedentes derivados de los impuestos y de las rentas rurales, pero después de la guerra muchas de esas ciudades estaban fuertemente endeudadas. La razón no es difícil de establecer. Las ciudades se libraban una y otra vez de la conquista y el pillaje efectuando «contribuciones» económicas al ejército acampado delante de sus puertas. Pero incluso los impuestos fuertemente incrementados resultaban insuficientes para cubrir esos pagos y, en consecuencia, el gobierno municipal tenía que recurrir a los préstamos, que obtenía de sus mismos ciudadanos, de la aristocracia regional o de militares usureros. Al finalizar la guerra, terminó la exigencia de «contribuciones», pero las ciudades se encontraron con deudas ingentes. Por ejemplo, la deuda municipal de Nuremberg se cuadruplicó entre 1618 (1,8 millones de marcos) y el final de la guerra (7,4 millones).[44] Normalmente, hacían falta varias décadas para devolver esos préstamos y entretanto las ciudades se veían abrumadas por las fuertes cantidades que tenían que pagar a sus acreedores en concepto de intereses.

Sin duda, este tipo de fenómenos fueron producidos por la guerra. Sin embargo, los síntomas de decadencia económica han de ser interpretados con cautela. Por ejemplo, después de la guerra, muchos gobiernos municipales y territoriales realizaron cuentas detalladas de las sumas que ellos o sus súbditos se habían visto obligados a pagar a los soldados, ya fuera por la fuerza o a raíz de una negociación. Pero a veces, esas cuentas, a pesar de ser muy detalladas, dan una impresión errónea sobre las pérdidas de una región, pues cuando menos una parte del dinero entregado a los soldados volvía a las economías locales en forma de los pagos por los bienes y servicios. Por ejemplo, en la ciudad de Schwäbisch Hall se calculó después de la guerra que sus ciudadanos habían pagado a los soldados un total de 3.644.656 marcos durante el conflicto. Pero el valor total de las propiedades de todos los ciudadanos antes de la guerra había sido estimado en algo más de 1 millón de marcos y en 1652 el valor de sus propiedades se estimó en 750.000 marcos.[45] Si los ciudadanos de Schwäbisch Hall habían

44. W. Schwemmer, *Die Schulden der Reichsstadt Nürnberg und ihre Übernahme durch der bayerischen Staat*, Nuremberg, 1967, p. 8.

45. Buchstab, *Reichsstädte, Städtekurie und Westfälischer Friedenskongress*,

pagado más de 3,5 millones de marcos en concepto de tributo durante la guerra, sin duda gran parte de ese dinero había ingresado de nuevo en la economía de la ciudad en concepto del pago de la comida, alojamiento y servicios a sus habitantes, por parte de los soldados.[46]

En realidad, lo que los archivos locales registran como una pérdida de riqueza, muchas veces fue simplemente una transferencia de propiedad. Esto es particularmente cierto en las zonas rurales que experimentaron una importante —aunque con frecuencia temporal— disminución de la producción agrícola. Muchos campesinos tenían que abandonar sus tierras cuando aparecían los soldados, pero en ocasiones, como en Linden, regresaban. Con frecuencia, poseían un sofisticado sistema de alarma para conocer la aproximación de las tropas; pues cuando se enteraban con la suficiente antelación, los campesinos podían rescatar la mayor parte de su ganado y de sus bienes muebles. Como escribió el funcionario de una aldea de Franconia a su príncipe en 1645: «No queda aquí ninguno de sus súbditos; todos han ido a Nuremberg, Schwabach y Lichtenau con todas sus posesiones, incluso aquellas cosas que sólo valen un kreuzer».[47] Una vez pasada la amenaza, los campesinos —o sus herederos— podían regresar a la tierra. E incluso si no lo hacían, los campos no quedaban necesariamente baldíos de forma permanente. En efecto, las tierras vacantes revertían normalmente a manos de los señores, que después de la guerra formaron con esas tierras abandonadas propiedades más extensas y productivas. Esto ocurrió sobre todo en el este de Alemania, donde la tierra aceleró el proceso de desaparición de un campesinado independiente y contribuyó a la formación de grandes propiedades agrícolas.

Estos factores explican por qué muchos historiadores han pretendido determinar el impacto económico de la guerra teniendo en cuenta la evolución a largo plazo y no comparando simplemente los datos de antes y después de la guerra. Por ejemplo, algunos afirman que Alemania estaba sumida ya en el declive económico antes de 1618 como consecuencia de su incapacidad para competir con las nacientes economías atlánticas. Para ellos, la decadencia visible de la economía

pp. 210-211; G. Wunder, *Die Bürger von Hall: Sozialgeschichte einer Reichsstadt, 1216-1802*, Sigmaringen, 1980, pp. 188-189, 269-270.

46. Se encontrarán algunos datos paralelos del noroeste de Alemania en Benecke, «The problem of death and destruction in the Thirty Years' War», pp. 239-253.

47. Bog, *Die bäuerliche Wirtschaft*, p. 126.

alemana durante los años de guerra fue, pues, la continuación de una tendencia de más largo alcance. Otros especialistas consideran, en cambio, que la economía alemana conservó su vigor hasta 1618. Aunque es posible que la importancia de Alemania en el comercio internacional disminuyera antes de ese año, insisten en que la producción agrícola y artesanal fue importante hasta el comienzo de la guerra. La controversia entre los que defienden la teoría de la «decadencia anterior» y los que apoyan la tesis de la «guerra desastrosa» se ha mantenido a lo largo de muchos años.[48] Pero hoy en día parece ganar adeptos la idea de la «decadencia anterior», pues se está imponiendo la tendencia a situar los acontecimientos de Alemania en un contexto europeo general. Todo el mundo acepta que el siglo XVII fue un período de contracción económica general en Europa, después de los años de expansión del siglo XVI. Recientemente, un historiador ha afirmado, incluso, que hay que interpretar la Guerra de los Treinta Años como un fenómeno económico, estrechamente vinculado con los ciclos de contracción y expansión económicas: «la Guerra de los Treinta Años como fenómeno social —afirma Heiner Haan— fue consecuencia del crecimiento económico a largo plazo del siglo XVI; se alimentó de la riqueza producida en esa expansión y finalmente destruyó esa misma riqueza».[49]

Ciertamente, es importante tener en cuenta también la evolución de la economía después de la guerra. También en este contexto son evidentes los riesgos que derivan de establecer conclusiones a partir de la situación de 1650. En efecto, muchas zonas de Europa central experimentaron una rápida recuperación económica en los decenios posteriores a la guerra: se ocuparon de nuevo muchas tierras, se reconstruyeron edificios y se reanudaron la producción y el comercio. Sin embargo, en ocasiones esa recuperación es difícil de apreciar por su carácter efímero, pues no habían transcurrido aún veinte años cuando Alemania se vio sumida de nuevo en una serie de costosas guerras: desde mediados del decenio de 1660, el Sacro Imperio se vio implicado en una larga serie de enfrentamientos con los turcos y los franceses. Aunque esos conflictos causaron un menor impacto físico y demográfico sobre Alemania que la Guerra de los Treinta Años, ya que las luchas se desarrollaron fundamentalmente en las fronteras del Im-

48. Véase Rabb, «The effects of the Thirty Years' War», pp. 40-51.

49. Haan, «Prosperität und Dreissigjähriger Krieg», p. 117.

perio, implicaron una gravosa carga económica. Para algunas comunidades, especialmente en el Círculo suabo del Imperio, las exigencias económicas de las guerras contra Francia y contra los turcos fueron incluso mayores que las que había impuesto la Guerra de los Treinta Años.

De cuanto hemos dicho parece desprenderse que la catástrofe económica y demográfica a corto plazo que causó tan profunda impresión en los contemporáneos es exagerada si la situamos en el contexto del desarrollo general de Alemania entre 1550 y 1700. Pero la perspectiva del historiador siempre es diferente que la que tienen quienes viven los acontecimientos de su época. Los alemanes que vivieron la Guerra de los Treinta Años no sabían —ni les importaba— que los cincuenta pacíficos años que vivió Alemania antes de 1618 habían sido un período de decadencia económica gradual y tampoco sabían —ni les importaba— que el período de posguerra brindaría oportunidades para la recuperación económica y para la reconstrucción. En efecto, lo que ellos tuvieron que vivir fueron las incertidumbres y horrores de la guerra más larga, más costosa y más brutal que había conocido hasta entonces el suelo alemán. Para la esposa de Georg Rösch, violada por el «soldado gordo» del este de Finlandia y por su amigo «el soldado joven de cabello rubio», la guerra fue una catástrofe personal.[50] Para el doctor Johann Morhard de Schwäbisch Hall, que en el día de su 76 cumpleaños en 1630 tuvo que dedicar una parte de la plata de su familia para ayudar a salvar a su ciudad de la ocupación imperial, la guerra supuso una sangría de su riqueza y seguridad.[51] Para Hans Heberle, el zapatero de Neenstetten, cuyo diario registra que tuvo que huir treinta veces con su familia para buscar la seguridad en la ciudad de Ulm, la guerra fue una fuente interminable de temor y perturbación.[52] Los alemanes que sobrevivieron a la guerra sabían que había sido una catástrofe sin precedentes para el pueblo alemán, y sabían, mejor que sus hijos y que algunos de los historiadores modernos, por qué la firma de la paz y la partida de los últimos soldados suecos fue una ocasión propicia para cantar himnos de alabanza y pronunciar sermones de agradecimiento por toda Alemania.

50. Schmidt, «Dreissigjähriger Krieg», IV, 1956, p. 72.
51. J. Morhard, *Haller Haus-Chronik*, Schwäbisch Hall, 1962, p. 136.
52. G. Zillhardt, ed., *Der Dreissigjährige Krieg in zeitgenössischer Darstellung: Hans Heberles «Zeytregister» (1618-1672)*, Ulm, 1975, *passim*.

III. La guerra y la política

Hasta 1939, la Guerra de los Treinta Años fue, con mucho, el período más traumático de la historia de Alemania. Las pérdidas demográficas fueron proporcionalmente mayores que en la segunda guerra mundial. El desplazamiento de población y la devastación material fueron casi de igual envergadura y la dislocación cultural y económica perduraron mucho más tiempo. Esas consecuencias sociales llamaron la atención de eruditos del siglo XIX como Gustav Freytag y, asimismo, fueron utilizadas por diferentes grupos políticos nacionalistas que pretendían presentar la paz de Westfalia, y la guerra en su conjunto, como una iniquidad monstruosa perpetrada contra Alemania por potencias extranjeras, especialmente por Francia. Después de 1919, se estableció incluso un paralelismo entre la paz de Westfalia y el acuerdo de Versalles.

No obstante, no era éste el punto de vista de los alemanes del siglo XVIII, ni de los vecinos de Alemania durante los siglos XVIII y XIX. Hasta 1806, el acuerdo de Westfalia fue considerado por todos como la constitución fundamental del Imperio e incluso después de esa fecha era contemplado algunas veces como garantía fundamental del orden en la Europa central. En 1866, el político francés Alphonse Thiers afirmó con toda seriedad que «el principio más elevado de la política europea es que Alemania estará formada por estados independientes, unidos únicamente por un ligero vínculo federativo. Ése fue el principio proclamado por toda Europa en el congreso de Westfalia». Por otra parte, en el decenio de 1780, Catalina la Grande de Rusia criticó al emperador José II porque su política era contraria «al tratado de Westfalia, que es la base y el núcleo de la constitución del Imperio».[53] Tal vez la alabanza más encendida de las consecuencias beneficiosas del acuerdo de Westfalia la hizo en 1671 el incurable romántico Jean-Jacques Rousseau:

> Lo que realmente sostiene el sistema de estados europeo son las negociaciones constantes, que casi siempre mantienen un equilibrio global. Pero ese sistema descansa en un fundamento todavía más sólido, el Imperio alemán, que desde su posición en el corazón de Europa controla a todas las potencias y, por tanto, garantiza la

53. Citado en M. Walker, *German Home Towns, Community, state and general estate 1648-1871*, Ithaca y Londres, 1971, pp. 14, 15.

> seguridad de otros tal vez más, incluso, que la suya propia. El Imperio tiene el reconocimiento universal por su extensión y por el número y virtudes de sus pueblos; su constitución, que toma de los conquistadores los medios y la voluntad de conquistar, es beneficiosa para todos y se levanta como un peligroso arrecife para el invasor. A pesar de sus imperfecciones, esta constitución imperial mantendrá, mientras dure, el equilibrio de Europa; ningún príncipe debe temer que otro pueda destronarle. La paz de Westfalia puede seguir siendo eternamente el fundamento de nuestro sistema político.[54]

Esta retórica resulta sumamente sugestiva, especialmente cuando la encontramos también en las obras de autores alemanes influyentes como Leibnitz o Schiller. Pero ciertamente, el equilibrio de poder creado por la Guerra de los Treinta Años y preservado por la paz de Westfalia no fue la base del sistema político europeo eternamente ni resolvió todas las dificultades de Europa. Sin embargo, sus resultados fueron mucho más positivos de lo que muchos historiadores modernos están dispuestos a admitir. Por ejemplo, C. V. Wedgwood afirma lacónicamente en su clásico estudio:

> La guerra no solucionó ningún problema. Sus consecuencias, tanto inmediatas como indirectas, fueron negativas o desastrosas ... Es el ejemplo más notable en la historia europea de un conflicto sin sentido.[55]

Esto es incierto e injusto. Lo cierto es que la guerra solucionó los problemas de Alemania de forma que ni la religión ni el imperialismo de los Habsburgo volvieron a producir otro conflicto importante. A los gobernantes territoriales se les otorgó el poder supremo (*Landeshoheit*, no tan amplio como la soberanía) en sus localidades y el poder colectivo, en las Dietas y Círculos, para solucionar los problemas de los impuestos comunes, la defensa, las leyes y los asuntos públicos sin la intervención imperial.[56] Las cuestiones religiosas no se resolvían por votación mayoritaria, sino por «el consenso amistoso» de los bloques

54. J.-J. Rousseau, «Extrait du projet de paix perpétuelle de Monsieur l'Abbé de St Pierre», 1761, en *Oeuvres complètes de Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, III, Éditions de la Pléiade, París, 1964, p. 572.

55. Wedgwood, *Thirty Years' War*, p. 526.

56. Véase, para más información, Vann, *The Swabian Kreis*.

católico y protestante. Por otra parte, la Guerra de los Treinta Años sirvió para crear una situación definitiva en los territorios de los Habsburgo austriacos. El culto protestante apenas se practicaba y las asambleas representativas perdieron gran parte de su influencia, excepto en Hungría. Además, no se restituyeron sus propiedades a los exiliados, de forma que aquellos a quienes se habían concedido tierras a partir de 1619 se vieron finalmente a salvo. La «monarquía Habsburgo», nacida de unidades diferentes, unas apoyadas en el principio de la herencia y otras en el de la elección, era ahora una entidad mucho más poderosa. Depurados de disidentes, y separados de España, los compactos territorios de los Habsburgo austriacos eran todavía lo bastante extensos como para garantizarles un lugar entre los gobernantes más destacados de Europa y para perpetuar su posesión del título imperial hasta que el Imperio fue abolido en 1806.

Se consiguieron logros sólidos y duraderos, que de ningún modo han de ser minimizados por el hecho de que la guerra no cesó inmediatamente en todas partes en 1648. En el este, la tensión entre el emperador y los turcos fue haciéndose cada vez más intensa y sólo la guerra entre el sultán y Venecia por el control de Creta retrasó el estallido de un gran conflicto en Hungría hasta 1663. Incluso en el interior de Alemania algunas de las cláusulas de la paz de Westfalia amenazaron —o provocaron de hecho— con producir nuevas hostilidades. Aunque Suecia y Brandemburgo se dividieron finalmente Pomerania en 1653, creando cada una su administración e incluso señalando su frontera común con mojones de delimitación, Federico Guillermo estuvo a punto de entrar en guerra con el duque de Neoburgo en 1651 a propósito del reparto de Cleves-Juliers. Hubo enfrentamientos de escasa importancia —que los contemporáneos calificaron como «la guerra de vacas de Düsseldorf»— hasta que se fijaron las posiciones exactas de los dos pretendientes, que habían estado en disputa durante casi medio siglo.[57] Pero la posición de Francia en Alsacia y Lorena no se resolvió rápidamente. En Alsacia, aunque los territorios y derechos de los Habsburgo habían sido cedidos a Francia, las diez ciudades más importantes de la zona (que también habían pasado a manos de los franceses) siguieron siendo miembros del Imperio con representantes en la Dieta. La complejidad de la situación desconcertó de tal forma al gobierno de París que envió un agente especial en marzo de 1650

57. Detalles en Opgenoorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm: der grosse Kurfürst*, cap. 4.

para investigar. «Regresarás —ordenó un perplejo Mazarino— y arrojarás más luz que la que tenemos hasta el momento.» Pero la ambigüedad no era accidental: Isaac Volmar, plenipotenciario imperial en Westfalia y antiguo canciller de Alsacia, pretendía que tanto Francia como el Imperio mantuvieran su presencia en la región para que «prevalezca la voluntad más fuerte». Debido a esta decisión, esa desventurada provincia se convirtió en un campo de batalla cada vez que chocaron los Habsburgo y los Borbones.[58]

Aún así, lo cierto es que Alsacia tuvo al menos un breve respiro para recuperarse de la Guerra de los Treinta Años. No tuvo Lorena tanta fortuna. Aunque se ratificó el control de Francia sobre los «tres obispados», la situación del resto del ducado, conquistado por Luis XIII en 1632-1633, quedó intencionadamente sin resolver hasta que Francia y España hubieran firmado la paz. La consecución de un acuerdo entre esas dos potencias católicas había sido uno de los deseos más ardientes de Fernando III, pero, como ya hemos señalado, el emperador se había visto obligado a abandonar a su aliado: España y Francia continuaron luchando hasta la paz de los Pirineos (noviembre de 1659). Incluso después de esa fecha, las hostilidades generadas por la Guerra de los Treinta Años continuaron en el Báltico, donde Rusia, Dinamarca, Polonia y Brandemburgo seguían viendo con malos ojos los beneficios obtenidos por Suecia —en gran parte a sus expensas— en 1648. Sólo la muerte en 1660 del temible Carlos X (el antiguo príncipe Carlos Gustavo, que sucedió a la reina Cristina en 1654) permitió la firma de los tratados de Oliva (1660, con Polonia), Copenhague (1661, con Dinamarca) y Kardis (1661, con Rusia), que llevaron finalmente la paz al norte de Europa.

Pero incluso estos acuerdos fueron efímeros. Europa no comenzó a vivir una era de paz a finales del siglo XVII porque tanto Suecia como Francia —los vencedores incuestionables de la Guerra de los Treinta Años— continuaron luchando contra sus vecinos durante sesenta años. Pero la lucha contra el imperialismo sueco y francés que se desarrolló a partir de 1648 difería, al menos en un aspecto fundamental, de las guerras de principios del siglo XVII: no existía ahora un vínculo religioso fuerte entre los diferentes aliados. Ciertamente, la religión continuó siendo importante desde el punto de vista político (por ejemplo, permitió a Guillermo III destronar al católico Jacobo II

58. Cita y análisis tomados de Livet, *L'intendance d'Alsace*, pp. 123 ss.

en 1688 con muy poco esfuerzo; e igualmente el temor a la política antiprotestante de Luis XIV a partir de 1685 contribuyó a unir a sus enemigos del norte). Pero la religión no dominaba ya las relaciones internacionales, como había ocurrido en el pasado. El aliado más importante del calvinista Guillermo en las guerras contra Luis XIV fue el príncipe católico Eugenio de Saboya, quien estaba al servicio de los no menos católicos Habsburgo austriacos; y, por otra parte, en las guerras del Báltico la Suecia luterana fue finalmente derrotada por una coalición de la luterana Dinamarca, la calvinista Brandemburgo, la católica Polonia y la Rusia ortodoxa.

No es fácil determinar con exactitud el momento en que termina la política confesional. Cuando un agudo observador afirmó inmediatamente después de la paz de Westfalia que «la razón de Estado es una bestia maravillosa, pues hace que se olviden todos los razonamientos», no hacía sino rendir homenaje a la secularización que se había impuesto recientemente en la política europea.[59] Pero, ¿cuándo comenzó ese proceso? Tal vez, la «intervención extranjera» en el conflicto constituye una pista, pues sin duda los príncipes alemanes que tomaron las armas a favor y en contra del emperador estaban fuertemente influidos por consideraciones confesionales. La sinceridad religiosa de Federico V y de Anhalt, de Julius Echter y de Maximiliano, de Jorge de Baden-Durlach e incluso de Cristián de Brunswick, están más allá de toda duda. Mientras fueron estos hombres y sus aliados alemanes quienes ocuparon el primer plano, la religión fue también preponderante. Pero no consiguieron imponer una solución duradera. Cuando la tarea de defender la causa protestante recayó en los luteranos, menos militantes y menos intransigentes que los calvinistas, y cuando se incrementó la participación de potencias no alemanas, comenzaron a imponerse las «razones de Estado». Naturalmente, el interés religioso no quedó totalmente obliterado: Maximiliano de Baviera siguió inexorablemente decidido a asegurar una paz católica y aunque Federico del Palatinado murió, deprimido, en 1632, su primo Carlos Gustavo de Pfalz-Zweibrücken tuvo la satisfacción de encabezar en 1648 el saqueo del palacio imperial en Praga llevado a cabo por los ejércitos suecos. Sin embargo, pese a esa continuidad, lo cierto es que las cuestiones religiosas fueron perdiendo importancia de forma inexorable.

59. Schmid, «Konfessionspolitik», pp. 222-223: von Thumshirn, en representación de Sajonia-Altemburgo, el 28 de noviembre de 1648.

las razones en factores sociales y económicos a largo plazo, como la dislocación económica provocada por la sobreproducción y superpoblación en los primeros decenios de la centuria, o el empeoramiento del clima, o la destrucción o despoblación generalizadas provocadas por la propia guerra. Ciertamente, son muchos los datos que abonan estas afirmaciones. Prácticamente toda Europa se vio afectada por lo que se ha llamado la «crisis general del siglo XVII», una combinación de cambios económicos, sociales, políticos, climáticos e intelectuales que hicieron mucho más plausible la posibilidad de enfrentamientos entre los gobiernos y entre los gobiernos y sus súbditos.[62] Pero ninguno de estos elementos podía hacer, por sí mismo, que una guerra durara treinta años. Y, en cualquier caso, muchos de esos datos pierden fuerza cuando se analizan atentamente. Como han puesto en evidencia Gerhard Benecke y Christopher Friedrichs, ni siquiera los indicadores de posguerra que registran la destrucción material —aparentemente inequívocos— son totalmente confiables: los cálculos detallados de los daños producidos guardan un extraño silencio sobre los muertos y heridos producidos por la guerra y toda la atención se centra, en cambio, en elaborar un minucioso catálogo de cada mueble, cada ladrillo y cada vestido destruido o perdido. En algunos casos, los daños estimados superaban con mucho la riqueza total de la comunidad en cualquier momento de la centuria. Al igual que la «Madre Coraje» de Brecht, las autoridades de Alemania en la posguerra estaban dispuestas a vender a sus hijos por obtener un beneficio.[63] Incluso en la actualidad, el visitante de los territorios del antiguo Sacro Imperio Romano encuentra muchos edificios que datan de los años de la guerra o del período inmediatamente posterior, cuando Alemania estaba supuestamente postrada: las iglesias y el palacio de Neoburgo, en el Danubio, comenzados en 1640; los extraordinarios edificios y fortificaciones construidos durante la guerra en Augsburgo, Münster, Ulm y Nördlingen, etc. De no haber sido por los bombardeos de 1939-1945, podríamos citar muchos otros ejemplos. Los diarios de los viajeros a Alemania después de 1648 —como los ingleses Edward Brown y Philip Skippon, que recorrieron el Imperio en los primeros años del decenio de 1660— contienen numerosas referencias a edificios construidos durante los años de la guerra, pero raras veces mencionan huellas de destrucción o desastre. Ciertamente, si sus relatos fueran la única fuente, nunca sabríamos que había habido una gran guerra. Hasta el momento en que se produjeron las depredaciones de los ejércitos de Luis XIV, Alemania protagonizó una sorprendente recuperación económica (pese a la continuación de la «crisis general» en los demás países).[64]

Otras explicaciones de la larga duración de la Guerra de los Treinta Años se han centrado menos en la incompetencia de los ejércitos, para dedicar más atención a la ineficacia de los gobiernos que los reclutaban. Una vez creados los ejércitos, se dice, no había dinero para pagarlos y tampoco se controlaban y organizaban para conseguir victorias rápidas y decisivas, por lo cual la guerra se eternizaba. También hay muchos datos que apoyan esta hipótesis. En su excelente estudio de la relación entre la economía y la política en los reinados de los primeros Borbones franceses, Richard Bonney afirma que de tanto en tanto el gobierno francés se veía obligado a variar o abandonar sus objetivos debido a la ausencia de medios económicos. Fue fundamentalmente la falta de dinero para protagonizar una participación más completa la que inspiró la «guerra de diversión» de 1629 a 1635, y en 1647-1648 el desarrollo de las conversaciones de paz en Westfalia se vio seriamente afectado por la situación del tesoro francés.[65] Como ya hemos señalado en capítulos anteriores, el ritmo de la intervención española, danesa e inglesa se vio también muy influido por considera-

62. Véase G. Parker y L. M. Smith, eds., *The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century*, Londres, 1978, caps. 1, 2 y 8. Véase una detallada información sobre el clima en Alemania durante los años de la guerra, en W. Lenke, *Klimadaten von 1621-1650 nach Beobachtungen des Landgrafen Hermann von Hessen*, Offenbach, 1960: *Berichte des deutschen Wetterdienstes*, nr. LXIII, vol. 9. El landgrave, aunque no tenía barómetro ni termómetro, realizó continuas observaciones que dejó registradas, en Kassel y (a partir de 1640) en Fulda, cuatro veces al día desde 1635 hasta 1650 (excepto durante el año 1645). Esos datos demuestran claramente que el clima, especialmente en el decenio de 1640, era más fresco y húmedo. En 1648 hubo 157 días de lluvia, nieve u otras precipitaciones; en 1649, 147 días, y en 1650, 179.

63. Véase G. Benecke, *Society and Politics in Germany 1500-1750*, Londres, 1974, pp. 234-239, y pp. 301-308, *supra*.

64. P. Skippon, «An account of a journey through the Low Countries, Germany, Italy and France», en A. Churchill, ed., *A collection of voyages and travels*, VI, Londres, 1732, pp. 418-484. Véase también Friedrichs, *Nördlingen*, caps. 2, 4 y 5. Es cierto que en la mayor parte de las zonas no se alcanzó el mismo nivel de vida de antes de la guerra hasta después de 1700, pero esto se debió en gran medida a Luis XIV.

65. Bonney, *The King's Debts*, pp. 126-127, 200, 202-205.

ciones económicas. Es indudable que todos estos estados se implicaron en una guerra que estaba por encima de sus posibilidades; ésa es la razón por la cual llegaron a la paralización. Sin embargo, y no deja de ser sorprendente, no fue ésa una experiencia universal. Suecia, el emperador, Baviera y Hesse-Kassel consiguieron mantener grandes ejércitos en el campo de batalla hasta el fin de la guerra sin provocar el colapso interno. Es cierto que la posición financiera de Fernando II a comienzos de 1630 era precaria, pero, aparte de ese breve episodio de penuria, lo cierto es que desde 1625 hasta 1648 (y naturalmente después) la corte imperial dirigió constantemente las operaciones de hasta 50.000 hombres en armas. Inevitablemente, la carga fiscal que recaía sobre los súbditos de los Habsburgo se elevó: impuestos sobre las propiedades; impuestos sobre los productos (en especial el vino); impuestos sobre los productos de lujo e impuestos sobre la nobleza y riqueza, pero después de la revuelta de 1635 en Austria no hubo una resistencia organizada similar a la de Normandía frente a Richelieu o la de Cataluña o Nápoles frente a Olivares. De igual forma, Suecia, entre 1630 y 1650 mantuvo a un ejército aún mayor, aunque su soldada se satisfacía en parte con subsidios extranjeros y el abastecimiento procedía de los territorios ocupados. Tal vez la fuerza más notable era el ejército de Hesse, que en 1648 tenía guarniciones en 43 fortalezas —casi tantas como los franceses— y sin embargo no contaba prácticamente con una base central, pues Hesse-Kassel había sido ocupado en el decenio de 1630 por fuerzas enemigas, siendo luego terriblemente devastado.[66] Ciertamente, los soldados de Hesse fueron pocas veces protagonistas en el drama, pero demostraron mejor que nadie hasta qué punto podía llevarse a la práctica la máxima *bellum se ipse alet*. Si un gobernante sin tierras como Amalia de Hesse podía mantener 10.000 hombres o más en armas a pesar de los 25 años de hostigamiento constante por parte del emperador del Sacro Imperio Romano, la guerra en Alemania podía durar eternamente.

Pero si Hesse podía mantener enhiesto su estandarte, no tenía fuerza suficiente para ganar la guerra. Tampoco el ejército sueco, a

66. Véase Beck, *Der hessische Bruderzwist*, donde se encontrará un breve y sucinto estudio de las últimas fases de la guerra desde el punto de vista de Hesse. En cuanto a los territorios de los Habsburgo, la guerra tuvo también efectos catastróficos, pero fueron menos graves de lo que se podía esperar. Véase, para una zona, R. Sandgruber, «Zur Wirtschaftsentwicklung Niederösterreichs im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert», *Unsere Heimat*, XLV (1974), pp. 210-221.

pesar de sus grandes victorias, consiguió imponer una rendición incondicional al emperador: ni la batalla de Breitenfeld, ni la de Wittstock, ni la de Jankov produjeron el hundimiento total de las tropas imperiales. Tampoco la campaña de 1648, en la que el ejército sueco estuvo a punto de tomar Praga, habría resultado probablemente decisiva desde el punto de vista militar. En efecto, Praga había sido ocupada dos veces anteriormente (en 1618 y 1631), pero en ambas ocasiones se había recuperado. De igual forma, en 1645-1646 Viena parecía también condenada pero sobrevivió intacta. Hacía falta algo más que la ocupación de una ciudad o dos para poner fin a la Guerra de los Treinta Años.

Reinaba, al parecer, una situación de parálisis militar y política. Fue éste un hecho de la mayor importancia, pues dado que ningún grupo de potencias tenía la capacidad militar para alcanzar la victoria total y que la situación política y religiosa estaba totalmente equilibrada, los designios quijotescos y los temperamentos belicosos, incluso de personajes de escasa entidad, comenzaron a ejercer una influencia desproporcionada en el curso de los acontecimientos. La prosopografía de los príncipes y prelados de comienzos del siglo XVII puede no ser edificante ni atractiva, pero es fundamental para la comprensión del carácter de la guerra. Su libertad de acción era temible y se refleja en el *status* casi divino que les atribuían sus súbditos. Citemos a título de ejemplo las palabras pronunciadas en honor del landgrave Jorge de Hesse-Darmstadt durante su funeral en 1661:

> Así como el sol en los cielos es hecho y modelado por Dios y es una obra realmente maravillosa del Todopoderoso, también los reyes, los príncipes y los señores son situados y ordenados por Dios en el estado secular. Por esa razón también pueden ser llamados dioses.[67]

El landgrave Jorge, el último en morir de los grandes actores de la guerra, parece haber sido también uno de los menos atractivos. Cobarde y vengativo hacia su primo Mauricio, personalidad más abierta y cultivada, sin embargo su fuerza de voluntad desempeñó un papel

67. Citado por L. W. Forster, *The Temper of Seventeenth-Century German Literature*, Londres, 1952, p. 9. Véanse elogios similares de teóricos políticos y predicadores en Inglaterra, citados por J. N. Figgis, *The Theory of the Divine Right of Kings*, Londres, 1894, caps. 7, 8 y 9.

de primera magnitud en la guerra. Más que ningún otro factor fue su incansable diplomacia entre 1630 y 1635 la que consiguió finalmente convencer a su suegro, Juan Jorge de Sajonia, para que firmara la paz con el emperador, abriendo así una brecha insuperable entre los defensores de la causa protestante. No había hecho sino pisar suelo alemán el rey Gustavo Adolfo cuando el landgrave Jorge presentó los «Hessische Punkten» a la asamblea de Ratisbona; al no encontrar apoyo a su iniciativa, intentó —a pesar de Breitenfeld— entablar negociaciones directas con el emperador. Casi inmediatamente, el avance irresistible de los suecos hacia el Rin le obligó a alinearse en el bando de Gustavo Adolfo, pero Jorge buscó una y otra vez el acuerdo con los imperiales: primero en Colonia en 1632, luego en Leitmeritz en 1633, en Pirna en 1634 y finalmente (con éxito) en Praga en 1635. ¿Qué perseguía el landgrave con esta constante ofensiva de paz? Sin duda, pretendía restablecer la paz en el Imperio creando un frente unido de príncipes alemanes contra sus enemigos extranjeros. Esas consideraciones políticas se veían reforzadas por una ansiedad confesional: tenía la profunda convicción de que había que detener la irrupción del calvinismo, que recientemente había reclamado Hesse-Kassel y Brandemburgo. Pero tan elevadas motivaciones públicas no excluían la ambición territorial privada: Jorge pretendía también salvaguardar los beneficios conseguidos de manos de sus enemigos domésticos en el decenio de 1620 y, sobre todo, asegurarse de que Hesse-Kassel (el más antiguo aliado de Suecia en Alemania) no recuperara nunca su posición preeminente. Dada la situación territorial de Darmstadt —rodeada por vecinos católicos y calvinistas y con sólo un 25 por 100 de Hesse (frente al 50 por 100 para Kassel)—, la lealtad absoluta al emperador y la inquebrantable alianza con la Sajonia electoral parecían la única garantía del landgrave para el futuro.[68]

Ese oportunismo persistente y concienzudo fue característico de la élite política alemana durante la Guerra de los Treinta Años. Tal vez se ha prestado demasiada atención a la supuesta irracionalidad del liderazgo del Palatinado a partir de 1618, con Federico V aceptando el destino que le ofrecían el Parlamento bohemio y Cristián de Anhalt. Resaltar los elementos mesiánicos en la política del elector resulta atractivo superficialmente, pues tradicionalmente los mesías no llevan

68. La política de paz de Jorge ha sido agudamente analizada por Frohnweiler, «Die Friedenspolitik Landgraf Georgs II.», especialmente pp. 163-170.

consigo la paz, sino una espada. Sin embargo, Federico no recibía únicamente el consejo de Anhalt, sino también de los experimentados Camerarius, Dohna y Rusdorf. El promedio de edad de sus consejeros principales en 1619 era de cincuenta y siete años. No puede decirse, pues, que fueran muchachos impetuosos. Estaba a favor de la intervención de Bohemia como medida preventiva: se trataba de impedir que los Habsburgo incrementaran su fuerza y pudieran utilizarla algún día contra el Palatinado. El nada excitable John Donne visitó Heidelberg inmediatamente antes de que Federico partiera hacia su nuevo reino y pronunció un sermón de despedida sobre el texto «ahora nuestra salvación está más cerca que cuando creíamos», con un fuerte (y prolongado) énfasis en la palabra «ahora».[69]

Pero hacía falta algo más que un sermón para mover a unos príncipes protestantes. La vida disoluta de Cristián IV de Dinamarca le dejaba muchas veces arruinado y en ocasiones en posición difícil. Jugaba con frecuencia (en el año 1625, primer año de su intervención en Alemania, ganó 1.007 táleros y perdió 1.510); era promiscuo y muchas veces estaba borracho durante dos o tres días seguidos (según los diarios de sus cortesanos, durante el decenio de 1600 pasaba dos o tres semanas intoxicado cada año; véase lámina 24). La edad no debilitó su capacidad. «Ésta es la vida del rey —se quejaba un embajador inglés en Copenhague en 1632—: beber todo el día y yacer con una prostituta cada noche.»[70] Por su parte, Juan Jorge de Sajonia encontraba solaz en la bebida y en la caza cuando le abrumaban los grandes problemas políticos y religiosos de la época. Este Nimrod teutónico afirmaba haber matado personalmente más de 150.000 animales y, tal vez afortunadamente, sus hazañas en la bebida no están cuantificadas. Sin embargo, lo cierto es que Juan Jorge se veía sometido a

69. G. R. Potter y E. Simpson, eds., *Sermons of John Donne*, II, Berkeley y Los Ángeles, 1955, pp. 250-268. El Dr. Donne comenzaba: «No hay una palabra más global, que pueda abarcarlo todo mejor, en toda la religión, que la primera palabra de este texto: AHORA». La preocupación por el tiempo y, en especial, por lo inmediato, era compartida por la mayor parte de los escritores de la época. Esto se refleja en la popularidad de que gozaban la poesía lírica, sonetos y epigramas (que intentan atrapar una emoción, pensamiento o acción momentáneas del fluir del tiempo) y en los epitalamios escritos para destacar la singularidad de cualquier acontecimiento, por trivial que pueda parecer.

70. Véase más información en E. L. Petersen, «Conspicuous consumption: the Danish nobility of the seventeenth century», *Kwartalnik historij Kultury materialnej*, I, 1982, pp. 64-65.

duras presiones. Por una parte, durante todo el decenio de 1620, el emperador jugó deliberadamente con la obligación de los luteranos de apoyar el poder establecido y con la aversión de Juan Jorge al calvinismo. Por otra parte, el miedo y la incertidumbre de Sajonia sobre el futuro del luteranismo, si los católicos derrotaban a todos sus enemigos, fue explotado por Gustavo Adolfo y por la corte en el exilio del Palatinado. No es extraño que el elector se diera a la bebida y que en 1651 decidiera dividir sus tierras entre sus cuatro hijos, asegurándose de que ninguno de ellos tuviera que afrontar las terribles decisiones que a él le habían abrumado.

De hecho, no era posible buscar de forma inmediata una solución duradera para todos los grandes conflictos a los que tuvieron que hacer frente Juan Jorge y sus contemporáneos. Aunque tal vez se habrían podido esperar más resultados de un conflicto general que se prolongó durante tanto tiempo, lo cierto es que casi todos los problemas de la época que tenían solución fueron resueltos, quedando tan sólo los que estaban más allá de la capacidad de hombres mejores que el borrachín elector de Sajonia. La dificultad a la hora de estimar los logros de los príncipes alemanes es consecuencia, en parte, de la tentación inevitable de comparar su actuación con la de los dirigentes extranjeros. Obviamente, no había vestigio alguno de indecisión en Zúñiga y en Olivares, en Richelieu y Mazarino, en Oxenstierna y en Gustavo Adolfo. Pero la razón de ese contraste es evidente: la guerra alemana no se desarrollaba ante las puertas de su casa. «Ganemos o perdamos —como observó Oxenstierna en una ocasión— no es nuestra guerra.» Oxenstierna podía tener una visión más fría de los acontecimientos, simplemente porque no estaba directamente amenazado por ellos. A excepción, tal vez, del período 1628-1629, Suecia no estuvo nunca en peligro de invasión por parte de Alemania; tampoco lo estuvo Francia, a excepción del año 1636, y, mucho menos todavía, España. En consecuencia, los políticos extranjeros podían tratar de conseguir sus objetivos utilizando todos los medios a su alcance. Oxenstierna pudo trabajar durante trece años para socavar la paz de Praga; Richelieu y Mazarino podían seguir luchando, al menos en teoría, hasta que sus enemigos —o incluso toda Alemania— se derrumbaran por agotamiento. Pero todo eso no estaba al alcance de los príncipes del Imperio, que se veían inmersos en los fragores de la guerra y que carecían del poder de esos gobernantes extranjeros.

En consecuencia, debido a la parálisis de los mecanismos políticos

normales, la determinación personal o los prejuicios de los enemigos ejercieron una influencia decisiva en el curso de la Guerra de los Treinta Años. No todos habían nacido para gobernar: la posición de Lorenzo de Brindisi respecto a los problemas de Donauwörth condujo finalmente a la formación de la Unión y luego de la Liga; Oñate y Zúñiga ayudaron a convertir la revuelta de Bohemia en una guerra a gran escala y Lamormaini hizo peligrar constantemente la victoria de los Habsburgo con su insistencia en el Edicto de Restitución. En último extremo, fueron estos personajes decididos, y un puñado de hombres como ellos, quienes hicieron que la Guerra de los Treinta Años fuera lo que de hecho fue.

CONVENCIONES

Moneda. Siempre que ha sido posible, todas las cantidades de dinero se dan en táleros imperiales (*Reichsthaler*). Las conversiones de otras monedas se han realizado de acuerdo con el siguiente esquema:

4,8 táleros 4,5 escudos 12 libras tornesas 10 florines holandeses 6 florines del Rin	igual a 1 libra esterlina

Fechas. Corresponden todas ellas al calendario gregoriano, a menos que se especifique otra cosa.

Lugares y nombres de personas. Cuando existe una versión española aceptada la hemos utilizado (por ejemplo, Viena, La Haya y Colonia; Jacobo I, Mauricio de Nassau y Gustavo Adolfo); en los demás casos, hemos utilizado la forma preferida en general por el lugar o la persona concretas (así, Bratislava en lugar de Pressburg o Posnonia y Mazarino en lugar de Mazzarini).

ABREVIATURAS

AGRB	Archives Générales du Royaume, Bruselas, Bélgica
AGS	Archivo General, Simancas, España
AMAE	Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, París, Francia
ARA	Algemene Rijksarchief, La Haya, Holanda
BGSA	Bayerisches Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Munich, República Federal de Alemania
BL	British Library, Londres, Inglaterra
BNM	Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, España
KrA	Krigsarkivet, Estocolmo, Suecia
NLS	National Library of Scotland, Edimburgo, Escocia
PRO, S. P.	Public Record Office, Londres, Inglaterra; State Papers Collection
RAC	Rigsarkivet, Copenhague, Dinamarca
ZSM	Zentrales Staatsarchiv, Merseburg, República Democrática Alemana

MAPAS



CLAVE

- Límite del Sacro Imperio Romano
- Límites de los territorios de los Habsburgo, en 1616
- Miembros del Erbverein en 1609
- Miembros de la Alianza de Neoburgo, 1605-1608
- Miembros de la Liga católica en 1612
  1. COLONIA
  2. TRÉVERIS
  3. ESTRASBURGO
  4. MAGUNCIA
  5. FULDA
  6. WURZBURGO
  7. BAMBERG
  8. CONSTANZA
  9. ELLWANGEN
  10. AUGSBURGO
  11. BAVIERA
  12. EICHSTÄTT
- Miembros de la Unión protestante en 1612
  1. CLEVES
  2. JULIERS
  3. BERG
  4. MARK
  5. RAVENSBURG
  6. HESSE-KASSEL
  7. BAYREUTH
  8. ANHALT
  9. BRANDEMBURGO
  10. BAJO PALATINADO
  11. BADEN
  12. WÜRTTEMBERG
  13. ANSBACH
  14. ALTO PALATINADO
  15. NEOBURGO
- Conflictos urbanos en Alemania, 1600-1618
- Localidades donde se firmaron tratados
- Otras ciudades

MAPA 1

Antes de la guerra

MAPA 2

La guerra, 1618-1629



MAPA 3

La guerra en el decenio de 1630



MAPA 4

La guerra en el decenio de 1640

CRONOLOGÍA

† = muerte
* = victoria de los Habsburgo o sus aliados
** = derrota de los Habsburgo o sus aliados

Todas las fechas corresponden al calendario gregoriano.
Los acontecimientos importantes figuran en VERSALITAS.

Año	*Alemania*	*Los territorios de los Habsburgo*	*España y los Países Bajos*	*Francia, Inglaterra e Italia*	*Escandinavia, Polonia y Rusia*	*Transilvania y los turcos*
1606		*Jun.* Paz de Viena, pone fin a la revuelta de Hungría *Nov.* Paz de Zsitva Torok, pone fin a la «larga» guerra turca				*Jun.* Paz de Viena *Nov.* Paz de Zsitva Torok
1607			*Mar.* Alto el fuego en las guerras de Holanda (hasta 1609) *Nov.* Bancarrota española			
	17 dic. «INCIDENTE DE DONAUWÖRTH»					
1608	*Ene.* Dieta Imperial en Ratisbona (hasta 3 mayo) *12 may.* SE CONSTITUYE LA UNIÓN PROTESTANTE	*Feb.* Tratado de Bratislava *Jun.* Matías se convierte en archiduque reinante y rey de Hungría				
1609	*Mar.* Primera crisis de Cleves-Juliers (hasta oct. 1610)	*Mar.* Concesiones de Matías a los protestantes	*Abr.* TREGUA DE LOS DOCE AÑOS (hasta 1621)			
	10 jul. SE CONSTITUYE LA LIGA CATÓLICA	*9 jul.* Carta de Majestad: nombramiento de los «defensores»				
1610				*14 may.* † Enrique IV de Francia; minoría de edad de Luis XIII (hasta 1617)	*Sep.* Polonia invade Rusia (hasta 1618)	
	Oct. † Federico IV del Palatinado; le					

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	sucede Federico V					
1611		*Mar.* Las tropas de Passau atacan Praga	*Mar.* Tratado matrimonial franco-español	*Mar.* Tratado matrimonial franco-español		
		May. Matías coronado rey de Bohemia			*Abr.* Dinamarca invade Suecia (guerra hasta 1613)	
	Jul. Juan Jorge I elector de Sajonia (hasta 1656)					
					Oct. Gustavo Adolfo, rey de Suecia (hasta 1632)	
1612	*20 ene.* † Rodolfo II; Matías elegido emperador (hasta 1619)					
				Abr. Tratado de Wesel entre Inglaterra y la Unión		
				Dic. † Francisco, duque de Mantua		
1613						
	Feb. Matrimonio de Federico V e Isabel Estuardo				*Ene.* Paz de Knäred (Dinamarca y Suecia)	
					Mar. Miguel Romanov elegido zar (hasta 1645)	Bethlen Gabor príncipe de Transilvania (hasta 1629)
	Abr. El elector de Brandemburgo se convierte al calvinismo			*Abr.* Primera guerra de sucesión de Mantua (hasta junio 1615)		
	May. Tratado entre la Unión y Holanda					
	Jul. Wolfgang Guillermo de Neoburgo se convierte al catolicismo					
	Ag. Dieta Imperial					

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	en Ratisbona (hasta oct.)					
1614				*Ene.* Guerra civil francesa (hasta mayo)		
	May. Segunda crisis de Cleves-Juliers (hasta sept.)					
	Ag. Aquisgrán recatolizada; revuelta Fettmilch en Frankfurt	*Ag.* Dieta General en Linz				
				Oct. Estados Generales en Francia		
	Nov. Tratado de Xanten		*Nov.* Tratado de Xanten			
1615	Revuelta luterana en Brandemburgo		La armada holandesa ataca la costa del Pacífico de la América española			
				Jun. El tratado de Asti pone fin a la primera guerra de Mantua		
				Ag. Guerra civil en Francia (hasta mayo 1616)		
		Dic. Guerra de los uscoques (hasta feb. 1618)		*Dic.* Guerra de los uscoques (hasta 1618)		
1616				*Sep.* Segunda guerra de sucesión de Mantua (hasta 1617)		
1617	Año del Jubileo luterano; apertura «Academia Militar» en Siegen			*Feb.* Guerra civil en Francia (hasta abr.)		
		20 mar. TRATADO DE OÑATE	*20 mar.* TRATADO DE OÑATE		*Mar.* Paz de Stolbova (Suecia y Rusia)	
	Abr. Se renueva la Unión evangélica			*24 abr.* Gobierno personal de Luis XIII (hasta 1643)		

Año	*Alemania*	*Los territorios de los Habsburgo*	*España y los Países Bajos*	*Francia, Inglaterra e Italia*	*Escandinavia, Polonia y Rusia*	*Transilvania y los turcos*
	(hasta 1621); disolución de la Liga católica					
					Jun. Suecia invade Livonia	
		Jul.-dic. Fernando de Estiria reconocido como rey designado de Bohemia y Hungría				
			Ag. Oldenbarnevelt recluta tropas waardgelder			
				3 oct. La paz de Pavía pone fin a la segunda guerra de Mantua		
1618	Brandemburgo se anexiona Prusia	*Feb.* Paz de Wiener-Neustadt (archiduque y Venecia)		*Feb.* Paz de Wiener-Neustadt	Tregua de Suecia con Polonia (hasta 1621)	
			Mar. Don Baltasar de Zúñiga se convierte en el principal ministro español (hasta 1622)			
		23 may. DEFENESTRACIÓN DE PRAGA				
		Jun. Saboya otorga subsidios a Bohemia (hasta abr. 1619)				
			Ag. Caída de Oldenbarnevelt			
		Sep. Mansfeld captura Pilsen				
1619	*Ene.* Se constituye de nuevo la Liga católica				*Ene.* Paz de Deulino (Polonia y Rusia)	
				Feb. Guerra civil en Francia (hasta abril)		
	20 mar. † Matías	*20 mar.* † Matías; le				

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		sucede Fernando de Estiria				
		May. Primer asedio de Viena	*May.* Los archiduques envían ayuda a Fernando; ejecución de Oldenbarnevelt			
		10 jun. * Záblatí. Moravia se une a la confederación				
	28 ag. Fernando elegido emperador	*22-26 ag.* DERROCAMIENTO DE FERNANDO; ELECCIÓN DE FEDERICO				*Ag.* Bethlen Gabor conquista Hungría (hasta oct.)
	8 oct. Tratado de Munich (España-Baviera-emperador)				*Oct.* Polonia ataca a los turcos	
		Nov. Segundo asedio de Viena				*Nov.* Polonia invade Transilvania
1620						*20 ene.* Bethlen Gabor concluye una tregua de nueve meses con los Habsburgo
	20 mar. GARANTÍA DE MÜHLHAUSEN					
				Abr. Rebelión de María de Médicis (hasta agosto)		
	3 jul. TRATADO DE ULM	*Jul.* Los bávaros ocupan la Alta Austria (hasta 1628)		*Jul.* Masacre de la Valtelina		
	Ag. Spínola invade el Palatinado		*Ag.* Spínola invade el Palatinado	*Ag.* Terminan las guerras civiles francesas; Luis XIII invade el Bearn; los Habsburgo ocupan la Valtelina		*Ag.* Bethlen Gabor invade Hungría de nuevo
					20 sep. ** Cecora (polacos contra turcos)	*20 sep.* ** Cecora (polacos contra turcos)
		Oct. Confiscaciones. Creación de un				

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		tribunal (hasta 1623) *3 nov.* * MONTAÑA BLANCA				
1621	*21 ene.* Federico es proscrito	*Ene.* Creación del Consorcio de Acuñación: período de «Kipper- und Wipper» (hasta 1623)				
	Feb. Conferencia de Segeberg			*Feb.* Guerra de los hugonotes franceses (hasta oct. 1622)	*Feb.* Conferencia de Segeberg	
			31 mar. † Felipe III. Felipe IV rey de España (hasta 1665)			
	Abr. Alto el fuego en el Palatinado (hasta jul.) *27 abr.* Federico se alía con la República de Holanda *14 may.* Disolución de la Unión		*Abr.* GUERRA EN LOS PAÍSES BAJOS (hasta 1648); Federico V llega a la República de Holanda			
			15 jul. † archiduque Alberto			
				Sep. Los Habsburgo ocupan los territorios de las Ligas grisonas	*Sep.* Suecia captura Riga	
	Oct. Los bávaros ocupan el Alto Palatinado; Kipper- und Wipperzeit (hasta 1623)				*Oct.* Tregua entre Polonia y Turquía	*Oct.* Tregua entre polacos y turcos
1622		*Ene.* Primera paz de Nikolsburg		*Ene.* El papa funda la Congregación para la Propagación de la Fe		*Ene.* Primera paz de Nikolsburg (emperador y Transilvania)
			Feb. Spínola conquista Juliers			
	Mar. Publicación de					

Año	*Alemania*	*Los territorios de los Habsburgo*	*España y los Países Bajos*	*Francia, Inglaterra e Italia*	*Escandinavia, Polonia y Rusia*	*Transilvania y los turcos*
	Cancelleria Hispanica					
	Abr. ** Wiesloch					
	6 may. * WIMPFEN (Jorge de Baden derrotado)					
	Jun. Conferencia de Bruselas (hasta nov.)		*Jun.* Conferencia de Bruselas (hasta nov.)			
	20 jun. * HÖCHST (Cristián de Brunswick derrotado)					
	13 jul. Federico prescinde de Mansfeld y Brunswick					
	26 ag. ** Fleurus					
			4 oct. Spínola levanta el sitio de Bergen			
			Oct. † Zúñiga; OLIVARES VALIDO (hasta 1643)			
1623	*25 feb.* El electorado palatino transferido a Maximiliano			*Feb.* Se forma la Liga de Lyon; España accede a abandonar la Valtelina		Bethlen Gabor invade Hungría; guerra de los turcos con Persia (hasta 1639)
	Mar. Rendición de Frankenthal					
				Abr. Buckingham y el príncipe Carlos van a Madrid en busca de un acuerdo matrimonial		
	6 ag. * STADTLOHN			*Ag.* Urbano VIII elegido papa (hasta 1644)		
1624	*Ene.* Mansfeld disuelve su ejército					
				Abr. Richelieu entra a formar parte del Consejo de Luis XIII		
						May. Segunda paz de Nikolsburg; los persas toman Bagdad

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			Jun. Tratado de Compiègne (Francia y la República de Holanda) *Jul.* Las tropas españolas sitian Breda (hasta jun. 1625)	*Jun.* Tratado de Compiègne (Francia y la República de Holanda)		
				Ag. RICHELIEU PRIMER MINISTRO DE FRANCIA (hasta 1642); los franceses ocupan la Valtelina	
			Oct. Creación del *Almirantazgo del Norte* *Dic.* El ejército de Mansfeld embarca hacia Holanda			
1625				*Ene.* Nueva revuelta hugonote en Francia (hasta 1629)		
			Mar. España en guerra con Inglaterra (hasta 1630)	*Mar.* Guerra con España (hasta 1630); Saboya invade Génova		
	Abr. Cristián IV elegido Kreisoberst de la Baja Sajonia		*Abr.* † Mauricio de Nassau; Federico Enrique, capitán general de la República de Holanda (hasta 1647)	*Abr.* † Jacobo VI y I; Carlos I, rey de Inglaterra (hasta 1649)	*Abr.* Cristián IV elegido Kreisoberst de la Baja Sajonia	
			Jun. Los españoles ocupan Breda (hasta 1637); bloqueo fluvial de España en Westfalia (hasta 162		*Jun.* Suecia invade Prusia	
	Jul. Wallenstein crea un nuevo ejército imperial; bloqueo fluvial de España en					

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	Westfalia (hasta 1629)					
		Oct. Reformations-kommission en la Alta Austria				
			Nov. Ataque anglo-h			
				n. Ataque anglo-		
				landés contra Cádiz		
	9 dic. ALIANZA DE LA HAYA		*9 dic.* ALIANZA DE LA HAYA	*9 dic.* ALIANZA DE LA HAYA	*9 dic.* ALIANZA DE LA HAYA	
1626					*Ene.* ** Wallhof (los suecos derrotan a los polacos)	Bethlen Gabor invade Moravia; los turcos no consiguen reconquistar Bagdad
			5 mar. Tratado de Monzón (ratificado e mayo)	*mar.* Tratado de Monzón tificado en mayo)		
	Abr. * del puente Dessau					
		May. Revuelta de la Alta Austria (hasta sep.)			*May.* Campañas de Gustavo Adolfo en Prusia (hasta 1629)	
			Jul. Se publica el esquema de la Unión de Armas			
	26 ag. * LUTTER. Avance tropas imperiales hacia el norte				*26 ag.* * LUTTER	
						Dic. Paz de Bratislava
1627	*Feb.* Entrega de Mecklemburgo a Wallenstein como garantía; las tropas imperiales conquistan Mecklemburgo, Pomerania y Holstein		*Feb.* España decreta la bancarrota			
	Mar. La partición de Hesse favorece a Darmstadt; abdica Mauricio de Hesse-			r. Alianza franco-ñola contra Inglaterra		

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	Kassel *May.* Tratado de Königsberg (emperador-Brandemburgo)					
		Sep. Nueva constitución para Bohemia y Moravia				
	Oct. Reunión electoral de Mühlhausen (hasta nov.) *10 nov.* Capitulación de Fransburg (Pomerania)					
				Jun. Guerra entre Francia e Inglaterra (hasta 1629)		
1628	*Ene.* Wallenstein se convierte en duque de Mecklemburgo; las tropas imperiales ocupan Jutlandia *May.* Baviera se anexiona el Alto Palatinado *May.* ASEDIO SIN ÉXITO DE STRALSUND (hasta jul.)	*May.* La Alta Austria de nuevo bajo control de los Habsburgo				
				Dic. Tercera guerra de Mantua (hasta jun. 1631)		
					Jun. Suecia libera Stralsund	
	Sep. * Wolgast (Wallenstein derrota a los daneses)		*Sep.* Los holandeses capturan la flota española que transporta plata		*Sep.* * Wolgast (Wallenstein derrota a los daneses)	
				11 oct. RENDICIÓN DE LA ROCHELLE		
1629	*6/28 mar.* EDICTO DE RESTITUCIÓN			*Mar.* Las tropas francesas, al mando de Luis XIII,	*14 mar.* Encuentro de Ulfsbäck (Cristián y	

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				invaden Italia	Gustavo Adolfo)	
			Abr. Los holandeses asedian 's Hertogenbosch (hasta sep.)	*Abr.* Paz de Susa entre Francia e Inglaterra		
				May. El ejército imperial invade Italia		
				28 jun. «Gracia de Alais», que pone fin a la revuelta hugonote	*17 jun.* * Honigfelde (Stuhm)	
	7 jul. PAZ DE LÜBECK; los imperiales envían ayuda a Polonia				*7 jul.* Paz de Lübeck	
			Ag. Los españoles ocupan Amersfoort; los holandeses toman Wesel			
			14 sep. Los holandeses ocupan s' Hertogenbosch		*26 sep.* Tregua polaco-sueca de Altmark (hasta 1635)	
						Nov. † Bethlen Gabor; le sucede Jorge Rákóczi (hasta 1648)
1630			*Feb.* Los holandeses toman Pernambuco (Brasil) (hasta 1654)	Los franceses ocupan Saboya; la peste asola Italia (hasta 1631)		
	Abr. Reunión de Annaburg (Sajonia y Brandemburgo)					
			17 jun. Tratado franco-holandés para la concesión de un subsidio	*17 jun.* Tratado de subsidio franco-holandés		
	6 jul. Gustavo Adolfo invade Alemania			*Jul.* Las tropas imperiales toman Mantua	*Jul.* Gustavo Adolfo invade Alemania	
	Jul. REUNIÓN ELECTORAL DE RATISBONA (hasta nov.)					

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	Ag. Magdeburgo desafía al emperador (hasta mayo 1631) *13 ag.* Wallenstein destituido *Sep.* Conferencia de Zabeltitz (Sajonia y Brandemburgo) *13 oct.* PAZ DE RATISBONA			*13 oct.* PAZ DE RATISBONA *11 nov.* Journée de Dupes (París)		
			15 nov. Paz de Madrid (Inglaterra y España)	*13 nov.* Paz de Madrid (Inglaterra y España)		
1631				*11 ene.* Tratado de Bärwalde	*Ene.* Tratado de Bärwalde	
	Feb. Asamblea de Leipzig (hasta abr.) *12 abr.* Manifiesto de Leipzig *20 may.* Saqueo de Magdeburgo				*13 abr.* Suecia ocupa Frankfurt del Oder	
				8 may. Tratado de Fontainebleau (Francia y Baviera)		
	22 jun. Alianza Brandemburgo-Suecia *4 ag.* Convención de Frankfurt (hasta oct.) *Sep.* Sajonia, Bremen y Hesse-Kassel aliados con Suecia *17 sep.* ** BREITENFELD			*19 jun.* Paz de Cherasco	*Jun.* Alianza entre Suecia y Brandemburgo *Sep.* Alianza entre Suecia y Sajonia *17 sep.* ** BREITENFELD	
	Nov. Suecia conquista Maguncia (hasta 1636)	*15 nov.* Los sajones toman Praga (hasta 1632)	*Sep.* Revuelta en el País Vasco (hasta 1634)			
1632	*Dic.* Wallenstein llamado de nuevo *Abr.* ** RAIN; los suecos ocupan				*Abr.* † Segismundo III; accede al trono	

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	Baviera *13 abr.* Acuerdo de Göllersdorf: Wallenstein de nuevo jefe supremo				Ladislao IV (hasta 1648)	
			Jun. Los holandeses toman Venlo y Roermond; abortada la rebelión de los Países Bajos del Sur			
	Jul. Asedio del Alte Veste (hasta 18 sep.)					
			23 ag. Los holandeses conquistan Maastricht			
	1 nov. Wallenstein conquista Leipzig *17 nov.* ** LÜTZEN				*Nov.* ** LÜTZEN; † Gustavo Adolfo; le sucede Cristina (hasta 1654) *Dic.* Guerra de Smolensko (hasta jun. 1634)	
1633				*19 abr.* Se renueva el tratado franco-sueco	*19 abr.* Renovación del tratado franco-sueco	
	23 abr. Liga Heilbronn (hasta 1635)				*23 abr.* Liga Heilbronn; motines en el ejército sueco	Los turcos atacan Polonia
		Jun.-jul. Tregua en Silesia		*Jun.* Francia invade Lorena		
	Jul. ** Hessisch-Oldendorf; motines en el ejército sueco					
		Ag.-oct. Tregua en Silesia *Oct.* * Steinau; Wallenstein reconquista Silesia				
1634	*25 feb.* † Wallenstein *22 abr.* Brandemburgo exige la evacuación sueca de Pomerania			*Abr.* Francia incrementa el subsidio a Holanda		

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					Jun. Paz entre Rusia y Polonia	Los turcos atacan Persia
		Jul. Los sajones invaden Bohemia (hasta sep.)				
	6 sep. * NÖRDLINGEN					
			Oct. El cardenal-infante gobierna Flandes (hasta 1641)			
	1 nov. Alianza de Francia con la Liga Heilbronn *24 nov.* Preliminares de Pirna			*Nov.* Francia ocupa posiciones suecos en Alsacia; la Liga Heilbronn se alía con Francia		
1635			*8 feb.* Tratado franco-holandés renovado	*8 feb.* Renovado el tratado franco-holandés		
	Mar. España ocupa Tréveris; el elector encarcelado (hasta 1645)		*26 mar.* España ocupa Tréveris	*Mar.* Francia ocupa la Valtelina (hasta 1637)		
				28 abr. Tratado de Compiègne (Francia y Suecia)	*28 abr.* Tratado de Compiègne	
	30 may. PAZ DE PRAGA: el emperador y Sajonia		*19 may.* FRANCIA DECLARA LA GUERRA A ESPAÑA	*19 may.* FRANCIA DECLARA LA GUERRA A ESPAÑA		
	Ag. Motines en el ejército sueco *6 sep.* Brandemburgo acepta la paz de Praga	Revuelta campesina en Estiria			*Ag.* Motines en el ejército sueco *Sep.* Paz sueco-polaca de Stuhmsdorf (hasta 1655)	
				27 oct. Francia toma a su servicio a Bernardo de Sajonia-Weimar		
1636	*Ene.* Suecia rinde Maguncia *Mar.* El emperador declara la guerra a Francia			*Mar.* El emperador declara la guerra a Francia		
				30 mar. Tratado de	*30 mar.* Tratado de	

Año	*Alemania*	*Los territorios de los Habsburgo*	*España y los Países Bajos*	*Francia, Inglaterra e Italia*	*Escandinavia, Polonia y Rusia*	*Transilvania y los turcos*
				Wismar (Suecia y Francia)	Wismar (Francia y Suecia) *Jun.* Oxenstierna regresa a Suecia	
			Jul. El ejército de Flandes invade Francia *15 ag.* El ejército de Flandes en Corbie	*Jul.* El ejército de Flandes invade Francia *15 ag.* El ejército de Flandes en Corbie *Sep.* Las tropas imperiales invaden Borgoña; revuelta Croquant en Francia		
	4 sep. Reunión electoral de Ratisbona (hasta enero 1637) *Oct.* Congreso de Colonia *4 oct.* ** WITTSTOCK *22 dic.* Fernando III elegido rey de romanos					
1637	*Ene.* El ejército sueco se retira a Torgau		Juan Mauricio de Nassau gobierna el Brasil holandés (hasta 1644)			
	15 feb.† FERNANDO II; le sucede FERNANDO III *Mar.* † Boguslav XIV de Pomerania	*15 feb.* † FERNANDO II; le sucede FERNANDO III		*Mar.* Revuelta de la Valtelina; reocupación española		
	Jun. El ejército sueco se retira a Pomerania (hasta oct. 1638)				*Jun.* El ejército sueco se retira a Pomerania	
			Ag. Conflictos en Évora *Sep.* Los franceses toman Leucate (Cataluña) *Oct.* Los holandeses conquistan Breda	*Sep.* Las tropas francesas toman Leucate (Cataluña)		
1638	*Mar.* ** Rheinfelden			*15 mar.* Tratado de	*15 mar.* Tratado de	

Año	*Alemania*	*Los territorios de los Habsburgo*	*España y los Países Bajos*	*Francia, Inglaterra e Italia*	*Escandinavia, Polonia y Rusia*	*Transilvania y los turcos*
				Hamburgo (Francia y Suecia)	Hamburgo (Francia y Suecia)	
	Dic. Bernardo de Sajonia-Weimar toma Breisach		*Dic.* Bernardo toma Breisach			
1639	*Abr.* ** Chemnitz			*Abr.* Tratado anglo-danés de Hamburgo	*Abr.* Tratado anglo-danés de Hamburgo	
		May. Suecia invade Bohemia (hasta 1640)				
	Jul. † Bernardo de Sajonia-Weimar; Francia hereda todas sus conquistas		*Jul.* Los franceses capturan Salces	*Jul.* Los franceses ocupan Salces; revuelta de los Nu-pieds en Normandía (hasta nov.)		
			21 oct. ** Los Down la flota holandesa destruye la armada española			
1640	*Ene.* Conversaciones bávaro-francesas en Einsiedeln			*Ene.* Conversaciones franco-bávaras en Einsiedeln		
	Feb. Reunión electoral de Nuremberg					
			May. Revuelta de Cataluña (hasta 165			
	Sep. DIETA DE RATISBONA (hasta oct. 1641)					
	Dic. † Jorge Guillermo; le sucede Federico Guillermo		*Dic.* Revuelta de Portugal (hasta 1668			
1641			*Ene.* Cataluña acepta la protección franc			
	May. † Baner; motines en el ejército sueco					
			Jun. Alianza entre Holanda y Portugal	*30 jun.* Tratado de Hamburgo (alianza franco-sueca hasta el fin de la guerra)	*30 jun.* Tratado de Hamburgo (alianza franco-sueca hasta el fin de la guerra)	

Año	*Alemania*	*Los territorios de los Habsburgo*	*España y los Países Bajos*	*Francia, Inglaterra e Italia*	*Escandinavia, Polonia y Rusia*	*Transilvania y los turcos*
	24 jul. Paz entre Brandemburgo y Suecia					
			Ag. Los holandeses toman Angola (hasta 1648)			
	Nov. Torstensson en el ejército sueco					
1642	*Ene.* Paz de Goslar (el emperador y Brunswick) Suecia ocupa Sajonia e invade Moravia			Guerra civil inglesa (hasta 1649); Conspiración de Cinq-Mars		
	2 nov. ** Breitenfeld (2.ª)			*4 dic.* † RICHELIEU; MAZARINO SE CONVIERTE EN PRIMER MINISTRO FRANCÉS (hasta 1661)		
1643			*17 ene.* Caída de Olivares			
	Feb. «Deputationstag» de Frankfurt (hasta 1645) *May.* Suecia invade Dinamarca (hasta 1645)			*14 may.* † Luis XIII; Luis XIV, rey de Francia (hasta 1715)	*May.* Guerra sueco-danesa (hasta 1645)	
	Ag. COMIENZAN LAS NEGOCIACIONES EN WESTFALIA (hasta 1648)		*19 may.* ** ROCROI	*19 may.* ** ROCROI		
	Nov. * Tuttlingen			*Nov.* * Tuttlingen		*Nov.* Alianza entre Suecia y Transilvania (hasta 1645) *Feb.* Rákóczi invade
1644						

Año	*Alemania*	*Los territorios de los Habsburgo*	*España y los Países Bajos*
	Ag. ** Friburgo; los franceses ocupan Alsacia		
1645	*5 mar.* ** JANKOV		Los franceses toman diez ciudades en los Países Bajos
	May. * Mergentheim		
	3 ag. ** ALLERHEIM; primera sesión plenaria conferencia de paz de Westfalia *6 sep.* Tregua de Kötzschenbroda (Sajonia y Suecia)	Asedio de Viena por los suecos	
	Nov. Trauttmannsdorf llega a Westfalia (hasta jun. 1647)		
1646			*Ene.* Llegan a Münster los negociadores de la República de Holanda
	Abr. Paz de Eilenburg (Suecia y Sajonia) *Sep.* Paz preliminar franco-imperial		
			Oct. Los franceses toman Dunkerque
1647			*Ene.* Tregua hispano

Francia, Inglaterra e Italia	*Escandinavia, Polonia y Rusia*	*Transilvania y los turcos*
		Hungría (hasta agos. 1645)
Jul. ** Marston Moor; INOCENCIO X sucede a URBANO VIII como papa		
	Nov. Acuerdo de alto el fuego en la guerra sueco-danesa	
Jun. ** Naseby		*Jun.* Los turcos sitian Creta (hasta 1668)
	Jul. † Miguel Romanov *Ag.* Paz de Brömsebro	*Ag.* Rákóczi reclamado
		Dic. Paz de Viena
Sep. Paz preliminar franco-imperial *Oct.* Los franceses toman Dunkerque		

Año	*Alemania*	*Los territorios de los Habsburgo*	*España y los Países Bajos*	*Francia, Inglaterra e Italia*	*Escandinavia, Polonia y Rusia*	*Transilvania y los turcos*
			holandesa (hasta 164			
	14 mar. Tregua franco-bávara (hasta sep.)			*14 mar.* Tregua franco-bávara		
			May. † Federico Enrique; revuelta de Sicilia	*May.* Revuelta de Sicilia		
			Jul. Revuelta de Nápoles	*Jul.* Revuelta de Masaniello en Nápoles (hasta 1648)		
			Oct. Bancarrota de España			
1648			*30 ene.* PAZ DE MÜNSTER			
					Feb. † Cristián IV	
	17 may. ** Zusmarshausen			*May.* Comienza la Fronda (hasta 1654)		
	6 ag. Paz preliminar sueco-imperial		*20 ag.* ** Lens	*20 ag.* ** Lens		
		Oct. Los suecos sitian Praga				
	24 oct. PAZ DE WESTFALIA	*24 oct.* PAZ DE WESTFALIA		*24 oct.* PAZ DE WESTFALIA	*24 oct.* PAZ DE WESTFALIA Revuelta de Chmielnicki en Ucrania (hasta 1654)	
1649	*Ene.* Baviera evacuada					
	Abr. Las ciudades imperiales admiten la igualdad religiosa					
1650	*26 jun.* ACUERDO DE NUREMBERG SOBRE LA DESMOVILIZACIÓN				*26 jun.* ACUERDO DE NUREMBERG	
					Oct. Coronación de la reina Cristina	

ENSAYO BIBLIOGRÁFICO

A. Obras generales

Son millares los libros y artículos que se han escrito sobre el tema de la Guerra de los Treinta Años, en su mayor parte con el mismo título que esta obra. Los mejores títulos son los siguientes, por orden alfabético: H. Langer, *The Thirty Years' War*, Leipzig, 1978 (ed. ingl., Poole, 1980); G. Livet, *La guerre de Trente ans*, París, 1963; G. Pagès, *The Thirty Years' War*, París, 1939 (ed. ingl., Londres, 1970); J. V. Polichenski, *The Thirty Years' War*, Londres, 1971, y C. V. Wedgwood, *The Thirty Years' War*, Londres, 1938 (con frecuentes reediciones). Hay también estudios con un título ligeramente distinto, como G. Benecke, *Germany in the Thirty Years' War*, Londres, 1978; S. H. Steinberg, *The «Thirty Years' War» and the Conflict for European Hegemony, 1600-1660*, Londres, 1967; D. Maland, *Europe at War, 1600-1650*, Londres, 1980, y T. K. Rabb, ed., *The Thirty Years' War. Problems of motive, extent and effect*, Lexington, 1964. Véase también un nuevo título en p. 401, *infra*.

Todas estas obras tienen aspectos positivos, pero, como indicamos en el Prólogo, ninguna de ellas resulta totalmente adecuada. El excelente libro de Langer es, en realidad, una historia cultural de Alemania durante la guerra; Pagès, Polichenski y Wedgwood estudian un aspecto del conflicto, olvidando los demás. Benecke ofrece la traducción al inglés —de incalculable valor— de muchos documentos fundamentales, pero no una historia general de la guerra; la interpretación de Steinberg está plagada de errores factuales; Maland se basa exclusivamente en obras secundarias; Rabb presenta, bastante apresuradamente, las opiniones de 21 autores distintos en menos de 100 páginas. El mejor estudio breve es, incuestionablemente, el de Livet, pero es limitado lo que se puede decir en 125 páginas. Así pues, ninguna de estas obras recientes está a la altura del soberbio estudio (ya antiguo) de Moriz Ritter, *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Gegenreformation und des dreissigjährigen Krieges, 1555-1648*, 3 vols., Stuttgart, 1889; reeditado en Darmstadt, 1974. El volumen I abarca el período 1555-1586; el volumen II los años 1586-1618 en dos partes, separadas por el incidente de Donauwörth de 1607 y por el conflicto entre Rodolfo II y su hermano; el volumen III comprende los años 1618-1635 de forma bastante exhaustiva. Ninguna otra obra estudia de forma tan lúcida y completa las repercusiones internacionales de cada acontecimiento individual en el Imperio. El libro de Ritter sigue siendo fundamental e indispensable para la historia de la guerra hasta 1635 y para los acontecimientos que desembocaron en el estallido del conflicto.

No es posible recomendar otra obra general con la misma confianza. Incluso los sólidos capítulos que dedica a este tema la *Cambridge Modern History*, volumen IV, publicados en 1906, son desiguales. Aunque algunos (como el dedicado a la cuestión de la Valtelina) son todavía brillantes, otros están claramente superados. Pero, ¿qué podemos ofrecer a cambio? Depende, naturalmente, del tiempo de que disponga el lector. En consecuencia, el *apparatus criticus* que ofrecemos a continuación pretende cubrir un doble objetivo: indicar y evaluar todas las fuentes en las que se basa el texto de este libro y llamar la atención del lector sobre las obras más útiles (que se indican con *). En el índice alfabético aparecen los autores cuyas obras se citan ya sea en este Ensayo bibliográfico o en las notas.

B. Los antecedentes

Según afirma un destacado historiador alemán en una obra publicada en los años 1950, había desaparecido casi por completo el interés por la historia de Alemania en el período 1555-1618. Esto es cierto todavía. Los lectores ingleses que no puedan leer los dos primeros volúmenes de la *Deutsche Geschichte* (citada *supra*), sólo tienen a su alcance tres breves bosquejos: uno a cargo de G. D. Ramsay en la *New Cambridge Modern History* (en dos partes, vol. III, cap. 10, y vol. IV, cap. 10); el segundo, de *C. P. Clasen, en H. Trevor-Roper, ed., *The Age of Expansion. Europe and the world 1559-1660*, Londres, 1968, cap. 4; el tercero, algo más detallado, de Hajo Holborn, *A History of Modern Germany: the Reformation*, Londres, 1965, caps. 10 y 11.

Una de las lagunas más importantes en la mayor parte de las obras sobre la guerra —incluida la de Ritter— es el análisis de los acontecimientos en los territorios austriacos. En consecuencia, los especialistas han de sentirse especialmente satisfechos por el importante estudio, de reciente aparición, de *R. J. W. Evans, *The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy 1550-1700: an interpretation*, Oxford, 1979, con una completa bibliografía en varios idiomas. Hay que tener en cuenta, también, los siguientes estudios: H. Sturmberger, «Die Anfänge des Bruderzwistes in Habsburg»,

Mitteilungen des Oberösterreichischen Landesarchivs, V (1957), pp. 143-188, que hace un excelente análisis de las relaciones de Rodolfo con sus hermanos; una obra anterior del Dr. Evans, *Rudolf II and His World. A study in intellectual history 1576-1612*, Oxford, 1973, y el nuevo volumen de ensayos *Rudolf II and His Court*, Leids Kunsthistorisch Jaarboek, I, Delft, 1982. Sería interesante poseer estudios similares sobre Fernando II, pero no existe ninguno. El análisis más completo de su política sigue siendo la crónica contemporánea de uno de sus consejeros privados, publicada en los años 1640 y que en los años 1720 recibió forma definitiva en doce impresionantes volúmenes tamaño folio a cargo del impresor del elector de Sajonia: *Frantz Christoph Khevenhillers Annales Ferdinandeorum*. Una obra del mismo autor, *Conterfet Kupfferstich*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1721-1722, ofrece anécdotas biográficas ilustradas. La obra de F. Hurter, *Geschichte Kaiser Ferdinands II. und seiner Eltern*, 11 vols., Schaffhausen, 1850-1867, es tendenciosa pero sigue siendo fundamental. A menor escala, se puede consultar: J. Franzl, *Ferdinand II. Kaiser im Zwiespalt der Zeit*, Graz, 1978; H. Sturmberger, *Kaiser Ferdinand II und das Problem des Absolutismus*, Munich, 1957, y G. Franz, «Glaube und Recht im politischen Denken Kaiser Ferdinands II.», *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte*, XLIX (1958), pp. 258-269. Véase también F. Stieve, en *Allgemeine deutsche Biographie*, VI, 1877, pp. 644-664. Sobre la hábil manipulación de la opinión pública, en especial en la Alemania luterana, por parte del emperador, véase K. Nolden, *Die Reichspolitik Kaiser Ferdinands II. in der Publizistik bis zum Lübecker Frieden 1629*, Colonia, 1958. Hay también importante información respecto a la toma de decisiones en la corte del emperador en el importante y reciente estudio de *R. Bireley, *Religion and Politics in the Age of the Counter-Reformation. Emperor Ferdinand II, William Lamormaini, S.J., and the formation of Imperial policy*, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1981. Sobre la región de procedencia de Fernando hay una excelente colección de ensayos, A. Novotny y B. Sutter, eds., *Inneröesterreich 1564-1619*, Graz, 1967, y una excelente monografía de Schulze, *Landesdefension und Staatsbildung: Studien zum Kriegswesen des innerösterreichischen Territorialstaates (1564-1619)*, Viena, 1973.

Los únicos problemas de entre los que afectaban al Imperio en esos años que han merecido estudios extensos, que abarcan todo el período, son la religión, la economía y (tal vez sorprendentemente) las instituciones representativas. Sobre la situación general del protestantismo en esa época en Alemania, véase J. B. Neveux, *Vie spirituelle et vie sociale entre Rhin et Baltique au XVII^e siècle*, París, 1967; H. Schilling, *Konfessionskonflikt und Staatsbildung. Eine Fallstudie über das Verhältnis von religiösem und sozialem Wandel in der Frühneuzeit am Beispiel der Grafschaft Lippe*, Gütersloh, 1981: Quellen und Forschungen zur Reformationsgeschichte, XLVIII; B. Vogler, «La politique scolaire entre Rhin et Moselle, l'exemple du duché de Deux-Ponts 1555-1619», *Francia*, III, 1975, pp. 236-320, y IV, 1976, pp. 287-364; e *idem*, *Le monde germanique et helvétique à l'époque des Réformes, 1517-1618*, II, París, 1981. Sobre la Fórmula de Concordia, véanse los artículos del cuatricentenario editados por L. W. Spitz en *Sixteenth-century Journal*, VIII, n.º 4 (1977). Los mejores estudios de la economía son los de H. Kellenbenz, en H. Aubin y W. Zorn, eds., *Handbuch der deutschen Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte*, I, Stuttgart, 1971, pp. 389-494, y, desde un punto de vista socialista, el de J. Kuczynski, *Geschichte des Alltags des deutschen Volkes. I: 1600-50*, Berlín Este, 1981. Véase también I. Bog, «Wachstumsprobleme der oberdeutschen Wirtschaft 1540-1618», en F. Lütge, ed., *Wirtschaftliche und soziale Probleme der gewerblichen Entwicklung im 15.-16. und 19. Jahrhundert*, Stuttgart, 1968, pp. 44-89, y R. Endres, «Zur wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Lage in Franken vor dem dreissigjährigen Krieg», *Jahrbuch für fränkische Landesforschung*, XXVIII (1968), pp. 5-52.

Entre los estudios de las asambleas representativas, el que goza de mayor aceptación (cuando menos entre los lectores ingleses) es el de F. L. Carsten, *Princes and Parliaments in Germany from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century*, Oxford, 1959. No obstante, aunque contiene una cantidad ingente de datos de gran interés y gran número de generalizaciones de gran claridad, la obra de Carsten ha sido objeto de críticas por parte de determinados historiadores alemanes, que la consideran demasiado anglocéntrica. Esas críticas afirman que el autor exagera las similitudes entre las asambleas alemanas y el Parlamento inglés. Véase, por ejemplo, P. Herde, «Deutsche Landstände und englisches Parliament», *Historisches Jahrbuch*, LXXX (1966), pp. 286-297. P. Blickle ofrece una visión muy diferente de las asambleas representativas del sur de Alemania, resaltando su estructura auténticamente democrática (tan diferente del modelo inglés), en *Landschaften im alten Reich. Die staatlichen Funktionen des gemeinen Mannes in Oberdeutschland*, Munich, 1973. Para otras referencias sobre la Dieta Imperial y los Círculos, véanse las notas 26 y 28 de las pp. 36-37 y 39, *supra*. Sobre las asambleas de los territorios austriacos, hay dos largos artículos de importancia vital: sobre sus orígenes, véase M. Mitterauer, «Ständegliederung und Ländertypen», en E. Bruckmüller *et al.*, eds., *Herrschaftsstruktur und Ständebildung II. Beiträge zur Typologie der Österreichischen Länder aus ihren mittelalterlichen Grundlagen*, Munich, 1973, pp. 115-203; sobre las escuelas protestantes, fundadas por las asambleas y símbolo de su independencia, véase G. Heiss, «Konfession, Politik und Erziehung, Die Landschaftsschulen in der nieder- und innerösterreichischen Ländern vor dem dreissigjährigen Krieg», en G. Klingenstein *et al.*, eds., *Bildung, Politik und Gesellschaft*, Viena, 1978, pp. 13-63.

También los grupos políticos al margen de los territorios de los Habs-

burgo que tuvieron algo que ver en los acontecimientos de Bohemia con anterioridad a 1618 han sido objeto de la atención de los especialistas. Los archivos de la Unión y de la Liga se hallan en la actualidad en las diferentes secciones del Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv en Munich, donde se conservan los archivos del período de preguerra del Palatinado renano, así como los del ducado de Baviera. Por lo que hace al período 1599-1613, la mayor parte del contenido de esos archivos, junto con mucha otra documentación procedente de otras fuentes, se publicó en la serie *Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte des Dreissigjährigen Krieges*, editada por Moriz Ritter *et al.*, vols. I-XII, Munich, 1870-1978.

El mejor estudio en lengua inglesa sobre la política del Palatinado es el breve esbozo de C. P. Clasen, *The Palatinate in European History 1559-1660*, Londres, 1963. Hay muchos otros estudios en alemán, en especial, V. Press, *Calvinismus und Territorialstaat: Regierung und Zentralbehörden der Kurpfalz 1559-1619*, Stuttgart, 1970: Kieler historische Studien, VII; *idem*, «Die Grundlagen der kurpfälzischen Herrschaft in der Oberpfalz 1499-1621», *Verhandlungen des historischen Vereins für Oberpfalz und Regensburg*, CXVII, 1977, pp. 31-67, y F. H. Schubert, *Ludwig Camerarius, 1573-1651: Eine Biographie*, Kallmünz, 1955: Münchener historische Studien: Abteilung Neuere Geschichte, I. No existe una biografía moderna de Anhalt, pero sus contactos con los protestantes de la Europa central han sido brevemente analizados por A. A. van Schelven en «Der Generalstab des politischen Calvinismus in Zentraleuropa zu Beginn des dreissigjährigen Krieges», *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte*, XXXVI (1939), pp. 117-141. No existe un estudio reciente sobre la Unión, pero varios de sus miembros han sido objeto de excelentes monografías. Véase, especialmente, H. G. Herold, *Markgraf Joachim-Ernst von Brandenburg-Ansbach als Reichsfürst*, Schriftenreihe der Historischen Kommission bei der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, X, Gotinga, 1973; E. Kossol, *Die Reichspolitik des Pfalzgrafen Philipp Ludwig von Neuburg (1547-1614)*, Schriftenreihe der Historischen Kommission bei der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, XIV, Gotinga, 1976, y E. L. Sticht, *Markgraf Christian von Brandenburg-Kulmbach und das Oberland der Markgrafschaft im dreissigjährigen Krieg (1618-1635)*, Neuhaus-an-der-Eger, 1964.

Hay dos estudios excelentes de Baviera y la Liga: F. Neuer-Landfried, *Die Katholische Liga: Gründung, Neugründung und Organisation eines Sonderbundes, 1608-1620*, Münchener historische Studien, Abteilung bayerische Geschichte, IX, Kallmünz, 1968, y H. Altmann, *Die Reichspolitik Maximilians von Bayern, 1613-1618*, Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte des dreissigjährigen Krieges, neue Folge, XII, Munich, 1978. Otros volúmenes de esta serie llevan el título general *Die Politik Maximilians I. von Bayern und seiner Verbündeten 1618-1651*. El volumen I (en dos

partes, publicado en Munich, 1966-1970) abarca el período 1618-1622. El volumen II abarca los años 1623-1635 en 10 partes, no todas las cuales pueden consultarse todavía: partes 1-3 (publicadas en Leipzig, 1907, 1918 y 1942) y 4-5 (publicadas en Munich, 1948 y 1964) llegan hasta 1630. La parte 8 (1632-1633) apareció en 1981 y la parte 9 (para 1634-1635) en 1986. El volumen III, que abarca el período 1635-1648, probablemente no llegará a publicarse, ya que todo el material pertinente ha de aparecer en la subsección bávara del *Acta Pacis Westphalicae* (véase p. 396, *infra*).

Paradójicamente, no existe una biografía bien conseguida del director de la Liga, aunque la documentación al respecto es muy voluminosa, siendo A. Kraus el que mejor estudia esa documentación en «Kurfürst Maximilian I von Bayern. Das neue Bild eines grossen Fürsten», *Historisches Jahrbuch*, XCVII/XCVIII (1978), pp. 505-526, donde se revisa toda la bibliografía aparecida desde 1963. Sobre la figura de Maximiliano antes de la guerra, véase el completo estudio de H. Dollinger: *Studien zur Finanzreform Maximilians I. von Bayern in den Jahren 1598-1618. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Frühabsolutismus*, Schriftenreihe der historischen Kommission bei der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, VIII, Gotinga, 1968. Es recomendable también la lectura de H. Dotterweich, *Der junge Maximilian. Jugend und Erziehung des bayerischen Herzogs und späteren Kurfürsten Maximilian I. von 1573 bis 1593*, Munich, 1962: un estudio muy atractivo basado en los documentos de la casa ducal y en los libros de ejercicios del joven duque, y K. Pfister, *Kurfürst Maximilian von Bayern und sein Jahrhundert*, Munich, 1948: insuficientemente riguroso pero lleno de interesantes anécdotas. Tal vez el mejor retrato, y desde luego el más actualizado, es el que aparece en un catálogo de una gran exposición organizada en 1980 en la Munich *Residenz*: H. Glaser, ed., *Wittelsbach und Bayern. II. Um Glauben und Reich: Kurfürst Maximilian I. 1. Beiträge zur bayerischen Geschichte und Kunst 1573-1657* y 2. *Katalog der Ausstellung*, Munich y Zurich, 1980. Otros estudios sobre el tema de Maximiliano y las artes aparecieron en H. Glaser, ed., *Quellen und Studien zur Kunstpolitik der Wittelsbacher vom 16. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert*, Munich y Zurich, 1980.

Por lo que respecta a la reacción de otras potencias europeas ante los acontecimientos en el Imperio, véase, en el caso de Inglaterra, S. L. Adams, «The Protestant Cause: Relations with the west European Calvinist communities as a political issue in England, 1585-1630», Oxford University, tesis doctoral, 1973, y J. V. Polichenski, *Anglie a Bílá Hora*, Praga, 1949; en el caso de Francia: R. Mousnier, *The Assassination of Henry IV* (ed. inglesa, Londres, 1973) y J. M. Hayden, «Continuity in the France of Henry IV and Louis XIII. French foreign policy, 1598-1615», *Journal of Modern History*, XLV (1973), pp. 1-23; en el caso de las Provincias Unidas: J. den Tex, *Oldenbarnevelt* (ed. ingl., 2 vols., Cambridge, 1973),

y A. Th. van Dursen, *Honni Soit qui Mal y Pense? De Republiek tussen de Mogendheden (1610-1612)*, Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afdeling Letterkunde, N. S., XXVIII/i, Amsterdam, 1965. En el caso de España, véase: P. Brightwell, «Spain and Bohemia: the decision to intervene, 1619», *European Studies Review*, XII (1982), pp. 117-141; *idem*, «Spain, Bohemia and Europe 1619-21», *loc. cit.*, pp. 371-399; y la monografía de Straub que citamos en esta misma página.

C. El decenio de 1620

Hay un estudio breve de la revuelta de Bohemia de H. Sturmberger, *Aufstand in Böhmen. Der Beginn des dreissigjährigen Krieges*, Munich y Viena, 1959; pero la obra de A. Gindely, *Geschichte des dreissigjährigen Krieges*, 4 vols., Praga, 1869-1880, sigue siendo indispensable para la «fase bohemia» de la guerra. Sobre la reacción de Fernando ante la crisis, aparte de las obras de Franzl y Bireley (*supra*), se encontrará mucha más información en P. Broucek, «Feldmarschall Bucquoy als Armeekommandant, 1618 bis 1620», en *Der dreissigjährige Krieg: Beiträge zu seiner Geschichte*, Schriften des Heeresgeschichtlichen Museums, VII, Viena, 1976, pp. 25-57, y H. Kretschmer *Sturmpetition und Blockade Wiens im Jahre 1619*, Militärhistorische Schriftenreihe, XXXVIII, Viena, 1978. A Dieter Albrecht se debe un extraordinario estudio de la política papal y bávara frente a la revuelta. Véanse sus tres estudios: «Zur Finanzierung des dreissigjährigen Krieges», *Zeitschrift für bayerischen Landesgeschichte*, XIX (1956), pp. 534-567; *Die deutsche Politik Papst Gregors XV*, Schriftenreihe zur bayerischen Landesgeschichte, LIII, Munich, 1956, y **Die auswärtige Politik Maximilians von Bayern, 1618-1635*, Schriftenreihe der historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, VI, Gotinga, 1962.

Sobre la posición de España, véase P. Brightwell, «The Spanish origins of the Thirty Years' war», *European Studies Review*, IX (1979), pp. 409-431 (y otros dos artículos citados *supra*) y el importante estudio de E. Straub, *Pax et imperium. Spaniens Kampf um seine Friedensordnung in Europa zwischen 1617 und 1635*, Rechts- und staatswissenschaftliche Veröffentlichungen der Görres-Gesellschaft, Neue Folge, XXXI, Paderborn, 1980. Hay que decir, sin embargo, que hay algunas curiosas lagunas en la lista de autoridades de Straub y que se han dirigido críticas a su interpretación por olvidar el papel de Baviera y de Austria (véase el comentario crítico de H. Altmann, en *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte*, XLV, 1982, pp. 723-72). Una de las obras que no cita Straub es el estudio de Alcalá Zamora y Queipo de Llano, *España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte (1618-1639). La última ofensiva europea de los Austrias madrileños*, Barcelona, 1975, que coincide en gran parte con los capítulos pertinentes de B. Chudoba, *Spain and the Empire 1519-1643*, Chicago, 1952, y con secciones importantes de R. Ródenas Vilar, *La política europea de España durante la Guerra de los Treinta Años, 1624-1630*, Madrid, 1967. No obstante, tanto Alcalá Zamora como el autor del presente libro y muchos otros especialistas en el tema, han sido objeto de las críticas de *J. I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World 1606-1661*, Oxford, 1982, por no prestar la atención suficiente a la guerra en los Países Bajos. Por su parte, Israel no integra los acontecimientos de los Países Bajos con los acontecimientos de Alemania. Sin duda, no hay nadie perfecto.

Sobre el «designio Báltico» tiene gran valor la obra de A. E. Sokol, *Das habsburgische Admiralitätswerk des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts*, Biblos-Schriften, LXXXIX, Viena, 1976: H. Günter, *Die Habsburger-Liga 1625-1635. Briefe und Akten aus dem General-Archiv zu Simancas*, Berlín, 1908, reimpresión de 1965, nos ofrece una útil colección de documentos españoles, junto con una larga introducción, sobre la negociación de las dos ramas de la Casa de Austria durante este período. El análisis más reciente de toda esta cuestión se encuentra en el equilibrado y extraordinariamente documentado artículo de M. E. H. N. Mout, «"Holendische propositiones". Een Habsburgs plan tot vernietigung van handel, visserij en scheepvaart der Republiek (ca 1625)», *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis*, XCV (1982), pp. 345-362. Sobre la corte de España, donde se tomaron tantas decisiones cruciales, véase Jonathan Brown y J. H. Elliott, *A Palace for a King. The Buen Retiro and the Court of Philip IV*, Londres y New Haven, 1980. En la actualidad, Elliott acaba de publicar dos estudios importantes: *Richelieu and Olivares*, Cambridge, 1984, y *The Count Duke of Olivares. The Statesman in an age of decline*, New Haven, 1986. La política alemana del gobierno en Bruselas, que no siempre coincidía con la de Madrid, ha sido estudiada por J. Kessel, *Spanien und die geistlichen Kurstaaten am Rhein während der Regierungszeit der Infantin Isabella (1621-1633)*, Frankfurt del Main, 1979.

No existe un buen estudio del principal oponente de Fernando, el elector palatino Federico V, aunque puede obtenerse bastante información en Schubert, *Camerarius*, y Press, *Calvinismus und Territorialstaat* (véase p. 380, *supra*). Véase también J. G. Weiss, «Die Vorgeschichte des böhmischen Abenteuers Friedrichs V. von der Pfalz», *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins*, N.F. LIII (1940), pp. 383-492, y F. H. Schubert, «Die pfälzische Exilregierung im dreissigjährigen Krieg: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des politischen Protestantismus», *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins*, CII (1954), pp. 575-680.

El mejor estudio de las campañas de 1621 y 1622 en el oeste es el de

H. Wertheim, *Der Tolle Halberstädter: Herzog Christian von Braunschweig im Pfälzischen Krieg, 1621-1622*, Berlín, 1929. Sobre la campaña de 1623, véase W. Brünick, *Der Graf von Mansfeld in Ostfriesland (1623-1624)*, Abhandlungen und Vorträge zur Geschichte Ostfrieslands, XXIV, Aurich, 1957, que aporta también el retrato más convincente de Mansfeld. Sobre la ocupación del Palatinado renano, véase A. Egler, *Die Spanier in der Linkrheinischen Pfalz, 1620-32. Invasion, Verwaltung, Rekatholisierung*, Quellen und Abhandlungen zur mittelrheinischen Kirchengeschichte, XIII, Maguncia, 1971, y W. Dautermann, *Alzey im dreissigjährigen Krieg. Eine Studie über die Wirkung des dreissigjährigen Krieges in einer pfälzischen Stadt*, Historische Studien, CCCXVIII, Berlín, 1937. Finalmente, sobre el Alto Palatinado, véase K.-O. Ambronn y A. Fuchs, eds., *Die Oberpfalz wird bayerisch: die Jahre 1621 bis 1628 im Amberg und der Oberpfalz*, Ausstellungskatalog, Amberg, 1978, y J. Staber, «Die Eroberung der Oberpfalz im Jahre 1621. Nach dem Tagebuch des Johann Christoph von Preysing», *Verhandlungen des historischen Vereins für Oberpfalz und Regensburg*, CIV (1964), pp. 165-221.

Por lo que respecta a la intervención danesa, H. Gamrath y E. Ladewig Petersen, *Gyldendal's danmarkshistorie, II*, 2: *1559-1648*, Copenhague, 1980, aportan un relato de los acontecimientos y una completa bibliografía crítica, que incluye todas las obras en danés, a la que se remite a los lectores. El preludio a esa intervención —y su relación con el contexto sueco-danés— ha sido analizado muy recientemente por L. Tandrup, *Mod triumf eller tragedie. En politisk-diplomatisk studie i forloebet af den dansk-svenske magtkamp fra Kalmarkrigen til Kejserkrigen*, 2 vols., Aarhus, 1979. Véanse los comentarios críticos de S. Heiberg y K. J. V. Jespersen en *Fortid og Nutid*, XXVIII (1980), pp. 636-643, y *Historisk tidsskrift* [Dansk], LXXXI (1981), pp. 242-253, respectivamente. La obra de Tandrup coincide en gran medida con la de T. Christiansen, *Die Stellung König Christians IV. von Dänemark zu den Kriegsereignissen im deutschen Reich und zu den Plänen einer evangelischen Allianz 1618-1625*, Kiel, 1937. El estudio aún no superado (en la tradición de Ranke) de la política exterior de Cristián IV hasta 1645 es el de J. A. Fridericia, *Danmarks ydre politische Historie fra Freden i Lübeck til Freden i Kjoebenhavn*, 2 vols., Copenhague, 1876-1881; reimpreso en 1972. Sobre las finanzas públicas, véase E. Ladewig Petersen, «From Domain state to Tax state», *Scandinavian Economic History Review*, XXIII (1975), pp. 116-148, y *«Defence, war and finance: Christian IV and the Council of the Realm 1596-1629», *Scandinavian Journal of History*, VII (1982), pp. 277-313.

A menudo, se olvida el papel de Transilvania y, tras ella, de los turcos en las primeras fases de la Guerra de los Treinta Años; sin embargo, no falta material de estudio. Véase D. Angyal, «Gabriel Bethlen», *Revue Historique*, LIII (1928), pp. 19-80; J. V. Polichenski, «Bohemia, the Turk and the Christian Commonwealth, 1462-1620», *Byzantinoslavica*, XIV (1953), pp. 82-108; R. R. Heinisch, «Habsburg, die Pforte und der Böhmische Aufstand (1618-1620)», *Südostforschungen*, XXXIII (1974), páginas 125-165, y XXXIV (1975), pp. 79-124; y H. Valentinitsch, «Die Steiermark, Ungarn und die Osmanen, 1606-1662», *Zeitschrift des Historischen Vereines für Steiermark*, LXV (1974), pp. 93-128.

Para la política exterior de Inglaterra en el decenio de 1620, véase S. L. Adams, «The Protestant cause» (p. 381, *supra*) y sus artículos: «Foreign Policy and the Parliaments of 1621 and 1624», en K. Sharpe, ed., *Faction and Parliament: Essays on Early Stuart History*, Oxford, 1978, pp. 139-171, y «Spain or the Netherlands? The dilemmas of early Stuart foreign policy», en H. Tomlinson, ed., *Before the Civil War*, Londres, 1984, pp. 79-101. Véase también E. Weiss, *Die Unterstützung Friedrichs V. von der Pfalz durch Jakob I, und Karl I von England im dreissigjährigen Krieg (1618-32)*, Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für geschichtliche Landeskunde in Baden-Württenberg, serie B, XXXVII, Stuttgart, 1966, y R. Zaller, «"Interest of state": James I and the Palatinate», *Albion*, VI (1974), pp. 144-175. Los intentos de Jacobo I de mediar en el Palatinado han sido objeto de un análisis detallado por parte de A. W. White, «Suspension of Arms: Anglo-Spanish Mediation in the Thirty Years' War, 1621-1625», Tulane University, tesis doctoral, 1978. No existe un estudio moderno de la política exterior holandesa en la Guerra de los Treinta Años, pero pueden encontrarse algunos detalles de la ayuda militar a los protestantes alemanes en F. J. G. ten Raa y F. de Bas, *Het Staatsche Leger, 1573-1795. III (1609-1625)*, Breda, 1915; J. V. Polichenski, *Nizozemská politika a Bílá Hora*, Praga, 1958; J. H. Hora Siccama, *Schets van de diplomatieke betrekkingen tusschen Nederland en Brandenburg 1596-1678*, Utrecht, 1867, caps. 1 y 2, y J. G. Smit y J. Roelevink, eds., *Resolutiën der Staten-Generaal*, nieuwe reeks IV-V, La Haya, 1981-1983.

En cuanto a los otros estados intervencionistas, es la actuación de Francia la que ha sido mejor estudiada. Véase V. L. Tapié, *La politique de la France et le début de la guerre de trente ans*, París, 1934; R. Pithon, «Les débuts difficiles du Ministère de Richelieu et la crise de la Valtelline (1621-1627)», *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, LXXIV (1960), pp. 298-322, y «La Suisse, théâtre de la Guerre Froide entre la France et l'Espagne pendant la crise de la Valtelline (1621-1626)», *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte*, XIII (1963), pp. 33-53. No parece que exista un estudio totalmente satisfactorio sobre la política exterior de Richelieu. El mejor estudio de este personaje en inglés —W. F. Church, *Richelieu and Reason of State*, Princeton, 1972— es poco lo que tiene que decir sobre política exterior a partir de 1627. Tal vez la introducción más es-

clarecedora es la parte II de J. Wollenberg, *Richelieu: Staatsräson und Kircheninteresse. Zur Legitimation der Politik des Kardinalpremier*, Bielefeld, 1977. El lector encontrará muchas ideas brillantes acerca de la política exterior francesa durante todos los años de la guerra en *R. J. Bonney, *The King's Debts. Politics and Finance in France 1589-1661*, Oxford, 1981. Para algunas otras potencias interesadas en la lucha durante el decenio de 1620, véase R. Kleinman, «Charles Emanuel I of Savoy and the Bohemian election of 1619», *European Studies Review*, V, 1975, pp. 3-29; J. Krebs, *Die Politik der evangelischen Union im Jahre 1618*, Breslau, 1890-1891, y M. Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus. A History of Sweden 1611-32*, I, Londres, 1953, caps. 4-5.

Sin embargo, lo cierto es que el principal vencedor del decenio de 1620 no fue un príncipe extranjero sino el emperador, gracias a las aplastantes derrotas militares que los generales católicos infligieron a todos sus enemigos uno tras otro. Aunque es ciertamente extraño, no existe una biografía moderna de Tilly, si bien la notable sección (ilustrada) que le dedica Glaser, ed., en *Wittelsbach und Bayern* II/1, pp. 377-379, colma de alguna forma esa laguna. El estudioso serio se ve obligado a basarse en la obra del gran apologeta de Tilly, O. Klopp, *Tilly im dreissigjährigen Krieg*, 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1861; ed. revisada, Paderborn, 1891-1896. El otro gran personaje, Albrecht von Waldstein, o Wallenstein, no ha sufrido el mismo olvido: existen tal vez unas 4.000 obras referentes a este personaje en diferentes idiomas. Para los lectores ingleses, la mejor biografía que se puede consultar es la de Golo Mann, *Wallenstein, His Life Narrated*, Londres, 1976 (la edición alemana original —Frankfurt, 1971— incluye notas y una detallada bibliografía). También es útil la obra de H. Diwald, *Wallenstein: eine Biographie*, Munich, 1969, aunque su punto de vista es más germánico y no ha suscitado la misma controversia (véanse, por ejemplo, los artículos críticos favorables y opuestos a la biografía de Mann en las publicaciones *Merkur*, XXVI [1972], pp. 282-296, y *Neue Rundschau*, LXXXIII [1972], pp. 343-349). No obstante, la mayor parte de los historiadores no alemanes parecen estar de acuerdo en que ninguna de estas obras difiere gran cosa de las interpretaciones anteriores. De hecho, en muchos casos dan menos información que obras clásicas como la de Gindely, *Waldstein während seines ersten Generalats*, 2 vols., Praga, 1886, o la más reciente de A. Ernstberger, *Wallenstein als Volkswirt im Herzogtum Friedland*, Reichenberg, 1929, e *idem*, *Hans de Witte, Finanzmann Wallensteins*, Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Beiheft, XXXVIII, Wiesbaden, 1954. El estudioso de Wallenstein que quiera ser diligente, no podrá dejar de consultar las ingentes colecciones documentales mencionadas en la p. 391, *infra*. No hay ninguna obra adecuada sobre Eggenberg, pero puede encontrarse alguna información en H. von Zwiedineck-Südenhorst, *Hans Ulrich Fürst von Eggenberg*, Viena, 1880, y W. E. Heydendorff, *Die Fürsten und Freiherren zu Eggenberg und ihre Vorfahren*, Graz, 1965.

Se ha publicado gran cantidad de material sobre la historia interna de la monarquía Habsburgo después de la Montaña Blanca. Por supuesto, hay que citar el valiosísimo estudio de Evans, *The Habsburg Monarchy* (p. 377, *supra*), tras la cual tal vez el mejor punto de partida sea A. Coreth, *Pietas Austriaca. Ursprung und Entwicklung barocker Frömmigkeit in Osterreich*, Munich, 1959. Para las instituciones fundamentales de la monarquía, véase: T. Fellner y H. Kretschmayr, *Die österreichische Zentralverwaltung*, I, 2 vols., Viena, 1907; L. Gross, *Die Geschichte der deutschen Reichshofkanzlei von 1559 bis 1806*, Viena, 1933, y H. F. Schwarz, *The Imperial Privy Council in the Seventeenth Century*, Cambridge, Mass., 1943. A los acontecimientos políticos y militares de los territorios Habsburgo separados hay que aproximarse en gran medida a través de obras narrativas anticuadas. Por lo que respecta a Bohemia, T. B. Bílek, *Dehjiny konfiskací v Chechách po r. 1618*, 2 vols., Praga, 1882-1883, da todo lujo de detalles sobre las transferencias de propiedad, pero sus cifras han sido revisadas por F. L. Snider, «The restructuring of the Bohemian nobility in the seventeenth century», Universidad de California en Berkeley, tesis doctoral, 1972. La obra de A. Gindely, *Geschichte der Gegenreformation in Böhmen*, ed. T. Tupetz, Leipzig, 1894, es sólida pero incompleta. En cuanto a E. Denis, *La Bohême depuis la Montagne Blanche*, París, 1903, cuya traducción al checo realizada por J. Vanchura contiene numerosos añadidos y correcciones, es el clásico liberal rencoroso. Tal vez el mejor texto moderno es el de K. Bosl, ed., *Handbuch der Geschichte der böhmischen Länder*, II, Stuttgart, 1974. La nueva constitución se hallará en H. Jirechek, ed., *Constitutiones regni Bohemiae anno 1627 reformatae*, Praga, etc., 1888. I. Kollmann, ed., *Acta Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide res gestas Bohemicas illustrantia*, 2 vols., Praga, 1923-1954, estudia los primeros momentos de la Contrarreforma planeada; J. V. Polichenski, M. Toegel *et al.*, eds., *Documenta Bohemica Bellum Tricennale illustrantia*, 7 vols., Praga, 1971-1977, contiene un importante material desconocido hasta ahora. Para Hungría, son fundamentales los escritos de Pázmány. Se hizo una edición completa en 13 volúmenes, Budapest, 1894-1905, editándose después su correspondencia, ed. J. Hanuy, 2 vols., Budapest, 1910-1911. El último estudio del cardenal primado es el de F. Bitskey, *Humanista erudició és barokk világkép, Pázmány Péter prédikációi*, Budapest, 1979. László Nagy registra acontecimientos militares en *Bethlen Gábor a Független Magyarországért*, Budapest, 1969, y *Magyar hadsereg és hadmüvészet a harmincéves háborúban*, Budapest, 1972. A no tardar, aparecerá una síntesis en Zs. P. Pach, ed., *Magyarország története*, III (1526-1686). No existe ningún estudio satisfactorio de Esterházy. En cuanto a Austria, J. Loserth, ed., *Akten und Korrespondenzen sur Ge-*

schichte der Gegenreformation in Innerösterreich unter Karl II und Ferdinand II, 2 vols. en 3, Viena, 1898-1907, documenta el destino de los protestantes estirios. El de sus correligionarios en las restantes zonas del Imperio ha sido estudiado, desde el punto de vista católico, por B. Duhr, *Geschichte der Jesuiten in den Ländern deutscher Zunge*: vols. II.1 y II.2, Friburgo, 1913, abarcan la primera mitad del siglo XVII.

Sobre el desarrollo del absolutismo de los Habsburgo en la Alta Austria, véase sobre todo H. Sturmberger, *Adam Graf Herberstorff. Herrschaft und Freiheit im Konfessionellen Zeitalter*, Munich, 1976. Hay, asimismo, dos volúmenes en conmemoración del 350 aniversario de la revuelta de 1626, cuya temática es más amplia de la que indican sus títulos: *Der oberösterreichische Bauernkrieg 1626: Ausstellung des Landes Oberösterreich im Linzer Schloss und im Schloss zu Scharnstein*, Linz, 1976, y G. Heilingsetzer, *Der oberösterreichische Bauernkrieg 1626*, Militärhistorische Schriftenreihe, vol. XXXII, Viena, 1976. El impacto del absolutismo de los Habsburgo en la sociedad campesina de la Alta Austria ha sido estudiado por H. Rebel, *Peasant Classes. The bureaucratization of property and family relations under early Habsburg absolutism, 1511-1636*, Princeton, 1983, cap. 8. Sobre la revuelta y sumisión de la Baja Austria, véase el excelente trabajo de R. D. Chesler, «Crown, lords and God: the establishment of secular authority and the pacification of Lower Austria, 1618-48», Princeton University Press, tesis doctoral, 1979.

Finalmente, Fernando III es la Cenicienta de la investigación. Se puede consultar M. Koch, *Geschichte des deutschen Reiches unter der Regierung Ferdinands III*, 2 vols., Viena, 1865-1866, para su política alemana, y F. Stieve, en *Allgemeine deutsche Biographie*, VI, 1877, pp. 664-671, donde se encontrará una breve interpretación.

D. 1630-1635

Sobre la desastrosa guerra de Mantua, que sería el hito decisivo en el cambio de fortuna de los Habsburgo, el estudio clásico sigue siendo el de R. Quazza, *La guerra per la successione di Mantova e del Monferrato*, 2 vols., Mantua, 1926. Hay también un útil conjunto de documentos españoles en *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, LIV, y en M. Fernández Álvarez, *Don Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba y la guerra de sucesión de Mantua y del Monferrato 1627-9*, Madrid, 1955, con una larga introducción. La actitud del papa en el conflicto de Mantua ha sido examinada (independientemente) por Q. Aldea, «La neutralidad de Urbano VIII en los años decisivos de la Guerra de treinta años (1628-32)», *Hispania Sacra*, XXI (1968), pp. 155-178, y por G. Lutz, *Kardinal Giovanni Francesco Guidi di Bagno. Politik und Religion im Zeitalter Richelieus und Urbans VIII*, Bibliothek des deutschen historischen Instituts im Rom, XXXIV, Tubinga, 1971. Véase un análisis de las consecuencias económicas de la guerra en D. Sella, *Crisis and Continuity. The economy of Spanish Lombardy in the seventeenth century*, Cambridge, Mass., 1979.

Para los acontecimientos de Ratisbona del verano de 1630 hay que consultar las obras escritas o editadas por Dieter Albrecht: *Die auswärtige Politik Maximilians* (p. 382, *supra*); *Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte des dreissigjährigen Krieges, neue Folge: die Politik Maximilians I von Bayern und seiner Verbündeten 1618-51*, II, parte 5, Munich, 1964, documento 170 (315 páginas de documentos referentes a la Reunión electoral); *Richelieu, Gustav Adolf und das Reich*, Munich y Viena, 1959, y «Der Regensburger Kurfürstentag 1630 und die Entlassung Wallensteins», en D. Albrecht, ed., *Regensburg. Stadt der Reichstage*, Ratisbona, 1980, pp. 51-71. Véase también el estudio antiguo de O. Heyne, *Der Kurfürstentag zu Regensburg von 1630*, Berlín, 1866. Se encontrará un punto de vista más moderno en R. Bireley, S.J., *Maximilian von Bayern, Adam Contzen SJ., und die Gegenreformation in Deutschland 1624-35*, Schriftenreihe der Historischen Kommission bei der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, XIII, Gotinga, 1975, e *idem*, *Religion and Politics in the Age of the Counter-Revolution*, cap. 6. Sobre la política de los electores protestantes después de Ratisbona, véase B. Nischan, «Reformed Irenicism and the Leipzig colloquy of 1631», *Central European History*, IX (1976), pp. 3-26, y «Brandenburg's Reformed Räte and the Leipzig Manifesto of 1631», *Journal of Religious History*, X (1979), pp. 365-380.

Los trabajos de Michael Roberts constituyen el punto de partida indispensable —y, para muchos lectores ingleses, muchas veces el punto de llegada— para el estudio de la intervención sueca en la guerra. Ante todo hay que citar su importante biografía del monarca sueco, cuyo segundo volumen estudia la guerra de Alemania: *M. Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus: a history of Sweden 1611-1632*, 2 vols., Londres, 1953-1958; edición abreviada en un solo volumen, *Gustavus Adolphus and the Rise of Sweden*, Londres, 1973. Otros temas se desarrollan en M. Roberts, *Essays in Swedish History*, Londres, 1967, especialmente en el capítulo 6 («The political objectives of Gustavus Adolphus in Germany, 1630-32») y muchos documentos traducidos están recogidos en la obra del mismo autor, *Sweden as a Great Power 1611-1697: government, society, foreign policy*, Londres, 1968. En el último trabajo de Roberts, **The Swedish Imperial Experience 1560-1718*, Cambridge, 1979, se reestudian muchos temas y se analizan algunos puntos nuevos.

Muy poco más es lo que se ha publicado sobre este tema en inglés, pero naturalmente, los lectores que conocen la lengua sueca tienen mucho más donde elegir. Respecto al tema de la guerra propiamente, ha de ocu-

par un lugar de honor el estudio definitivo realizado por el Estado Mayor del ejército sueco: *Sveriges Krig 1611-1632*, 8 vols., Estocolmo, 1936-1939 (los vols. 3-6 estudian la guerra en Alemania en el período 1629-1632). Es difícil que esta obra, con sus mapas, cuadros y diagramas, y con un texto basado en documentos consultados en los archivos de toda Europa, sea alguna vez superada. Un útil estudio ilustrado de las fortificaciones de Suecia es el de L. W. Munthe, *Kongliga Fortifikationens Historia I*, Estocolmo, 1902 (que abarca hasta 1641), y II, Estocolmo, 1904 (que cubre el período 1641-1676). En los últimos años, la atención de los historiadores militares suecos se ha centrado en la economía del Imperio durante la guerra. Véase por ejemplo: H. Landberg, L. Ekholm, R. Nordlund y S. A. Nilsson, *Det konintentala krigets ekonomi. Studier i krigsfinansiering under Svensk Stormaktstid*, Estocolmo, 1971; S. A. Lundkvist, «Svensk Krigsfinansiering 1630-5», *Historisk Tidskrift [Svensk]*, LXXXVI (1966), pp. 377-421; L. Ekholm, *Svensk krigsfinansiering*, Studia historia Upsaliensia, LVI, Upsala, 1974; R. Nordlund, «Kontribution eller satisfaktion. Pommern och de Svenska krigsfinanserna, 1633», *Historisk Tidsskrift [Svensk]*, XCIV (1974), pp. 321-402, e *idem, Krig paa avveckling. Sverige och tyska kriget 1633*, Upsala, 1974.

Para la política de Suecia en el Imperio, siguen siendo fundamentales dos estudios ya antiguos de Johannes Kretzschmar: «Die Allianz-Verhandlungen Gustav Adolfs mit Kurbrandenburg in Mai und Juni 1631», *Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte*, XVII (1904), pp. 341-382, y *Gustav Adolfs Pläne und Ziele in Deutschland und die Herzöge zu Braunschweig und Lüneburg*, Hannover y Leipzig, 1904. Sobre las relaciones de Suecia con Hesse, véase W. Keim, «Landgraf Wilhelm V von Hessen-Kassel vom Regierungsantritt 1627 bis zum Abschluss des Bündnisses mit Gustav Adolf 1631», *Hessisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte*, XII (1962), pp. 130-210, y XIII (1963), pp. 141-222. No existe ningún estudio similar del matrimonio forzoso impuesto por Suecia a la Sajonia electoral, aunque las razones que se utilizaron para convencer a Juan Jorge de que invadiera Bohemia en 1631 se analizan en M. Toegel, «Prríchiny saského vpádu do Chech v roce 1631», *Cheskoslovencki chasopis historicki*, XXI (1973), pp. 553-581 (con un sumario en alemán). Una nueva biografía del monarca publicada en Alemania presta cierta atención a estas cuestiones: G. Barudio, *Gustav Adolf der Grosse. Eine politische Biographie*, Frankfurt, 1982. La política sueca en Alemania después de la muerte del rey ha sido espléndidamente analizada por M. Roberts, *«Oxenstierna in Germany, 1633-1636», *Scandia*, XLVIII (1982), pp. 61-105. Por su parte, *S. Goetze, *Die Politik des schwedischen Reichskanzlers Axel Oxenstierna gegenüber Kaiser und Reich*, Kiel, 1971, realiza un avance importante respecto al punto de vista tradicional representado por J. Kretzschmar, *Der Heilbronner Bund 1632-5*, 3 vols., Lübeck, 1922,

y A. Kuesel, *Der Heilbronner Convent. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des dreissigjährigen Krieges*, Halle, 1878, aunque lo cierto es que estas dos obras más antiguas contienen un material que no es posible encontrar en ninguna otra parte. Finalmente, para la administración sueca de sus conquistas, véase C. Deinert, *Die schwedische Epoche in Franken von 1631-5*, Wurzburgo, 1966, y H. D. Müller, *Der schwedische Staat in Mainz 1631-1636. Einnahmen, Verwaltung, Absichten, Restitution*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Stadt Mainz, XXIV, Maguncia, 1979. Véanse también las fuentes indicadas en las pp. 393-394, *infra*.

Lo que omiten todas estas obras admirables y detalladas es el carisma de los principales protagonistas: ni Gustavo Adolfo ni Oxenstierna aparecen en las páginas publicadas como la figura sobrehumana que veían en ellos los contemporáneos. Cuando menos por lo que respecta al rey, este atractivo popular es visible en los relatos elogiosos de sus acciones que aparecen en todos los panfletos y periódicos protestantes del período 1630-1632 y, más aún, en los «Gustaviana», los innumerables utensilios fabricados con la efigie del rey. Estatuillas, vasos ceremoniales, medallones, retratos e incluso vidrieras se utilizaban como propaganda. Hay muestras de ellos en la mayor parte de los museos y galerías de la Europa protestante.

Mucho menos satisfactoria es la situación por lo que hace al principal enemigo de Suecia en esos años, Wallenstein. Las biografías recientes de Mann y Diwald (p. 386, *supra*) no cubren de forma satisfactoria los años de su segundo mandato como general. Desde luego, no pueden sustituir las masivas colecciones documentales y estudios realizados hace dos o tres generaciones. Las más importantes, por orden alfabético, son las siguientes: A. Gaedeke, *Wallensteins Verhandlungen mit den Schweden und Sachsen 1631-4. Mit Akten und Urkunden aus dem Königlich Sächsischen Hauptstaatsarchiv zu Dresden*, Frankfurt, 1885; H. Hallwich: *Wallensteins Ende, Ungedruckte Briefe und Akten*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1879; *idem, Fünf Bücher Geschichte Wallensteins*, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1910, e *idem, Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte Wallensteins 1630-34*, 4 vols., Fontes Rerum Austriacarum, sección II, vols. LXIII-LXVI, Viena, 1912; K. G. Helbig, *Der Kaiser Ferdinand und der Herzog von Friedland während des Winters 1633-4*, Dresde, 1852; G. Irmer, *Die Verhandlungen Schwedens und seiner Verbündeten mit Wallenstein und dem Kaiser 1631-4*, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1888-1889; J. Pekarr, *Wallenstein 1630-1634. Tragödie einer Verschwörung*, 2 vols., Berlín, 1937; ed. original en checo, 1895 [sobre la obra de Pekarr, véase la recensión informativa de W. Goetz, «Wallenstein und Kurfürst Maximilian von Bayern», *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte*, XI, 1938, pp. 106-120], y Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, *Wallensteins Ende*, Salzburgo, 1952². Estas ingentes compilaciones de documentos y comentarios ilustran, mejor que cualquier obra posterior, las

negociaciones extraordinariamente complejas en las que estaba embarcado el general. En consecuencia, explican en gran parte el «misterio» de Wallenstein y el «problema Wallenstein». Debemos recomendar también otros tres trabajos de H. Hallwich —*Heinrich Matthias Thurn als Zeuge im Prozess Wallensteins*, Leipzig, 1883; *Gestalten am Wallensteins Lager. I. Johann Merode* y II. *Johann Aldringer*, Leipzig, 1884-1885— y una colección de cartas importantes de los archivos de Moravia: P. von Chlumecky, ed., *Die Regesten der Archive im Markgrafthume Mähren. I... Briefen Kaiser Ferdinands des Zweiten, Albrechts von Waldstein, und Romboalds Grafen Collalto* (dos partes, con paginación separada, encuadernadas en un solo volumen), Brünn, 1856.

La única aportación importante de los últimos años ha sido la del investigador finlandés *P. Suvanto: *Wallenstein und seine Anhänger am Wiener Hof zur Zeit des Zweiten Generalats 1631-4*, Helsinki, 1963, y **Die deutsche Politik Oxenstiernas und Wallensteins*, Studia historica, IX, Helsinki, 1979. Algunas de las afirmaciones más polémicas del primer estudio fueron corroboradas (aunque no sin críticas), basándose en otras fuentes documentales, por G. Lutz, «Wallenstein, Ferdinand II. und der Wiener Hof. Bemerkungen zu einem erneuten Beitrag zur alten Wallensteinfrage», *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken*, XLVIII (1968), pp. 207-243. No obstante, se mencionan otras fuentes en la nota 19 de las pp. 146-147, *supra*.

Otras dos potencias se vieron íntimamente implicadas en esta fase de la guerra: España y Hesse-Kassel. Sobre la primera, véase A. van der Essen, *Le Cardinal-Infant et la politique européenne de l'Espagne, 1609-1641*, I, Lovaina, 1944; *idem*, «Le rôle du Cardinal-Infant dans la politique espagnole du XVII[e] siècle», *Revista de la Universidad de Madrid*, III (1954), pp. 357-383, y R. A. Stradling, *Europe and the Decline of Spain. A study of the Spanish system 1580-1720*, Londres, 1981, caps. 2 y 3. La guerra en Hesse ha sido estudiada por R. Altmann, *Landgraf Wilhelm V von Hessen-Kassel im Kampf gegen Kaiser und Katholizismus*, Marburgo, 1938, y L. van Tongerloo, «Beziehungen zwischen Hessen-Kassel und den Vereinigten Niederlanden während des dreissigjährigen Krieges», *Hessisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte*, XIV (1964), pp. 199-270.

El papel fundamental de Hesse-Darmstadt en la firma de la paz de Praga entre el emperador y la mayor parte de sus súbditos luteranos ha sido objeto de un agudo análisis de K. H. Frohnweiler, «Die Friedenspolitik Landgraf Georgs I. von Hessen-Darmstadt in den Jahren 1630-5», *Archiv für hessische Geschichte und Altertumskunde*, nueva serie, XXIX (1964), pp. 1-185. Sobre las negociaciones que desembocaron en la paz de Praga, véase Bireley, *Religion and Politics*, cap. 11, y *K. Repgen, *Die römische Kurie und der westfälische Friede. I.i Papst, Kaiser und Reich 1521-1644*, Tubinga, 1962, pp. 329-388, y los primeros capítulos de *F. Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden*, Münster, 1977[4]. El texto de la paz ha sido estudiado en profundidad por K. Bierther, «Zur Edition von Quellen zum Prager Frieden vom 30. Mai 1635», en K. Repgen, ed., *Forschungen und Quellen zur Geschichte des Dreissigjährigen Krieges*, Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der neueren Geschichte, XII, Münster, 1981, pp. 1-31. Sus consecuencias militares han sido bien estudiadas por H. Haan, «Kaiser Ferdinad II. und das Problem des Reichabsolutismus. Die Prager Heeresreform von 1635», en H. U. Rudolf, ed., *Der Dreissigjährige Krieg. Perspektiven und Strukturen*, Darmstadt, 1977, pp. 208-264.

E. 1635-1641

Las dos grandes convenciones reunidas en Alemania durante este período para solucionar las divisiones en Alemania han sido objeto de un meticuloso estudio: H. Haan, *Der Regensburger Kurfürstentag von 1636/1637*, Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der neueren Geschichte, III, Münster, 1967, y K. Bierther, *Der Regensburger Reichstag von 1640/1641*, Kallmünz, 1971. En relación con la Reunión electoral de 1636 hay un buen estudio de la embajada inglesa encabezada por Thomas, conde de Arundel, que reproduce «True Relation» de William Crowne y muchos de los grabados de Wenceslas Hollar: F. Springell, *Connoisseur and Diplomat: the earl of Arundel's embassy to Germany in 1636*, Londres, 1963.

La correspondencia de Oxenstierna es la fuente más importante para el estudio de este período y, desde 1888, gran parte de ella ha sido publicada en dos series por la Real Academia Sueca de las Letras, la Historia y Antigüedades: *Axel Oxenstiernas skrifter och brevvexling*, 1.ª serie (que contiene la correspondencia escrita por el canciller hasta 1636), 15 vols.; y 2.ª serie (que contiene la correspondencia que recibió el canciller ordenada por autores y no cronológicamente), 12 vols. Ambas series están aún en curso de publicación. La actitud de los regentes y del Consejo de Estado ante la guerra está documentada en *Svenska riksraadets protokoll (Handlingar rörande Skandinaviens Historia)*, 3.ª serie, III- VIII, Estocolmo, 1885-1888, que reproduce las actas del Consejo, y en *Handlingar rörande Skandinaviens Historia*, 1.ª serie, XXIV-XXX y XXXII-XXXVIII, Estocolmo, 1842-1857, que reproduce las cartas e instrucciones de los regentes y del Consejo a Oxenstierna. Los tratados de Suecia con las potencias extranjeras, así como destacados documentos relacionados con ellos, han sido editados en Carl Hallendorff, ed., *Sverges Traktater med främmande magter jemte andra hit hörande handlingar, V. 2 (1632-1645)*, Estocolmo, 1909. Sobre las relaciones franco-suecas, véase Erik

Falk, *Sverige och Frankrite 1632-4*, Estocolmo, 1911; Sverker Arnoldsson, *Svensk-fransk krigs- och fredspolitik i Tyskland 1634-6*, Göteborg, 1937; Sune Lundgren, *Johan Adler Salvius. Problem kring freden, krigseconomien och maktkampen*, Lund, 1945; L. Tingsten, *Huvuddragen av Sveriges Politik och Krigföring i Tyskland efter Gustav II Adolfs död till och med sommaren 1635*, Estocolmo, 1930; *idem*, *Fäldmarskalkarna Johan Baner och Lennart Torstensson saasom härförare*, Estocolmo, 1932, y B. Steckzén, *Johan Baner*, Estocolmo, 1939.

El estudio general de Pagès, *The Thirty Years' War*, es especialmente sólido en los temas de Francia y algunos aspectos importantes han sido tratados más extensamente por el mismo autor en «Autour du "grand orage". Richelieu et Marillac. Deux Politiques», *Revue Historique*, CLXXIX (1937), pp. 63-97. Este estudio, aunque es fundamentalmente una revisión de las relaciones de Richelieu con sus críticos en el interior de Francia, incluye observaciones de enorme interés sobre la importancia de la obtención del Pinerolo. Véanse también las dos obras generales sobre este período, de R. J. Bonney: *Political Change in France under Richelieu and Mazarin 1624-1661*, Oxford, 1978, y *The King's Debts* (p. 386, *supra*). El estudio de *D. P. O'Connell, «A cause célèbre in the history of treaty making. The refusal to ratify the peace treaty of Regensburg in 1630», *British Yearbook of International Law*, XLII (1967), pp. 71-90, es un importante análisis de un incidente crucial en el enfrentamiento de Francia con el emperador, que hay que completar con los comentarios de Pagès sobre la situación doméstica. Respecto a la política francesa en Alsacia, el lector debe consultar ante todo la obra de G. Livet, *L'intendance d'Alsace sous Louis XIV, 1648-1715*, Estrasburgo y París,1956: obra difícil de leer y que se centra en un período distinto del que estamos estudiando. No obstante, en el libro I hay un excelente análisis de las contradicciones de la «protección» francesa. No ha quedado totalmente superado por dos estudios más recientes: W. H. Stein, *Protection royale. Eine Untersuchung zu den Protektionsverhältnissen im Elsass zur Zeit Richelieus. 1622-1643*, Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der neueren Geschichte, IX, Münster, 1978, y R. Oberlé, *La République du Mulhouse pendant la guerre de trente ans*, París, 1965. El interés de Suiza en la zona ha sido estudiado por R. Stritmatter, *Die Stadt Basel während des dreissigjährigen Krieges. Politik, Wirtschaft, Finanzen*, Berna, Frankfurt y Las Vegas, 1977. Sobre la política de los Habsburgo en Alsacia, véase el completo estudio de W. E. Heydendorff, «Vorderösterreich im dreissigjährigen Krieg. Der Verlust der Vorlande am Rhein und die Versuche zu deren Rückgewinnung», *Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs*, XII (1959), pp. 74-142, y XIII (1960), pp. 107-194.

La política de Francia en el curso inferior del Rin también ha sido ampliamente estudiada. Véase, sobre todo, H. Weber, *Frankreich, Kurtrier, der Rhein und das Reich, 1623-35*, Bonn, 1969, obra que ha sido resumida por el mismo autor en su artículo *«Richelieu et le Rhin», *Revue Historique*, CCXXXIX (1968), pp. 265-280. El interesante artículo de R. Pillorget, «Louis XIV and the electorate of Trier, 1652-76», en R. M. Hatton, ed., *Louis XIV and Europe*, Londres, 1976, pp. 115-132, contiene también comentarios sobre los años 1640. Sobre la devastación producida por la guerra en Borgoña a partir de 1635, véase el estudio clásico de G. Roupnel, *La ville et la campagne au 17e siècle. Étude sur les populations du pays dijonnais*, París, 1955[2]; para la devastación de Lorena, véase S. Gaber, *La Lorraine meurtrie: les malheurs de la Guerre de Trente Ans*, Nancy, 1979.

F. 1642-1650

La obra más sobresaliente sobre la paz que puso fin al conflicto es la de Dickmann, *Der Westfälische Frieden*. A M. Heckel se debe un útil estudio de este libro, en el que, al tiempo que reconoce su carácter de obra definitiva, hace algunas observaciones críticas: «Zur Historiographie des Westfälischen Friedens. Die Bedeutung des Werkes von Fritz Dickmann für die deutsche Verfassungs- und Kirchenrechtsgeschichte», *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Kanonistische Abteilung*, LVII (1971), pp. 322-335. Las negociaciones simultáneas en Münster sobre la paz entre España y la República de Holanda han sido bien estudiadas por J. J. Poelhekke, *De vrede van Munster*, La Haya, 1948, e Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, cap. 6.

Los estudios de Konrad Repgen de Bonn, y de sus discípulos, nos permiten comprender cada vez mejor la laberíntica actividad diplomática que se desarrolló durante los últimos cinco años de la guerra. Hay que hacer mención especial del estudio de Repgen sobre la política papal para la consecución de un acuerdo (aunque termina en 1644) —véase pp. 392-393, *supra*— y su artículo «Uber den Zusammenhang von Verhandlungstechnik und Vertragsbegriffen. Die kaiserlichen Elsass-Angebote vom 28. März und 14. April 1646 an Frankreich», en A. Besch, ed., *Die Stadt in der europäischen Geschichte, Festschrift Edith Ennen*, Bonn, 1972, pp. 638-666. También son de destacar los estudios de los discípulos de Repgen, publicados en la serie *Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der neueren Geschichte*. Hay que mencionar especialmente el trabajo de *F. Wolff, *Corpus Evangelicorum und Corpus Catholicorum auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongress. Die Einfügung der konfessionellen Ständeverbindungen in die Reichsverfassung*, Münster, 1966 (vol. II de la serie); W. Becker, *Der Kurfürstenrat. Grundzüge seiner Entwicklung in der*

Reichsverfassung und seiner Stellung auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongress, Münster, 1973 (vol. V); R. Philippe, *Württemberg und der Westfälische Friede*, Münster, 1976 (vol. VIII) y *K. Ruppert, *Die kaiserliche Politik auf dem Westfälischen Friedenskongress (1643-8)*, Münster, 1979 (vol. X). Repgen es también el editor general de la serie *Acta Pacis Westphalicae*, en proceso de publicación. Hay tres series: «Instrucciones» (1 vol. publicado, teniendo que aparecer otros dos); «Correspondencia» (6 vols. publicados y 18 más previstos) y «Protocolos, negociaciones, diarios y varios» (4 vols. publicados y 14 o más en preparación o anunciados).

Algunos pensarán que los trabajos que hemos citado sobre el tema son suficientes. Ahora bien, la conferencia que duró cinco años, y a la que asistieron representantes de 194 estados diferentes, ha dejado más huellas documentales que prácticamente ningún otro fenómeno comparable. En consecuencia, los historiadores se han sentido atraídos por este tema como las moscas. Sobre Polonia y la paz, véase J. Leszozynski, *Wladislaw IV a Slask w latach 1644-8*, Wroclaw, 1969; sobre Brandemburgo, véase E. Opgenoorth, *Friedrich Wilhelm: der grosse Kurfürst von Brandenburg. Eine politische Biographie*, I, Gotinga, 1971, caps. 3-4, y sobre la solución de la cuestión religiosa en Westfalia, M. Heckel, «Itio in partes. Zur Religionsverfassung des Heiligen Römischen Reiches deutscher Nation», *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Kanonistische Abteilung*, LXIV (1978), pp. 180-308. Hay una versión resumida en inglés, muy útil, de las cláusulas de la paz en G. Symcox, ed., *War, Diplomacy and Imperialism, 1618-1763*, Londres, 1974, pp. 39-62.

Muy pocos son los trabajos que se han publicado sobre las campañas finales de la guerra. Se han descrito algunas acciones, algunos generales han sido objeto de una biografía, pero no existe un estudio general de la lucha mejor que el ya citado de Ruppert. Sólo el esfuerzo de guerra sueco ha sido objeto de un análisis adecuado, aunque únicamente desde el punto de vista económico. Véase K. R. Böhme, «Geld für die schwedische Armee nach 1640», *Scandia*, XXXIII (1967), pp. 54-95, y G. Lorenz, «Schweden und die französischen Hilfsgelder von 1638 bis 1649», en K. Repgen, ed., *Forschungen und Quellen zur Geschichte des Dreissigjährigen Krieges*, Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der neueren Geschichte, XII, Münster, 1981, pp. 98-148. Sobre la desmovilización del ejército imperial, véase el admirable trabajo (en su mayor parte sin publicar) de P. Hoyos, *Ernst von Traun, Generalkriegskommissär, und die Abdankung der kaiserlichen Armee nach dem 30-jährigen Krieg*, Viena, 1970. La parte III, sobre la desmovilización en sí, ha sido publicada en *Der dreissigjährige Krieg* (p. 399, *infra*), pp. 169-232.

G. Los ejércitos y la destrucción

Quien esté interesado en el estudio de la historia militar encontrará un material de utilidad en el arte del período, particularmente en la obra de pintores como Wranckx y Snaeyers, y de grabadores como Callot, Richter y Franck. Una excelente selección de estas obras ha sido reproducida en Langer, *The Thirty Years' War*. Existen también «juegos de guerra» de la mayor parte de las grandes batallas, producidos por la Avalon-Hill Company de Maryland y la SPI de Nueva York. La película titulada *The Last Valley*, con guión de John Prebble, relata vívidamente la vida cotidiana de los ejércitos que lucharon en la guerra, y un curioso libro de ilustraciones —E. Wagner, *European Weapons and Warfare 1618-1648*, Londres, 1979— reconstruye escenas militares.

Todos estos medios visuales nos ayudan a comprender mejor el período porque comunican una inmediatez que le falta a la mera palabra. No obstante, hay algunas obras impresas excelentes sobre la vida cotidiana durante la guerra, comenzando por la propia literatura del período. En Alemania, grandes escritores como Opitz, Moscherosch y Grimmelshausen narraron la vida durante la guerra en poemas y en prosa. Pero, ¿hasta qué punto podemos dar crédito a cuanto se dice en estas obras literarias? Hans (o Johann) Jacob Christoph von Grimmelshausen, por ejemplo, nació hacia 1621 y antes de ser hecho prisionero, había recibido varios años de educación luterana en la escuela local. Pasó los cinco años siguientes con el ejército imperial, el ejército de Hesse y, una vez más, el ejército imperial. En 1640 se convirtió en funcionario militar y después de la guerra permaneció como secretario de su coronel hasta 1660, año en que se estableció como tabernero. Desde entonces hasta su muerte en 1676 completaba sus ingresos escribiendo libros sobre sus experiencias de guerra. El primero de ellos, titulado *Las aventuras de Simplicissimus el alemán*, estaba ya en la quinta edición en 1672. En 1700 había ya otros treinta títulos publicados basados en él o en uno de sus personajes. Dos de esos libros habían sido escritos también por Grimmelshausen: *Vagabunda Coraje* y *Springinsfeld* (ambos publicados en 1670). Los libros de Grimmelshausen han influido decisivamente en el estudio histórico de los soldados que lucharon en la guerra y de su mundo.

Esto nos parece lamentable, porque se ha demostrado que a Grimmelshausen le interesaba más el efectismo literario que el realismo. Así, el relato de la batalla de Wittstock, en 1636, que aparece en *Simplicissimus* y que el autor afirma haber contemplado personalmente, es un plagio —en algunas partes palabra por palabra— de la edición alemana de 1629 de la *Arcadia* de sir Philip Sidney. En las primeras páginas de *Vagabunda Coraje*, que describe los acontecimientos de 1620-1621, Grimmelshausen repite exactamente el erróneo relato de los acontecimientos que aparece

en otra obra popular contemporánea, *Teutscher Florus*, de Wassenberg. No se puede, pues, dar credibilidad a estos relatos. Tal vez no debemos sorprendernos por ello. Después de todo, Grimmelshausen era novelista y no historiador. Pero las consecuencias para la exactitud histórica son importantes. Con frecuencia, al escritor creativo le interesan más, necesariamente, los elementos dinámicos que los elementos estáticos de una guerra. Su interés se centra en las batallas, las marchas y las matanzas y puede permitirse la indiferencia ante las estructuras financieras, logísticas y de mando que hay tras esas operaciones. Pero en el caso de Grimmelshausen no hay indiferencia sino más bien hostilidad: los generales son considerados como el enemigo real. Incluso la promiscua Coraje no se trata con nadie de rango superior a capitán y sus principales enemigos son el comandante y el coronel. Así pues, los personajes de Grimmelshausen tienen el olor del fuego de campamento y no del cuartel, pues el autor los presenta chillando, jugando o zurciendo sus calcetines mientras esperan a que comience la acción y aunque los episodios de la guerra que se describen en *Simplicissimus* puedan ser imaginarios, no lo son los personajes. No encontramos en la historia de la literatura una descripción parecida a la que hace Grimmelshausen de la vida del soldado hasta los diarios escritos por los soldados ingleses de la Guerra Peninsular. Véase C. Hohoff, ed., *Johann Jacob Christoph von Grimmelshausen in Selbstzeugnissen und Bilddokumenten*, Reinbeck-bei-Hamburg, 1978, y H. Geulen, «"Arkadische" Simpliciana. Zu einer Quelle Grimmelshausens und ihrer strukturellen Bedeutung für seinen Roman», *Euphorion: Zeitschrift für Literaturgeschichte*, LXIII (1969), pp. 426-437.

También en Inglaterra varios contemporáneos —en su mayor parte hombres que lucharon en la guerra— escribieron sus experiencias. Cuatro relatos son de especial importancia: Sydnam Poyntz, «Relation [1624-1636]», ed. A. T. S. Goodrick en *Camden Society Publications*, 3.ª serie, XIV (1908); Sir James Turner, *Pallas Armata. Military essayes of the ancient Graecian, Roman and modern art of war*, Londres, 1683, pp. 157-372; *idem*, *Memoirs of his own life and times*, Edimburgo, 1829, y R. Monro, *Monro his expedition with the worthy Scots regiment call'd Mackays*, Londres, 1637. Muy poco es lo que sabemos sobre estos tres autores (aunque Monro volvió a aparecer, apenas disfrazado, en *Memoirs of a Cavalier* de Daniel Defoe y como «Dugald Dalgetty» de sir Walter Scott). La carrera de Poyntz se describe en la edición que hizo Goodrick de su obra y las últimas hazañas militares de Turner y Monro se analizan y describen en el libro de D. Stevenson, *Scottish Covenanters and Irish Confederates. Scottish-Irish relations in the mid-seventeenth century*, Belfast, 1981, pp. 80-83 y 312-313. Entre las obras más recientes sobre los soldados que lucharon en la guerra, el estudio de Langer, *The Thirty Years' War*, pp. 61-102, constituye un excelente punto de partida. Puede

completarse con el importante y más detallado estudio de *F. Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and His Workforce, 13th to 17th Centuries*, 2 vols., Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Beihefte XLVII-XLVIII, Wiesbaden, 1964-1965.

Respecto al desarrollo de la guerra durante este período, probablemente las obras de J. R. Hale, *War and society in Renaissance Europe 1450-1620*, Londres, 1985, y M. Anderson (1618-1770) aún sin publicar en la colección de Fontana War and Society, serán los estudios más útiles. Pero hasta que hayan aparecido, el lector ha de basarse exclusivamente en H. W. Koch, *The Rise of Modern Warfare 1618-1815*, Londres, 1981, y en otras obras generales, así como en tres artículos que sitúan los cambios militares del período en una perspectiva más amplia: M. Roberts, «The Military Revolution 1560-1660», en Roberts, ed., *Essays in Swedish History*, Londres, 1967, pp. 195-225; G. Parker, «The Military Revolution 1560-1660 —a myth?», en Parker, *Spain and the Netherlands 1559-1659: ten studies*, Londres, 1979, pp. 86-103, y H. Eichberg, «Geometrie als barocke Verhaltensnorm. Fortifikation und Exerzitien», *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung*, IV (1977), pp. 17-50. Ninguno de estos trabajos sustituye al estudio general más antiguo de E. von Frauenholz, *Das Heerwesen in der Zeit des Dreissigjährigen Krieges*, 2 vols., Munich, 1938-1939, vol. III, partes 1-2 de *Entwicklungsgeschichte des deutschen Heerwesens*, del mismo autor.

Finalmente, hay abundantes estudios de las tropas que luchaban por un señor particular. Respecto al bando imperial, véase: J. C. Allmayer-Beck y E. Lessing, *Die Kaiserliche Kriegsvölker von Maximilian I bis Prinz Eugen 1479-1718*, Munich, 1978, con hermosas ilustraciones; O. Elster, *Die Piccolomini-Regimenter während des dreissigjährigen Krieges, besonders das Kürassier-Regiment Alt-Piccolomini*, Viena, 1903; *Der Dreissigjährige Krieg. Beiträge zu seiner Geschichte*, Schriften des Heeresgeschichtlichen Museums in Wien, VII, Viena, 1976; T. M. Barker, *The Military Intellectual and Battle: Raimondo Montecuccoli and the Thirty Years' War*, Albany, Nueva York, 1975, y los cuatro primeros estudios de *idem*, *Army, Aristocracy, Monarchy: essays on war, society and government in Austria 1618-1780*, Nueva York, 1982. No existe ningún estudio moderno adecuado sobre el ejército bávaro durante la guerra, pero véase R. Baumann, *Das Söldnerwesen im 16. Jahrhundert im bayerischen und süddeutschen Beispiel. Eine gessellschaftsgeschichtliche Untersuchung*, Munich, 1978. Sobre los ejércitos del bando anti-imperial, véase: J. W. Wijn, *Het Krijgswezen in den tijd van Prins Maurits*, Utrecht, 1934; J. A. Fallon, «Scottish mercenaries in the service of Denmark and Sweden, 1626-32», University of Glasgow, tesis doctoral, 1972; P. Dukes, «The Leslie family in the Swedish period (1630-5) of the Thirty Years' War», *European Studies Review*, XII (1982), pp. 401-424; L. André, *Michel le Tellier*

et l'organisation de l'armée monarchique, París, 1906; B. Kroener, *Les Routes et les Étapes. Die Versorgung der französischen Armeen in Nordostfrankreich (1635-61). Ein Beitrag zur Verwaltungsgeschichte des Ancien Régime*, 2 vols., Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der neueren Geschichte, XI, Münster, 1980; *idem*, «Die Entwicklung der Truppenstärken in den französischen Armeen zwischen 1635 und 1661», en K. Repgen, ed., *Forschungen und Quellen zur Geschichte des Dreissigjährigen Krieges*, Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der neueren Geschichte, XII, Münster, 1981, pp. 149-220 y [Estado Mayor del ejército sueco, ed.] *Sveriges Krig, 1611-1632* (p. 390, *supra*).

Acerca de la destrucción causada por las tropas, hay un resumen excelente del material, voluminoso pero a veces contradictorio, publicado antes de 1960 en T. K. Rabb, «The effects of the Thirty Years' War on the German economy», *Journal of Modern History*, XXXIV (1962), pp. 40-51. A F. Lütge debemos un importante estudio de las condiciones en los momentos anteriores a la guerra: «Die wirtschaftliche Lage Deutschlands vor Ausbruch des dreissigjährigen Krieges», *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, CLXX (1958), pp. 43-99. Entre los estudios más recientes, el lector interesado puede consultar con provecho los siguientes: G. Benecke, «The problem of death and destruction during the Thirty Years' War: new evidence from the Middle Wesser Front», *European Studies Review*, II (1972), pp. 239-253; *G. Franz, *Der Dreissigjährige Krieg und das deutsche Volk*, Stuttgart, 1979[4]; C. R. Friedrichs, *Urban Society in an Age of War: Nördlingen, 1580-1720*, Princeton, N. J., 1979; H. Haan, «Prosperität und Dreissigjähriger Krieg», *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, VII (1981), pp. 81-118, y H. Kamen, «The economic an social consequences of the Thirty Years' War», *Past and Present*, XXXIX (1968), pp. 44-61.

Hay una serie inagotable de estudios locales sobre la destrucción causada por la guerra, algunos de los cuales son muy buenos y otros son aterradores. En el volumen de Franz citado antes, pueden encontrarse extensas referencias. Una fuente inusualmente rica de datos para una zona alemana es proporcionada por H. Schmidt, «Der dreissigjährige Krieg: wie er sich auf das Rothenburger Land und seine Leute auswirkte», *Fränkischer Feierabend*, vols. I-IX, publicado como suplementos semanales en *Fränkischer Anzeiger*, Rothenburg ob der Tauber, 1953-1961. Para otras fuentes sobre la destrucción a partir de 1635, véanse las notas 12-22 del capítulo V.

ADDENDA

Mientras este libro estaba en prensa, aparecieron una serie de obras sobre la guerra. En primer lugar, Peter Limm, *The Thirty Years' War*, Londres, 1984, un volumen en la colección «Seminar Studies in History», que es un estudio breve y útil, con una selección de documentos fundamentales (traducidos al inglés). Por otra parte, las pp. 253-351 de la excelente publicación *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung*, X (1983), están dedicadas al estudio de los acontecimientos políticos de Alemania entre 1555 y 1618, con el título «Möglichkeiten der Reichspolitik zwischen Augsburger Religionsfrieden und Ausbruch des dreissigjährigen Kriegs». Son especialmente interesantes los artículos de K. Vocelka (sobre los emperadores Matías y Rodolfo, 1606-1612) y de K. Schlaich (sobre el principio de mayoría en la Dieta entre 1495 y 1613).

Para el decenio de 1620, un artículo nuevo analiza la intervención de Inglaterra en una coyuntura crucial: T. Cogswell, «Foreign Policy and Parliament: the Case of La Rochelle, 1625-6», *English Historical Review*, XCIX (1984), pp. 241-267. El frío encuentro de los reyes de Dinamarca y Suecia en Ulfsbäck en 1629 (véase p. 123, *supra*) es el tema de K. J. V. Jespersen, «Kongemoedet i Ulfsbäck praestegard februar 1629», *Historie*, nueva serie, XIV (1982), pp. 420-439. Por su parte, E. Ladewig Petersen ha situado la intervención de Cristián IV en un contexto más amplio: «War, Finance and the Growth of Absolutism: some Aspects of the European Integration of seventeenth-century Denmark», en G. Rystad, ed., *Europe and Scandinavia. Aspects of the Process of Integration in the seventeenth century*, Lund, 1983, pp. 33-49. J. I. Israel, «Central European Jewry during the Thirty Years' War», *Central European History*, XVI (1983), pp. 3-30, ha puesto en evidencia que las comunidades judías prosperaron con los franceses, los suecos y los imperiales. M. E. Mallett y J. R. Hale, *The Military Organization of a Renaissance State. Venice c. 1400 to 1617*, Cambridge, 1984, han realizado un estudio espléndido sobre la guerra contra los uscoques (pp. 242-247, 327-329 y 482-484).

Obras publicadas desde 1984

Durante los dos últimos años han aparecido una serie de trabajos nuevos de gran interés. Lugar preeminente hay que conceder a dos obras generales sobre la guerra, ambas en alemán pero de carácter diferente. G. Schormann, *Der dreissigjährige Krieg*, Gotinga, 1985, presenta un útil y conciso resumen de los acontecimientos en sólo 150 páginas. Por su parte, G. Barudio, *Der teutsche Krieg 1618-1648*, Frankfurt, 1985, en cambio, desarrolla el tema a lo largo de 700 páginas. Ambas obras constituyen, fundamentalmente, una narración de la guerra y ambas tienden a concentrarse en los acontecimientos de Alemania (aunque Barudio ha trabajado intensamente las fuentes escandinavas).

Hay una serie de estudios sobre Alemania durante y después de la

guerra, entre los que cabe citar la excelente monografía de James A. Vann, *The making of a state: Württemberg 1593-1793*, Ithaca y Londres, 1984; R. P. Hsia, *Society and religion in Münster 1535-1618*, New Haven y Londres, 1984; J. Whaley, *Religious toleration and social change in Hamburg 1529-1819*, Cambridge, 1985; D. W. Sabean, *Power in the blood. Popular culture and village discourse in early modern Germany*, Cambridge, 1984, cap. 2, y R. J. W. Evans, «Culture and anarchy in the Empire, 1540-1680», *Central European History*, XVIII (1985), pp. 14-30. Sobre Francia, véase J. Bergin, *Cardinal Richelieu. Power and the pursuit of wealth*, New Haven y Londres, 1985. Sobre Inglaterra, T. Cogswell, «Prelude to Ré: the Anglo-French struggle over La Rochelle, 1624-7», *History*, LXXI (1986), pp. 1-27. Sobre España, R. A. Stradling, «Olivares and the origins of the Franco-Spanish war, 1627-1635», *English Historical Review*, CI (1986), pp. 68-94. Este último trabajo pone de relieve que España estaba preparada para declarar la guerra a Francia en cualquier momento a partir de septiembre de 1634 y que a partir de enero de 1635 consideraba la guerra inevitable. En último extremo, fue Francia la que declaró la guerra, pero las investigaciones más recientes ponen de manifiesto que también el gobierno francés, presionado por sus aliados holandeses, consideraba ya en junio de 1634 que el enfrentamiento era inevitable. En ambos casos, era el monarca el que encabezaba el grupo de «halcones» que se mostraban partidarios de una pronta ruptura de las hostilidades, mientras que los dos primeros ministros predicaban la moderación. Ahora bien, la convicción en ambas cortes de que la guerra estaba a la vuelta de la esquina hizo más probable la declaración. Más datos sobre la guerra se encontrarán en las actas de una conferencia sobre la Guerra de los Treinta Años celebrada en Munich en agosto de 1984, editadas por Konrad Repgen y que serán publicadas por Oldenbourg Verlag de Munich con el título *Krieg und Politik 1618-1648: europäische Studien und Perspektiven*.

También el aspecto militar de la guerra ha suscitado un interés nuevo. El ejército y los objetivos de guerra de Richelieu en los tres primeros años tras el comienzo de las hostilidades con España han sido estudiados de forma exhaustiva por D. W. Parrot, «The administration of the French army during the ministry of Cardinal Richelieu», Oxford University Press, tesis doctoral, 1985. El comportamiento general de las tropas en esta época ha sido agudamente analizado por B. Kroener, «Soldat oder Soldateska? Programmatischer Aufriss einer Sozialgeschichte militärischen Unterschichten in der ersten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts», en M. Messerschmidt *et al.*, eds., *Militärgeschichte. Probleme, Thesen, Wege*, Frankfurt, 1982, pp. 100-123. Sin embargo, por lo que respecta a las últimas fases de la guerra, no existe aún ninguna obra que pueda sustituir a dos estudios editados por el Estado Mayor del ejército sueco y que no hemos

citado en la Bibliografía: Förvarsstabens krigshistoriska avdelning, *Slaget vid Jankow 1645-1945*, Estocolmo, 1948, e *idem*, *Fraan Femern och Jankow till Westfaliska Freden. En minnesskrift aar 1948*, Estocolmo, 1948.

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Brahe, Per; n. en 1602 en Suecia; soldado y abogado; consejero sueco desde 1626; gobernador general de Prusia (1634-1637) y Finlandia (1637-1641 y 1648-1651); comandante militar contra Dinamarca en 1643-1644 y 1657-1659; m. en 1680: visión derrotista de, 231
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Esta es la primera síntesis global que se publica en España sobre la Guerra de los Treinta Años (1618-1648), acontecimiento fundamental de la historia moderna y núcleo de la crisis general del siglo XVII. Enfrentado a la gigantesca tarea de sistematizar la bibliografía existente y de trabajar las inmensas fuentes documentales de Copenhague, Estocolmo, Simancas, Roma, París, Praga y las de las dos Alemanias, el profesor Geoffrey Parker ha contado con la colaboración de importantes especialistas (John Elliott para España) para componer un libro que, por primera vez, presenta un análisis estructurado de la llamada «guerra civil europea» en todos sus aspectos políticos, económicos, sociales, diplomáticos y militares. Esta obra, que no podrá ser superada en muchos años, es según Jonathan Israel «lúcida, amena, brillante y, sobre todo, extraordinariamente útil para los especialistas, los estudiantes y el público en general».

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